Le processus de destitution des administrateurs | The Process of Removing Directors


Voici un article très explicite publié sur le blogue de Richard Leblanc, concernant le statut des membres de conseils d’administration. Le point de vue avancé par Richard est que les actionnaires devraient avoir une voix plus prédominante sur le choix des administrateurs qui doivent rester sur le conseil.

Le processus de destitution des administrateurs | The Process of Removing Directors

 

« It’s very rare for a director to be removed from a board. Only 2% of directors who step down are dismissed or not reelected, according to Stanford researchers. Most directors get re-elected and continue serving. Some directors serve on boards for up to 25 years. About a year ago, I counted 30 directors who served on Canada’s five bank boards for more than nine years. Nine years is the upper limit for independence now in the U.K.

P1030704

A board does not have the power to remove another director, even if that director is performing poorly. If the director digs in and refuses to step down, that director must be replaced at the annual meeting. It is rare for shareholders to remove a director at the meeting if he or she is re-nominated. Only 93 directors failed to win majority support, out of a total universe of some 50,000, as of recent figures ».

L’indépendance des présidents de conseils d’administration (PCA) : Une qualité primordiale !


Pour débuter la deuxième année de mon blogue en gouvernance, je vous invite à lire cet excellent article publié sur le site de Blooberg.com. L’indépendance des présidents de conseils d’administration (PCA) est une règle et une pratique exemplaire de bonne gouvernance. Toutes les formations en gouvernance des sociétés énoncent cette règle comme étant cruciale. Pourtant, aux États-Unis, 80 % des entreprise du S&P 500 ont des PCA qui ne rencontrent pas les critères d’indépendance énoncés par les autorités règlementaires, contrairement au Canada ou au Royaume-Uni où , à la suite de pressions des autorités règlementaires et des investisseurs, une forte majorité des entreprises se sont données des PCA indépendants.  Que se passe-t-il au pays de la libre entreprise ? Qui a raison ? Y-a-t-il des avantages financiers et stratégiques à ne pas scinder les fonctions de président du conseil (PCA, Chairman) et de président et chef de la direction (PCD, CEO) ? L’article ci-joint est très clair à cet égard : c’est un énorme conflit d’intérêt … au moins potentiellement ! « We don’t let students grade their own exams, but we let CEOs chair their own boards ».  
 
 

« In the early 1990s, Adrian Cadbury, the former chairman of Cadbury Schweppes, led a committee that proposed reforms to improve governance and reassure the investor community after a series of high-profile scandals among British companies. One of the recommendations called for independent outside chairmen. Within a decade, most U.K. companies had adopted the recommendation due to pressure from regulators and investors.

Chairman
Chairman (Photo credit: k-ideas)

Separating the chairman and CEO roles has never been widely accepted in the U.S., where CEOs like to pile up titles and don’t like answering to someone else. Chief Executive magazine reported in June that 63 percent of CEOs said in a survey that they would recommend a combined role for their replacements, despite the concerns of shareholder groups. The Council of Institutional Investors, for example, calls dual roles “a fundamental conflict of interest.”

Votre entreprise est-elle préparée à prendre en compte les risques environnementaux et sociaux ? Et votre C.A. ?


Les actionnaires exercent de plus en plus de pressions sur les C.A. afin que ceux-ci prennent en compte les risques environnementaux et sociaux. Voici un article publié par E&Y qui fait un excellent résumé de la situation. À lire.

 

Aujourd’hui, c’est le premier anniversaire du blogue Gouvernance   |  Jacques Grisé et ce billet est le 365e de l’année, ce qui représente une moyenne d’une publication par jour. Je me propose de tenir le rythme pour les prochaines années.

 

Faites de mon blogue votre source d’information indispensable sur les activités et les actualités en gouvernance de sociétés. Merci.

