Quelles sont les dispositions règlementaires susceptibles de s’appliquer aux firmes de conseil spécialisées en matière de votation en 2015 ?

Comme on le sait, le marché est actuellement dominé par deux grands joueurs : (1) Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) et (2) Glass Lewis & Co. Les recommandations de ces organisations influencent grandement le comportement des actionnaires activistes et le processus de votation lors des assemblées annuelles, notamment le comportement des investisseurs institutionnels qui se fient souvent aveuglément sur les avis de ces firmes conseil, négligeant ainsi leur rôle de fiduciaire. 

Plusieurs représentants de la communauté des affaires dont le commissaire de la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Daniel M. Gallagher, s’inquiètent du manque de transparence de ces entreprises, de l’absence de mécanismes de reddition de compte et de la présence potentielle de conflits d’intérêts.

En 2015, ces firmes feront l’objet d’une supervision accrue de la SEC et, possiblement, de la mise en place d’un code de conduite prévoyant la divulgation des méthodologies utilisées. Les préoccupations relatives aux pratiques de ces firmes sont sensiblement les mêmes aux É.U., au Canada et en Europe.

Pour en savoir plus sur les actions de l’AMF, je vous invite à consulter l’Avis 25-201 relatif aux indications à l’intention des agences de conseil en vote. Vous pouvez également consulter la présentation de l’IGOPP en réponse à l’appel de commentaires sur le projet d’avis relatif aux indications à l’intention des agences de conseil en vote.

Je vous invite aussi à lire l’article ci-dessous publié par David A. Katz, associé de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, spécialisée dans le domaine des fusions et acquisitions, et paru sur le forum de la Harvard Law School.

Voici un bref extrait de la conclusion de l’article. Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Important Proxy Advisor Developments

At best, proxy advisors play an important role in making investment managers more informed, efficient stewards of their clients’ proxy voting. However, their influence has become so significant that it is crucial that their recommendations be as worthwhile, transparent, and objective as possible. As the focus shifts to the 2015 proxy season, companies should be mindful of the SEC’s increased scrutiny of investment advisers’ voting and use of proxy advisory firms. Corporate issuers can and should be proactive in obtaining and reviewing proxy voting reports relating to the company and promptly requesting any needed corrections of incorrect information. In cases of material misstatements or confusion created by the proxy voting reports, companies may wish to add their own corrections to their proxy materials or other shareholder communications. Companies should, as always, continue to engage directly with their large shareholders and make the case for supporting the recommendations of the board. Healthy communication with issuers will help enable institutional investors to make their own independent, informed decisions about voting matters.

A separate issue that has not been widely discussed is whether the proxy advisory firms should be required to make their reports public, since they influence such a large segment of the voting population. Although the proxy advisory firms currently are not required to publicly file their reports, if the goal is increased transparency, perhaps this should change. As the SEC monitors the proxy advisory firms in the coming months, appropriate consideration should be given to modernizing the antiquated proxy voting system and determining what additional steps, if any, should be taken to regulate these firms and their influence on public companies.

Companies concerned about the undue influence of proxy advisors have an engaged advocate in Commissioner Gallagher, and momentum may be building, both in the United States and abroad, toward further reform in this area. The upcoming proxy season will be a key time for the SEC to observe any ramifications of SLB 20 and to consider next steps. Fundamentally, the SEC has, with SLB 20, reminded investment managers that their fiduciary duties are incompatible with inattentive overreliance on proxy advisors. It remains to be seen what effect the new guidance will have, but if it proves to be effective, it may herald a new era of decreasing relevance for proxy advisory firms.

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* David A. Katz is a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz specializing in the areas of mergers and acquisitions and complex securities transactions. The following post is based on an article by Mr. Katz and Laura A. McIntosh that first appeared in the New York Law Journal; the full article, including footnotes, is available here.