Catégorie : Comportement

Gouvernance exemplaire à Facebook ?


Les préoccupations de gouvernance, de protection des droits des actionnaires passent au deuxième plan dans le cas d’entreprises à succès telles que Google, LinkedIn et Facebook. Sommes-nous face à un nouveau modèle de gouvernance qui s’adresse à des propriétaires-dirigeants d’entreprises à succès ou sommes-nous en voie de prendre des risques inconsidérés qui portent préjudices aux actionnaires et aux parties prenantes ? Voici un article publié par John Plender dans le Financial Times (FT.com Blogs) du 26 février 2012.

Gouvernance exemplaire à Facebook ?

Voici deux courts extraits de l’article :

« Not so long ago, a debate raged about whether there was any real evidence that good governance contributed to strong corporate performance. It seemed to me pretty academic, given the palpable damage bad governance had inflicted on shareholders at such disaster zones as Enron and the Robert Maxwell empire.

The protection for investors against that age-old governance problem, the over-dominant CEO, is non-existent. If there is a novelty here, it is that the potentially over-dominant executive is just 27 years old and has created a company that will be valued in tens of billions on flotation. And, indeed, none of this is to denigrate the achievement of Mr Zuckerberg. It would, after all, be unusual for someone of his age to have grasped the advantages for himself, as well as for shareholders, of a strong governance framework. And in today’s heady market the IPO will, I suspect, be a big success ».

Cinq raisons qui expliquent pourquoi certains C.A. d’OBNL ont des problèmes d’efficacité


Voici cinq raisons qui expliquent pourquoi certains C.A. d’OBNL ont des problèmes d’efficacité … et quelques suggestions pour y remédier.

Have you ever sat down at a board meeting and realized that no one was excited to be there? There could be several reasons for that. Maybe it was the end of a long day for everyone. Maybe they ate too much for dinner and are tired. Or maybe, just maybe, it’s something you can do something about. Maybe there’s something that simply got sidetracked somewhere along the way that you can do something to remedy.

Group Think. Have you seen the studies that sent people out on the street to ask for help? An interesting situation unfolded. If there were just one or two people on the street, typically one of them would see what they could do to help. However if there were more than 2 or 3 people on the street, everyone appeared to wait to see if someone else would do something. In fact, in many cases, no one ended up doing anything. This situation often occurs in the nonprofit board room. Everyone is waiting to see what everyone else will do. One thing to try? Bring in an outside expert to provide a critical analysis of the situation. another option is to assign someone the role of the ‘devil’s advocate.’

Wrong People. When you were recruiting your board, did you ask them to be a part as a favor to you? Or did you ask them because you thought they couldn’t say no to you? If you have the wrong people and the wrong skill sets represented, take a step back, identify what your goals for the board are, and identify the skills you need to accomplish that. Then look out in the community and seek out people who are well known and who are passionate about your cause.

Unclear Expectations. When recruiting board members it is tempting to minimize the commitment that will be required of members. The right people will still want to be a part, and the people who are only trying to fill their resume will shy away. Having clear expectation will help ensure you are recruiting the right people.

No Accountability. Our board members are busy people and its easy for things to slip their mind. Generally speaking, they appreciate check-in and reminder calls. Don’t rely on emails for this. Just pick up the phone and call – or ask another board member to make that call. This idea has taken root and resulted in forward movement more than any other with the organizations I have worked with. Waiting a month until the next board meeting to bring something up again only results in things being delayed – or sidetracked permanently.

Magical’ Thinking. Growing up near a major tourist destination in Orlando Florida and having a mom who worked as a chaplain in the local emergency room opened my eyes to this phenomenon early. We would hear stories of people doing things that they wouldn’t do under normal situations. Something about pixie dust perhaps. But sometimes, in the nonprofit world, we have our own kind of pixie dust. It makes us think that nothing bad can come to the organization we work with and that things will fix themselves. We must be proactive and not fall into this trap.

5 Reasons Nonprofit Boards Stall – and What You Can Do About It

Quelles autres raisons peuvent amener les C.A. d’OBNL à tourner en rond et, selon votre expérience, que pouvez faire pour éviter les dysfonctionnements ?

La règle du « comply or explain » est-elle efficacement appliquée?