 

English: Risk Management road sign
English: Risk Management road sign (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

 

« Shareholders are asking boards to mitigate risks tied to evolving regulations, shifting global weather patterns and heightened public awareness of climate change issues. Summary: Proposals from shareholders reveal that investors find their company’s social and environmental policies correlated with its risk management strategy — and ultimately its financial performance. We estimate that half of all shareholder resolutions in 2011 will center on social and environmental issues. »

 

Dix événements qui ont radicalement changé la gouvernance au cours des 10 dernières années


Il y a dix ans, on parlait très peu de gouvernance dans la profession d’administrateur et dans la formation en administration. Voici dix événements qui ont radicalement changé la manière de concevoir et de vivre la gouvernance au cours des 10 dernières années. C’est un article très intéressant et je vous incite fortement à le lire pour être à la fine pointe des connaissances en gouvernance. Ci-dessous les dix facteurs de changement incontournables présentés dans l’article publié dans Corporate Secretary.

Corporate Secretary

1. Sarbanes-Oxley 

2. The fall of Lehman Brothers

3. Dodd-Frank

4. Social media governance

5. Say on pay

6. Protecting whistleblowers

7. Corporate social responsibility

8. The rise of the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practice  Act (FCPA)  

9. Women on boards

10. Shareholder spring’ activism and protests

Ten events that have changed corporate governance

ENRON, The Play
ENRON, The Play (Photo credit: Scott Beale)

Ten years ago, corporate governance was still in the concept stage. There wasn’t much information available to the public about the way corporations were governed, and there were few regulations, websites or groups dealing with the topic on a daily basis. Over the years, however, the notion of good corporate governance has taken an interesting turn. After a string of corporate failures that crippled the economy, it has become clear that governance matters. So as Corporate Secretary celebrates its tenth anniversary as a publication, we take a look at ten significant events that have changed the face of corporate governance.

Should Proxy Advisory Firms Be Regulated ? Yes according to Richard Leblanc


IFP_KevinSellersWRK_2987
IFP_KevinSellersWRK_2987 (Photo credit: IntelFreePress)

Voici un billet paru sur le blogue de Richard Leblanc, Governance Gateway . L’auteur se dit favorable à cette éventalité. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Governance Gateway Blog » Should Proxy Advisory Firms Be Regulated? Yes. yorku.ca

 

« The Ontario Securities Commission has asked whether proxy advisory firms should be regulated. (Proxy advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis, which is owned by Ontario Teachers Pension Plan, provide governance assessment and recommendations to institutional shareholders on their voting at annual meetings of companies.) In my view, proxy advisory firms should be regulated for three important reasons.

Conflicts of Interest

Lack of Qualitative Assessment of Governance Quality and Predictive Validity on Shareholder Value

Lack of Transparency »

Tendances en matière de rémunération des hauts dirigeants en 2013 (Aon Hewitt)


Voici une présentation PTT issue d’un rapport de recherche de la firme Aon Hewitt partagé par Richard Leblanc dans LinkedIn. Ce document très important fait le point sur les réalisations de l’annéee 2011-2013 en matière de rémunération aux É.U. et présente les tendances anticipées pour 2013.

Bougainvillea
Bougainvillea (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

La présentation couvre essentiellement les sujets suivants : (1) Un état global de la situation (big picture), (2) Une mise à jour de la règlementation et des règles de gouvernance, (3) Les tendances en matière de rémunération, (4) Un aperçu des programmes de rémunération incitative à long terme. Bonne lecture !

 

 

http://www.aon.com/attachments/human-capital-consulting/2012_Executive_Compensation_Trends_July11Webinar_FINAL.pdf

Les administrateurs de sociétés doivent-ils « twitter » ?


Voici un article très intéressant sur le « twittage » (gazouillage) publié sur le blogue de Ann-Maree Moodie, Managing Director de The Boardroom Consulting Group. La question se pose de plus en plus et l’article montre que les administrateurs de sociétés sont sur leurs gardes à ce stade-ci, et avec raison !  Il faut apprendre à apprivoiser le média et on commence à voir plusieurs hauts dirigeants et administrateurs se lancer dans l’aventure.  Mais pas n’importe comment ! Pourquoi ? Lisez l’article pour vous former une opinion.

