Étiquette : International

Trois obstacles à la « bonne gouvernance » selon Marcel Côté


Solide prise de position de Marcel Côté, associé de la firme de consultation Secor, et un message clair aux organismes de réglementation et de classement des entreprises en fonction de leur « bonne gouvernance ».

D’accord avec ses propos ?

« La bonne gouvernance des entreprises est au cœur des préoccupations du milieu de l’investissement. La saison des assemblées annuelles approche, et elle donnera…

Lire la suite dans l’article de CA Magazine :

Trois obstacles à la «bonne gouvernance» selon Marcel Côté

 

Le système de gouvernance à BP : un exemple à suivre !


Voici une référence au site de BP qui décrit en détail le système de gouvernance en vigueur. La présentation du rapport est impeccable et le cadre conceptuel pourrait servir d’exemple à beaucoup d’organisations. Pourtant les difficultés rencontrées par l’entreprise ont été, et sont encore, énormes… Sans cet appareillage de gouvernance, l’entreprise aurait-elle pu affronter la crise du Golfe du Mexique ? Pas sûr !

Le système de gouvernance à BP

Il faut cependant ajouter qu’un bon système de gouvernance ne sera efficace que si la culture organisationnelle et le système de rémunération encouragent des comportement appropriés. BP a un excellent système de gouvernance, sur papier, mais il faut également que la direction et le C.A. aient un sens aigu de l’éthique pour « bien gouverner » (Tone at the Top). La culture a-t-elle évoluée depuis cette crise… Pas sûr non plus !

Mon propos n’est certainement pas de faire le procès de BP car je ne sais pas quelles sont les leçons que l’entreprise a tirées de cette catastrophe et de la gestion de la crise. Je référe à BP parce que je crois y retrouver un très bon exemple de cadre conceptuel en gouvernance. Mais, bien sûr, cela ne garantit absolument pas que l’organisation possède la culture requise pour se comporter en bon citoyen corporatif.

Les conclusions du rapport sur la crise du Golfe du Mexique présentées au Président Obama mentionnent justement ces éléments : “ The disaster can be attributed to an organizational culture and incentives that encourage cost cutting and cutting corners that rewarded workers for doing it faster and cheaper but not better”.  Food for thought.

L’internationalisation des conseils d’administration : Une tendance lourde en gouvernance !


Voici un résumé du Global Board Index report de la firme Egon Zehnder International qui montre que les entreprises qui opèrent à un niveau global ont avantage à mettre beaucoup d’énergie dans la constitution d’un Board international, un Board qui reflète le niveau d’activité international de la société.
 
 

There is a compelling argument to be made for greater international representation on boards. But, if that is the case, why aren’t boards doing more to close the gap between their global aspirations and the international directors who represent such an apparent advantage? The answer is that while these directors can provide great value to boards and their companies, identifying and attracting them is a difficult and daunting process. It can be done,

Based on anecdotal evidence from our client work and broader observations about global companies and their boards, we have long believed that global boards can be a valuable resource to companies pursuing a global strategy. We set out to quantify the current state of the “globalness” of boards of large companies, beyond what we experience day-to-day with our clients, and to determine if and how board composition links to business success. 

The results of the study confirmed our belief that there is a gap between companies’ global activity and longer-term plans, on the one hand, and the board resources that help to shape and guide that strategy, on the other. The troubling news is that this gap is large. The good news is that once companies are aware of the extent of the gap between their global strategy and their director resources, they can work toward closing it. In light of the positive correlation we are seeing between companies that perform better on key business metrics and those with international representation on their boards, we suspect many companies will take steps to ameliorate this deficit on their boards.

Comment la mondialisation affecte-t-elle la rémunération des hauts dirigeants ?


Très bon article paru dans Slate qui discute de l’influence de la globalisation des marchés sur la rémunération des CEO.  Peu ou pas du tout d’effet … Voici un extrait de l’article :

Comment la mondialisation affecte-t-elle la rémunération des hauts dirigeants ?

The global war for talent is a popular justification for exorbitant chief executive pay. But with few exceptions, expatriate chiefs are a tiny minority at most major publicly traded corporations. It’s bad news for shareholders, especially in high-pay hubs, who could find better-value stewards overseas.

