Étiquette : risques

2012 : L’année de la rémunération en fonction de la performance (P4P)


Voici un document du Conference Board publié dans LinkedIn par Richard Leblanc récemment. Super intéressant; à lire.

The year of Pay for Performance – Proxy season 2012

Les administrateurs de sociétés et le risque associé à une mauvaise réputation


Richard Joly, président de Leaders & Cie, nous offre le résultat de sa réflexion sur le risque réputationnel dans Les affaires.com
Une mauvaise réputation d’entreprise est ce qui effraie le plus les administrateurs, car ceux-ci ont mis toute leur carrière pour bâtir leur réputation et ils ne veulent surtout pas la perdre. La réputation est également l’actif le plus précieux d’une entreprise et c’est un risque important à maîtriser pour le conseil d’administration.

Une mauvaise réputation, c’est comme l’eau contaminée d’une maison. Plus personne ne la désire. Arthur Andersen est le plus bel exemple. Cette société internationale dans le domaine de la vérification comptable jouissait d’une réputation enviable avant que certains associés soient liés au scandale d’Enron. Dans l’espace de quelques mois, cette firme est disparue car leurs clients ne voulaient pas être associés à eux, pour cause de mauvaise réputation.

Les administrateurs de sociétés et le risque lié à une mauvaise réputation

SNC-Lavalin: Quelles leçons les conseils d’administration doivent-ils retenir ?


Excellente intervention de Diane Bérard sur le blogue Les Affaires.com. Dans ce billet, Mme Bérard pose plusieurs questions fort pertinentes à Richard Leblanc, expert en gouvernance à l’Université York. Et comme c’est son habitude, Richard Leblanc formule des réponses claires et précises. D’abord, Mme Bérard brosse un résumé de la situation :

« Pierre Duhaime, pdg de SNC-Lavalin, a démissionné.  Ce geste marque la conclusion du premier chapitre d’une saga qui dure depuis plusieurs semaines. Celle-ci a débuté avec des allégations de pots-de-vin en Libye pour un montant d’une trentaine de millions de dollars. Après enquête, on apprend que cette somme s’élèverait plutôt à  56 M$ et elle ne serait pas nécessairement reliée à la Libye.  Il s’agirait de fonds utilisés pour payer des “agents” à l’étranger. Cette somme aurait été soumise au chef de la direction financière ainsi qu’au président du conseil qui ne l’aurait pas autorisée. En dépit de cela, Pierre Duhaime aurait permis cette dépense. Je résume: une somme de 56M$, sans aucun lien apparent avec les projets de SNC, aurait été dépensée sans  autorisation. Et l’usage pour lequel celle-ci aurait été dépensée contreviendrait au code d’éthique de SNC ».

Lisez cet article pour connaître le point de vue de Richard Leblanc sur les questions suivantes :

SNC-Lavalin: cinq leçons pour les conseils

Q: Il doit y avoir beaucoup de gens nerveux aujourd’hui?

Q: Pourquoi s’en faire, SNC est canadienne et le Canada n’a pas de loi sur la corruption?

Q: “L’ incident SNC” aura-t-il des répercussions chez d’autres conseils de sociétés canadiennes?

Q:  Quelles leçons les conseils devraient-ils tirer de ce dérapage?

Les quatre (4) plus grands risques de la rémunération incitative


Voici le résumé d’article qui décrit assez bien les écueils de la rémunération incitative (Pay for Performance P4P). L’auteur, E. James Brennan, est un partisan de la rémunération incitative. Son article a pour but de mettre les administrateurs en garde contre quatre problèmes susceptibles de rendre l’exercice périlleux !

 

Stickman top 4 p4p risks

The Top 4 Risks in Pay for Performance

« Pay for Performance, (« P4P » for us cool compensation pros) is all the rage. Those of you who read my postings regularly know that I’m a big proponent of performance-based compensation, in its many forms. Despite being a big supporter, or perhaps because of it, I think its important to discuss the major risks involved with these programs.

