Catégorie : International

SNC-Lavalin suspendue par la Banque mondiale – Problème de gouvernance ?


Le malheur s’acharne sur SNC-Lavalin. Lire les deux articles dans LesAffaires.com et dans le Globe and Mail.

À la suite d’une enquête lancée en septembre dernier, l’une des filiales de SNC-Lavalin (TSX: SNC) a reçu de la Banque mondiale un avis formel suspendant temporairement le droit de cette filiale de déposer des appels d’offres visant de nouveaux projets de la Banque mondiale.

SNC-Lavalin suspendue par la Banque mondiale

One of Canada’s global champions has just given itself a beating. Canadian officials often pointed to SNC-Lavalin’s business abroad as an example of this country’s trade inroads. It’s taking over the sale of CANDU nuclear equipment. Foreign Minister John Baird brought an SNC exec, Bruno Picard, to meet Libya’s new leaders last fall.

The board of Montreal-based SNC-Lavalin has reported two mysterious payments totalling $56-million. - The board of Montreal-based SNC-Lavalin has reported two mysterious payments totalling $56-million. | Ryan Remiorz/The Canadian Press

SNC-Lavalin: Quelles leçons les conseils d’administration doivent-ils retenir ?


Excellente intervention de Diane Bérard sur le blogue Les Affaires.com. Dans ce billet, Mme Bérard pose plusieurs questions fort pertinentes à Richard Leblanc, expert en gouvernance à l’Université York. Et comme c’est son habitude, Richard Leblanc formule des réponses claires et précises. D’abord, Mme Bérard brosse un résumé de la situation :

« Pierre Duhaime, pdg de SNC-Lavalin, a démissionné.  Ce geste marque la conclusion du premier chapitre d’une saga qui dure depuis plusieurs semaines. Celle-ci a débuté avec des allégations de pots-de-vin en Libye pour un montant d’une trentaine de millions de dollars. Après enquête, on apprend que cette somme s’élèverait plutôt à  56 M$ et elle ne serait pas nécessairement reliée à la Libye.  Il s’agirait de fonds utilisés pour payer des “agents” à l’étranger. Cette somme aurait été soumise au chef de la direction financière ainsi qu’au président du conseil qui ne l’aurait pas autorisée. En dépit de cela, Pierre Duhaime aurait permis cette dépense. Je résume: une somme de 56M$, sans aucun lien apparent avec les projets de SNC, aurait été dépensée sans  autorisation. Et l’usage pour lequel celle-ci aurait été dépensée contreviendrait au code d’éthique de SNC ».

Lisez cet article pour connaître le point de vue de Richard Leblanc sur les questions suivantes :

SNC-Lavalin: cinq leçons pour les conseils

Q: Il doit y avoir beaucoup de gens nerveux aujourd’hui?

Q: Pourquoi s’en faire, SNC est canadienne et le Canada n’a pas de loi sur la corruption?

Q: “L’ incident SNC” aura-t-il des répercussions chez d’autres conseils de sociétés canadiennes?

Q:  Quelles leçons les conseils devraient-ils tirer de ce dérapage?

Les spécificités de la gouvernance des entreprises familiales


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait de l’excellent billet publié par Hélène Solignac, associée de Rivoli Consulting en charge de l’activité Gouvernance d’entreprise (France). L’auteure présente les résultats d’une étude conduite par HEC, Poytechnique et le BCG auprès d’une cinquantaine de grandes entreprises françaises.

Il me semble que les constats dégagés sont tout à fait transposables aux entreprises québécoises; la gouvernance des entreprises familiales et des PME est plus complexe que l’on est porté à croire ! Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) de l’Université Laval a d’ailleurs mis sur pied une formation intensive de deux jours sur la Gouvernance des PME.

Les conseils d’administration et la stratégie

 

Les chercheurs ont cherché à « mettre en évidence les facteurs-clés transposables à des entreprises non familiales, en particulier, la priorité donnée au long terme et à la pérennité de l’entreprise, le rôle central des valeurs, conjuguées avec la capacité à innover et à explorer de nouvelles opportunités sont des caractéristiques largement partagées par les entreprises familiales. Les valeurs très fortes qui trouvent leur origine dans la famille et son histoire, sont incarnées par les dirigeants familiaux et intériorisées par tous les membres de l’entreprise. Elles fondent une vision long terme partagée, mais aussi un système d’obligations et d’attentes réciproques.

