Pourquoi séparer les fonctions de président du conseil (PCA) et de président et chef de la direction (PDG) ?

Très bonnes réflexions d’Yvan Allaire sur le dogme de la séparation des rôles entre PCA et PDG. À lire sur le blogue Les Affaires .com.

Rien à rajouter à ce billet de l’expert en gouvernance qui , comme moi, cherche des réponses à plusieurs théories sur la gouvernance. Plus de recherches dans le domaine de la gouvernance serait grandement indiquées… Le CAS et la FSA de l’Université Laval mettront sur pied un programme de recherche dont le but est de répondre à ce type de questionnement.

Pourquoi séparer les fonctions de président du conseil (PCA) et de président et chef de la direction (PDG) ?

« Parmi les dogmes de la bonne gouvernance, la séparation des rôles du PCA et du PDG vient au deuxième rang immédiatement derrière « l’i1031_mgmnt_twojobs_630x420ndépendance absolue et inviolable » de la majorité des administrateurs. … Bien que les études empiriques aient grande difficulté à démontrer de façon irréfutable la valeur de ces deux dogmes, ceux-ci sont, semble-t-il, incontournables. Dans le cas de la séparation des rôles, le sujet a pris une certaine importance récemment chez Research in Motion ainsi que chez Air Transat. Le compromis d’un administrateur en chef (lead director) pour compenser pour le fait que le PCA et le PDG soit la même personne ne satisfait plus; le dogme demande que le président du conseil soit indépendant de la direction ».

Comment la mondialisation affecte-t-elle la rémunération des hauts dirigeants ?

Très bon article paru dans Slate qui discute de l’influence de la globalisation des marchés sur la rémunération des CEO.  Peu ou pas du tout d’effet … Voici un extrait de l’article :

Comment la mondialisation affecte-t-elle la rémunération des hauts dirigeants ?

The global war for talent is a popular justification for exorbitant chief executive pay. But with few exceptions, expatriate chiefs are a tiny minority at most major publicly traded corporations. It’s bad news for shareholders, especially in high-pay hubs, who could find better-value stewards overseas.

« Multinationals are constantly in search of cheaper workers. The one exception appears to be the most expensive staff of all, in the boardroom. Particularly in the United States and Britain, boards have shown little desire to get the maximum bang for their buck by insisting companies cast wider recruitment nets. Anglo-American companies continue to tolerate steep rises in pay at the top that far exceed returns.

In 2010, compensation for the head honchos at American and British companies climbed 36 percent and 43 percent, respectively, dwarfing shareholder returns of around 15 percent, according to research firms GMI and Incomes Data Services. As recently as 1993, U.S. corporate bosses were paid some 130 times more than the average worker. Now they command about 350 times more, according to Duke University economist Dan Ariely.

A big plank of the defense has been globalization. Since the brightest CEOs can take their pick of posts across the globe, or so the argument goes, shareholders should not be surprised by astronomic remuneration – a point recently made by the Corporation of London’s policy chief. This oft-repeated excuse for overcharging shareholders is seldom backed up with evidence ».

Gouvernance exemplaire à Facebook ?

Les préoccupations de gouvernance, de protection des droits des actionnaires passent au deuxième plan dans le cas d’entreprises à succès telles que Google, LinkedIn et Facebook. Sommes-nous face à un nouveau modèle de gouvernance qui s’adresse à des propriétaires-dirigeants d’entreprises à succès ou sommes-nous en voie de prendre des risques inconsidérés qui portent préjudices aux actionnaires et aux parties prenantes ? Voici un article publié par John Plender dans le Financial Times (FT.com Blogs) du 26 février 2012.

Gouvernance exemplaire à Facebook ?

Voici deux courts extraits de l’article :

« Not so long ago, a debate raged about whether there was any real evidence that good governance contributed to strong corporate performance. It seemed to me pretty academic, given the palpable damage bad governance had inflicted on shareholders at such disaster zones as Enron and the Robert Maxwell empire.

The protection for investors against that age-old governance problem, the over-dominant CEO, is non-existent. If there is a novelty here, it is that the potentially over-dominant executive is just 27 years old and has created a company that will be valued in tens of billions on flotation. And, indeed, none of this is to denigrate the achievement of Mr Zuckerberg. It would, after all, be unusual for someone of his age to have grasped the advantages for himself, as well as for shareholders, of a strong governance framework. And in today’s heady market the IPO will, I suspect, be a big success ».

