L’auteur, Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers, (Professeur de Corporate Governance à Nyenrode Business University et Directeur de l’Institute Nyenrode Corporate Governance des Pays-Bas) présente un continuum très utile en gouvernance : à une extrémité, l’approche comportementale (soft); à l’autre extrémité, la législation stricte (hard).
Pour éviter d’accroître induement la législation, l’auteur propose une réflexion sur les éléments culturels relatifs au C.A. et l’utilisation de mécanismes d’évaluation du C.A.
Learning Mores and Board Evaluationsblogs.law.harvard.edu
« In the paper, Learning Mores and Board Evaluations – Soft Controls in Corporate Governance, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, I argue that the prevailing boardroom mores, the unwritten rules, are at one end of having an impact on board effectiveness. Legislation, the more tangibly written rules, is at the other end. In between are voluntary codes of conduct, or legally embedded corporate governance codes….
… How, non-executive directors can avoid further legislation. In other words, how can they take a closer look at their own mores and unwritten rules? The answer lies in the board evaluation. A formal and rigorous evaluation will bring to light whether
1) the highly desired open culture is present,
2) the individual non-executive directors are sufficiently dedicated,
3) the supervisory board and its members do indeed operate sufficiently, independently, and have a critical attitude towards each other and executive directors, and
4) the board is sufficiently diverse to prevent group thinking and tunnel vision. The evaluation needs to discuss these themes seriously and formally. In the end, when it comes to board effectiveness, mores may have more authority than legislation ».