« Multinationals are constantly in search of cheaper workers. The one exception appears to be the most expensive staff of all, in the boardroom. Particularly in the United States and Britain, boards have shown little desire to get the maximum bang for their buck by insisting companies cast wider recruitment nets. Anglo-American companies continue to tolerate steep rises in pay at the top that far exceed returns.

In 2010, compensation for the head honchos at American and British companies climbed 36 percent and 43 percent, respectively, dwarfing shareholder returns of around 15 percent, according to research firms GMI and Incomes Data Services. As recently as 1993, U.S. corporate bosses were paid some 130 times more than the average worker. Now they command about 350 times more, according to Duke University economist Dan Ariely.

A big plank of the defense has been globalization. Since the brightest CEOs can take their pick of posts across the globe, or so the argument goes, shareholders should not be surprised by astronomic remuneration – a point recently made by the Corporation of London’s policy chief. This oft-repeated excuse for overcharging shareholders is seldom backed up with evidence ».

La règle du « comply or explain » est-elle efficacement appliquée?


Voici un très court article paru dans guardian.co.uk qui explique les mécanismes du Comply or Explain et qui montre que la règle semble être appliquée avec beaucoup de succès, du moins dans le FTSE 350. À lire pour mieux comprendre cette règle de gouvernance qui tend à se généraliser.
 

The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) reckons it does, citing research showing 96% of FTSE 350 companies comply with corporate governance codes.

The basic tenet of the corporate governance rules that have been nurtured since the early 1990s revolve around the idea of « comply or explain ». A company should comply with the code – for instance not having the same person acting as chairman or chief executive – but can get away with it if they are able to explain their actions convincingly to shareholders.

 

Pratique de gouvernance canadiennes – réponses aux questions de l’EU


Voici le résumé d’un chapitre de volume publié dans International Journal of Disclosure and Governance (2012) par plusieurs auteurs canadiens dont Richard Leblanc. J’ai pensé que l’introduction au chapitre saurait vous inciter à lire le document au complet. Bonne lecture.

« The European Commission has put forward an interesting set of questions about how to improve corporate governance, within its ‘Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance Framework’ (Green Paper, 2011). The following provides analysis and the responses by a working group of authors in Canada to these questions based on the experience and research of the group (academics and practitioners) and the relevant literature ».

Pratiques de gouvernance canadiennes – réponses aux questions de l’EU

INTRODUCTION

« The European Commission, in response to the governance failures that came to light in the credit crisis, is considering fundamental changes to European governance systems. As a step towards that goal, the EU has put forward a series of questions that examine essential aspects of governance, that is, what it involves, who it applies to and how it can be enforced. Whether these are the only or best questions that can be asked in this context is not the issue in this article, but rather, we see addressing them as an opportunity to bring to the reader the latest in governance research, as well as lessons from experience with the governance regimes in other regions, notably Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

This article is authored by a working group of academics and practitioners, with expertise in governance and various sub-governance domains. Members of the group have advised and worked with boards, regulators and companies that have become recognized for their leading governance practices. It is these experiences and the literature upon which we also draw.

Twenty-three of the 25 questions have been addressed below. Each question appears, followed by our group’s response. Two of the questions (questions 13 and 16) were not addressed owing to the time constraints of the submission (which was due on 22 July 2011) and the group felt that it did not possess all of the requisite expertise.

At the outset, the European Commission should be congratulated for establishing a high-level governance forum for discussions and debates and for the exchange of experiences. The need for a clear road map through the shifting and confusing terrain of corporate governance is very compelling. In a global marketplace, the solutions and recommendations championed in Europe will have a profound effect on governance standards in Canada and elsewhere.

In this article, the authors address in detail the need for improved governance in the areas articulated by the EU. First we consider the need for similar or different standards for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and unlisted companies. Then we focus on board recruitment, diversity and ways to improve the effectiveness of individual directors and boards. The critical area of governance over remuneration is then subject to our analysis, and we then assess ways to improve the board’s role in the governance of risk, of asset managers and of proxy advisors. Ensuring adequate shareholder engagement is next addressed, as well as minority shareholder interests. Lastly, we make recommendations for improvements in the implementation and monitoring of governance codes ».

Background: Canadian corporate governance practices

« We believe that Canada is a leader in corporate governance practices and, given that our group members are primarily Canadian, we draw on many of the initiatives here to frame our response to the EU deliberations. We also draw on global developments, including those in the United Kingdom and United States.