Bien sûr, l’entreprise familiale n’est pas un modèle en soi : les exemples sont nombreux de successions et de transmissions mal gérées, d’isolement de dirigeants autoritaires ou de dissensions familiales préjudiciables à l’entreprise. Les risques liés à une gouvernance mal organisée et au non respect des actionnaires minoritaires, à des héritiers peu préparés, à une trop forte résistance au changement ne sont pas toujours bien analysés.

Néanmoins, à l’heure de la “corporate governance”, où la gestion des managers professionnels est critiquée pour sa vision court-termiste, la recherche de profits immédiats, les risques excessifs et non maîtrisés – comme les échecs d’opérations de croissance externe du fait de l’attention insuffisante portée à l’intégration – ; où l’on déplore le manque d’éthique, la perte de sens au travail, la promotion de individualisme au détriment de la recherche de coopération, ces pistes de réflexion sont les bienvenues ».

Liste de 3 500 femmes prêtes à siéger sur des C.A. européens


The European Business Schools/Women on Board initiative has published a first  list of more than 3500 board-ready women to bring Europe into the 21st  Century and support European Commission Vice President Reding’s initiative to shatter  the glass ceiling for women in Europe’s publicly listed corporation’s board  rooms.

The European Business Schools Women on Board Initiative

The list includes individual profiles of 150  senior executive women who are publicly supporting Commissioner Reding’s  initiative as well as European Business Schools who have culled their alumnae,  faculty, and Board members to identify more than 3500 “board ready” women.

The group has also published five sets of  criteria for board membership.  These  criteria were used as guidelines for the selection of the individual women and  by the business schools for their selection of board ready women (see below).

The group includes Business Schools such as  IESE (ES), EDHEC (F), INSEAD (F), Cambridge Judge Business School (UK), IMD  (CH) , RSM (NL), Boston University Leadership Institute(BE),  ESMT (D) and the business school association  EFMD (European Foundation of Management Development) as well as professional organizations  such as the GTWN (Global Telecom Women’s Network), WiTT (Women in Telecoms and  Technology), WoB  (Women on Boards), the  FT Non-Executive Director’s Club, EPWN (European Professsional Women’s Network),  IFA (Institut Francais des Administrateurs),  TIAW (The International Alliance for Women).

By publishing this first list, the group believes  it will do away with oft-cited remarks such as “there are not any qualified  women” and “where can board ready women be found”.  It also believes that such a list will help  increase not only the gender diversity but also the international diversity of  companies since many corporations may wish to avail themselves of the talent of  senior executive women from other countries than where they are based.

L’avenir des quotas en Europe : le débat se poursuit


Excellent article sur l’avenir des quotas en Europe. Voici un long extrait de ce document:

Norway’s businesswomen and the boardroom bias debate

As the EU begins a three-month consultation on whether there should be quotas for women in the boardroom, Harriet Alexander asks whether Norway’s quotas could work in Britain.

Mrs Berdal said she was broadly supportive of the quota system, as a necessary   step – even though she disliked the principle of interference in boards. She   also denied that it had adversely affected the profitability of Norwegian   companies.

« If women are just there as ‘tokens’, then the nomination committee is   doing a really bad job. I don’t know any woman who is there just to make up   the numbers; they are all highly qualified and professional, » she said.

« There was obviously resistance at the beginning, but now that it has been   there for a few years it has weakened.

« My general experience is that it is working fine, and that boards are not   weakened by the system: on the contrary, in fact.

But other business experts have expressed scepticism that the EU could impose  uniform restrictions on such diverse national working cultures.

Kenneth Ahern, a professor of finance from the University of Michigan, doubted   whether Britain was ready to make the necessary financial sacrifice to push  women onto boards. His own research on Norway, published last year, showed   that « the quota led to younger and less experienced boards, and   deterioration in operating performance, consistent with less capable boards. »

He told The Sunday Telegraph: « In Norway, they knew that the value   of their companies would drop, but society there cared more about equality   than finance. It was a conscious decision.

« For the EU to make such an important moral choice, across such a variety   of countries, is a very big ask indeed. I could see there being real   resistance to obligatory quotas from countries such as Germany and the UK,   which prize the financial output extremely highly. »

Mrs Berdal, who was a widely-travelled international lawyer before dedicating   herself full time to board work, agreed that it could be hard to impose   quotas in Britain.

