Boardroom Burnout !


Voici un résumé des recommandations présentées par Kaye O’Leary dans innovationexcellence.com pour éviter de surcharger les membres de conseils d’administration.

Boardroom Burnout !

Practical tips from board members on how to avoid wearing-out your directors!

« The challenge:  It’s no secret that there are an increasing number of demands on boards.  Directors are expected to keep abreast of the organization’s business model, performance, strategic challenges and risk environment, understand the industry, understand the legislative environment, be knowledgeable of and ensure compliance with regulatory and reporting requirements and changes, evaluate the CEO and board’s performance, has a compliant and effective compensation program, be current on applicable accounting rules and ensure that the organization has a solid succession plan and effective culture.

Tip 1:  Don’t waste precious meeting time presenting information that was distributed in the board materials

Effective Board Suggestion: Skip the presentations of the information that was distributed and move directly to questions on the material distributed.  (PS – make sure you get your materials out well in advance of the meeting!  Do not distribute materials on a Friday afternoon for a Tuesday board meeting; board members do not enjoy spending their weekend reading board materials.)

Tip 2:  Utilize Committees Effectively

Effective Board Suggestion: Rely on your committees and avoid repeating the committee work with the full board.

Tip 3:  Annually Assess the Work of the Board

Effective Board Suggestion: As part of your annual board assessment process, take the time to review how the board spends its time vs. the organization’s strategic priorities.  Is your board focused on your strategic priorities? Do you have special purpose committees that are no longer relevant?  Are there things your board can stop doing?   Review the materials you are sending out in your board book.  If you send it, you are obliging your board members to read the material; don’t send 60 pages of financial information if 15 pages will suffice ».

Où sont les femmes dans la direction des organisations?


Voici les résultats d’une étude réalisée par la Chaire Claire-Bonenfant – Femmes, Savoirs et Sociétés de l’Université Laval, sous la direction de la professeure Hélène Lee-Gosselin : Où sont les femmes dans la direction des organisations?

Pour les femmes qui souhaitent accéder à des postes de haute direction, la compétence et la performance, voire la volonté et l’ambition, ne suffisent pas toujours pour être reconnues et promues. Certains éléments du contexte organisationnel, tels que la sensibilité de l’organisation à la réalité des femmes, l’existence d’un lien entre l’employée et un membre du réseau des personnes influentes dans l’organisation, l’encouragement et le soutien offerts tout au long du cheminement professionnel ou l’émergence d’opportunités liées à une restructuration, à des projets spéciaux ou à de nouvelles activités, s’avèrent souvent déterminants. L’ascension professionnelle est donc bien souvent le résultat d’une combinaison de facteurs individuels et organisationnels auxquels s’ajoute la présence de circonstances favorables.

Comment améliorer la gestion d’un conseil d’administration d’OBNL ?


Article intéressant de Richard Leblanc, paru dans Canadian Business qui propose plusieurs moyens visant l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’admistration d’OBNL. À la liste présentée, j’ajouterais l’importance de choisir un solide leader comme président du conseil.




Comment améliorer un conseil d’administration d’OBNL ?

 

Not-for-profit organizations are among the most important in our economy—some are hospitals, while others are schools, universities or charities. Many are large, complex organizations with multiple moving parts and interdependent stakeholders. They are tough to lead and govern, but must be as effectively led as for-profits. They require CEOs, directors and staff who are at the top of their game and willing to make the necessary commitment.

Gouvernance des sociétés : de nombreux défis pour les conseils d’administration en 2012


Excellent article par Brendan Sheehan dans Boardmember.com qui présente les perspectives nouvelles qui s’offrent aux C.A. et aux hauts dirigeants des sociétés cotées en bourse en 2012. De nombreux défis attendent les administrateurs en réponse aux demandes pressantes de groupes d’actionnaires « activistes » , notamment  l’Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Je vous encourage à lire l’article au complet mais voici un court extrait :

telescope

Gouvernance des sociétés : de nombreux défis pour les conseils d’administration en 2012

« The failure of prominent companies, ongoing scandals, and the stubbornly persistent financial crisis have dramatically changed the landscape for managements and directors at U.S. public companies and provided new vigor to activist shareholders and governance commentators. For boards of directors, keeping track of the latest reforms and ensuring the company is fully compliant has become an even more complicated puzzle.

