Placer les actionnaires-investisseurs au cœur du processus de nomination des administrateurs | Qu’en pensez-vous ?


Il est toujours intéressant de lire des articles qui font des propositions audacieuses sur la gouvernance des sociétés. En effet, c’est assez rare dans ce domaine qu’on se hasarde à présenter de nouvelles façons d’exercer la gouvernance.

Voici un article original et provocant publié par Emil Redding* dans CITYA.M.com qui suggère une nouvelle manière de nommer des administrateurs afin de tenir compte d’une plus grande diversité, mais aussi d’une plus grande volonté d’engagement des grands actionnaires-investisseurs dans la composition des comités de gouvernance et de mise en nomination !

Voici un extrait de l’article. Que pensez-vous de la proposition de l’auteure ?

Shareholders must be involved at an earlier stage of the process to have a real say over who is chosen. Instead of the Nominations Committee being made up of part of the current board, usually including the chair and often the chief executive, there should be a majority of “investor representatives” chosen by the body of shareholders. They would then have a vital say in who was put forward for final selection, and for “election” at the AGM.
 
Once the right non-executive directors (NEDs) are being appointed, they should be treated as more professional, held to account and rewarded accordingly. The recruitment of NEDs should become more formal and include psychometric testing. But the evaluation of NEDs also needs to become more in-depth. Pay should form an automatic part of board evaluations, and sector average pay levels should be published by the Financial Reporting Council to increase transparency.
 
By encouraging the owners of companies to take more responsibility, the UK corporate governance framework will be strengthened …

 

The boardroom debate needs to move beyond gender

WEAK and ineffectual boards are a risk to the health of their companies and to the whole UK economy. As the Flowers chairmanship of Co-op Bank showed, a board that does not contain the right mix of skills and experience will not be able to prevent mistakes from happening. We need financial and technical experts holding boardroom bosses to account. Yet the British corporate governance debate has been dominated by gender diversity. While it is vitally important that boards become more representative, this also skews attention away from where it should be – how to appoint directors with a diversity of skills and experience. So how can it be achieved? As my report today recommends, instead of executive search firms expanding shortlists to include more women, their attention should be on including people with different skills and experiences to those traditionally head-hunted. In the annual report, the skills and experiences of each board member should be emphasised, rather than their gender, so that focus shifts onto what that person brings to the monitoring and steering of the firm. Engaging shareholders is another necessary step. The 2012 Kay Review rightly identified lack of investor oversight as a crucial flaw, but the proposal to set up an Investor Forum, where shareholders meet to encourage collective engagement, and vague recommendations that investors be consulted over major appointments, will do little to improve the relationship between shareholders and the firms they own. Investors do have a say, by voting at the AGM. Yet the board typically puts forward the people they want, and shareholders unanimously waive the appointments through. Shareholders must be involved at an earlier stage of the process to have a real say over who is chosen. Instead of the Nominations Committee being made up of part of the current board, usually including the chair and often the chief executive, there should be a majority of “investor representatives” chosen by the body of shareholders. They would then have a vital say in who was put forward for final selection, and for “election” at the AGM. Once the right non-executive directors (NEDs) are being appointed, they should be treated as more professional, held to account and rewarded accordingly. The recruitment of NEDs should become more formal and include psychometric testing. But the evaluation of NEDs also needs to become more in-depth. Pay should form an automatic part of board evaluations, and sector average pay levels should be published by the Financial Reporting Council to increase transparency. By encouraging the owners of companies to take more responsibility, the UK corporate governance framework will be strengthened. This is the best insurance we can have against governance failures such as at Co-Op Bank.

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*Emily Redding is author of Policy Exchange’s report Board Rules: Improving Corporate Governance.
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Un exercice de remue-méninge pour repenser les règles de « bonne gouvernance »


Aujourd’hui, veille de Noel, je vous présente les sommaires des Think-tank produit par Board Intelligence, une firme spécialisée dans les informations sur les conseils d’administration. Celle-ci a tenu une série de débats sur la réinvention des règles de gouvernance en demandant aux panels de se prononcer sur la question suivante :

If you could rip up the rule book, what would good governance look like ?

Voici les résumés des résultats les plus remarquables présentés dans FT.com. Bonne lecture et Joyeux Noel ! 

Think-tank searches for good governance

Stressing the importance of company boards can weaken the sense of accountability among management and staff, according to participants in a recent debate.

They agreed there is a strong case for saying an organisation lives or dies by the actions and inactions of its management team, rather than the board, and that employees were a better indicator of how a company is run than scrutiny of the board.

An alternative boardroom model was suggested, drawing on the way some executive committees operate, where the chief executive seeks consultation rather than consensus. Perhaps the chairman could have a similar function.