Comment les médias sociaux inflencent-ils la gouvernance des sociétés ?

Voici un article publié dans la section Innovations du Washington Post qui montre l’influence grandissante des médias sociaux sur la gouvernance des entreprises. L’auteur met en évidence la relation entre une plus grande utilisation des médias sociaux et la tendance des entreprises à accoder plus d’importance aux questions de développement durable et de responsabilités sociales.

Social media is the new boardroom

While many of the world’s largest businesses are genuinely making their operations more socially responsible, and a growing number of political leaders are also getting on board, the banking and finance sector lags behind. The biggest risk posed to economic recovery is if that sector remains trapped in the old model that prioritizes irresponsible risk-taking to drive annual bonuses over genuine, long-term, sustainable profit and value-creation.

Wall Street should get on board because appealing to young people’s sense of social responsibility is also where competitive advantage lies. A 2010 report from Accenture found that the top 50 most sustainable companies (taken from a cross industry group of 275 companies from the Fortune Global 1,000) outperformed shareholder return of the bottom fifty by 16 percentage points over three years and by 38 percentage points over five years.

I believe the banking and finance sector will catch up. CSR has been taken out of the silo and put in the P&L statement thanks to the revolution in communications that has empowered ordinary people to sanction those who don’t behave the way they want them to. The most successful businesses of the next decade will be the most socially responsible. They will reap huge benefits from the power of social media, as employees, shareholders and consumers become passionate advocates for their brands and businesses. And the most talented young people will want to work for them.


Comment s’assurer que le processus de relève du CEO est efficace ?

Voici un article très pertinent, publié dans talentmgt.com, qui met l’accent sur trois actions clés à entreprendre pour assurer la relève de la haute direction. Le conseil d’administration a un rôle crucial à jouer dans ce processus.

A successful CEO transition requires a collaborative partnership between boards and CEOs and acknowledgement of the complex dynamics involved. The last 18 months have seen a series of high-profile CEO succession stories. Since every organization deals with it at some point, it’s interesting that many companies continue to bungle the process, especially when getting it wrong can be costly.

Succession missteps pose a serious threat to business performance, and ultimately to shareholder value. They can lead to a leadership vacuum, interruptions in decision making and business processes, and the loss of stakeholder confidence. Potential successors can become so focused on the race — who is winning or losing the succession battle — that they lose sight of managing performance. Candidates who are passed over for the top post may leave abruptly, depleting the talent pool and making it harder to manage the leadership change. And competitors that sense weakness may launch an offensive to win over customers, poach talent or even attempt a takeover.

Amélioration de l’information annuelle des OBNL

Vous trouverez, ci-joint, un extrait de la préface d’un important document publié par le Conseil canadien de l’information sur la performance de l’ICCA. C’est un guide d’une grande pertinence pour les dirigeants et membres de conseils d’administration d’OBNL.

Amélioration de l’information annuelle des organismes sans but lucratif

L’information publiée par les organismes sans but lucratif suscite de plus en plus d’intérêt. Le présent document, intitulé Amélioration de l’information annuelle des organismes sans but lucratif et publié par l’Institut Canadien des Comptables Agréés (ICCA), a été élaboré par un groupe de travail réunissant des représentants d’organismes sans but lucratif qui ont été invités à faire part de leurs points de vue au Conseil canadien de l’information sur la performance de l’ICCA.

Le présent guide vise à aider les hauts dirigeants et les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif à préparer des rapports annuels de qualité qui renforcent la reddition de comptes et fournissent une information utile aux parties prenantes. Les petites organisations dont les ressources sont limitées pourront envisager d’échelonner la mise en oeuvre des présentes indications sur un certain nombre d’années. Par ailleurs, bien que ces indications visent les petits et moyens organismes sans but lucratif, elles peuvent également présenter un intérêt pour les entités de plus grande taille. Les organismes publics qui appliquent les PCGR pour les organismes sans but lucratif, y compris ceux du secteur «HUCE» (hôpitaux, universités, collèges et écoles), devraient se reporter aux dispositions des énoncés de pratiques recommandées du Conseil sur la comptabilité dans le secteur public.