Many of the post-Enron reforms have concentrated on enhancing transparency and boosting disclosure in proxy statements and other corporate filings. The end result is while shareholders have greater insight into the companies they own, they also now demand a louder voice in the way companies are being managed and directed, even down to who gets hired and how much they get paid. This, in turn, has led to what many observers have characterized as the pendulum swinging too far to one side, creating a need for balance.

In the meantime, with activists gaining broader access to corporate boards and with disclosure policies constantly expanding, directors and management are becoming increasingly more concerned about what shareholders think. This time of year, that interest manifests itself in trying to figure out what is going to happen during proxy season. How are people going to vote? What will be the hot-button issues? Where will the surprises come from?

As with most things, in order to predict the future it can be instructive to look at the past. An examination of recent voting results and proposal activity reveals that, despite all the talk about the shifting focus of activists, the same proposals that surface every year continue to dominate the voting agenda. Majority voting dominated the proposals, as it has in the last four or five years, followed by the repeal of classified board structure, rights to call special meetings, and rights to act by written consent. These four areas have been among the most prevalent proposal topics for many years, and companies generally understand how to address the surrounding issues. Compensation-related proposals were strongly featured as well, and are likely to be the main focus in 2012.

That being said, several new disclosure rules were enacted in late 2010 and during 2011 that, as investors have time to examine the disclosures and get comfortable with them, could spark an increase in activity. In short, most experts feel that investors will start to move away from simple issues like board structure and poison pills and engage with boards on more complicated—and possibly more important—risk- and performance-related issues ».

ISS publie son « Board Practice Report – 2012 »


L’étude du ISS présente les perspectives qui s’offrent aux conseils d’administration en 2012. Très intéressant de connaître le point de vue d’une organisation « activiste ».

ISS Releases 2012 U.S. Board Practices Study

A decade ago, more than 60 percent of S&P 500 companies had staggered board terms, and plurality voting in director elections was widely accepted. Today, two-thirds of S&P 500 firms have declassified boards and nearly 80 percent of these companies have adopted majority voting provisions, as many boards have heeded shareholder votes for these reforms.

As one might expect, the prevalence of majority voting and declassified boards is higher at large-cap companies, which are subject to more public scrutiny and generally have greater institutional ownership. However, there are some practices, such as independent board chairs, that remain more common at small and mid-cap firms. Directors on a typical S&P 500 board tend to be more independent, more diverse, and slightly older on average than at smaller-cap companies.

These are among the findings in ISS’ annual Board Practices study, which examines director elections, board and director independence, and board diversity, among other factors, at S&P 1500 firms. This year’s report, which analyzes board practices and characteristics based on index, includes data as of June 30, 2011, from 1,461 companies and 13,760 individual board seats in the S&P 500, the MidCap S&P 400, and the SmallCap S&P 600.

Here are some of the key findings from the 2012 edition of Board Practices: The Structure of Boards at S&P 1500 Companies:

L’internationalisation des conseils d’administration : Une tendance lourde en gouvernance !


Voici un résumé du Global Board Index report de la firme Egon Zehnder International qui montre que les entreprises qui opèrent à un niveau global ont avantage à mettre beaucoup d’énergie dans la constitution d’un Board international, un Board qui reflète le niveau d’activité international de la société.
 
 

There is a compelling argument to be made for greater international representation on boards. But, if that is the case, why aren’t boards doing more to close the gap between their global aspirations and the international directors who represent such an apparent advantage? The answer is that while these directors can provide great value to boards and their companies, identifying and attracting them is a difficult and daunting process. It can be done,

Based on anecdotal evidence from our client work and broader observations about global companies and their boards, we have long believed that global boards can be a valuable resource to companies pursuing a global strategy. We set out to quantify the current state of the “globalness” of boards of large companies, beyond what we experience day-to-day with our clients, and to determine if and how board composition links to business success. 