Canada has adopted the Anglo-American, unitary model of corporate governance. Our companies, however, operate within different ownership structures, legal and linguistic dualities, geographic diversity, and a decentralized regulatory regime of 13 provinces and territories. We have companies that are state-owned, family, significant shareholder, small and medium-sized listed, as well as widely held, not dissimilar to the diverse plurality and tapestry within the European Union.

Canada has had formal corporate governance guidelines in place since 1994 (Dey et al, ‘Where were the Directors?’) within a flexible ‘comply or explain’ approach. There has been time to digest and assess a continuously evolving corporate governance landscape, as companies and boards adopt guidelines and practices to suit the foregoing diverse circumstances, in a flexible manner.

The Canadian corporate governance guidelines, most recently revised in 2005 (Canadian Securities Administrators, 2005), have been adopted and adapted by companies within the listed sector, and through osmosis and other best practices, within private, governmental and not-for-profit sectors as well. It is upon this experience that we also draw for our responses ».

Rappel : Qu’est-ce qu’un code de gouvernance ? Un exemple


Depuis quelque jours, je constate que plusieurs personnes se questionnent sur les propriétés d’un code de gouvernance. Voici, à titre d’exemple, la table des matières du code de gouvernance des entreprises UK. Je vous encourage fortement à prendre connaissance de ce court document car, à mon avis, c’est l’énoncé le plus clair des principes de gouvernance qui existe.

Governance and the Code 1
Preface 2-3
Comply or Explain 4-5
The Main Principles of the Code 6-7
Section A: Leadership 9-11
Section B: Effectiveness 12-17
Section C: Accountability 18-21
Section D: Remuneration 22-24
Section E: Relations with Shareholders 25-26

Schedule A: The design of performance-related remuneration
for executive directors 27
Schedule B: Disclosure of corporate governance arrangements 28-35

Voir le document au complet :

The UK Corporate Governance Code

Voir également le règlement de l’AMF concernant les directives relatives à la gouvernance :

L’instruction générale 58-201 relative à la gouvernance

Boardroom News | Directorship | Boardroom Intelligence


Excellent guide de l’actualité en gouvernance dans le monde

Étapes concrètes pour remédier aux manques de connaissances des Boards en matière de réseaux sociaux


Un autre excellent article de knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu qui montre les importantes lacunes des C.A. en matière de réseaux sociaux et qui indique clairement les étapes à suivre en vue de s’assurer que les membres de C.A. deviennent familiers avec ceux-ci. Voici quelques extraits de l’article :

« Let’s start with today’s reality. The world has changed but corporate boards haven’t kept pace. How do you know? Ask most boards what they monitor and measure at their organizations. There’s a big chance that most of them will say they are monitoring and measuring financial results, compliance and legal risks ».

« What’s surprising about such responses is that boards know that solid decision-making is essential to mitigating risks and ensuring the viability of their enterprises. How is it, then, that most of them don’t have a grip on the operational value these technologies offer, or the critical « big data » — about customer sentiment, employee engagement and investor insights — that they produce? The answer: They’re still using corporate governance tools and strategies that were developed in an age that was neither social nor mobile, or ever considered that the « cloud » would exist ».

« In short, today’s corporate directors have the « necessary » skills in terms of compliance and financial performance, but not the « sufficient » skills in terms of strategic or technological know how. Why? Because for years, astute corporate directors believed the tools that companies like Facebook and Twitter offered weren’t essential. In their view, these new means of communications were for kids, had little, if any, business value, and created minimal strategic, operational or financial risks. Wow, were they wrong ».

Comment Linkedin, Facebook et Twitter ont changé la valeur ajoutée du leadership


Excellent article publié dans Forbes par Glenn Llopis. À lire.

Comment Linkedin, Facebook et Twitter ont changé la valeur ajoutée du leadership

Most executives claim that social media doesn’t add value.  As a former C-level exec, I was skeptical myself, but now I’m a believer. LinkedIn, Facebook and Twitter have changed the ROI on leadership and it’s your responsibility to get in the game. 