Succès et/ou échecs dans la planification de la relève du CEO !

Excellent article, paru dans bworldonline.com, sur les difficultés inhérentes à l’activité de planification de la relève. Le C.A., notamment le président du conseil et le président du comité des ressources humaines, doivent suivre attentivement le processus car rien n’est moins évident pour un CEO que de réussir à passer le relais à une autre personne désignée, longtemps d’avance. Un article à lire avec l’esprit bien ouvert.

 Success and succession

« It seems that the more successful a company is in terms of growth and profitability, the less concerned it is in looking for a replacement for the CEO responsible for talent management and business strategy. This holds true even for aging leaders already prone to repeat the same stories in one meeting. Is succession a dirty word for the one being succeeded.

Identifying a specific individual to take one’s place, even if he is already the clear number two, invites risks for the incumbent as an impatient deputy may already be assembling his own management team, not necessarily other successors ».


Rémunération de la direction – Le point de vue anglais (UK)

Excellent article partagé par Richard Leblanc et publié le 20 février par Carter McNamara dans Blog : Boards of Directors

Executive Remuneration – A View from the UK | Boards of Directors

In recent years, executive remuneration has moved from its traditional ambit of corporate governance circles and company secretary forums to the public eye. In the UK, the last six months, has seen a particular focus on what many in the media see as ‘excessive executive pay’.

The UK government is currently consulting on most of these but the framework is clear enough and I suspect the similar measures will be adopted in many other Western countries to the extent they haven’t already.

Voici un résumé, en anglais, des mesures proposées au UK concernant la rémunération des hauts dirigeants (pour plus de détails, lire l’article)

1.       Greater transparency over remuneration reports

2.       Forward looking binding vote on pay policy

3.       Backward looking advisory vote on pay policy

4.       Director’s notice periods greater than one year

5.       Exit payments

6.       Ban on Executives servicing on Remuneration Committees

7.       Remuneration Consultants

8.       Clawback provisions

Oeuvrer sur des C.A. d’OBNL : Excellent apprentissage à des postes de direction de sociétés !

Voici un excellent article publié par Alice Korngold dans Huffington Post Canada qui montre éloquemment que s’investir dans des C.A. d’organisations à but non lucratif est une excellente préparation à des postes de direction de sociétés.

Cinq raisons qui expliquent pourquoi certains C.A. d’OBNL ont des problèmes d’efficacité

Voici cinq raisons qui expliquent pourquoi certains C.A. d’OBNL ont des problèmes d’efficacité … et quelques suggestions pour y remédier.

Have you ever sat down at a board meeting and realized that no one was excited to be there? There could be several reasons for that. Maybe it was the end of a long day for everyone. Maybe they ate too much for dinner and are tired. Or maybe, just maybe, it’s something you can do something about. Maybe there’s something that simply got sidetracked somewhere along the way that you can do something to remedy.

Group Think. Have you seen the studies that sent people out on the street to ask for help? An interesting situation unfolded. If there were just one or two people on the street, typically one of them would see what they could do to help. However if there were more than 2 or 3 people on the street, everyone appeared to wait to see if someone else would do something. In fact, in many cases, no one ended up doing anything. This situation often occurs in the nonprofit board room. Everyone is waiting to see what everyone else will do. One thing to try? Bring in an outside expert to provide a critical analysis of the situation. another option is to assign someone the role of the ‘devil’s advocate.’

Wrong People. When you were recruiting your board, did you ask them to be a part as a favor to you? Or did you ask them because you thought they couldn’t say no to you? If you have the wrong people and the wrong skill sets represented, take a step back, identify what your goals for the board are, and identify the skills you need to accomplish that. Then look out in the community and seek out people who are well known and who are passionate about your cause.

Unclear Expectations. When recruiting board members it is tempting to minimize the commitment that will be required of members. The right people will still want to be a part, and the people who are only trying to fill their resume will shy away. Having clear expectation will help ensure you are recruiting the right people.

