Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un document de la firme Thomson Reuters (White Paper) très intéressant sur le rôle de l’audit interne dans l’identification des risques émergents.
C’est un rôle très stimulant pour les administrateurs et les gestionnaires prêts à relever les défis. Voici un extrait du document. Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Reinsurance company Swiss Re defines emerging risks as “newly developing or changing risks which are difficult to quantify and which may have a major impact on the organisation.” This identifies their key elements.
Emerging risks may be entirely new, such as those posed by social media or technological innovation. Or they may come from existing risks that evolve or escalate – for example, the way counterparty credit risk or liquidity risk sky-rocketed during the 2008 financial crisis.
Newly developing risks lack precedent or history, and their precise form may not be immediately clear, which makes them difficult to measure or model. Changing risks are at least familiar in their shape and nature, although the rate of transformation and intensity can make them hard to quantify.
The final key element of emerging risks is their potential impact. New or changing risks can be as menacing as those the organisation deals with on a daily basis, and sometimes even more so. To give just one example, the way in which the music business failed to address the implications of digital downloads allowed a complete outsider, the computer company Apple, to step in and define and dominate the new market.
Emerging risks also threaten through their apparent remoteness or their obscurity. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld distinguished between things we know we do not know (‘known unknowns’), and things we do not know we do not know (‘unknown unknowns’). In the first category are risks whose shape might be familiar, but where we do not necessarily understand all of their elements – causes, potential impact, probability or timing. Unknown unknowns are events that are so out of left field or seemingly farfetchedthat it takes great insight or a leap of the imagination to even articulate them. These include the ‘black swan’ events highlighted by the investor-philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb, where the human tendency is to dismiss them as improbable beforehand, then rationalise them after they occur. The 9/11 terrorist attack, or the financial crash of 2008, or the invention of the internet show that not only do black swan events happen, but they do so more frequently than is generally recognised, and they have an historically significant impact (and not always negative).
Many emerging risks are characterised by their global nature, their scale or their longer-term horizon – climate change is an example that displays all of these elements. In other cases, it is less the individual events themselves, some of which may be relatively moderate or manageable on their own, as the conflation of circumstances that creates a ‘perfect storm’.
“The clear message from the survey is that internal audit functions need to stop thinking about themselves as compliance specialists and start taking on a much larger, more strategic role within the organization,” Ernst & Young LLP internal audit leader Brian Schwartz said in a news release. “IA is increasingly being asked by senior management and the board to provide broader business insights and better anticipate traditional and emerging risks, even as they maintain their focus on non-negotiable compliance activities.”
New risks
As strategic opportunities emerge, internal auditors also are adjusting to new compliance duties, according to the survey. Globalization has resulted in increased revenue from emerging markets for many companies, so new regulatory, cultural, tax, and talent risks are emerging.
Internal audit will play a more prominent role in evaluating these risks, according to the survey report. Although slightly more than one-fourth (27%) of respondents are heavily involved in identifying, assessing, and monitoring emerging risks now, 54% expect to be heavily involved in the next two years.
The biggest primary risks that respondents said their organizations are tracking are:
Economic stability (54%).
Cybersecurity (52%).
Major shifts in technology (48%).
Strategic transactions in global locations (44%).
Data privacy regulations (39%).
Survey respondents said the skills most often found to be lacking in internal audit functions are:
Data analytics;
Business strategy;
Deep industry experience;
Risk management; and
Fraud prevention and detection.
“As corporate leaders demand a greater measure of strategy and insight from their internal audit functions, CAEs will need to move quickly to close competency gaps and ensure that they have the right people in the right place, at the right time.” Schwartz said. “If they fail to meet organizational expectations, they risk being left behind or consigned to more transactional compliance activities.”
Voici, en rappel, un billet publié le 22 novembre sur les principes fondamentaux de la bonne gouvernance ? Voilà un sujet bien d’actualité, une question fréquemment posée, laquelle appelle, trop souvent, des réponses complexes et peu utiles pour ceux qui siègent sur des conseils d’administration.