Do you have something innovative to say? Do you trust yourself enough to share what is on your mind?  The social media community out there is eager to hear what you have to say, and to share your views with a wider community – for a wider impact

 

Application suédoise du principe « comply or explain »


Voici un bref document explicatif de Per Lekvall, membre du Swedish Corporate Governance Board, sur le modèle d’application du « comply or explain » à l’échelle suédoise. L’expérience suédoise en la matière est intéressante à plusieurs égards, notamment parce que l’on peut en évaluer les effets sur plusieurs années. Ce document a été transmis par ecoDa – The European Confederation of Directors’ Associations http://www.ecoda.org/ , association à laquelle le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés adhère.

Après une brève introduction, M. Lekvall explique comment le code suédois est appliqué et quels sont les résultats sur une périodes de 6 ans.

The Swedish Corporate Governance Code, based on the comply-or-explain principle, was introduced 1 July 2005 for the about 100 largest companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Three years later, 1 July 2008, the requirement to apply the Code was widened to include all companies listed on a regulated market in Sweden, currently around 260 companies. Having initially been considerably questioned, after only a few years the Code became well accepted by the companies and is now generally seen as an integral part of the corporate governance regulatory system in Sweden. It is administered entirely within the Swedish business sector self-regulation framework, which has a long tradition as a complementary regulation to law and other statutory regulation in Sweden.

The system for managing, implementing and monitoring the Code is in short as follows:

The Swedish Corporate Governance Board is responsible for defining the Code and for keeping it up-to-date with regard to new developments in the field in Sweden and internationally. To this end, the Board annually follows up how the companies’ use the Code, but only as a means to analyze its functioning, not to supervise how individual companies apply the Code.

This duty instead rests with the two regulated markets in Sweden, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and NGM Equity. This is based on the fact that all companies listed on these exchanges are contractually obliged to apply the Code. The exchanges monitor the adequate application of the Code by their member companies on an individual basis according to a certain procedure, with the possibility to report unsatisfactory application, should a company refuse to respond properly to questions about this, to their respective Disciplinary Committees. Theses, in turn, have an arsenal of increasingly severe sanctions at their disposal, none of which, however, knowingly have been used so far.

Still the stock exchanges only monitor that companies apply the Code properly, not whether the corporate governance behavior they report is satisfactory or not from an investment point of view. This is entirely left to the capital market, i.e. the shareholders and their advisors and intermediaries, to decide on and act upon accordingly.

Hence the Swedish system can be described as strict on the requirement to apply the Code but relatively soft on obligations to comply with individual Code rules. The aim of the Swedish Corporate Governance Board is that all listed companies should apply the Code properly, but      not that all companies must comply with all its rules all the time. On the contrary, the Board encourages companies to use the Code with the flexibility intended with the comply-or-explain mechanism and would, in fact, be concerned if all companies would comply with all rules in the Code. Such a situation would indicate that the Code is not ambitious enough.

Nevertheless, Swedish listed companies are quite compliant to the Code, as shown by the latest follow-up numbers (referring to the reporting year 2010):  50% of the companies reported no case of non-compliance and another 39% reported non-compliance to a single Code rule adding up to almost 90% of the companies reporting no or at most one case of non-compliance. These numbers have been more or less the same over the last three years.

The Board considers these results slightly on the high side in terms of compliance. On the other hand they show that the companies find the Code relevant and can apply it without much trouble.

Another crucial issue of code application is the quality of the explanations given in terms of their information value to the capital market. This has been followed up annually since the introduction of the Code through a fixed methodology each year, thus ensuring a reasonable degree of consistency over time. (The methodology was also to some extent “validated” in the RiskMetrics study of code monitoring and enforcement practices in the EU some years ago, which reported results for Sweden very close to those produced by our method.)

According to this methodology all explanations reported each year are classified according to their information value to the market (not whether they are considered satisfactory or not from an investment point of view) into one of the categories Good, Acceptable and Unsatisfactory/Non-existent. The key issue here is the share of Unsatisfactory/Non-existent explanations, which has developed as follows since the introduction of the Code:

          2005          2006            2007          2008            2009            2010

          28%           23%             15%           27%             29%             15%

The interesting thing with this series is that it demonstrates, first, a learning curve of successive improvement 2005– 2007, during which time only the Large-Cap companies were obliged to apply the Code, then a bounce back up when the Code application was broadened to include all listed companies, and finally a second phase of  downwards learning curve leading back to the 15% level.

The significant drop in 2010 no doubt also has to do with an important change of the Code imposed this year, whereby companies were obliged not only to motivate any case of non-compliance but also to describe the solution they had chosen in lieu of what the Code prescribes. This simple measure has significantly improved the information value of the explanations.