No Accountability. Our board members are busy people and its easy for things to slip their mind. Generally speaking, they appreciate check-in and reminder calls. Don’t rely on emails for this. Just pick up the phone and call – or ask another board member to make that call. This idea has taken root and resulted in forward movement more than any other with the organizations I have worked with. Waiting a month until the next board meeting to bring something up again only results in things being delayed – or sidetracked permanently.

Magical’ Thinking. Growing up near a major tourist destination in Orlando Florida and having a mom who worked as a chaplain in the local emergency room opened my eyes to this phenomenon early. We would hear stories of people doing things that they wouldn’t do under normal situations. Something about pixie dust perhaps. But sometimes, in the nonprofit world, we have our own kind of pixie dust. It makes us think that nothing bad can come to the organization we work with and that things will fix themselves. We must be proactive and not fall into this trap.

5 Reasons Nonprofit Boards Stall – and What You Can Do About It

Quelles autres raisons peuvent amener les C.A. d’OBNL à tourner en rond et, selon votre expérience, que pouvez faire pour éviter les dysfonctionnements ?

La règle du « comply or explain » est-elle efficacement appliquée?

Voici un très court article paru dans guardian.co.uk qui explique les mécanismes du Comply or Explain et qui montre que la règle semble être appliquée avec beaucoup de succès, du moins dans le FTSE 350. À lire pour mieux comprendre cette règle de gouvernance qui tend à se généraliser.

The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) reckons it does, citing research showing 96% of FTSE 350 companies comply with corporate governance codes.

The basic tenet of the corporate governance rules that have been nurtured since the early 1990s revolve around the idea of « comply or explain ». A company should comply with the code – for instance not having the same person acting as chairman or chief executive – but can get away with it if they are able to explain their actions convincingly to shareholders.


Pratique de gouvernance canadiennes – réponses aux questions de l’EU

Voici le résumé d’un chapitre de volume publié dans International Journal of Disclosure and Governance (2012) par plusieurs auteurs canadiens dont Richard Leblanc. J’ai pensé que l’introduction au chapitre saurait vous inciter à lire le document au complet. Bonne lecture.

« The European Commission has put forward an interesting set of questions about how to improve corporate governance, within its ‘Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance Framework’ (Green Paper, 2011). The following provides analysis and the responses by a working group of authors in Canada to these questions based on the experience and research of the group (academics and practitioners) and the relevant literature ».

Pratiques de gouvernance canadiennes – réponses aux questions de l’EU


« The European Commission, in response to the governance failures that came to light in the credit crisis, is considering fundamental changes to European governance systems. As a step towards that goal, the EU has put forward a series of questions that examine essential aspects of governance, that is, what it involves, who it applies to and how it can be enforced. Whether these are the only or best questions that can be asked in this context is not the issue in this article, but rather, we see addressing them as an opportunity to bring to the reader the latest in governance research, as well as lessons from experience with the governance regimes in other regions, notably Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

This article is authored by a working group of academics and practitioners, with expertise in governance and various sub-governance domains. Members of the group have advised and worked with boards, regulators and companies that have become recognized for their leading governance practices. It is these experiences and the literature upon which we also draw.

Twenty-three of the 25 questions have been addressed below. Each question appears, followed by our group’s response. Two of the questions (questions 13 and 16) were not addressed owing to the time constraints of the submission (which was due on 22 July 2011) and the group felt that it did not possess all of the requisite expertise.

At the outset, the European Commission should be congratulated for establishing a high-level governance forum for discussions and debates and for the exchange of experiences. The need for a clear road map through the shifting and confusing terrain of corporate governance is very compelling. In a global marketplace, the solutions and recommendations championed in Europe will have a profound effect on governance standards in Canada and elsewhere.

In this article, the authors address in detail the need for improved governance in the areas articulated by the EU. First we consider the need for similar or different standards for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and unlisted companies. Then we focus on board recruitment, diversity and ways to improve the effectiveness of individual directors and boards. The critical area of governance over remuneration is then subject to our analysis, and we then assess ways to improve the board’s role in the governance of risk, of asset managers and of proxy advisors. Ensuring adequate shareholder engagement is next addressed, as well as minority shareholder interests. Lastly, we make recommendations for improvements in the implementation and monitoring of governance codes ».

