Court article paru dans Reuters et qui annonce les changements d’humeur des actionnaires envers les PDG trop gourmands.
The Telegraph has dubbed it Shareholder Spring: in the UK, these days, CEOs are falling left and right after shareholders complain about their pay. First came David Brennan, the CEO of pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca, who…
Voici un cas présenté par Julie Garland McLellan dans le cadre de sa chronique Director’s Dilemma publié sur son site. Ce cas porte sur une situation de procès-verbaux problématiques ! Qu’en pensez-vous ?
« Lenny recently joined the board of a government business enterprise. The government has been improving its board member selection processes and, this year, had a specific requirement that each board should have at least one director with a formal governance qualification. Having gained such a qualification Lenny was delighted that he was appointed to a large and politically sensitive board where all the other directors are far older and more experienced than he. He is concerned about the quality of the board minutes. They read like a transcript with verbatim remarks attributed to individuals. Some of the statements concern Ministerial or Departmental staff; they are quite possibly defamatory and of questionable relevance to the business. Lenny has raised the issue with the Chairman but been told that this is how minutes are done ‘in practice’ and that theoretical ideas won’t be trialled in his boardroom. The other board members don’t seem concerned but get restless when, at each meeting, Lenny goes through the minutes and requests numerous changes. The latest set of minutes is even more worrisome; it states that the board noted and reviewed several new policy statements that were not on the agenda and that Lenny has no copy of or recollection of discussing. He called the board secretary who informed him that this will save him and his board colleagues a lot of unnecessary reading and boring discussion of things they can’t do anything about. The secretary believes management have compliance well in hand so there is no need to worry.
What should Lenny do? »
If you would like to publish your advice on this topic in a global company directors’ newsletter please respond to the dilemma above with approximately 250 words of advice for Lenny. Back issues of the newsletter are available at http://www.mclellan.com.au/newsletter.html (see link below) where you can check out the format and quality.
Vous trouverez, ci-joint, un article publié par le « Board Director Training Institute of Japan » (BDTI), une organisation japonaise dont la mission est d’accroître la confiance entre les corporations et le public. L’objectif poursuivi par le BDTI est de favoriser le développement éthique des entreprises et de l’économie japonaise par la diffusion d’études sur la gouvernance et la mise en place de programmes de formation en gouvernance. L’article brosse un tableau sommaire des tendances en matière de gouvernance dans certains pays asiatiques.
A Look at Hong Kong’s Corporate Governance Code, Regarding « Director Training »
Since Singapore has just set forth amendments to its Corporate Governance Code that are impressively well-refined and substantial, we thought we would look at some other « Corporate Governance Codes » (CG Codes) in Asia from the « board training » perspective.
Excellent article écrit par Holly J. Gregory, partner Weil, Gotshal & Mages, dans Practicallaw.com
SOCIAL MEDIA : What Boards Need to Know
Voici un extrait des pricipaux points saillants. Vous devez lire cet article pour avoir plusieurs bonnes suggestions concernant cette problématiques.
Importance for boards to understand the implications of social media
« Boards need to be proactive in learning about social media from a strategic and risk management perspective, so that they can provide effective guidance and risk oversight. They should understand the company’s social media policies and internal controls, as well as the processes that management uses to monitor and manage social media risks. Boards should also understand the value of social media as a source of information, and should determine with management how best to mine and aggregate that information.
The following sets outs steps the board should take, including important questions the board should ask, to understand and effectively oversee the company’s use of, and policies on, social media:
Discuss corporate strategy
The board should periodically discuss with management its strategic approach to social media. Questions the board should ask include:zzHow does social media relate to corporate strategy?
Ensure adequate risk management
The board (or an appropriate committee) should also periodically discuss with management the risks associated with social media and ensure that the company is adequately managing those risks. Issues the board should focus on include:zzHow does the company monitor and mine social media from a risk perspective?
Identify relevant personnel
The board should know who in the company is responsible for social media efforts. The board should ask:zzHow is responsibility for social media organized in the company?
Review social media policies and internal controls.
The board (or an appropriate committee) should review company policies and internal controls related to social media from time to time. The board should make sure that the company has strict, straightforward and well-understood policies about who communicates for the company and in what circumstances. These policies should specifically address social media. Any company information that is posted online should first be approved by people who are knowledgeable about disclosure requirements under federal securities laws (such as Regulation FD, proxy solicitation rules, antifraud laws and prospectus requirements), advertising laws and other applicable laws. Key questions the board should consider include:What are the company’s social media policies?
