Constats sur la perte de contrôle des sociétés québécoises | Le cas de RONA


C’est avec plaisir que je partage l’opinion de Yvan Allaire, président exécutif du CA de l’IGOPP, publié ce jour même dans La Presse.

Ce troisième acte de la saga RONA constitue, en quelque sorte, une constatation de la dure réalité des affaires corporatives d’une société multinationale, vécue dans le contexte du marché financier québécois.

Yvan Allaire présente certains moyens à prendre afin d’éviter la perte de contrôle des fleurons québécois.

Selon l’auteur, « Il serait approprié que toutes les institutions financières canadiennes appuient ces formes de capital, en particulier les actions multivotantes, pourvu qu’elles soient bien encadrées. C’est ce que font la Caisse de dépôt, le Fonds de solidarité et les grands fonds institutionnels canadiens regroupés dans la Coalition canadienne pour la bonne gouvernance ».

Cette opinion d’Yvan Allaire est un rappel aux moyens de défense efficaces face à des possibilités de prises de contrôle hostiles.

Dans le contexte juridique et réglementaire canadien, le seul obstacle aux prises de contrôle non souhaitées provient d’une structure de capital à double classe d’actions ou toute forme de propriété (actionnaires de contrôle, protection législative) qui met la société à l’abri des pressions à court terme des actionnaires de tout acabit. Faut-il rappeler que les grandes sociétés québécoises (et canadiennes) doivent leur pérennité à des formes de capital de cette nature, tout particulièrement les actions à vote multiple ?

Bonne lecture !

RONA, LE TROISIÈME ACTE

 

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Acte I : La velléité de la société américaine Lowe’s d’acquérir RONA survenant à la veille d’une campagne électorale au Québec suscite un vif émoi et un consensus politique : il faut se donner les moyens de bloquer de telles manœuvres « hostiles ». Inquiet de cette agitation politique et sociale, Lowe’s ne dépose pas d’offre.

Acte II : Lowe’s fait une offre « généreuse » qui reçoit l’appui enthousiaste des dirigeants, membres du conseil et actionnaires de RONA, tous fortement enrichis par cette transaction. Lowe’s devient propriétaire de la société québécoise.

Acte III : Devant un aréopage politique et médiatique québécois, s’est déroulé la semaine dernière un troisième acte grinçant, bien que sans suspense, puisque prévisible dès le deuxième acte.

En effet, qui pouvait croire aux engagements solennels, voire éternels, de permanence des emplois, etc. pris par l’acquéreur Lowe’s en fin du deuxième acte ?

Cette société cotée en Bourse américaine ne peut se soustraire au seul engagement qui compte : tout faire pour maintenir et propulser le prix de son action. Il y va de la permanence des dirigeants et du quantum de leur rémunération. Toute hésitation, toute tergiversation à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour répondre aux attentes des actionnaires sera sévèrement punie.

C’est la loi implacable des marchés financiers. Quiconque est surpris des mesures prises par Lowe’s chez RONA n’a pas compris les règles de l’économie mondialisée et financiarisée. Ces règles s’appliquent également aux entreprises canadiennes lors d’acquisitions de sociétés étrangères.

On peut évidemment regretter cette tournure, pourtant prévisible, chez RONA, mais il ne sert à rien ni à personne d’invoquer de possibles représailles en catimini contre RONA.

QUE FAIRE, ALORS ?

Ce n’est pas en aval, mais en amont que l’on doit agir. Dans le contexte juridique et réglementaire canadien, le seul obstacle aux prises de contrôle non souhaitées provient d’une structure de capital à double classe d’actions ou toute forme de propriété (actionnaires de contrôle, protection législative) qui met la société à l’abri des pressions à court terme des actionnaires de tout acabit. Faut-il rappeler que les grandes sociétés québécoises (et canadiennes) doivent leur pérennité à des formes de capital de cette nature, tout particulièrement les actions à vote multiple ?

Il serait approprié que toutes les institutions financières canadiennes appuient ces formes de capital, en particulier les actions multivotantes, pourvu qu’elles soient bien encadrées. C’est ce que font la Caisse de dépôt, le Fonds de solidarité et les grands fonds institutionnels canadiens regroupés dans la Coalition canadienne pour la bonne gouvernance.

(Il est étonnant que Desjardins, quintessentielle institution québécoise, se soit dotée d’une politique selon laquelle cette institution « ne privilégie pas les actions multivotantes, qu’il s’agit d’une orientation globale qui a été mûrement réfléchie et qui s’appuie sur les travaux et analyses de différents spécialistes » ; cette politique donne à Desjardins, paraît-il, toute la souplesse requise pour évaluer les situations au cas par cas ! On est loin du soutien aux entrepreneurs auquel on se serait attendu de Desjardins.)

Mais que fait-on lorsque, comme ce fut le cas au deuxième acte de RONA, les administrateurs et les dirigeants appuient avec enthousiasme la prise de contrôle de leur société ? Alors restent les actionnaires pourtant grands gagnants en vertu des primes payées par l’acquéreur. Certains actionnaires institutionnels à mission publique, réunis en consortium, pourraient détenir suffisamment d’actions (33,3 %) pour bloquer une transaction.

Ce type de consortium informel devrait toutefois être constitué bien avant toute offre d’achat et ne porter que sur quelques sociétés d’une importance stratégique évidente pour le Québec.

Sans actionnaire de contrôle, sans protection juridique contre les prises de contrôle étrangères (comme c’est le cas pour les banques et compagnies d’assurances, les sociétés de télécommunications, de transport aérien), sans mesures pour protéger des entreprises stratégiques, il faut alors se soumettre hélas aux impératifs des marchés financiers.

Êtes-vous moniste, pluraliste ou de l’approche impartiale, eu égard aux objectifs de l’organisation ?


Voici un article très éclairant sur la compréhension des modèles qui expliquent la recherche des objectifs de l’entreprise par les administrateurs de sociétés.

L’article de Amir Licht, professeur de droit à Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, et publié sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, présente une nouvelle façon de concevoir la gouvernance des organisations.

Êtes-vous moniste, pluraliste ou de l’approche impartiale, eu égard à la détermination des objectifs de l’organisation  ?

Dans le domaine de la gouvernance des entreprises, l’approche de la priorité accordée aux actionnaires domine depuis le début des lois sur la gouvernance des sociétés. C’est l’approche moniste qui considère que les organisations ont comme principal objectif de maximiser les bénéfices des actionnaires.

Récemment, une nouvelle approche émerge avec vigueur. C’est la conception selon laquelle l’entreprise doit prioritairement viser à atteindre les objectifs de l’ensemble des parties prenantes. On parle alors d’une approche pluraliste, c’est-à-dire d’un modèle de gouvernance qui vise à rencontrer les objectifs de plusieurs parties prenantes, d’une manière satisfaisante et optimale.

L’auteur constate que ces deux approches ont plusieurs failles et qu’un modèle mettant principalement l’accent sur l’impartialité de tous les administrateurs est la clé pour l’atteinte des objectifs de l’organisation.

The monistic position endorses a single maximand (that which is to be maximized)—invariably, shareholder interest—while the pluralistic position supports a multiple-objective duty that would balance the interests of several stakeholder constituencies, shareholders included.

Je vous invite à lire ce court article afin de vous former une opinion sur le modèle de gestion privilégiée par votre organisation.

Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Bonne lecture !

 

Stakeholder Impartiality: A New Classic Approach for the Objectives of the Corporation

 

Modèles de gouvernance
Ivan Tchotourian, revue Contact – Université Laval

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The stockholder/stakeholder dilemma has occupied corporate leaders and corporate lawyers for over a century. Most recently, the Business Roundtable, in a complete turnaround of its prior position, stated that “the paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the corporation’s stockholders.” The signatories of this statement failed, however, to specify how they would carry out these newly stated ideals. Directors of large U.K. companies don’t enjoy this luxury anymore. Under section 172 of the Companies Act 2006, directors are required to have regard to the interests of the company’s employees, business partners, the community, and the environment, when they endeavor to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members (shareholders). Government regulations promulgated in 2018 require large companies to include in their strategic reports a new statement on how the directors have considered stakeholders’ interest in discharging this duty.

These developments are recent twists in a plot that has been unfolding—in circles, in must be said—in the debate over the objectives of the corporation. This debate oscillates between two polar positions, dubbed “monistic” and “pluralistic” in the business management parlance. The monistic position endorses a single maximand (that which is to be maximized)—invariably, shareholder interest—while the pluralistic position supports a multiple-objective duty that would balance the interests of several stakeholder constituencies, shareholders included. How to perform this balancing act is a question that has virtually never been addressed until now. When the Supreme Court of Canada in 2008 discussed it in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, it explicitly eschewed giving it an answer. Lawyers are similarly at sea with regard to a multiple-stakeholder-objective provision in India’s Companies Act, 2013.

This article advances a new, yet classical, approach for the task of considering the interests of various stakeholders by directors and other corporate fiduciaries. I argue that for lawfully accomplishing this task, while also complying with their standard duties of loyalty and care, directors should exercise their discretion impartially. Respectively, judicial review of directors’ conduct in terms of treating different stakeholders should implement the concomitant doctrine of impartiality. This approach is new, as it has not yet been implemented in this context. At the same time, this approach is also classical, even orthodox. The duty of impartiality (or even-handedness, or fairness; courts use these terms interchangeably) has evolved in traditional trust law mostly during the nineteenth century. In recent years, it has been applied in trust cases in several common law jurisdictions. More importantly, this duty has been applied during the latter part of the twentieth century in modern, complex settings of pension funds, where fund trustees face inescapable conflicts between subgroups of savers. These conflicts resemble the tensions between different stakeholders in business corporations—a feature that renders this doctrine a suitable source of inspiration for the task at hand.

In a nutshell, the duty of impartiality accepts that there could be irreconcilable tensions and conflicts among several trust beneficiaries who in all other respects stand on equal footing vis-à-vis the trustee. Applying the rule against duty-duty conflict (dual fiduciary) in this setting would be ineffective, as it would disable the trustee—and consequently, the trust—without providing a solution to the conundrum. The duty of impartiality calls on the trustee to consider the different interests of the beneficiaries impartially, even-handedly, fairly, etc.; it does not impose any heavier burden on the good-faith exercise of the trustee’s discretion. Crucially, the duty of impartiality does not imply equality. All that it requires is that the different interests be considered within very broad margins.

This article thus proposes an analogous process-oriented impartiality duty for directors—to consider the interests of relevant stakeholders. Stakeholder impartiality, too, is a lean duty whose main advantage lies in its being workable. It is particularly suitable for legal systems that hold a pluralistic stance on the objectives of the corporation, such as Canada’s and India’s open-ended stakeholderist approaches. Such a doctrinal framework might also prove useful for systems and individuals that endorse a monistic, shareholder-focused approach. That could be the case in the United Kingdom and Australia, for instance, where directors could face liability if they did not consider creditors’ interest in a timely fashion even before the company reaches insolvency. Moreover, this approach could be helpful where the most extreme versions of doctrinal shareholderism arguably rein, such as Delaware law post-NACEPF v. Gheewalla—in particular, with regard to tensions between common and preferred stockholders post-Trados.

A normatively appealing legal regime is unlikely to satisfy even its proponents if it does not lend itself to practical implementation; a fortiori for its opponents. For legal systems and for individual lawyers that champion a pluralistic stakeholder-oriented approach for the objective of the corporation, having a workable doctrine for implementing that approach is crucial—an absolute necessity. This is precisely where impartiality holds a promise for advancing the discourse and actual legal regulation of shareholder-stakeholder relations through fiduciary duties.

The complete article is available for download here.

Prix Fidéide | Saine gouvernance


Je me fais le porte-parole du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) pour vous sensibiliser au lancement d’un Prix Fidéide visant à reconnaître et encourager les meilleures pratiques en gouvernance : le Fidéide Saine gouvernance.

Le CAS s’associe à nouveau à la Chambre de commerce et d’industrie de Québec (CCIQ) pour la sélection des candidats à ce prix Fidéide.

J’ai donc décidé, à la suite d’une demande de Chantale Coulombe, présidente du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, d’aider à susciter des candidatures pour ce prestigieux prix en gouvernance. Le prix sera présenté en collaboration avec le cabinet d’avocats Jolicoeur Lacasse.

Voici donc le communiqué que la direction du Collège souhaite partager avec les abonnés de mon blogue.

 

 

Fidéide Saine gouvernance

 

Les critères

Au nombre des critères pour se mériter ce prix, l’entreprise doit avoir en place un comité consultatif ou un conseil d’administration et elle doit s’être distinguée en ayant adopté une ou des pratiques de gouvernance reconnue(s) au cours des trois dernières années que ce soit en lien notamment avec :

(i) la gestion de risque

(ii) les mesures de la performance financière et non financière

(iii) l’implantation de sous-comités

(iv) la parité

(v) les dossiers de ressources humaines

(vi) la relève au sein du CA et\ou au sein de la direction de l’organisation

(vii) le développement durable

(viii) les technologies ou

(iv) la responsabilité sociale.

 

Retour sur le Fidéide Saine Gouvernance 2019

Connus et reconnus dans la grande région de la Capitale-Nationale et de Chaudière-Appalaches, les Fidéides visent à récompenser des entreprises qui se sont démarquées pour des performances exceptionnelles. L’an dernier, pour la toute première fois, la Chambre ajoutait la catégorie Saine gouvernance et c’est la Coopérative des consommateurs de Lorette – Convivio IGA qui a eu l’honneur de décrocher ce premier Fidéide. Deux autres finalistes prestigieux avaient retenu l’attention du jury en 2019, soit : l’Administration portuaire de Québec et le Réseau de transport de la capitale (RTC).

 

Une occasion de reconnaître et d’encourager la saine gouvernance

À titre d’administrateur de sociétés, vous connaissez sans aucun doute des organisations qui mériteraient une telle distinction. Aussi, je vous invite fortement à les inciter à poser leur candidature au plus tard le 5 novembre.

