Étiquette : Réglementation

La planification de la relève : Une activité primordiale pour tous les C.A.


Un des meilleurs articles sur l’obligation des Conseils d’administration en matière de planification de la relève des PDG, paru dans Blogs.reuters.com.

La planification de la relève : Une activité primordiale pour tous…

« In an environment of increased corporate governance scrutiny, succession planning through both departures and crises is a focal point for shareholder interests and transparency-related issues. Companies historically kept succession plans close to their vests, but recent succession episodes at Apple Inc., Bank of America Corpand Hewlett-Packard have highlighted the multitude of issues that shareholders have with respect to the concern shown by boards on such a significant matter.

In October 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reversed its long-held position whereby the exclusion of shareholder requests for disclosure of succession plans from proxy statements was allowed. The SEC clearly recognized that succession planning-related matters are within the remit of shareholder proposals, and that boards must significantly address the issues as leadership voids or uncertainty could adversely affect companies ».

Liste de 3 500 femmes prêtes à siéger sur des C.A. européens


The European Business Schools/Women on Board initiative has published a first  list of more than 3500 board-ready women to bring Europe into the 21st  Century and support European Commission Vice President Reding’s initiative to shatter  the glass ceiling for women in Europe’s publicly listed corporation’s board  rooms.

The European Business Schools Women on Board Initiative

The list includes individual profiles of 150  senior executive women who are publicly supporting Commissioner Reding’s  initiative as well as European Business Schools who have culled their alumnae,  faculty, and Board members to identify more than 3500 “board ready” women.

The group has also published five sets of  criteria for board membership.  These  criteria were used as guidelines for the selection of the individual women and  by the business schools for their selection of board ready women (see below).

The group includes Business Schools such as  IESE (ES), EDHEC (F), INSEAD (F), Cambridge Judge Business School (UK), IMD  (CH) , RSM (NL), Boston University Leadership Institute(BE),  ESMT (D) and the business school association  EFMD (European Foundation of Management Development) as well as professional organizations  such as the GTWN (Global Telecom Women’s Network), WiTT (Women in Telecoms and  Technology), WoB  (Women on Boards), the  FT Non-Executive Director’s Club, EPWN (European Professsional Women’s Network),  IFA (Institut Francais des Administrateurs),  TIAW (The International Alliance for Women).

By publishing this first list, the group believes  it will do away with oft-cited remarks such as “there are not any qualified  women” and “where can board ready women be found”.  It also believes that such a list will help  increase not only the gender diversity but also the international diversity of  companies since many corporations may wish to avail themselves of the talent of  senior executive women from other countries than where they are based.

L’avenir des quotas en Europe : le débat se poursuit


Excellent article sur l’avenir des quotas en Europe. Voici un long extrait de ce document:

Norway’s businesswomen and the boardroom bias debate

As the EU begins a three-month consultation on whether there should be quotas for women in the boardroom, Harriet Alexander asks whether Norway’s quotas could work in Britain.

Mrs Berdal said she was broadly supportive of the quota system, as a necessary   step – even though she disliked the principle of interference in boards. She   also denied that it had adversely affected the profitability of Norwegian   companies.

« If women are just there as ‘tokens’, then the nomination committee is   doing a really bad job. I don’t know any woman who is there just to make up   the numbers; they are all highly qualified and professional, » she said.

« There was obviously resistance at the beginning, but now that it has been   there for a few years it has weakened.

« My general experience is that it is working fine, and that boards are not   weakened by the system: on the contrary, in fact.

But other business experts have expressed scepticism that the EU could impose  uniform restrictions on such diverse national working cultures.

Kenneth Ahern, a professor of finance from the University of Michigan, doubted   whether Britain was ready to make the necessary financial sacrifice to push  women onto boards. His own research on Norway, published last year, showed   that « the quota led to younger and less experienced boards, and   deterioration in operating performance, consistent with less capable boards. »

He told The Sunday Telegraph: « In Norway, they knew that the value   of their companies would drop, but society there cared more about equality   than finance. It was a conscious decision.