« I think the British culture – both in society in general, and in   business – is a bit more conservative, and still a bit more male dominated   than in Scandinavia.

« In the boardroom, if you have only men, they tend to know each other   from school, university or the golf club, and decisions are often made   outside of the boardroom so you don’t have full control and transparency.   Maybe in the UK you’ll have to twist some more arms. »

La formation en gouvernance s’internationalise : l’exemple de Singapour


Voici un article intéressant paru dans Channelnewsasia.com qui montre les besoins de formation en gouvernance des hauts dirigeants de Singapour et les efforts entrepris afin d’explorer les formations à l’internationnal, notamment en Europe.

La formation en gouvernance s’internationalise : l’exemple de Singapour

« Going back to school after climbing the corporate ladder – that’s what some top corporate executives are doing to keep up with rapid changes in the business world especially on corporate governance issues. Besides partnering SMU to conduct a certificate and diploma programme in company directorship, the Singapore Institute of Directors is also exploring the possibility of working with a leading a leading international institution to run an annual senior director and chairman programme for experienced senior directors.

With recent changes in Singapore’s corporate governance landscape, experts said there is a need for directors to upgrade their knowledge.

Irving Low, Partner and Risk Consulting Head at KPMG Singapore, said: « If you talk to the old boys from 10, 15 years ago, (you would realise that) how they manage risk and govern companies these days is very different. The old guards would say the world has changed completely. »

Trois obstacles à la « bonne gouvernance » selon Marcel Côté


Solide prise de position de Marcel Côté, associé de la firme de consultation Secor, et un message clair aux organismes de réglementation et de classement des entreprises en fonction de leur « bonne gouvernance ».

D’accord avec ses propos ?

« La bonne gouvernance des entreprises est au cœur des préoccupations du milieu de l’investissement. La saison des assemblées annuelles approche, et elle donnera…

Lire la suite dans l’article de CA Magazine :

Trois obstacles à la «bonne gouvernance» selon Marcel Côté

 

Le système de gouvernance à BP : un exemple à suivre !


Voici une référence au site de BP qui décrit en détail le système de gouvernance en vigueur. La présentation du rapport est impeccable et le cadre conceptuel pourrait servir d’exemple à beaucoup d’organisations. Pourtant les difficultés rencontrées par l’entreprise ont été, et sont encore, énormes… Sans cet appareillage de gouvernance, l’entreprise aurait-elle pu affronter la crise du Golfe du Mexique ? Pas sûr !

Le système de gouvernance à BP

Il faut cependant ajouter qu’un bon système de gouvernance ne sera efficace que si la culture organisationnelle et le système de rémunération encouragent des comportement appropriés. BP a un excellent système de gouvernance, sur papier, mais il faut également que la direction et le C.A. aient un sens aigu de l’éthique pour « bien gouverner » (Tone at the Top). La culture a-t-elle évoluée depuis cette crise… Pas sûr non plus !

Mon propos n’est certainement pas de faire le procès de BP car je ne sais pas quelles sont les leçons que l’entreprise a tirées de cette catastrophe et de la gestion de la crise. Je référe à BP parce que je crois y retrouver un très bon exemple de cadre conceptuel en gouvernance. Mais, bien sûr, cela ne garantit absolument pas que l’organisation possède la culture requise pour se comporter en bon citoyen corporatif.

Les conclusions du rapport sur la crise du Golfe du Mexique présentées au Président Obama mentionnent justement ces éléments : “ The disaster can be attributed to an organizational culture and incentives that encourage cost cutting and cutting corners that rewarded workers for doing it faster and cheaper but not better”.  Food for thought.

L’internationalisation des conseils d’administration : Une tendance lourde en gouvernance !


Voici un résumé du Global Board Index report de la firme Egon Zehnder International qui montre que les entreprises qui opèrent à un niveau global ont avantage à mettre beaucoup d’énergie dans la constitution d’un Board international, un Board qui reflète le niveau d’activité international de la société.
 
 

There is a compelling argument to be made for greater international representation on boards. But, if that is the case, why aren’t boards doing more to close the gap between their global aspirations and the international directors who represent such an apparent advantage? The answer is that while these directors can provide great value to boards and their companies, identifying and attracting them is a difficult and daunting process. It can be done,

Based on anecdotal evidence from our client work and broader observations about global companies and their boards, we have long believed that global boards can be a valuable resource to companies pursuing a global strategy. We set out to quantify the current state of the “globalness” of boards of large companies, beyond what we experience day-to-day with our clients, and to determine if and how board composition links to business success. 