Voici un très court article paru dans guardian.co.uk qui explique les mécanismes du Comply or Explain et qui montre que la règle semble être appliquée avec beaucoup de succès, du moins dans le FTSE 350. À lire pour mieux comprendre cette règle de gouvernance qui tend à se généraliser.
 

The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) reckons it does, citing research showing 96% of FTSE 350 companies comply with corporate governance codes.

The basic tenet of the corporate governance rules that have been nurtured since the early 1990s revolve around the idea of « comply or explain ». A company should comply with the code – for instance not having the same person acting as chairman or chief executive – but can get away with it if they are able to explain their actions convincingly to shareholders.

 

Étapes concrètes pour remédier aux manques de connaissances des Boards en matière de réseaux sociaux


Un autre excellent article de knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu qui montre les importantes lacunes des C.A. en matière de réseaux sociaux et qui indique clairement les étapes à suivre en vue de s’assurer que les membres de C.A. deviennent familiers avec ceux-ci. Voici quelques extraits de l’article :

« Let’s start with today’s reality. The world has changed but corporate boards haven’t kept pace. How do you know? Ask most boards what they monitor and measure at their organizations. There’s a big chance that most of them will say they are monitoring and measuring financial results, compliance and legal risks ».

« What’s surprising about such responses is that boards know that solid decision-making is essential to mitigating risks and ensuring the viability of their enterprises. How is it, then, that most of them don’t have a grip on the operational value these technologies offer, or the critical « big data » — about customer sentiment, employee engagement and investor insights — that they produce? The answer: They’re still using corporate governance tools and strategies that were developed in an age that was neither social nor mobile, or ever considered that the « cloud » would exist ».

« In short, today’s corporate directors have the « necessary » skills in terms of compliance and financial performance, but not the « sufficient » skills in terms of strategic or technological know how. Why? Because for years, astute corporate directors believed the tools that companies like Facebook and Twitter offered weren’t essential. In their view, these new means of communications were for kids, had little, if any, business value, and created minimal strategic, operational or financial risks. Wow, were they wrong ».

Comment Linkedin, Facebook et Twitter ont changé la valeur ajoutée du leadership


Excellent article publié dans Forbes par Glenn Llopis. À lire.

Comment Linkedin, Facebook et Twitter ont changé la valeur ajoutée du leadership

Most executives claim that social media doesn’t add value.  As a former C-level exec, I was skeptical myself, but now I’m a believer. LinkedIn, Facebook and Twitter have changed the ROI on leadership and it’s your responsibility to get in the game. 

Do you have something innovative to say? Do you trust yourself enough to share what is on your mind?  The social media community out there is eager to hear what you have to say, and to share your views with a wider community – for a wider impact

 

Stratégies de Mark Zuckerberg de Facebook : Manquements aux pratiques de « bonne gouvernance » ou sagesse de l’approche adoptée


Mark Zuckerberg détient 28% des actions de Facebook mais il contrôlera 57% des votes. C’est une des façons qu’il a trouvé pour avoir la paix, pour gérer son entreprise en paix! Voici le point de vue d’Yvan Allaire, expert dans les questions de gouvernance, publié aujourd’hui dans une lettre au National Post, intitulée “Governance: in your Face… book!”

Yvan Allaire salue la sagesse de l’approche de Mark Zuckerberg

Voir l’entrevue de Diane Bérard dans LesAffaires.com

Yvan Allaire félicite Mark Zuckerberg. Le fondateur de Facebook va à l’encontre des principes de “ bonne “ gouvernance” généralement reconnus. Mais… il va dans le sens d’un capitalisme durable et de la création de valeur à long terme, estime le président du conseil de l’Institut de gouvernance des organisations privées et publiques (IGOPP).

“Une entreprise a besoin d’un actionnaire de contrôle bien en charge pour éviter les actions nocives ( dictature des profits trimestriels, pressions des analystes financiers et des investisseurs “touristes” attaque des fonds vautours)”, déclare Yvan Allaire.

Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Application suédoise du principe « comply or explain »


Voici un bref document explicatif de Per Lekvall, membre du Swedish Corporate Governance Board, sur le modèle d’application du « comply or explain » à l’échelle suédoise. L’expérience suédoise en la matière est intéressante à plusieurs égards, notamment parce que l’on peut en évaluer les effets sur plusieurs années. Ce document a été transmis par ecoDa – The European Confederation of Directors’ Associations http://www.ecoda.org/ , association à laquelle le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés adhère.