L’article de Jo Iwasaki, paru sur le site du NewStateman, a l’avantage de résumer très succinctement les cinq (5) grands principes qui doivent animer et inspirer les administrateurs de sociétés.
Les principes évoqués dans l’article sont simples et directs; ils peuvent même paraître simplistes mais, à mon avis, ils devraient servir de puissants guides de référence à tous les administrateurs de sociétés.
Les cinq principes retenus dans l’article sont les suivants :
Un solide engagement du conseil (leadership);
Une grande capacité d’action liée au mix de compétences, expertises et savoir être;
Une reddition de compte efficace envers les parties prenantes;
Un objectif de création de valeur et une distribution équitable entre les principaux artisans de la réussite;
De solides valeurs d’intégrité et de transparence susceptibles de faire l’objet d’un examen minutieux de la part des parties prenantes.
« What board members need to remind themselves is that they are collectively responsible for the long-term success of their company. This may sound obvious but it is not always recognised ».
Our suggestion is to get back to the fundamental principles of good governance which board members should bear in mind in carrying out their responsibilities. If there are just a few, simple and short principles, board members can easily refer to them when making decisions without losing focus. Such a process should be open and dynamic.
Back to basics: What are the fundamental principles of corporate governance? Photograph: Getty Images.
An effective board should head each company. The Board should steer the company to meet its business purpose in both the short and long term.
Capability
The Board should have an appropriate mix of skills, experience and independence to enable its members to discharge their duties and responsibilities effectively.
Accountability
The Board should communicate to the company’s shareholders and other stakeholders, at regular intervals, a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of how the company is achieving its business purpose and meeting its other responsibilities.
Sustainability
The Board should guide the business to create value and allocate it fairly and sustainably to reinvestment and distributions to stakeholders, including shareholders, directors, employees and customers.
Integrity
The Board should lead the company to conduct its business in a fair and transparent manner that can withstand scrutiny by stakeholders.
We kept them short, with purpose, but we also kept them aspirational. None of them should be a surprise – they might be just like you have on your board. Well, why not share and exchange our ideas – the more we debate, the better we remember the principles which guide our owbehaviour.
De son côté, l’Ordre des administrateurs agréés du Québec (OAAQ) a retenu six (6) valeurs fondamentales qui devraient guider les membres dans l’accomplissement de leurs tâches de professionnels. Il est utile de les rappeler dans ce billet :
Transparence
La transparence laisse paraître la réalité tout entière, sans qu’elle ne soit altérée ou biaisée. Il n’existe d’autre principe plus vertueux que la transparence de l’acte administratif par l’administrateur qui exerce un pouvoir au nom de son détenteur; celui qui est investi d’un pouvoir doit rendre compte de ses actes à son auteur.
Essentiellement, l’administrateur doit rendre compte de sa gestion au mandant ou autre personne ou groupe désigné, par exemple, à un conseil d’administration, à un comité de surveillance ou à un vérificateur. L’administrateur doit également agir de façon transparente envers les tiers ou les préposés pouvant être affectés par ses actes dans la mesure où le mandant le permet et qu’il n’en subit aucun préjudice.
Continuité
La continuité est ce qui permet à l’administration de poursuivre ses activités sans interruption. Elle implique l’obligation du mandataire de passer les pouvoirs aux personnes et aux intervenants désignés pour qu’ils puissent remplir leurs obligations adéquatement.
La continuité englobe aussi une perspective temporelle. L’administrateur doit choisir des avenues et des solutions qui favorisent la survie ou la croissance à long terme de la société qu’il gère. En lien avec la saine gestion, l’atteinte des objectifs à court terme ne doit pas menacer la viabilité d’une organisation à plus long terme.
Efficience
L’efficience allie efficacité, c’est-à-dire, l’atteinte de résultats et l’optimisation des ressources dans la pose d’actes administratifs. L’administrateur efficient vise le rendement optimal de la société à sa charge et maximise l’utilisation des ressources à sa disposition, dans le respect de l’environnement et de la qualité de vie.
