Quel est le cadre juridique du fonctionnement d’un conseil consultatif de PME ?


Voici quelques éléments d’information en réponse à une question souvent posée dans le cadre de la formation en gouvernance de sociétés. Cette question a été soumise à la considération de Me Raymonde Crête, professeure de droit à l’Université Laval et de Me Thierry Dorval, associé de Norton Rose. Je reproduis ici la réponse de ces deux experts juridiques en gouvernance.

« Dans une PME, il est possible de créer un comité consultatif. Il n’existe pas de règles spécifiques concernant la création de ce type de comité. Concernant la création de ce type de comité consultatif, on peut consulter le site suivant :

Palasis-Prince pavillion of the Laval Universi...

Un comité consultatif pour vous critiquer et accélérer votre croissance

Les membres du comité consultatif ne sont pas, en principe, assujettis aux responsabilités qui incombent normalement aux administrateurs de sociétés, à moins qu’ils agissent, dans les faits, comme des administrateurs. Si les membres du comité consultatif agissent, dans les faits ou de facto, comme des administrateurs de sociétés, ils pourraient engager leur responsabilité, notamment en matière fiscale ou d’environnement. L’article 227.1 de la Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu impose aux administrateurs une responsabilité solidaire en cas de non-paiement de certains impôts. Pour éviter d’engager leur responsabilité, les membres du comité consultatif ne doivent donc pas exercer des fonctions analogues ou des pouvoirs similaires à ceux exercés par les membres d’un conseil d’administration, tels les pouvoirs décisionnels en matière d’émission d’actions, de déclaration de dividendes, etc ».

Concernant les responsabilités du conseil d’administration, vous pouvez consulter le document ci-dessous publié par Norton Rose.

Identification et gestion des risques que comporte le rôle d’administrateur de société

Le processus de destitution des administrateurs | The Process of Removing Directors


Voici un article très explicite publié sur le blogue de Richard Leblanc, concernant le statut des membres de conseils d’administration. Le point de vue avancé par Richard est que les actionnaires devraient avoir une voix plus prédominante sur le choix des administrateurs qui doivent rester sur le conseil.

Le processus de destitution des administrateurs | The Process of Removing Directors

 

« It’s very rare for a director to be removed from a board. Only 2% of directors who step down are dismissed or not reelected, according to Stanford researchers. Most directors get re-elected and continue serving. Some directors serve on boards for up to 25 years. About a year ago, I counted 30 directors who served on Canada’s five bank boards for more than nine years. Nine years is the upper limit for independence now in the U.K.

P1030704

A board does not have the power to remove another director, even if that director is performing poorly. If the director digs in and refuses to step down, that director must be replaced at the annual meeting. It is rare for shareholders to remove a director at the meeting if he or she is re-nominated. Only 93 directors failed to win majority support, out of a total universe of some 50,000, as of recent figures ».

L’indépendance des présidents de conseils d’administration (PCA) : Une qualité primordiale !


Pour débuter la deuxième année de mon blogue en gouvernance, je vous invite à lire cet excellent article publié sur le site de Blooberg.com. L’indépendance des présidents de conseils d’administration (PCA) est une règle et une pratique exemplaire de bonne gouvernance. Toutes les formations en gouvernance des sociétés énoncent cette règle comme étant cruciale. Pourtant, aux États-Unis, 80 % des entreprise du S&P 500 ont des PCA qui ne rencontrent pas les critères d’indépendance énoncés par les autorités règlementaires, contrairement au Canada ou au Royaume-Uni où , à la suite de pressions des autorités règlementaires et des investisseurs, une forte majorité des entreprises se sont données des PCA indépendants.  Que se passe-t-il au pays de la libre entreprise ? Qui a raison ? Y-a-t-il des avantages financiers et stratégiques à ne pas scinder les fonctions de président du conseil (PCA, Chairman) et de président et chef de la direction (PCD, CEO) ? L’article ci-joint est très clair à cet égard : c’est un énorme conflit d’intérêt … au moins potentiellement ! « We don’t let students grade their own exams, but we let CEOs chair their own boards ».  
 
 

« In the early 1990s, Adrian Cadbury, the former chairman of Cadbury Schweppes, led a committee that proposed reforms to improve governance and reassure the investor community after a series of high-profile scandals among British companies. One of the recommendations called for independent outside chairmen. Within a decade, most U.K. companies had adopted the recommendation due to pressure from regulators and investors.

Chairman
Chairman (Photo credit: k-ideas)

Separating the chairman and CEO roles has never been widely accepted in the U.S., where CEOs like to pile up titles and don’t like answering to someone else. Chief Executive magazine reported in June that 63 percent of CEOs said in a survey that they would recommend a combined role for their replacements, despite the concerns of shareholder groups. The Council of Institutional Investors, for example, calls dual roles “a fundamental conflict of interest.”

Votre entreprise est-elle préparée à prendre en compte les risques environnementaux et sociaux ? Et votre C.A. ?


Les actionnaires exercent de plus en plus de pressions sur les C.A. afin que ceux-ci prennent en compte les risques environnementaux et sociaux. Voici un article publié par E&Y qui fait un excellent résumé de la situation. À lire.

 

Aujourd’hui, c’est le premier anniversaire du blogue Gouvernance   |  Jacques Grisé et ce billet est le 365e de l’année, ce qui représente une moyenne d’une publication par jour. Je me propose de tenir le rythme pour les prochaines années.

 

Faites de mon blogue votre source d’information indispensable sur les activités et les actualités en gouvernance de sociétés. Merci.

 

English: Risk Management road sign
English: Risk Management road sign (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

 

« Shareholders are asking boards to mitigate risks tied to evolving regulations, shifting global weather patterns and heightened public awareness of climate change issues. Summary: Proposals from shareholders reveal that investors find their company’s social and environmental policies correlated with its risk management strategy — and ultimately its financial performance. We estimate that half of all shareholder resolutions in 2011 will center on social and environmental issues. »

 

Dix événements qui ont radicalement changé la gouvernance au cours des 10 dernières années


Il y a dix ans, on parlait très peu de gouvernance dans la profession d’administrateur et dans la formation en administration. Voici dix événements qui ont radicalement changé la manière de concevoir et de vivre la gouvernance au cours des 10 dernières années. C’est un article très intéressant et je vous incite fortement à le lire pour être à la fine pointe des connaissances en gouvernance. Ci-dessous les dix facteurs de changement incontournables présentés dans l’article publié dans Corporate Secretary.

Corporate Secretary

1. Sarbanes-Oxley 

2. The fall of Lehman Brothers

3. Dodd-Frank

4. Social media governance

5. Say on pay

6. Protecting whistleblowers

7. Corporate social responsibility

8. The rise of the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practice  Act (FCPA)  

9. Women on boards

10. Shareholder spring’ activism and protests

Ten events that have changed corporate governance

ENRON, The Play
ENRON, The Play (Photo credit: Scott Beale)

Ten years ago, corporate governance was still in the concept stage. There wasn’t much information available to the public about the way corporations were governed, and there were few regulations, websites or groups dealing with the topic on a daily basis. Over the years, however, the notion of good corporate governance has taken an interesting turn. After a string of corporate failures that crippled the economy, it has become clear that governance matters. So as Corporate Secretary celebrates its tenth anniversary as a publication, we take a look at ten significant events that have changed the face of corporate governance.

Should Proxy Advisory Firms Be Regulated ? Yes according to Richard Leblanc


IFP_KevinSellersWRK_2987
IFP_KevinSellersWRK_2987 (Photo credit: IntelFreePress)

Voici un billet paru sur le blogue de Richard Leblanc, Governance Gateway . L’auteur se dit favorable à cette éventalité. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Governance Gateway Blog » Should Proxy Advisory Firms Be Regulated? Yes. yorku.ca

 

« The Ontario Securities Commission has asked whether proxy advisory firms should be regulated. (Proxy advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis, which is owned by Ontario Teachers Pension Plan, provide governance assessment and recommendations to institutional shareholders on their voting at annual meetings of companies.) In my view, proxy advisory firms should be regulated for three important reasons.

Conflicts of Interest

Lack of Qualitative Assessment of Governance Quality and Predictive Validity on Shareholder Value

Lack of Transparency »

Échec de la gouvernance à RIM | Un coup d’oeil au C.A. !


Richard Leblanc, dans un article publié dans Canadian Business, présente une solide analyse de la composition du conseil d’administration de RIM  À partir des discussions publiées dans le groupe Boards and Advisors  de LinkedIn, il a identifié les changements requis afin de  renouveler le « Board » de RIM. Bonne lecture !

 

Échec de la gouvernance à RIM | Un coup d’oeil au C.A. !

 « It took RIM until 2012 to accede to having an independent board chair, a practice recommended almost 20  years ago. At this week’s annual general meeting, the minimalist shuffle toward corporate governance continued. Chair Barbara Stymiest, a former banker and regulator, acknowledged there were gaps in board skills.