En mettant les projecteurs sur les meilleures pratiques adoptées par ces entreprises, c’est toute la gouvernance des sociétés qui en profitera.

 

Informations et dépôt des candidatures

 

Pour plus de détails, visitez la page Fidéide Saine gouvernance 2020 sur le site du Collège ou encore, rendez-vous sur la page désignée sur le site de la Chambre.

 

Changement de perspective en gouvernance de sociétés !


Yvan Allaire*, président exécutif du conseil de l’Institut sur la gouvernance (IGOPP) vient de me faire parvenir un nouvel article intitulé « The Business Roundtable on “The Purpose of a Corporation” Back to the future! ».

Cet article, qui doit bientôt paraître dans le Financial Post, intéressera assurément tous les administrateurs siégeant à des conseils d’administration, et qui sont à l’affût des nouveautés dans le domaine de la gouvernance.

Le document discute des changements de paradigmes proposés par les CEO des grandes corporations américaines. Les administrateurs selon ce groupe de dirigeants doivent tenir compte de l’ensemble des parties prenantes (stakeholders) dans la gouverne des organisations, et non plus accorder la priorité aux actionnaires.

Cet article discute des retombées de cette approche et des difficultés eu égard à la mise en œuvre dans le système corporatif américain.

Le texte est en anglais. Une version française devrait être produite bientôt sur le site de l’IGOPP.

Bonne lecture !

 

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CEOs in Business Roundtable ‘Redefine’ Corporate Purpose To Stretch Beyond Shareholders

The Business Roundtable on “The Purpose of a Corporation” Back to the future!

Yvan Allaire, PhD (MIT), FRSC

 

In September 2019, CEOs of large U.S. corporations have embraced with suspect enthusiasm the notion that a corporation’s purpose is broader than merely“ creating shareholder value”. Why now after 30 years of obedience to the dogma of shareholder primacy and servile (but highly paid) attendance to the whims and wants of investment funds?


Simply put, the answer rests with the recent conversion of these very funds, in particular index funds, to the church of ecological sanctity and social responsibility. This conversion was long acoming but inevitable as the threat to the whole system became more pressing and proximate.

The indictment of the “capitalist” system for the wealth inequality it produced and the environmental havoc it wreaked had to be taken seriously as it crept into the political agenda in the U.S. Fair or not, there is a widespread belief that the root cause of this dystopia lies in the exclusive focus of corporations on maximizing shareholder value. That had to be addressed in the least damaging way to the whole system.

Thus, at the urging of traditional investment funds, CEOs of large corporations, assembled under the banner of the Business Roundtable, signed a ringing statement about sharing “a fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders”.

That commitment included:

Delivering value to our customers

Investing in our employees

Dealing fairly and ethically with our suppliers.

Supporting the communities in which we work.

Generating long-term value for shareholders, who provide the capital that allows companies to invest, grow and innovate.

It is remarkable (at least for the U.S.) that the commitment to shareholders now ranks in fifth place, a good indication of how much the key economic players have come to fear the goings-on in American politics. That statement of “corporate purpose” was a great public relations coup as it received wide media coverage and provides cover for large corporations and investment funds against attacks on their behavior and on their very existence.


In some way, that statement of corporate purpose merely retrieves what used to be the norm for large corporations. Take, for instance, IBM’s seven management principles which guided this company’s most successful run from the 1960’s to 1992:

Seven Management Principles at IBM 1960-1992

  1. Respect for the individual
  2. Service to the customer
  3. Excellence must be way of life
  4. Managers must lead effectively
  5. Obligation to stockholders
  6. Fair deal for the supplier
  7. IBM should be a good corporate citizen

The similarity with the five “commitments” recently discovered at the Business Roundtable is striking. Of course, in IBM’s heydays, there were no rogue funds, no “activist” hedge funds or private equity funds to pressure corporate management into delivering maximum value creation for shareholders. How will these funds whose very existence depends on their success at fostering shareholder primacy cope with this “heretical nonsense” of equal treatment for all stakeholders?

As this statement of purpose is supported, was even ushered in, by large institutional investors, it may well shield corporations against attacks by hedge funds and other agitators. To be successful, these funds have to rely on the overt or tacit support of large investors. As these investors now endorse a stakeholder view of the corporation, how can they condone and back these financial players whose only goal is to push up the stock price often at the painful expense of other stakeholders?

This re-discovery in the US of a stakeholder model of the corporation should align it with Canada and the UK where a while back the stakeholder concept of the corporation was adopted in their legal framework.

Thus in Canada, two judgments of the Supreme Court are peremptory: the board must not grant any preferential treatment in its decision-making process to the interests of the shareholders or any other stakeholder, but must act exclusively in the interests of the corporation of which they are the directors.

In the UK, Section 172 of the Companies Act of 2006 states: “A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, among which the interests of the company’s employees, the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment,…”

So, belatedly, U.S. corporations will, it seems, self-regulate and self-impose a sort of stakeholder model in their decision-making.

Alas, as in Canada and the UK, they will quickly find out that there is little or no guidance on how to manage the difficult trade-offs among the interests of various stakeholders, say between shareholders and workers when considering outsourcing operations to a low-cost country.

But that may be the appeal of this “purpose of the corporation”: it sounds enlightened but does not call for any tangible changes in the way corporations are managed.

 

Répertoire des articles en gouvernance publiés sur LinkedIn


L’un des moyens utilisés pour mieux faire connaître les grandes tendances en gouvernance de sociétés est la publication d’articles choisis sur ma page LinkedIn.

Ces articles sont issus des parutions sur mon blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé

Depuis janvier 2016, j’ai publié un total de 43 articles sur ma page LinkedIn.

Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la liste des 10 articles que j’ai publiés à ce jour en 2019 :

 

Liste des 10 articles publiés à ce jour en 2019

 

Image associée

 

 

1, Les grandes firmes d’audit sont plus sélectives dans le choix de leurs mandats

2. Gouvernance fiduciaire et rôles des parties prenantes (stakeholders)

3. Problématiques de gouvernance communes lors d’interventions auprès de diverses organisations – Partie I Relations entre président du CA et DG

4. L’âge des administrateurs de sociétés représente-t-il un facteur déterminant dans leur efficacité comme membres indépendants de CA ?

5. On constate une évolution progressive dans la composition des conseils d’administration

6. Doit-on limiter le nombre d’années qu’un administrateur siège à un conseil afin de préserver son indépendance ?

7. Manuel de saine gouvernance au Canada

8. Étude sur le mix des compétences dans la composition des conseils d’administration

9. Indice de diversité de genre | Equilar

10. Le conseil d’administration est garant de la bonne conduite éthique de l’organisation !

 

Si vous souhaitez voir l’ensemble des parutions, je vous invite à vous rendre sur le Lien vers les 43 articles publiés sur LinkedIn depuis 2016

 

Bonne lecture !

Comment un PDG doit-il se comporter afin de faire appel aux atouts stratégiques de son CA ?


Récemment, je suis tombé sur un article vraiment passionnant qui explique la nature des relations entre le PDG et le CA,

La dynamique entre ces deux acteurs de la gouvernance est fondamentale afin de bien comprendre et ainsi mettre en œuvre des comportements à valeur ajoutée entre les administrateurs et le chef de la direction (CEO).

Cette étude, publiée par Maureen Bujno, Benjamin Finzi et Vincent Firthis, gestionnaires principaux chez Deloitte LLP’s Center for Board Effectiveness, et paru sur le Forum en gouvernance du Harvard Law School, démontre que les CEO croient que leurs CA devraient être un atout stratégique d’une valeur déterminante.

Voici sept conseils qui mettent l’accent sur la manière dont le CEO devrait s’y prendre pour amener le CA à devenir un atout stratégique dans des conditions qui peuvent paraître de l’ordre de la confrontation :

 

  1. L’initiative conduisant aux relations efficaces revient au CEO ;
  2. Le CEO doit être transparent au maximum ;
  3. Le CEO doit tirer avantage de la tension naturelle qui se développe dans les relations avec son CA ;
  4. Le CEO doit encourager l’expérience vécue par le CA plutôt que de mettre uniquement l’accent sur les réunions du conseil ;
  5. Le CEO et son équipe doivent faire l’impossible pour rendre les documents intelligibles et synthétisés ;
  6. Le CEO devrait y penser à deux fois avant d’agir comme président du conseil ;
  7. Le CEO devrait avoir son mot à dire eu égard aux compétences requises des nouveaux administrateurs.

 

L’extrait ci-dessous présente les teneurs de cet article.  Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de cet article, surtout si vous occupez un poste de responsabilité comme premier dirigeant, peu importe le type d’organisation.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

 

A More Strategic Board

 

 

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Introduction

 

To be a CEO today is to have one of the most complex and demanding—not to mention visible—jobs in the world. Beyond the scope of their business, CEOs and the organizations they lead have increasingly significant and more transparent influence at multiple levels—societal, cultural, environmental, political—affecting vast numbers of stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, and citizens. Meanwhile, the world around them is in constant motion.

Given the weight of responsibility that rests on their shoulders, it’s no wonder that CEOs, when observed from a distance, are often depicted in near-heroic terms. It’s also not surprising that CEOs, when engaged in more intimate conversations about their role, are often keenly interested in finding help to validate their models of the business environment and to develop their vision of the future.

But where can CEOs find the sounding board they need without falling short of the extraordinary abilities that people find reassuring to attribute to them? One possible answer lies in the recognition that CEOs also have bosses: the boards who hire them, evaluate them, set their pay, and sometimes fire them. In fact, as one CEO told us, “The board relationship is really the most critical factor in [a CEO’s] success.”

While there is no shortage of advice on how boards can improve their effectiveness as the corporate and management oversight entity, there is far less written on how CEOs and boards can work together to enhance their relationship for strategic benefit. We set out to address this by conducting more than 50 conversations with Fortune 1,000 CEOs, board chairs, directors, academics, and external board advisers to ask them to share their experience and perspectives. This article draws insights from what we heard.

For CEOs, the board of the future is strategic

 

The days of boards being a collection of the CEO’s best friends are behind us. Boards of integrity want far more than to be identified as aloof VIPs who meet from time to time to rubber-stamp management’s decisions. Even the notion that boards be actively engaged in overseeing the development and execution of corporate strategy is now being superseded by the expectation that they get actively involved in interpreting complex market dynamics and shaping a vision for the company’s future. Board chairs and other directors told us they want to contribute more value and use their full range of talents: “The trendline is unequivocal that directors want to be more involved in strategy and discussions at that [top] level.”

“CEOs are realizing that the board is a strategic asset. That’s the board of the future.”

— Director

CEOs seem to want that, too. Boards represent a unique wealth of strategic and leadership experience that CEOs should want to tap into. As one CEO shared, “When I took over [as CEO], it was clear to me that the executive team wanted as little interaction with the board as possible. I feel completely different about that. Getting the board engaged is going to pay off down the road.”

A key challenge for CEOs is how. Consider that the typical board is composed of prominent, successful individuals, accustomed to having significant influence and to having people ready to assist them when needed. Further, being a board member is not a full-time role, and board members likely have multiple other commitments that constrain the amount of time and energy they can spend on board activities, which might make it difficult for the CEO to attract the board’s focused attention.

How can CEOs engage the board in becoming a “strategic asset” under such challenging circumstances? Here are seven pieces of advice drawn from our research.

Comment les firmes de conseil en votation évaluent-elles les efforts des entreprises eu égard à leur gestion environnementale et sociale ?


Les auteurs* de cet article expliquent en des termes très clairs le sens que les firmes de conseil en votation Glass Lewis et ISS donnent aux risques environnementaux et sociaux associés aux pratiques de gouvernance des entreprises publiques (cotées).

Il est vrai que l’on parle de ESG (en anglais) ou de RSE (en français) sans donner de définition explicite de ces concepts.

Ici, on montre comment les firmes spécialisées en conseils aux investisseurs mesurent les dimensions sous-jacentes à ces expressions.

Les administrateurs de sociétés ont tout intérêt à connaître sur quoi ces firmes se basent pour évaluer la qualité des efforts de leur entreprise en matière de gestion environnementale et de considérations sociales.

J’espère que vous apprécierez ce court extrait paru sur le Forum du Harvard Law School.

Bonne lecture !

 

 

Glass Lewis, ISS, and ESG

 

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With some help from leading investor groups like Black Rock and T. Rowe Price, environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) issues, once the sole purview of specialist investors and activist groups, are increasingly working their way into the mainstream for corporate America. For some boards, conversations about ESG are nothing new. For many directors, however, the increased emphasis on the subject creates some consternation, in part because it’s not always clear what issues properly fall under the ESG umbrella. E, S, and G can mean different things to different people—not to mention the fact that some subjects span multiple categories. How do boards know what it is that they need to know? Where should boards be directing their attention?

A natural starting place for directors is to examine the guidelines published by the leading proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis. While not to be held up as a definitive prescription for good governance practices, the stances adopted by both advisors can provide a window into how investors who look to these organizations for guidance are thinking about the subject.

 

Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)

 

In February of 2018, ISS launched an Environmental & Social Quality Score which they describe as “a data-driven approach to measuring the quality of corporate disclosures on environmental and social issues, including sustainability governance, and to identify key disclosure omissions.”

To date, their coverage focuses on approximately 4,700 companies across 24 industries they view “as being most exposed to E&S risks, including: Energy, Materials, Capital Goods, Transportation, Automobiles & Components, and Consumer Durables & Apparel.” ISS believes that the extent to which companies disclose their practices and policies publicly, as well as the quality of a company’s disclosure on their practices, can be an indicator of ESG performance. This view is not unlike that espoused by Black Rock, who believes that a lack of ESG disclosure beyond what is legally mandated often necessitates further research.

Below is a summary of how ISS breaks down E, S, & G. Clearly the governance category includes topics familiar to any public company board.