The results of the study confirmed our belief that there is a gap between companies’ global activity and longer-term plans, on the one hand, and the board resources that help to shape and guide that strategy, on the other. The troubling news is that this gap is large. The good news is that once companies are aware of the extent of the gap between their global strategy and their director resources, they can work toward closing it. In light of the positive correlation we are seeing between companies that perform better on key business metrics and those with international representation on their boards, we suspect many companies will take steps to ameliorate this deficit on their boards.

Comment la mondialisation affecte-t-elle la rémunération des hauts dirigeants ?


Très bon article paru dans Slate qui discute de l’influence de la globalisation des marchés sur la rémunération des CEO.  Peu ou pas du tout d’effet … Voici un extrait de l’article :

Comment la mondialisation affecte-t-elle la rémunération des hauts dirigeants ?

The global war for talent is a popular justification for exorbitant chief executive pay. But with few exceptions, expatriate chiefs are a tiny minority at most major publicly traded corporations. It’s bad news for shareholders, especially in high-pay hubs, who could find better-value stewards overseas.

« Multinationals are constantly in search of cheaper workers. The one exception appears to be the most expensive staff of all, in the boardroom. Particularly in the United States and Britain, boards have shown little desire to get the maximum bang for their buck by insisting companies cast wider recruitment nets. Anglo-American companies continue to tolerate steep rises in pay at the top that far exceed returns.

In 2010, compensation for the head honchos at American and British companies climbed 36 percent and 43 percent, respectively, dwarfing shareholder returns of around 15 percent, according to research firms GMI and Incomes Data Services. As recently as 1993, U.S. corporate bosses were paid some 130 times more than the average worker. Now they command about 350 times more, according to Duke University economist Dan Ariely.

A big plank of the defense has been globalization. Since the brightest CEOs can take their pick of posts across the globe, or so the argument goes, shareholders should not be surprised by astronomic remuneration – a point recently made by the Corporation of London’s policy chief. This oft-repeated excuse for overcharging shareholders is seldom backed up with evidence ».

Gouvernance exemplaire à Facebook ?


Les préoccupations de gouvernance, de protection des droits des actionnaires passent au deuxième plan dans le cas d’entreprises à succès telles que Google, LinkedIn et Facebook. Sommes-nous face à un nouveau modèle de gouvernance qui s’adresse à des propriétaires-dirigeants d’entreprises à succès ou sommes-nous en voie de prendre des risques inconsidérés qui portent préjudices aux actionnaires et aux parties prenantes ? Voici un article publié par John Plender dans le Financial Times (FT.com Blogs) du 26 février 2012.

Gouvernance exemplaire à Facebook ?

Voici deux courts extraits de l’article :

« Not so long ago, a debate raged about whether there was any real evidence that good governance contributed to strong corporate performance. It seemed to me pretty academic, given the palpable damage bad governance had inflicted on shareholders at such disaster zones as Enron and the Robert Maxwell empire.

The protection for investors against that age-old governance problem, the over-dominant CEO, is non-existent. If there is a novelty here, it is that the potentially over-dominant executive is just 27 years old and has created a company that will be valued in tens of billions on flotation. And, indeed, none of this is to denigrate the achievement of Mr Zuckerberg. It would, after all, be unusual for someone of his age to have grasped the advantages for himself, as well as for shareholders, of a strong governance framework. And in today’s heady market the IPO will, I suspect, be a big success ».

Rémunération de la direction – Le point de vue anglais (UK)


Excellent article partagé par Richard Leblanc et publié le 20 février par Carter McNamara dans Blog : Boards of Directors

Executive Remuneration – A View from the UK | Boards of Directors

In recent years, executive remuneration has moved from its traditional ambit of corporate governance circles and company secretary forums to the public eye. In the UK, the last six months, has seen a particular focus on what many in the media see as ‘excessive executive pay’.

The UK government is currently consulting on most of these but the framework is clear enough and I suspect the similar measures will be adopted in many other Western countries to the extent they haven’t already.

Voici un résumé, en anglais, des mesures proposées au UK concernant la rémunération des hauts dirigeants (pour plus de détails, lire l’article)

1.       Greater transparency over remuneration reports

2.       Forward looking binding vote on pay policy

3.       Backward looking advisory vote on pay policy

4.       Director’s notice periods greater than one year

5.       Exit payments

6.       Ban on Executives servicing on Remuneration Committees

7.       Remuneration Consultants

8.       Clawback provisions

La règle du « comply or explain » est-elle efficacement appliquée?


