Aujourd’hui, je vous propose une très intéressante lecture publiée par David F. Larcker et Brian Tayan, de la Stanford Graduate School of Business qui porte sur la conception que se fait Charles Munger de la bonne gouvernance des sociétés.
Les auteurs nous proposent de répondre à trois questions relatives à la position de Munger, vice-président du conseil de Berkshire :
1. Le système de gouvernance basé sur la confiance avancé par Munger pourrait-il s’appliquer à différents types d’organisations ?
2. Quelles pratiques de gouvernance sont-elles nécessaires et quelles pratiques sont-elles superflues ?
3. Comment s’assurer que la culture organisationnelle survivra à un processus de succession du PCD ?
À la suite de la lecture de l’article ci-dessous, quelles seraient vos réponses à ces questions.
Voici un résumé de la pensée de Munger, suivi d’un court extrait. Bonne lecture !
Berkshire Hathaway Vice Chairman Charlie Munger is well known as the partner of CEO Warren Buffett and also for his advocacy of “multi-disciplinary thinking” — the application of fundamental concepts from across various academic disciplines to solve complex real-world problems. One problem that Munger has addressed over the years is the optimal system of corporate governance. Munger advocates that corporate governance systems become more simple, rather than more complex, and rely on trust rather than compliance to instill ethical behavior in employees and executives. He advocates giving more power to a highly capable and ethical CEO, and taking several steps to improve the culture of the organization to reduce the risk of self-interested behavior.
How should an organization be structured to encourage ethical behavior among organizational participants and motivate decision-making in the best interest of shareholders? His solution is unconventional by the standards of governance today and somewhat at odds with regulatory guidelines. However, the insights that Munger provides represent a contrast to current “best practices” and suggest the potential for alternative solutions to improve corporate performance and executive behavior.
The need for a governance system is based on the premise that individuals working in a firm are selfinterested and therefore willing to take actions to further their own interest at the expense of the organization’s interests. To discourage this tendency, companies implement a series of carrots (incentives) and sticks (controls). The incentives might be monetary, such as performance-based compensation that aligns the financial interest of executives with shareholders. Or they might be or cultural, such as organizational norms that encourage certain behaviors. The controls include policies and procédures to limit malfeasance and oversight mechanisms to review executive decisions.