La controverse au sujet du leadership du CA | Séparation des pouvoirs ou combinaison des rôles ?


L’étude de David Larcker*, professeur de comptabilité à la Stanford Graduate School of Business, publié dans le forum du Harvard Law School, examine la controverse eu égard à la combinaison des fonctions de PDG et de président du conseil. Environ 50 % des grandes sociétés américaines sont présidées par un administrateur indépendant, comparativement à 23 % il y a 15 ans.

Toute la question du bien-fondé de la dualité des rôles PDG/Chairman est encore ambiguë, même si les experts de la gouvernance et les actionnaires activistes sont généralement d’accord avec la séparation des fonctions.

L’auteur a procédé à une enquête auprès des 100 plus grandes sociétés ainsi qu’auprès des 100 plus petites entreprises du Fortune 1000, afin d’étudier l’évolution de ce phénomène au cours des 20 dernières années.

Il ressort de ces études que les grandes sociétés sont beaucoup plus incitées (par les actionnaires) à séparer les deux fonctions que les entreprises plus petites (57 % vs 3 %).

En fait, les 100 plus petites entreprises du Fortune 1000 ne sont pas ciblées par les actionnaires pour opérer ce changement.

Un billet que j’ai publié le 5 juillet, La séparation des fonctions de président du conseil et de président de l’entreprise (CEO) est-elle généralement bénéfique ? , montre que la combinaison des deux rôles peut avoir ses avantages.

En lisant ces deux publications, vous serez certainement plus en mesure d’évaluer les conflits potentiels à assumer les deux fonctions.

Bonne lecture !

 

Chairman and CEO: The Controversy over Board Leadership

 

Our paper, Chairman and CEO: The Controversy over Board Leadership, examines the circumstances under which companies decide to combine or separate the chairman and CEO roles and shareholder response to this decision.

In recent years, companies have consistently moved toward separating the chairman and CEO roles. According to Spencer Stuart, just over half of companies in the S&P 500 Index are led by a dual chairman/CEO, down from 77 percent 15 years ago. In theory, an independent chairman improves the ability of the board of directors to oversee management. However, separation of the chairman and CEO roles is not unambiguously positive, and there is little research support for requiring a separation of these roles. Still, shareholder activists and many governance experts remain active in pressuring companies to divide their leadership structure.

Shareholders%20keep%20Moynihan%20as%20Bank%20of%20America%20chairman,%20C_11871607_1452968841970_346339_ver1_0_640_360

Given the controversy over chairman/CEO duality, we examined in detail the leadership structures of publicly traded corporations and the circumstances under which they are changed. Our sample includes the 100 largest and 100 smallest companies in the Fortune 1000 in 2016. The measurement period includes the 20-year period 1996-2015.

We find that board leadership structures are not stable. Only a third (34 percent) of companies made no changes during the entire 20-year measurement period. Slightly under half of these consistently maintained separate chairman and CEO positions (such as Costco, Intel, and Walgreens); slightly more than half of these consistently combined them (such as Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, and ExxonMobil). Still, these companies are the exception rather than the rule. It is significantly more likely that a company makes at least one change to board leadership structure (combination or separation) over time. On average, companies made 1.7 changes, or approximately 1 change every 12 years. Changes are more frequent among large companies (2.2 changes, on average) than smaller companies (1.3 changes). In both cases, companies are slightly more likely to separate the roles than to combine them.

Most separations occur during the succession process, with the former CEO, founder, or other officer continuing to serve as chair on either a temporary or permanent basis. Of the 171 separations in our sample, 134 (78 percent) are associated with an orderly succession. This is true of both small and large companies. However, large companies are significantly more likely to separate the roles temporarily, whereas smaller companies are more likely to do so permanently.

Approximately a quarter (22 percent) of separations are not part of an orderly succession. Nine percent follow an abrupt resignation of the CEO, 6 percent a governance issue (such as accounting restatement or CEO scandal), 3 percent a merger, 2 percent a shareholder vote, and 2 percent are required of the company as part of a government bailout.

The decision to combine the chairman and CEO roles tends to be more uniform. The vast majority of combinations (91 percent) involve an orderly succession at the top. Only 9 percent are associated with a merger, sudden resignation, or governance-related issue. In 90 percent of combinations, the current CEO is given the additional title of chair; in 10 percent of cases, a new CEO is recruited to become dual chair/CEO.

Most interesting, perhaps, is the frequency with which companies “permanently” separate the leadership roles only to recombine them at a later date. Slightly over one-third (34 percent) of companies in our sample permanently separated the chairman and CEO roles and later recombined them during the 20-year measurement period. Best Buy split the roles for nearly 13 years when founder and chairman Richard Schultze stepped down as CEO in 2002; Schultze eventually resigned from the board and when his successor as chairman retired in 2015, then-CEO Hubert Joly was given the additional title of board chair. The company gave no public explanation of its decision to recombine the roles. Bank of America and Walt Disney both separated the chairman and CEO roles following shareholder votes and subsequently recombined them 5 and 9 years later, respectively, under different management. In both cases, the board justified the decision to recombine as rewarding the successful leadership of the current CEO.

In the cases of Bank of America and Walt Disney, the decisions to recombine the roles were highly controversial. Across the entire sample, however, shareholder response was unexpectedly varied. Only 34 percent of the companies that separated and recombined the chairman and CEO roles were targeted by shareholder-sponsored proxy proposals to require separation. Average support for these proposals was 33 percent, not significantly different from companies that consistently maintain a dual chairman/CEO structure (34 percent support) or that separate the roles temporarily during succession (36 percent support). It was also not significantly different from the average support across the total universe of companies that face shareholder-sponsored proposals requiring separation (32 percent).

Finally, it is interesting to note that pressure to separate the chairman and CEO roles seems to center almost exclusively on large companies. Only 3 of the 95 small companies in our sample were the target of a shareholder proposal to require an independent chairman over the entire 20-year measurement period, even though their board leadership structures are not significantly different from those of larger corporations. By contrast, a majority (56 out of 92) of large companies were targeted at least once. This suggests that the companies that shareholders target to advocate for independent board leadership might not necessarily be those with the most egregious governance problems but instead those that are the most visible public targets.

The full paper is available for download here.


*David Larcker is Professor of Accounting at Stanford Graduate School of Business. This post is based on a paper authored by Professor Larcker and Bryan Tayan, Researcher with the Corporate Governance Research Initiative at Stanford Graduate School of Business.

Les dirigeants les mieux payés dirigent les entreprises les moins performantes


La très grande majorité des gens croient que la rémunération des dirigeants est associée à une performance supérieure de leurs sociétés. Ce n’est pas ce que l’étude récemment publiée dans le Wall Street Journal par Theo Francis* tend à démontrer.

L’étude de la firme de recherche MSCI auprès de 800 CEO indique que, depuis 2006, les CEO les moins bien payés produisent des rendements supérieurs pour leurs firmes ! La différence est assez significative.

Je vous laisse le soin de lire ce compte rendu et de me donner vos impressions.

Bonne lecture !

Best-Paid CEOs Run Some of Worst-Performing Companies

 

The best-paid CEOs tend to run some of the worst-performing companies and vice versa—even when pay and performance are measured over the course of many years, according to a new study.

The analysis, from corporate-governance research firm MSCI, examined the pay of some 800 CEOs at 429 large and midsize U.S. companies during the decade ending in 2014, and also looked at the total shareholder return of the companies during the same period.

MSCI found that $100 invested in the 20% of companies with the highest-paid CEOs would have grown to $265 over 10 years. The same amount invested in the companies with the lowest-paid CEOs would have grown to $367. The report is expected to be released as early as Monday.

 

Graphique salaires CEO

 

The results call into question a fundamental tenet of modern CEO pay: the idea that significant slugs of stock options or restricted stock, especially when the size of the award is also tied to company performance in other ways, helps drive better company performance, which in turn will improve results for shareholders. Equity incentive awards now make up 70% of CEO pay in the U.S.

“The highest paid had the worst performance by a significant margin,” said Ric Marshall, a senior corporate governance researcher at MSCI. “It just argues for the equity portion of CEO pay to be more conservative.”

Executive-pay critics have long said pay and performance could be better aligned, and in June, The Wall Street Journal reported little relationship between one-year pay and performance figures for the S&P 500. Most longer-term analyses have used considered three or five years at a time.

The MSCI study compared 10-year total shareholder return—stock appreciation plus dividends—and cumulative total CEO pay as reported in proxy-filing summary-compensation tables.

The study also examined pay and performance among companies within the same broad economic sectors and found similar results: The top-paid half of CEOs in a sector tended to run companies that performed worse than their peers, while the lower-paid half tended to outperform.

“Whether you look at the entire group or adjust by market-cap and sector, you really get very similar results,” Mr. Marshall.

One possible factor driving the results, the researchers concluded: Annual pay reviews and proxy disclosures, which discourage boards and executives from focusing on longer-term results. The report recommended that the Securities and Exchange Commission require disclosure of cumulative incentive pay over long periods, to help illustrate a CEO’s pay relative to longer-term performance.