Conscient de l’accès limité aux ressources, l’administrateur met tout en œuvre pour les utiliser avec diligence, parcimonie et doigté dans le but d’atteindre les résultats anticipés. L’absence d’une utilisation judicieuse des ressources constitue une négligence, une faute qui porte préjudice aux commettants.
Équilibre
L’équilibre découle de la juste proportion entre force et idées opposées, d’où résulte l’harmonie contributrice de la saine gestion des sociétés. L’équilibre se traduit chez l’administrateur par l’utilisation dynamique de moyens, de contraintes et de limites imposées par l’environnement en constante évolution.
Pour atteindre l’équilibre, l’administrateur dirigeant doit mettre en place des mécanismes permettant de répartir et balancer l’exercice du pouvoir. Cette pratique ne vise pas la dilution du pouvoir, mais bien une répartition adéquate entre des fonctions nécessitant des compétences et des habiletés différentes.
Équité
L’équité réfère à ce qui est foncièrement juste. Plusieurs applications en lien avec l’équité sont enchâssées dans la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés de la Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne et dans la Charte québécoise des droits et libertés de la personne. L’administrateur doit faire en sorte de gérer en respect des lois afin de prévenir l’exercice abusif ou arbitraire du pouvoir.
Abnégation
L’abnégation fait référence à une personne qui renonce à tout avantage ou intérêt personnel autre que ceux qui lui sont accordés par contrat ou établis dans le cadre de ses fonctions d’administrateur.
Aujourd’hui, je propose aux administrateurs de sociétés une lecture très utile pour mieux appréhender les défis reliés à l’utilisation de services juridiques dans le cas d’entreprises de petite capitalisation.
Cet article, publié par Adam J. Epstein* dans NACD Directorship, présente clairement les options qui s’offrent aux administrateurs de ces entreprises lorsque vient le temps de décider d’une stratégie gagnante pour l’achat de services juridiques.
Les conseils de l’auteur sont notamment très précieux pour aider l’entreprise à embaucher le bon type de firme et pour décider de la forme que prendra le paiement des honoraires.
Je vous invite donc à lire ce court article; en voici un court extrait. Bonne lecture !
Because so many small-cap companies— particularly those with market capitalizations below $500 million—operate without in-house counsel, and because many officers and directors lack legal backgrounds, there is a constant risk of either hiring the wrong attorneys or paying too much for legal services. And since few small-cap companies can afford either, directors should consider the following insights into common circumstances involving legal services.
Current Environment The law firm business model is in the midst of a historic transformation. After decades of hypergrowth and profitability, the law industry post-financial crisis is in many cases a shadow of its former self. Put differently, when it comes to purchasing legal services, it’s become a buyer’s market.
English: Law Firm Logo (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
For small-cap companies already saddled with comparatively crippling costs of “being public,” the evolution of the marketplace for legal services is unreservedly positive. But even in the face of a buyer’s market, many small-cap companies aren’t benefitting as much as they should.
For example, one of the most dramatic changes to the law firm model is an inexorable shift away from hourly billing to flat fees. According to The Wall Street Journal, the frequency of use of flat fee structures has nearly doubled at large law firms in the last several years. At a high level, this is beneficial to purchasers of legal services, because hourly fee billing can be susceptible to conflicts of interest (i.e., lawyers might be tempted to take more time to complete tasks because they are getting paid by the hour). But just because a company is paying a flat fee for a particular service doesn’t necessarily mean the company is getting a better deal. Especially when it comes to clients with less legal acumen, law firms still do their best to construct flat fees that aren’t demonstrably different than historic hourly fees when all is said and done. Accordingly, management needs to confirm that any flat fees agreed upon are, in fact, more advantageous to the company and its shareholders.
Notwithstanding the positive developments in the legal services marketplace for small-cap companies, there are three circumstances in particular that are always deserving of added director scrutiny.