Boards and Governance

« He’s 63, well-educated, a former accountant-turned-bureaucrat, who has a portfolio of company, government and not-for-profit boards. We’re not meeting in a public place because the topics we’re discussing are sensitive. As a chairman, he’s seeking independent counsel; it’s understood the conversation is confidential. As we conclude our business, we joke about what would happen if we tweeted about the meeting. It’s immediately apparent that there is nothing that we could say even if we were remotely serious.

English: Jack Dorsey and Barack Obama at Twitt...
English: Jack Dorsey and Barack Obama at Twitter Town Hall in July 2011 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

“I’ve always thought of Twitter as a waste of time,” he says. “Now I realise that even if I simply tweeted, ‘having a coffee with Ann-Maree Moodie’, there would be a number of people who may surmise the reason for the meeting. So even for company directors just tweeting that you’re meeting with someone could be market-sensitive or could become material. It’s a game-changer.”

 

Comment réconcilier la conduite éthique et la rémunération ?


Richard Leblanc, dans Canadian Business, présente plusieurs moyens pour les conseils de réconcilier la rémunération des hauts dirigeants avec les comportements attendus de ces derniers. L’article décrit, entre autre, certaines clauses de recouvrement (clawbacks et malus). Voici quelques extraits :

How can boards tie ethical conduct to executive compensation?

President Barack Obama delivering remarks on n...
President Barack Obama delivering remarks on new executive compensation restrictions. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« If the board is doing its job, there should be no battle and no need to ask the CEO to relinquish compensation, given what happened. The compensation (cash and stock) should not have been awarded or vested to Diamond in the first place, if the Barclays board (and other bank boards) is complying with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s guidance….

Boards have wide leverage to align ethical conduct and internal controls with executive compensation. There are two main tools: “clawbacks” and “malus.”

In short, if the board wants an executive to focus on ethics, tie his or her compensation to these outcomes. Doing this—which executives will resist—will focus executives’ minds on doing what’s right, as their money is on the line. This is exactly what regulators want in the aftermath of the financial crisis. And clawbacks and malus clauses for banks will likely migrate to non-banks as all companies will be expected to have risk-adjusted compensation in the future ».

À quoi servent les actionnaires de nos jours ?


Excellent article de Justin Fox et Jay W. Lorsch dans le dernier numéro (juillet-août) de Harvard Business Review. On y décrit les rôles que devraient jouer les actionnaires de nos jours et on présente plusieurs suggestions pour les aider à mieux contribuer au succès des organisations. Un must !
 
What Good Are Shareholders? – Harvard Business Review 

Walmart Shareholders' Meeting 2011
Walmart Shareholders’ Meeting 2011 (Photo credit: Walmart Stores)
« The path forward for corporate executives and shareholders appears blocked. Executives complain, with justification, that meddling and second-guessing from shareholders are making it ever harder for them to do their jobs effectively. Shareholders complain, with justification, of executives who pocket staggering paychecks while delivering mediocre results. Boards are stuck in the middle—under increasing pressure to act as watchdogs and disciplinarians despite evidence that they’re more effective as friendly advisers…
 

Our aim here is to focus on shareholders. Who are they? What are their incentives? What are they good at? What are they bad at? The body of research and discussion on these questions is growing. (For a summary, see “Are Institutional Investors Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?,” a working paper by Ben W. Heineman Jr. and Stephen Davis, published by Yale’s Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance.) Our contribution is to offer a framework for thinking about shareholders’ role and to make some suggestions for changes. We’ve divided shareholders’ contributions into three areas: money, information, and discipline ».

Il y a un problème lorsqu’un haut dirigeant est irremplaçable !