Voici un très court article paru dans guardian.co.uk qui explique les mécanismes du Comply or Explain et qui montre que la règle semble être appliquée avec beaucoup de succès, du moins dans le FTSE 350. À lire pour mieux comprendre cette règle de gouvernance qui tend à se généraliser.
 

The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) reckons it does, citing research showing 96% of FTSE 350 companies comply with corporate governance codes.

The basic tenet of the corporate governance rules that have been nurtured since the early 1990s revolve around the idea of « comply or explain ». A company should comply with the code – for instance not having the same person acting as chairman or chief executive – but can get away with it if they are able to explain their actions convincingly to shareholders.

 

Pratique de gouvernance canadiennes – réponses aux questions de l’EU


Voici le résumé d’un chapitre de volume publié dans International Journal of Disclosure and Governance (2012) par plusieurs auteurs canadiens dont Richard Leblanc. J’ai pensé que l’introduction au chapitre saurait vous inciter à lire le document au complet. Bonne lecture.

« The European Commission has put forward an interesting set of questions about how to improve corporate governance, within its ‘Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance Framework’ (Green Paper, 2011). The following provides analysis and the responses by a working group of authors in Canada to these questions based on the experience and research of the group (academics and practitioners) and the relevant literature ».

Pratiques de gouvernance canadiennes – réponses aux questions de l’EU

INTRODUCTION

« The European Commission, in response to the governance failures that came to light in the credit crisis, is considering fundamental changes to European governance systems. As a step towards that goal, the EU has put forward a series of questions that examine essential aspects of governance, that is, what it involves, who it applies to and how it can be enforced. Whether these are the only or best questions that can be asked in this context is not the issue in this article, but rather, we see addressing them as an opportunity to bring to the reader the latest in governance research, as well as lessons from experience with the governance regimes in other regions, notably Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

This article is authored by a working group of academics and practitioners, with expertise in governance and various sub-governance domains. Members of the group have advised and worked with boards, regulators and companies that have become recognized for their leading governance practices. It is these experiences and the literature upon which we also draw.

Twenty-three of the 25 questions have been addressed below. Each question appears, followed by our group’s response. Two of the questions (questions 13 and 16) were not addressed owing to the time constraints of the submission (which was due on 22 July 2011) and the group felt that it did not possess all of the requisite expertise.

At the outset, the European Commission should be congratulated for establishing a high-level governance forum for discussions and debates and for the exchange of experiences. The need for a clear road map through the shifting and confusing terrain of corporate governance is very compelling. In a global marketplace, the solutions and recommendations championed in Europe will have a profound effect on governance standards in Canada and elsewhere.

In this article, the authors address in detail the need for improved governance in the areas articulated by the EU. First we consider the need for similar or different standards for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and unlisted companies. Then we focus on board recruitment, diversity and ways to improve the effectiveness of individual directors and boards. The critical area of governance over remuneration is then subject to our analysis, and we then assess ways to improve the board’s role in the governance of risk, of asset managers and of proxy advisors. Ensuring adequate shareholder engagement is next addressed, as well as minority shareholder interests. Lastly, we make recommendations for improvements in the implementation and monitoring of governance codes ».

Background: Canadian corporate governance practices

« We believe that Canada is a leader in corporate governance practices and, given that our group members are primarily Canadian, we draw on many of the initiatives here to frame our response to the EU deliberations. We also draw on global developments, including those in the United Kingdom and United States.

Canada has adopted the Anglo-American, unitary model of corporate governance. Our companies, however, operate within different ownership structures, legal and linguistic dualities, geographic diversity, and a decentralized regulatory regime of 13 provinces and territories. We have companies that are state-owned, family, significant shareholder, small and medium-sized listed, as well as widely held, not dissimilar to the diverse plurality and tapestry within the European Union.

Canada has had formal corporate governance guidelines in place since 1994 (Dey et al, ‘Where were the Directors?’) within a flexible ‘comply or explain’ approach. There has been time to digest and assess a continuously evolving corporate governance landscape, as companies and boards adopt guidelines and practices to suit the foregoing diverse circumstances, in a flexible manner.