1. Incorrect Metrics

Metrics are the “things” that are being measured. These are the foundation of your plan and must represent the measurements of success. I will save you the time of repeating what I, and others, have already said. A couple of interesting articles are here and here.

2. Poorly Set Goals

Goals are the levels that define the success of each metric. These are the drivers of your plan and must represent your destination. Again, I will save time, by pointing out some other articles, here and here.

3. Underwhelming Communication

Performance compensation is often confusing. Clean, clear communications are essential to engaging and motivating your staff. This is a topic we cover here often at the Compensation Cafe. Some good examples are here, here and here.

4. Human Nature

Human nature is the one thing that you cannot build into your compensation programs, yet it is the single biggest risk to pay for performance. A colleague of mine often says that the problem isn’t that P4P programs don’t work well, it’s that they work TOO well. Results and actions must be in alignment. Many companies create great metrics, goals and communications and still have compensation plans blow up.  Why is this? For programs that demand high-performance, you must also provide strong management and oversight. Many companies use their compensation plans as a form of management. This may lead to participants slowly defining the good and bad ».

Comment le Board peut-il aider à prévenir la fraude dans les entreprises ?


Très bonne analyse de Richard Leblanc dans Canadian Business sur les moyens à prendre en vue de prévenir la fraude dans les entreprises. C’est de plus en plus une responsabilité du Board de s’assurer que les organisations mettent en place les bons mécanismes de surveillance.

Prévenir la fraude dans les organisations – Does Canada have a…

« The issue raises many questions, but among them are a couple I’m particularly interested in: do directors on boards play a role in detecting and deterring fraud, and can they be held responsible, or even liable, if they do not fulfill this role properly? Increasingly, the answer to both is yes, especially given new U.K. and U.S. legislation following the financial crisis.

A bank director once told me that the number one role of a director was to watch for fraud. That may be true. So here is a list of 10 red flags and suggestions based on my work with companies accused of fraud or other malfeasance—some were pretty high profile ».

Lire l’article pour connaître ces dix mises en garde.

Pratique de gouvernance canadiennes – réponses aux questions de l’EU


Voici le résumé d’un chapitre de volume publié dans International Journal of Disclosure and Governance (2012) par plusieurs auteurs canadiens dont Richard Leblanc. J’ai pensé que l’introduction au chapitre saurait vous inciter à lire le document au complet. Bonne lecture.

« The European Commission has put forward an interesting set of questions about how to improve corporate governance, within its ‘Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance Framework’ (Green Paper, 2011). The following provides analysis and the responses by a working group of authors in Canada to these questions based on the experience and research of the group (academics and practitioners) and the relevant literature ».

Pratiques de gouvernance canadiennes – réponses aux questions de l’EU

INTRODUCTION

« The European Commission, in response to the governance failures that came to light in the credit crisis, is considering fundamental changes to European governance systems. As a step towards that goal, the EU has put forward a series of questions that examine essential aspects of governance, that is, what it involves, who it applies to and how it can be enforced. Whether these are the only or best questions that can be asked in this context is not the issue in this article, but rather, we see addressing them as an opportunity to bring to the reader the latest in governance research, as well as lessons from experience with the governance regimes in other regions, notably Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

This article is authored by a working group of academics and practitioners, with expertise in governance and various sub-governance domains. Members of the group have advised and worked with boards, regulators and companies that have become recognized for their leading governance practices. It is these experiences and the literature upon which we also draw.

Twenty-three of the 25 questions have been addressed below. Each question appears, followed by our group’s response. Two of the questions (questions 13 and 16) were not addressed owing to the time constraints of the submission (which was due on 22 July 2011) and the group felt that it did not possess all of the requisite expertise.

At the outset, the European Commission should be congratulated for establishing a high-level governance forum for discussions and debates and for the exchange of experiences. The need for a clear road map through the shifting and confusing terrain of corporate governance is very compelling. In a global marketplace, the solutions and recommendations championed in Europe will have a profound effect on governance standards in Canada and elsewhere.

