Voici un article scientifique publié dans Social Science Research Network (SSRN)par Bill Francis (1), Iftekhar Hasan (2) et Qiang Wu (3) sur un sujet très pertinent pour la gouvernance des sociétés : L’utilité de la présence de professeurs d’université sur les C.A. des entreprises publiques.
L’article montre que la présence de professeurs sur les conseils d’administration est positivement associée à une meilleure performance des entreprises. Les professeurs-administrateurs, plus particulièrement ceux qui ont une formation en administration, jouent un rôle très important de conseillers auprès de l’entreprise. Leur influence sur la performance des entreprises semble déterminante dans plusieurs domaines relatifs à la bonne gouvernance.
« Directors from academia served on the boards of more than one third of S&P 1,500 firms over the 1998-2006 period. This paper investigates the effects of academic directors on corporate governance and firm performance. We find that companies with directors from academia are associated with higher performance. In addition, we find that professors without administrative jobs drive the positive relation between academic directors and firm performance. We also show that professors’ educational backgrounds affect the identified relationship. For example, academic directors with business-related degrees have the most positive impacts on firm performance among all the academic fields considered in our regressions.
Furthermore, we show that academic directors play an important governance role through their monitoring and advising functions. Specifically, we find that the presence of academic directors is associated with higher acquisition performance, higher number of patents, higher stock price informativeness, lower discretionary accruals, lower CEO compensation, and higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Overall, our results provide supportive evidence that academic directors are effective monitors and valuable advisors, and that firms benefit from academic directors ».
Si vous souhaitez avoir plus d’information sur les objectifs, la méthodologie ou les résultats de l’étude, je vous invite à lire l’article au complet.
Peter F. Drucker and Masatoshi Ito Graduate School of Management (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
« This paper empirically investigates whether the presence of academic directors affects firm performance and corporate governance. Based on the independence theory, expertise theory, and diversity theory, we hypothesize that academic directors can improve board efficacy and subsequent firm performance because of their monitoring abilities and advising abilities. The key result is in line with our hypothesis. We find that the presence of directors from academia in the boardroom is associated with higher firm performance. The positive association holds after controlling for firm- and other governance-specific characteristics, and considering endogeneity issues, such as omitted variable bias, self-selection bias and causality issue. By comparing the differences in the attendance behavior and committee assignments of academic directors and other outside directors, we find that academic directors perform better than other outside directors in the boardroom.
We further examine the monitoring and advising roles of academic directors in details. We find that firms with academic directors have higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, lower cash-based CEO compensation, more patent numbers, higher acquisition performance, higher stock price informativeness, and are less likely to manage their earnings. The results provide several channels through which academic directors affect firm value positively.
We also find evidence that academic directors with administrative jobs do not improve firm performance as much as academic directors without administrative jobs. Additional analysis finds that academic directors with administrative jobs have more severe board-meeting attendance problems. Furthermore, we find that academic directors’ areas of study have different impacts on firm performance ».
_______________________________________
(1) Lally School of Management and Technology, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Stephen Miles, fondateur et PCD de The Miles Group, une entreprise qui se spécialise dans le conseil en gestion des talents, met l’accent sur un véritable problème de plusieurs C.A. : leurs relatives faiblesses en gouvernance ! Après avoir fait ressortir les exigences accrues des investisseurs institutionnels pour une plus grande performance des membres de C.A., l’auteur présente cinq lacunes majeures de plusieurs conseils d’administration : (1) connaissances déficientes, (2) manque d’auto-évaluation, (3) sentiment de supériorité, (4) manque d’expérience de plusieurs membres dans certains comités et processus de recrutement déficient, (5) problème de leadership.
À mon avis, les membres de conseils d’administration devraient examiner leur efficacité à la lumière des constats évoqués par l’auteur. On voit que la composition d’un C.A. performant repose beaucoup sur le recrutement des membres, sur le leadership du président du conseil et sur le renforcement du comité de gouvernance, parent pauvre des comités statutaires selon Stephen Miles.