Chairmen of the Bored
Chairmen of the Bored (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

This might also reflect the reality of the near-impossible task faced by non-executive directors. One participant said: “A non-executive is on a hiding to nothing – and to do the job properly, they need smaller portfolios and better pay. When things go wrong, they can expect to be tried in the court of public opinion.”

It was argued that this is becoming such a trend that many talented candidates are no longer willing to take on the role. “I wouldn’t take a non-executive role in a big and complex global bank. The mismatch between what you are accountable for and your ability to affect it is enormous,” one commented.

“To do the job of the non-exec properly you have to get out of the boardroom and into the organisation. You have to experience the business for yourself and not just take management’s word for it.”

There were also complaints about the amount of time required to do the job of the non-executive: “It’s not 12 days a year at £1,500 per day – it’s at least 30 days. Given the opportunity cost of what an accomplished person could be doing with their time, and given the risk you carry as a non-executive, why do it?”

If we don’t go so far as to rip up the governance rule book, at least we should make it shorter, they agreed. Rules will always have unintended  consequences and breed perverse outcomes – and fear of falling foul of the rules  can
lead boards to document as little as possible to maintain “plausible  deniability”.

At a subsequent debate it was proposed there should be a register to name and shame – and praise – the performance of non-executives. At present, shareholders’ opinion of a non-executive and their decision on re-electing them is based on gut feeling. A public register would be helpful in forming a judgment, listing statistics about the number of boards the non-executive is on, the time they allocate to each and notable events that took place on their watch

There are chairmen with such large portfolios they could not possibly allocate sufficient time to each board, they argued. A public register would make this much more transparent.

Débats entre cinq présidents de conseils et un PCD

The five chairmen and chief executives attending a recent think-tank discussion accepted that even improved boards cannot prevent all corporate crises and expressed concern at this overly “defensive” role. They argued that “stopping bad things happening” must be tempered by helping “good things happen”.

The participants agreed that non-executives must have the confidence to challenge the chairman and chief executive. One said: “Having sat on the board of my employer as an executive, I have come to the conclusion that it is a hopeless role. When the chief executive is sitting opposite, it is fairly obvious how you’re supposed to respond to the question ‘what do you think?’

“Board meetings are not a good use of time. We don’t question why we’re doing what we’re doing.”

The group concluded that “small is beautiful: small boards, small briefing packs, small agenda, and small rule book”.

At a subsequent dinner, also attended by chairmen and chief executives, a call was made for boards to be more realistic about their limitations and to be more discerning about where they focus their efforts

For example, boards attempt to scrutinise specific investment decisions when the information they can absorb and the time available for discussion mean substantive challenge or insights are unlikely.

On the other hand, it was pointed out that boards are also held liable for the detail as well as the big picture. Even so, attempting to meet these conflicting responsibilities by “clogging up the board agenda with too many matters to explore properly” cannot be the answer, they agreed.

The participants argued that the governance rule book is ineffective and that boards should instead be subject to an annual review of their effectiveness.

A need for “better memories, rather than better rules or regulations”, was stressed and the recommendation that non-executives should stand down after nine years was criticised for institutionalising the short-term memory of the boardroom.

One said: “When our bank repeated its mistakes from the early 1990s, it wasn’t the bank that suffered from amnesia – it was just the board.”

The chairmen and chief executives concluded that UK business suffers from a short-term “sell-out” culture. It was argued that in the US, business leaders who are successful will strive to be yet more successful and in Germany, successful businesses are nurtured for the next generation. But in the UK, business people aspire to have just enough to “retire to the Old Rectory”. One said: “We lack the ambition – or greed – of the Americans and we don’t feel the duty of the Germans. We need to raise the level of ambition – and sense of duty.”

Débats entre présidents de conseils

Boards are failing at strategy and becoming increasingly focused on costs, according to a think-tank debate attended by chairmen. One said: “We need the conversation in the boardroom to be two levels ‘higher’. Many of our largest companies are sitting on cash and they need to get back to strategy and invest in the future – or there won’t be one.”

It was suggested that advisory boards, unfettered by concerns of liability  and governance, might be better at tackling strategy – and might attract  creative people who would otherwise be put off joining boards by the burden of  governance.

The chairmen also asked whether more of a board’s work could be handled by committees, as they can be more focused and effective.

They also questioned whether age and experience should continue to take precedence over training and education when appointing board members. One view was that boardroom skills are becoming more specialised and need to be learned.

Regulators came under fire from the chairmen. They were accused of not understanding the businesses they are regulating and of treating non-executives as executives.

The meeting also referred to the spread of regulation from the financial services sector. One said: “We have a two-tier corporate world: financial services and the rest. But what starts as regulation of financial services bleeds through to the rest.”

The participants warned that because boards are out of touch with society, there is a danger of a backlash and the emergence of an “anti-business” movement.

The relationship between society and business was also raised at a subsequent debate. One view was that the future of the corporation depends on it being redesigned and finance returned to its proper, subservient role of supporting the wider economy.