The results of the study confirmed our belief that there is a gap between companies’ global activity and longer-term plans, on the one hand, and the board resources that help to shape and guide that strategy, on the other. The troubling news is that this gap is large. The good news is that once companies are aware of the extent of the gap between their global strategy and their director resources, they can work toward closing it. In light of the positive correlation we are seeing between companies that perform better on key business metrics and those with international representation on their boards, we suspect many companies will take steps to ameliorate this deficit on their boards.

Pourquoi séparer les fonctions de président du conseil (PCA) et de président et chef de la direction (PDG) ?


Très bonnes réflexions d’Yvan Allaire sur le dogme de la séparation des rôles entre PCA et PDG. À lire sur le blogue Les Affaires .com.

Rien à rajouter à ce billet de l’expert en gouvernance qui , comme moi, cherche des réponses à plusieurs théories sur la gouvernance. Plus de recherches dans le domaine de la gouvernance serait grandement indiquées… Le CAS et la FSA de l’Université Laval mettront sur pied un programme de recherche dont le but est de répondre à ce type de questionnement.

Pourquoi séparer les fonctions de président du conseil (PCA) et de président et chef de la direction (PDG) ?

« Parmi les dogmes de la bonne gouvernance, la séparation des rôles du PCA et du PDG vient au deuxième rang immédiatement derrière « l’i1031_mgmnt_twojobs_630x420ndépendance absolue et inviolable » de la majorité des administrateurs. … Bien que les études empiriques aient grande difficulté à démontrer de façon irréfutable la valeur de ces deux dogmes, ceux-ci sont, semble-t-il, incontournables. Dans le cas de la séparation des rôles, le sujet a pris une certaine importance récemment chez Research in Motion ainsi que chez Air Transat. Le compromis d’un administrateur en chef (lead director) pour compenser pour le fait que le PCA et le PDG soit la même personne ne satisfait plus; le dogme demande que le président du conseil soit indépendant de la direction ».

Comment la mondialisation affecte-t-elle la rémunération des hauts dirigeants ?


Très bon article paru dans Slate qui discute de l’influence de la globalisation des marchés sur la rémunération des CEO.  Peu ou pas du tout d’effet … Voici un extrait de l’article :

Comment la mondialisation affecte-t-elle la rémunération des hauts dirigeants ?

The global war for talent is a popular justification for exorbitant chief executive pay. But with few exceptions, expatriate chiefs are a tiny minority at most major publicly traded corporations. It’s bad news for shareholders, especially in high-pay hubs, who could find better-value stewards overseas.

« Multinationals are constantly in search of cheaper workers. The one exception appears to be the most expensive staff of all, in the boardroom. Particularly in the United States and Britain, boards have shown little desire to get the maximum bang for their buck by insisting companies cast wider recruitment nets. Anglo-American companies continue to tolerate steep rises in pay at the top that far exceed returns.

In 2010, compensation for the head honchos at American and British companies climbed 36 percent and 43 percent, respectively, dwarfing shareholder returns of around 15 percent, according to research firms GMI and Incomes Data Services. As recently as 1993, U.S. corporate bosses were paid some 130 times more than the average worker. Now they command about 350 times more, according to Duke University economist Dan Ariely.

A big plank of the defense has been globalization. Since the brightest CEOs can take their pick of posts across the globe, or so the argument goes, shareholders should not be surprised by astronomic remuneration – a point recently made by the Corporation of London’s policy chief. This oft-repeated excuse for overcharging shareholders is seldom backed up with evidence ».

Gouvernance exemplaire à Facebook ?


Les préoccupations de gouvernance, de protection des droits des actionnaires passent au deuxième plan dans le cas d’entreprises à succès telles que Google, LinkedIn et Facebook. Sommes-nous face à un nouveau modèle de gouvernance qui s’adresse à des propriétaires-dirigeants d’entreprises à succès ou sommes-nous en voie de prendre des risques inconsidérés qui portent préjudices aux actionnaires et aux parties prenantes ? Voici un article publié par John Plender dans le Financial Times (FT.com Blogs) du 26 février 2012.