« For the EU to make such an important moral choice, across such a variety   of countries, is a very big ask indeed. I could see there being real   resistance to obligatory quotas from countries such as Germany and the UK,   which prize the financial output extremely highly. »

Mrs Berdal, who was a widely-travelled international lawyer before dedicating   herself full time to board work, agreed that it could be hard to impose   quotas in Britain.

« I think the British culture – both in society in general, and in   business – is a bit more conservative, and still a bit more male dominated   than in Scandinavia.

« In the boardroom, if you have only men, they tend to know each other   from school, university or the golf club, and decisions are often made   outside of the boardroom so you don’t have full control and transparency.   Maybe in the UK you’ll have to twist some more arms. »

Trois obstacles à la « bonne gouvernance » selon Marcel Côté


Solide prise de position de Marcel Côté, associé de la firme de consultation Secor, et un message clair aux organismes de réglementation et de classement des entreprises en fonction de leur « bonne gouvernance ».

D’accord avec ses propos ?

« La bonne gouvernance des entreprises est au cœur des préoccupations du milieu de l’investissement. La saison des assemblées annuelles approche, et elle donnera…

Lire la suite dans l’article de CA Magazine :

Trois obstacles à la «bonne gouvernance» selon Marcel Côté

 

Gouvernance des sociétés : de nombreux défis pour les conseils d’administration en 2012


Excellent article par Brendan Sheehan dans Boardmember.com qui présente les perspectives nouvelles qui s’offrent aux C.A. et aux hauts dirigeants des sociétés cotées en bourse en 2012. De nombreux défis attendent les administrateurs en réponse aux demandes pressantes de groupes d’actionnaires « activistes » , notamment  l’Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Je vous encourage à lire l’article au complet mais voici un court extrait :

telescope

Gouvernance des sociétés : de nombreux défis pour les conseils d’administration en 2012

« The failure of prominent companies, ongoing scandals, and the stubbornly persistent financial crisis have dramatically changed the landscape for managements and directors at U.S. public companies and provided new vigor to activist shareholders and governance commentators. For boards of directors, keeping track of the latest reforms and ensuring the company is fully compliant has become an even more complicated puzzle.

Many of the post-Enron reforms have concentrated on enhancing transparency and boosting disclosure in proxy statements and other corporate filings. The end result is while shareholders have greater insight into the companies they own, they also now demand a louder voice in the way companies are being managed and directed, even down to who gets hired and how much they get paid. This, in turn, has led to what many observers have characterized as the pendulum swinging too far to one side, creating a need for balance.

In the meantime, with activists gaining broader access to corporate boards and with disclosure policies constantly expanding, directors and management are becoming increasingly more concerned about what shareholders think. This time of year, that interest manifests itself in trying to figure out what is going to happen during proxy season. How are people going to vote? What will be the hot-button issues? Where will the surprises come from?

As with most things, in order to predict the future it can be instructive to look at the past. An examination of recent voting results and proposal activity reveals that, despite all the talk about the shifting focus of activists, the same proposals that surface every year continue to dominate the voting agenda. Majority voting dominated the proposals, as it has in the last four or five years, followed by the repeal of classified board structure, rights to call special meetings, and rights to act by written consent. These four areas have been among the most prevalent proposal topics for many years, and companies generally understand how to address the surrounding issues. Compensation-related proposals were strongly featured as well, and are likely to be the main focus in 2012.

That being said, several new disclosure rules were enacted in late 2010 and during 2011 that, as investors have time to examine the disclosures and get comfortable with them, could spark an increase in activity. In short, most experts feel that investors will start to move away from simple issues like board structure and poison pills and engage with boards on more complicated—and possibly more important—risk- and performance-related issues ».