In this article, the authors address in detail the need for improved governance in the areas articulated by the EU. First we consider the need for similar or different standards for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and unlisted companies. Then we focus on board recruitment, diversity and ways to improve the effectiveness of individual directors and boards. The critical area of governance over remuneration is then subject to our analysis, and we then assess ways to improve the board’s role in the governance of risk, of asset managers and of proxy advisors. Ensuring adequate shareholder engagement is next addressed, as well as minority shareholder interests. Lastly, we make recommendations for improvements in the implementation and monitoring of governance codes ».

Background: Canadian corporate governance practices

« We believe that Canada is a leader in corporate governance practices and, given that our group members are primarily Canadian, we draw on many of the initiatives here to frame our response to the EU deliberations. We also draw on global developments, including those in the United Kingdom and United States.

Canada has adopted the Anglo-American, unitary model of corporate governance. Our companies, however, operate within different ownership structures, legal and linguistic dualities, geographic diversity, and a decentralized regulatory regime of 13 provinces and territories. We have companies that are state-owned, family, significant shareholder, small and medium-sized listed, as well as widely held, not dissimilar to the diverse plurality and tapestry within the European Union.

Canada has had formal corporate governance guidelines in place since 1994 (Dey et al, ‘Where were the Directors?’) within a flexible ‘comply or explain’ approach. There has been time to digest and assess a continuously evolving corporate governance landscape, as companies and boards adopt guidelines and practices to suit the foregoing diverse circumstances, in a flexible manner.

The Canadian corporate governance guidelines, most recently revised in 2005 (Canadian Securities Administrators, 2005), have been adopted and adapted by companies within the listed sector, and through osmosis and other best practices, within private, governmental and not-for-profit sectors as well. It is upon this experience that we also draw for our responses ».

Les « posts » les plus populaires en vérification sur le blogue de Norman Marks


Voici un compte rendu des billets les plus populaires récemment publiés sur le blogue de Norman Marks. L’auteur est un spécialiste de la gouvernance, plus spécialement de la vérification interne.

Les « posts » les plus populaires en vérification sur le blogue de Norman Marks

These are the posts on my personal blog that obtained the most views. The #1 post, on risk appetite, garnered nearly 3,000 views. I will later share the top posts on the IIA blog. Posted on Jan 5, 2012 by Norman Marks The…

 

L’année 2012 s’annonce meilleure pour les communications entre les sociétés et leurs actionnaires


Voici un petit billet de Catherine Dunn dans Law.com Network qui annonce un bel optimisme en matière de communications entre les sociétés et leurs actionnaires en 2012.  L’auteur réfère à Maureen Errity, directrice du Centre de la Gouvernance de Deloitte Deloitte.

L’année 2012 s’annonce meilleure pour les communications entre les sociétés et leurs actionnaires

Compensation, Risk to Dominate the 2012 Proxy Season

The New role of the Chief Risk Officer


Le nouveau rôle du Chef de la gestion des risques

 

 The Evolving Role of the Chief Risk Officer « ERM Advantage ermadvantage.com 

In working with different sized institutions to develop an enterprise risk management program, some of the questions that tend to come up relate in particular to the Chief Risk Officer’s (CRO) role, including:

  1. To whom should the CRO report?
  2. Does the CRO only work on the risk framework or can (or should) he participate in risk assessments?
  3. Does the CRO own any of the risks?

C.A. « puissant et expérimenté » vs PDG « super puissant » !


Voici un article, publié dans dealbook.nytimes.com et partagé par Cynthia Biasolo, qui montre que dans beaucoup de situations même un C.A. « puissant et expérimenté » n’a pas toujours la volonté de « challenger » les décisions d’un PDG « super puissant ».

The New York Times 

La chute de MF Global, à l’instar de très nombreuses autres institutions financières, tend à démontrer que le C.A. n’a pas exercé toute la vigilance requise en matière de gestion des risques.

Que faire dans ces cas ? L’auteur suggère de questionner le PDG davantage et de s’assurer d’établir une culture de gestion des risques dans l’entreprise (« tone at the top »).