Gouvernance exemplaire à Facebook ?

Voici deux courts extraits de l’article :

« Not so long ago, a debate raged about whether there was any real evidence that good governance contributed to strong corporate performance. It seemed to me pretty academic, given the palpable damage bad governance had inflicted on shareholders at such disaster zones as Enron and the Robert Maxwell empire.

The protection for investors against that age-old governance problem, the over-dominant CEO, is non-existent. If there is a novelty here, it is that the potentially over-dominant executive is just 27 years old and has created a company that will be valued in tens of billions on flotation. And, indeed, none of this is to denigrate the achievement of Mr Zuckerberg. It would, after all, be unusual for someone of his age to have grasped the advantages for himself, as well as for shareholders, of a strong governance framework. And in today’s heady market the IPO will, I suspect, be a big success ».

Amélioration de l’information annuelle des OBNL


Vous trouverez, ci-joint, un extrait de la préface d’un important document publié par le Conseil canadien de l’information sur la performance de l’ICCA. C’est un guide d’une grande pertinence pour les dirigeants et membres de conseils d’administration d’OBNL.

Amélioration de l’information annuelle des organismes sans but lucratif

L’information publiée par les organismes sans but lucratif suscite de plus en plus d’intérêt. Le présent document, intitulé Amélioration de l’information annuelle des organismes sans but lucratif et publié par l’Institut Canadien des Comptables Agréés (ICCA), a été élaboré par un groupe de travail réunissant des représentants d’organismes sans but lucratif qui ont été invités à faire part de leurs points de vue au Conseil canadien de l’information sur la performance de l’ICCA.

Le présent guide vise à aider les hauts dirigeants et les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif à préparer des rapports annuels de qualité qui renforcent la reddition de comptes et fournissent une information utile aux parties prenantes. Les petites organisations dont les ressources sont limitées pourront envisager d’échelonner la mise en oeuvre des présentes indications sur un certain nombre d’années. Par ailleurs, bien que ces indications visent les petits et moyens organismes sans but lucratif, elles peuvent également présenter un intérêt pour les entités de plus grande taille. Les organismes publics qui appliquent les PCGR pour les organismes sans but lucratif, y compris ceux du secteur «HUCE» (hôpitaux, universités, collèges et écoles), devraient se reporter aux dispositions des énoncés de pratiques recommandées du Conseil sur la comptabilité dans le secteur public.

Oeuvrer sur des C.A. d’OBNL : Excellent apprentissage à des postes de direction de sociétés !


Voici un excellent article publié par Alice Korngold dans Huffington Post Canada qui montre éloquemment que s’investir dans des C.A. d’organisations à but non lucratif est une excellente préparation à des postes de direction de sociétés.

Cinq raisons qui expliquent pourquoi certains C.A. d’OBNL ont des problèmes d’efficacité


Voici cinq raisons qui expliquent pourquoi certains C.A. d’OBNL ont des problèmes d’efficacité … et quelques suggestions pour y remédier.

Have you ever sat down at a board meeting and realized that no one was excited to be there? There could be several reasons for that. Maybe it was the end of a long day for everyone. Maybe they ate too much for dinner and are tired. Or maybe, just maybe, it’s something you can do something about. Maybe there’s something that simply got sidetracked somewhere along the way that you can do something to remedy.

Group Think. Have you seen the studies that sent people out on the street to ask for help? An interesting situation unfolded. If there were just one or two people on the street, typically one of them would see what they could do to help. However if there were more than 2 or 3 people on the street, everyone appeared to wait to see if someone else would do something. In fact, in many cases, no one ended up doing anything. This situation often occurs in the nonprofit board room. Everyone is waiting to see what everyone else will do. One thing to try? Bring in an outside expert to provide a critical analysis of the situation. another option is to assign someone the role of the ‘devil’s advocate.’