Après une brève introduction, M. Lekvall explique comment le code suédois est appliqué et quels sont les résultats sur une périodes de 6 ans.

The Swedish Corporate Governance Code, based on the comply-or-explain principle, was introduced 1 July 2005 for the about 100 largest companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Three years later, 1 July 2008, the requirement to apply the Code was widened to include all companies listed on a regulated market in Sweden, currently around 260 companies. Having initially been considerably questioned, after only a few years the Code became well accepted by the companies and is now generally seen as an integral part of the corporate governance regulatory system in Sweden. It is administered entirely within the Swedish business sector self-regulation framework, which has a long tradition as a complementary regulation to law and other statutory regulation in Sweden.

The system for managing, implementing and monitoring the Code is in short as follows:

The Swedish Corporate Governance Board is responsible for defining the Code and for keeping it up-to-date with regard to new developments in the field in Sweden and internationally. To this end, the Board annually follows up how the companies’ use the Code, but only as a means to analyze its functioning, not to supervise how individual companies apply the Code.

This duty instead rests with the two regulated markets in Sweden, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and NGM Equity. This is based on the fact that all companies listed on these exchanges are contractually obliged to apply the Code. The exchanges monitor the adequate application of the Code by their member companies on an individual basis according to a certain procedure, with the possibility to report unsatisfactory application, should a company refuse to respond properly to questions about this, to their respective Disciplinary Committees. Theses, in turn, have an arsenal of increasingly severe sanctions at their disposal, none of which, however, knowingly have been used so far.

Still the stock exchanges only monitor that companies apply the Code properly, not whether the corporate governance behavior they report is satisfactory or not from an investment point of view. This is entirely left to the capital market, i.e. the shareholders and their advisors and intermediaries, to decide on and act upon accordingly.

Hence the Swedish system can be described as strict on the requirement to apply the Code but relatively soft on obligations to comply with individual Code rules. The aim of the Swedish Corporate Governance Board is that all listed companies should apply the Code properly, but      not that all companies must comply with all its rules all the time. On the contrary, the Board encourages companies to use the Code with the flexibility intended with the comply-or-explain mechanism and would, in fact, be concerned if all companies would comply with all rules in the Code. Such a situation would indicate that the Code is not ambitious enough.

Nevertheless, Swedish listed companies are quite compliant to the Code, as shown by the latest follow-up numbers (referring to the reporting year 2010):  50% of the companies reported no case of non-compliance and another 39% reported non-compliance to a single Code rule adding up to almost 90% of the companies reporting no or at most one case of non-compliance. These numbers have been more or less the same over the last three years.

The Board considers these results slightly on the high side in terms of compliance. On the other hand they show that the companies find the Code relevant and can apply it without much trouble.

Another crucial issue of code application is the quality of the explanations given in terms of their information value to the capital market. This has been followed up annually since the introduction of the Code through a fixed methodology each year, thus ensuring a reasonable degree of consistency over time. (The methodology was also to some extent “validated” in the RiskMetrics study of code monitoring and enforcement practices in the EU some years ago, which reported results for Sweden very close to those produced by our method.)

According to this methodology all explanations reported each year are classified according to their information value to the market (not whether they are considered satisfactory or not from an investment point of view) into one of the categories Good, Acceptable and Unsatisfactory/Non-existent. The key issue here is the share of Unsatisfactory/Non-existent explanations, which has developed as follows since the introduction of the Code:

          2005          2006            2007          2008            2009            2010

          28%           23%             15%           27%             29%             15%

The interesting thing with this series is that it demonstrates, first, a learning curve of successive improvement 2005– 2007, during which time only the Large-Cap companies were obliged to apply the Code, then a bounce back up when the Code application was broadened to include all listed companies, and finally a second phase of  downwards learning curve leading back to the 15% level.

The significant drop in 2010 no doubt also has to do with an important change of the Code imposed this year, whereby companies were obliged not only to motivate any case of non-compliance but also to describe the solution they had chosen in lieu of what the Code prescribes. This simple measure has significantly improved the information value of the explanations.