L’article est-il biaisé en faveur de la gestion des talents ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Bonne lecture.
No board member sets out to be mediocre. And yet as institutional shareholders and activists are “grading” board performance on a steeper curve than ever before, their view is that many boards are coming up short.
RDECOM Board of Directors holds meeting (Photo credit: RDECOM)
ISS, government regulators, the press, and others are exercising much greater scrutiny over whether boards are executing their fiduciary responsibilities and really acting in the best interests of shareholders. While activist shareholders traditionally were able to hold sway and demand board seats in smaller companies outside the Fortune 500, today we are seeing this happen with venerable names such as Procter & Gamble, Yahoo!, BMC Software, and JC Penney.
In this climate of stakeholders’ taking a much tougher stance on what they deem to be “underperforming directors,” it’s worth it to examine the causes of mediocre performance on boards today. Why are many boards missing the mark?
Voici un excellent article, paru dans The Economist, qui présente un plaidoyer convaincant en faveur de l’adoption d’une perspective à long terme dans la conduite des entreprises. L’auteur montre que la théorie de la maximisation du rendement des actionnaires (souvent à court terme) passe par l’implantation de stratégies alignées sur l’accroissement de la valeur des sociétés à long terme. Il donne plusieurs exemples d’entreprises qui ont optées, avec succès, pour une vision et un management à long terme, seule approche susceptible d’assurer la pérennité des entreprises. Le conseil d’administration qui doit avoir une orientation claire à cet égard.
Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de ce court extrait et à lire l’article au complet si cette perspective vous allume. Qu’en pensez-vous ?
Peut-on, comme Peter Drucker, concevoir une théorie du management qui prône une vue à long terme, tout en assurant la satisfaction des actionnaires … et des autres parties prenantes ?
« HE IS the chief executive of a multinational corporation, but Paul Polman sometimes sounds more like a spokesman for Occupy Wall Street. The boss of Unilever (an Anglo-Dutch consumer-goods firm with brands ranging from Timotei shampoo to Ben & Jerry’s ice cream) agonises about unemployment, global warming and baby-boomer greed. He puts some of the blame for these ills on the most influential management theory of the past three decades: the idea that companies should aim above all else to maximise returns to shareholders.
Paul Polman – World Economic Forum on East Asia 2011 (Photo credit: World Economic Forum)
He appears to mean it. Since taking charge in 2009, Mr Polman has stopped Unilever from publishing full financial results every quarter. He refuses to offer earnings guidance to equity analysts. He has introduced a lengthy “sustainable living plan” and attracted a new cadre of long-term investors, particularly in emerging markets. He even told an audience in Davos that hedge-fund managers would sell their own grandmothers to make a profit.
Mr Polman was one of several titans to decry the cult of shareholder value at the Peter Drucker Forum (an annual gathering of admirers of the late Austrian-born management guru) in Vienna on November 15th and 16th. Roger Martin, the dean of the Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto, called it a “crummy principle that is undermining American capitalism”. Georg Kapsch of the Federation of Austrian Industries urged the world to abandon it. Rick Wartzman, the director of the Drucker Institute, said its critics were gaining momentum.
The cult has certainly yielded perverse results. The fashion for linking pay to share prices has spurred some bosses to manipulate those prices. For example, a manager with share options gets nothing if the share price misses its target, so he may take unwise risks to hit it. Short-termism is rife on Wall Street: the average time that people hold a stock on the New York Stock Exchange has tumbled from eight years in 1960 to four months in 2010. The emphasis on short-term results has tempted some firms to skimp on research and innovation, robbing the future to flatter this year’s profits. “Long-term results cannot be achieved by piling short-term results on short-term results,” Drucker once remarked ».