Wrong People. When you were recruiting your board, did you ask them to be a part as a favor to you? Or did you ask them because you thought they couldn’t say no to you? If you have the wrong people and the wrong skill sets represented, take a step back, identify what your goals for the board are, and identify the skills you need to accomplish that. Then look out in the community and seek out people who are well known and who are passionate about your cause.

Unclear Expectations. When recruiting board members it is tempting to minimize the commitment that will be required of members. The right people will still want to be a part, and the people who are only trying to fill their resume will shy away. Having clear expectation will help ensure you are recruiting the right people.

No Accountability. Our board members are busy people and its easy for things to slip their mind. Generally speaking, they appreciate check-in and reminder calls. Don’t rely on emails for this. Just pick up the phone and call – or ask another board member to make that call. This idea has taken root and resulted in forward movement more than any other with the organizations I have worked with. Waiting a month until the next board meeting to bring something up again only results in things being delayed – or sidetracked permanently.

Magical’ Thinking. Growing up near a major tourist destination in Orlando Florida and having a mom who worked as a chaplain in the local emergency room opened my eyes to this phenomenon early. We would hear stories of people doing things that they wouldn’t do under normal situations. Something about pixie dust perhaps. But sometimes, in the nonprofit world, we have our own kind of pixie dust. It makes us think that nothing bad can come to the organization we work with and that things will fix themselves. We must be proactive and not fall into this trap.

5 Reasons Nonprofit Boards Stall – and What You Can Do About It

Quelles autres raisons peuvent amener les C.A. d’OBNL à tourner en rond et, selon votre expérience, que pouvez faire pour éviter les dysfonctionnements ?

La règle du « comply or explain » est-elle efficacement appliquée?


Voici un très court article paru dans guardian.co.uk qui explique les mécanismes du Comply or Explain et qui montre que la règle semble être appliquée avec beaucoup de succès, du moins dans le FTSE 350. À lire pour mieux comprendre cette règle de gouvernance qui tend à se généraliser.
 

The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) reckons it does, citing research showing 96% of FTSE 350 companies comply with corporate governance codes.

The basic tenet of the corporate governance rules that have been nurtured since the early 1990s revolve around the idea of « comply or explain ». A company should comply with the code – for instance not having the same person acting as chairman or chief executive – but can get away with it if they are able to explain their actions convincingly to shareholders.

 

Pratique de gouvernance canadiennes – réponses aux questions de l’EU


Voici le résumé d’un chapitre de volume publié dans International Journal of Disclosure and Governance (2012) par plusieurs auteurs canadiens dont Richard Leblanc. J’ai pensé que l’introduction au chapitre saurait vous inciter à lire le document au complet. Bonne lecture.

« The European Commission has put forward an interesting set of questions about how to improve corporate governance, within its ‘Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance Framework’ (Green Paper, 2011). The following provides analysis and the responses by a working group of authors in Canada to these questions based on the experience and research of the group (academics and practitioners) and the relevant literature ».

Pratiques de gouvernance canadiennes – réponses aux questions de l’EU

INTRODUCTION

« The European Commission, in response to the governance failures that came to light in the credit crisis, is considering fundamental changes to European governance systems. As a step towards that goal, the EU has put forward a series of questions that examine essential aspects of governance, that is, what it involves, who it applies to and how it can be enforced. Whether these are the only or best questions that can be asked in this context is not the issue in this article, but rather, we see addressing them as an opportunity to bring to the reader the latest in governance research, as well as lessons from experience with the governance regimes in other regions, notably Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

This article is authored by a working group of academics and practitioners, with expertise in governance and various sub-governance domains. Members of the group have advised and worked with boards, regulators and companies that have become recognized for their leading governance practices. It is these experiences and the literature upon which we also draw.

Twenty-three of the 25 questions have been addressed below. Each question appears, followed by our group’s response. Two of the questions (questions 13 and 16) were not addressed owing to the time constraints of the submission (which was due on 22 July 2011) and the group felt that it did not possess all of the requisite expertise.