ISS publie son « Board Practice Report – 2012 »


L’étude du ISS présente les perspectives qui s’offrent aux conseils d’administration en 2012. Très intéressant de connaître le point de vue d’une organisation « activiste ».

ISS Releases 2012 U.S. Board Practices Study

A decade ago, more than 60 percent of S&P 500 companies had staggered board terms, and plurality voting in director elections was widely accepted. Today, two-thirds of S&P 500 firms have declassified boards and nearly 80 percent of these companies have adopted majority voting provisions, as many boards have heeded shareholder votes for these reforms.

As one might expect, the prevalence of majority voting and declassified boards is higher at large-cap companies, which are subject to more public scrutiny and generally have greater institutional ownership. However, there are some practices, such as independent board chairs, that remain more common at small and mid-cap firms. Directors on a typical S&P 500 board tend to be more independent, more diverse, and slightly older on average than at smaller-cap companies.

These are among the findings in ISS’ annual Board Practices study, which examines director elections, board and director independence, and board diversity, among other factors, at S&P 1500 firms. This year’s report, which analyzes board practices and characteristics based on index, includes data as of June 30, 2011, from 1,461 companies and 13,760 individual board seats in the S&P 500, the MidCap S&P 400, and the SmallCap S&P 600.

Here are some of the key findings from the 2012 edition of Board Practices: The Structure of Boards at S&P 1500 Companies:

Gouvernance exemplaire à Facebook ?


Les préoccupations de gouvernance, de protection des droits des actionnaires passent au deuxième plan dans le cas d’entreprises à succès telles que Google, LinkedIn et Facebook. Sommes-nous face à un nouveau modèle de gouvernance qui s’adresse à des propriétaires-dirigeants d’entreprises à succès ou sommes-nous en voie de prendre des risques inconsidérés qui portent préjudices aux actionnaires et aux parties prenantes ? Voici un article publié par John Plender dans le Financial Times (FT.com Blogs) du 26 février 2012.

Gouvernance exemplaire à Facebook ?

Voici deux courts extraits de l’article :

« Not so long ago, a debate raged about whether there was any real evidence that good governance contributed to strong corporate performance. It seemed to me pretty academic, given the palpable damage bad governance had inflicted on shareholders at such disaster zones as Enron and the Robert Maxwell empire.

The protection for investors against that age-old governance problem, the over-dominant CEO, is non-existent. If there is a novelty here, it is that the potentially over-dominant executive is just 27 years old and has created a company that will be valued in tens of billions on flotation. And, indeed, none of this is to denigrate the achievement of Mr Zuckerberg. It would, after all, be unusual for someone of his age to have grasped the advantages for himself, as well as for shareholders, of a strong governance framework. And in today’s heady market the IPO will, I suspect, be a big success ».

Rémunération de la direction – Le point de vue anglais (UK)


Excellent article partagé par Richard Leblanc et publié le 20 février par Carter McNamara dans Blog : Boards of Directors

Executive Remuneration – A View from the UK | Boards of Directors

In recent years, executive remuneration has moved from its traditional ambit of corporate governance circles and company secretary forums to the public eye. In the UK, the last six months, has seen a particular focus on what many in the media see as ‘excessive executive pay’.

The UK government is currently consulting on most of these but the framework is clear enough and I suspect the similar measures will be adopted in many other Western countries to the extent they haven’t already.

Voici un résumé, en anglais, des mesures proposées au UK concernant la rémunération des hauts dirigeants (pour plus de détails, lire l’article)

1.       Greater transparency over remuneration reports

2.       Forward looking binding vote on pay policy

3.       Backward looking advisory vote on pay policy

4.       Director’s notice periods greater than one year

5.       Exit payments

6.       Ban on Executives servicing on Remuneration Committees

7.       Remuneration Consultants

8.       Clawback provisions

La règle du « comply or explain » est-elle efficacement appliquée?