__________________________________
*Adam J. Epstein is lead director of OCZ Technology Group, an NACD Board Leadership Fellow, and advises smallcap boards through his firm, Third Creek Advisors. This article is excerpted, in part, from his book, The Perfect Corporate Board: A Handbook for Mastering the Unique Challenges of Small-Cap Companies (McGraw-Hill, 2012).
Le document ci-dessous du The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (HLS) publié par Martin Lipton, associé fondateur de Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, expose plusieurs considérations à prendre en compte par les administrateurs en 2014.
In many respects, the relentless drive to adopt corporate governance mandates seems to have reached a plateau: essentially all of the prescribed “best practices”—including say-on-pay, the dismantling of takeover defenses, majority voting in the election of directors and the declassification of board structures—have been codified in rules and regulations or voluntarily adopted by a majority of S&P 500 companies. Only 11 percent of S&P 500 companies have a classified board, 8 percent have a poison pill and 6 percent have not adopted a majority vote or plurality-vote-plus-resignation standard to elect directors. The activists’ “best practices” of yesterday have become the standard practices of today. While proxy advisors and other stakeholders in the corporate governance industry will undoubtedly continue to propose new mandates, we are currently in a period of relative stasis as compared to the sea change that began with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and unfolded over the last decade.
English: Langdell Library Harvard Law School (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
In other respects, however, the corporate governance landscape continues to evolve in meaningful ways. We may be entering an era of more nuanced corporate governance debates, where the focus has shifted from check-the-box policies to more complex questions such as how to strike the right balance in recruiting directors with complementary skill sets and diverse perspectives, and how to tailor the board’s role in overseeing risk management to the specific needs of the company. Shareholder engagement has been an area of particular focus, as both companies and institutional investors have sought to engage in more regular dialogue on corporate governance matters. The evolving trend here is not only the frequency and depth of engagement, but also a more fundamental re-thinking of the nature of relationships with shareholders and the role that these relationships play in facilitating long-term value creation. Importantly, this trend is about more than just expanding shareholder influence in corporate governance matters; instead, there is an emphasis on the roles and responsibilities of both companies and shareholders in facilitating thoughtful conversations instead of reflexive, off-the-shelf mandates on corporate governance issues, and cultivating long-term relationships that have the potential to curb short-termist pressures in the market.
Conclusions:
In 2005, Martin Lipton wrote for a symposium commemorating the 25th anniversary of his article attacking financial market short-termism and supporting the legality of corporate management to take actions to defeat hostile takeovers. The conclusion to that piece is as relevant today as it was in 2005:
In the words of [famous educator and management consultant] Peter Drucker, “the Enterprise can be said to be the one innovation that created the Modern Economy—far more so than any other invention, whether material or conceptual.” The American enterprise is the systematic risk-taker and risk-sharer of our economy—the primary means through which wealth and prosperity are generated on a macroeconomic level. Central to this structure is a delicate interrelationship among the enterprise, the CEO (who manages it), the board of directors (which oversees its management) and shareholders and society at large (who benefit from it).
If special-interest shareholders and other “activists” [and the academics who support them] prevail in their latest battle—that is, if additional, more demanding governance and “shareholder empowerment” measures and personal liability for directors become integrated into the regulatory and common law landscape—we will have altered the structure of the enterprise and moved toward excising the board from its principal role. Not only will the board as an institution suffer from the curtailment of its ability to manage the corporation, but we will not be able to attract competent, responsible people to serve as directors of public companies. Moreover, faced with a punitive regime that could extend to any perceived failure of a director (whether or not intentional and whether or not egregious), the people who do serve on boards will focus on their self-protection, and will be hesitant to take risks that may benefit the corporation. As [then] Treasury Secretary John Snow . . . remarked, “some investments that should have been undertaken, that would have been good for society, good for investors, good for shareholders, and good for the economy’s growth, won’t be undertaken.” In short, director passivity will have triumphed over the entrepreneurialism that has always been at the heart of the business judgment rule. We must all brace ourselves for this next battle. And we must do all we can to ensure that the train does not fly off the tracks.
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 