Background: Canadian corporate governance practices

« We believe that Canada is a leader in corporate governance practices and, given that our group members are primarily Canadian, we draw on many of the initiatives here to frame our response to the EU deliberations. We also draw on global developments, including those in the United Kingdom and United States.

Canada has adopted the Anglo-American, unitary model of corporate governance. Our companies, however, operate within different ownership structures, legal and linguistic dualities, geographic diversity, and a decentralized regulatory regime of 13 provinces and territories. We have companies that are state-owned, family, significant shareholder, small and medium-sized listed, as well as widely held, not dissimilar to the diverse plurality and tapestry within the European Union.

Canada has had formal corporate governance guidelines in place since 1994 (Dey et al, ‘Where were the Directors?’) within a flexible ‘comply or explain’ approach. There has been time to digest and assess a continuously evolving corporate governance landscape, as companies and boards adopt guidelines and practices to suit the foregoing diverse circumstances, in a flexible manner.

The Canadian corporate governance guidelines, most recently revised in 2005 (Canadian Securities Administrators, 2005), have been adopted and adapted by companies within the listed sector, and through osmosis and other best practices, within private, governmental and not-for-profit sectors as well. It is upon this experience that we also draw for our responses ».

Forum sociétés d’État 2012 – Québec, 17 avril

Forum sociétés d'État 2012 - À Québec


Le Cercle des ASC est fier d’organiser, conjointement avec le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, le Forum sociétés d’État 2012 de Québec, en collaboration avec l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés (IAS) section Québec.

Le Forum sociétés d’État aura lieu le mardi 17 avril 2012, de 7 h 30 à 10 h 45, à l’Hôtel Château Laurier, à Québec. Le forum sera constitué d’un panel et d’une conférence : « Mise en oeuvre de la nouvelle gouvernance » et « Évaluation et orientations gouvernementales ». Voir le lien ci-dessous.

Forum sur les sociétés d’État – Québec 17 avril

Rappel : Qu’est-ce qu’un code de gouvernance ? Un exemple

Depuis quelque jours, je constate que plusieurs personnes se questionnent sur les propriétés d’un code de gouvernance. Voici, à titre d’exemple, la table des matières du code de gouvernance des entreprises UK. Je vous encourage fortement à prendre connaissance de ce court document car, à mon avis, c’est l’énoncé le plus clair des principes de gouvernance qui existe.

Governance and the Code 1
Preface 2-3
Comply or Explain 4-5
The Main Principles of the Code 6-7
Section A: Leadership 9-11
Section B: Effectiveness 12-17
Section C: Accountability 18-21
Section D: Remuneration 22-24
Section E: Relations with Shareholders 25-26

Schedule A: The design of performance-related remuneration
for executive directors 27
Schedule B: Disclosure of corporate governance arrangements 28-35

Voir le document au complet :

The UK Corporate Governance Code

Voir également le règlement de l’AMF concernant les directives relatives à la gouvernance :

L’instruction générale 58-201 relative à la gouvernance

Boardroom News | Directorship | Boardroom Intelligence

Excellent guide de l’actualité en gouvernance dans le monde

Le mode de gouvernance de Facebook est-il à risque ?

Je suis d’accord avec les propos de mon collègue Richard Leblanc. Son article, dans Canadian Business, soulève plusieurs questionnements fondamentaux pour les experts en gouvernance. Comme il y plusieurs points de vue différents sur le sujet et que tout le monde s’entend pour affirmer que l’opération est légale, il y a matière à concevoir un beau cas en gouvernance, créatrice de valeur, et en stratégie de conservation du contrôle de l’entreprise. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Facebook’s board is a recipe for disaster

« Facebook’s governance has been described by Businessweek as resembling a “dictatorship” and by a Wall Street Journal blog as “Governance = Zuckerberg.” Under the public offering, 27-year-old Mark Zuckerberg owns almost 60% of supervoting shares, is chair and CEO, can name a successor CEO and has complete control over the nomination process for directors ».

Étapes concrètes pour remédier aux manques de connaissances des Boards en matière de réseaux sociaux

Un autre excellent article de knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu qui montre les importantes lacunes des C.A. en matière de réseaux sociaux et qui indique clairement les étapes à suivre en vue de s’assurer que les membres de C.A. deviennent familiers avec ceux-ci. Voici quelques extraits de l’article :

« Let’s start with today’s reality. The world has changed but corporate boards haven’t kept pace. How do you know? Ask most boards what they monitor and measure at their organizations. There’s a big chance that most of them will say they are monitoring and measuring financial results, compliance and legal risks ».