Voici un très court article paru dans guardian.co.uk qui explique les mécanismes du Comply or Explain et qui montre que la règle semble être appliquée avec beaucoup de succès, du moins dans le FTSE 350. À lire pour mieux comprendre cette règle de gouvernance qui tend à se généraliser.
 

The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) reckons it does, citing research showing 96% of FTSE 350 companies comply with corporate governance codes.

The basic tenet of the corporate governance rules that have been nurtured since the early 1990s revolve around the idea of « comply or explain ». A company should comply with the code – for instance not having the same person acting as chairman or chief executive – but can get away with it if they are able to explain their actions convincingly to shareholders.

 

Pratique de gouvernance canadiennes – réponses aux questions de l’EU


Voici le résumé d’un chapitre de volume publié dans International Journal of Disclosure and Governance (2012) par plusieurs auteurs canadiens dont Richard Leblanc. J’ai pensé que l’introduction au chapitre saurait vous inciter à lire le document au complet. Bonne lecture.

« The European Commission has put forward an interesting set of questions about how to improve corporate governance, within its ‘Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance Framework’ (Green Paper, 2011). The following provides analysis and the responses by a working group of authors in Canada to these questions based on the experience and research of the group (academics and practitioners) and the relevant literature ».

Pratiques de gouvernance canadiennes – réponses aux questions de l’EU

INTRODUCTION

« The European Commission, in response to the governance failures that came to light in the credit crisis, is considering fundamental changes to European governance systems. As a step towards that goal, the EU has put forward a series of questions that examine essential aspects of governance, that is, what it involves, who it applies to and how it can be enforced. Whether these are the only or best questions that can be asked in this context is not the issue in this article, but rather, we see addressing them as an opportunity to bring to the reader the latest in governance research, as well as lessons from experience with the governance regimes in other regions, notably Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

This article is authored by a working group of academics and practitioners, with expertise in governance and various sub-governance domains. Members of the group have advised and worked with boards, regulators and companies that have become recognized for their leading governance practices. It is these experiences and the literature upon which we also draw.

Twenty-three of the 25 questions have been addressed below. Each question appears, followed by our group’s response. Two of the questions (questions 13 and 16) were not addressed owing to the time constraints of the submission (which was due on 22 July 2011) and the group felt that it did not possess all of the requisite expertise.

At the outset, the European Commission should be congratulated for establishing a high-level governance forum for discussions and debates and for the exchange of experiences. The need for a clear road map through the shifting and confusing terrain of corporate governance is very compelling. In a global marketplace, the solutions and recommendations championed in Europe will have a profound effect on governance standards in Canada and elsewhere.

In this article, the authors address in detail the need for improved governance in the areas articulated by the EU. First we consider the need for similar or different standards for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and unlisted companies. Then we focus on board recruitment, diversity and ways to improve the effectiveness of individual directors and boards. The critical area of governance over remuneration is then subject to our analysis, and we then assess ways to improve the board’s role in the governance of risk, of asset managers and of proxy advisors. Ensuring adequate shareholder engagement is next addressed, as well as minority shareholder interests. Lastly, we make recommendations for improvements in the implementation and monitoring of governance codes ».

Background: Canadian corporate governance practices

« We believe that Canada is a leader in corporate governance practices and, given that our group members are primarily Canadian, we draw on many of the initiatives here to frame our response to the EU deliberations. We also draw on global developments, including those in the United Kingdom and United States.

Canada has adopted the Anglo-American, unitary model of corporate governance. Our companies, however, operate within different ownership structures, legal and linguistic dualities, geographic diversity, and a decentralized regulatory regime of 13 provinces and territories. We have companies that are state-owned, family, significant shareholder, small and medium-sized listed, as well as widely held, not dissimilar to the diverse plurality and tapestry within the European Union.