Excellent article qui suscite la réflexion sur l’efficacité des C.A. dans leur rôle de surveillance des intérêts des stakeholders.

BRIC et C.A. : Comprendre les risques associés au développement international


Le carnet de Richard Joly, président et fondateur de Leaders & Cie, publié dans les Affaires est vraiment très intéressant. Selon une récente étude publiée par PricewaterhouseCoopers, 51 % des entreprises américaines souhaitent pénétrer les pays du BRIC (Brésil, Russie, Inde et Chine) dans un proche avenir.

Selon notre expert, « la raison est simple; ces entreprises ont de la difficulté à croître dans leurs marchés traditionnels. Pour les administrateurs de sociétés, l’expansion vers ces pays représente de nouveaux risques à gérer. Ils doivent s’assurer que les initiatives d’expansion sont au cœur de la stratégie d’entreprise et non un projet ad hoc adopté en réponse à un courant populaire ».

À lire : BRIC et C.A. : Pas sans risques !

Le besoin d’une bonne réglementation en gouvernance


Très bonne analyse de Richard Leblanc dans Canadian Business sur la nécessité de mieux encadrer la gestion des risques, par une réglementation plus « moderne », et par l’ajout de plus fortes expertises dans le domaine de la gestion des risques sur les Boards.

Risk management, corporate governance and banking reforms to date have been wholly inadequate. We need to admit that most corporate directors simply do not understand complex derivative products, and we are demanding too much of them in expecting otherwise. If we want directors to understand derivatives, they need to be chosen differently.

Guide de gestion des risques par le COSO


Pour les membres de CA qui sont intéressés par les nouvelles règles édictées par le COSO.

Risk Management Guidance from COSO candorsolutions.co.za

Management governs risk by means of risk management frameworks, such as COSO. What guidance have COSO provided?

Conseils de McKinsey sur la dynamique des CA


Un bon résumé des avis de McKinsey concernant les pratiques et la dynamique du Conseil

Gestion des risques et CA


Dix (10) questions que les CA devraient se poser en ce qui concerne la gestion des risques : Une compilation de Norman Marks

Norman is a practitioner and thought leader in internal audit, risk management, compliance and ethics, and has led large and small internal audit departments, been a Chief Risk Officer and Chief Compliance Officer, and managed IT Security and governance functions.

 

A good reference for boards is the 20 Questions series from the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. The series includes one on risk management. I have my own set of 10 questions (OK, they have follow-on questions). These were developed for boards, but they would probably be a good basis for questions auditors could ask as well.

  1. How has the executive team become familiar with leading risk management practices? When you manage risk, and uncertainty in general, are you using a recognized risk standard or framework?
  2. Risk management is about managing uncertainties that may impact our ability to achieve our goals. In broad strokes, can you describe how you identify, assess, and determine how to manage those uncertainties?
  3. How do you integrate the consideration and management of risk in the setting of strategy, achievement of goals and objectives, optimization of performance and management of major projects?
  4. How have you assigned the management of risk within the companies? Is it clearly part of each manager’s responsibilities, or is it seen as the responsibility of the risk officer, CFO, or other person? If the latter, why? If the former, how are they informed, educated in risk management techniques, and provided the tools for the task?
  5. How are risk criteria, including risk appetite and tolerance, set? How are those levels and expectations for taking risk communicated across the organization? How do you know when the levels are exceeded?
  6. If each manager is responsible for managing risks within their sphere of operations, within their set of responsibilities, how do you make sure you as an executive team have a clear view of risk across the organization? How do you manage the accumulation and interplay of risks when a single situation can affect multiple areas, or when the activities of one manager affect others?
  7. Are you managing risk fast enough, so you can act when necessary? Is the organization agile? Are you able to change strategic directions if risk levels change?
  8. What is your process for involving the board? Under what circumstances will you notify us? What information will you share and when?
  9. If you have a risk office, what is their role relative to the responsibilities of management? Where do they report, do they have access to executives and the board, and are they adequately resourced?
  10. How do you make sure the risk management process is working as you expect? Are you using internal audit to obtain that assurance?