__________________________

*Theo Francis covers corporate news for The Wall Street Journal from Washington, D.C., and specializes in using regulatory documents to write about complex financial, business, economic, legal and regulatory issues.

Énoncés de principes de gouvernance généralement reconnus


Voici une « lettre ouverte » publiée sur le forum de la Harvard Law School on Corporate Governance par un groupe d’éminents dirigeants de sociétés publiques (cotées) qui présente les principes de la saine gouvernance : « The Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance »*.

Les principes sont regroupés en plusieurs thèmes :

  1. La composition du CA et la gouvernance interne
    1. Composition
    2. Élection des administrateurs
    3. Nomination des administrateurs
    4. Rémunération des administrateurs et la propriété d’actions
    5. Structure et fonctionnement des comités du conseil
    6. Nombre de mandats et âge de la retraite
    7. Efficacité des administrateurs
  2. Responsabilités des administrateurs
    1. Communication des administrateurs avec de tierces parties
    2. Activités cruciales du conseil : préparer les ordres du jour
  3. Le droit des actionnaires
  4. La reddition de comptes et la divulgation des activités
  5. Le leadership du conseil
  6. La planification de la relève managériale
  7. La rémunération de la direction
  8. Le rôle du gestionnaire des actifs des clients dans la gouvernance des sociétés

 

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance

 

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The following is a series of corporate governance principles for public companies, their boards of directors and their shareholders. These principles are intended to provide a basic framework for sound, long-term-oriented governance. But given the differences among our many public companies—including their size, their products and services, their history and their leadership—not every principle (or every part of every principle) will work for every company, and not every principle will be applied in the same fashion by all companies.

I. Board of Directors—Composition and Internal Governance

a. Composition

  1. Directors’ loyalty should be to the shareholders and the company. A board must not be beholden to the CEO or management. A significant majority of the board should be independent under the New York Stock Exchange rules or similar standards.
  2. All directors must have high integrity and the appropriate competence to represent the interests of all shareholders in achieving the long-term success of their company. Ideally, in order to facilitate engaged and informed oversight of the company and the performance of its management, a subset of directors will have professional experiences directly related to the company’s business. At the same time, however, it is important to recognize that some of the best ideas, insights and contributions can come from directors whose professional experiences are not directly related to the company’s business.
  3. Directors should be strong and steadfast, independent of mind and willing to challenge constructively but not be divisive or self-serving. Collaboration and collegiality also are critical for a healthy, functioning board.
  4. Directors should be business savvy, be shareholder oriented and have a genuine passion for their company.
  5. Directors should have complementary and diverse skill sets, backgrounds and experiences. Diversity along multiple dimensions is critical to a high-functioning board. Director candidates should be drawn from a rigorously diverse pool.
  6. While no one size fits all—boards need to be large enough to allow for a variety of perspectives, as well as to manage required board processes—they generally should be as small as practicable so as to promote an open dialogue among directors.
  7. Directors need to commit substantial time and energy to the role. Therefore, a board should assess the ability of its members to maintain appropriate focus and not be distracted by competing responsibilities. In so doing, the board should carefully consider a director’s service on multiple boards and other commitments.

b. Election of directors

Directors should be elected by a majority of the votes cast “for” and “against/withhold” (i.e., abstentions and non-votes should not be counted for this purpose).

c. Nominating directors

  1. Long-term shareholders should recommend potential directors if they know the individuals well and believe they would be additive to the board.
  2. A company is more likely to attract and retain strong directors if the board focuses on big-picture issues and can delegate other matters to management (see below at II.b., “Board of Directors’ Responsibilities/Critical activities of the board; setting the agenda”).

d. Director compensation and stock ownership

  1. A company’s independent directors should be fairly and equally compensated for board service, although (i) lead independent directors and committee chairs may receive additional compensation and (ii) committee service fees may vary. If directors receive any additional compensation from the company that is not related to their service as a board member, such activity should be disclosed and explained.
  2. Companies should consider paying a substantial portion (e.g., for some companies, as much as 50% or more) of director compensation in stock, performance stock units or similar equity-like instruments. Companies also should consider requiring directors to retain a significant portion of their equity compensation for the duration of their tenure to further directors’ economic alignment with the long-term performance of the company.

e. Board committee structure and service

  1. Companies should conduct a thorough and robust orientation program for their new directors, including background on the industry and the competitive landscape in which the company operates, the company’s business, its operations, and important legal and regulatory issues, etc.
  2. A board should have a well-developed committee structure with clearly understood responsibilities. Disclosures to shareholders should describe the structure and function of each board committee.
  3. Boards should consider periodic rotation of board leadership roles (i.e., committee chairs and the lead independent director), balancing the benefits of rotation against the benefits of continuity, experience and expertise.

f. Director tenure and retirement age

  1. It is essential that a company attract and retain strong, experienced and knowledgeable board members.
  2. Some boards have rules around maximum length of service and mandatory retirement age for directors; others have such rules but permit exceptions; and still others have no such rules at all. Whatever the case, companies should clearly articulate their approach on term limits and retirement age. And insofar as a board permits exceptions, the board should explain (ordinarily in the company’s proxy statement) why a particular exception was warranted in the context of the board’s assessment of its performance and composition.
  3. Board refreshment should always be considered in order to ensure that the board’s skill set and perspectives remain sufficiently current and broad in dealing with fast-changing business dynamics. But the importance of fresh thinking and new perspectives should be tempered with the understanding that age and experience often bring wisdom, judgment and knowledge.

g. Director effectiveness

Boards should have a robust process to evaluate themselves on a regular basis, led by the non-executive chair, lead independent director or appropriate committee chair. The board should have the fortitude to replace ineffective directors.

II. Board of Directors’ Responsibilities

a. Director communication with third parties

  1. Robust communication of a board’s thinking to the company’s shareholders is important. There are multiple ways of going about it. For example, companies may wish to designate certain directors—as and when appropriate and in coordination with management—to communicate directly with shareholders on governance and key shareholder issues, such as CEO compensation. Directors who communicate directly with shareholders ideally will be experienced in such matters.
  2. Directors should speak with the media about the company only if authorized by the board and in accordance with company policy.
  3. In addition, the CEO should actively engage on corporate governance and key shareholder issues (other than the CEO’s own compensation) when meeting with shareholders.

b. Critical activities of the board; setting the agenda

  1. The full board (including, where appropriate, through the non-executive chair or lead independent director) should have input into the setting of the board agenda.
  2. Over the course of the year, the agenda should include and focus on the following items, among others:
    1. A robust, forward-looking discussion of the business.
    2. The performance of the current CEO and other key members of management and succession planning for each of them. One of the board’s most important jobs is making sure the company has the right CEO. If the company does not have the appropriate CEO, the board should act promptly to address the issue.
    3. Creation of shareholder value, with a focus on the long term. This means encouraging the sort of long-term thinking owners of a private company might bring to their strategic discussions, including investments that may not pay off in the short run.
    4. Major strategic issues (including material mergers and acquisitions and major capital commitments) and long-term strategy, including thorough consideration of operational and financial plans, quantitative and qualitative key performance indicators, and assessment of organic and inorganic growth, among others.
    5. The board should receive a balanced assessment on strategic fit, risks and valuation in connection with material mergers and acquisitions. The board should consider establishing an ad hoc Transaction Committee if significant board time is otherwise required to consider a material merger or acquisition. If the company’s stock is to be used in such a transaction, the board should carefully assess the company’s valuation relative to the valuation implied in the acquisition. The objective is to properly evaluate the value of what you are giving vs. the value of what you are getting.
    6. Significant risks, including reputational risks. The board should not be reflexively risk averse; it should seek the proper calibration of risk and reward as it focuses on the long-term interests of the company’s shareholders.
    7. Standards of performance, including the maintaining and strengthening of the company’s culture and values.
    8. Material corporate responsibility matters.
    9. Shareholder proposals and key shareholder concerns.
    10. The board (or appropriate board committee) should determine the best approach to compensate management, taking into account all the factors it deems appropriate, including corporate and individual performance and other qualitative and quantitative factors (see below at VII., “Compensation of Management”).
  3. A board should be continually educated on the company and its industry. If a Board feels it would be productive, outside experts and advisors should be brought in to inform directors on issues and events affecting the company.
  4. The board should minimize the amount of time it spends on frivolous or non-essential matters—the goal is to provide perspective and make decisions to build real value for the company and its shareholders.
  5. As authorized and coordinated by the board, directors should have unfettered access to management, including those below the CEO’s direct reports.
  6. At each meeting, to ensure open and free discussion, the board should meet in executive session without the CEO or other members of management. The independent directors should ensure that they have enough time to do this properly.
  7. The board (or appropriate board committee) should discuss and approve the CEO’s compensation.
  8. In addition to its other responsibilities, the Audit Committee should focus on whether the company’s financial statements would be prepared or disclosed in a materially different manner if the external auditor itself were solely responsible for their preparation.