Even though this later development is encouraging, the Board is not satisfied with a situation where about 15% of the explanations are non-existent or not deemed informative enough to the capital market. In principle a “zero tolerance vision” should be applied (although it may in practice be difficult to reach this level entirely). Therefore the Board is currently considering further measures to decrease the number of unsatisfactory explanations.

 

Assemblées annuelles des actionnaires virtuelles : une nouvelle tendance !


La mise en oeuvre d’assemblées annuelles virtuelles commencent à devenir de plus en plus significative dans le monde des sociétés ouvertes. L’article publié dans directorship.com décrit le processus mis en place et montre les avantages et les inconvénients d’une telle démarche.

Plusieurs entreprises optent pour une approche  « progressive » en expérimentant avec une formule hybride. Bref, un article à lire pour mieux appréhender les nouvelles tendances en matière de participation des actionnaires et de divulgation des informations.

Assemblées annuelles des actionnaires virtuelles : une nouvelle tendance !

« Some companies may never hold an annual shareholders’ meeting that is virtual, while other companies have opted to wave off the in-person annual meeting altogether in favor of a meeting in cyberspace. Unlike webcasts, which are available to the public, the virtual shareholder meeting (VSM) offers the ability to verify attendance and provides an interactive element that allows for real-time voting in a secure environment. The VSM also enables two-way engagement, allowing shareholders to ask questions of corporate officers and directors ».

L’évolution du rôle crucial de président du conseil d’administration


Voici un extrait d’un article, publié dans le Financial Times du 27 décembre 2011, qui note un changement significatif dans la nomination des présidents de conseils d’administration. Dans le passé, plus de la moitié des présidents de conseils du FTSE 100 (UK) étaient d’ex CEO, et la plupart étaient nommés immédiatement après avoir quitté leurs postes de CEO. L’article montre que les comités de nomination accordent maintenant plus d’importance à l’étendue de l’expérience des candidats et, en conséquence, le nombre de CEO accédant directement à des postes de présidents de conseils a tendance à diminuer. Lire l’article pour plus de détails.

The UK’s largest companies are increasingly looking beyond business leaders who are just stepping down as chief executives when they choose their chairmen, according to a leading firm of headhunters.

While in the past it was quite usual for outgoing chief executives to move straight into the role of chairman, the nominations committees of large quoted groups now prefer to see candidates with wider experience.

Analysis by Spencer Stuart suggests that out of the 60 chairmen of FTSE 100 companies who have held chief executive responsibilities, just over half have had a gap between finishing their executive career and embarking on life as a company chairman.

The practice of moving from chief executive to chairman within the same company has become less common since the UK’s corporate governance code made it clear that such a succession plan required explanation to shareholders. If those following this route are excluded, the bias towards chief executives who have acquired some non-executive experience first becomes even stronger.

“The chairman’s role has evolved from being the leader of the board to being the conductor of an orchestra,” says Will Dawkins, head of Spencer Stuart’s UK board services practice. “Nowadays, the chairman of a classic quoted company is leading a board composed of non-executive directors who are also very senior and powerful.”

Problème de l’asymétrie du pouvoir et de l’information entre Board et CEO !


Voici un excellent article paru dans The Conference Board Review (winter 2012), publié par Simon C.Y. Wong, associé à la firme d’investissement Governance for Owners. 

Il s’agit ici d’un sujet capital pour quiconque possède une grande expérience en gouvernance de sociétés. Pourtant, il y a peu d’auteurs qui l’aborde de front et il y très peu de recherches empiriques dans le domaine. Cet article présente clairement les enjeux du déséquilibre d’autorité entre le PDG et les membres du conseil d’administration. L’auteur donne plusieurs exemples d’asymétrie entre le pouvoir du CEO et celui de son Board et il suggère des pistes d’action intéressantes en vue de rétablir l’équilibre :

– Solide expérience de leadership et grande crédibilité du président du conseil

– Indépendance d’esprit des administrateurs

– Connaissances approfondies du secteur d’affaires par les membres du C.A.

– Limite de temps imposé au PDG (10 ans par exemple)

– Séparation des rôles de président du conseil et de PDG

Mismatch in the Boardroom

« But as any board member would acknowledge, it’s no small thing to challenge the CEO, especially when he’s serving as chairman as well. All too often, there’s a stature gap between the CEO and other directors, and that gap can seriously hinder boards’ effectiveness. Indeed, the consequences of boards’ failure to robustly challenge their “star” CEOs can be devastating…. To serve as an effective counterweight to the chief executive, boards should ensure that the statures of their non-executive members are equal to or greater than the CEO’s.