 

iss-esg-quality-score-table

 

ISS’ E&S scoring is based on answers to over 380 individual questions which ISS analysts attempt to answer for each covered company based on disclosed data. The majority of the questions in the ISS model are applied to all industry groups, and all of them are derived from third-party lists or initiatives, including the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. The E&S Quality Score measures the company’s level of environmental and social disclosure risk, both overall and specific to the eight broad categories listed in the table above. ISS does not combine ES&G into a single score, but provides a separate E&S score that stands alongside the governance score.

These disclosure risk scores, similar to the governance scores companies have become accustomed to seeing each year, are scaled from 1 to 10 with lower scores indicating a lower level of risk relative to industry peers. For example, a score of 2 indicates that a company has lower risk than 80% of its industry peers.

 

Glass Lewis

 

Glass Lewis uses data and ratings from Sustainalytics, a provider of ESG research, in the ESG Profile section of their standard Proxy Paper reports for large cap companies or “in instances where [they] identify material oversight issues.” Their stated goal is to provide summary data and insights that can be used by Glass Lewis clients as part of their investment decision-making, including aligning proxy voting and engagement practices with ESG risk management considerations.

The Glass Lewis evaluation, using Sustainalytics guidelines, rates companies on a matrix which weighs overall “ESG Performance” against the highest level of “ESG Controversy.” Companies who are leaders in terms of ESG practices (or disclosure) have a higher threshold for triggering risk in this model.

 

glass-lewis-risk-model-chart

 

The evaluation model also notes that some companies involved in particular product areas are naturally deemed higher risk, including adult entertainment, alcoholic beverages, arctic drilling, controversial weapons, gambling, genetically modified plants and seeds, oil sands, pesticides, thermal coal, and tobacco.

Conclusion

 

ISS and Glass Lewis guidelines can help provide a basic structure for starting board conversations about ESG. For most companies, the primary focus is on transparency, in other words how clearly are companies disclosing their practices and philosophies regarding ESG issues in their financial filings and on their corporate websites? When a company has had very public environmental or social controversies—and particularly when those issues have impacted shareholder value—advisory firm evaluations of corporate transparency may also impact voting recommendations on director elections or related shareholder proposals.

Pearl Meyer does not expect the advisory firms’ ESG guidelines to have much, if any, bearing on compensation-related recommendations or scorecards in the near term. In the long term, however, we do think certain hot-button topics will make their way from the ES&G scorecard to the compensation scorecard. This shift will likely happen sooner in areas where ESG issues are more prominent, such as those specifically named by Glass Lewis.

We are recommending that organizations take the time to examine any ESG issues relevant to their business and understand how those issues may be important to stakeholders on a proactive basis, perhaps adding ESG policies to the list of sunny day shareholder outreach topics after this year’s proxy season. This does take time and effort, but better that than to find out about a nagging ESG issue through activist activity or a negative voting recommendation from ISS or Glass Lewis.

 

References

1. https://www.issgovernance.com/iss-announces-launch-of-environmental-social-qualityscore-corporate-profiling-solution/

2. https://www.glasslewis.com/understanding-esg-content/

_________________________________________________________

* David Bixby is managing director and Paul Hudson is principal at Pearl Meyer & Partners, LLC. This post is based on a Pearl Meyer memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Social Responsibility Resolutions by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

Quelles sont les responsabilités dévolues à un conseil d’administration ?


En gouvernance des sociétés, il existe un certain nombre de responsabilités qui relèvent impérativement d’un conseil d’administration.

À la suite d’une décision rendue par la Cour Suprême du Delaware dans l’interprétation de la doctrine Caremark (voir ici),il est indiqué que pour satisfaire leur devoir de loyauté, les administrateurs de sociétés doivent faire des efforts raisonnables (de bonne foi) pour mettre en œuvre un système de surveillance et en faire le suivi.

Without more, the existence of management-level compliance programs is not enough for the directors to avoid Caremark exposure.

L’article de Martin Lipton *, paru sur le Forum de Harvard Law School on Corporate Governance, fait le point sur ce qui constitue les meilleures pratiques de gouvernance à ce jour.

Bonne lecture !

 

Spotlight on Boards

 

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  1. Recognize the heightened focus of investors on “purpose” and “culture” and an expanded notion of stakeholder interests that includes employees, customers, communities, the economy and society as a whole and work with management to develop metrics to enable the corporation to demonstrate their value;
  2. Be aware that ESG and sustainability have become major, mainstream governance topics that encompass a wide range of issues, such as climate change and other environmental risks, systemic financial stability, worker wages, training, retraining, healthcare and retirement, supply chain labor standards and consumer and product safety;
  3. Oversee corporate strategy (including purpose and culture) and the communication of that strategy to investors, keeping in mind that investors want to be assured not just about current risks and problems, but threats to long-term strategy from global, political, social, and technological developments;
  4. Work with management to review the corporation’s strategy, and related disclosures, in light of the annual letters to CEOs and directors, or other communications, from BlackRock, State Street, Vanguard, and other investors, describing the investors’ expectations with respect to corporate strategy and how it is communicated;
  5. Set the “tone at the top” to create a corporate culture that gives priority to ethical standards, professionalism, integrity and compliance in setting and implementing both operating and strategic goals;
  6. Oversee and understand the corporation’s risk management, and compliance plans and efforts and how risk is taken into account in the corporation’s business decision-making; monitor risk management ; respond to red flags if and when they arise;
  7. Choose the CEO, monitor the CEO’s and management’s performance and develop and keep current a succession plan;
  8. Have a lead independent director or a non-executive chair of the board who can facilitate the functioning of the board and assist management in engaging with investors;
  9. Together with the lead independent director or the non-executive chair, determine the agendas for board and committee meetings and work with management to ensure that appropriate information and sufficient time are available for full consideration of all matters;
  10. Determine the appropriate level of executive compensation and incentive structures, with awareness of the potential impact of compensation structures on business priorities and risk-taking, as well as investor and proxy advisor views on compensation;
  11. Develop a working partnership with the CEO and management and serve as a resource for management in charting the appropriate course for the corporation;
  12. Monitor and participate, as appropriate, in shareholder engagement efforts, evaluate corporate governance proposals, and work with management to anticipate possible takeover attempts and activist attacks in order to be able to address them more effectively, if they should occur;
  13. Meet at least annually with the team of company executives and outside advisors that will advise the corporation in the event of a takeover proposal or an activist attack;
  14. Be open to management inviting an activist to meet with the board to present the activist’s opinion of the strategy and management of the corporation;
  15. Evaluate the individual director’s, board’s and committees’ performance on a regular basis and consider the optimal board and committee composition and structure, including board refreshment, expertise and skill sets, independence and diversity, as well as the best way to communicate with investors regarding these issues;
  16. Review corporate governance guidelines and committee workloads and charters and tailor them to promote effective board and committee functioning;
  17. Be prepared to deal with crises; and
  18. Be prepared to take an active role in matters where the CEO may have a real or perceived conflict, including takeovers and attacks by activist hedge funds focused on the CEO.

 

Afin de satisfaire ces attentes, les entreprises publiques doivent :

 

  1. Have a sufficient number of directors to staff the requisite standing and special committees and to meet investor expectations for experience, expertise, diversity, and periodic refreshment;
  2. Compensate directors commensurate with the time and effort that they are required to devote and the responsibility that they assume;
  3. Have directors who have knowledge of, and experience with, the corporation’s businesses and with the geopolitical developments that affect it, even if this results in the board having more than one director who is not “independent”;
  4. Have directors who are able to devote sufficient time to preparing for and attending board and committee meetings and engaging with investors;
  5. Provide the directors with the data that is critical to making sound decisions on strategy, compensation and capital allocation;
  6. Provide the directors with regular tutorials by internal and external experts as part of expanded director education and to assure that in complicated, multi-industry and new-technology corporations, the directors have the information and expertise they need to respond to disruption, evaluate current strategy and strategize beyond the horizon; and
  7. Maintain a truly collegial relationship among and between the company’s senior executives and the members of the board that facilitates frank and vigorous discussion and enhances the board’s role as strategic partner, evaluator, and monitor.

_________________________________________________________

Martin Lipton* is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Un document incontournable en gouvernance des entreprises cotées : « OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2019 »


Voici un rapport de recherche exhaustif publié tous les deux ans par l’OCDE.

Vous y retrouverez une mine de renseignements susceptibles de répondre à toute question relative à la gouvernance des plus importantes autorités des marchés financiers au monde.

C’est un document essentiel qui permet de comparer et d’évaluer les progrès en gouvernance dans les 49 plus importants marchés financiers.

Vous pouvez télécharger le rapport à la fin du sommaire exécutif publié ici. Le document est illustré par une multitude de tableaux et de figures qui font image il va sans dire.

Voici l’introduction au document de recherche. Celui-ci vient d’être publié. La version française devrait suivre bientôt.

Bonne lecture !

 

The 2019 edition of the OECD Corporate Governance Factbook (the “Factbook”) contains comparative data and information across 49 different jurisdictions including all G20, OECD and Financial Stability Board members. The information is presented and commented in 40 tables and 51 figures covering a broad range of institutional, legal and regulatory provisions. The Factbook provides an important and unique tool for monitoring the implementation of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Issued every two years, it is actively used by governments, regulators and others for information about implementation practices and developments that may influence their effectiveness.

It is divided into five chapters addressing: 1) the corporate and market landscape; 2) the corporate governance framework; 3) the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions; 4) the corporate boards of directors; and 5) mechanisms for flexibility and proportionality in corporate governance.

 

OECD (2019), OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2019

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2019 »

 

The corporate and market landscape

 

Effective design and implementation of corporate governance rules requires a good empirical understanding of the ownership and business landscape to which they will be applied. The first chapter of the Factbook therefore provides an overview of ownership patterns around the world, with respect to both the categories of owners and the degree of concentration of ownership in individual listed companies. Since the G20/OECD Principles also include recommendations with respect to the functioning of stock markets, it also highlights some key structural changes with respect to stock exchanges.

The OECD Equity Market Review of Asia (OECD, 2018a) reported that stock markets have undergone profound changes during the past 20 years. Globally, one of the most important developments has been the rapid growth of Asian stock markets—both in absolute and in relative terms. In 2017, a record number of 1 074 companies listed in Asia, almost twice as many as the annual average for the previous 16 years. Of the five jurisdictions that have had the highest number of non-financial company IPOs in the last decade, three are in Asia. In 2017, Asian non-financial companies accounted for 43% of the global volume of equity raised. The proportion attributable to European and US companies has declined during the same period. In terms of stock exchanges, by total market capitalisation, four Asian exchanges were in the top ten globally (Japan Exchange Group, Shanghai Stock Exchange, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, and Shenzhen Stock Exchange).

With respect to ownership patterns at the company level in the world’s 50 000 listed companies, a recent OECD study (De la Cruz et al., forthcoming) reports a number of features of importance to policymaking and implementation of the G20/OECD Principles. The report, which contains unique information about ownership in companies from 54 jurisdictions that together represent 95% of global market capitalisation, shows that four main categories of investors dominate ownership of today’s publicly listed companies. These are: institutional investors, public sector owners, private corporations, and strategic individual investors. The largest category is institutional investors, holding 41% of global market capitalisation. The second largest category is the public sector, which has significant ownership stakes in 20% of the world’s listed companies and hold shares representing 13% of global market capitalisation. With respect to ownership in individual companies, in half of the world’s publicly listed companies, the three largest shareholders hold more than 50% of the capital, and in three-quarters of the world’s public listed companies, the three largest owners hold more than 30%. This is to a large extent attributable to the growth of stock markets in Asian emerging markets.

Stock exchanges have also undergone important structural changes in recent years, such as mergers and acquisitions and demutualisations. Out of 52 major stock exchanges in 49 jurisdictions, 18 now belong to one of four international groups. Thirty-three (63%) of these exchanges are either self-listed or have an ultimate parent company that is listed on one or more of its own exchanges. More than 62% of market capitalisation is concentrated in the five largest stock exchanges, while more than 95% is concentrated in the largest 25. The top 25 highest valued exchanges include 11 non-OECD jurisdictions.

 

The corporate governance framework

 

An important bedrock for implementing the Principles is the quality of the legal and regulatory framework, which is consistent with the rule of law in supporting effective supervision and enforcement.

Against this background, the Factbook monitors who serves as the lead regulatory institution for corporate governance of listed companies in each jurisdiction, as well as issues related to their independence. Securities regulators, financial regulators or a combination of the two play the key role in 82% of all jurisdictions, while the Central Bank plays the key role in 12%. The issue of the independence of regulators is commonly addressed (among 86% of regulatory institutions) through the creation of a formal governing body such as a board, council or commission, usually appointed to fixed terms ranging from two to eight years. In a majority of cases, independence from the government is also promoted by establishing a separate budget funded by fees assessed on regulated entities or a mix of fees and fines. On the other hand, 25% of the regulatory institutions surveyed are funded by the national budget.

Since 2015 when the G20/OECD Principles were issued, 84% of the 49 surveyed jurisdictions have amended either their company law or securities law, or both. Nearly all jurisdictions also have national codes or principles that complement laws, securities regulation and listing requirements. Nearly half of all jurisdictions have revised their national corporate governance codes in the past two years and 83% of them follow a “comply or explain” compliance practice. A growing percentage of jurisdictions—67%—now issue national reports on company implementation of corporate governance codes, up from 58% in 2015. In 29% of the jurisdictions it is the national authorities that serve as custodians of the national corporate governance code.

 

The rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and key ownership functions

 

The G20/OECD Principles state that the corporate governance framework shall protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights and ensure equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders.

Chapter 3 of the Factbook therefore provides detailed information related to rights to obtain information on shareholder meetings, to request meetings and to place items on the agenda, and voting rights. The chapter also provides detailed coverage of frameworks for review of related party transactions, triggers and mechanisms related to corporate takeover bids, and the roles and responsibilities of institutional investors.