III. Shareholder Rights

  1. Many public companies and asset managers have recently reviewed their approach to proxy access. Others have not yet undertaken such a review or may have one under way. Among the larger market capitalization companies that have adopted proxy access provisions, generally a shareholder (or group of up to 20 shareholders) who has continuously held a minimum of 3% of the company’s outstanding shares for three years is eligible to include on the company’s proxy statement nominees for a minimum of 20% (and, in some cases, 25%) of the company’s board seats. Generally, only shares in which the shareholder has full, unhedged economic interest count toward satisfaction of the ownership/holding period requirements. A higher threshold of ownership (e.g., 5%) often has been adopted for smaller market capitalization companies (e.g., less than $2 billion).
  2. Dual-class voting is not a best practice. If a company has dual-class voting, which sometimes is intended to protect the company from short-term behavior, the company should consider having specific sunset provisions based upon time or a triggering event, which eliminate dual-class voting. In addition, all shareholders should be treated equally in any corporate transaction.
  3. Written consent and special meeting provisions can be important mechanisms for shareholder action. Where they are adopted, there should be a reasonable minimum amount of outstanding shares required in order to prevent a small minority of shareholders from being able to abuse the rights or waste corporate time and resources.

IV. Public Reporting

  1. Transparency around quarterly financial results is important.
  2. Companies should frame their required quarterly reporting in the broader context of their articulated strategy and provide an outlook, as appropriate, for trends and metrics that reflect progress (or not) on long-term goals. A company should not feel obligated to provide earnings guidance—and should determine whether providing earnings guidance for the company’s shareholders does more harm than good. If a company does provide earnings guidance, the company should be realistic and avoid inflated projections. Making short-term decisions to beat guidance (or any performance benchmark) is likely to be value destructive in the long run.
  3. As appropriate, long-term goals should be disclosed and explained in a specific and measurable way.
  4. A company should take a long-term strategic view, as though the company were private, and explain clearly to shareholders how material decisions and actions are consistent with that view.
  5. Companies should explain when and why they are undertaking material mergers or acquisitions or major capital commitments.
  6. Companies are required to report their results in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”). While it is acceptable in certain instances to use non-GAAP measures to explain and clarify results for shareholders, such measures should be sensible and should not be used to obscure GAAP results. In this regard, it is important to note that all compensation, including equity compensation, is plainly a cost of doing business and should be reflected in any non-GAAP measurement of earnings in precisely the same manner it is reflected in GAAP earnings.

V. Board Leadership (Including the Lead Independent Director’s Role)

  1. The board’s independent directors should decide, based upon the circumstances at the time, whether it is appropriate for the company to have separate or combined chair and CEO roles. The board should explain clearly (ordinarily in the company’s proxy statement) to shareholders why it has separated or combined the roles.
  2. If a board decides to combine the chair and CEO roles, it is critical that the board has in place a strong designated lead independent director and governance structure.
  3. Depending on the circumstances, a lead independent director’s responsibilities may include:
    1. Serving as liaison between the chair and the independent directors
    2. Presiding over meetings of the board at which the chair is not present, including executive sessions of the independent directors
    3. Ensuring that the board has proper input into meeting agendas for, and information sent to, the board
    4. Having the authority to call meetings of the independent directors
    5. Insofar as the company’s board wishes to communicate directly with shareholders, engaging (or overseeing the board’s process for engaging) with those shareholders
    6. Guiding the annual board self-assessment
    7. Guiding the board’s consideration of CEO compensation
    8. Guiding the CEO succession planning process

VI. Management Succession Planning

  1. Senior management bench strength can be evaluated by the board and shareholders through an assessment of key company employees; direct exposure to those employees is helpful in making that assessment.
  2. Companies should inform shareholders of the process the board has for succession planning and also should have an appropriate plan if an unexpected, emergency succession is necessary.

VII. Compensation of Management

  1. To be successful, companies must attract and retain the best people—and competitive compensation of management is critical in this regard. To this end, compensation plans should be appropriately tailored to the nature of the company’s business and the industry in which it competes. Varied forms of compensation may be necessary for different types of businesses and different types of employees. While a company’s compensation plans will evolve over time, they should have continuity over multiple years and ensure alignment with long-term performance.
  2. Compensation should have both a current component and a long-term component.
  3. Benchmarks and performance measurements ordinarily should be disclosed to enable shareholders to evaluate the rigor of the company’s goals and the goal-setting process. That said, compensation should not be entirely formula based, and companies should retain discretion (appropriately disclosed) to consider qualitative factors, such as integrity, work ethic, effectiveness, openness, etc. Those matters are essential to a company’s long-term health and ordinarily should be part of how compensation is determined.
  4. Companies should consider paying a substantial portion (e.g., for some companies, as much as 50% or more) of compensation for senior management in the form of stock, performance stock units or similar equity-like instruments. The vesting or holding period for such equity compensation should be appropriate for the business to further senior management’s economic alignment with the long-term performance of the company. With properly designed performance hurdles, stock options may be one element of effective compensation plans, particularly for the CEO. All equity grants (whether stock or options) should be made at fair market value, or higher, at the time of the grant, with particular attention given to any dilutive effect of such grants on existing shareholders.
  5. Companies should clearly articulate their compensation plans to shareholders. While companies should not, in the design of their compensation plans, feel constrained by the preferences of their competitors or the models of proxy advisors, they should be prepared to articulate how their approach links compensation to performance and aligns the interests of management and shareholders over the long term. If a company has well-designed compensation plans and clearly explains its rationale for those plans, shareholders should consider giving the company latitude in connection with individual annual compensation decisions.
  6. If large special compensation awards (not normally recurring annual or biannual awards but those considered special awards or special retention awards) are given to management, they should be carefully evaluated and—in the case of the CEO and other “Named Executive Officers” whose compensation is set forth in the company’s proxy statement—clearly explained.
  7. Companies should maintain clawback policies for both cash and equity compensation.

VIII. Asset Managers’ Role in Corporate Governance

Asset managers, on behalf of their clients, are significant owners of public companies, and, therefore, often are in a position to influence the corporate governance practices of those companies. Asset managers should exercise their voting rights thoughtfully and act in what they believe to be the long-term economic interests of their clients.

  1. Asset managers should devote sufficient time and resources to evaluate matters presented for shareholder vote in the context of long-term value creation. Asset managers should actively engage, as appropriate, based on the issues, with the management and/or board of the company, both to convey the asset manager’s point of view and to understand the company’s perspective. Asset managers should give due consideration to the company’s rationale for its positions, including its perspective on certain governance issues where the company might take a novel or unconventional approach.
  2. Given their importance to long-term investment success, proxy voting and corporate governance activities should receive appropriate senior-level oversight by the asset manager.
  3. Asset managers, on behalf of their clients, should evaluate the performance of boards of directors, including thorough consideration of the following:
    1. To the extent directors are speaking directly with shareholders, the directors’ (i) knowledge of their company’s corporate governance and policies and (ii) interest in understanding the key concerns of the company’s shareholders
    2. The board’s focus on a thoughtful, long-term strategic plan and on performance against that plan
  4. An asset manager’s ultimate decision makers on proxy issues important to long-term value creation should have access to the company, its management and, in some circumstances, the company’s board. Similarly, a company, its management and board should have access to an asset manager’s ultimate decision makers on those issues.
  5. Asset managers should raise critical issues to companies (and vice versa) as early as possible in a constructive and proactive way. Building trust between the shareholders and the company is a healthy objective.
  6. Asset managers may rely on a variety of information sources to support their evaluation and decision-making processes. While data and recommendations from proxy advisors may form pieces of the information mosaic on which asset managers rely in their analysis, ultimately, their votes should be based on independent application of their own voting guidelines and policies.
  7. Asset managers should make public their proxy voting process and voting guidelines and have clear engagement protocols and procedures.
  8. Asset managers should consider sharing their issues and concerns (including, as appropriate, voting intentions and rationales therefor) with the company (especially where they oppose the board’s recommendations) in order to facilitate a robust dialogue if they believe that doing so is in the best interests of their clients.

*The Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance were developed, and are posted on behalf of, a group of executives leading prominent public corporations and investors in the U.S.

The Open Letter and key facts about the principles are also available here and here.

Comment procéder à l’évaluation du CA, des comités et des administrateurs | En rappel !


Les conseils d’administration sont de plus en plus confrontés à l’exigence d’évaluer l’efficacité de leur fonctionnement par le biais d’une évaluation annuelle du CA, des comités et des administrateurs.

En fait, le NYSE exige depuis dix ans que les conseils procèdent à leur évaluation et que les résultats du processus soient divulgués aux actionnaires. Également, les investisseurs institutionnels et les activistes demandent de plus en plus d’informations au sujet du processus d’évaluation.

Les résultats de l’évaluation peuvent être divulgués de plusieurs façons, notamment dans les circulaires de procuration et sur le site de l’entreprise.