All businesses should demonstrate public benefit – just as charities have to show a public benefit in return for charitable status, businesses should do the same, perhaps in return for limited liability status.

Another view was that voluntary sector leaders should be encouraged to join corporate boards, because of their specific skills, including in reputation and risk management.

Participants went on to call for younger, more vibrant boards. “You should see the faces of the future – not just the past,” said one. The concern that  young executives are too busy to join boards was rejected and some chairmen were  blamed for claiming to support diversity of age but then not allowing their  executives to join someone else’s board.

It was also argued that businesses and boards need permission to fail. “What business or person can achieve great things without the possibility of failure?” one asked.

Vous pouvez lire les résultats des dix autres débats en vous référant à l’article en référence.

How to measure a post-2015 MDG on good governance (post2015.org)

Quelle est la place des employés dans la gouvernance à l’américaine ?


Voici un bref compte rendu, paru dans le Financial Times, dans le cadre la série « Better Boards » qui discute de l’urgence de donner une place aux employés dans la gouvernance des entreprises. On sait que les employés siègent sur les conseils d’administration de plusieurs entreprises européennes. Pourquoi cet aspect de la gouvernance est-il occulté aux É.U. et au Canada ? Quelle est votre idée à ce sujet ?

L’article du FT aborde aussi d’autres sujets sur la composition des C.A. Vos commentaires sont appréciés.

Better Boards: is there a role for employees ?

Board Intelligence, a specialist in board information, is holding a  series of debates called “The Board is Dead; Long Live the Board”. Peter Whitehead reports on the most notable findings, as part of Executive  Appointments’ “Better Boards” series. Participants in the fifth  think-tank debate discussed the role of employees in corporate governance. They  said that those with the biggest stake in the long-term success of a business  should have the balance of power – and that, arguably, this is the employees.

World business  finance and political news fro...
World business finance and political news from the Financial Times– FT.com Europe (Photo credit: catorze14)

“Much of our system of corporate governance is intent on protecting and  empowering the investor. But investors in large listed stocks have access to a  liquid market and can usually exit should they wish to. By contrast, most  employees are at the mercy of a relatively illiquid employment market and so  surely have more skin in the game,” they said.

But concerns were also raised that both employees and shareholders can have vested interests that might not always be in the long-term interest of the  company, whereas independent non-executive directors should not be driven by  self-interest.

Les aspects éthiques de la gouvernance d’entreprise | Un rapport qui prend en compte la réalité européenne (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Corporate governance in multicultural organization (leadershipbyvirtue.blogspot.com)

Is Your Board Governing Itself Effectively? (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Board Evaluation – A Window into the Boardroom (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Changements significatifs dans la composition des C.A.


La présence de CFO actifs sur des C.A. d’autres conseils d’administration est en forte diminution dans les entreprises du Royaume-Unis.  L’article ci-dessous, publié par Alison Smith, Chief Corporate Correspondent du Financial Times, est très instructif à cet égard et mérite que l’on s’y arrête un peu. La tendance observée par Spencer Stuart est-elle la même dans d’autres pays, dont le Canada, la France, les États-Unis ?

Je crois que nous assistons présentement à des changements significatifs dans la composition des conseils d’administration : une rotation plus importante des administrateurs, des C.A. de plus petites tailles, une plus grande diversité de membres, plus de présidents de conseils indépendants et plus d’administrateurs indépendants, moins de CEO et de CFO actifs sur les conseils d’administration d’autres sociétés. Quel est votre point de vue sur cette petite révolution dans la composition des conseils d’administration. L’article de Smith devrait alimenter notre réflexion. Bonne journée en ce lendemain de Noel.

CFO India
CFO India (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

External UK board roles on the decline

« Fewer than one in four finance directors of the UK’s biggest companies now acts as a non-executive director on another board, according to boardroom research by Spencer Stuart. The headhunter’s study of the largest 150 quoted companies by market value shows a sharp drop in the proportion of finance chiefs taking on external roles compared with the two in five who did so just two years ago. “Boards and chief executives are more cautious about releasing chief financial officers’ (CFOs) time than they have ever been,” says Aidan Bell, head of the CFO practice at Spencer Stuart, “and the boards they are interested in joining want more of their time in those non-executive roles.”

Finance directors are often sought after as non-executives because they have the background and qualifications that make them obvious candidates to join or chair the board audit or risk committee… Because non-executives now face more pressure and reputational risk even compared with just a few years ago, non-execs who also hold full-time executive jobs often have to work longer at weekends to carry out their external duties effectively. This can make them more reluctant to take on such roles… The relative scarcity of CFOs available to be non-executives is causing companies to look more broadly to fill audit committee roles ».

« Global Board Ready Women » | Online database list of 8 000 women from the European Business Schools (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)