Canada has had formal corporate governance guidelines in place since 1994 (Dey et al, ‘Where were the Directors?’) within a flexible ‘comply or explain’ approach. There has been time to digest and assess a continuously evolving corporate governance landscape, as companies and boards adopt guidelines and practices to suit the foregoing diverse circumstances, in a flexible manner.

The Canadian corporate governance guidelines, most recently revised in 2005 (Canadian Securities Administrators, 2005), have been adopted and adapted by companies within the listed sector, and through osmosis and other best practices, within private, governmental and not-for-profit sectors as well. It is upon this experience that we also draw for our responses ».

Forum sociétés d’État 2012 – Québec, 17 avril


Forum sociétés d'État 2012 - À Québec

Invitation

Le Cercle des ASC est fier d’organiser, conjointement avec le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, le Forum sociétés d’État 2012 de Québec, en collaboration avec l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés (IAS) section Québec.

Le Forum sociétés d’État aura lieu le mardi 17 avril 2012, de 7 h 30 à 10 h 45, à l’Hôtel Château Laurier, à Québec. Le forum sera constitué d’un panel et d’une conférence : « Mise en oeuvre de la nouvelle gouvernance » et « Évaluation et orientations gouvernementales ». Voir le lien ci-dessous.

Forum sur les sociétés d’État – Québec 17 avril

Rappel : Qu’est-ce qu’un code de gouvernance ? Un exemple


Depuis quelque jours, je constate que plusieurs personnes se questionnent sur les propriétés d’un code de gouvernance. Voici, à titre d’exemple, la table des matières du code de gouvernance des entreprises UK. Je vous encourage fortement à prendre connaissance de ce court document car, à mon avis, c’est l’énoncé le plus clair des principes de gouvernance qui existe.

Governance and the Code 1
Preface 2-3
Comply or Explain 4-5
The Main Principles of the Code 6-7
Section A: Leadership 9-11
Section B: Effectiveness 12-17
Section C: Accountability 18-21
Section D: Remuneration 22-24
Section E: Relations with Shareholders 25-26

Schedule A: The design of performance-related remuneration
for executive directors 27
Schedule B: Disclosure of corporate governance arrangements 28-35

Voir le document au complet :

The UK Corporate Governance Code

Voir également le règlement de l’AMF concernant les directives relatives à la gouvernance :

L’instruction générale 58-201 relative à la gouvernance

Le mode de gouvernance de Facebook est-il à risque ?


Je suis d’accord avec les propos de mon collègue Richard Leblanc. Son article, dans Canadian Business, soulève plusieurs questionnements fondamentaux pour les experts en gouvernance. Comme il y plusieurs points de vue différents sur le sujet et que tout le monde s’entend pour affirmer que l’opération est légale, il y a matière à concevoir un beau cas en gouvernance, créatrice de valeur, et en stratégie de conservation du contrôle de l’entreprise. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Facebook’s board is a recipe for disaster

« Facebook’s governance has been described by Businessweek as resembling a “dictatorship” and by a Wall Street Journal blog as “Governance = Zuckerberg.” Under the public offering, 27-year-old Mark Zuckerberg owns almost 60% of supervoting shares, is chair and CEO, can name a successor CEO and has complete control over the nomination process for directors ».

Stratégies de Mark Zuckerberg de Facebook : Manquements aux pratiques de « bonne gouvernance » ou sagesse de l’approche adoptée


Mark Zuckerberg détient 28% des actions de Facebook mais il contrôlera 57% des votes. C’est une des façons qu’il a trouvé pour avoir la paix, pour gérer son entreprise en paix! Voici le point de vue d’Yvan Allaire, expert dans les questions de gouvernance, publié aujourd’hui dans une lettre au National Post, intitulée “Governance: in your Face… book!”

Yvan Allaire salue la sagesse de l’approche de Mark Zuckerberg

Voir l’entrevue de Diane Bérard dans LesAffaires.com

Yvan Allaire félicite Mark Zuckerberg. Le fondateur de Facebook va à l’encontre des principes de “ bonne “ gouvernance” généralement reconnus. Mais… il va dans le sens d’un capitalisme durable et de la création de valeur à long terme, estime le président du conseil de l’Institut de gouvernance des organisations privées et publiques (IGOPP).