L’article publié par John Olson, associé fondateur de la firme Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, professeur invité à Georgetown Law Center, et paru sur le forum du Harvard Law School, présente certaines approches fréquemment utilisées pour l’évaluation du CA, des comités et des administrateurs.

On recommande de modifier les méthodes et les paramètres de l’évaluation à chaque trois ans afin d’éviter la routine susceptible de s’installer si les administrateurs remplissent les mêmes questionnaires, gérés par le président du conseil. De plus, l’objectif de l’évaluation est sujet à changement (par exemple, depuis une décennie, on accorde une grande place à la cybersécurité).

C’est au comité de gouvernance que revient la supervision du processus d’évaluation du conseil d’administration. L’article décrit quatre méthodes fréquemment utilisées.

(1) Les questionnaires gérés par le comité de gouvernance ou une personne externe

(2) les discussions entre administrateurs sur des sujets déterminés à l’avance

(3) les entretiens individuels avec les administrateurs sur des thèmes précis par le président du conseil, le président du comité de gouvernance ou un expert externe.

(4) L’évaluation des contributions de chaque administrateur par la méthode d’auto-évaluation et par l’évaluation des pairs.

Chaque approche a ses particularités et la clé est de varier les façons de faire périodiquement. On constate également que beaucoup de sociétés cotées utilisent les services de spécialistes pour les aider dans leurs démarches.

agenda733X370-slide

 

La quasi-totalité des entreprises du S&P 500 divulgue le processus d’évaluation utilisé pour améliorer leur efficacité. L’article présente deux manières de diffuser les résultats du processus d’évaluation.

(1) Structuré, c’est-à-dire un format qui précise — qui évalue quoi ; la fréquence de l’évaluation ; qui supervise les résultats ; comment le CA a-t-il agi eu égard aux résultats de l’opération d’évaluation.

(2) Information axée sur les résultats — les grandes conclusions ; les facteurs positifs et les points à améliorer ; un plan d’action visant à corriger les lacunes observées.

Notons que la firme de services aux actionnaires ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services) utilise la qualité du processus d’évaluation pour évaluer la robustesse de la gouvernance des sociétés. L’article présente des recommandations très utiles pour toute personne intéressée par la mise en place d’un système d’évaluation du CA et par sa gestion.

Voici trois articles parus sur mon blogue qui abordent le sujet de l’évaluation :

L’évaluation des conseils d’administration et des administrateurs | Sept étapes à considérer

Quels sont les devoirs et les responsabilités d’un CA ?  (la section qui traite des questionnaires d’évaluation du rendement et de la performance du conseil)

Évaluation des membres de Conseils

Bonne lecture !

Getting the Most from the Evaluation Process

 

More than ten years have passed since the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) began requiring annual evaluations for boards of directors and “key” committees (audit, compensation, nominating/governance), and many NASDAQ companies also conduct these evaluations annually as a matter of good governance. [1] With boards now firmly in the routine of doing annual evaluations, one challenge (as with any recurring activity) is to keep the process fresh and productive so that it continues to provide the board with valuable insights. In addition, companies are increasingly providing, and institutional shareholders are increasingly seeking, more information about the board’s evaluation process. Boards that have implemented a substantive, effective evaluation process will want information about their work in this area to be communicated to shareholders and potential investors. This can be done in a variety of ways, including in the annual proxy statement, in the governance or investor information section on the corporate website, and/or as part of shareholder engagement outreach.

To assist companies and their boards in maximizing the effectiveness of the evaluation process and related disclosures, this post provides an overview of several frequently used methods for conducting evaluations of the full board, board committees and individual directors. It is our experience that using a variety of methods, with some variation from year to year, results in more substantive and useful evaluations. This post also discusses trends and considerations relating to disclosures about board evaluations. We close with some practical tips for boards to consider as they look ahead to their next annual evaluation cycle.

Common Methods of Board Evaluation

As a threshold matter, it is important to note that there is no one “right” way to conduct board evaluations. There is room for flexibility, and the boards and committees we work with use a variety of methods. We believe it is good practice to “change up” the board evaluation process every few years by using a different format in order to keep the process fresh. Boards have increasingly found that year-after-year use of a written questionnaire, with the results compiled and summarized by a board leader or the corporate secretary for consideration by the board, becomes a routine exercise that produces few new insights as the years go by. This has been the most common practice, and it does respond to the NYSE requirement, but it may not bring as much useful information to the board as some other methods.

Doing something different from time to time can bring new perspectives and insights, enhancing the effectiveness of the process and the value it provides to the board. The evaluation process should be dynamic, changing from time to time as the board identifies practices that work well and those that it finds less effective, and as the board deals with changing expectations for how to meet its oversight duties. As an example, over the last decade there have been increasing expectations that boards will be proactive in oversight of compliance issues and risk (including cyber risk) identification and management issues.

Three of the most common methods for conducting a board or committee evaluation are: (1) written questionnaires; (2) discussions; and (3) interviews. Some of the approaches outlined below reflect a combination of these methods. A company’s nominating/governance committee typically oversees the evaluation process since it has primary responsibility for overseeing governance matters on behalf of the board.

1. Questionnaires

The most common method for conducting board evaluations has been through written responses to questionnaires that elicit information about the board’s effectiveness. The questionnaires may be prepared with the assistance of outside counsel or an outside advisor with expertise in governance matters. A well-designed questionnaire often will address a combination of substantive topics and topics relating to the board’s operations. For example, the questionnaire could touch on major subject matter areas that fall under the board’s oversight responsibility, such as views on whether the board’s oversight of critical areas like risk, compliance and crisis preparedness are effective, including whether there is appropriate and timely information flow to the board on these issues. Questionnaires typically also inquire about whether board refreshment mechanisms and board succession planning are effective, and whether the board is comfortable with the senior management succession plan. With respect to board operations, a questionnaire could inquire about matters such as the number and frequency of meetings, quality and timeliness of meeting materials, and allocation of meeting time between presentation and discussion. Some boards also consider their efforts to increase board diversity as part of the annual evaluation process.

Many boards review their questionnaires annually and update them as appropriate to address new, relevant topics or to emphasize particular areas. For example, if the board recently changed its leadership structure or reallocated responsibility for a major subject matter area among its committees, or the company acquired or started a new line of business or experienced recent issues related to operations, legal compliance or a breach of security, the questionnaire should be updated to request feedback on how the board has handled these developments. Generally, each director completes the questionnaire, the results of the questionnaires are consolidated, and a written or verbal summary of the results is then shared with the board.

Written questionnaires offer the advantage of anonymity because responses generally are summarized or reported back to the full board without attribution. As a result, directors may be more candid in their responses than they would be using another evaluation format, such as a face-to-face discussion. A potential disadvantage of written questionnaires is that they may become rote, particularly after several years of using the same or substantially similar questionnaires. Further, the final product the board receives may be a summary that does not pick up the nuances or tone of the views of individual directors.

In our experience, increasingly, at least once every few years, boards that use questionnaires are retaining a third party, such as outside counsel or another experienced facilitator, to compile the questionnaire responses, prepare a summary and moderate a discussion based on the questionnaire responses. The desirability of using an outside party for this purpose depends on a number of factors. These include the culture of the board and, specifically, whether the boardroom environment is one in which directors are comfortable expressing their views candidly. In addition, using counsel (inside or outside) may help preserve any argument that the evaluation process and related materials are privileged communications if, during the process, counsel is providing legal advice to the board.

In lieu of asking directors to complete written questionnaires, a questionnaire could be distributed to stimulate and guide discussion at an interactive full board evaluation discussion.

2. Group Discussions

Setting aside board time for a structured, in-person conversation is another common method for conducting board evaluations. The discussion can be led by one of several individuals, including: (a) the chairman of the board; (b) an independent director, such as the lead director or the chair of the nominating/governance committee; or (c) an outside facilitator, such as a lawyer or consultant with expertise in governance matters. Using a discussion format can help to “change up” the evaluation process in situations where written questionnaires are no longer providing useful, new information. It may also work well if there are particular concerns about creating a written record.

Boards that use a discussion format often circulate a list of discussion items or topics for directors to consider in advance of the meeting at which the discussion will occur. This helps to focus the conversation and make the best use of the time available. It also provides an opportunity to develop a set of topics that is tailored to the company, its business and issues it has faced and is facing. Another approach to determining discussion topics is to elicit directors’ views on what should be covered as part of the annual evaluation. For example, the nominating/governance could ask that each director select a handful of possible topics for discussion at the board evaluation session and then place the most commonly cited topics on the agenda for the evaluation.

A discussion format can be a useful tool for facilitating a candid exchange of views among directors and promoting meaningful dialogue, which can be valuable in assessing effectiveness and identifying areas for improvement. Discussions allow directors to elaborate on their views in ways that may not be feasible with a written questionnaire and to respond in real time to views expressed by their colleagues on the board. On the other hand, they do not provide an opportunity for anonymity. In our experience, this approach works best in boards with a high degree of collegiality and a tradition of candor.

