Richard Leblanc, dans Canadian Business, présente plusieurs moyens pour les conseils de réconcilier la rémunération des hauts dirigeants avec les comportements attendus de ces derniers. L’article décrit, entre autre, certaines clauses de recouvrement (clawbacks et malus). Voici quelques extraits :
« If the board is doing its job, there should be no battle and no need to ask the CEO to relinquish compensation, given what happened. The compensation (cash and stock) should not have been awarded or vested to Diamond in the first place, if the Barclays board (and other bank boards) is complying with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s guidance….
Boards have wide leverage to align ethical conduct and internal controls with executive compensation. There are two main tools: “clawbacks” and “malus.”
In short, if the board wants an executive to focus on ethics, tie his or her compensation to these outcomes. Doing this—which executives will resist—will focus executives’ minds on doing what’s right, as their money is on the line. This is exactly what regulators want in the aftermath of the financial crisis. And clawbacks and malus clauses for banks will likely migrate to non-banks as all companies will be expected to have risk-adjusted compensation in the future ».