Très bon article publié dans le New York Times hier qui montre l’importance cruciale pour un Board de se préoccuper du processus de planification de la relève du PDG. L’article décrit la saga de la mise à pied de Robert Diamond Jr en tant que CEO de la Barclays

 
Barclay!
Barclay! (Photo credit: J Dueck)

« Was Robert E. Diamond Jr. really irreplaceable? The Barclays board operated for 15 years on the assumption that he was. As a result, the British bank’s chief executive became more powerful — and ever harder to replace. Now that he has been kicked out in the wake of the scandal over the rigging of a key interest rate, Barclays is struggling to find new leadership.

And the moral of the story? Boards must always counterbalance strong chief executives with strong chairmen and have good succession plans in place. Most importantly, they should never treat anybody as indispensable — in case that is what they become ».

Que penser de la gouvernance des entreprises de la Silicon Valley ?


Voici un excellent article, paru dans Dealbook.nytimes.com, et partagé par Louise Champoux-Paillé, dans le groupe de discussion Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance sur LinkedIn. « Les entreprises de la Vallée favorisent une nouvelle gouvernance où les administrateurs et les actionnaires jouent un rôle effacé comparativement au président et chef de la direction. Une structure sans grand contrepoids ».

Cet article présente plusieurs exemples de cette «nouvelle gouvernance» et se questionne sur les tendances de ce mouvement : une exception (a blip) ou l’annonce de changements qui vont s’étendre à l’ensemble des modes de gouvernance des entreprises ?

In Silicon Valley, Chieftains Rule With Few Checks and Balances

English: Silicon Valley, seen from a jetliner ...
English: Silicon Valley, seen from a jetliner in the direction of San Jose (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

So the new thing in Silicon Valley appears to be for public companies to be run as private ones without significant input from boards and shareholders. This leaves the wunderkinder of the Internet free to run their companies without interference. The question is whether this is merely a bubble in corporate governance or a trend that will spread to the rest of corporate America.

Exigence de divulgation du nombre de femmes sur les C.A. en Nouvelle-Zélande


La Nouvelle-Zélande fait un pas crucial afin d’inciter les entreprises cotées à accroître le nombre de femmes sur les C.A. et dans des postes de direction. La nouvelle directive est alignée sur celle de l’Australie qui exige également une autoévaluation de la politique formelle de diversité. Encore une fois, on assiste à une certaine globalisation des codes de gouvernance et des directives en découlant. 

 

New Zealand Exchange
New Zealand Exchange (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« Listed companies will be required to disclose how many women they have on their boards and in senior management, the NZX announced last night. In addition to publishing a gender breakdown of directors and senior management, firms with a formal diversity policy will be required to evaluate their performance with respect to that policy, NZX said…

… The NZX’s new rule brings New Zealand into closer alignment with Australia, where similar requirements introduced by the Australian Stock Exchange resulted in a big jump in the level of female representation on listed company boards. As of last August, 12.7 per cent of Australia’s top 200 listed firms had women directors, compared with just 9.3 per cent for the top 100 listed companies in this country ».

Élaboration d’un continuum de comportements (soft-hard) en gouvernance


L’auteur, Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers, (Professeur de Corporate Governance à Nyenrode Business University et Directeur de l’Institute Nyenrode Corporate Governance des Pays-Bas) présente un continuum très utile en gouvernance : à une extrémité, l’approche comportementale (soft); à l’autre extrémité, la législation stricte (hard).

Pour éviter d’accroître induement la législation, l’auteur propose une réflexion sur les éléments culturels relatifs au C.A. et l’utilisation de mécanismes d’évaluation du C.A.

Learning Mores and Board Evaluationsblogs.law.harvard.edu

English: Corporate Governance
English: Corporate Governance (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« In the paper, Learning Mores and Board Evaluations – Soft Controls in Corporate Governance, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, I argue that the prevailing boardroom mores, the unwritten rules, are at one end of having an impact on board effectiveness. Legislation, the more tangibly written rules, is at the other end. In between are voluntary codes of conduct, or legally embedded corporate governance codes….

… How, non-executive directors can avoid further legislation. In other words, how can they take a closer look at their own mores and unwritten rules? The answer lies in the board evaluation. A formal and rigorous evaluation will bring to light whether

1) the highly desired open culture is present,

2) the individual non-executive directors are sufficiently dedicated,

3) the supervisory board and its members do indeed operate sufficiently, independently, and have a critical attitude towards each other and executive directors, and

4) the board is sufficiently diverse to prevent group thinking and tunnel vision. The evaluation needs to discuss these themes seriously and formally. In the end, when it comes to board effectiveness, mores may have more authority than legislation ».

Avantages à la dissociation des rôles de Président du Conseil (PCA) et de Président et chef de la direction (PCD)


Voici un excellent article paru dans 24/7 WALL St qui montre clairement le besoin de séparer les fonctions de PCA et de PCD. Les études montrent que la rémunération globale des deux postes séparés est significativement moindre que la rémunération d’un PCA/PCD.

Breaking Up Chairman and CEO Roles

New York Stock Exchange
New York Stock Exchange (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« CEOs do not like it. More and more often, it seems, the roles of  chairman and CEO become separate from one another. And the arrangement  usually is forced on the chief executive. A major problem at a big corporation  is often the catalyst of these actions. That certainly happened at many of the  nation’s banks after the financial crisis. Troubled Chesapeake Energy (NYSE:  CHK) ripped the chairman’s role from CEO Aubrey Mc Clendon when  it became clear that he took advantage of his position to financially enrich  himself… It turns out that there may be reasons other than good corporate governance  practices to separate the two jobs. A new  study by GMI Ratings, a corporate governance research firm, claims that  the decision to separate the roles also saves a public company, and thus, its  shareholders, money. In a new piece of research GMI found :

The cost of employing a combined CEO/chair is 151 percent of what it  costs to employ a separate CEO and chairman.

Specifically, the data show :

– Executives with a combined CEO and chair role earn a median total summary  compensation of just over $16 million.

– CEOs who do not serve as chair earn $9.8 million in median total summary  compensation.

– A separate CEO and chairman earn a combined $11 million ».

The Director’s Dilemma – Juillet 2012


Voici un cas présenté par Julie Garland McLelland www.mclellan.com.au. À chaque mois Julie présente un cas qui est analysé par trois experts. Vous pouvez vous abonner à la série Director’s Dilemma.

Welcome to the July 2012 edition of The Director’s Dilemma.

This newsletter provides case studies that have been written to help you to develop your judgement as a company director. The case studies are based upon real life; they focus on complex and challenging boardroom issues which can be resolved in a variety of ways. There is often no one ‘correct’ answer; just an answer that is more likely to work given the circumstances and personalities of the case.

These are real life cases; the names and some circumstances have been altered to ensure anonymity. Each potential solution to the case study has different pros and cons for the individuals and companies concerned. Every month this newsletter presents an issue and several responses.

Consider: Which response would you choose and why?

Miriam is the Regional Managing Director for a large multi-national company. She oversees a group of companies that manufacture and sell products across the region and also export from it. One of the subsidiaries in her group is in a country that has a small market for the products and is fundamentally unprofitable. She has recommended on several occasions that the board allow her to close this subsidiary and supply that market by importing product from other group companies. She has backed her recommendations with detailed market analyses and projections as well as implementation plans.

Each time the board has denied her request and she is forced to continue to see the subsidiary drain her region’s profits and the shareholders’ returns. Last time the board met in her region she made the usual request and was denied again. She lost her temper and said some fairly harsh words in an unprofessional tone.

Miriam is a professional manager and has produced good results so her transgression was forgiven. However the board is, once again, meeting in her region and she has another invitation to present her recommended strategy to them.

What should Miriam do?

Eli’s Answer

Before addressing the board again, Miriam needs to find out why its members have so far refused to close the subsidiary. There may be a surface agenda as well as a hidden agenda, and she needs to uncover both. Once she finds out what the real concerns are, she needs to factor them into any proposed solution, which may be something other than her first choice.

When proposing the eventual solution, Miriam should first acknowledge respectfully the concerns about the proposed closing, and then explain the challenge she has in balancing these concerns with the need to be fiscally viable. The fact that she acknowledges the board’s concerns with utmost respect will likely make it easier for the board to listen to her proposed solution. Again, the proposed solution would probably not be an outright shutdown, but one that would somehow optimize the positive outcomes and minimize the risks.

Of course, there is a possibility that Miriam will discover that the board’s resistance to a shutdown is not legitimate but is emotionally or personally-based (e.g., the board Chair is the one who orchestrated the start-up of this subsidiary and takes personal offence to any suggestion of a shut down). If this is the case, Miriam may consider whether she can tolerate working in this setting. If her professionalism is substantially compromised, she should consider resigning.

One other issue to consider is whether the board should even be involved in decisions to start-up or wind-down a subsidiary, or whether such decisions should be delegated to the CEO who would make them on strictly professional considerations. However, such a change would require a revision of board policy to delegate more authority to management and remain focused primarily on strategic priorities, fiduciary duties, and organizational policies.

Eli Mina is a consultant on board effectiveness, shared decision making, and meeting procedures. He is the author of « 101 Boardroom Problems and How to Solve Them » and is based in Vancouver, Canada.

Julie’s Answer

Miriam must set the correct strategic context for a board discussion. She should investigate and understand the reasons the subsidiary was established and the assumptions presented to the board when they approved establishment. She should ask:

  1. Were the assumptions wrong?
  2. Were the assumptions right but the world has now changed?
  3. Have the reasons for setting up in such a small market ceased to exist?
  4. Can the aims of the subsidiary be addressed by another strategy?

Loss of temper (or any emotional control) is not acceptable behaviour for a senior executive. Miriam is lucky to have a second chance. She must make the most of this by establishing a strong shared understanding of strategy for the subsidiary. She needs to present the facts and align herself with the board by building agreement about what the subsidiary was set up to accomplish before she asks the board to endorse a change of strategy.

She then needs to demonstrate that the board can rely on her leadership to implement the strategy she is recommending. This is not just a question of financial logic and brief implementation plans; she must address risks including legal issues around staff redundancies and closure of facilities. The board needs to satisfy itself that the strategy recommended will be satisfactorily implemented under her leadership.

Board time is precious and Miriam should write a good board paper so that all directors are able to engage in a productive discussion and confidently make a decision.

If the board is still unwilling to close the subsidiary she will just have to carry on running it. By engaging in a proper high level discussion Miriam should gain an insight into the reasons for retaining a loss-making subsidiary. She may even find that she agrees with the directors.

Miriam needs to relax. It is the board’s decision, not hers. She has done her duty by providing the information required to facilitating a proper debate and decision.

Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia.

Michelle’s Answer

Miriam is forgetting that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over again and expecting different results! If the board is saying ‘no’ – then it’s ‘no’! The good news for Miriam is that ‘no’ is just feedback that she didn’t properly understand her audience’s attitude. Miriam simply hasn’t reflected to the board that she understands their perspective before seeking approval. ‘No’ means try again, just do something different!

To date Miriam has presented her logic, data and analysis and only covered what she wanted to say, and it’s not working. Miriam should remember, ‘it’s not about me, it’s all about the audience’. I suggest Miriam think about the issues from the board member’s (not her own) perspective. She should ask herself, ‘what is this audience thinking, feeling and doing in relation to this issue?’ She could phone each board member prior to the board meeting and elicit their concerns. She could seek feedback from her direct reports as they are possibly more connected to the issues at the coal face. I expect Miriam would find that her previous approach was misdirected. Instead of focusing on profitability (her main concern) there’s probably a different matter getting in the way of their approval, such as a prior commitment to the staff in the unprofitable subsidiary or to the wider financial market regarding the closure of the subsidiary.