3. Interviews

Another method of conducting board evaluations that is becoming more common is interviews with individual directors, done in-person or over the phone. A set of questions is often distributed in advance to help guide the discussion. Interviews can be done by: (a) an outside party such as a lawyer or consultant; (b) an independent director, such as the lead director or the chair of the nominating/governance committee; or (c) the corporate secretary or inside counsel, if directors are comfortable with that. The party conducting the interviews generally summarizes the information obtained in the interview process and may facilitate a discussion of the information obtained with the board.

In our experience, boards that have used interviews to conduct their annual evaluation process generally have found them very productive. Directors have observed that the interviews yielded rich feedback about the board’s performance and effectiveness. Relative to other types of evaluations, interviews are more labor-intensive because they can be time-consuming, particularly for larger boards. They also can be expensive, particularly if the board retains an outside party to conduct the interviews. For these reasons, the interview format generally is not one that is used every year. However, we do see a growing number of boards taking this path as a “refresher”—every three to five years—after periods of using a written questionnaire, or after a major event, such as a corporate crisis of some kind, when the board wants to do an in-depth “lessons learned” analysis as part of its self-evaluation. Interviews also offer an opportunity to develop a targeted list of questions that focuses on issues and themes that are specific to the board and company in question, which can contribute further to the value derived from the interview process.

For nominating/governance committees considering the use of an interview format, one key question is who will conduct the interviews. In our experience, the most common approach is to retain an outside party (such as a lawyer or consultant) to conduct and summarize interviews. An outside party can enhance the effectiveness of the process because directors may be more forthcoming in their responses than they would if another director or a member of management were involved.

Individual Director Evaluations

Another practice that some boards have incorporated into their evaluation process is formal evaluations of individual directors. In our experience, these are not yet widespread but are becoming more common. At companies where the nominating/governance committee has a robust process for assessing the contributions of individual directors each year in deciding whether to recommend them for renomination to the board, the committee and the board may conclude that a formal evaluation every year is unnecessary. Historically, some boards have been hesitant to conduct individual director evaluations because of concerns about the impact on board collegiality and dynamics. However, if done thoughtfully, a structured process for evaluating the performance of each director can result in valuable insights that can strengthen the performance of individual directors and the board as a whole.

As with board and committee evaluations, no single “best practice” has emerged for conducting individual director evaluations, and the methods described above can be adapted for this purpose. In addition, these evaluations may involve directors either evaluating their own performance (self-evaluations), or evaluating their fellow directors individually and as a group (peer evaluations). Directors may be more willing to evaluate their own performance than that of their colleagues, and the utility of self-evaluations can be enhanced by having an independent director, such as the chairman of the board or lead director, or the chair of the nominating/governance committee, provide feedback to each director after the director evaluates his or her own performance. On the other hand, peer evaluations can provide directors with valuable, constructive comments. Here, too, each director’s evaluation results typically would be presented only to that director by the chairman of the board or lead director, or the chair of the nominating/governance committee. Ultimately, whether and how to conduct individual director evaluations will depend on a variety of factors, including board culture.

Disclosures about Board Evaluations

Many companies discuss the board evaluation process in their corporate governance guidelines. [2] In addition, many companies now provide disclosure about the evaluation process in the proxy statement, as one element of increasingly robust proxy disclosures about their corporate governance practices. According to the 2015 Spencer Stuart Board Index, all but 2% of S&P 500 companies disclose in their proxy statements, at a minimum, that they conduct some form of annual board evaluation.

In addition, institutional shareholders increasingly are expressing an interest in knowing more about the evaluation process at companies where they invest. In particular, they want to understand whether the board’s process is a meaningful one, with actionable items emerging from the evaluation process, and not a “check the box” exercise. In the United Kingdom, companies must report annually on their processes for evaluating the performance of the board, its committees and individual directors under the UK Corporate Governance Code. As part of the code’s “comply or explain approach,” the largest companies are expected to use an external facilitator at least every three years (or explain why they have not done so) and to disclose the identity of the facilitator and whether he or she has any other connection to the company.

In September 2014, the Council of Institutional Investors issued a report entitled Best Disclosure: Board Evaluation (available here), as part of a series of reports aimed at providing investors and companies with approaches to and examples of disclosures that CII considers exemplary. The report recommended two possible approaches to enhanced disclosure about board evaluations, identified through an informal survey of CII members, and included examples of disclosures illustrating each approach. As a threshold matter, CII acknowledged in the report that shareholders generally do not expect details about evaluations of individual directors. Rather, shareholders “want to understand the process by which the board goes about regularly improving itself.” According to CII, detailed disclosure about the board evaluation process can give shareholders a “window” into the boardroom and the board’s capacity for change.

The first approach in the CII report focuses on the “nuts and bolts” of how the board conducts the evaluation process and analyzes the results. Under this approach, a company’s disclosures would address: (1) who evaluates whom; (2) how often the evaluations are done; (3) who reviews the results; and (4) how the board decides to address the results. Disclosures under this approach do not address feedback from specific evaluations, either individually or more generally, or conclusions that the board has drawn from recent self-evaluations. As a result, according to CII, this approach can take the form of “evergreen” proxy disclosure that remains similar from year to year, unless the evaluation process itself changes.

The second approach focuses more on the board’s most recent evaluation. Under this approach, in addition to addressing the evaluation process, a company’s disclosures would provide information about “big-picture, board-wide findings and any steps for tackling areas identified for improvement” during the board’s last evaluation. The disclosures would identify: (1) key takeaways from the board’s review of its own performance, including both areas where the board believes it functions effectively and where it could improve; and (2) a “plan of action” to address areas for improvement over the coming year. According to CII, this type of disclosure is more common in the United Kingdom and other non-U.S. jurisdictions.

Also reflecting a greater emphasis on disclosure about board evaluations, proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (“ISS”) added this subject to the factors it uses in evaluating companies’ governance practices when it released an updated version of “QuickScore,” its corporate governance benchmarking tool, in Fall 2014. QuickScore views a company as having a “robust” board evaluation policy where the board discloses that it conducts an annual performance evaluation, including evaluations of individual directors, and that it uses an external evaluator at least every three years (consistent with the approach taken in the UK Corporate Governance Code). For individual director evaluations, it appears that companies can receive QuickScore “credit” in this regard where the nominating/governance committee assesses director performance in connection with the renomination process.

What Companies Should Do Now

As noted above, there is no “one size fits all” approach to board evaluations, but the process should be viewed as an opportunity to enhance board, committee and director performance. In this regard, a company’s nominating/governance committee and board should periodically assess the evaluation process itself to determine whether it is resulting in meaningful takeaways, and whether changes are appropriate. This includes considering whether the board would benefit from trying new approaches to the evaluation process every few years.

Factors to consider in deciding what evaluation format to use include any specific objectives the board seeks to achieve through the evaluation process, aspects of the current evaluation process that have worked well, the board’s culture, and any concerns directors may have about confidentiality. And, we believe that every board should carefully consider “changing up” the evaluation process used from time to time so that the exercise does not become rote. What will be the most beneficial in any given year will depend on a variety of factors specific to the board and the company. For the board, this includes considerations of board refreshment and tenure, and developments the board may be facing, such as changes in board or committee leadership.  Factors relevant to the company include where the company is in its lifecycle, whether the company is in a period of relative stability, challenge or transformation, whether there has been a significant change in the company’s business or a senior management change, whether there is activist interest in the company and whether the company has recently gone through or is going through a crisis of some kind. Specific items that nominating/governance committees could consider as part of maintaining an effective evaluation process include:

  1. Revisit the content and focus of written questionnaires. Evaluation questionnaires should be updated each time they are used in order to reflect significant new developments, both in the external environment and internal to the board.
  2. “Change it up.”  If the board has been using the same written questionnaire, or the same evaluation format, for several years, consider trying something new for an upcoming annual evaluation. This can bring renewed vigor to the process, reengage the participants, and result in more meaningful feedback.
  3. Consider whether to bring in an external facilitator. Boards that have not previously used an outside party to assist in their evaluations should consider whether this would enhance the candor and overall effectiveness of the process.
  4. Engage in a meaningful discussion of the evaluation results. Unless the board does its evaluation using a discussion format, there should be time on the board’s agenda to discuss the evaluation results so that all directors have an opportunity to hear and discuss the feedback from the evaluation.
  5. Incorporate follow-up into the process. Regardless of the evaluation method used, it is critical to follow up on issues and concerns that emerge from the evaluation process. The process should include identifying concrete takeaways and formulating action items to address any concerns or areas for improvement that emerge from the evaluation. Senior management can be a valuable partner in this endeavor, and should be briefed as appropriate on conclusions reached as a result of the evaluation and related action items. The board also should consider its progress in addressing these items.
  6. Revisit disclosures.  Working with management, the nominating/governance committee and the board should discuss whether the company’s proxy disclosures, investor and governance website information and other communications to shareholders and potential investors contain meaningful, current information about the board evaluation process.