Even though this later development is encouraging, the Board is not satisfied with a situation where about 15% of the explanations are non-existent or not deemed informative enough to the capital market. In principle a “zero tolerance vision” should be applied (although it may in practice be difficult to reach this level entirely). Therefore the Board is currently considering further measures to decrease the number of unsatisfactory explanations.

 

Board Focus 2012 : Issues and Developments


Excellent article du The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation qui présente une revue de l’année 2011 en gouvernance et discute des perspectives pour 2012. À lire.

chapeau

Board Focus 2012 : Issues and Developments

Governance developments in 2011 brought some good news. Shareholder governance proposals were at their lowest level since 2002. Support declined for controversial proposals, such as shareholders’ right to call special meetings or act by written consent, and ISS conceded that its recommendations about written consent proposals should reflect the company’s governance as a whole. Even say-on-pay voting had some worthwhile effects. It gave shareholders the means to express more targeted dissatisfaction, driving a decline in opposition to director incumbents, and it prompted more and better dialogue between many companies and their major shareholders and better disclosure about the business rationale for pay decisions.

Changement dans les pratiques de gouvernance de RIM


Article intéressant, paru dans Financialpost.com, qui montre l’ampleur des pressions exercée par les parties prenantes au Canada afin d’amener des modifications aux pratiques de gouvernance de RIM, notamment la séparation des pouvoirs entre le président du conseil et le PDG.

Changement dans les pratiques de gouvernance de RIM

« According to the report, RIM was forced to choose between the wishes of Canadian shareholders and organizations which “strongly prefer, if not demand” that RIM appoint an independent chairman, separate from the chief executive role, to lead the company’s board of directors, and the business practices of American companies.

While the majority of the TSX 60 and TSX Composite companies divide the roles of chair of the board and CEO, in the U.S., the majority of the largest publicly traded U.S. companies and those firms that make up the S&P 500 do not split the roles of chair and CEO, forgoing independent chairs.

Faced with this schism, the Committee came to the point of view that the strong opposition to non-independent chairs in Canada should outweigh the other considerations, including current practice in the United States and in RIM’s ecosystem, the report states ».

 

Newsletter de l’Institut français des administrateurs (IFA) de janvier 2012


 

Découvrez la lettre de liaison mensuelle adressée aux adhérents de l’IFA, le partenaire français du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS).

Newsletter de l’IFA : édition de janvier 2012 (11/01/2012)

Cette publication électronique mensuelle au format pdf téléchargeable via le site internet a pour objectif de faciliter l’accès aux informations-clés sur les activités de l’IFA pour tous les adhérents : l’agenda des prochains évènements et séminaires, les activités en région, les actualités de la gouvernance, les dernières publications et les principaux services disponibles.

Elle complète les informations que vous pouviez recevoir au quotidien par email ou trouver dans le magazine administrateur – La lettre de l’IFA.

 

L’évolution du rôle crucial de président du conseil d’administration


Voici un extrait d’un article, publié dans le Financial Times du 27 décembre 2011, qui note un changement significatif dans la nomination des présidents de conseils d’administration. Dans le passé, plus de la moitié des présidents de conseils du FTSE 100 (UK) étaient d’ex CEO, et la plupart étaient nommés immédiatement après avoir quitté leurs postes de CEO. L’article montre que les comités de nomination accordent maintenant plus d’importance à l’étendue de l’expérience des candidats et, en conséquence, le nombre de CEO accédant directement à des postes de présidents de conseils a tendance à diminuer. Lire l’article pour plus de détails.

The UK’s largest companies are increasingly looking beyond business leaders who are just stepping down as chief executives when they choose their chairmen, according to a leading firm of headhunters.

While in the past it was quite usual for outgoing chief executives to move straight into the role of chairman, the nominations committees of large quoted groups now prefer to see candidates with wider experience.

Analysis by Spencer Stuart suggests that out of the 60 chairmen of FTSE 100 companies who have held chief executive responsibilities, just over half have had a gap between finishing their executive career and embarking on life as a company chairman.

The practice of moving from chief executive to chairman within the same company has become less common since the UK’s corporate governance code made it clear that such a succession plan required explanation to shareholders. If those following this route are excluded, the bias towards chief executives who have acquired some non-executive experience first becomes even stronger.