J’ai récemment pris connaissance d’une entrevue conduite par C-Suite Insight avec Douglas K. Chia*, secrétaire corporatif de la firme Johnson & Johnson. Cette entrevue aborde essentiellement quatre sujets très importants pour les parties prenantes de l’entreprise : (1) les pratiques de planification de la relève de la direction, surtout du PCD (2) les pratiques de rémunération et la préparation du document CD&A (Compensation Discussion and Analysis), (3) les relations et les discussions avec les investisseurs institutionnels et (4) les communications avec les actionnaires, notamment les aspects concernant le Say on Pay et la création de valeur à long terme.
Voici un compte rendu de cette entrevue. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture.
C-Suite Insight: What are the big issues that you’re considering as Johnson & Johnson prepares for proxy season?
Doug: Like many other high-profile companies, executive compensation is a critical item for us during proxy season, and we are looking at the continuum of the story that we’ve been telling for the last few years in our proxy statements. As you may have seen, there have been some major changes in our executive suite from last year to this year, specifically a succession from a long-tenured CEO, who is retiring after a remarkable 41-year career at J&J, to a new CEO. So, obviously this recent leadership succession will be a big focus area. We’ll also continue to emphasize the changes in the design of our compensation programs that have been made over the past few years, which we put a lot of effort into describing in last year’s proxy statement.
Headquarters of the Johnson & Johnson Company, One Johnson & Johnson Plaza, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA. Architect: Henry N. Cobb of the I. M. Pei Company, built 1983. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
CSI: Succession planning is a weakness in a lot of companies. So could you take us through succession planning at Johnson & Johnson, when it started, and how you worked your way through it?
Doug: For us, succession planning has always been something which has gone smoothly because it’s been thought out in advance. J&J has had only seven CEOs since becoming a public company in the early 1940s, and each one has come from the internal ranks. In the current case, we have an outgoing CEO who had served in the position for the past decade. The process of identifying potential successors for him started a number of years ago, in the 2010-2011 timeframe, and the lead candidates became apparent to the public. Our major investors were familiar and quite comfortable with the individuals who were being considered.
CSI: In succession planning and other major processes at J&J, how do you view long-term sustainable value and how do you view your engagement with shareholders?
Doug: We’ve always managed our business for the long-term, which is reflected in our culture by the fact that people tend to have very long careers at Johnson & Johnson. So, we have the benefit of being able to train up-and-coming leaders in a variety of business situations and give our Board exposure to them along the way. In terms of shareholder engagement, our major investors get exposed to many of our senior business leaders through investor conferences and meetings where they can talk in-depth about the businesses they are running. Over time, investors get familiar with a small cadre of J&J senior business leaders.
CSI: We have to mention Say on Pay. How did this issue affect you initially, and how do you address it when you’re writing a CD&A?
Doug: You cannot write the CD&A only thinking about the Say on Pay vote. This reminds me of what my teachers in school used to say: You shouldn’t “study to the test.” Instead, study the subject, master the subject, and then you will do fine on the test. So for us, writing the CD&A each year is about making sure we tell the story that reflects what’s taking place at the company, our compensation philosophy, the values we are trying to instill through our compensation plans, how our executives are paid, and what performance is being rewarded. We try to illustrate that we manage our business for the long-term and thus place a lot of focus on aligning executive compensation with our long-term investors. That being said, you do want to consider the vote outcome, keeping in mind the “advisory” nature of the vote. Suffice it to say that ours have not been where we want them to be, although we did gain support from over a majority of the votes cast in each of the last two years.
CSI: What have you done about this?
Doug: Over the past summer and fall, we had some of our Board members and senior management sit down with a diverse mix of investors, in one-on-one settings, specifically to talk about executive compensation. Through those discussions, we have been able to better understand the parts of our executive compensation program and our disclosure that could be enhanced. One point the investor discussions drove home that is important for all of us to remember when writing the CD&A is that for investors, the proxy statement is really all they have to rely on for information; they likely know very little else about the company’s pay programs.