Endnotes:

[1] See NYSE Rule 303A.09, which requires listed companies to adopt and disclose a set of corporate governance guidelines that must address an annual performance evaluation of the board. The rule goes on to state that “[t]he board should conduct a self-evaluation at least annually to determine whether it and its committees are functioning effectively.” See also NYSE Rules 303A.07(b)(ii), 303A.05(b)(ii) and 303A.04(b)(ii) (requiring annual evaluations of the audit, compensation, and nominating/governance committees, respectively).
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[2] In addition, as discussed in the previous note, NYSE companies are required to address an annual evaluation of the board in their corporate governance guidelines.
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______________________________

*John Olson is a founding partner of the Washington, D.C. office at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP and a visiting professor at the Georgetown Law Center.

La gouvernance en Grande-Bretagne | Nouveau paradigme énoncé par Theresa May


Voici les éléments de la proposition de Theresa May eu égard à la nouvelle gouvernance corporative de la Grande-Bretagne.

Ce texte est de Martin Lipton de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. C’est un résumé des principaux points évoqués aujourd’hui par la ministre.

Bonne lecture !

Corporate Governance—A New Paradigm from the U.K.

 

ShowImage

 

1. Stakeholder, not shareholder, governance.

2. Board diversity: consumers and workers to be added.

3. Protection from takeover for national champions like Cadbury and AstraZeneca.

4. Binding, not advisory, say-on-pay.

5. Long-term, not short-term, business strategy.

6. Greater corporate transparency.

7. Stricter antitrust.

8. Higher taxes and crack down on tax avoidance and evasion.

9. It is not anti-business to suggest that big business needs to change. Better governance will help these companies to take better decisions, for their own long-term benefit and that of the economy overall.

The full speech is attached.

Résultats eu égard aux propositions des actionnaires lors des assemblées annuelles de 2016


Voici les principaux résultats eu égard aux propositions des actionnaires lors des assemblées annuelles de 2016. Ce sont des données relatives aux grandes sociétés publiques américaines.

Je crois qu’il est intéressant d’avoir le pouls de l’évolution des propositions des actionnaires, car cela révèle l’état de la gouvernance dans les grandes corporations ainsi que le niveau d’activités des activistes.

Cet article, publié par Elizabeth Ising, associée et co-présidente de la « Securities Regulation and Corporate Governance practice group » de la firme Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, est paru sur le forum de HLS hier.

L’auteure présente les résultats de manière très illustrée, sans porter de jugement.

Personnellement, je constate un certain essoufflement des propositions des actionnaires en 2016. Dans plusieurs cas cependant les entreprises ont remédié aux lacunes de gouvernance.

Vos commentaires sont recherchés et appréciés.

Bonne lecture !

 

Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2016 Proxy Season

 

This post provides an overview of shareholder proposals submitted to public companies for 2016 shareholder meetings, including statistics, notable decisions from the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission on no-action requests, and information about litigation regarding shareholder proposals. All shareholder proposal data in this post is as of June 1, 2016 unless otherwise indicated.

Submitted Shareholder Proposals

Overview

Fewer Proposals Submitted: According to ISS data, shareholders have submitted fewer shareholder proposals for 2016 meetings than they did for 2015 meetings.

However, the number of proposals submitted for 2016 meetings is still higher than the approximate number of proposals submitted for 2014 and 2013 meetings.

Support Declined: Average support for shareholder proposals is at its lowest in four years. [1]

Only 14.5% of proposals (61 proposals) voted on at 2016 meetings received support from a majority of votes cast, compared to 16.7% of proposals (75 proposals) at 2015 meetings.

Focus Remains on Governance

Across five broad categories of shareholder proposals, the approximate number of proposals submitted for 2016 meetings (as compared to 2015 meetings) was as follows:

 

Shareholder-Proposal-Developments-2016-Proxy-Seaso_2016-07-06_11-26-46

For the second year in a row, governance & shareholder rights proposals were the most frequently submitted proposals, largely due to the yet again unprecedented number of proxy access shareholder proposals submitted (201 proposals (or 21.9% of all proposals) submitted for 2016 meetings versus 108 proposals submitted for 2015 meetings).

Proxy Access Proposals Continue to Dominate

The most common 2016 shareholder proposal topics, along with the approximate numbers of proposals submitted and as compared to the most common 2015 shareholder proposal topics, were [2] [3]:

Shareholder-Proposal-Developments-2016-Proxy-Seaso_2016-07-06_11-26-57

Most Active Proponents

Chevedden & Co.: As is typically the case, John Chevedden and shareholders associated with him (including James McRitchie) submitted by far the greatest number of shareholder proposals—approximately 227 for 2016 meetings.

Most of these proposals (66.6%) have either been voted on or are pending. Twenty-three percent have been omitted after obtaining relief through the SEC no-action process; another 7% have ultimately not been included in proxy statements or have not been properly presented at the meeting; and only 3.1% of these proposals have been withdrawn.

By way of comparison, shareholder proponents withdrew approximately 19.2% of the proposals submitted for 2016 meetings, up from approximately 17% of the proposals withdrawn for 2015 meetings.

NYC Pension Funds: This season once again saw a large number of proposals submitted by the New York City Comptroller on behalf of five New York City pension funds, which submitted or cofiled at least 79 proposals (as compared to 86 proposals submitted for 2015 meetings), including approximately 72 proxy access proposals, [4] as part of the Comptroller’s continuation of its “Boardroom Accountability Project” for 2016.

Only 34.6% of these proposals have either been voted on or are pending; most (55.6%) of these proposals have been withdrawn. The remainder (9.8%) have been omitted or not otherwise included in proxy statements.

Other Proponents

Some of the Same Players (But Not Everyone Returned in 2016): As was true for 2015 meetings, with the exception of Calvert Asset Management and UNITE HERE!, several of the same proponents that were reported to have submitted or co-filed at least 20 proposals each for 2015 meetings, did so again for 2016 meetings:

Shareholder-Proposal-Developments-2016-Proxy-Seaso_2016-07-06_11-27-09

Same Subject Areas: As reflected in the chart above, the focus of these proponents remained largely consistent with their focus for 2015 meetings.

Public Pension Funds: In addition to the New York City and New York State pension funds, several other state pension funds submitted shareholder proposals as well:

California State Teachers’ Retirement System (18 proposals, largely focused on governance matters and climate change);

Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds (14 proposals, largely focused on governance, social, and political matters);

City of Philadelphia Public Employees Retirement System (10 proposals, largely focused on political and lobbying matters);

North Carolina Retirement Systems (two board diversity proposals);

California Public Employees’ Retirement System (one proxy access proposal); and

Firefighters’ Pension System of Kansas City, Missouri (one majority voting in director elections proposal).

Shareholder Proposal Voting Results

Majority Voting in Director Elections Receives the Highest Support

The following are the principal topics addressed in proposals that received high shareholder support at a number of companies’ 2016 meetings:

Majority Voting in Uncontested Director Elections: Ten proposals voted on averaged 74.2% of votes cast, compared to 76.6% in 2015;

Amendment of Bylaws or Articles to Remove Antitakeover Provisions: Two proposals voted on averaged 70.6% of votes cast, compared to 79% in 2015;

Board Declassification: Three proposals voted on averaged 64.5% of votes cast, compared to 72.6% in 2015;

Elimination of Supermajority Vote Requirements: Thirteen proposals voted on averaged 59.6% of votes cast, compared to 53.0% in 2015;

Proxy Access: Fifty-eight proposals voted on averaged 48.7% of votes cast, compared to 54.6% in 2015;

Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings: Sixteen proposals voted on averaged 39.6% of votes cast, compared to 44.4% in 2015; and

Written Consent: Thirteen proposals voted on averaged 43.4% of votes cast, compared to 39.4% in 2015.

Majority Votes on Shareholder Proposals

The table below shows the principal topics addressed in proposals that received a majority of votes cast at a number of companies:

Shareholder-Proposal-Developments-2016-Proxy-Seaso_2016-07-06_11-27-20

* * *

The complete publication is available here.

Endnotes:

[1] As of June 1, 2016, voting results were available through the ISS databases for a total of 422 proposals. As a matter of practice, the vast majority of shareholder proposals submitted to companies for shareholder meetings are submitted under Rule 14a-8 rather than pursuant to companies’ advance notice bylaws. However, because the ISS data does not indicate whether a shareholder proposal has been submitted under Rule 14a-8 or under a company’s advance notice bylaws, it is possible that the ISS data includes voting results for shareholder proposals not submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8. This discrepancy is likely to account for only a very small number of proposals.
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[2] Includes all corporate civic engagement proposals, except proposals relating to charitable contributions (one submitted as of June 1, 2016 for 2016 meetings).
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[3] Includes proposals relating to (i) reports on climate change; (ii) greenhouse gas emissions; and (iii) climate change action (i.e., proposals requesting increasing return of capital to shareholders in light of climate change risks). Note that climate change is a subtopic of the environmental and social category of proposals.
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[4] NYC Comptroller, Boardroom Accountability Project, available at http://comptroller.nyc.gov/boardroom-accountability/ (last visited June 1, 2016).
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Top 15 des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue au deuxième trimestre de 2016


Voici une liste des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue au deuxième trimestre de 2016.