All jurisdictions require companies to provide advance notice of general shareholder meetings. A majority establish a minimum notice period of between 15 and 21 days, while another third of the jurisdictions provide for longer notice periods. Nearly two-thirds of jurisdictions require such notices to be sent directly to shareholders, while all but four jurisdictions require multiple methods of notification, which may include use of a stock exchange or regulator’s electronic platform, publication on the company’s web site or in a newspaper.

Approximately 80% of jurisdictions establish deadlines of up to 60 days for convening special meetings at the request of shareholders, subject to specific ownership thresholds. This is an increase from 73% in 2015. Most jurisdictions (61%) set the ownership threshold for requesting a special shareholder meeting at 5%, while another 32% set the threshold at 10%. Compared to the threshold for requesting a shareholder meeting, many jurisdictions set lower thresholds for placing items on the agenda of the general meeting. With respect to the outcome of the shareholder meeting, approximately 80% of jurisdictions require the disclosure of voting decisions on each agenda item, including 59% that require such disclosure immediately or within 5 days.

The G20/OECD Principles state that the optimal capital structure of the company is best decided by the management and the board, subject to approval of the shareholders. This may include the issuing of different classes of shares with different rights attached to them. In practice, all but three of the 49 jurisdictions covered by the Factbook allow listed companies to issue shares with limited voting rights. In many cases, such shares come with a preference with respect to the receipt of the firm’s profits.

Related party transactions are typically addressed through a combination of measures, including board approval, shareholder approval, and mandatory disclosure. Provisions for board approval are common; two-thirds of jurisdictions surveyed require or recommend board approval of certain types of related party transactions. Shareholder approval requirements are applied in 55% of jurisdictions, but are often limited to large transactions and those that are not carried out on market terms. Nearly all jurisdictions require disclosure of related party transactions, with 82% requiring use of International Accounting Standards (IAS24), while an additional 8% allow flexibility to follow IAS 24 or the local standard.

The Factbook provides extensive data on frameworks for corporate takeovers. Among the 46 jurisdictions that have introduced a mandatory bid rule, 80% take an ex-post approach, where a bidder is required to initiate the bid after acquiring shares exceeding the threshold. Nine jurisdictions take an ex-ante approach, where a bidder is required to initiate a takeover bid for acquiring shares which would exceed the threshold. More than 80% of jurisdictions with mandatory takeover bid rules establish a mechanism to determine the minimum bidding price.

Considering the important role played by institutional investors as shareholders of listed companies, nearly all jurisdictions have established provisions for at least one category of institutional investors (such as pension, investment or insurance funds) to address conflicts of interest, either by prohibiting specific acts or requiring them to establish policies to manage conflicts of interest. Three-fourths of all jurisdictions have established requirements or recommendations for institutional investors to disclose their voting policies, while almost half require or recommend disclosure of actual voting records. Some jurisdictions establish regulatory requirements or may rely on voluntary stewardship codes to encourage various forms of ownership engagement, such as monitoring and constructive engagement with investee companies and maintaining the effectiveness of monitoring when outsourcing the exercise of voting rights.

 

The corporate board of directors

 

The G20/OECD Principles require that the corporate governance framework ensures the strategic guidance of the company by the board and its accountability to the company and its shareholders. The most common board format is the one-tier board system, which is favoured in twice as many jurisdictions as those that apply two-tier boards (supervisory and management boards). A growing number of jurisdictions allow both one and two-tier structures.

Almost all jurisdictions require or recommend a minimum number or ratio of independent directors. Definitions of independent directors have also been evolving during this period: 80% of jurisdictions now require directors to be independent of significant shareholders in order to be classified as independent, up from 64% in 2015. The shareholding threshold determining whether a shareholder is significant ranges from 2% to 50%, with 10% to 15% being the most common.

Recommendations or requirements for the separation of the board chair and CEO have doubled in the last four years to 70%, including 30% required. The 2015 edition of the Factbook reported a binding requirement in only 11% of the jurisdictions, with another 25% recommending it in codes.

Nearly all jurisdictions require an independent audit committee. Nomination and remuneration committees are not mandatory in most jurisdictions, although more than 80% of jurisdictions at least recommend these committees to be established and often to be comprised wholly or largely of independent directors.

Requirements or recommendations for companies to assign a risk management role to board level committees have sharply increased since 2015, from 62% to 87% of surveyed jurisdictions. Requirements or recommendations to implement internal control and risk management systems have also increased significantly, from 62% to 90%.

While recruitment and remuneration of management is a key board function, a majority of jurisdictions have a requirement or recommendation for a binding or advisory shareholder vote on remuneration policy for board members and key executives. And nearly all jurisdictions surveyed now require or recommend the disclosure of the remuneration policy and the level/amount of remuneration at least at aggregate levels. Disclosure of individual levels is required or recommended in 76% of jurisdictions.

The 2019 Factbook provides data for the first time on measures to promote gender balance on corporate boards and in senior management, most often via disclosure requirements and measures such as mandated quotas and/or voluntary targets. Nearly half of surveyed jurisdictions (49%) have established requirements to disclose gender composition of boards, compared to 22% with regards to senior management. Nine jurisdictions have mandatory quotas requiring a certain percentage of board seats to be filled by either gender. Eight rely on more flexible mechanisms such as voluntary goals or targets, while three resort to a combination of both. The proportion of senior management positions held by women is reported to be significantly higher than the proportion of board seats held by women.

 

Mechanisms for flexibility and proportionality in corporate governance

 

It has already been pointed out that effective implementation of the G20/OECD Principles requires a good empirical understanding of economic realities and adaption to changes in corporate and market developments over time. The G20/OECD Principles therefore state that policy makers have a responsibility to put in place a framework that is flexible enough to meet the needs of corporations that are operating in widely different circumstances, facilitating their development of new opportunities and the most efficient deployment of resources. The 2019 Factbook provides a special chapter that presents the main findings of a complementary OECD review of how 39 jurisdictions apply the concepts of flexibility and proportionality across seven different corporate governance regulatory areas. The chapter builds on the 2018 OECD report Flexibility and Proportionality in Corporate Governance (OECD, 2018b). The report finds that a vast majority of countries have criteria that allow for flexibility and proportionality at company level in each of the seven areas of regulation that were reviewed: 1) board composition, board committees and board qualifications; 2) remuneration; 3) related party transactions; 4), disclosure of periodic financial information and ad hoc information; 5) disclosure of major shareholdings; 6) takeovers; and 7) pre-emptive rights. The report also contains case studies of six countries, which provide a more detailed picture of how flexibility and proportionality is being used in practice.

The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

Le rôle du CA dans le développement durable et la création de valeur pour les actionnaires et les parties prenantes


Aujourd’hui, je présente un article publié par Azeus Convene qui montre l’importance accrue que les entreprises doivent apporter au développement durable.
L’article insiste sur le rôle du conseil d’administration pour faire des principes du développement durable à long terme les principales conditions de succès des organisations.
Les administrateurs doivent concevoir des politiques qui génèrent une valeur ajoutée à long terme pour les actionnaires, mais ils doivent aussi contribuer à améliorer le sort des parties prenantes, telles que les clients, les communautés et la société en général.
Il n’est cependant pas facile d’adopter des politiques qui mettent de l’avant les principes du développement durable et de la gestion des risques liés à l’environnement.Dans ce document, publié sur le site de Board Agenda, on explique l’approche que les conseils d’administration doivent adopter en insistant plus particulièrement sur trois points :

 

  1. Un leadership capable de faire valoir les nombreux avantages stratégiques à tirer de cette approche ;
  2. Des conseils eu égard à l’implantation des changements
  3. Le processus de communication à mettre en œuvre afin de faire valoir les succès des entreprises

 

L’article qui suit donne plus de détails sur les fondements et l’application de l’approche du développement durable.

 

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont appréciés.

 

Le développement durable, la création de valeur et le rôle du CA

 

 

 

Businesses everywhere are developing sustainability policies. Implementation is never easy, but the right guidance can show the way.

When the experts sat down to write the UK’s new Corporate Governance Code earlier this year, they drafted a critical first principle. The role of the board is to “promote the long-term sustainable success of the company”. Boardroom members should generate value for shareholders, but they should also be “contributing to wider society”.

It is the values inherent in this principle that enshrines sustainability at the heart of running a company today.

Often sustainability is viewed narrowly, relating to policies affecting climate change. But it has long since ceased to be just about the environment. Sustainability has become a multifaceted concern embracing the long-term interests of shareholders, but also responsibilities to society, customers and local communities.

Publications like Harvard Business Review now publish articles such as “Inclusive growth: profitable strategies for tackling poverty and inequality”, or “Competing on social purpose”. Forbes has “How procurement will save the world” and “How companies can increase market rewards for sustainability efforts”. Sustainability is a headline issue for company leaders and here to stay.

But it’s not always easy to see how sustainability is integrated into a company’s existing strategy. So, why should your company engage with sustainability and what steps can it take to ensure it is done well?

…one of the biggest issues at the heart of the drive for sustainability is leadership. Implementing the right policies is undoubtedly a “top-down” process, not least because legal rulings have emphatically cast sustainability as a fiduciary duty.

The reasons for adopting sustainability are as diverse as the people and groups upon which companies have an impact. First, there is the clear environmental argument. Governments alone cannot tackle growing environment risk and will need corporates to play their part through their strategies and business models.

The issues driving political leaders have also filtered down to investment managers who have developed deep concerns that companies should be building strategies that factor in environmental, social and governance (ESG) risk. Companies that ignore the issue risk failing to attract capital. A 2015 study by the global benchmarking organisation PRI (Principles for Responsible Investment), conducted with Deutsche Bank Asset Management, showed that among 2,200 studies undertaken since 1970, 63% found a positive link between a company’s ESG performance and financial performance.

There’s also the risk of being left behind, or self-inflicted damage. In an age of instant digital communication news travels fast and a company that fails on sustainability could quickly see stakeholder trust undermined.

Companies that embrace the topic can also create what might be termed “sustainability contagion”: businesses supplying “sustainable” clients must be sustainable themselves, generating a virtuous cascade of sustainability behaviour throughout the supply chain. That means positive results from implemented sustainability policies at one end of the chain, and pressure to comply at the other.

Leadership

But perhaps one of the biggest issues at the heart of the drive for sustainability is leadership. Implementing the right policies is undoubtedly a “top-down” process, not least because legal rulings have emphatically cast sustainability as a fiduciary duty. That makes executive involvement and leadership an imperative. However, involvement of management at the most senior level will also help instil the kind of culture change needed to make sustainability an ingrained part of an organization, and one that goes beyond mere compliance.

Leaders may feel the need to demonstrate the value of a sustainability step-change. This is needed because a full-blooded approach to sustainability could involve rethinking corporate structures, processes and performance measurement. Experts recognise three ways to demonstrate value: risk, reward and recognition.

“Risk” looks at issues such as potential dangers associated with ignoring sustainability such as loss of trust, reputational damage (as alluded to above), legal or regulatory action and fines.

A “rewards”-centred approach casts sustainability as an opportunity to be pursued, as long as policies boost revenues or cut costs, and stakeholders benefit.

Meanwhile, the “recognition” method argues that sharing credit for spreading sustainability policies promotes long-term engagement and responsibility.

Implementation

Getting sustainability policies off the ground can be tricky, particularly because of their multifaceted nature.

recent study into European boards conducted by Board Agenda & Mazars in association with the INSEAD Corporate Governance Centre showed that while there is growing recognition by boards about the importance of sustainability, there is also evidence that they experience challenges about how to implement effective ESG strategies.

Proponents advise the use of “foundation exercises” for helping form the bedrock of sustainability policies. For example, assessing baseline environmental and social performance; analysing corporate management, accountability structures and IT systems; and an examination of material risk and opportunity.

That should provide the basis for policy development. Then comes implementation. This is not always easy, because being sustainable can never be attributed to a single policy. Future-proofing a company has to be an ongoing process underpinned by structures, measures and monitoring.
Policy delivery can be strengthened by the appointment of a chief sustainability officer (CSO) and establishing structures around the role, such as regular reporting to the chief executive and board, as well as the creation of a working committee to manage implementation of policies across the company.

Proponents advise the use of “foundation exercises” for helping form the bedrock of sustainability policies.

Sustainability values will need to be embedded at the heart of policies directing all business activities. And this can be supported through the use of an organisational chart mapping the key policies and processes to be adopted by each part of the business. The chart then becomes a critical ready reckoner for the boardroom and its assessment of progress.

But you can only manage what you measure, and sustainability policies demand the same treatment as any other business development initiative: key metrics accompanying the plan.

But what to measure? Examples include staff training, supply chain optimisation, energy efficiency, clean energy generation, reduced water waste, and community engagement, among many others.

Measuring then enables the creation of targets and these can be embedded in processes such as audits, supplier contracts and executive remuneration. If they are to have an impact, senior management must ensure the metrics have equal weight alongside more traditional measures.

All of this must be underpinned by effective reporting practices that provide a window on how sustainability practices function. And reporting is best supported by automated, straight-through processing, where possible.

Reliable reporting has the added benefit of allowing comparison and benchmarking with peers, if the data is available. The use of globally accepted standards—such as those provided by bodies like the Global Reporting Initiative—build confidence among stakeholders. And management must stay in touch, regularly consulting with the CSO and other stakeholders—customers, investors, suppliers and local communities—to ensure policies are felt in the right places.

Communication

Stakeholders should also hear about company successes, not just deliver feedback. Communicating a sustainability approach can form part of its longevity, as stakeholders hear the good news and develop an expectation of receiving more.

Companies are not expected to achieve all their sustainability goals tomorrow. Some necessarily take time. What is expected is long-term commitment and conviction, honest reporting and steady progress.

Care should be taken, however. Poor communication can be damaging, and a credible strategy will be required, one that considers how to deliver information frequently, honestly and credibly. It will need to take into account regulatory filings and disclosures, and potentially use social media as a means of reaching the right audience.

And that’s because successful sustainability policies are something to shout about. There is enormous pressure on companies to think differently, to reject a blinkered focus only on the bottom line and develop strategies that enable their companies to provide value, not only for shareholders but other stakeholders—society, customers, and suppliers—alike.