At the outset, the European Commission should be congratulated for establishing a high-level governance forum for discussions and debates and for the exchange of experiences. The need for a clear road map through the shifting and confusing terrain of corporate governance is very compelling. In a global marketplace, the solutions and recommendations championed in Europe will have a profound effect on governance standards in Canada and elsewhere.

In this article, the authors address in detail the need for improved governance in the areas articulated by the EU. First we consider the need for similar or different standards for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and unlisted companies. Then we focus on board recruitment, diversity and ways to improve the effectiveness of individual directors and boards. The critical area of governance over remuneration is then subject to our analysis, and we then assess ways to improve the board’s role in the governance of risk, of asset managers and of proxy advisors. Ensuring adequate shareholder engagement is next addressed, as well as minority shareholder interests. Lastly, we make recommendations for improvements in the implementation and monitoring of governance codes ».

Background: Canadian corporate governance practices

« We believe that Canada is a leader in corporate governance practices and, given that our group members are primarily Canadian, we draw on many of the initiatives here to frame our response to the EU deliberations. We also draw on global developments, including those in the United Kingdom and United States.

Canada has adopted the Anglo-American, unitary model of corporate governance. Our companies, however, operate within different ownership structures, legal and linguistic dualities, geographic diversity, and a decentralized regulatory regime of 13 provinces and territories. We have companies that are state-owned, family, significant shareholder, small and medium-sized listed, as well as widely held, not dissimilar to the diverse plurality and tapestry within the European Union.

Canada has had formal corporate governance guidelines in place since 1994 (Dey et al, ‘Where were the Directors?’) within a flexible ‘comply or explain’ approach. There has been time to digest and assess a continuously evolving corporate governance landscape, as companies and boards adopt guidelines and practices to suit the foregoing diverse circumstances, in a flexible manner.

The Canadian corporate governance guidelines, most recently revised in 2005 (Canadian Securities Administrators, 2005), have been adopted and adapted by companies within the listed sector, and through osmosis and other best practices, within private, governmental and not-for-profit sectors as well. It is upon this experience that we also draw for our responses ».

Forum sociétés d’État 2012 – Québec, 17 avril


Forum sociétés d'État 2012 - À Québec

Invitation

Le Cercle des ASC est fier d’organiser, conjointement avec le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, le Forum sociétés d’État 2012 de Québec, en collaboration avec l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés (IAS) section Québec.

Le Forum sociétés d’État aura lieu le mardi 17 avril 2012, de 7 h 30 à 10 h 45, à l’Hôtel Château Laurier, à Québec. Le forum sera constitué d’un panel et d’une conférence : « Mise en oeuvre de la nouvelle gouvernance » et « Évaluation et orientations gouvernementales ». Voir le lien ci-dessous.

Forum sur les sociétés d’État – Québec 17 avril

Rappel : Qu’est-ce qu’un code de gouvernance ? Un exemple


Depuis quelque jours, je constate que plusieurs personnes se questionnent sur les propriétés d’un code de gouvernance. Voici, à titre d’exemple, la table des matières du code de gouvernance des entreprises UK. Je vous encourage fortement à prendre connaissance de ce court document car, à mon avis, c’est l’énoncé le plus clair des principes de gouvernance qui existe.

Governance and the Code 1
Preface 2-3
Comply or Explain 4-5
The Main Principles of the Code 6-7
Section A: Leadership 9-11
Section B: Effectiveness 12-17
Section C: Accountability 18-21
Section D: Remuneration 22-24
Section E: Relations with Shareholders 25-26

Schedule A: The design of performance-related remuneration
for executive directors 27
Schedule B: Disclosure of corporate governance arrangements 28-35

Voir le document au complet :

The UK Corporate Governance Code

Voir également le règlement de l’AMF concernant les directives relatives à la gouvernance :

L’instruction générale 58-201 relative à la gouvernance

Le mode de gouvernance de Facebook est-il à risque ?