The Canadian corporate governance guidelines, most recently revised in 2005 (Canadian Securities Administrators, 2005), have been adopted and adapted by companies within the listed sector, and through osmosis and other best practices, within private, governmental and not-for-profit sectors as well. It is upon this experience that we also draw for our responses ».

Rappel : Qu’est-ce qu’un code de gouvernance ? Un exemple


Depuis quelque jours, je constate que plusieurs personnes se questionnent sur les propriétés d’un code de gouvernance. Voici, à titre d’exemple, la table des matières du code de gouvernance des entreprises UK. Je vous encourage fortement à prendre connaissance de ce court document car, à mon avis, c’est l’énoncé le plus clair des principes de gouvernance qui existe.

Governance and the Code 1
Preface 2-3
Comply or Explain 4-5
The Main Principles of the Code 6-7
Section A: Leadership 9-11
Section B: Effectiveness 12-17
Section C: Accountability 18-21
Section D: Remuneration 22-24
Section E: Relations with Shareholders 25-26

Schedule A: The design of performance-related remuneration
for executive directors 27
Schedule B: Disclosure of corporate governance arrangements 28-35

Voir le document au complet :

The UK Corporate Governance Code

Voir également le règlement de l’AMF concernant les directives relatives à la gouvernance :

L’instruction générale 58-201 relative à la gouvernance

Boardroom News | Directorship | Boardroom Intelligence


Excellent guide de l’actualité en gouvernance dans le monde

Application suédoise du principe « comply or explain »


Voici un bref document explicatif de Per Lekvall, membre du Swedish Corporate Governance Board, sur le modèle d’application du « comply or explain » à l’échelle suédoise. L’expérience suédoise en la matière est intéressante à plusieurs égards, notamment parce que l’on peut en évaluer les effets sur plusieurs années. Ce document a été transmis par ecoDa – The European Confederation of Directors’ Associations http://www.ecoda.org/ , association à laquelle le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés adhère.

Après une brève introduction, M. Lekvall explique comment le code suédois est appliqué et quels sont les résultats sur une périodes de 6 ans.

The Swedish Corporate Governance Code, based on the comply-or-explain principle, was introduced 1 July 2005 for the about 100 largest companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Three years later, 1 July 2008, the requirement to apply the Code was widened to include all companies listed on a regulated market in Sweden, currently around 260 companies. Having initially been considerably questioned, after only a few years the Code became well accepted by the companies and is now generally seen as an integral part of the corporate governance regulatory system in Sweden. It is administered entirely within the Swedish business sector self-regulation framework, which has a long tradition as a complementary regulation to law and other statutory regulation in Sweden.

The system for managing, implementing and monitoring the Code is in short as follows:

The Swedish Corporate Governance Board is responsible for defining the Code and for keeping it up-to-date with regard to new developments in the field in Sweden and internationally. To this end, the Board annually follows up how the companies’ use the Code, but only as a means to analyze its functioning, not to supervise how individual companies apply the Code.

This duty instead rests with the two regulated markets in Sweden, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and NGM Equity. This is based on the fact that all companies listed on these exchanges are contractually obliged to apply the Code. The exchanges monitor the adequate application of the Code by their member companies on an individual basis according to a certain procedure, with the possibility to report unsatisfactory application, should a company refuse to respond properly to questions about this, to their respective Disciplinary Committees. Theses, in turn, have an arsenal of increasingly severe sanctions at their disposal, none of which, however, knowingly have been used so far.

Still the stock exchanges only monitor that companies apply the Code properly, not whether the corporate governance behavior they report is satisfactory or not from an investment point of view. This is entirely left to the capital market, i.e. the shareholders and their advisors and intermediaries, to decide on and act upon accordingly.

Hence the Swedish system can be described as strict on the requirement to apply the Code but relatively soft on obligations to comply with individual Code rules. The aim of the Swedish Corporate Governance Board is that all listed companies should apply the Code properly, but      not that all companies must comply with all its rules all the time. On the contrary, the Board encourages companies to use the Code with the flexibility intended with the comply-or-explain mechanism and would, in fact, be concerned if all companies would comply with all rules in the Code. Such a situation would indicate that the Code is not ambitious enough.

Nevertheless, Swedish listed companies are quite compliant to the Code, as shown by the latest follow-up numbers (referring to the reporting year 2010):  50% of the companies reported no case of non-compliance and another 39% reported non-compliance to a single Code rule adding up to almost 90% of the companies reporting no or at most one case of non-compliance. These numbers have been more or less the same over the last three years.