So, we have to take a critical eye to what we’ve presented in the past and ask ourselves, “How can we tell our story better in order to make people understand the important context and rationale underlying these compensation decisions?” I think it’s fair to say that this process has helped us identify specific areas where we could have done a more effective job of telling our story. That’s something we’ll continue to work on this year and every year.
CSI: We’ve talked to major institutional investors such as TIAA-CREF and CalPERS, and also companies like BlackRock. They’ve stressed to us the importance of private engagement. In many cases, they think it’s more effective if they engage you privately. Is that your experience and what’s your view, how much do you welcome that sort of private engagement?
Doug: I think that’s right. One-on-one engagement is a very effective method of communication between companies and investors. The advantage of this direct engagement is the candid nature of the discussion that ensues when there is not an “audience” of outsiders. Over time, you can build strong relationships this way. In particular, “real-time” engagement, either by phone or in-person, provides the opportunity for the kind of constructive back-and-forth discussion that helps tease out critical issues. It helps both sides more precisely identify areas that need to be clarified. In the one-on-one meetings we had over the summer and fall, the investors we met with were able to get a real sense of just how much time and thought our Board members put into the decisions around executive compensation and how many factors come into play. Those are hard things to effectively illustrate to investors through a written document like a proxy statement.
CSI: Have these private dialogues increased in the last few years, in the era of Dodd-Frank?
Doug: Yes, I can say they have for us. We are more proactive than we had been in the past, and many of our investors have also become more proactive. Some who were not inclined to talk to us in the past are now more receptive to having a conversation.
CSI: How do you balance the tension between short-term results and a long-term commitment to spending money on R&D and creating long-term value?
Doug: It’s a tricky balance, but J&J has a long-term philosophy. It’s no secret to the investment community as we constantly emphasize that we manage the business for the long-term. So, to a certain extent, we’re expecting investors who have made significant investments in our company to have that same mindset. Most are investing in the company as a long-term play. However, when you have so many shareholders, they are not all going to agree with you on everything, so naturally there are going to be some shareholders who have a shorter-term outlook for a variety of reasons.
CSI: What sort of big picture advice would you give public companies, and in particular corporate secretaries, as they prepare for proxy season?
Doug: As far as corporate secretaries go, we exchange know-how quite a bit. One of the most rewarding parts of my job is establishing the kinds of relationships with my counterparts where we can help each other be better at what we do. On the subject of engagement, the basic message I like to convey to my peers is that they should be open to engagement with those investors who want to have real constructive dialogue. It’s a dynamic environment out there right now and you have to be thinking about how to make strategic adjustments.
Also, don’t be afraid to make a break with your past practices on what your disclosure looks like, or how much disclosure you want to give. We should all take a fresh look every year and ask ourselves, “What are people asking for and what makes sense to give to them?” These days, you can’t approach every disclosure requirement as something for which you’re only going to provide what a rule demands. If you do, your company will be missing a huge opportunity to tell its story.
Finally, for all of us, and corporate secretaries in particular, the key to the debate around executive compensation is creating an environment where your board members have everything they need to make well thought-out decisions. That’s what I think of when I hear people refer to “good governance.” We need to keep the focus on the integrity of the decisions, the underlying decision-making process, and the people who have the duty to make those decisions.
____________________________________
*Douglas K. Chia is Assistant General Counsel & Corporate Secretary at Johnson & Johnson, the world’s most comprehensive and broadly-based manufacturer of health care products, headquartered in New Brunswick, New Jersey. His responsibilities include providing legal counsel to the corporation on matters of corporate governance, securities regulation, public company disclosure, and Sarbanes-Oxley Act compliance. Prior to joining Johnson & Johnson, Mr. Chia was Assistant General Counsel, Corporate at Tyco International. In private practice, Mr. Chia was an associate at the law firms of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett and Clifford Chance, practicing in the New York and Hong Kong offices of each firm. While in private practice, Mr. Chia provided legal counsel to issuers and underwriters on securities offerings and cross-border transactions. Mr. Chia is a member of the Board of Directors, Executive Steering Committee, Corporate Practices Committee, and Policy Advisory Committee of the Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals, and is Chairman of the Society’s Membership Committee. Mr. Chia is also a member of the Corporate & Securities Law Committee of the Association of Corporate Counsel, as well as a member of the National Asian Pacific American Bar Association (NAPABA).