« What’s surprising about such responses is that boards know that solid decision-making is essential to mitigating risks and ensuring the viability of their enterprises. How is it, then, that most of them don’t have a grip on the operational value these technologies offer, or the critical « big data » — about customer sentiment, employee engagement and investor insights — that they produce? The answer: They’re still using corporate governance tools and strategies that were developed in an age that was neither social nor mobile, or ever considered that the « cloud » would exist ».

« In short, today’s corporate directors have the « necessary » skills in terms of compliance and financial performance, but not the « sufficient » skills in terms of strategic or technological know how. Why? Because for years, astute corporate directors believed the tools that companies like Facebook and Twitter offered weren’t essential. In their view, these new means of communications were for kids, had little, if any, business value, and created minimal strategic, operational or financial risks. Wow, were they wrong ».

Comment Linkedin, Facebook et Twitter ont changé la valeur ajoutée du leadership

Excellent article publié dans Forbes par Glenn Llopis. À lire.

Comment Linkedin, Facebook et Twitter ont changé la valeur ajoutée du leadership

Most executives claim that social media doesn’t add value.  As a former C-level exec, I was skeptical myself, but now I’m a believer. LinkedIn, Facebook and Twitter have changed the ROI on leadership and it’s your responsibility to get in the game. 

Do you have something innovative to say? Do you trust yourself enough to share what is on your mind?  The social media community out there is eager to hear what you have to say, and to share your views with a wider community – for a wider impact


Stratégies de Mark Zuckerberg de Facebook : Manquements aux pratiques de « bonne gouvernance » ou sagesse de l’approche adoptée

Mark Zuckerberg détient 28% des actions de Facebook mais il contrôlera 57% des votes. C’est une des façons qu’il a trouvé pour avoir la paix, pour gérer son entreprise en paix! Voici le point de vue d’Yvan Allaire, expert dans les questions de gouvernance, publié aujourd’hui dans une lettre au National Post, intitulée “Governance: in your Face… book!

Yvan Allaire salue la sagesse de l’approche de Mark Zuckerberg

Voir l’entrevue de Diane Bérard dans LesAffaires.com

Yvan Allaire félicite Mark Zuckerberg. Le fondateur de Facebook va à l’encontre des principes de “ bonne “ gouvernance” généralement reconnus. Mais… il va dans le sens d’un capitalisme durable et de la création de valeur à long terme, estime le président du conseil de l’Institut de gouvernance des organisations privées et publiques (IGOPP).

“Une entreprise a besoin d’un actionnaire de contrôle bien en charge pour éviter les actions nocives ( dictature des profits trimestriels, pressions des analystes financiers et des investisseurs “touristes” attaque des fonds vautours)”, déclare Yvan Allaire.

Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Gouvernance municipale

Une formation conçue pour les maires, élus et administrateurs municipaux

Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) offrira à nouveau la formation Gouvernance municipale, sur une formule de deux jours, les 22 et 23 mars prochains, à Montréal.

Les maires, élus, cadres supérieurs et administrateurs d’organismes municipaux sont invités à participer à cette formation laquelle leur permettra d’apprendre et d’échanger sur les particularités de la gouvernance dans le monde municipal : les enjeux et les défis, le leadership éthique et la performance organisationnelle. Ce cours insiste aussi sur les écueils à éviter dans un environnement de plus en plus complexe et exigeant.

Thèmes abordés et description des sessions

Sous la coordination de M. Florent Gagné, plusieurs experts témoigneront de leur expérience; cette formation est un moment privilégié pour revoir les grandes orientations et pour optimiser la gouvernance municipale, dans une ambiance conviviale. L’équipe de formateurs et conférenciers est composée de MM. Gilles Paquet, René Villemure, Jean-Paul L’Allier, Denis Boutin, Robert Desnoyers, Maurice Gosselin et Alain Marcoux.

Pour connaître les détails de cette formation, visitez le www.cas.ulaval.ca

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