Cette liste de 15 billets constitue, en quelque sorte, un sondage de l’intérêt manifesté par des milliers de personnes sur différents thèmes de la gouvernance des sociétés. On y retrouve des points de vue bien étayés sur des sujets d’actualité relatifs aux conseils d’administration.

Que retrouve-t-on dans ce blogue et quels en sont les objectifs?

Ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et les plus récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revue, des blogues et des sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.

 

Revue-de-presse-630x350

 

Je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernance dans le monde francophone, en fournissant au lecteur une mine de renseignements récents (les billets) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes.

Quelques statistiques à propos du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé

Ce blogue a été initié le 15 juillet 2011 et, à date, il a accueilli plus de 192000 visiteurs. Le blogue a progressé de manière tout à fait remarquable et, au 30 juin 2016, il était fréquenté par des milliers de visiteurs par mois. Depuis le début, jai œuvré à la publication de 1373 billets.

En 2016, j’estime qu’environ 5000 personnes par mois visiteront le blogue afin de sinformer sur diverses questions de gouvernance. À ce rythme, on peut penser quenviron 60000 personnes visiteront le site du blogue en 2016. 

On note que 80 % des billets sont partagés par l’intermédiaire de différents moteurs de recherche et 20 %  par LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook et Tumblr.

Voici un aperçu du nombre de visiteurs par pays :

  1. Canada (64 %)
  2. France, Suisse, Belgique (20 %)
  3. Maghreb [Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie] (5 %)
  4. Autres pays de l’Union européenne (3 %)
  5. États-Unis [3 %]
  6. Autres pays de provenance (5 %)

En 2014, le blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé a été inscrit dans deux catégories distinctes du concours canadien Made in Blog [MiB Awards] : Business et Marketing et médias sociaux. Le blogue a été retenu parmi les dix [10] finalistes à l’échelle canadienne dans chacune de ces catégories, le seul en gouvernance. Il n’y avait pas de concours en 2015.

Vos commentaires sont toujours grandement appréciés. Je réponds toujours à ceux-ci.

N.B. Vous pouvez vous inscrire ou faire des recherches en allant au bas de cette page.

Bonne lecture !

 Voici les Tops 15 du second trimestre de 2016 du blogue en gouvernance

 

 1.       Vous siégez à un conseil d’administration | comment bien se comporter ?
2.       Cinq (5) principes simples et universels de saine gouvernance ?
3.       Le rôle du comité exécutif versus le rôle du conseil d’administration
4.       Taille du CA, limite d’âge et durée des mandats des administrateurs
5.       Les conséquences juridiques du Brexit
6.       LE RÔLE DU PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION (PCA) | LE CAS DES CÉGEP
7.       Composition du conseil d’administration d’OSBL et recrutement d’administrateurs | Une primeur
8.       La composition du conseil d’administration | Élément clé d’une saine gouvernance
9.       Un guide essentiel pour comprendre et enseigner la gouvernance | En reprise
10.   L’utilisation des huis clos lors des sessions de C.A.
11.   Il ne faut pas attendre d’être à la retraite pour convoiter des postes sur des conseils d’administration !
12.   Attention au syndrome du « bon gars » dans la gouvernance des OBNL !
13.   Quinze (15) astuces d’un CA performant
14.   Comment procéder à l’évaluation du CA, des comités et des administrateurs | Un sujet d’actualité !
15.   Performance et dynamique des conseils d’administration | Yvan Allaire

La séparation des fonctions de président du conseil et de président de l’entreprise (CEO) est-elle généralement bénéfique ?


Les autorités réglementaires, les firmes spécialisées en votation et les experts en gouvernance suggèrent que les rôles et les fonctions de président du conseil d’administration soient distincts des attributions des PDG (CEO).

En fait, on suppose que la séparation des fonctions, entre la présidence du conseil et la présidence de l’entreprise (CEO), est généralement bénéfique, c’est-à-dire que des pouvoirs distincts permettent d’éviter les conflits d’intérêts, tout en rassurant les actionnaires.

C’est ce que les professeurs de finance Harley Ryan*, Narayanan Jayaraman et Vikram Nanda ont tenté de valider empiriquement dans leur récente étude sur le sujet. L’article a paru aujourd’hui dans le forum du Harvard Law School on Corporate Governance. Comme on le sait, la plupart des études antérieures ne sont pas concluantes à cet égard.

Les auteurs ont proposé un modèle d’apprentissage de la dualité des deux fonctions en identifiant une stratégie basée sur la préparation de la relève : “passing the baton” (PTB). Dans ce modèle, les administrateurs s’allouent une période de probation afin de bien connaître les habiletés de leurs nouveaux CEO.

Si les membres du CA sont rassurés sur les talents du CEO et s’ils sont satisfaits de ses performances, ils lui attribuent également le poste de « chairman ». Le pouvoir accru du CEO améliore la rétention des meilleurs éléments.

Les résultats de la recherche montrent que les CEO qui ont obtenu le titre de « chairman » dans ces conditions (PTB) tendent à mieux réussir qu’avant la nomination à ce poste. De plus, les actionnaires sont plutôt réceptifs à ce mode de nomination, surtout si la promotion est faite dans un court délai, car cela leur indique que le CEO constitue une valeur sûre pour l’organisation.

Les auteurs insistent sur l’importance de considérer les mécanismes d’apprentissage en place (PTB) ainsi que les objectifs de rétention des meilleurs CEO dans l’évaluation des structures de gouvernance.

Ainsi, les actionnaires ne sont pas toujours nécessairement mieux servis par la séparation des deux rôles. Notons cependant qu’en général, les sociétés cotées ont de plus en plus tendance à séparer les deux fonctions.

Le billet paru sur mon blogue le 17 novembre 2015 fait état de la situation à ce jour :

Les études contemporaines démontrent une nette tendance en faveur de la séparation des deux rôles. Le Canadian Spencer Stuart Board Index estime qu’une majorité de 85 % des 100 plus grandes entreprises canadiennes cotées en bourse ont opté pour la dissociation entre les deux fonctions. Dans le même sens, le rapport Clarkson affiche que 84 % des entreprises inscrites à la bourse de Toronto ont procédé à ladite séparation. Subsistent cependant encore de nos jours des entreprises canadiennes qui  permettent le cumul. L’entreprise Air Transat A.T. Inc en est la parfaite illustration : M. Jean-Marc Eustache est à la fois président du conseil et chef de la direction. A contrario, le fond de solidarité de la Fédération des travailleurs du Québec vient récemment de procéder à la séparation des deux fonctions.

Aux États-Unis en 2013, 45 % des entreprises de l’indice S&P500 (au total 221 entreprises) dissocient les rôles de PDG et de président du conseil. Toutefois, les choses ne sont pas aussi simples qu’elles y paraissent : 27 % des entreprises de cet indice ont recombiné ces deux rôles. Évoquons à ce titre le cas de Target Corp dont les actionnaires ont refusé la dissociation des deux fonctions .

Est-ce dans l’air du temps ? Est-ce le résultat d’études sérieuses sur les principes de bonne gouvernance ?

Comme on dit souvent en management : Ça dépend des cas !

Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Bonne lecture !

 

Does Combining the CEO and Chair Roles Cause Poor Firm Performance?

 

Considerable disagreement exists on the merits of CEO-Chair duality. In recent years, there has been growing regulatory and investor pressure to split the titles of CEO and Chairman of the Board. In fact, there is a significant trend towards separation of the two titles. However, the empirical evidence in the literature is inconclusive on the impact of separating these roles. We argue that the inconclusive evidence arises from endogenous self-selection that complicates empirical identification strategies and the ability to recognize the correct counterfactual firms.

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In our paper, Does Combining the CEO and Chair Roles Cause Poor Firm Performance?, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we propose a learning model of CEO-chair duality and implement an identification strategy to address sample selection issues. Our model and identification is based on “passing the baton” (PTB) firms that award the chair position after a probationary period during which the board of directors learns about the ability of the CEO. In the model, the board optimally awards the additional position of board chair if the CEO demonstrates sufficient talent. The increase in CEO power improves the retention of high-quality CEOs by mitigating concerns about the board reneging on compensation contracts. The model delivers several implications that we test in our empirical analysis.

Using a very large sample of over 22,000 firm-year observations for the period 1995-2010, we explore the determinants and consequences of the combining the two roles. Firms that always combine the two roles, always separate the roles, or award the additional title following a period of evaluation exhibit significantly different firm characteristics, which suggest self-selection. We find that PTB firms are more likely to be from industries that are less homogenous. This is consistent with a learning rationale underlying PTB strategies: CEO performance is harder to benchmark in such industries and reneging on contracts may be of greater concern to CEOs. We also find that firms with more business segments are more likely to combine the two roles. These findings suggest that more complex organizations are better served by combining the roles of the CEO and the Chairman.