We are more likely to be influenced by our emotions first and then substantiate our views with logic and data. It’s important that Miriam dedicates some time in the opening of her upcoming board presentation to re-establish rapport with her board. Only then is she in a position to deliver the relevant facts and data based on her assessment of their perspective.

This matter is important, so I encourage her to allocate the time important matters deserve. Miriam must plan her approach and rehearse until she is confident. A professional presentation skills coach can help dramatically with the necessary preparation for this type of business presentation.

Michelle Bowden, CSP is a Master of Influence and presentations coach. She is the author of « Don’t Picture me Naked » – how to present your ideas and influence people using techniques that actually work. She is based in Sydney, Australia.

Disclaimer

The opinions expressed above are general in nature and are designed to help you to develop your judgement as a director. They are not a definitive legal ruling. Names and some circumstances in the case study have been changed to ensure anonymity. Contributors to this newsletter comment in the context of their own jurisdiction; readers should check their local laws and regulations as they may be very different.

This newsletter – If you have any ideas for improving the newsletter please let me know. If you are reading a forwarded copy please visit my website and sign up for your own subscription.

www.mclellan.com.au | PO Box 97 Killara NSW 2071 email julie@mclellan.com.au | phone +61 2 9499 8700 | mobile +61 411 262 470 | fax +61 2 9499 8711

Le C.A. et l’utilisation des médias sociaux


Excellent document de Santiago Chaher et James David Spellman paru dans Global Corporate Governance Forum Publication. La publication présente plusieurs facteurs qui devraient inciter les conseils d’administration à se préoccuper sérieusement des médias sociaux. À lire. 

Corporate Governance and Social Media

« What should board members know about social media as it relates to a company’s ability to do business and safeguard its image? And what is the board’s role in helping a company make the best use of social media—and defending against its misuse? Two corporate governance practitioners provide insights on the power of new social technologies to shape boards’ decisions and bolster stakeholders’ influence ».
 
Image representing Twitter as depicted in Crun...
Image via CrunchBase

« In short, today’s corporate directors have the ‘necessary’ skills in terms of compliance and financial performance, but not the ‘sufficient’ skills in terms of strategic or technological know how, » says Barry Libert, chief executive officer of OpenMatters, a consultancy for boards. « Why? Because for years, astute corporate directors believed the tools that companies like Facebook and Twitter offered weren’t essential. In their view, these new means of communications were for kids, had little, if any, business value, and created minimal strategic, operational or financial risks. Wow, were they wrong. »

This circumstance will change as business and personal needs require more extensive use of social media.For a 2011 Deloitte questionnaire, 79 percent of all public company respondents reported that their board’s use of technology is increasing.

En rappel : Un nouveau modèle de gouvernance de sociétés


Voici, en rappel, un excellent billet de Richard Leblanc qui a fait un travail colossal de synthèse afin de dégager les bases d’un modèle de gouvernance, bâti à partir des nombreuses et riches discussions dans le groupe Boards & Advisers de LinkedIn. Richard a développé un modèle vraiment très pertinent que vous pouvez télécharger à partir de son blogue. Je vous encourage à lire ce document synthèse qui est le fruit de centaines d’échanges sur LinkedIn. Par la même occasion, je vous invite à vous inscrire à son blogue et à suivre son groupe Boards & Advisers sur LinkedIn.

Shareholder Spring and A New Model of Corporate Governance

« Shareholder activism at CP Rail, Yahoo, Research in Motion, Chesapeake Energy and BMC Software continues, trying to prevent the destruction of billions of dollars of shareholder value. Shareholders rejected Citigroup’s, Aviva’s, Knight Capital’s, FirstMerit’s and Cairn Energy’s executive pay packages. Activists and hedge funds such as Bill Ackman at Pershing Square, Dan Loeb of Third Point Capital, Vic Alboini at Jaguar Financial Corp., Paul Singer at Elliot Management and Carl Icahn reveal defects in the current corporate governance system. What do they all have in common? And are boards listening ? »

Comment un PDG peut-il mieux communiquer avec son C.A. ?