Companies are not expected to achieve all their sustainability goals tomorrow. Some necessarily take time. What is expected is long-term commitment and conviction, honest reporting and steady progress. The landscape on which businesses function is changing. They must change with it.

This article has been produced by Board Agenda in collaboration with Azeus Convene, a supporter of Board Agenda.

Un plan de fusion avorté entre deux OBNL


Voici un cas publié sur le site de Julie McLelland qui aborde un processus de fusion manqué entre deux OBNL dont la mission est de s’occuper de déficience.

C’est un bris de confiance dramatique qui se produit entre les deux organisations, et la plupart des organisations sont dépourvues lorsqu’une telle situation se présente.

Kalinda, la présidente du conseil d’administration, se pose beaucoup de questions sur l’éjection de deux de ses hauts dirigeants qui siégeaient au CA de l’entreprise ciblée.

Elle n’est pas certaine de la meilleure approche à adopter dans une telle situation et c’est la raison pour laquelle elle cherche les meilleures avenues pour l’organisation et pour les cadres déchus.

Le cas présente la situation de manière assez factuelle, puis trois experts se prononcent sur le cas.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

 

Un plan de fusion avorté entre deux OBNL

 

 

Kalinda chairs a small disability-sector not for profit company. For almost a year the company has been in friendly merger discussions with a similar company operating in an adjacent geographic area.

Kalinda’s CEO and CFO were elected to the board of the neighbouring company in advance of the merger. Everyone expected the merger to proceed. Kalinda’s CEO and CFO reported that the merger was a major topic of that board’s discussions, but they could not give details as it would be a conflict of interest and they were excluded from most of the discussions.

Now Kalinda has received a letter from the chair of the other board saying the merger is not going ahead because due diligence uncovered some ‘worrying information’.

The letter also said the CEO and CFO must resign immediately as it was ‘no longer appropriate’ for them to be directors. Kalinda immediately called the executives who said they had no idea what had happened: They had not been made aware of any issues.

Kalinda’s executives called the CEO of the other company but she refused to talk to them and said the other directors had voted them off in a special meeting three days ago. Kalinda tried calling the other chair but her calls were all declined.

She wants to know what has been found and if there is any possibility of getting the merger discussions back on course. Her company has deferred several strategic projects, incurred legal costs, and refrained from bidding for a government contract so as not to compete against the other company.

What should Kalinda do?

 

Julia’s Answer

Kalinda should identify the actual reasons for the merger failing and analyse whether the show stoppers are on her side, the partner’s side, or connected to a third-party.

What if the problem is in her company and not evident to her? It could possibly be known or even invented (?) by the partner company – but they don’t seem to be open to providing any information. They could even think she is involved herself. It could be fraud, financial problems or any other major issues they consider as deal breaking. Kalinda needs to do her homework in her own company, carefully prioritising, and usually with external support. Her aim is to eliminate any potential time bombs quickly and efficiently.

Step two – analysing third party show stoppers on the partner’s side: The partner has been offered more attractive merger conditions by another company – Kalinda should identify the competitor and consider adapting her conditions, or they decided not to merge anymore, e.g. due to changing market circumstances or new, promising chances for business growth without a partner – Kalinda should find out what these could be and what they mean for her. The partner could also think that his and Kalinda’s executives are not a good match in general. In this case Kalinda needs to evaluate the consequences of a future with a merger but without her CEO and CFO.

Kalinda also needs to consider a completely new strategy starting from scratch – without the original target partner, possibly with a different partner or a business model and growth strategy her executive team drives alone. In each case Kalinda should evaluate whether her executive team is capable of delivering the future target performance and adds value with regards to the option/s she finally chooses and whether alternative executives would add more value.

Julia Zdrahal-Urbanek is Managing Partner of AltoPartners Austria and heads their board practice. She is based in Vienna, Austria.

 

Julie’s Answer

What a mess!

Kalinda is too far removed from the negotiations. She needs to talk with whoever has been handling the merger discussions from her company’s side and find out what are the issues that have led to this decision. If these are a concern to the prospective merger partner they should be a concern to the board.

She then needs to decide how she is going to move forwards when her two most senior executives are on the other party’s board and thus bound to act in the other party’s interests.  Kalinda is in no position to instruct her CEO and/or CFO on whether they should resign; that is a personal decision for them to make. Whilst they are on the other board they cannot act for Kalinda’s board on the merger.

It is the members, rather than the directors, who can vote directors off a board and, until there is a properly constituted members’ meeting they remain on the board unless they resign; they are not off the board simply because the other directors said so!

There should be a draft heads of agreement setting out how the parties will treat each other. Kalinda should reread it and see what it says about the costs of the deal, non-compete on tendering, deferral of projects, and other issues, that have now harmed her company.  She needs to consult her company’s legal adviser and find out if they can recover costs or claim damages.

Most important, she needs to schedule a board meeting and build consensus on a way forward. That is a board decision and not hers, as chair, to make. With any merger, acquisition, or divestment, a good board should always have a contingency plan. It is now time to implement it.

Julie Garland McLellan is a non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia.

 

Brendan’s Answer

Kalinda needs to take a hard look at how they approached this potential and so called “friendly” merger.

Conscious Governance uses a six-step model for assessing partnerships, alliances, mergers and acquisitions: you must have the right strategy, information, timing, price, conditions, and integration.

From the information available, Kalinda, her Board and her executives failed significantly in their duty to their own organisation, especially on the first three items.

Firstly, I hear no clear strategic imperative for the merger to be entertained.  It is also puzzling why Kalinda’s CEO and CFO were elected to the other Board.  It is puzzling why Kalinda’s and the organisation’s policies allowed them to join the other board as Directors.  It is also puzzling, if not troubling, that the other Board facilitated their engagement as Directors, especially while merger discussions were underway.

Conscious Governance also encourages Boards to consider 20 tough questions (copies available on request) before embarking on merger discussions, and hopefully before someone wants to merge with you.  One question proposes a $30,000 break fee if the other party pulls out of the merger discussions.  This will test how serious they are.  It would also would have helped Kalinda’s organisation cover some costs but would not recompense lost business opportunities or contracts.

Brendan Walsh is a Senior Associate at Conscious Governance. He is based in Parkville, Victoria, Australia.

 

 

 

 

Composition du conseil d’administration d’OSBL et recrutement d’administrateurs | En rappel


Ayant collaboré à la réalisation du volume « Améliorer la gouvernance de votre OSBL » des auteurs Jean-Paul Gagné et Daniel Lapointe, j’ai obtenu la primeur de la publication d’un chapitre sur mon blogue en gouvernance.

Pour donner un aperçu de cette importante publication sur la gouvernance des organisations sans but lucratif (OSBN), j’ai eu la permission des éditeurs, Éditions Caractère et Éditions Transcontinental, de publier l’intégralité du chapitre 4 qui porte sur la composition du conseil d’administration et le recrutement d’administrateurs d’OSBL.

Je suis donc très fier de vous offrir cette primeur et j’espère que le sujet vous intéressera suffisamment pour vous inciter à vous procurer cette nouvelle publication.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un court extrait de la page d’introduction du chapitre 4. Je vous invite à cliquer sur le lien suivant pour avoir accès à l’intégralité du chapitre.

 

La composition du conseil d’administration et le recrutement d’administrateurs

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « composition du CA »

 

Vous pouvez également feuilleter cet ouvrage en cliquant ici

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

__________________________________

 

Les administrateurs d’un OSBL sont généralement élus dans le cadre d’un processus électoral tenu lors d’une assemblée générale des membres. Ils peuvent aussi faire l’objet d’une cooptation ou être désignés en vertu d’un mécanisme particulier prévu dans une loi (tel le Code des professions).

L’élection des administrateurs par l’assemblée générale emprunte l’un ou l’autre des deux scénarios suivants:

1. Les OSBL ont habituellement des membres qui sont invités à une assemblée générale annuelle et qui élisent des administrateurs aux postes à pourvoir. Le plus souvent, les personnes présentes sont aussi appelées à choisir l’auditeur qui fera la vérification des états financiers de l’organisation pour l’exercice en cours.

ameliorezlagouvernancedevotreosbl

2. Certains OSBL n’ont pas d’autres membres que leurs administrateurs. Dans ce cas, ces derniers se transforment une fois par année en membres de l’assemblée générale, élisent des administrateurs aux postes vacants et choisissent l’auditeur qui fera la vérification des états financiers de l’organisation pour l’exercice en cours.

 

La cooptation autorise le recrutement d’administrateurs en cours d’exercice. Les personnes ainsi choisies entrent au CA lors de la première réunion suivant celle où leur nomination a été approuvée. Ils y siègent de plein droit, en dépit du fait que celle-ci ne sera entérinée qu’à l’assemblée générale annuelle suivante. La cooptation n’est pas seulement utile pour pourvoir rapidement aux postes vacants; elle a aussi comme avantage de permettre au conseil de faciliter la nomination de candidats dont le profil correspond aux compétences recherchées.

Dans les organisations qui élisent leurs administrateurs en assemblée générale, la sélection en fonction des profils déterminés peut présenter une difficulté : en effet, il peut arriver que les membres choisissent des administrateurs selon des critères qui ont peu à voir avec les compétences recherchées, telles leur amabilité, leur popularité, etc. Le comité du conseil responsable du recrutement d’administrateurs peut présenter une liste de candidats (en mentionnant leurs qualifications pour les postes à pourvoir) dans l’espoir que l’assemblée lui fasse confiance et les élise. Certains organismes préfèrent coopter en cours d’exercice, ce qui les assure de recruter un administrateur qui a le profil désiré et qui entrera en fonction dès sa sélection.

Quant à l’élection du président du conseil et, le cas échéant, du vice-président, du secrétaire et du trésorier, elle est généralement faite par les administrateurs. Dans les ordres professionnels, le Code des professions leur permet de déterminer par règlement si le président est élu par le conseil d’administration ou au suffrage universel des membres. Comme on l’a vu, malgré son caractère démocratique, l’élection du président au suffrage universel des membres présente un certain risque, puisqu’un candidat peut réussir à se faire élire à ce poste sans expérience du fonctionnement d’un CA ou en poursuivant un objectif qui tranche avec la mission, la vision ou encore le plan stratégique de l’organisation. Cet enjeu ne doit pas être pris à la légère par le CA. Une façon de minimiser ce risque est de faire connaître aux membres votants le profil recherché pour le président, profil qui aura été préalablement établi par le conseil. On peut notamment y inclure une expérience de conseil d’administration, ce qui aide à réduire la période d’apprentissage du nouveau président et facilite une transition en douceur.

Les actions multivotantes sont populaires aux États-Unis. Les entreprises canadiennes devraient-elles emboîter le pas ?


Je vous recommande la lecture de cet article d’Yvan Allaire*, président exécutif du conseil d’administration de l’IGOPP, paru dans le Financial Post le 6 mars 2019.

Comme je l’indiquais dans un précédent billet, Les avantages d’une structure de capital composée d’actions multivotantes, celles-ci « n’ont pas la cote au Canada ! Bien que certains arguments en faveur de l’exclusion de ce type de structure de capital soient, de prime abord, assez convaincants, il existe plusieurs autres considérations qui doivent être prises en compte avant de les interdire et de les fustiger ».

Cependant, comme l’auteur le mentionne dans son article, cette structure de capital est de plus en plus populaire dans le cas d’entreprises entrepreneuriales américaines.

Il y a de nombreux avantages de se prévaloir de la formule d’actions multivotantes. Selon Allaire, les entreprises canadiennes, plus particulièrement les entreprises québécoises, devraient en profiter pour se joindre au mouvement.

J’ai reproduit, ci-dessous, l’article publié dans le Financial Post. Quelle est votre opinion sur ce sujet controversé ?

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Dual-class shares are hot in the U.S. again. Canada should join in

 

 

Image associée
Some 69 dual-class companies are now listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange, down from 100 in 2005. Peter J. Thompson/National Post 

American fund managers are freaking out about the popularity of multiple voting shares among entrepreneurs going for an initial public offering (IPO). In recent years, some 20 per cent of American IPOs (and up to a third among tech entrepreneurs) have adopted a dual-class structure. Fund managers are working overtime to squelch this trend.

In Canada, this form of capital structure has been the subject of unrelenting attacks by some fund managers, proxy-advisory firms and, to a surprising degree, by academics. Some 69 dual-class companies are now listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange, down from 100 in 2005. Since 2005, only 23 Canadian companies went public with dual-class shares and 16 have since converted to a single-class.

A dual class of shares provides some measure of protection from unwanted takeovers as well as from the bullying that has become a feature of current financial markets. (The benefits of homegrown champions, controlled by citizens of the country and headquartered in that country need no elaboration. Not even the U.S. tolerates a free-for-all takeover regime, but Canada does!)

These 69 dual-class companies have provided 19 of Canada’s industrial champions as well as 12 of the 50 largest Canadian employers. The 54 companies (out of the 69 that were listed on the TSX 10 years ago) provided investors with a mean annual compounded return of 8.98 per cent (median 9.62 per cent) as compared to 5.06 per cent for the S&P/TSX Index and 6.0 per cent for the TSX 60 index (as per calculations by the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations).

As for the quality of their governance, by the standards set by The Globe and Mail for its annual governance scoring of TSX-listed companies, the average governance score of companies without a dual-class of shares is 66.15 while the score of companies with multiple voting shares, once the penalty (up to 10 points) imposed on dual-class companies is removed, is 60.1, a barely significant difference.

 


*Cet article a été et rédigé par Yvan Allaire, Ph. D. (MIT), MSRC, président exécutif du conseil d’administration de l’IGOPP.

Dix erreurs que les conseils peuvent éviter sur les droits de l’homme


Voici un article publié par MAZAR* sur les erreurs les plus fréquentes que commettent les conseils eu égard aux risques associés aux droits de la personne.

Selon les auteurs, la plus grande erreur est de ne pas reconnaître la gravité des risques, mais ce n’est pas le seul danger !