“Une entreprise a besoin d’un actionnaire de contrôle bien en charge pour éviter les actions nocives ( dictature des profits trimestriels, pressions des analystes financiers et des investisseurs “touristes” attaque des fonds vautours)”, déclare Yvan Allaire.

Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Application suédoise du principe « comply or explain »


Voici un bref document explicatif de Per Lekvall, membre du Swedish Corporate Governance Board, sur le modèle d’application du « comply or explain » à l’échelle suédoise. L’expérience suédoise en la matière est intéressante à plusieurs égards, notamment parce que l’on peut en évaluer les effets sur plusieurs années. Ce document a été transmis par ecoDa – The European Confederation of Directors’ Associations http://www.ecoda.org/ , association à laquelle le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés adhère.

Après une brève introduction, M. Lekvall explique comment le code suédois est appliqué et quels sont les résultats sur une périodes de 6 ans.

The Swedish Corporate Governance Code, based on the comply-or-explain principle, was introduced 1 July 2005 for the about 100 largest companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Three years later, 1 July 2008, the requirement to apply the Code was widened to include all companies listed on a regulated market in Sweden, currently around 260 companies. Having initially been considerably questioned, after only a few years the Code became well accepted by the companies and is now generally seen as an integral part of the corporate governance regulatory system in Sweden. It is administered entirely within the Swedish business sector self-regulation framework, which has a long tradition as a complementary regulation to law and other statutory regulation in Sweden.

The system for managing, implementing and monitoring the Code is in short as follows:

The Swedish Corporate Governance Board is responsible for defining the Code and for keeping it up-to-date with regard to new developments in the field in Sweden and internationally. To this end, the Board annually follows up how the companies’ use the Code, but only as a means to analyze its functioning, not to supervise how individual companies apply the Code.

This duty instead rests with the two regulated markets in Sweden, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and NGM Equity. This is based on the fact that all companies listed on these exchanges are contractually obliged to apply the Code. The exchanges monitor the adequate application of the Code by their member companies on an individual basis according to a certain procedure, with the possibility to report unsatisfactory application, should a company refuse to respond properly to questions about this, to their respective Disciplinary Committees. Theses, in turn, have an arsenal of increasingly severe sanctions at their disposal, none of which, however, knowingly have been used so far.

Still the stock exchanges only monitor that companies apply the Code properly, not whether the corporate governance behavior they report is satisfactory or not from an investment point of view. This is entirely left to the capital market, i.e. the shareholders and their advisors and intermediaries, to decide on and act upon accordingly.

Hence the Swedish system can be described as strict on the requirement to apply the Code but relatively soft on obligations to comply with individual Code rules. The aim of the Swedish Corporate Governance Board is that all listed companies should apply the Code properly, but      not that all companies must comply with all its rules all the time. On the contrary, the Board encourages companies to use the Code with the flexibility intended with the comply-or-explain mechanism and would, in fact, be concerned if all companies would comply with all rules in the Code. Such a situation would indicate that the Code is not ambitious enough.

Nevertheless, Swedish listed companies are quite compliant to the Code, as shown by the latest follow-up numbers (referring to the reporting year 2010):  50% of the companies reported no case of non-compliance and another 39% reported non-compliance to a single Code rule adding up to almost 90% of the companies reporting no or at most one case of non-compliance. These numbers have been more or less the same over the last three years.

The Board considers these results slightly on the high side in terms of compliance. On the other hand they show that the companies find the Code relevant and can apply it without much trouble.