Voici un article paru dans blog.openviewpartners.com qui montre la nécessité d’établir une bonne communication entre le PDG et le C.A. Si les réunions avec le C.A. sont un cauchemar pour vous, dépêchez-vous de lire cet article !

How to Take Advantage of Your Board of Directors

« It’s no secret a lot of CEOs aren’t big fans of their boards of directors. They derive very little value from them and in some cases find the board to be an utter distraction. Even seasoned CEOs who have managed to assemble a valuable team of advisors and mentors sometimes struggle with board management. They’re not sure how often to communicate with them, how involved they should allow board members to be, or in which areas the board could provide the most value…

The most common Board of Directors (BOD) challenges are often functions of these three issues:

  1. You don’t communicate with your BOD: If the only time you talk with your board is during quarterly meetings, an information gap will inevitably exist. That can cause a huge operational disconnect that results in ineffective and inefficient meetings. Too much of the BOD meetings are spent getting caught up, versus having a meaningful dialogue about the key issues.
  2. You don’t want to show your weaknesses: CEOs are very often hesitant to open up and reveal their weaknesses. This may be born out of a bad experience in the past or just pure ego. They worry that if they’re candid about the challenges the business is facing, they’ll be viewed as incompetent.
  3. You don’t want to bother them: Entrepreneurs too often assume that their board members are too busy to be bothered with seemingly menial issues, and they feel like a nuisance if they ask for help ». 

Say On Pay : Analyzing the Voting Results of 2011 and 2012


Excellent article by Jeffrey M. Stein and Laura O. Hewett in The Metropolitan Corporate Council.

 

Say On Pay: Analyzing The Second Year Of Shareholder Votes

Say-O-Pay Voting Results in 2011 and 2012

« Despite the media headlines and the concerns of many in-house counsel leading up to the first round of mandatory say-on-pay votes in 2011, results were overwhelmingly positive.

  1. Public companies received an overall average of 92 percent support for say on pay in 2011.
  2. Approximately 45 companies failed to achieve majority support for the vote, which amounts to less than 2 percent of companies.
  3. Approximately 6 percent of companies received support in the range between 50 percent and 70 percent of the vote (or, thinking about it a different way, had at least 30 percent of shareholders vote against say on pay). While these were passing votes, the proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) considers this lower level of support as raising significant issues with respect to a company’s compensation program, and will subject that company’s compensation program to additional scrutiny in the following year.

Results of the say-on-pay votes in 2012 (through June 15, 2012) have continued to be overwhelmingly positive.

  1. Public companies have received an average of 91 percent support for say on pay in 2012.
  2. Approximately 52 companies have failed to achieve majority support for say on pay. While this number already exceeds the total number of companies that lost the vote in 2011, it still amounts to only 3 percent of companies.
  3. Approximately 6 percent of companies have received support of between 50 percent and 70 percent of the vote ».

Exemple de révolte des actionnaires : Chesapeake Energy


Voici un article paru récemment dans le New-York Times et qui présente le résultat de la révolte des actionnaires lors de l’assemblée annuelle de Chesapeake Energy. On voit de plus en plus de situations où les administrateurs d’importantes sociétés sont l’objet de désapprobation de la part des actionnaires. La voix des actionnaires, par l’intermédiaire d’organisation comme ISS, se fait de plus en plus entendre et les C.A. doivent être de plus en plus vigilent.

Shareholders rebuke to the failed leadership of the board of directors at Chesapeake

Chesapeake Energy
Chesapeake Energy (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

 

Shareholders sent an angry message to the board and management of Chesapeake Energy on Friday, withholding support for the two directors up for election, rejecting the pay plan for top executives and urging the company to allow major shareholders to nominate their own board candidates.