Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un billet publié par Richard Leblanc* sur son blogue Governance Gateway. Il s’agit d’une proposition de changement à trois niveaux :
(1) Renforcement du rôle du C.A. en matière de création de valeur;
(2) Imputabilité de la direction envers le C.A.;
(3) Imputabilité du C.A. envers les actionnaires.
L’auteur nous demande de faire des suggestions dans le but de peaufiner un cas qu’il est en voie de réaliser. Des suggestions concernant cette liste ?
I. Increase Board Engagement, Expertise and Incentives to Focus on Value Creation
Reduce the size of the Board.
Increase the frequency of Board meetings.
Limit Director overboardedness.
Limit Chair of the Board overboardedness.
Increase Director work time.
Increase the Board Chair’s role in the value creation process.
Focus the majority of Board time on value creation and company performance.
Increase Director roles and responsibilities relative to value creation.
Increase Director compensation, and match incentive compensation to long-term value creation and individual performance.
Enable Director access to information and reporting Management.
Enable Director and Board access to expertise to inform value creation as needed.
Require active investing in the Company by Directors.
Select Directors who can contribute directly to value creation.
Revise the Board’s committee structure to address value creation.
Hold Management to account.
Disclose individual Director areas of expertise directly related to value creation.
Increase Board engagement focused on value creation.
Establish and fund an independent Office of the Chairman.
Limit Board homogeneity and groupthink.
II. Increase Director Independence from Management and Management Accountability to the Board
Increase objective Director and advisory independence.
Limit Director interlocks.
Limit over-tenured Directors.
Limit potential Management capture and social relatedness of Directors.
Decrease undue Management influence on Director selection.
Decrease undue Management influence on Board Chair selection.
Increase objective independence of governance assurance providers.
Limit management control of board protocols.
Address fully perceived conflicts of interest.
Establish independent oversight functions reporting directly to Committees of the Board to support compliance oversight.
Match Management compensation with longer-term value creation, corporate performance and risk management.
III. Increase Director Accountability to Shareholders
The Board Chair and Committee Chairs shall communicate face-to-face and visit regularly with major Shareholders.
Communicate the value creation plan to Shareholders.
Implement integrated, longer-term reporting focused on sustained value creation that includes non-financial performance and investment.
Implement independent and transparent Director performance reviews with Shareholder input linked to re-nomination.
Each Director, each year, shall receive a majority of Shareholder votes cast to continue serving as a Director.
Make it easier for Shareholders to propose and replace Directors.
Limit any undue Management influence on Board – Shareholder communication.
Limit Shareholder barriers to the governance process that can be reasonably seen to promote Board or Management entrenchment.
* Richard W. Leblanc, Associate Professor, Law, Governance & Ethics, Faculty of Liberal Arts & Professional Studies, of the Bar of Ontario; Summer Faculty 2013 (MGMT S-5018 Corporate Governance) at Harvard University; Faculty at the Directors College; and Research Fellow and Advisory Board Member, Institute for Excellence in Corporate Governance, University of Texas at Dallas, Naveen Jindal School of Management.