Another crucial issue of code application is the quality of the explanations given in terms of their information value to the capital market. This has been followed up annually since the introduction of the Code through a fixed methodology each year, thus ensuring a reasonable degree of consistency over time. (The methodology was also to some extent “validated” in the RiskMetrics study of code monitoring and enforcement practices in the EU some years ago, which reported results for Sweden very close to those produced by our method.)

According to this methodology all explanations reported each year are classified according to their information value to the market (not whether they are considered satisfactory or not from an investment point of view) into one of the categories Good, Acceptable and Unsatisfactory/Non-existent. The key issue here is the share of Unsatisfactory/Non-existent explanations, which has developed as follows since the introduction of the Code:

          2005          2006            2007          2008            2009            2010

          28%           23%             15%           27%             29%             15%

The interesting thing with this series is that it demonstrates, first, a learning curve of successive improvement 2005– 2007, during which time only the Large-Cap companies were obliged to apply the Code, then a bounce back up when the Code application was broadened to include all listed companies, and finally a second phase of  downwards learning curve leading back to the 15% level.

The significant drop in 2010 no doubt also has to do with an important change of the Code imposed this year, whereby companies were obliged not only to motivate any case of non-compliance but also to describe the solution they had chosen in lieu of what the Code prescribes. This simple measure has significantly improved the information value of the explanations.

Even though this later development is encouraging, the Board is not satisfied with a situation where about 15% of the explanations are non-existent or not deemed informative enough to the capital market. In principle a “zero tolerance vision” should be applied (although it may in practice be difficult to reach this level entirely). Therefore the Board is currently considering further measures to decrease the number of unsatisfactory explanations.

 

Board Focus 2012 : Issues and Developments


Excellent article du The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation qui présente une revue de l’année 2011 en gouvernance et discute des perspectives pour 2012. À lire.

chapeau

Board Focus 2012 : Issues and Developments

Governance developments in 2011 brought some good news. Shareholder governance proposals were at their lowest level since 2002. Support declined for controversial proposals, such as shareholders’ right to call special meetings or act by written consent, and ISS conceded that its recommendations about written consent proposals should reflect the company’s governance as a whole. Even say-on-pay voting had some worthwhile effects. It gave shareholders the means to express more targeted dissatisfaction, driving a decline in opposition to director incumbents, and it prompted more and better dialogue between many companies and their major shareholders and better disclosure about the business rationale for pay decisions.

Assemblées annuelles des actionnaires virtuelles : une nouvelle tendance !


La mise en oeuvre d’assemblées annuelles virtuelles commencent à devenir de plus en plus significative dans le monde des sociétés ouvertes. L’article publié dans directorship.com décrit le processus mis en place et montre les avantages et les inconvénients d’une telle démarche.

Plusieurs entreprises optent pour une approche  « progressive » en expérimentant avec une formule hybride. Bref, un article à lire pour mieux appréhender les nouvelles tendances en matière de participation des actionnaires et de divulgation des informations.

Assemblées annuelles des actionnaires virtuelles : une nouvelle tendance !

« Some companies may never hold an annual shareholders’ meeting that is virtual, while other companies have opted to wave off the in-person annual meeting altogether in favor of a meeting in cyberspace. Unlike webcasts, which are available to the public, the virtual shareholder meeting (VSM) offers the ability to verify attendance and provides an interactive element that allows for real-time voting in a secure environment. The VSM also enables two-way engagement, allowing shareholders to ask questions of corporate officers and directors ».

Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) – Vol. 6, no. 1, Février 2012


Voici un aperçu de la dernière édition du Bulletin électronique du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS). Vous y trouverez un résumé de la 6e Grande conférence en gouvernance du CAS, au Parquet du Centre CDP Capital à Montréal ainsi qu’un compte rendu de la remise des prix Reconnaissance CAS 2012.

La conférence, « L’évolution des exigences imposées aux administrateurs de sociétés », présentée par M. Pierre Lortie, conseiller principal, affaires, chez Fraser Milner et Casgrain S.E.N.C.R.L., a réuni plus de 150 administrateurs, hauts dirigeants et partenaires du CAS.