“The chairman’s role has evolved from being the leader of the board to being the conductor of an orchestra,” says Will Dawkins, head of Spencer Stuart’s UK board services practice. “Nowadays, the chairman of a classic quoted company is leading a board composed of non-executive directors who are also very senior and powerful.”

Êtes-vous prêts à siéger sur le C.A. de Yahoo ?


Voici un article sur les obstacles au recrutement de membres de conseils d’administration, particulièrement dans les cas où les sociétés éprouvent des problèmes financiers et ont un avenir incertain. L’article présente le cas de Yahoo mais les constats s’appliquent aussi à une multitude de sociétés en difficulté : PME, OBNL, Start-Up, etc.
 
Si vous cherchez à joindre un C.A. et que vous aimez l’action, regardez du côté des entreprises qui ont des problèmes. Vous constaterez que plusieurs administrateurs sont prêts à vous céder leur place…
 
 

« The search continues at Yahoo! for new directors. Who will they be? The battered media company is preparing to add some fresh blood to its board as the company’s new CEO Scott Thompson, who was lured away from PayPal, seeks to turn around the firm’s poor financial performance and strengthen its weak governance practices…. But Yahoo! is just one example of a board undergoing massive overhaul. The quality of directors is currently a major concern for shareholders, and successful candidates will have to have more than a sterling résumé with ironclad references. According to industry observers, shareholders are more alert to the issues and are carefully scrutinizing those who serve on audit committees, compensation committees, and so on. Meanwhile, the level of insider knowledge, experience and education of a board director is becoming increasingly relevant…. The bottom line is this: finding the right candidate for a company’s board is now tougher than ever. With concerns around executive compensation, board oversight and risk management becoming top priorities on the boardroom agenda, a well-qualified set of directors is essential for corporate success ».

Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Cinq prinicipes de base pour évaluer l’efficacité d’un C.A.


Très bonne analyse de A. Au, S S. Boren et E. De Angelis, publié par SpencerStuart, sur les principes de base relatifs à l’évaluation de l’efficacité des conseils d’administration.
 

Cinq prinicipes de base pour évaluer l’efficacité d’un C.A.

« Corporate boards today are expected to be more engaged, more knowledgeable and more effective than in the past. One tool that a growing number of boards are using to examine and improve their effectiveness is the board evaluation. Annual assessments have become the norm for boards in many countries, with nearly all listed companies in Canada, France, the U.K. and the U.S. conducting some sort of assessment each year ».

Plus de femmes sur les C.A. en Australie


Voici un article qui fait état des progrès constatés sur le nombre de femmes siégeant à des Boards australiens. Il semble bien que les mesures d’incitations adoptées portent fruits, mais la côte est encore abrupte…

Plus de femmes sur les C.A. en Australie

« A RECORD was quietly broken last month. It signed off a year in which women accounted for 40 per cent of new board appointments to ASX50 companies – to now make up almost 19 per cent of all ASX50 directors.

While still very much in the minority, women now have a bigger presence on big company boards than ever before. In terms of boosting diversity on Australian boards, it has been a year of  »real progress », says Jillian Segal, an ASX and National Australia Bank director ».

Newsletter de l’Institut français des administrateurs – Édition de décembre 2011


Découvrez la lettre de liaison mensuelle adressée aux adhérents de l’IFA, le partenaire français du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS).

 

Cette publication électronique mensuelle au format pdf téléchargeable via le site internet a pour objectif de faciliter l’accès aux informations-clés sur les activités de l’IFA pour tous les adhérents : l’agenda des prochains évènements et séminaires, les activités en région, les actualités de la gouvernance, les dernières publications et les principaux services disponibles.

Femmes sur les C.A. : Approche européenne ou américaine ?


Voici deux articles de Bloomberg qui font le point sur la situation des femmes sur les C.A. de compagnies américaines et européennes. Aux É.U., les Boards sont fortement opposés aux quotas et les organisations proposent d’autres façons d’arriver à une meilleure représentation des femmes sur les C.A.; en général, on penche plus vers des cibles.

En revanche, plusieurs pays européens ont décidés de forcer la parité en imposant des quotas. Le débat se poursuit. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Boys-only boards: Where the women aren’t at the top

Femmes au C.A. : Approches différentes entre U.S. et Europe