Voici une étude empirique qui cherche à mieux comprendre comment le choix des mesures de performance influence la rémunération de la direction.
Globalement, les résultats montrent une corrélation positive entre la rémunération du CEO et plusieurs autres mesures de création de valeur. L’étude indique qu’il y a d’autres facteurs qui viennent nuancer cette conclusion.
Je vous invite à lire cet article pour mieux saisir les relations entre les mesures de performance et la structure de rémunération de la direction. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un court extrait de cette étude.
Bonne lecture !
MEASURING AND REWARDING PERFORMANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE IN RELATION TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Debate surrounding executive compensation is an enduring feature of the UK corporate landscape. While concern over compensation levels continue to exercise politicians, regulators, investors and the media, there is growing concern over the degree to which performance metrics commonly used in executive compensation contracts represent appropriate measures of long-term value creation. This debate partly reflects fears that UK executives face excessive pressure to deliver short-term results at the expense of long-term improvements in value (e.g., Kay Review 2012).
This report contributes to the debate over executive compensation generally and in particular to the question of performance measure choice in executive compensation contracts. The first part of the report summarises key insights from the academic and professional literatures regarding the structure of executive compensation arrangements and the metrics used to link pay with corporate performance.
The second part of the report presents findings from a pilot study of executive compensation arrangements and their association with corporate value creation using a subsample of FTSE-100 companies.
Our results provide some comfort but also create cause for concern. On the positive side, results demonstrate a material positive association between CEO pay and several measures of value creation for all capital providers. The evidence suggests that prevailing executive pay structures incentivise and reward important aspects of value creation even though contractual performance metrics are not directly linked with value creation in many cases. More troubling, however, is our evidence that (i) a large fraction of CEO pay appears unrelated to periodic value creation and (ii) key aspects of compensation consistently correlate with performance metrics such as TSR and EPS growth where the direct link with value creation is more fragile.