Evaluate shareholder relations programs.
The board should review shareholder relations and communications programs to evaluate whether the company is well-positioned to elicit information from key shareholders. The company should be able to determine what key shareholders care about so that the board and management can respond to legitimate concerns. In addition to trolling social media websites for information, the company should engage in regular outreach with significant shareholders. This can be done through the use of online surveys, shareholder hotlines, dedicated communication websites and targeted meetings with specific shareholders or groups of shareholders.
Assess investor communications policy.
The board should verify that the company’s investor communications policy is up-to-date and well-understood by directors, senior management and investor relations personnel. Boards should ask:zzAre messages coordinated?
Emphasize employee compliance.
The board’s attention to a culture of compliance at the company, beginning with the « tone at the top, » emphasizes the need for employees to act with integrity. The board should make sure that there are protected channels for employees to voice concerns. This will help discourage employees from making negative comments about the company through social media. Also, the board should recognize that rogue employees who act out online are often symptomatic of a broader morale problem within the company.
Confirm auditor review.
The board’s audit committee should ask the company’s internal audit department whether auditors are reviewing compliance with social media and communications policies.
Stay up-to-date.
Directors should follow relevant blogs and other social media related to the company, but with a strict understanding that they should « listen » only (just as they are advised not to engage with shareholders directly unless asked to do so on an agreed topic and message). This is not only important to ensure that communications and engagement are coordinated around a clear message, but also to avoid legal problems, such as the selective disclosure of material non-public information. Directors should ask management (including the corporate secretary and the corporate communications professionals) what they read and follow to stay up-to-date on influential views about the company and key governance issues ».
Food for Thought !
How being a Millennial has shaped how Mark Zuckerberg runs Facebook.
Voici 2 articles vraiment intéressants, le premier de Forbes et le deuxième de Fox Business.
Can The Millennial Zuckerberg Be A Great Leader?
Voir aussi :
At Facebook, Zuckerberg Poised for Corporate Governance Crash Course
Voici un article publié par Kathy Noël dans Affaires sans frontières qui s’appuie sur les réflexions de l’éthicien René Villemure.
« Les entreprises peuvent-elles réussir et se déployer partout sur la planète en étant parfaitement éthique? On se le demande parfois, car plus rien dans ce monde n’est vraiment neutre. Il y aura toujours des opposants à un projet, quel qu’il soit, où qu’il soit. Cependant, pour l’éthicien René Villemure, président de l’Institut québécois d’éthique appliquée, les entreprises n’ont d’autres choix que de s’en préoccuper. Il en va de leur durabilité ».
«Les entreprises ne doivent plus seulement se demander si ce qu’elles font est légal, elles doivent se demander si c’est juste».
Être nommé à un conseil d’administration : une question de compétences ou de contacts ?
 |
 |
Être nommé à un conseil d’administration : compétences ou contacts ?
Article très intéressant qui a fait pas mal de vagues dans les médias sociaux.
The one definition of a good board
Rather predictably, after the death of Steve Jobs, Apple Inc.’s board of directors has come under fire for being pliant toadies: yes-men and women.
The board is rather unconventional by current standards. Just seven members, many hand-picked by Jobs, and by most accounts, subservient to him and his personal quirks and needs (particularly regarding his health in recent years). The other notable feature has been the optical and functional irrelevance of the chairperson. This was Steve Jobs’s board — full stop.
Voici une excellente analyse de la primauté du droit des actionnaires aux États-Unis : les actionnaires d’abord, ou toutes les parties prenantes ? Richard Leblanc commente cet article à propos de l’idéologie de la primauté des actionnaires.
« This is an interesting piece. It argues that the duty to stockholders [only] is inaccurate. I would agree. In Canada and the UK, the duty is to the corporation. The corporation includes shareholders and shareholders are residual claimants, but there are also non-shareholder stakeholders boards must consider. In the US, most corporate statutes are similar, except CA and Delaware also include explicit reference to shareholders, but do not negate to mention the corporation, as I understand. There appears to be a greater recognition overall of shareholders within these two states, and the .. moins
The idea that a corporation’s sole duty is to stockholders is a dangerous fad with no basis in U.S. law or…
Vous trouverez, ci-joint, un court résumé de la conférence organisée par European Confederation of Directors’ Associations (ECODA) sur l’application du « Comply or explain » dans les pays de l’EU. Ce document a été rédigé par Béatrice RICHEZ-BAUM beatrice.richez-baum@ecoda.org, secrétaire générale de ECODA. Voilà donc le sommaire du point de vue d’un groupe d’expert sur la question.