Je suis d’accord avec les propos de mon collègue Richard Leblanc. Son article, dans Canadian Business, soulève plusieurs questionnements fondamentaux pour les experts en gouvernance. Comme il y plusieurs points de vue différents sur le sujet et que tout le monde s’entend pour affirmer que l’opération est légale, il y a matière à concevoir un beau cas en gouvernance, créatrice de valeur, et en stratégie de conservation du contrôle de l’entreprise. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Facebook’s board is a recipe for disaster

« Facebook’s governance has been described by Businessweek as resembling a “dictatorship” and by a Wall Street Journal blog as “Governance = Zuckerberg.” Under the public offering, 27-year-old Mark Zuckerberg owns almost 60% of supervoting shares, is chair and CEO, can name a successor CEO and has complete control over the nomination process for directors ».

Étapes concrètes pour remédier aux manques de connaissances des Boards en matière de réseaux sociaux


Un autre excellent article de knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu qui montre les importantes lacunes des C.A. en matière de réseaux sociaux et qui indique clairement les étapes à suivre en vue de s’assurer que les membres de C.A. deviennent familiers avec ceux-ci. Voici quelques extraits de l’article :

« Let’s start with today’s reality. The world has changed but corporate boards haven’t kept pace. How do you know? Ask most boards what they monitor and measure at their organizations. There’s a big chance that most of them will say they are monitoring and measuring financial results, compliance and legal risks ».

« What’s surprising about such responses is that boards know that solid decision-making is essential to mitigating risks and ensuring the viability of their enterprises. How is it, then, that most of them don’t have a grip on the operational value these technologies offer, or the critical « big data » — about customer sentiment, employee engagement and investor insights — that they produce? The answer: They’re still using corporate governance tools and strategies that were developed in an age that was neither social nor mobile, or ever considered that the « cloud » would exist ».

« In short, today’s corporate directors have the « necessary » skills in terms of compliance and financial performance, but not the « sufficient » skills in terms of strategic or technological know how. Why? Because for years, astute corporate directors believed the tools that companies like Facebook and Twitter offered weren’t essential. In their view, these new means of communications were for kids, had little, if any, business value, and created minimal strategic, operational or financial risks. Wow, were they wrong ».

Stratégies de Mark Zuckerberg de Facebook : Manquements aux pratiques de « bonne gouvernance » ou sagesse de l’approche adoptée


Mark Zuckerberg détient 28% des actions de Facebook mais il contrôlera 57% des votes. C’est une des façons qu’il a trouvé pour avoir la paix, pour gérer son entreprise en paix! Voici le point de vue d’Yvan Allaire, expert dans les questions de gouvernance, publié aujourd’hui dans une lettre au National Post, intitulée “Governance: in your Face… book!

Yvan Allaire salue la sagesse de l’approche de Mark Zuckerberg

Voir l’entrevue de Diane Bérard dans LesAffaires.com

Yvan Allaire félicite Mark Zuckerberg. Le fondateur de Facebook va à l’encontre des principes de “ bonne “ gouvernance” généralement reconnus. Mais… il va dans le sens d’un capitalisme durable et de la création de valeur à long terme, estime le président du conseil de l’Institut de gouvernance des organisations privées et publiques (IGOPP).

“Une entreprise a besoin d’un actionnaire de contrôle bien en charge pour éviter les actions nocives ( dictature des profits trimestriels, pressions des analystes financiers et des investisseurs “touristes” attaque des fonds vautours)”, déclare Yvan Allaire.

Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Application suédoise du principe « comply or explain »


Voici un bref document explicatif de Per Lekvall, membre du Swedish Corporate Governance Board, sur le modèle d’application du « comply or explain » à l’échelle suédoise. L’expérience suédoise en la matière est intéressante à plusieurs égards, notamment parce que l’on peut en évaluer les effets sur plusieurs années. Ce document a été transmis par ecoDa – The European Confederation of Directors’ Associations http://www.ecoda.org/ , association à laquelle le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés adhère.

Après une brève introduction, M. Lekvall explique comment le code suédois est appliqué et quels sont les résultats sur une périodes de 6 ans.