What’s the best way for boards to protect their standing and influence against an all-powerful CEO? By separating the roles of chairman and CEO. Even after years of corporate-governance experts’ urging, most U.S. companies still concentrate power at the very top—indeed, many firms reward a well-performing CEO with the chairman’s title. Nothing could more clearly signal a board’s acquiescence to a diminished role ».

Pourquoi certains C.A. manquent-ils de courage ?


Très intéressant article de Richard Leblanc dans Canadian Business le 6 janvier 2012. Les C.A. résistent souvent à faire les changements requis pour créer de la valeur pour les actionnaires. Pourquoi ? Deux raisons fondamentales selon Richard Leblanc : manque d’indépendance (self interest) et manque de courage.
 

Pourquoi certains C.A. manquent-ils de courage ?

“Then, and only then—when a board is independent, composed of industry leaders and effectively led—will it rise up and have the will to act. The fact that this has not happened yet in many troubled companies means change must occur by shareholders rather than from within. Regulators would be well-served if corporate governance changes were more often spurred by investors”.

Présider un C.A. : Un art à maîtriser


Richard Leblanc révèle les principaux facteurs qui rendent un président de C.A. efficace. Excellente lecture.
 
 
The former Prime Minister whispered in my ear before the board meeting of the bank, “Watch the way I chair this meeting, Richard.” Seeing a meeting chaired almost perfectly is a rarity so I paid attention and was not…

Présider un C.A. : Un art à maîtriser

Procès Nortel : Le Board est-il responsable ?


À lire, l’excellent article de Sophie Cousineau publé dans la Presse le 17 janvier 2012.

Le C.A. de Nortel est-il responsable de la débâcle et des fraudes ? Vous, en tant qu’administrateurs de sociétés, quel est votre point de vue sur la situation ?

Procès Nortel : Le Board est-il responsable ?

« Employées avec intelligence et modération, les mesures incitatives au rendement peuvent avoir une certaine utilité. Mais le conseil d’administration de Nortel a complètement travesti ces outils pour récompenser des dirigeants accros aux options qui cherchaient le profit rapide sans penser aux lendemains.

C’est le procès de ces administrateurs nonchalants qu’on devrait faire. Malheureusement ou heureusement, récompenser l’échec et la cupidité n’est pas une infraction au Code criminel ».

Une formation universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés : Indispensable !


L’article met en évidence l’importance pour les «Business Schools» d’offrir une formation en gouvernance de sociétés, une formation qui s’adresse à des membres de C.A. ou à des membres potentiels de C.A.

À ce jour, peu d’écoles de gestion offrent une formation qui prépare les participants à vivre les expériences de la gouvernance des entreprises, plus particulièrement en favorisant l’apprentissage expérientiel, les jeux de rôle et la simulation. Voir cet excellent article du FT.

Most corporate boards are failing. I’m not only referring to the spectacular failures at Olympus, Yahoo or BP; most boards are not adding the value they could to corporations because they are not being educated properly. It…

Beaucoup d’OBNL adoptent le iPad : Efficace ?


Voici un article très intéressant sur l’augmentation fulgurante de l’utilisation des iPad par les membres de conseils d’administration, notamment par les C.A. d’OBNL. En août 2011, la firme australienne de consultation pour OBNL de Steven Bowman, Conscious Governance,  a effectué un sondage auprès de CEO et de membres de C.A. d’OBNL afin, entre autre, de savoir ce qu’ils pensaient  de l’utilisation des iPad dans les réunions de conseils.

Steven Bowman explique ce qui l’a surpris lors du survey : “I have seen an exponential growth in the use of iPads in the Board room since February 2011. What surprised me most were the comments from large numbers of Directors that their use of the iPad was actually assisting them to focus even more, and that the Board meetings were even more productive. And often these comments were coming from Directors who had refused to use laptops, sometimes even email, prior to the introduction of the iPad.” Voici les points saillants des résultats du sondage.

