Comment préserver le fragile équilibre entre les principaux acteurs de la gouvernance ?


Aujourd’hui, j’ai choisi de partager avec les lecteurs un article de Holly J. Gregory, associé de Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, paru sur le blogue de Harvard Law School Forum (HLSF) on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. Ce billet présente un solide argumentaire en faveur de la préservation d’un juste équilibre entre les principaux acteurs de la gouvernance  : les actionnaires, les administrateurs, les managers, les conseillers et les autorités règlementaires.

Il est clair que le conseil d’administration, élu par les actionnaires, a toujours la responsabilité de l’orientation, de la surveillance et du suivi de l’organisation. Mais l’environnement de la gouvernance a changé et les actionnaires peuvent maintenant se référer aux avis exprimés par les firmes spécialisées de conseils en procuration pour mieux faire entendre leurs voix.

L’auteur tente de clarifier les rôles de tous les acteurs en insistant sur les équilibres fragiles à préserver dans la gouvernance des sociétés. Que pensez-vous de la montée de l’influence des actionnaires activistes ?

Preserving Balance in Corporate Governance

In our annual missive last year, we wrote about the need to restore trust in our system of corporate governance generally and in relations between boards of directors and shareholders specifically. We continue to be troubled by the tensions that have developed over roles and responsibilities in the corporate governance framework for public companies. The board’s fundamental mandate under state law – to “manage and direct” the operations of the company – is under pressure, facilitated by federal regulation that gives shareholders advisory votes on subjects where they do not have decision rights either under corporate law or charter. Some tensions between boards and shareholders are inherent in our governance system and are healthy. While we are concerned about further escalation, we do not view the current relationship between boards and shareholders as akin to a battle, let alone a revolution, as some media rhetoric about a “shareholder spring” might suggest. However, we do believe that boards and shareholders should work to smooth away excesses on both sides to ensure a framework in which decisions can be made in the best interests of the company and its varied body of shareholders.

English: The former Gales Brewery Betrayed by ...
English: The former Gales Brewery Betrayed by shareholders who wanted the cash rather than a successful business. Sold to Fullers 2005, closed by Fullers 2006 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The board is charged with managing and directing the affairs of the corporation. State law does not dictate with specificity how the board should carry out this mandate, but rather imposes fiduciary duties on individual directors. This allows a degree of board self-determination within the flexible fiduciary framework of prudence, good faith and loyalty. However, while board and director responsibilities have not changed in any fundamental way, from a compliance, disclosure and risk management perspective, more is expected from the boards of public companies than ever before. Boards need to meet the expanding expectations of regulators, shareholders, and the public while maintaining focus on key board responsibilities. The corporate form enables shareholders to share in the benefits of corporate activity while limiting their potential liability to their investment. Their decision rights may be limited, but their voice and their influence is not. Of course, with power comes responsibility. If shareholders do not have the resources to become informed about a particular company and the issues that it faces, or if there are no performance issues or other red flags that would warrant special attention, it makes sense for shareholders to generally defer to the board’s recommendations made in the fiduciary decision-making framework the law promotes. This essential construct of corporate law should be respected as it has served all of us well. Shareholder powers should be exercised to strengthen this construct, not create a playground for special interests.

Preserving the delicate balance between board and shareholder responsibilities is vital to enable companies to maintain focus and efficiently create sustainable long-term value for shareholders, particularly in times of difficult economic conditions.

Les actionnaires doivent-ils être consultés sur les rémunérations des hauts dirigeants ? (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

A Call on U.S. Independent Directors to Develop Shareholder Engagement Strategies (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Director Primacy at the Lowell Milken Institute (professorbainbridge.com)

Barry Rosenstein Attacks Canadian Corporate Governance [VIDEO] (valuewalk.com)

What Is a Corporation? (infotaxsquare.wordpress.com)

Debating « The Shareholder Value Myth » (concurringopinions.com)