The Board considers these results slightly on the high side in terms of compliance. On the other hand they show that the companies find the Code relevant and can apply it without much trouble.

Another crucial issue of code application is the quality of the explanations given in terms of their information value to the capital market. This has been followed up annually since the introduction of the Code through a fixed methodology each year, thus ensuring a reasonable degree of consistency over time. (The methodology was also to some extent “validated” in the RiskMetrics study of code monitoring and enforcement practices in the EU some years ago, which reported results for Sweden very close to those produced by our method.)

According to this methodology all explanations reported each year are classified according to their information value to the market (not whether they are considered satisfactory or not from an investment point of view) into one of the categories Good, Acceptable and Unsatisfactory/Non-existent. The key issue here is the share of Unsatisfactory/Non-existent explanations, which has developed as follows since the introduction of the Code:

          2005          2006            2007          2008            2009            2010

          28%           23%             15%           27%             29%             15%

The interesting thing with this series is that it demonstrates, first, a learning curve of successive improvement 2005– 2007, during which time only the Large-Cap companies were obliged to apply the Code, then a bounce back up when the Code application was broadened to include all listed companies, and finally a second phase of  downwards learning curve leading back to the 15% level.

The significant drop in 2010 no doubt also has to do with an important change of the Code imposed this year, whereby companies were obliged not only to motivate any case of non-compliance but also to describe the solution they had chosen in lieu of what the Code prescribes. This simple measure has significantly improved the information value of the explanations.

Even though this later development is encouraging, the Board is not satisfied with a situation where about 15% of the explanations are non-existent or not deemed informative enough to the capital market. In principle a “zero tolerance vision” should be applied (although it may in practice be difficult to reach this level entirely). Therefore the Board is currently considering further measures to decrease the number of unsatisfactory explanations.

 

Board Focus 2012 : Issues and Developments


Excellent article du The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation qui présente une revue de l’année 2011 en gouvernance et discute des perspectives pour 2012. À lire.

chapeau

Board Focus 2012 : Issues and Developments

Governance developments in 2011 brought some good news. Shareholder governance proposals were at their lowest level since 2002. Support declined for controversial proposals, such as shareholders’ right to call special meetings or act by written consent, and ISS conceded that its recommendations about written consent proposals should reflect the company’s governance as a whole. Even say-on-pay voting had some worthwhile effects. It gave shareholders the means to express more targeted dissatisfaction, driving a decline in opposition to director incumbents, and it prompted more and better dialogue between many companies and their major shareholders and better disclosure about the business rationale for pay decisions.

Changement dans les pratiques de gouvernance de RIM


Article intéressant, paru dans Financialpost.com, qui montre l’ampleur des pressions exercée par les parties prenantes au Canada afin d’amener des modifications aux pratiques de gouvernance de RIM, notamment la séparation des pouvoirs entre le président du conseil et le PDG.

Changement dans les pratiques de gouvernance de RIM

« According to the report, RIM was forced to choose between the wishes of Canadian shareholders and organizations which “strongly prefer, if not demand” that RIM appoint an independent chairman, separate from the chief executive role, to lead the company’s board of directors, and the business practices of American companies.

While the majority of the TSX 60 and TSX Composite companies divide the roles of chair of the board and CEO, in the U.S., the majority of the largest publicly traded U.S. companies and those firms that make up the S&P 500 do not split the roles of chair and CEO, forgoing independent chairs.

Faced with this schism, the Committee came to the point of view that the strong opposition to non-independent chairs in Canada should outweigh the other considerations, including current practice in the United States and in RIM’s ecosystem, the report states ».

 

Newsletter de l’Institut français des administrateurs (IFA) de janvier 2012


 

Découvrez la lettre de liaison mensuelle adressée aux adhérents de l’IFA, le partenaire français du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS).

Newsletter de l’IFA : édition de janvier 2012 (11/01/2012)

Cette publication électronique mensuelle au format pdf téléchargeable via le site internet a pour objectif de faciliter l’accès aux informations-clés sur les activités de l’IFA pour tous les adhérents : l’agenda des prochains évènements et séminaires, les activités en région, les actualités de la gouvernance, les dernières publications et les principaux services disponibles.

Elle complète les informations que vous pouviez recevoir au quotidien par email ou trouver dans le magazine administrateur – La lettre de l’IFA.