Overall, CEOs that receive the additional title of board chair outperform their industry benchmark before receiving both titles. In firms that combine the roles after observing the CEO’s performance under a separate board chair, the combination is positively related to both firm and industry performance in the two years prior to the combination. As predicted by our model, a naïve analysis of the post-chair appointment performance, one that fails to control for selection issues and mean reversion in performance data, indicates a significant drop in firm performance relative to the pre-chair period. However, in a matched sample of firms where the matching criteria includes the pre-appointment performance and firm attributes that predict a high propensity for using a PTB succession strategy, there is no evidence of post-appointment underperformance. These results suggest that the pass-the-baton succession process appears to be an equilibrium mechanism in which some firms optimally use the PTB structure to learn about the CEO and then award the additional title of board chair to increase the odds of retaining talented CEOS. Thus, the evidence is broadly consistent with the learning hypothesis that the additional title is awarded by the board after evaluating the ability of the CEO.

Our model suggests that, ceteris paribus, talented CEOs in a weaker bargaining position relative to the board will tend to be promoted to chair more quickly. The reason is that more vulnerable CEOs are more likely to pursue outside opportunities. Supportive of the prediction, we find that when the board is more independent, is not coopted and the CEO is externally sourced—the promotion to chair occurs more quickly. These findings are also counter to the notion that agency considerations and influence are central to the CEO being appointed chairman. We also show that stockholders react positively to combinations that occur early in the CEO’s tenure, which suggests that early promotions reveal directors’ private information about the quality of the CEO to the market. This is inconsistent with alternative explanations such as an incentive rationale for PTB or agency problem, since both of these alternatives would suggest a negative market reaction to such promotions.

A major implication of our analysis for researchers is that one should consider learning mechanisms and retention objectives when evaluating various board structures. Structures that are seemingly incompatible with effective monitoring may in fact be optimal when one considers the impact of learning on retention. For governance activists and policy makers, the implications of our analysis are straightforward: the results call into question the prevailing wisdom that suggests that shareholders will always be better served by separating the two roles. Thus, those who seek to reform governance should be cautious in proposing to unambiguously separate the roles of CEO and board chair. Forcing separation by fiat is likely not an ideal policy. Overall our evidence suggests that having one type of executive and board leadership structure is not optimal for all firms.

The full paper is available for download here.


Harley Ryan* is Associate Professor of Finance at Georgia State University, Narayanan Jayaraman is Professor of Finance at Georgia Institute of Technology et Vikram Nanda is Professor of Finance at the University of Texas at Dallas.

Le modèle de la maximisation de la valeur aux actionnaires est toujours dominant !


Les théories contemporaines de la gouvernance sont basées sur le modèle de la « maximisation de la valeur aux actionnaires ».

Dans un article paru sur le forum du Harvard Law School on Corporate Governance, l’auteur Marc Moore* explique que, malgré l’émergence d’autres paradigmes des rouages de la gouvernance moderne (Post — Shareholders-Values | PSV), c’est encore le modèle de la maximisation de la valeur aux actionnaires qui domine.

C’est ainsi que le nouveau modèle de réallocation des profits des PSV, qui favoriserait le développement interne de l’entreprise et les investissements à long terme, cède le pas, la plupart du temps, à la redistribution des surplus aux actionnaires, notamment par la voie des dividendes ou par le rachat des actions.

Voici comment l’auteur conclut son article. Quel est votre point de vue ?

The somewhat uncomfortable truth for many observers is that, for better or worse, the American system of shareholder capitalism, and its pivotal corporate governance principle of shareholder primacy, are ultimately products of our own collective (albeit unintentional) civic design. Accordingly, while in many respects the orthodox shareholder-oriented corporate governance framework may be a social evil; it is nonetheless a necessary evil, which US worker-savers implicitly tolerate as the effective social price for sustaining a system of non-occupational income provision outside of direct state control. Until corporate governance scholars and policymakers are capable of coordinating their respective energies towards somehow alleviating US worker-savers’ significant dependence on corporate equity as a source of non-occupational wealth gains, the shareholder-oriented corporation is likely to remain a socially indispensable phenomenon. To those who rue this prospect, it might be retorted “better the devil you know than the devil you don’t.”

Bonne lecture !

The Indispensability of the Shareholder Value Corporation

 

Despite their differences of opinion on other issues, most corporate law and governance scholars have tended to agree upon one thing at least: that the overarching normative objective of corporate governance—and, by implication, corporate law—should be the maximization (or, at least, long-term enhancement) of shareholder wealth. Indeed this proposition—variously referred to as the “shareholder wealth maximization”, “shareholder value”, or “shareholder primacy” norm—is so ingrained within mainstream corporate governance thinking that it has traditionally been subjected to little serious policy or even academic question. However, the zeitgeist would appear to be slowly but surely changing. The financial crisis may not quite have proved the watershed moment it was initially heralded as in terms of resetting dominant currents of economic or political opinion. Nonetheless, in the narrower but still important domain of corporate governance thinking and policymaking, the past decade’s events have triggered the onset of what promises to be a potentially major paradigm shift in the direction of an evolving “Post-Shareholder-Value” (or “PSV”) consensus.

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On an academic level, this movement is represented by a growing body of influential legal and economic scholarship which contests most of the staple ideological tenets of orthodox corporate governance theory. Amongst the most noteworthy contributions to this literature are Professor Lynn Stout’s influential 2012 book The Shareholder Value Myth (Berret-Koehler), and also Professor Colin Mayer’s excellent 2013 work Firm Commitment: Why the corporation is failing us and how to restore trust in it (Oxford University Press). In particular, proponents of the PSV paradigm typically dismiss the common neo-classical equation of shareholder wealth maximization with economic efficiency in the broader social sense. They also typically eschew individualistic understandings of the firm in terms of its purported internal bargaining dynamics, in favour of alternative conceptual models which celebrate the distinctive value of the corporation’s inherently autonomous corporeal features.

Evidence of a potential drift from the formerly dominant shareholder primacy paradigm in corporate governance is additionally apparent on a practical policy-making level today, not least in the rapid proliferation of Benefit Corporations as a viable and popular alternative legal form to the orthodox for-profit corporation. At the same time, the increasing use by US-listed firms of dual-class voting structures designed to insulate management from outside capital market pressures, coupled with the seemingly greater flexibility afforded to boards over recent years in defending against unwanted takeover bids from so-called corporate “raiders,” both provide additional cause to question the longevity of the shareholder-oriented corporate governance status quo.

But while evolving PSV institutional mechanisms such as Benefit Corporations and dual-class share structures are prima facie encouraging from a social perspective, there is cause for scepticism about their capacity to become anything more than a relatively niche or peripheral feature of the US public corporations landscape. This is principally because such measures, in spite of their apparent reformist potential, are still ultimately quasi-contractual and thus essentially voluntary in nature, meaning that they are unlikely to be adopted in a public corporations context except in extraordinary instances. From a normative point of view, moreover, it is arguable that such measures—irrespective of the extent of their take-up over the coming years—ultimately should remain quasi-contractual and voluntary in nature, as opposed to being placed on any sort of mandatory basis.

In this regard, it should be respected that public corporations are not only the predominant organizational vehicle for conducting large-scale industrial production projects over indefinite time horizons, as academic proponents of the PSV position have vigorously emphasized. Of comparable importance and ingenuity is that fact that—in the United States at least—public corporations are also a necessary structural means of enabling the residual income streams accruing from successful industrial projects to fund the provision of socially essential financial services, via the medium of public capital (and especially equity) markets. Unfortunately, though, these two dimensions of the public corporation are not always mutually compatible. Rather, it would seem that more often than not they are prone to antagonize, rather than complement, one another. This is especially so when it comes to the periodically-vexing managerial question of whether a firm’s residual earnings should be committed internally to the sustenance and development of the productive corporate enterprise itself, or else distributed externally to shareholders in the form of either enhanced dividends or stock buybacks. The problem is that the evolving PSV corporate governance paradigm—as manifested on both an intellectual and policy level today—focuses exclusively on the former of those dimensions at the expense of the latter.

The somewhat uncomfortable truth for many observers is that, for better or worse, the American system of shareholder capitalism, and its pivotal corporate governance principle of shareholder primacy, are ultimately products of our own collective (albeit unintentional) civic design. Accordingly, while in many respects the orthodox shareholder-oriented corporate governance framework may be a social evil; it is nonetheless a necessary evil, which US worker-savers implicitly tolerate as the effective social price for sustaining a system of non-occupational income provision outside of direct state control. Until corporate governance scholars and policymakers are capable of coordinating their respective energies towards somehow alleviating US worker-savers’ significant dependence on corporate equity as a source of non-occupational wealth gains, the shareholder-oriented corporation is likely to remain a socially indispensable phenomenon. To those who rue this prospect, it might be retorted “better the devil you know than the devil you don’t.”

The complete paper is available for download here.


Marc Moore* is Reader in Corporate Law and Director of the Centre for Corporate and Commercial Law (3CL) at the University of Cambridge. This post is based on a recent paper by Dr. Moore. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power by Lucian Bebchuk.