 Grande conférence du CAS 2012 par M. Pierre Lortie

M. Lortie a jeté un regard critique sur les mécanismes de régulation et de gouvernance des sociétés canadiennes et québécoises, dans une perspective nord-américaine. Son allocution fut basée sur une recherche approfondie et rigoureuse de quatre thèmes fondamentaux en gouvernance, soit : l’évolution des exigences réglementaires, les recommandations pour une réforme de la gouvernance, le défi de la réglementation des offres publiques d’achat et de rachat, puis la sous-capitalisation des entreprises québécoises et leur faible présence à la cote des bourses.

Consultez l’allocution complète [+]

Dans le cadre de sa Grande conférence, tenue le 25 janvier dernier, le Collège a salué la contribution exceptionnelle de quatre formateurs en leur remettant le prix Reconnaissance CAS 2012. Ce prix est remis annuellement aux intervenants ayant gracieusement offert plus de 25 heures de formation en classe et ayant obtenu un taux de satisfaction très élevé de la part des participants. 

Prix Reconnaissance CAS 2012

De gauche à droite
Bridgit Courey, sociétaire et consultante principale en rémunération des cadres et du personnel, chez PCI-Perrault Conseil, Stéphan Drolet, associé, services-conseils, et responsable de la pratique de juricomptabilité de KPMG au Québec, Dominic Deneault, associé principal, stratégie et gouvernance durable, chez TREBORA Conseil, Guy Langlois, associé directeur canadien, services-conseils gestion des risques, chez KPMG

Bulletin du CAS Volume 6, numéro 1, Février 2012

Pierre Lortie pose un regard critique sur les mécanismes de régulation de la gouvernance au Canada et au Québec


Voici le texte intégral de l’allocution de Pierre Lortie, conseiller principal, affaires Fraser Milner Casgrain, présentée dans le cadre des Grandes conférences annuelles du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS). Dans son article intitulé « l’évolution des exigences imposées aux administrateurs de sociétés », M. Lortie jette un regard critique sur les mécanismes de régulation et de gouvernance des sociétés canadiennes et québécoises, dans une perspective nord-américaine.

Pierre Lortie, Fraser Milner Casgrain

Le texte de l’allocution est basé sur une recherche approfondie et rigoureuse de quatre thèmes fondamentaux en gouvernance, soit :

  1. l’évolution des exigences réglementaires,
  2. les recommandations pour une réforme de la gouvernance,
  3. le défi de la réglementation des offres publiques d’achat et de rachat («OPA »)
  4. la sous-capitalisation des entreprises québécoises et leur faible présence à la cote des bourses.

Texte de la conférence de Pierre Lortie – L’évolution des exigences imposées aux administrateurs de sociétés

Le conférencier nous a livré ses avis expérimentés et il a énoncé de judicieuses recommandations à l’intention des régulateurs et des spécialistes en gouvernance. Ses propos ont été très bien accueillis par l’auditoire composé essentiellement d’administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC), d’intervenants et de partenaires du CAS;  ceux-ci contribueront certainement à l’amélioration des connaissances en gouvernance qui se reflèteront dans les enseignements des programmes de formation du CAS. Donc, à lire avec un bon café…

La grande conférence annuelle du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS)


Le 25 janvier 2012, le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) présente sa grande conférence annuelle en gouvernance. Cette année, le CAS invite M. Pierre Lortie, conseiller principal, affaires, de la firme Fraser Milner Casgrain à prononcer une conférence sur l’évolution des exigences imposées aux administrateurs de sociétés.

Pierre Lortie, Fraser Milner Casgrain

L’événement a lieu au Parquet du Centre de la Caisse de dépôt et placement (CDP), Montréal, mercredi le 25 janvier à 17h. Pour en savoir plus, voir l’invitation à :

La grande conférence annuelle du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS)