Boardroom Burnout !


Voici un résumé des recommandations présentées par Kaye O’Leary dans innovationexcellence.com pour éviter de surcharger les membres de conseils d’administration.

Boardroom Burnout !

Practical tips from board members on how to avoid wearing-out your directors!

« The challenge:  It’s no secret that there are an increasing number of demands on boards.  Directors are expected to keep abreast of the organization’s business model, performance, strategic challenges and risk environment, understand the industry, understand the legislative environment, be knowledgeable of and ensure compliance with regulatory and reporting requirements and changes, evaluate the CEO and board’s performance, has a compliant and effective compensation program, be current on applicable accounting rules and ensure that the organization has a solid succession plan and effective culture.

Tip 1:  Don’t waste precious meeting time presenting information that was distributed in the board materials

Effective Board Suggestion: Skip the presentations of the information that was distributed and move directly to questions on the material distributed.  (PS – make sure you get your materials out well in advance of the meeting!  Do not distribute materials on a Friday afternoon for a Tuesday board meeting; board members do not enjoy spending their weekend reading board materials.)

Tip 2:  Utilize Committees Effectively

Effective Board Suggestion: Rely on your committees and avoid repeating the committee work with the full board.

Tip 3:  Annually Assess the Work of the Board

Effective Board Suggestion: As part of your annual board assessment process, take the time to review how the board spends its time vs. the organization’s strategic priorities.  Is your board focused on your strategic priorities? Do you have special purpose committees that are no longer relevant?  Are there things your board can stop doing?   Review the materials you are sending out in your board book.  If you send it, you are obliging your board members to read the material; don’t send 60 pages of financial information if 15 pages will suffice ».

Où sont les femmes dans la direction des organisations?


Voici les résultats d’une étude réalisée par la Chaire Claire-Bonenfant – Femmes, Savoirs et Sociétés de l’Université Laval, sous la direction de la professeure Hélène Lee-Gosselin : Où sont les femmes dans la direction des organisations?

Pour les femmes qui souhaitent accéder à des postes de haute direction, la compétence et la performance, voire la volonté et l’ambition, ne suffisent pas toujours pour être reconnues et promues. Certains éléments du contexte organisationnel, tels que la sensibilité de l’organisation à la réalité des femmes, l’existence d’un lien entre l’employée et un membre du réseau des personnes influentes dans l’organisation, l’encouragement et le soutien offerts tout au long du cheminement professionnel ou l’émergence d’opportunités liées à une restructuration, à des projets spéciaux ou à de nouvelles activités, s’avèrent souvent déterminants. L’ascension professionnelle est donc bien souvent le résultat d’une combinaison de facteurs individuels et organisationnels auxquels s’ajoute la présence de circonstances favorables.

Comment améliorer la gestion d’un conseil d’administration d’OBNL ?


Article intéressant de Richard Leblanc, paru dans Canadian Business qui propose plusieurs moyens visant l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’admistration d’OBNL. À la liste présentée, j’ajouterais l’importance de choisir un solide leader comme président du conseil.




Comment améliorer un conseil d’administration d’OBNL ?

 

Not-for-profit organizations are among the most important in our economy—some are hospitals, while others are schools, universities or charities. Many are large, complex organizations with multiple moving parts and interdependent stakeholders. They are tough to lead and govern, but must be as effectively led as for-profits. They require CEOs, directors and staff who are at the top of their game and willing to make the necessary commitment.

Le système de gouvernance à BP : un exemple à suivre !


Voici une référence au site de BP qui décrit en détail le système de gouvernance en vigueur. La présentation du rapport est impeccable et le cadre conceptuel pourrait servir d’exemple à beaucoup d’organisations. Pourtant les difficultés rencontrées par l’entreprise ont été, et sont encore, énormes… Sans cet appareillage de gouvernance, l’entreprise aurait-elle pu affronter la crise du Golfe du Mexique ? Pas sûr !

Le système de gouvernance à BP

Il faut cependant ajouter qu’un bon système de gouvernance ne sera efficace que si la culture organisationnelle et le système de rémunération encouragent des comportement appropriés. BP a un excellent système de gouvernance, sur papier, mais il faut également que la direction et le C.A. aient un sens aigu de l’éthique pour « bien gouverner » (Tone at the Top). La culture a-t-elle évoluée depuis cette crise… Pas sûr non plus !

Mon propos n’est certainement pas de faire le procès de BP car je ne sais pas quelles sont les leçons que l’entreprise a tirées de cette catastrophe et de la gestion de la crise. Je référe à BP parce que je crois y retrouver un très bon exemple de cadre conceptuel en gouvernance. Mais, bien sûr, cela ne garantit absolument pas que l’organisation possède la culture requise pour se comporter en bon citoyen corporatif.

Les conclusions du rapport sur la crise du Golfe du Mexique présentées au Président Obama mentionnent justement ces éléments : “ The disaster can be attributed to an organizational culture and incentives that encourage cost cutting and cutting corners that rewarded workers for doing it faster and cheaper but not better”.  Food for thought.

Gouvernance des sociétés : de nombreux défis pour les conseils d’administration en 2012


Excellent article par Brendan Sheehan dans Boardmember.com qui présente les perspectives nouvelles qui s’offrent aux C.A. et aux hauts dirigeants des sociétés cotées en bourse en 2012. De nombreux défis attendent les administrateurs en réponse aux demandes pressantes de groupes d’actionnaires « activistes » , notamment  l’Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Je vous encourage à lire l’article au complet mais voici un court extrait :

telescope

Gouvernance des sociétés : de nombreux défis pour les conseils d’administration en 2012

« The failure of prominent companies, ongoing scandals, and the stubbornly persistent financial crisis have dramatically changed the landscape for managements and directors at U.S. public companies and provided new vigor to activist shareholders and governance commentators. For boards of directors, keeping track of the latest reforms and ensuring the company is fully compliant has become an even more complicated puzzle.

Many of the post-Enron reforms have concentrated on enhancing transparency and boosting disclosure in proxy statements and other corporate filings. The end result is while shareholders have greater insight into the companies they own, they also now demand a louder voice in the way companies are being managed and directed, even down to who gets hired and how much they get paid. This, in turn, has led to what many observers have characterized as the pendulum swinging too far to one side, creating a need for balance.

In the meantime, with activists gaining broader access to corporate boards and with disclosure policies constantly expanding, directors and management are becoming increasingly more concerned about what shareholders think. This time of year, that interest manifests itself in trying to figure out what is going to happen during proxy season. How are people going to vote? What will be the hot-button issues? Where will the surprises come from?

As with most things, in order to predict the future it can be instructive to look at the past. An examination of recent voting results and proposal activity reveals that, despite all the talk about the shifting focus of activists, the same proposals that surface every year continue to dominate the voting agenda. Majority voting dominated the proposals, as it has in the last four or five years, followed by the repeal of classified board structure, rights to call special meetings, and rights to act by written consent. These four areas have been among the most prevalent proposal topics for many years, and companies generally understand how to address the surrounding issues. Compensation-related proposals were strongly featured as well, and are likely to be the main focus in 2012.

That being said, several new disclosure rules were enacted in late 2010 and during 2011 that, as investors have time to examine the disclosures and get comfortable with them, could spark an increase in activity. In short, most experts feel that investors will start to move away from simple issues like board structure and poison pills and engage with boards on more complicated—and possibly more important—risk- and performance-related issues ».

ISS publie son « Board Practice Report – 2012 »


L’étude du ISS présente les perspectives qui s’offrent aux conseils d’administration en 2012. Très intéressant de connaître le point de vue d’une organisation « activiste ».

ISS Releases 2012 U.S. Board Practices Study

A decade ago, more than 60 percent of S&P 500 companies had staggered board terms, and plurality voting in director elections was widely accepted. Today, two-thirds of S&P 500 firms have declassified boards and nearly 80 percent of these companies have adopted majority voting provisions, as many boards have heeded shareholder votes for these reforms.

As one might expect, the prevalence of majority voting and declassified boards is higher at large-cap companies, which are subject to more public scrutiny and generally have greater institutional ownership. However, there are some practices, such as independent board chairs, that remain more common at small and mid-cap firms. Directors on a typical S&P 500 board tend to be more independent, more diverse, and slightly older on average than at smaller-cap companies.

These are among the findings in ISS’ annual Board Practices study, which examines director elections, board and director independence, and board diversity, among other factors, at S&P 1500 firms. This year’s report, which analyzes board practices and characteristics based on index, includes data as of June 30, 2011, from 1,461 companies and 13,760 individual board seats in the S&P 500, the MidCap S&P 400, and the SmallCap S&P 600.

Here are some of the key findings from the 2012 edition of Board Practices: The Structure of Boards at S&P 1500 Companies:

L’internationalisation des conseils d’administration : Une tendance lourde en gouvernance !


Voici un résumé du Global Board Index report de la firme Egon Zehnder International qui montre que les entreprises qui opèrent à un niveau global ont avantage à mettre beaucoup d’énergie dans la constitution d’un Board international, un Board qui reflète le niveau d’activité international de la société.
 
 

There is a compelling argument to be made for greater international representation on boards. But, if that is the case, why aren’t boards doing more to close the gap between their global aspirations and the international directors who represent such an apparent advantage? The answer is that while these directors can provide great value to boards and their companies, identifying and attracting them is a difficult and daunting process. It can be done,

Based on anecdotal evidence from our client work and broader observations about global companies and their boards, we have long believed that global boards can be a valuable resource to companies pursuing a global strategy. We set out to quantify the current state of the “globalness” of boards of large companies, beyond what we experience day-to-day with our clients, and to determine if and how board composition links to business success. 

The results of the study confirmed our belief that there is a gap between companies’ global activity and longer-term plans, on the one hand, and the board resources that help to shape and guide that strategy, on the other. The troubling news is that this gap is large. The good news is that once companies are aware of the extent of the gap between their global strategy and their director resources, they can work toward closing it. In light of the positive correlation we are seeing between companies that perform better on key business metrics and those with international representation on their boards, we suspect many companies will take steps to ameliorate this deficit on their boards.

Gouvernance et éthique – Gilles Paquet


Voici le résumé de l’allocution d’ouverture prononcée par Gilles Paquet, professeur émérite à l’École de Gestion et Senior Research Fellow au Centre d’études en gouvernance de l’Université d’Ottawa, à l’occasion du Congrès annuel de l’Ordre des Administrateurs Agréés du Québec le 24 janvier 2012.

Gouvernance et éthique – Conférence de Gilles Paquet aux Adm.A. 

« Ma présentation s’est construite autour de quatre mots (contexte, gouvernance, stewardship et éthique) et d’une argumentation en deux temps, à l’effet que l’on ne peut pas comprendre l’éthique sans comprendre la gouvernance, et que l’on ne peut pas demander moins à un professionnel que le professionnalisme – c’est-à-dire un comportement éthique à la hauteur des attentes beaucoup plus grandes qu’on a d’un professionnel que d’un citoyen ordinaire.

De là l’importance de bien comprendre que l’Ordre doit développer le professionnalisme de ses membres, et ne pas s’enliser dans un corporatisme défenseur d’intérêts mesquins qui ne pourraient que détruire la légitimité et la valeur ajoutée de l’Ordre au plan social. »

Pourquoi séparer les fonctions de président du conseil (PCA) et de président et chef de la direction (PDG) ?


Très bonnes réflexions d’Yvan Allaire sur le dogme de la séparation des rôles entre PCA et PDG. À lire sur le blogue Les Affaires .com.

Rien à rajouter à ce billet de l’expert en gouvernance qui , comme moi, cherche des réponses à plusieurs théories sur la gouvernance. Plus de recherches dans le domaine de la gouvernance serait grandement indiquées… Le CAS et la FSA de l’Université Laval mettront sur pied un programme de recherche dont le but est de répondre à ce type de questionnement.

Pourquoi séparer les fonctions de président du conseil (PCA) et de président et chef de la direction (PDG) ?

« Parmi les dogmes de la bonne gouvernance, la séparation des rôles du PCA et du PDG vient au deuxième rang immédiatement derrière « l’i1031_mgmnt_twojobs_630x420ndépendance absolue et inviolable » de la majorité des administrateurs. … Bien que les études empiriques aient grande difficulté à démontrer de façon irréfutable la valeur de ces deux dogmes, ceux-ci sont, semble-t-il, incontournables. Dans le cas de la séparation des rôles, le sujet a pris une certaine importance récemment chez Research in Motion ainsi que chez Air Transat. Le compromis d’un administrateur en chef (lead director) pour compenser pour le fait que le PCA et le PDG soit la même personne ne satisfait plus; le dogme demande que le président du conseil soit indépendant de la direction ».

Comment la mondialisation affecte-t-elle la rémunération des hauts dirigeants ?


Très bon article paru dans Slate qui discute de l’influence de la globalisation des marchés sur la rémunération des CEO.  Peu ou pas du tout d’effet … Voici un extrait de l’article :

Comment la mondialisation affecte-t-elle la rémunération des hauts dirigeants ?

The global war for talent is a popular justification for exorbitant chief executive pay. But with few exceptions, expatriate chiefs are a tiny minority at most major publicly traded corporations. It’s bad news for shareholders, especially in high-pay hubs, who could find better-value stewards overseas.

« Multinationals are constantly in search of cheaper workers. The one exception appears to be the most expensive staff of all, in the boardroom. Particularly in the United States and Britain, boards have shown little desire to get the maximum bang for their buck by insisting companies cast wider recruitment nets. Anglo-American companies continue to tolerate steep rises in pay at the top that far exceed returns.

In 2010, compensation for the head honchos at American and British companies climbed 36 percent and 43 percent, respectively, dwarfing shareholder returns of around 15 percent, according to research firms GMI and Incomes Data Services. As recently as 1993, U.S. corporate bosses were paid some 130 times more than the average worker. Now they command about 350 times more, according to Duke University economist Dan Ariely.

A big plank of the defense has been globalization. Since the brightest CEOs can take their pick of posts across the globe, or so the argument goes, shareholders should not be surprised by astronomic remuneration – a point recently made by the Corporation of London’s policy chief. This oft-repeated excuse for overcharging shareholders is seldom backed up with evidence ».

Gouvernance exemplaire à Facebook ?


Les préoccupations de gouvernance, de protection des droits des actionnaires passent au deuxième plan dans le cas d’entreprises à succès telles que Google, LinkedIn et Facebook. Sommes-nous face à un nouveau modèle de gouvernance qui s’adresse à des propriétaires-dirigeants d’entreprises à succès ou sommes-nous en voie de prendre des risques inconsidérés qui portent préjudices aux actionnaires et aux parties prenantes ? Voici un article publié par John Plender dans le Financial Times (FT.com Blogs) du 26 février 2012.

Gouvernance exemplaire à Facebook ?

Voici deux courts extraits de l’article :

« Not so long ago, a debate raged about whether there was any real evidence that good governance contributed to strong corporate performance. It seemed to me pretty academic, given the palpable damage bad governance had inflicted on shareholders at such disaster zones as Enron and the Robert Maxwell empire.

The protection for investors against that age-old governance problem, the over-dominant CEO, is non-existent. If there is a novelty here, it is that the potentially over-dominant executive is just 27 years old and has created a company that will be valued in tens of billions on flotation. And, indeed, none of this is to denigrate the achievement of Mr Zuckerberg. It would, after all, be unusual for someone of his age to have grasped the advantages for himself, as well as for shareholders, of a strong governance framework. And in today’s heady market the IPO will, I suspect, be a big success ».

Comment les médias sociaux inflencent-ils la gouvernance des sociétés ?


Voici un article publié dans la section Innovations du Washington Post qui montre l’influence grandissante des médias sociaux sur la gouvernance des entreprises. L’auteur met en évidence la relation entre une plus grande utilisation des médias sociaux et la tendance des entreprises à accoder plus d’importance aux questions de développement durable et de responsabilités sociales.

Social media is the new boardroom

While many of the world’s largest businesses are genuinely making their operations more socially responsible, and a growing number of political leaders are also getting on board, the banking and finance sector lags behind. The biggest risk posed to economic recovery is if that sector remains trapped in the old model that prioritizes irresponsible risk-taking to drive annual bonuses over genuine, long-term, sustainable profit and value-creation.

Wall Street should get on board because appealing to young people’s sense of social responsibility is also where competitive advantage lies. A 2010 report from Accenture found that the top 50 most sustainable companies (taken from a cross industry group of 275 companies from the Fortune Global 1,000) outperformed shareholder return of the bottom fifty by 16 percentage points over three years and by 38 percentage points over five years.

I believe the banking and finance sector will catch up. CSR has been taken out of the silo and put in the P&L statement thanks to the revolution in communications that has empowered ordinary people to sanction those who don’t behave the way they want them to. The most successful businesses of the next decade will be the most socially responsible. They will reap huge benefits from the power of social media, as employees, shareholders and consumers become passionate advocates for their brands and businesses. And the most talented young people will want to work for them.

 

Comment s’assurer que le processus de relève du CEO est efficace ?


Voici un article très pertinent, publié dans talentmgt.com, qui met l’accent sur trois actions clés à entreprendre pour assurer la relève de la haute direction. Le conseil d’administration a un rôle crucial à jouer dans ce processus.

A successful CEO transition requires a collaborative partnership between boards and CEOs and acknowledgement of the complex dynamics involved. The last 18 months have seen a series of high-profile CEO succession stories. Since every organization deals with it at some point, it’s interesting that many companies continue to bungle the process, especially when getting it wrong can be costly.

Succession missteps pose a serious threat to business performance, and ultimately to shareholder value. They can lead to a leadership vacuum, interruptions in decision making and business processes, and the loss of stakeholder confidence. Potential successors can become so focused on the race — who is winning or losing the succession battle — that they lose sight of managing performance. Candidates who are passed over for the top post may leave abruptly, depleting the talent pool and making it harder to manage the leadership change. And competitors that sense weakness may launch an offensive to win over customers, poach talent or even attempt a takeover.

Amélioration de l’information annuelle des OBNL


Vous trouverez, ci-joint, un extrait de la préface d’un important document publié par le Conseil canadien de l’information sur la performance de l’ICCA. C’est un guide d’une grande pertinence pour les dirigeants et membres de conseils d’administration d’OBNL.

Amélioration de l’information annuelle des organismes sans but lucratif

L’information publiée par les organismes sans but lucratif suscite de plus en plus d’intérêt. Le présent document, intitulé Amélioration de l’information annuelle des organismes sans but lucratif et publié par l’Institut Canadien des Comptables Agréés (ICCA), a été élaboré par un groupe de travail réunissant des représentants d’organismes sans but lucratif qui ont été invités à faire part de leurs points de vue au Conseil canadien de l’information sur la performance de l’ICCA.

Le présent guide vise à aider les hauts dirigeants et les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif à préparer des rapports annuels de qualité qui renforcent la reddition de comptes et fournissent une information utile aux parties prenantes. Les petites organisations dont les ressources sont limitées pourront envisager d’échelonner la mise en oeuvre des présentes indications sur un certain nombre d’années. Par ailleurs, bien que ces indications visent les petits et moyens organismes sans but lucratif, elles peuvent également présenter un intérêt pour les entités de plus grande taille. Les organismes publics qui appliquent les PCGR pour les organismes sans but lucratif, y compris ceux du secteur «HUCE» (hôpitaux, universités, collèges et écoles), devraient se reporter aux dispositions des énoncés de pratiques recommandées du Conseil sur la comptabilité dans le secteur public.

Succès et/ou échecs dans la planification de la relève du CEO !


Excellent article, paru dans bworldonline.com, sur les difficultés inhérentes à l’activité de planification de la relève. Le C.A., notamment le président du conseil et le président du comité des ressources humaines, doivent suivre attentivement le processus car rien n’est moins évident pour un CEO que de réussir à passer le relais à une autre personne désignée, longtemps d’avance. Un article à lire avec l’esprit bien ouvert.

 Success and succession

« It seems that the more successful a company is in terms of growth and profitability, the less concerned it is in looking for a replacement for the CEO responsible for talent management and business strategy. This holds true even for aging leaders already prone to repeat the same stories in one meeting. Is succession a dirty word for the one being succeeded.

Identifying a specific individual to take one’s place, even if he is already the clear number two, invites risks for the incumbent as an impatient deputy may already be assembling his own management team, not necessarily other successors ».

 

Rémunération de la direction – Le point de vue anglais (UK)


Excellent article partagé par Richard Leblanc et publié le 20 février par Carter McNamara dans Blog : Boards of Directors

Executive Remuneration – A View from the UK | Boards of Directors

In recent years, executive remuneration has moved from its traditional ambit of corporate governance circles and company secretary forums to the public eye. In the UK, the last six months, has seen a particular focus on what many in the media see as ‘excessive executive pay’.

The UK government is currently consulting on most of these but the framework is clear enough and I suspect the similar measures will be adopted in many other Western countries to the extent they haven’t already.

Voici un résumé, en anglais, des mesures proposées au UK concernant la rémunération des hauts dirigeants (pour plus de détails, lire l’article)

1.       Greater transparency over remuneration reports

2.       Forward looking binding vote on pay policy

3.       Backward looking advisory vote on pay policy

4.       Director’s notice periods greater than one year

5.       Exit payments

6.       Ban on Executives servicing on Remuneration Committees

7.       Remuneration Consultants

8.       Clawback provisions

Oeuvrer sur des C.A. d’OBNL : Excellent apprentissage à des postes de direction de sociétés !


Voici un excellent article publié par Alice Korngold dans Huffington Post Canada qui montre éloquemment que s’investir dans des C.A. d’organisations à but non lucratif est une excellente préparation à des postes de direction de sociétés.

Cinq raisons qui expliquent pourquoi certains C.A. d’OBNL ont des problèmes d’efficacité


Voici cinq raisons qui expliquent pourquoi certains C.A. d’OBNL ont des problèmes d’efficacité … et quelques suggestions pour y remédier.

Have you ever sat down at a board meeting and realized that no one was excited to be there? There could be several reasons for that. Maybe it was the end of a long day for everyone. Maybe they ate too much for dinner and are tired. Or maybe, just maybe, it’s something you can do something about. Maybe there’s something that simply got sidetracked somewhere along the way that you can do something to remedy.

Group Think. Have you seen the studies that sent people out on the street to ask for help? An interesting situation unfolded. If there were just one or two people on the street, typically one of them would see what they could do to help. However if there were more than 2 or 3 people on the street, everyone appeared to wait to see if someone else would do something. In fact, in many cases, no one ended up doing anything. This situation often occurs in the nonprofit board room. Everyone is waiting to see what everyone else will do. One thing to try? Bring in an outside expert to provide a critical analysis of the situation. another option is to assign someone the role of the ‘devil’s advocate.’

Wrong People. When you were recruiting your board, did you ask them to be a part as a favor to you? Or did you ask them because you thought they couldn’t say no to you? If you have the wrong people and the wrong skill sets represented, take a step back, identify what your goals for the board are, and identify the skills you need to accomplish that. Then look out in the community and seek out people who are well known and who are passionate about your cause.

Unclear Expectations. When recruiting board members it is tempting to minimize the commitment that will be required of members. The right people will still want to be a part, and the people who are only trying to fill their resume will shy away. Having clear expectation will help ensure you are recruiting the right people.

No Accountability. Our board members are busy people and its easy for things to slip their mind. Generally speaking, they appreciate check-in and reminder calls. Don’t rely on emails for this. Just pick up the phone and call – or ask another board member to make that call. This idea has taken root and resulted in forward movement more than any other with the organizations I have worked with. Waiting a month until the next board meeting to bring something up again only results in things being delayed – or sidetracked permanently.

Magical’ Thinking. Growing up near a major tourist destination in Orlando Florida and having a mom who worked as a chaplain in the local emergency room opened my eyes to this phenomenon early. We would hear stories of people doing things that they wouldn’t do under normal situations. Something about pixie dust perhaps. But sometimes, in the nonprofit world, we have our own kind of pixie dust. It makes us think that nothing bad can come to the organization we work with and that things will fix themselves. We must be proactive and not fall into this trap.

5 Reasons Nonprofit Boards Stall – and What You Can Do About It

Quelles autres raisons peuvent amener les C.A. d’OBNL à tourner en rond et, selon votre expérience, que pouvez faire pour éviter les dysfonctionnements ?

La règle du « comply or explain » est-elle efficacement appliquée?


Voici un très court article paru dans guardian.co.uk qui explique les mécanismes du Comply or Explain et qui montre que la règle semble être appliquée avec beaucoup de succès, du moins dans le FTSE 350. À lire pour mieux comprendre cette règle de gouvernance qui tend à se généraliser.
 

The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) reckons it does, citing research showing 96% of FTSE 350 companies comply with corporate governance codes.

The basic tenet of the corporate governance rules that have been nurtured since the early 1990s revolve around the idea of « comply or explain ». A company should comply with the code – for instance not having the same person acting as chairman or chief executive – but can get away with it if they are able to explain their actions convincingly to shareholders.

 

Pratique de gouvernance canadiennes – réponses aux questions de l’EU


Voici le résumé d’un chapitre de volume publié dans International Journal of Disclosure and Governance (2012) par plusieurs auteurs canadiens dont Richard Leblanc. J’ai pensé que l’introduction au chapitre saurait vous inciter à lire le document au complet. Bonne lecture.

« The European Commission has put forward an interesting set of questions about how to improve corporate governance, within its ‘Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance Framework’ (Green Paper, 2011). The following provides analysis and the responses by a working group of authors in Canada to these questions based on the experience and research of the group (academics and practitioners) and the relevant literature ».

Pratiques de gouvernance canadiennes – réponses aux questions de l’EU

INTRODUCTION

« The European Commission, in response to the governance failures that came to light in the credit crisis, is considering fundamental changes to European governance systems. As a step towards that goal, the EU has put forward a series of questions that examine essential aspects of governance, that is, what it involves, who it applies to and how it can be enforced. Whether these are the only or best questions that can be asked in this context is not the issue in this article, but rather, we see addressing them as an opportunity to bring to the reader the latest in governance research, as well as lessons from experience with the governance regimes in other regions, notably Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

This article is authored by a working group of academics and practitioners, with expertise in governance and various sub-governance domains. Members of the group have advised and worked with boards, regulators and companies that have become recognized for their leading governance practices. It is these experiences and the literature upon which we also draw.

Twenty-three of the 25 questions have been addressed below. Each question appears, followed by our group’s response. Two of the questions (questions 13 and 16) were not addressed owing to the time constraints of the submission (which was due on 22 July 2011) and the group felt that it did not possess all of the requisite expertise.

At the outset, the European Commission should be congratulated for establishing a high-level governance forum for discussions and debates and for the exchange of experiences. The need for a clear road map through the shifting and confusing terrain of corporate governance is very compelling. In a global marketplace, the solutions and recommendations championed in Europe will have a profound effect on governance standards in Canada and elsewhere.

In this article, the authors address in detail the need for improved governance in the areas articulated by the EU. First we consider the need for similar or different standards for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and unlisted companies. Then we focus on board recruitment, diversity and ways to improve the effectiveness of individual directors and boards. The critical area of governance over remuneration is then subject to our analysis, and we then assess ways to improve the board’s role in the governance of risk, of asset managers and of proxy advisors. Ensuring adequate shareholder engagement is next addressed, as well as minority shareholder interests. Lastly, we make recommendations for improvements in the implementation and monitoring of governance codes ».

Background: Canadian corporate governance practices

« We believe that Canada is a leader in corporate governance practices and, given that our group members are primarily Canadian, we draw on many of the initiatives here to frame our response to the EU deliberations. We also draw on global developments, including those in the United Kingdom and United States.

Canada has adopted the Anglo-American, unitary model of corporate governance. Our companies, however, operate within different ownership structures, legal and linguistic dualities, geographic diversity, and a decentralized regulatory regime of 13 provinces and territories. We have companies that are state-owned, family, significant shareholder, small and medium-sized listed, as well as widely held, not dissimilar to the diverse plurality and tapestry within the European Union.

Canada has had formal corporate governance guidelines in place since 1994 (Dey et al, ‘Where were the Directors?’) within a flexible ‘comply or explain’ approach. There has been time to digest and assess a continuously evolving corporate governance landscape, as companies and boards adopt guidelines and practices to suit the foregoing diverse circumstances, in a flexible manner.

The Canadian corporate governance guidelines, most recently revised in 2005 (Canadian Securities Administrators, 2005), have been adopted and adapted by companies within the listed sector, and through osmosis and other best practices, within private, governmental and not-for-profit sectors as well. It is upon this experience that we also draw for our responses ».