« Sam is an experienced manager and has worked for over twenty years in his industry. He has also sat on two not-for-profit boards and enjoys the governance role. Now he has an opportunity to buy an equity stake in a small business that has a product and service for which market demand is growing.
The business has not been growing quickly due to flat market conditions and revenue has not increased substantially as a consequence. The current owners are a husband and wife team and are tired; they have run the business for many years and want to retire.
The proposal is that Sam should purchase 40% of the company and take a seat on the board. The existing owners would retain 30% equity each and a shareholder’s agreement would stipulate that board decisions would require a 70% majority to be agreed. The current board has three members consisting of the owners and an ‘independent’ chairman who is the lawyer and a long-standing friend of the owners. The proposal is that he should remain as “he adds a lot of value and sees things we would miss”.
Sam intends not to work in the company but to be merely a shareholder and director. He has ideas for improving the growth and increasing the value of the company but wants to retain his full time employment in a larger corporation as a security measure. His employer is happy for him to take on a board seat and there is no direct competition between the two companies so Sam would have no conflict of interest; however, Sam’s boss, who is a friend and mentor to Sam, is uneasy and has suggested that Sam could find himself outmanoeuvred in the boardroom and overcharged for his equity. Sam is appreciative of the counsel but believes the shareholder agreement protects his interests. He would like to discuss board dynamics with the current owners but they seem not to be interested as they say the Chairman handles all the compliance and they just run the business so there is nothing to worry about ».
Quels conseil donneriez-vous à Sam ? Esquissez une réponse avant de consulter les avis des experts sur le sujet ci-dessous !
Doug’s Answer
Owning part of an SME is much more than an equity purchase and a board position. High level strategic and governance oversight is not enough; it takes a more ‘hands-on’ involvement.
The owners have realised they have had enough. Under the current proposal there is little in the way of resolving the typical SME succession dilemma; specifically:
Who has the skill and energy to ultimately take control and drive the business?
How to extract full value for the business which substantially funds retirement?
The board risks stalemate and conflict in decisions with a Chair aligned with current owners. Not a good outcome for the business, Sam or the current owners.
For this to be a win / win for everyone, an agreed succession plan should be part of Sam’s due diligence process along the following lines:
Sam’s intentions, post current-owners succession, should be clarified and agreed
The appointment of an independent chair and an independent director experienced in the same industry should be agreed
Untapped management talent existing within the business and a skilling, education and promotion program outlined
Recruitment program for management where gaps are identified
Current owners agree to an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) where appropriate
Key client and supplier relationships transition to the wider management team.
Sam should further protect his minority interests by holding pre-emptive rights to purchase the remaining shares should they be on offer, notwithstanding the ESOP mentioned above.
By clarifying all the stakeholders’ intentions and aspirations, the business presents a unified front with management, the board and shareholders “singing from the same songbook”.
Doug Jardine provides consulting services to owner operated businesses and boards and is based in Sydney.
Julie’s Answer
There is more to a board than compliance. Managers accustomed to running things as they see fit whilst relying on a lawyer to put together a semblance of compliance at board level are not going to make good board colleagues. Sam has some good ideas but unless they are also in the shareholder agreement (with dates and budgets) they will likely never get implemented.
Already the board is set for deadlock whenever the existing directors disagree with Sam. The 70% required for decision-making is a nonsense as Sam will find he either has to conform to the wishes of a husband and wife team or try to split them. They might as well stipulate 100% consensus as that is all that will work in the circumstances. It is also a pretty good way to run a board.
I usually hate quasi-equity as it tends to complicate matters but Sam could look into having a preference share which is repayable as debt and converts to equity only when the strategy reaches certain milestones.