L’article a été publié en anglais. J’ai utilisé le traducteur de Chrome pour produire le texte français ci-dessous. La qualité de la traduction est très bonne et cela facilitera la vie des francophones !

Voici dix erreurs que les conseils peuvent éviter.

Bonne lecture !

Dix erreurs que les conseils peuvent éviter sur les droits de l’homme

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « conditions de travail abusives »

 

  1. Identifier et comprendre les risques

Les conseils échouent souvent à identifier et à comprendre les risques graves pour les droits de la personne, tels que les conditions de travail abusives liées aux salaires, aux contrats, à la sécurité, à la santé et au recours au travail des enfants, au travail forcé et à la traite des personnes. Ces pratiques abusives peuvent entraîner des dommages juridiques, financiers et de réputation.

  1. Soyez prêt

Attendre que quelque chose se passe mal avant de s’attaquer aux responsabilités en matière de droits de l’homme sur le lieu de travail et dans les chaînes d’approvisionnement est une voie sûre pour les gros problèmes. Il est essentiel d’établir un plan clair sur la manière de relever les défis et de fournir suffisamment de ressources pour le faire.

  1. Chercher de l’aide par le haut

Essayer de mettre en place de bonnes normes en matière de droits de l’homme dans la culture et la prise de décision de l’entreprise dans toutes les opérations et dans tous les lieux géographiques sans obtenir le soutien des plus grands directeurs échouera.

  1. Réaliser des audits réguliers

Ne présumez pas que les droits de la personne sont respectés dans vos chaînes d’approvisionnement, chez vous ou à l’étranger. Les conseils doivent veiller à ce que des audits et des revues des chaînes soient régulièrement effectués afin de garantir le respect des bonnes pratiques en matière de droits de l’homme. L’exposition tragique des conditions épouvantables des travailleurs de l’industrie textile au Bangladesh et dans d’autres pays a trop souvent fait les gros titres ces dernières années.

  1. Obtenez un expert à bord

Évitez toute attitude arrogante en matière de droits de l’homme et nommez au conseil une personne possédant une solide expertise, notamment en ce qui concerne le respect des exigences réglementaires nationales et internationales, ou formez un membre du conseil à diriger.

  1. Établir des canaux appropriés

Le fait de ne pas mettre en place les canaux adéquats pour permettre aux personnes internes ou externes à l’entreprise de faire part de leurs préoccupations concernant les droits de l’homme et leurs conséquences pour atteindre le conseil d’administration et la haute direction est une erreur courante.

  1. S’attaquer aux fautes professionnelles

Ne soyez pas tenté de nier ou de cacher toute malversation révélée, mais résolvez-le et apportez le changement de manière efficace grâce aux meilleures pratiques.

  1. Assurer l’engagement des parties prenantes

Il faut éviter un faible engagement avec les parties prenantes, car il est important de communiquer clairement sur la manière dont le conseil d’administration traite ses problèmes de droits de l’homme, en particulier si des problèmes se sont posés. Les actionnaires, en particulier, se posent davantage de questions sur les processus de gestion des risques liés aux droits de l’homme et sur la manière dont l’entreprise relève les défis et mesure les progrès.

  1. Ne prenez pas de raccourcis

Il est préférable de ne pas prendre de raccourcis pour remplir les exigences en matière de rapports réglementaires, telles que donner une réponse rapide ou répéter le contenu du rapport de l’année dernière. Les Principes directeurs des Nations Unies indiquent clairement comment rendre compte des questions relatives aux droits de l’homme dans un rapport annuel ou un rapport sur le développement durable.

  1. Évitez la complaisance

Devenir complaisant face au bilan de votre entreprise en matière de droits de l’homme n’est pas une option. De nouveaux systèmes tels que la Workforce Disclosure Initiative dirigée par des investisseurs, qui appelle à davantage de transparence sur la manière dont les entreprises gèrent leurs employés et les employés de la chaîne d’approvisionnement, se développent et mettent les entreprises à la loupe.


*Cet article a été produit par Board Agenda en collaboration avec Mazars, un partenaire de Board Agenda.

Les avantages d’une structure de capital composée d’actions multivotantes


C’est avec ravissement que je vous recommande la lecture de cette onzième prise de position d’Yvan Allaire* au nom de l’IGOPP.

Au Canada, mais aussi dans plusieurs pays, les actions multivotantes n’ont pas la cote ! Bien que certains arguments en faveur de l’exclusion de ce type de structure de capital soient de prime abord assez convaincantes, il existe plusieurs autres considérations qui doivent être prises en compte avant de les interdire et de les fustiger.

Comme l’auteur le mentionne dans ses recommandations, l’analyse attentive de ce type d’action montre les nombreux avantages à se doter de cet instrument.

J’ai reproduit, ci-dessous, le sommaire exécutif du document ainsi que les recommandations. Pour plus de détails, je vous invite à lire le texte au complet.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Ils orienteront les nouvelles exigences en matière de gouvernance.

 

Prise de position en faveur des actions multivotantes

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « action multivotantes »

 

Sommaire exécutif

 

En 2018, 69 sociétés ayant des actions à droit de vote supérieur (ADVS) étaient inscrites à la bourse de Toronto alors qu’elles étaient 100 en 2005. De 2005 à 2018, 38 n’avaient plus d’ADVS suite à des fusions, acquisitions, faillites et autres, 16 sociétés avaient converti leurs ADVS en actions à droit de vote unique et 23 nouvelles sociétés ayant des ADVS s’étaient inscrites à la bourse de Toronto
en émettant des ADVS.

Les arguments pour ou contre ce type de structure de capital-actions sont nombreux et, à certains égards, persuasifs. D’une part, certains fonds « proactifs » (notamment les fonds de couverture « activistes ») insistent auprès de conseils et des directions de sociétés publiques ciblées pour que soient prises des mesures et des décisions, qui selon eux feraient accroître le prix de l’action, quand ce n’est pas carrément de chercher à imposer la vente prématurée de l’entreprise au plus offrant. Évidemment, ce phénomène a renforcé la détermination des entrepreneurs à se protéger contre de telles pressions en adoptant lors de leur premier appel public à l’épargne des actions ayant différents droits de vote (davantage aux USA qu’au Canada).

D’autre part, les fonds indiciels et les fonds négociés en bourse (FNB ou ETF en anglais), désormais des investisseurs importants et en croissance, mais obligés de refléter soigneusement dans leurs placements la composition et la valeur des titres des indices boursiers, ne peuvent donc pas simplement manifester leurs insatisfactions en vendant leurs actions. Ils doivent exercer leur influence sur la direction d’une société par l’exercice de leur droit de vote (lequel est restreint dans les sociétés ayant des ADVS) et en exprimant haut et fort leur frustration et leurs désaccords. C’est sans surprise que ces fonds sont farouchement opposés aux actions à droit de vote supérieur, exhortant avec succès les fournisseurs d’indices (ex. : Dow-Jones, et autres) à exclure toutes nouvelles sociétés ayant des actions à droit de vote supérieur.

Ils font aussi campagne, avec moins de succès à ce jour, auprès de la Securities and Exchange Commission des États-Unis (SEC) afin qu’elle interdise cette structure de capital-actions. Leur dernier stratagème en date, promu par le Council of Institutional Investors (CII), serait d’imposer une clause crépusculaire temporelle obligatoire rentrant en vigueur 7 ans après un PAPE3. Bien entendu, ce terme pourrait être renouvelé par un vote majoritaire de  l’ensemble des actionnaires (quels que soient leurs droits de vote).

La question des « clauses crépusculaires » est ainsi devenue un enjeu névralgique. Certains investisseurs institutionnels, les agences de conseils en vote et autres gendarmes de la gouvernance ainsi qu’un certain nombre de chercheurs académiques proposent de restreindre, de contrôler et d’imposer un temps limite à la liberté relative que procurent aux entrepreneurs et aux entreprises familiales les actions à droits de vote supérieurs.

Au cours des dernières années, un vif débat s’est engagé, particulièrement aux États-Unis, entre les apôtres du dogme « une action, un vote » et les hérétiques qui estiment bénéfiques les actions ayant des droits de vote inégaux.

 

Recommandations

 

Les sociétés ayant des ADVS et les entreprises familiales comportent de grands avantages à la condition que soient bien protégés les porteurs d’actions ayant des droits de vote inférieurs.

La clause d’égalité de traitement (« coattail ») imposée depuis 1987 par la Bourse de Toronto, une caractéristique uniquement canadienne, doit être conservée pour les sociétés qui ont émis ou voudraient émettre des actions ayant différents droits de vote.

Comme l’IGOPP l’a fait en 2006, il recommande à nouveau en 2018 que le ratio des droits de vote des ADVS soit plafonné à 4:1, ce qui signifie qu’il est nécessaire de détenir 20 % de la valeur des capitaux propres de la société pour en détenir le contrôle absolu (50 % des votes et plus).

La bourse TSX de Toronto devrait plafonner le ratio des droits de vote des ADVS à 10:1.

Les actions sans droit de vote devraient être interdites ; en effet, il est impossible d’accorder le droit d’élire un tiers des membres du conseil à des actionnaires qui n’ont aucun droit de vote ; ou encore d’assurer un décompte distinct des votes sur les propositions des actionnaires et pour l’élection des membres du conseil à une classe d’actionnaires sans droit de vote !

Nous recommandons fortement un décompte distinct des voix pour chaque classe d’actions et de rendre les résultats publics, tant pour l’élection des membres du conseil d’administration que pour toute autre proposition soumise au vote des actionnaires.

Les actionnaires disposant de droits de vote inférieurs devraient avoir le droit d’élire un tiers des membres du conseil d’administration, dont les candidatures seraient proposées par le conseil. Jumelée au décompte distinct des voix pour chaque classe d’actions, cette mesure inciterait le conseil et les gestionnaires à sélectionner des candidats susceptibles de s’attirer les faveurs des actionnaires « minoritaires ». Évidemment, tous les membres du conseil d’administration ne doivent agir que dans l’intérêt de la société.

Pour les raisons citées précédemment et expliquées par la suite dans la position, l’IGOPP s’oppose résolument à l’imposition de clauses crépusculaires temporelles pour les sociétés ayant des ADVS. Nous sommes aussi contre les clauses crépusculaires déclenchées par un événement précis ainsi que par celles déclenchées en fonction de l’âge du fondateur, de l’entrepreneur ou de l’actionnaire de contrôle.

Toutefois, l’IGOPP recommande qu’à l’avenir une clause crépusculaire basée sur un seuil de propriété (dilution sunset) soit incluse lors du PAPE d’une société faisant usage d’ADVS.

Dans la suite logique de notre démonstration de la valeur économique et sociale des entreprises familiales, l’IGOPP est favorable à une grande latitude de transférabilité du contrôle aux membres de la famille du fondateur.

Également dans la suite de notre appui aux ADVS comme rempart contre les visées à court terme et l’influence indue de certains types de spéculateurs, nous recommandons que le contrôle de ces sociétés puisse aussi être transmis à une fiducie dirigée par une majorité de fiduciaires indépendants au bénéfice des héritiers du fondateur.

Lorsqu’un parent ou un descendant de l’actionnaire de contrôle est candidat pour le poste de PDG, les administrateurs indépendants, conseillés adéquatement, devraient discuter des mérites des divers candidats avec l’actionnaire de contrôle et faire rapport de la démarche adoptée par le conseil pour arrêter son choix à l’assemblée annuelle des actionnaires suivant l’entrée en fonction d’un nouveau chef de la direction.

L’IGOPP est favorable à l’adoption d’une forme d’ADVS comportant des droits de vote supérieurs que pour l’élection de la majorité (ou la totalité) des membres du conseil.

« L’examen approfondi des arguments et des controverses à propos d’actions multivotantes nous mène à la conclusion que les avantages de cette structure l’emportent haut la main sur ses inconvénients.

Non seulement de plus en plus d’études confortent leur performance économique, mais le fait de combiner la propriété familiale et les actions à droit de vote supérieur résulte en une plus grande longévité de l’entreprise, en une meilleure intégration dans les collectivités hôtes, à moins de vulnérabilité aux pressions des actionnaires de court terme et à moins de susceptibilité aux « modes » stratégiques et financières.

Cette précieuse forme de propriété doit être assortie de mesures assurant le respect et la protection des droits des actionnaires minoritaires. Nous avons formulé un certain nombre de recommandations à cette fin. Nous encourageons les sociétés ayant présentement des ADVS et les entrepreneurs qui souhaiteront demain inscrire une société en bourse et émettre des ADVS à adopter nos recommandations ».

 


*Ce document a été préparé et rédigé par Yvan Allaire, Ph. D. (MIT), MSRC, président exécutif du conseil d’administration de l’IGOPP.

Dissension au conseil d’administration et violation de confidentialité


Voici un cas publié sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan qui expose un sérieux problème de gouvernance auquel plusieurs conseils d’administration sont confrontés, surtout dans les OBNL.

Certains administrateurs ont beaucoup de difficulté à soutenir les prises de position du conseil lorsqu’ils sont en profond désaccord avec les décisions du CA.

Comment un président de CA doit-il agir afin de s’assurer que les décisions prises au conseil sont confidentielles et que les administrateurs sont tenus d’y adhérer, même s’ils ne sont pas de l’avis du CA ?

Et comment le président du CA doit-il se comporter lorsque la situation dégénère lourdement comme dans le cas exposé ci-dessous ?

À tout le moins, le membre dissident ne devrait pas défendre son point de vue dissident sur la place publique !

Le cas présente une situation bien réelle et plus fréquente que l’on pense ; puis, trois experts se prononcent de façon relativement unanime sur le dilemme que vit Henry, le président du CA. Il s’agit de :

Jane Davel is a non-executive director and consultant. She is based in Auckland, New Zealand

Julie Garland McLellan is a non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia

Lauren Smith is President of the Florida Chapter of NACD and a director on five boards. She is based in Miami, Florida, USA

Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de ces avis, en cliquant sur le lien ci-dessous, et me faire part de vos commentaires, si vous le souhaitez.