Image representing Research In Motion as depic...
Image via CrunchBase

 “Gaps” is an understatement. This board does not have the industry track record, or clout to push back against management ».

   

Huit pièges à éviter en matière de diversité des C.A. !


Un autre excellent article de Richard Leblanc dans Canadian Business. C’est certainement l’article le plus percutant et le plus éclairant sur le sujet de la « diversité » des conseils d’administration !  À lire par toutes les personnes intéressées par la bonne gouvernance.  Voici les huit pièges à considérer. L’article est fascinant !
 

The eight traps of boardroom diversity

 

English: Whisky Society boardroom table lookin...
English: Whisky Society boardroom table looking towards president (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« There are myths and vested interests in the movement toward boardroom diversity now underway in several countries. In this post, I’ll consider the “traps” and embedded myths, and in a later post propose solutions.

1. The “Defining diversity downward” trap

2. The “Business case” trap

3. The “Be careful” trap

4. The “Entrenchment” trap

5. The “We want a CEO” trap

6. The “It’s whom you know” trap

7. The “Prior experience” trap

8. The “Pipeline” or “Shallow pool” trap »

À quoi servent les actionnaires de nos jours ?


Excellent article de Justin Fox et Jay W. Lorsch dans le dernier numéro (juillet-août) de Harvard Business Review. On y décrit les rôles que devraient jouer les actionnaires de nos jours et on présente plusieurs suggestions pour les aider à mieux contribuer au succès des organisations. Un must !
 
What Good Are Shareholders? – Harvard Business Review 

Walmart Shareholders' Meeting 2011
Walmart Shareholders’ Meeting 2011 (Photo credit: Walmart Stores)
« The path forward for corporate executives and shareholders appears blocked. Executives complain, with justification, that meddling and second-guessing from shareholders are making it ever harder for them to do their jobs effectively. Shareholders complain, with justification, of executives who pocket staggering paychecks while delivering mediocre results. Boards are stuck in the middle—under increasing pressure to act as watchdogs and disciplinarians despite evidence that they’re more effective as friendly advisers…
 

Our aim here is to focus on shareholders. Who are they? What are their incentives? What are they good at? What are they bad at? The body of research and discussion on these questions is growing. (For a summary, see “Are Institutional Investors Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?,” a working paper by Ben W. Heineman Jr. and Stephen Davis, published by Yale’s Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance.) Our contribution is to offer a framework for thinking about shareholders’ role and to make some suggestions for changes. We’ve divided shareholders’ contributions into three areas: money, information, and discipline ».

Présence de représentants des travailleurs sur les conseils d’administration en France


Didier Serrat a publié un article intéressant dans Le cercle | les Echos sur l’historique de la présence des représentants des travailleurs sur les conseils d’administration en France. Très bon résumé de la situation historique en lien avec le programme du nouveau gouvernement Hollande.

 

« La grande conférence sociale qui s’ouvre lundi 9 juillet devrait voir le sujet de la représentation des salariés au conseil d’administration des grandes entreprises « mis sur la table » selon l’expression du Premier ministre dans son discours de politique générale le 3 juillet dernier. « Rien ne sera tabou »… Pourtant la capacité de résistance de la société française sur ce sujet est particulièrement forte. Petit rappel historique ».

Gouvernance d’entreprise, sujet à suivre dans la grande conférence…

Il y a un problème lorsqu’un haut dirigeant est irremplaçable !


Très bon article publié dans le New York Times hier qui montre l’importance cruciale pour un Board de se préoccuper du processus de planification de la relève du PDG. L’article décrit la saga de la mise à pied de Robert Diamond Jr en tant que CEO de la Barclays

 
Barclay!
Barclay! (Photo credit: J Dueck)

« Was Robert E. Diamond Jr. really irreplaceable? The Barclays board operated for 15 years on the assumption that he was. As a result, the British bank’s chief executive became more powerful — and ever harder to replace. Now that he has been kicked out in the wake of the scandal over the rigging of a key interest rate, Barclays is struggling to find new leadership.

And the moral of the story? Boards must always counterbalance strong chief executives with strong chairmen and have good succession plans in place. Most importantly, they should never treat anybody as indispensable — in case that is what they become ».

L’IFA publie un document phare sur la gouvernance des sociétés cotées en France


L’IFA publie un document phare sur la gouvernance des sociétés cotées dont l’objectif est d’attirer en France les investisseurs étrangers en les informant des atouts de l’hexagone.