The Swedish Corporate Governance Code, based on the comply-or-explain principle, was introduced 1 July 2005 for the about 100 largest companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Three years later, 1 July 2008, the requirement to apply the Code was widened to include all companies listed on a regulated market in Sweden, currently around 260 companies. Having initially been considerably questioned, after only a few years the Code became well accepted by the companies and is now generally seen as an integral part of the corporate governance regulatory system in Sweden. It is administered entirely within the Swedish business sector self-regulation framework, which has a long tradition as a complementary regulation to law and other statutory regulation in Sweden.

The system for managing, implementing and monitoring the Code is in short as follows:

The Swedish Corporate Governance Board is responsible for defining the Code and for keeping it up-to-date with regard to new developments in the field in Sweden and internationally. To this end, the Board annually follows up how the companies’ use the Code, but only as a means to analyze its functioning, not to supervise how individual companies apply the Code.

This duty instead rests with the two regulated markets in Sweden, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and NGM Equity. This is based on the fact that all companies listed on these exchanges are contractually obliged to apply the Code. The exchanges monitor the adequate application of the Code by their member companies on an individual basis according to a certain procedure, with the possibility to report unsatisfactory application, should a company refuse to respond properly to questions about this, to their respective Disciplinary Committees. Theses, in turn, have an arsenal of increasingly severe sanctions at their disposal, none of which, however, knowingly have been used so far.

Still the stock exchanges only monitor that companies apply the Code properly, not whether the corporate governance behavior they report is satisfactory or not from an investment point of view. This is entirely left to the capital market, i.e. the shareholders and their advisors and intermediaries, to decide on and act upon accordingly.

Hence the Swedish system can be described as strict on the requirement to apply the Code but relatively soft on obligations to comply with individual Code rules. The aim of the Swedish Corporate Governance Board is that all listed companies should apply the Code properly, but      not that all companies must comply with all its rules all the time. On the contrary, the Board encourages companies to use the Code with the flexibility intended with the comply-or-explain mechanism and would, in fact, be concerned if all companies would comply with all rules in the Code. Such a situation would indicate that the Code is not ambitious enough.

Nevertheless, Swedish listed companies are quite compliant to the Code, as shown by the latest follow-up numbers (referring to the reporting year 2010):  50% of the companies reported no case of non-compliance and another 39% reported non-compliance to a single Code rule adding up to almost 90% of the companies reporting no or at most one case of non-compliance. These numbers have been more or less the same over the last three years.

The Board considers these results slightly on the high side in terms of compliance. On the other hand they show that the companies find the Code relevant and can apply it without much trouble.

Another crucial issue of code application is the quality of the explanations given in terms of their information value to the capital market. This has been followed up annually since the introduction of the Code through a fixed methodology each year, thus ensuring a reasonable degree of consistency over time. (The methodology was also to some extent “validated” in the RiskMetrics study of code monitoring and enforcement practices in the EU some years ago, which reported results for Sweden very close to those produced by our method.)

According to this methodology all explanations reported each year are classified according to their information value to the market (not whether they are considered satisfactory or not from an investment point of view) into one of the categories Good, Acceptable and Unsatisfactory/Non-existent. The key issue here is the share of Unsatisfactory/Non-existent explanations, which has developed as follows since the introduction of the Code:

          2005          2006            2007          2008            2009            2010

          28%           23%             15%           27%             29%             15%

The interesting thing with this series is that it demonstrates, first, a learning curve of successive improvement 2005– 2007, during which time only the Large-Cap companies were obliged to apply the Code, then a bounce back up when the Code application was broadened to include all listed companies, and finally a second phase of  downwards learning curve leading back to the 15% level.

The significant drop in 2010 no doubt also has to do with an important change of the Code imposed this year, whereby companies were obliged not only to motivate any case of non-compliance but also to describe the solution they had chosen in lieu of what the Code prescribes. This simple measure has significantly improved the information value of the explanations.

Even though this later development is encouraging, the Board is not satisfied with a situation where about 15% of the explanations are non-existent or not deemed informative enough to the capital market. In principle a “zero tolerance vision” should be applied (although it may in practice be difficult to reach this level entirely). Therefore the Board is currently considering further measures to decrease the number of unsatisfactory explanations.