Bonne lecture !

 

Dissension au conseil d’administration et violation de confidentialité

 

 

 

 

Henry chairs a not-for-profit company and usually finds it a gratifying experience. Recently the company has been through hard times as the government ceased funding some activities although the community still needs them.

Henry and his board worked hard to develop new income streams to support continuing the company’s work. They achieved some success, but not enough to avoid having to discontinue some work and reduce headcount. All directors regretted having to make long-serving and loyal staff redundant. However, they had to find a balance of activity and income that would be sustainable; this was a necessary part of the strategy for success.

One director was vehemently opposed to the changes, preferring to run at a loss, eat into reserves, and hope for a change of heart from the government. When it was clear that this director would never agree, Henry took the matter to a vote and the cuts were approved with only one dissenter. Henry reminded the board that board decisions were ‘board decisions’ and all agreed that they would publicly support the approved course of action.

Since then the CEO has complained to Henry that the dissenting director has spoken to staff suggesting they ‘lawyer up’ to protect themselves from redundancies, oppose the closure of the unsustainable activities, and start a Facebook campaign to ‘shame the government into resuming funding’. Henry has also heard from friends that his dissenter is complaining publicly about the decision even though board policy is that the CEO or Chair are the two authorised spokesmen.

How can Henry handle this dissident director?

Les politiques des Cégeps et la gouvernance créatrice de valeur


Nous publions ici un billet de Danielle Malboeuf* qui nous renseigne sur une gouvernance créatrice de valeur eu égard à la gestion des CÉGEP.

Comme à l’habitude, Danielle nous propose son article à titre d’auteure invitée.

Je vous souhaite bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont appréciés.

 

Cégeps : politiques et gouvernance

par

Danielle Malboeuf*  

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « gouvernance créatrice de valeur »

 

Un enjeu à ne pas négliger

 

Chaque année, des personnes motivées et intéressées investissent leur temps et leur énergie dans les conseils d’administration (CA) des collèges. Elles surveillent particulièrement la gestion financière du collège et assurent une utilisation efficace et efficiente des sommes d’argent qui y sont dédiées. Toutefois, comme j’ai pu le constater lors de mes échanges avec des administrateurs, ces personnes souhaitent jouer un rôle qui va au-delà de celui de « fiduciaire ». Elles veulent avoir une contribution significative à la mission première du Cégep : donner une formation pertinente et de qualité où l’étudiant et sa réussite éducative sont au cœur des préoccupations. Elles désirent ainsi soutenir les cégeps dans leur volonté d’améliorer leur efficacité et leur efficience, de se développer et d’assurer la qualité et la pertinence de leurs services. Le nouveau mode de gouvernance qui est actuellement encouragé dans les institutions tant publiques que privées répond à ces attentes. Il s’agit d’une « gouvernance créatrice de valeurs » (1). Ce mode de gouvernance permet à chacun de contribuer sur la base de ses expériences et compétences au développement de nos collèges.

Pour permettre au CA de jouer pleinement son rôle de « créateur de valeurs », les collèges doivent compter sur des administrateurs compétents qui veillent au respect de ses obligations et à l’atteinte de haut niveau de performance. D’ailleurs, dans la suite de la parution d’un rapport de la vérificatrice générale en 2016 portant sur la gestion administrative des cégeps (2), j’ai rédigé un article dans lequel, je rappelais l’importance d’avoir, au sein des conseils d’administration (CA) des collèges, des administrateurs compétents qui ont, entre autres, une bonne connaissance des politiques, directives et exigences réglementaires en vigueur afin de répondre adéquatement aux attentes formulées dans ce rapport. La vérificatrice générale y recommandait entre autres, au regard des modes de sollicitation, le respect de la réglementation et des politiques internes (3). Il m’apparaît donc essentiel que les administrateurs soient en mesure d’évaluer régulièrement leur pertinence et leur mise en application.

Ainsi, parmi les responsabilités confiées au conseil, on retrouve celles-ci (4) :

  1. s’assurer que l’institution est administrée selon des normes reconnues et en conformité avec les lois.
  2. définir les politiques et les règlements de l’institution, les réviser périodiquement et s’assurer qu’ils sont appliqués.

 

Les collèges ont cinquante ans. Tout au cours de ces années, on a élaboré et mis en œuvre de nombreuses politiques et règlements qui ont été adoptés par les CA. Ces documents sont apparus au fil des ans pour répondre à des exigences légales et ministérielles, mais également à des préoccupations institutionnelles. Pour assurer l’application de ces politiques et règlements, les gestionnaires ont produit des outils de gestion : programmes, directives et procédures. On retrouve donc dans les collèges, des Cahiers de gestion qui regroupent tous ces documents et qui amènent des défis de mise en œuvre, de suivi et de révision.

Des collèges reconnaissent ces défis. En effet, la Commission d’évaluation de l’enseignement collégial (CEEC) fait le constat suivant dans son bilan des travaux portant sur l’évaluation de l’efficacité des systèmes d’assurance qualité. « Certains collèges ont entrepris…, la mise en place d’outils de gestion concertée et intégrée de la qualité ». « Certains collèges estiment toutefois que du travail reste à faire pour améliorer la synergie entre les mécanismes » (5).

Considérant les préoccupations actuelles et les attentes formulées par la Vérificatrice générale, j’invite tous les collèges à se doter de mécanismes au regard des politiques et règlements qui s’inscrivent dans les bonnes pratiques de gouvernance :

  1. Valider la pertinence de toute cette documentation ;

D’abord, les administrateurs doivent connaître le contenu des politiques et règlements, car ils ont, rappelons-le, la responsabilité de s’assurer qu’ils sont appliqués. Ils doivent également valider que tous ces documents sont encore pertinents. Constate-t-on des redondances ? Si c’est le cas, il faut apporter des correctifs.

2. Assurer la cohérence de toute cette documentation ;

À la lecture de documents institutionnels, on constate que les termes politiques, règlements, programmes, directives et procédures n’ont pas la même signification d’un collège à l’autre et à l’intérieur d’un même collège. On note la présence de politiques et de programmes qui sont rattachés au même objet. Alors qu’une politique est un ensemble d’orientation et de principes, un programme est un « ensemble des intentions d’action et des projets que l’institution doit mettre en œuvre pour respecter les orientations gouvernementales ou institutionnelles. »

À titre d’exemple, pour se conformer à une exigence ministérielle, les collèges ont élaboré, il y a plusieurs années, une Politique de gestion des ressources humaines pour le personnel membre d’une association accréditée au sens du Code du travail (on exclut ici les hors-cadre et cadres). Cette politique devait inclure des dispositions concernant l’embauche, l’insertion professionnelle, l’évaluation et le perfectionnement de ces employés. Dans certains collèges, ces dispositions se sont traduites par des programmes et d’autres par des politiques. Dans un même collège, on peut retrouver pour l’évaluation du personnel, un programme pour certaines catégories de personnel et une politique pour d’autres employés. Rappelons encore ici que le CA porte un regard sur les politiques et non les programmes. Cela pose un problème de cohérence, mais également d’équité.

De plus, on peut retrouver dans une politique des modalités de fonctionnement. Rappelons qu’une politique est un « ensemble d’orientations et de principes qui encadrent les actions que doit mettre en œuvre l’institution en vue d’atteindre les principes généraux préalablement fixés par le Ministère ou le CA. » Donc, dans une politique, on ne devrait pas retrouver des actions ou des modalités de fonctionnement qui s’apparentent à des directives ou des procédures. Le CA n’a pas à d’adopter des modalités de fonctionnement, car c’est une responsabilité de la direction générale.

3. Valider l’applicabilité des politiques et règlements en vigueur

Tel que suggéré par l’IGOPP (Institut sur la gouvernance d’organisations privées et publiques), le comité d’audit devrait avoir, entre autres, le mandat de :

Prendre connaissance au moins une fois l’an des mesures de conformité aux lois, règlements et politiques (6).

Un exemple de l’importance pour le CA de s’assurer de l’application des Lois et politiques est celle liée à la gestion contractuelle. La Loi sur les contrats dans les organismes publics demande à chaque collège de nommer un responsable de l’observation des règles contractuelles (RORC). Cette personne doit transmettre au CA et au Secrétariat du Conseil du trésor un rapport qui fait état de ses activités, de ses observations et de ses recommandations. Le but visé est de valider que la gestion contractuelle du collège se conforme à la loi, aux directives et aux règlements (du gouvernement et du collège). Il faut s’assurer que cela soit fait.

4. Procéder à la révision de ces politiques et règlements de façon systématique ;

La majorité des politiques et des règlements prévoient des moments de révision. A-t-on un calendrier de suivi à cet effet ?

J’encourage donc les conseils d’administration des collèges et les gestionnaires à inscrire la validation et l’évolution des politiques et règlements, à leurs priorités institutionnelles. On permet ainsi aux administrateurs de jouer pleinement leur rôle et de participer au développement de nos institutions.


(1) Le modèle de gouvernance « Créatrice de valeurs »®, préconisé par l’Institut sur la gouvernance d’organisations privées et publiques est celui développé par le professeur Yvan Allaire, président exécutif du conseil de l’IGOPP.

(2) Rapport du Vérificateur général du Québec à l’Assemblée nationale pour l’année 2016-2017, Gestion administrative des cégeps, Automne 2016

(3) idem, p.4

(4) Extraits du séminaire sur la gouvernance ; vers une gouvernance « Créatrice de valeurs », IGOPP (Institut sur la gouvernance d’organisations privées et publiques)

(5) Bilan de l’an 3-2016-2017, principaux constats découlant des audits de l’an 3, Évaluation de l’efficacité des systèmes d’assurance qualité des collèges québécois, p.20

(6) Extrait du séminaire sur la gouvernance ; vers une gouvernance « Créatrice de valeurs », IGOPP (Institut sur la gouvernance d’organisations privées et publiques), charte du comité de vérification et de finances.

_____________________________________

*Danielle Malboeuf est consultante et formatrice en gouvernance ; elle possède une grande expérience dans la gestion des CÉGEPS et dans la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégial et universitaire. Elle est CGA-CPA, MBA, ASC, Gestionnaire et administratrice retraitée du réseau collégial et consultante.


 

Articles sur la gouvernance des CÉGEPS publiés sur mon blogue par l’auteure :

 

(1) LE RÔLE DU PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION (PCA) | LE CAS DES CÉGEPS

(2) Les grands enjeux de la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégial

(3) L’exercice de la démocratie dans la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégial

(4) Caractéristiques des bons administrateurs pour le réseau collégial | Danielle Malboeuf

(5) La gouvernance des CÉGEPS | Une responsabilité partagée

(6) La gouvernance des Cégeps | Le rapport du Vérificateur général du Québec

Une revue de l’activisme actionnarial


Excellente revue de l’activisme actionnarial en 2018 par Jim Rossman, directeur de Shareholder Advisory de la firme Lazard. L’article a été publié sur le forum de la Harvard Law School aujourd’hui.

Vous trouverez ci-dessous les faits marquants de l’année. Je vous encourage à prendre connaissance des nombreuses illustrations infographiques dans la version complète.

Bonne lecture !

2018 Review of Shareholder Activism

 

 Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Shareholder Activism »

1. A New High-Water Mark for Global Activist Activity

  1. A record 226 companies were targeted in 2018, as compared to 188 companies in 2017
  2. $65.0bn of capital deployed in 2018, up from $62.4bn in 2017
  3. In spite of significant market volatility, Q4 2018 was the most active Q4 on record both by campaign volume and capital deployed
  4. Against the backdrop of a robust M&A market, 33% of 2018 activist campaigns were M&A related

2. Broadening Use of Activism as a Tactic

  1. A record 131 investors engaged in activism in 2018, reflecting the continued expansion of activism as a tactic
  2. 40 “first timers” launched activist campaigns in 2018, as compared to 23 “first timers” in 2017
  3. Nine of the top 10 activists (by current activist positions [1]) invested more than $1bn in 2018 (60 new campaigns in aggregate)
  4. Elliott continued to be the most prolific activist, with 22 new campaigns launched in 2018

3. Activism Is Reshaping Boardrooms

  1. 161 Board seats won in 2018, [2] up 56% from 2017 and 11% higher than the previous record of 145 seats in 2016
  2. Starboard led the way in 2018, winning 29 seats exclusively through negotiated settlements
  3. Activists continue to name accomplished candidates, with 27% of activist appointees having public company CEO/CFO experience
  4. However, only 18% of activist appointees in 2018 were female, as compared to 40% of new S&P 500 directors in 2018 [3]

4. Activism Has Global Reach

  1. Activist campaigns in Europe and APAC accounted for 23% and 12% of companies targeted, respectively
  2. 58 European campaigns and 30 APAC campaigns in 2018 were each record highs
  3. National champions, iconic family owned companies and regulated industries featured prominently among targeted companies

5. Traditional Active Managers Are the “New Vocalists”

  1. Traditional active managers are increasingly comfortable sharing their views on major activist campaigns in private interactions with
    management and more public forums
  2. Traditional managers like T. Rowe Price, Janus Henderson and GBL publicly voiced their opinions on major activist campaigns

6. Shareholder Dynamics Are Attracting Scrutiny

  1. BlackRock’s Larry Fink set the tone for the year, calling on companies to identify and follow through on their social purpose
  2. Stakeholder duties, employee Board representation and capital allocation / share buybacks became political issues
  3. Voting power of index funds remains a highly debated topic, and regulators have begun to explore the influence of proxy advisory firms and the proxy voting process itself

The complete publication, including Appendix, is available here.

Dix sujets « hots » pour les administrateurs en 2019


Voici dix thèmes « chauds » qui devraient préoccuper les administrateurs en 2019.

Ils ont été identifiés par Kerry BerchemChristine LaFollette, et Frank Reddick, associés de la firme Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld.

Le billet est paru aujourd’hui sur le forum du Harvard Law School.