 La gouvernance des sociétés cotées à l’usage des investisseurs 

Voici comment on présente l’ouvrage.

La qualité de la gouvernance des sociétés françaises constitue indiscutablement une valeur ajoutée et un renforcement de la sécurité économique et juridique. Afin de faire connaître ces pratiques en dehors de nos frontières, l’Institut Français des Administrateurs et Paris Ile-de-France Capitale Economique, en partenariat avec le Conseil Supérieur de l’Ordre des Experts-Comptables et la Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes, publient « La gouvernance des sociétés cotées à l’usage des investisseurs ».

Cette synthèse sur les pratiques sociétales de gouvernance en France a été réalisée à partir de l’expertise d’un groupe de travail piloté par la Commission Internationale de l’IFA présidée par Marie-Ange Andrieux et regroupant des institutions du monde économique et financier. Elle se veut, à la fois, un outil d’information des investisseurs étrangers et un document de valorisation de la gouvernance de nos sociétés.

« L’étude réalisée montre, en effet, que les pratiques de gouvernance françaises des sociétés cotées se situent déjà au niveau des meilleurs standards européens et internationaux, indique ainsi Daniel Lebègue, Président de l’IFA. Ces pratiques devraient poursuivre leur dynamique de progression, dans les grands groupes comme dans les entreprises moyennes, et même s’étendre aux entreprises non cotées. Équilibre des pouvoirs, performance des instances de gouvernance, à travers, entre autres, les différents comités, et transparence sont des qualités dont peuvent se prévaloir aujourd’hui nombre de Conseils d’administration ; Qualités indiscutablement séduisantes pour des investisseurs internationaux… Et qu’il s’agit donc de leur faire connaître ! »

Paris
Paris (Photo credit: citronate)

« La qualité de la gouvernance des entreprises est devenue un facteur significatif d’attractivité et de confiance; il contribue à améliorer la réputation d’un pays ou d’une région économique vis-à-vis de ses partenaires industriels et financiers, souligne Pierre Simon, Président de Paris IDF Capitale Economique. Dans un contexte de concurrence mondiale, c’est un vrai atout. Nous l’avons en France. »

Les atouts de la gouvernance des sociétés cotées françaises sont multiples et détaillées dans la synthèse :

– Le poids prépondérant de la « soft law » par rapport à la réglementation, au regard des sources de la gouvernance,
– La composition des Conseils (indépendance, diversité, mixité, compétences…) et l’efficacité de leur fonctionnement (comités, secrétariat général…),
– La qualité de la transparence de l’information tant financière qu’extra financière,
– La clarté de la communication sur la rémunération des mandataires sociaux,
– Le bon équilibre des pouvoirs entre les actionnaires et le Conseil d’Administration, 
– Le respect du droit des actionnaires et les outils mis à disposition des non-résidents au service de l’engagement actionnarial,
– Une bonne gestion des risques, facilitée par le rôle efficient des organismes de vérification et de contrôle.

Que penser de la gouvernance des entreprises de la Silicon Valley ?


Voici un excellent article, paru dans Dealbook.nytimes.com, et partagé par Louise Champoux-Paillé, dans le groupe de discussion Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance sur LinkedIn. « Les entreprises de la Vallée favorisent une nouvelle gouvernance où les administrateurs et les actionnaires jouent un rôle effacé comparativement au président et chef de la direction. Une structure sans grand contrepoids ».

Cet article présente plusieurs exemples de cette «nouvelle gouvernance» et se questionne sur les tendances de ce mouvement : une exception (a blip) ou l’annonce de changements qui vont s’étendre à l’ensemble des modes de gouvernance des entreprises ?

In Silicon Valley, Chieftains Rule With Few Checks and Balances

English: Silicon Valley, seen from a jetliner ...
English: Silicon Valley, seen from a jetliner in the direction of San Jose (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

So the new thing in Silicon Valley appears to be for public companies to be run as private ones without significant input from boards and shareholders. This leaves the wunderkinder of the Internet free to run their companies without interference. The question is whether this is merely a bubble in corporate governance or a trend that will spread to the rest of corporate America.

Exigence de divulgation du nombre de femmes sur les C.A. en Nouvelle-Zélande


La Nouvelle-Zélande fait un pas crucial afin d’inciter les entreprises cotées à accroître le nombre de femmes sur les C.A. et dans des postes de direction. La nouvelle directive est alignée sur celle de l’Australie qui exige également une autoévaluation de la politique formelle de diversité. Encore une fois, on assiste à une certaine globalisation des codes de gouvernance et des directives en découlant. 