…. « Bringing together about 90 high profile participants from diverse background and nationality, including EU and national decision-makers, representatives from the business sector, as well as regulators and supervisors, the event provided an informed platform to explore ways to improve the existing model for meaningful and verifiable explanations.
The EU-study by RiskMetrics (supported by ecoDa, BusinessEurope and Landwell) and the European Green Paper on Corporate Governance Framework stressed the need for improving the quality of the explanations and for a better monitoring of these explanations.
All the speakers acknowledged that the “comply or explain” principle has played a useful role in offering an incentive for continuous improvement in Corporate Governance practices and that flexibility is the condition for companies to have the tailored governance they need. However they stressed the need to have a credible system working well in terms of enforcement and being acceptable by society at large.
The speakers clearly call companies to take more responsibility on their governance to prevent regulation that would kill the whole discussion about the quality of explanations and that would reduce the governance debate to a compliance debate with regulators and a box ticking exercise.
If the quality of explanations and the quantity of supervision is improving, all markets’ actors have still a role to play to increase transparency and to enhance not only the content but also the process of good quality explanations »…. Pour plus d ‘information www.ecoda.org
Un autre billet intéressant de Richard Joly dans LesAffaires.com. À lire.
Gouvernance 101: la séparation des rôles de PDG et de Président du conseil
« Une règle fondamentale de gouvernance d’entreprise est la séparation des rôles entre celui de président du conseil et celui de chef de la direction. En 1993, le Rapport Dey avait démontré la corrélation positive entre la performance d’une entreprise et le nombre élevé d’administrateurs indépendants. Puis, en 2001, le Rapport Saucier avait renforcé cette notion, insistant sur la ligne de démarcation entre les responsabilités du conseil et celles de la direction.
Aujourd’hui, plus de 84 % des 300 plus grandes sociétés canadiennes cotées en bourse adhèrent à cette structure. L’objectif est d’équilibrer le pouvoir entre le conseil d’administration et la direction. Suite à de nombreux scandales, les Américains, qui ont toujours refusé d’adopter une telle structure de gouvernance, reconnaissent maintenant le bien-fondé de cette pratique. On compte aujourd’hui près de 50 % des grandes sociétés cotées en bourse au NYSE qui ont adopté cette structure ».
Le malheur s’acharne sur SNC-Lavalin. Lire les deux articles dans LesAffaires.com et dans le Globe and Mail.
À la suite d’une enquête lancée en septembre dernier, l’une des filiales de SNC-Lavalin (TSX: SNC) a reçu de la Banque mondiale un avis formel suspendant temporairement le droit de cette filiale de déposer des appels d’offres visant de nouveaux projets de la Banque mondiale.
One of Canada’s global champions has just given itself a beating. Canadian officials often pointed to SNC-Lavalin’s business abroad as an example of this country’s trade inroads. It’s taking over the sale of CANDU nuclear equipment. Foreign Minister John Baird brought an SNC exec, Bruno Picard, to meet Libya’s new leaders last fall.
Une mauvaise réputation, c’est comme l’eau contaminée d’une maison. Plus personne ne la désire. Arthur Andersen est le plus bel exemple. Cette société internationale dans le domaine de la vérification comptable jouissait d’une réputation enviable avant que certains associés soient liés au scandale d’Enron. Dans l’espace de quelques mois, cette firme est disparue car leurs clients ne voulaient pas être associés à eux, pour cause de mauvaise réputation.
Les administrateurs de sociétés et le risque lié à une mauvaise réputation
Cet article scientifique, publié dans Social Science Research Network, pose une question cruciale sur les fondements de la gouvernance. On explique pourquoi les Boards n’ont pas « l’autorité » requise pour exercer une influence significative sur les orientations stratégiques des organisations. L’article expose aussi les processus dont les Boards doivent se doter afin de mieux jouer leur rôle de supervision et de contrôle de la direction.
Les auteurs n’y vont pas « avec le dos de la cuillère », comme vous le constaterez. Je vous réfère au groupe de discussion LinkedIn – Boards & Advisors pour analyser la teneur des contributions des membres sur ce sujet ! Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un « abstract » de l’article.