  1. There is keen interest in the possibilities of iPad use;
  2. Top concerns about iPad use in the boardroom are security and usability;
  3. The iPad is both useful and limited;
  4. The iPad receives high marks for increasing efficiency;
  5. Success relies on making sure each board member has a device and on providing good training.

Pour plus de détails, veuillez lire l’article : Nonprofit Boards and the iPad: a Good Fit ?

Beaucoup d’OBNL adoptent le iPad: Efficace ?

Nonprofit board meetings can be a nightmare of paper and mailing. But some boards are adopting e-governance, using online systems and portals to get board members prepped for meetings. That’s where iPads come into play. iPads…

Une formation universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés : Essentielle !


L’article met en évidence l’importance pour les «Business Schools» d’offrir une formation en gouvernance de sociétés, une formation qui s’adresse à des membres de C.A. ou à des membres potentiels de C.A.

À ce jour, peu d’écoles de gestion offrent une formation qui prépare les participants à vivre les expériences de la gouvernance des entreprises, plus particulièrement en favorisant l’apprentissage expérientiel, les jeux de rôle et la simulation. Voir cet excellent article du FT.

Most corporate boards are failing. I’m not only referring to the spectacular failures at Olympus, Yahoo or BP; most boards are not adding the value they could to corporations because they are not being educated properly. It…

What’s at the core of corporate wrongdoing ? Leaders, Culture, Ethics….


Selon Dennis Levine, dans un article paru dans Fortune le 29 décembre 2011, la culture organisationnelle est au coeur des problèmes de malversation. Que doit faire un membre de C.A. pour se sensibiliser à celle-ci ?

To believe that the people who commit fraud are different from us might make us feel safe. But real safety comes from building an organization that stops these acts before they can take place. Dennis Levine, who lectured an NYU MBA ethics class as part of his community service many years ago, described the mentality that led to his insider trading conviction as a mentality of having to win the next game, competing with oneself for the next victory, where enough was never enough.

His explanation is applicable to both individuals and entire corporate cultures, such as MF Global and Olympus, where losses were allegedly buried from public view on purpose.

But Levine’s explanation doesn’t address why enough is never enough. What underlies the motivations to hide losses? And why does it often take a very rude awakening for a person (or a company) to change?

À la recherche d’un Board ?


Cet article de Richard Leblanc dans Canadian Business devrait intéresser tous ceux et toutes celles qui sont à la recherche d’un Conseil d’administration au cours des prochaines années. L’auteur a cependant omis de mentionner le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés parmi les grandes organisations de formation en gouvernance au Canada. Je me suis permis de le souligner à Richard… À lire.

 

Getting on boards

Do you think the average board can afford to pay a search firm $80,000 to recruit a director? Of course not. One major shift in 2011 was the impact of technology and diversification of boards on creating recruitment…

 
 

Le besoin de professionnalisation des conseillers en rémunération


Selon cet article publié dans Canadian Business, les conseillers en rémunération se placent souvent en situation de conflits d’intérêt en fournissant des services professionnels, simultanément, pour le Board et le management. L’auteur insiste sur un plus grand professionnalisme de la part de ces consultants. 
 
 

LA PME, la gouvernance et l’administrateur


Voici un article de André Laurin et André Vautour publié dans le Bulletin de novembre 2011 de Lavery. On y explique les avantages, pour une PME, de se doter de bons mécanismes de gouvernance. À lire.

LA PME, LA GOUVERNANCE ET L’ADMINISTRATEUR

Ci-dessous, les auteurs présentent un résumé des intérêts à favoriser la bonne gouvernance dans le cas d’une PME :

« L’actionnaire-dirigeant peut retirer de grands bénéfices de l’établissement de bonnes pratiques de gouvernance. Ainsi, à titre d’exemples non-exhaustifs, la société qu’il dirige pourra vraisemblablement accroître sa crédibilité auprès des prêteurs et investisseurs; il pourra recruter de meilleures personnes comme administrateurs; en cas de vente de l’entreprise, l’acheteur sera moins craintif; à titre d’administrateur, il accroîtra sa propre protection à l’égard de sa responsabilité potentielle; la société réduira les risques de poursuite; ces pratiques de gouvernance le forceront à être plus systématique et à développer des outils et systèmes de contrôle plus efficaces; mais surtout, il bénéficiera d’une aide et de conseils précieux de la part de ses co-administrateurs ».