Le futur des émissions d’action à votes mulltiples : le cas de Facebook


Excellent papier sur les raisons qui militent en faveur de l’émission d’actions à votes multiples. Le contexte semble propice à ces initiatives. Qu’en sera-t-il dans le futur ?

« Dual-class share structures used to be rare and confined largely to family-run  enterprises or media companies, such as the New York Times, where they could be  justified as protecting the company’s public mission. The received wisdom was  that active investors are good for companies and for the market as a whole, and  that companies need to put shareholders first. But Google bucked convention  when, in 2004, it adopted the dual-class structure for its I.P.O., and the  arrangement has become popular among technology companies. All the big tech  I.P.O.s of the past year—LinkedIn, Groupon, Yelp, Zynga—featured it, and  Google’s recent stock split took things to a new level and sold shares with no  voting rights at all. Whereas the C.E.O.s of most public companies have to spend  time kowtowing to investors, Zuckerberg and his peers are insisting on the right  to say, “Thanks for your money. Now shut up.”