Questioning Authority: Why Boards Do Not Control Managers and How a Better Board Process Can Help
Fewer than half of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) believe their boards of directors understand the strategic factors that determine their corporation’s success; in fact, some long term directors “confess that they don’t really understand how their companies make money.” Yet corporate law expects that boards of directors will stop managers from behaving badly. It assumes that the ultimate governing authority within corporations rests with their boards, and not with the managers who run them. Broadly accepted theories of corporate governance are based on the faulty assumption that boards have actual authority over managers. This Article directly challenges that assumption and argues that managers, not boards, control corporate decision-making processes. The problem is that scholars and policymakers have ignored the connection between decision-making processes and authority. This Article is the first to examine this largely unexplored relationship, which is essential to helping boards live up to their normative mandates.
Without an effective decision-making process, regulators will continue to expect boards to perform tasks that exceed their capabilities. Even more concerning, conventional structural reforms, such as increased director independence, actually have dangerous consequences. These reforms lessen boards’ actual authority by reducing their ability to utilize effective decision-making processes. Boards must take active steps to improve the quality of their decision making. Unless they do so, they will continue to fail because they lack to the power to perform as law and theory expect. This Article argues that effective decision-making processes, which can be found in organizational behavior theory, are the key means by which the board can exercise actual authority. Analyzing the components of such a process, and identifying which components are truly controlled by boards as opposed to managers, provides a roadmap for what boards need in order to have both de facto and de jure authority in their corporations. This Article provides that original analysis and applies insights into group decision making from organizational behavior theory to identify the attributes of an effective decision-making process that are essential to securing a board’s de facto authority.
The Top 4 Risks in Pay for Performance
« Pay for Performance, (« P4P » for us cool compensation pros) is all the rage. Those of you who read my postings regularly know that I’m a big proponent of performance-based compensation, in its many forms. Despite being a big supporter, or perhaps because of it, I think its important to discuss the major risks involved with these programs.
1. Incorrect Metrics
Metrics are the “things” that are being measured. These are the foundation of your plan and must represent the measurements of success. I will save you the time of repeating what I, and others, have already said. A couple of interesting articles are here and here.
2. Poorly Set Goals
Goals are the levels that define the success of each metric. These are the drivers of your plan and must represent your destination. Again, I will save time, by pointing out some other articles, here and here.
3. Underwhelming Communication
Performance compensation is often confusing. Clean, clear communications are essential to engaging and motivating your staff. This is a topic we cover here often at the Compensation Cafe. Some good examples are here, here and here.
4. Human Nature
Human nature is the one thing that you cannot build into your compensation programs, yet it is the single biggest risk to pay for performance. A colleague of mine often says that the problem isn’t that P4P programs don’t work well, it’s that they work TOO well. Results and actions must be in alignment. Many companies create great metrics, goals and communications and still have compensation plans blow up. Why is this? For programs that demand high-performance, you must also provide strong management and oversight. Many companies use their compensation plans as a form of management. This may lead to participants slowly defining the good and bad ».
Excellent article sur l’avenir des quotas en Europe. Voici un long extrait de ce document:
Norway’s businesswomen and the boardroom bias debate
As the EU begins a three-month consultation on whether there should be quotas for women in the boardroom, Harriet Alexander asks whether Norway’s quotas could work in Britain.
Mrs Berdal said she was broadly supportive of the quota system, as a necessary step – even though she disliked the principle of interference in boards. She also denied that it had adversely affected the profitability of Norwegian companies.
« If women are just there as ‘tokens’, then the nomination committee is doing a really bad job. I don’t know any woman who is there just to make up the numbers; they are all highly qualified and professional, » she said.
« There was obviously resistance at the beginning, but now that it has been there for a few years it has weakened.
« My general experience is that it is working fine, and that boards are not weakened by the system: on the contrary, in fact.
But other business experts have expressed scepticism that the EU could impose uniform restrictions on such diverse national working cultures.
Kenneth Ahern, a professor of finance from the University of Michigan, doubted whether Britain was ready to make the necessary financial sacrifice to push women onto boards. His own research on Norway, published last year, showed that « the quota led to younger and less experienced boards, and deterioration in operating performance, consistent with less capable boards. »
He told The Sunday Telegraph: « In Norway, they knew that the value of their companies would drop, but society there cared more about equality than finance. It was a conscious decision.
