Un PDG « dominant » est-il approprié pour une OBNL ?

L’auteur de ce billet, Eugene Fram*, tente de décrire comment le conseil d’administration d’une OBNL peut tracer une ligne entre (1) la confiance et la liberté accordée à son PDG et (2) le rôle d’orientation et de surveillance qui lui échoit.

C’est un article pertinent car on sait que les OBNL ont souvent des problèmes à distinguer les activités qui relèvent du conseil d’administration de celles qui relèvent du PDG (CEO). En bref, les membres du C.A. doivent se questionner sur l’étendue du pouvoir à consentir à leur PDG, et savoir quand trop de pouvoir est préjudiciable à l’organisation. Pour bien circonscrire les rôles, il est essentiel que les membres du conseil soient indépendants de la direction de l’organisation.

Les recherches montrent que les PDG qui agissent sans balises précises de la part de leurs conseils d’administration sont susceptibles d’abuser de leur position en s’octroyant des bénéfices personnels ou en prenant des risques excessifs.

David Larcker and Brian Tanya**, Stanford University professors, have come to the following conclusions about CEO power and raise some pertinent questions about the role of the board, based on research mainly centered on for-profit organizations. The research literature clearly shows that having a powerful CEO creates the potential for him or her to abuse this position to extract personal benefits or engage in excessive risky activities. At the same time, the research also shows that (CE0) power is often critical to the successful completion of tasks and the achievement of corporate objectives (and nonprofit missions). To this end, powerful CEOs can ultimately be a success or a failure. Are shareholders (stakeholders of nonprofits) better or worse off with a powerful CEO?

Voici un ensemble de responsabilités qui relèvent du conseil d’administration. Il est important d’en discuter en C.A. et de s’assurer que le PDG est bien au courant de celles-ci. L’auteur insiste également sur la nécessité d’établir une solide relation de confiance entre le conseil et le PDG de l’OBNL. Bonne lecture !

 Are Powerful CEOs Right for Nonprofit Organizations?

(1) Directs Management

• Establishes long-term organizational objective and outcomes.

• Sets overall policy affecting strategies designed to achieve objectives, outcomes and impacts.

• Employs the CEO

(2) Judges Management Actions

• Robustly evaluates short-term (annual) and long-term performance of management

• Determines whether policies and strategies are being carried out, whether outcomes and impacts are being achieved

(3) Approves management actions

• Critically reviews, approves or disapproves proposals in policy and strategic areas (for example, major capital needs or expenditures and major contracts)

• Provides formal recognition and acceptance of executive decisions when related to operational actions.

(4) Advises management

• Acts in an advisory or consultative capacity on operations when sought by management

(5) Receives information from management

• Regularly receives reports on the organization (e.g., performance, program development, external factors, concerns)

(6) Acts as a public, community or industry resource to management

• Keeps the organization attuned to the external environment in which it operates

• Partners with the CEO to develop funding

____________________________________________________________

* Eugene Fram & Vicki Brown (2011), “Policy vs. Paper Clips: How using the corporate model makes a nonprofit board more efficient and effective.” http://amzn.to/eu7nQl

**David Larcker et Brian Tanya, « Is a Powerful CEO Good or Bad for Shareholders ?« , Stanford Closer Look Series, 13 november 2012.

Articles sur les OBNL :

3 Reasons You Should Work for a Nonprofit (thedailymuse.com)

Nonprofits see exodus in leaders (charlotteobserver.com)

3 Ways Working For A Non-Profit Gives You A Competitive Edge (businessinsider.com)