Bonne lecture ! Quels sont vos points de vue à ce sujet ?

 

Top 10 Topics for Directors in 2019

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld »

 

1. Corporate Culture

The corporate culture of a company starts at the top, with the board of directors, and directors should be attuned not only to the company’s business, but also to its people and values across the company. Ongoing and thoughtful efforts to understand the company’s culture and address any issues will help the board prepare for possible crises, reduce potential liability and facilitate appropriate responses internally and externally.

2. Board Diversity

As advocates and studies continue to highlight the business case for diversity, public companies are facing increasing pressure from corporate governance groups, investors, regulators and other stakeholders to improve gender and other diversity on the board. As a recent McKinsey report highlights, many successful companies regard inclusion and diversity as a source of competitive advantage and, specifically, as a key enabler of growth.

3. #MeToo Movement

A responsible board should anticipate the possibility that allegations of sexual harassment may arise against a C-suite or other senior executive. The board should set the right tone from the top to create a respectful culture at the company and have a plan in place before these incidents occur. In that way, the board is able to quickly and appropriately respond to any such allegations. Any such response plan should include conducting an investigation, proper communications with the affected parties and the implementation of any necessary remedial steps.

4. Corporate Social Responsibility

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) concerns remained a hot-button issue in 2018. Social issues were at the forefront this year, ranging from gun violence, to immigration reform, to human trafficking, to calls for greater accountability and action from the private sector on issues such as climate change. This reflects a trend that likely foretells continued and increased focus on environmental, social and governance issues, including from regulatory authorities.

5. Corporate Strategy

Strategic planning should continue to be a high priority for boards in 2019, with a focus on the individual and combined impacts of the U.S. and global economies, geopolitical and regulatory uncertainties, and mergers and acquisitions activity on their industries and companies. Boards should consider maximizing synergies from recent acquisitions or reviewing their companies’ existing portfolios for potential divestitures.

6. Sanctions

During the second year of the Trump administration, U.S. sanctions expanded significantly to include new restrictions that target transactions with Iran, Russia and Venezuela. Additionally, the U.S. government has expanded its use of secondary sanctions to penalize non-U.S. companies that engage in proscribed activities involving sanctioned persons and countries. To avoid sanctions-related risks, boards should understand how these evolving rules apply to the business activities of their companies and management teams.

7. Shareholder Activism

There has been an overall increase in activism campaigns in 2018 regarding both the number of companies targeted and the number of board seats won by these campaigns. This year has also seen an uptick in traditionally passive and institutional investors playing an active role in encouraging company engagement with activists, advocating for change themselves and formulating express policies for handling activist campaigns.

8. Cybersecurity

With threats of nation-states infiltrating supply chains, and landmark laws being passed, cybersecurity and privacy are critical aspects of director oversight. Directors must focus on internal controls to guard against cyber-threats (including accounting, cybersecurity and insider trading) and expand diligence of third-party suppliers. Integrating both privacy and security by design will be critical to minimizing ongoing risk of cybersecurity breaches and state and federal enforcement.

9. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act

A year has passed since President Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) into law, and there will be plenty of potential actions and new faces on the tax landscape in 2019. Both the Senate Finance Committee and the Ways and Means Committee will have new chairs, and Treasury regulations implementing the TCJA will be finalized. President Trump will continue to make middle-class tax cuts a priority heading into next year. Perennial issues, such as transportation, retirement savings and health care, will likely make an appearance, and legislation improving the tax reform bill could be on the table depending on the outcome of the Treasury regulations.

10. SEC Regulation and Enforcement

To encourage public security ownership, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has adopted and proposed significant revisions to update and simplify disclosure requirements for public companies. It has taken steps to enhance the board’s role in evaluating whether to include shareholder proposals in a company’s proxy statement. It has also solicited comments on the possible reform of proxy advisor regulation, following increasing and competing calls from corporations, investor advocates and congressional leaders to revise these regulations. Boards and companies should monitor developments in this area, as well as possible changes in congressional and administration emphasis following the 2018 midterm elections.

Bonus: Midterm Elections

The 2018 midterm elections are officially over. Americans across the country cast their ballots for candidates for the House of Representatives and the Senate in what was widely perceived to be a referendum on President Trump’s first two years in office. With Democrats taking control of the House, and Republicans maintaining control of the Senate, a return to divided government will bring new challenges for effective governance. Compromise and bipartisanship will be tested by what is expected to be an aggressive oversight push from House Democrats. However, areas where there may be possible compromise include federal data privacy standards, infrastructure development, criminal justice reform and pharmaceutical drug pricing initiatives.

The complete publication is available here.

On constate une évolution progressive dans la composition des conseils d’administration


Les plus jeunes administrateurs sont appelés à devenir de nouvelles voix influentes dans les conseils ;

 

New Voices in the Boardroom: The Gradual Evolution of Board Composition

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « evolution composition CA »

 

The stakes for having the right people around the boardroom table have never been higher. Directors need to have the skills and experiences that not only align with their company’s long-term strategic direction but also enable their boards to effectively advise management amid unprecedented change and business disruption. Board succession has emerged as a key priority for shareholders, who increasingly expect boards to have a rigorous process in place for assessing board composition and refreshment. Of particular concern are whether there is enough diversity in the boardroom, whether the board has the right combination of skills, and how the board views director tenure.

Notably, directors with diverse profiles are increasingly joining US boardrooms. However, a chronically low rate of director turnover is bringing about only gradual shifts in the overall makeup of US boards. The modest pace of change is likely to persist, meaning that corporate boards are likely to evolve only incrementally.

Directors with diverse profiles are increasingly joining US boardrooms.

Looking to the year ahead, the following represent the board trends Spencer Stuart believes will continue or accelerate in 2019, and how they are likely to shape board composition in 2019 and beyond.

 

Turnover will continue to be driven by director departures and mandatory retirement in the near term.

 

In 2018, S&P 500 companies added the highest number of new directors since 2004 — roughly 0.88 new independent directors per board. That said, overall turnover in US boardrooms is modest, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, impeding meaningful year-over-year change in the overall composition of S&P 500 boards. During the 2018 proxy season, a little more than half of S&P 500 boards (57%) added one or more new directors.

Barring changes in boardroom refreshment practices, this trend is likely to continue. Limits on director tenure are rare today. Only 25 S&P 500 boards (5%) set explicit term limits for nonexecutive directors, with terms ranging from 9 to 20 years. Additionally, it does not appear that individual and/or peer assessments are regularly used by boards to promote refreshment. Only 38 percent of S&P 500 companies report some form of individual director evaluations, a percentage largely unchanged over the past five years.

Instead, S&P 500 boards are likely to continue relying on mandatory retirement policies to stimulate board turnover. Today, 71 percent of S&P 500 boards disclose a mandatory retirement age for directors, consistent with the past five years. Retirement ages also continue to climb. In 2008, a meager 11 percent of S&P 500 companies with mandatory retirement policies set the age limit at 75 or older, compared to 43.5 percent today. More than half of these companies mandate a retirement age of at least 73 or older. Three boards have a retirement age of 80.

 

 

Three-quarters of the independent directors who left S&P 500 boards in the 2018 proxy season served on boards with mandatory retirement ages. The age limits appeared to have influenced many of these departures — 37 percent of retirees had reached or exceeded the age limit at retirement, and another 16 percent left within three years of the retirement age. Currently, only 16 percent of the independent directors on S&P 500 boards with age caps are within three years of mandatory retirement.

Experience as a CEO, board chair, or similar position is no longer viewed as the only qualifying credential for director candidates.

The boardroom will gradually be reshaped by new perspectives and expertise.

 

While modest turnover will continue, evidence suggests that boards will use openings from director departures to inject fresh perspectives and expertise into emerging areas of need.

For one thing, experience as a CEO, board chair, or similar position is no longer viewed as the only qualifying credential for director candidates. Of the 428 new independent directors added to S&P 500 boards in the 2018 proxy year, only 35.5 percent were active or retired CEOs, board chairs, or similar, down from 47 percent a decade ago. Nor is a background in a public company boardroom a requirement. First-time public company directors constituted 33 percent of the 2018 class of new S&P 500 directors. These first-timers are younger than their peers and more likely to be actively employed (64% versus 53%). They are less likely to be CEOs or chief operating officers, and more likely to have other managerial experiences such as line or functional backgrounds or to hold roles in division/subsidiary leadership. They are also more likely to be minorities: 24 percent of first-time directors in 2018 are minorities, versus 19 percent of all new S&P 500 directors.

Of the 428 new independent directors added to S&P 500 boards in the 2018 proxy year, only 35.5 percent were active or retired CEOs, board chairs, or similar, down from 47 percent a decade ago.

*Includes directors who had served or were serving as an executive director on a public company board.

 

Recognizing the strategic imperative for new perspectives and experience in the boardroom, boards are increasingly adding directors with backgrounds in technology, digital transformation and technologies, consumer marketing, and other areas of emerging importance. Financial talent remains prized, especially the experiences of chief financial officers, finance executives, and/or investment professionals. That said, as investors have continued to press for more gender diversity, S&P 500 boards have increased the number of women directors, reaching a new high: 40 percent of new directors in the 2018 proxy year are women, an increase from 36 percent in 2017.

Financial talent remains prized, especially the experiences of chief financial officers, finance executives, and/or investment professionals.

 

Boards are also likely to enhance disclosures about composition. As interest in boardroom composition among investors has increased, a growing number of companies are voluntarily enhancing their disclosures to highlight the diversity of their boards and to showcase how director skills and qualifications align with company strategy. In fact, nearly a third (30%) of S&P 500 companies have published a board matrix spotlighting the skills and qualifications of each director on their governance web page.

Younger directors may become a potent new voice in the boardroom.

 

As boards prioritize new areas of expertise — such as industry and functional experience in technology and digital transformation, and certain areas of marketing and finance — many are tapping “next-generation” directors whose qualifications align with the needs of their organizations. One out of six directors (17%) in the 2018 class of new directors is age 50 or younger.

Given that their backgrounds and profiles differ from more traditional board members, these directors are likely to bring varied perspectives to boardroom discussions. Nearly two-thirds of these “next-gen” corporate directors have expertise in three sectors: technology/telecommunications (34%), consumer goods (16%), and private equity/investments (14%). A majority (almost two-thirds) are serving on their first public company board. More than half (53%) are women.

Interestingly, these directors may also be less likely to have lengthy tenures, due to factors such as the demands of their careers, a desire to move on, or dissatisfaction with their board experience. Twenty-eight (7%) of the 417 directors who left an S&P 500 board seat in the 2018 proxy season were 55 years old or younger, with an average tenure of five years. Other directors who departed their boards over the same period had a much longer tenure on average (12.7 years) and were 68.4 years old on average.

Business demands and investor pressure are likely to change how boards think about composition and refreshment strategies.

The implications for your board

 

Business demands and investor pressure are likely to change how boards think about composition and refreshment strategies. Increasingly, directors are recognizing that board composition should support and reflect the strategic needs of the organization. Boards can use the following recommendations to enhance short- and long-term approaches to their composition:

Have an ongoing refreshment strategy.

The composition of the board should be viewed as a strategic asset. Boards will be better prepared to plan for and take advantage of openings if there is a formal approach to refreshment. This includes regularly reviewing and aligning the board’s makeup to the company’s strategic direction, identifying desired competencies for future directors, and regularly infusing the board with perspectives relevant to the organization’s future needs.

Increasingly, investors consider meaningful full-board and individual assessments as “best practice” not only for evaluating and enhancing board and director performance but also for promoting boardroom refreshment. While annual evaluations have become the norm for boards, far fewer — 38 percent of S&P 500 boards — report some form of individual director evaluations. Proactive boards assess skills and attributes, incorporating results from board self-assessments. They also take a multiyear view of departures, including upcoming board leadership changes, and set clear expectations around director tenure.

Key Questions for Directors to Consider:

 

  1. Does the board as currently constituted give the company its best shot at success in supporting the strategy?
  2. What additional, and potentially underrepresented, skills or expertise would significantly enhance the board’s ability to do its job?
  3. What are our refreshment mechanisms and strategy, and how are they communicated to stakeholders, including investors?
  4. Are we using board evaluations to help identify gaps in expertise and skills the board may require in the coming years?
  5. Is our onboarding program robust and tailored to individual director needs and backgrounds?
Position new directors for success.

The nominating and governance committee chair and other board leaders should ensure that the board has a robust new-director orientation program in place. Incoming directors, particularly younger and first-time board members, benefit from an orientation and continuing education that familiarize them with the company’s needs and the board’s approach to governance. At a minimum, a director onboarding program should provide insights about public disclosures and nonpublic materials (such as board meeting minutes, forecasts, budgets, strategic plans, etc.) and socialize the new director(s) with key executives and members of senior management. Additionally, the board should recognize that new directors may find it helpful to partner with a mentor — formally or informally — who they can turn to for questions and feedback.

With greater focus on diversity, board culture becomes critical.

Boards are adding new perspectives to enhance board deliberations and improve outcomes. But greater diversity also increases the likelihood of misunderstanding and tension among directors with different points of view and backgrounds. In the past, boards tended to be more homogeneous and, as a result, there was typically more implicit agreement about director interaction and behavior. Today, with higher levels of diversity in the boardroom — whether in terms of experiences, skills, gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, and/or age — it’s critical to create a boardroom culture that facilitates constructive interactions between board members. All boards can benefit from cultures that value inquisitiveness and flexibility, and where directors are comfortable challenging one another’s — and management’s — assumptions and ideas.

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Note: This article was originally published in the NACD 2019 Governance Outlook.

*Julie Hembrock Daum leads the North American Board Practice and was a long standing board member of Spencer Stuart. She consults with corporate boards, working with companies of all sizes from the Fortune 10 to pre-IPO companies. She has conducted more than 1,000 board director assignments, recently recruiting outside directors for Johnson & Johnson, Whole Foods, Amazon, Saudi Aramco, Nike, numerous IPOs and spin off boards.