« For the EU to make such an important moral choice, across such a variety of countries, is a very big ask indeed. I could see there being real resistance to obligatory quotas from countries such as Germany and the UK, which prize the financial output extremely highly. »
Mrs Berdal, who was a widely-travelled international lawyer before dedicating herself full time to board work, agreed that it could be hard to impose quotas in Britain.
« I think the British culture – both in society in general, and in business – is a bit more conservative, and still a bit more male dominated than in Scandinavia.
« In the boardroom, if you have only men, they tend to know each other from school, university or the golf club, and decisions are often made outside of the boardroom so you don’t have full control and transparency. Maybe in the UK you’ll have to twist some more arms. »
Voici un résumé des recommandations présentées par Kaye O’Leary dans innovationexcellence.com pour éviter de surcharger les membres de conseils d’administration.
Practical tips from board members on how to avoid wearing-out your directors!
« The challenge: It’s no secret that there are an increasing number of demands on boards. Directors are expected to keep abreast of the organization’s business model, performance, strategic challenges and risk environment, understand the industry, understand the legislative environment, be knowledgeable of and ensure compliance with regulatory and reporting requirements and changes, evaluate the CEO and board’s performance, has a compliant and effective compensation program, be current on applicable accounting rules and ensure that the organization has a solid succession plan and effective culture.
Tip 1: Don’t waste precious meeting time presenting information that was distributed in the board materials
Effective Board Suggestion: Skip the presentations of the information that was distributed and move directly to questions on the material distributed. (PS – make sure you get your materials out well in advance of the meeting! Do not distribute materials on a Friday afternoon for a Tuesday board meeting; board members do not enjoy spending their weekend reading board materials.)
Tip 2: Utilize Committees Effectively
Effective Board Suggestion: Rely on your committees and avoid repeating the committee work with the full board.
Tip 3: Annually Assess the Work of the Board
Effective Board Suggestion: As part of your annual board assessment process, take the time to review how the board spends its time vs. the organization’s strategic priorities. Is your board focused on your strategic priorities? Do you have special purpose committees that are no longer relevant? Are there things your board can stop doing? Review the materials you are sending out in your board book. If you send it, you are obliging your board members to read the material; don’t send 60 pages of financial information if 15 pages will suffice ».
Article intéressant de Richard Leblanc, paru dans Canadian Business qui propose plusieurs moyens visant l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’admistration d’OBNL. À la liste présentée, j’ajouterais l’importance de choisir un solide leader comme président du conseil.
Comment améliorer un conseil d’administration d’OBNL ?
Not-for-profit organizations are among the most important in our economy—some are hospitals, while others are schools, universities or charities. Many are large, complex organizations with multiple moving parts and interdependent stakeholders. They are tough to lead and govern, but must be as effectively led as for-profits. They require CEOs, directors and staff who are at the top of their game and willing to make the necessary commitment.
Voici une référence au site de BP qui décrit en détail le système de gouvernance en vigueur. La présentation du rapport est impeccable et le cadre conceptuel pourrait servir d’exemple à beaucoup d’organisations. Pourtant les difficultés rencontrées par l’entreprise ont été, et sont encore, énormes… Sans cet appareillage de gouvernance, l’entreprise aurait-elle pu affronter la crise du Golfe du Mexique ? Pas sûr !
Le système de gouvernance à BP
Il faut cependant ajouter qu’un bon système de gouvernance ne sera efficace que si la culture organisationnelle et le système de rémunération encouragent des comportement appropriés. BP a un excellent système de gouvernance, sur papier, mais il faut également que la direction et le C.A. aient un sens aigu de l’éthique pour « bien gouverner » (Tone at the Top). La culture a-t-elle évoluée depuis cette crise… Pas sûr non plus !
Mon propos n’est certainement pas de faire le procès de BP car je ne sais pas quelles sont les leçons que l’entreprise a tirées de cette catastrophe et de la gestion de la crise. Je référe à BP parce que je crois y retrouver un très bon exemple de cadre conceptuel en gouvernance. Mais, bien sûr, cela ne garantit absolument pas que l’organisation possède la culture requise pour se comporter en bon citoyen corporatif.
Les conclusions du rapport sur la crise du Golfe du Mexique présentées au Président Obama mentionnent justement ces éléments : “ The disaster can be attributed to an organizational culture and incentives that encourage cost cutting and cutting corners that rewarded workers for doing it faster and cheaper but not better”. Food for thought.
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 