Voici un article paru dans The Financial Times (FT.com) par James Spellman, consultant chez IFC Global Corporate Governance Forum, sur les problèmes des conseils d’administration lorsque vient le temps d’approuver des états financiers. Les résultats de recherche montrent que 20 % des entreprises font de la comptabilité créative destinée à induire les actionnaires et les parties prenantes en erreur. Cet article questionne le niveau de compétence des administrateurs en matière financière et énonce six critères qui indiquent qu’une entreprise est mal « gouvernée ». Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait de l’article; je vous invite à lire ce court article au complet afin de vous faire une meilleure idée de l’importance de ce problème de gouvernance. Pour ce faire, vous devrez d’abord vous enregistrer à FT.com.
Michael Woodford, former Olympus president and chief executive, blew the whistle on the company’s fraud. The company later admitted to inappropriate accounting practice
Bad governance to blame for creative accounting
« Corporate boards continue to rubber stamp financial statements in which earnings are engineered, toxic debt is hidden “off” the balance sheet, and wishful thinking determines valuations of complex financial products…. Part of the problem lies in the breadth of choice for applying accounting rules, and nowhere is this more clear than with earnings management, as a recent study demonstrates.
Researchers surveyed chief financial officers to discover that one-fifth of “firms [surveyed] manage earnings to misrepresent economic performance”. Only half of earnings quality, the researchers found, “is driven by non-discretionary factors”.* One tool particularly favoured to game earnings – and the financial detectives’ red flag is accrual accounting: when revenues are recognised after ownership is transferred or the project is completed – not when the cash is received, as cash accounting requires ».
« Harvard University professor Lucien Bebchuk and colleagues narrowed it down to six criteria that are sure to pinpoint badly governed companies. These are: staggered boards; limitations on shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws or amend the charter; supermajority requirement for shareholders to approve a merger; golden parachutes for management and board members; and, prohibitions against “poison pills” that shareholders can use to make a company financially unattractive or dilute the acquirer’s voting power should an unauthorised change in control occur ».
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 