What he most needs to do is sit down with the current owners and talk, long, hard and deep, about what this company is really supposed to achieve. It looks as if it has always been supposed to provide a certain lifestyle and income for the owners. But what about the future? What do they now want the company to be?
If they can agree on a vision and set aside enough of Sam’s investment to fund the new actions that must be taken to achieve the vision, then they may be able to grow the company to a stage where a profitable exit is achievable. If they can’t agree on exactly what the vision is and how they will work to achieve it – Now – In detail – Sam should not invest.
Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia.
Simon’s Answer
Sam takes an equity share to help grow the company (future nest egg). The owners (husband and wife) want to retire and secure as much money as possible from the asset sale (nest egg right now). Neither party wants any ongoing operational involvement – what is this deal really about? Are the owners serious in selling or grabbing equity dollars?
The 70% rule subjugates Sam’s rights and restricts the potential for business improvements but also terrifyingly entrenches the owners’ current policies, practices and procedures. A resolution to change anything requires the support of Sam, the Chairman (even if he/she places director duties ahead of friendship) and one of the owners – good luck with that.
There needs to be far more discussion by all parties about the fundamentals of this deal before it proceeds any further.
Sam is a minority shareholder with a Shareholders’ Agreement (SA) that lacks rigour, inclusion of, and agreement on, significant matters. The SA affords Sam no rights protection, no restriction on changes in each owner’s equity or share ownership, no restraint of trade restriction on the owners once retired and no provisions for breaking deadlocks e.g. mediation which will be inevitable given the 70% rule.
There is no guarantee that the owners will be unified on either the quantum or timeframe for retirement and the SA needs to reconcile that fact. The owners (or one of them) could just sell the remaining 60% (30%) to another party or give the shareholding to their beneficiaries. What is the agreed owner exit strategy and succession plan? There is no first right of refusal (including terms) for Sam to buyout one or both owners.
What happens if one or both owners prematurely die/separate or become incapacitated? What happens if Sam dies or is incapacitated or simply wants to get out? These all need to be included in the SA with trigger events established, agreed timeframes and pre-calculated quantum.
Now is the time to construct a rigorous SA, if any party baulks now, better to establish that at the outset before the dollars are committed. If Sam acts in haste, he/she can repent at leisure.
Simon Pinnock is a professional and practising non-executive director and Board consultant. He is based in Melbourne, Australia.
Lisez le plus récent rapport de Deloitte au sujet des risques et des enjeux importants en matière de talents dont les conseils d’administration doivent tenir compte aujourd’hui.
« Dans la plupart des entreprises, les talents constituent la ressource essentielle, puisqu’il s’agit de la seule chose qui peut les démarquer de leurs concurrents. En l’absence de personnes compétentes pour mettre en œuvre et mener à terme la stratégie et les objectifs de l’entreprise sur tous les plans, l’entreprise ne réussira pas à atteindre son plein potentiel. Si les talents sont si essentiels, la question qui se pose est la suivante : Comment le conseil influence-t-il la capacité de l’organisation à attirer, à former et à retenir les personnes talentueuses ? »
« Ce rapport aidera les membres du conseil d’administration et de la haute direction à aborder les principaux enjeux stratégiques touchant les talents. Le rapport aidera à définir les rôles et responsabilités du conseil en ce qui a trait à la surveillance de la gestion des talents et fournira des idées, ainsi que des questions à poser à la direction. Le rapport met l’accent sur six questions importantes qui ont une incidence sur la gestion stratégique des talents dans les entreprises d’aujourd’hui :
Talents Centre (Photo credit: Khatleen Minerve (Sakura))
Surveiller les risques liés aux talents;
Responsabiliser la direction à l’égard des talents;
Tenir compte des répercussions des facteurs démographiques sur les stratégies d’affaires et de gestion des talents;
Connaître les risques entourant la rétention des talents;
Maintenir une supervision adéquate des talents par le conseil d’administration;
Planifier la relève dans les entreprises familiales ».