 

New Zealand Exchange
New Zealand Exchange (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« Listed companies will be required to disclose how many women they have on their boards and in senior management, the NZX announced last night. In addition to publishing a gender breakdown of directors and senior management, firms with a formal diversity policy will be required to evaluate their performance with respect to that policy, NZX said…

… The NZX’s new rule brings New Zealand into closer alignment with Australia, where similar requirements introduced by the Australian Stock Exchange resulted in a big jump in the level of female representation on listed company boards. As of last August, 12.7 per cent of Australia’s top 200 listed firms had women directors, compared with just 9.3 per cent for the top 100 listed companies in this country ».

Révision du code de gouvernance de Singapour


Le nouveau code de gouvernance de Singapour contient des changements significatifs en ce sens qu’il insiste sur les standards éthiques à respecter et la notion de parties prenantes.  De plus, il précise que les entreprises doivent considérer les facteurs liés au développement durable dans la formulation de la stratégie. Cet article, paru dans csr-asia.com, est intéressant à lire parce qu’il illustre clairement la tendance à concevoir des codes de gouvernance semblables à l’échelle mondiale.

 

CSR Asia – Corporate Social Responsibility in Asia

English: Integrated boardroom designed and ins...
English: Integrated boardroom designed and installed by EDG in 2003. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
« These changes are and address areas of corporate governance best practice – director independence, board composition, director training, multiple directorships, alternate directors, remuneration practices and disclosures, risk management, as well as shareholder rights and roles plus fundamental changes to the very first principle, which sets out that ‘every company should be headed by an effective board’….

 
However, the Revised Code also included a fundamental change to the very first principle, which sets out that ‘every company should be headed by an effective board’.   Previously the 2005 Code of Corporate Governance had set out that the role of the board was to do all those things stated below in black text. The Revised Code added the text in red, broadening its requirements to cover sustainability and ethical standards and embedding them in company strategy. Arguably, a huge shift.
  1. provide entrepreneurial leadership, set strategic objectives, and ensure that the necessary financial and human resources are in place for the company to meet its objectives;
  2. establish a framework of prudent and effective controls which enables risks to be assessed and managed, including safeguarding of shareholders’ interests and the company’s assets;
  3. review management performance;
  4. identify the key stakeholder groups and recognise that their perceptions affect the company’s reputation;
  5. set the company’s values and standard (including ethical standards), and ensure that obligations to shareholders and other(s) stakeholders are understood and met; and
  6. consider sustainability issues, e.g. environmental and social factors, as part of its strategic formulation ».

Avantages à la dissociation des rôles de Président du Conseil (PCA) et de Président et chef de la direction (PCD)


Voici un excellent article paru dans 24/7 WALL St qui montre clairement le besoin de séparer les fonctions de PCA et de PCD. Les études montrent que la rémunération globale des deux postes séparés est significativement moindre que la rémunération d’un PCA/PCD.

Breaking Up Chairman and CEO Roles

New York Stock Exchange
New York Stock Exchange (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« CEOs do not like it. More and more often, it seems, the roles of  chairman and CEO become separate from one another. And the arrangement  usually is forced on the chief executive. A major problem at a big corporation  is often the catalyst of these actions. That certainly happened at many of the  nation’s banks after the financial crisis. Troubled Chesapeake Energy (NYSE:  CHK) ripped the chairman’s role from CEO Aubrey Mc Clendon when  it became clear that he took advantage of his position to financially enrich  himself… It turns out that there may be reasons other than good corporate governance  practices to separate the two jobs. A new  study by GMI Ratings, a corporate governance research firm, claims that  the decision to separate the roles also saves a public company, and thus, its  shareholders, money. In a new piece of research GMI found :

The cost of employing a combined CEO/chair is 151 percent of what it  costs to employ a separate CEO and chairman.

Specifically, the data show :

– Executives with a combined CEO and chair role earn a median total summary  compensation of just over $16 million.

– CEOs who do not serve as chair earn $9.8 million in median total summary  compensation.

– A separate CEO and chairman earn a combined $11 million ».

The Director’s Dilemma – Juillet 2012


Voici un cas présenté par Julie Garland McLelland www.mclellan.com.au. À chaque mois Julie présente un cas qui est analysé par trois experts. Vous pouvez vous abonner à la série Director’s Dilemma.

Welcome to the July 2012 edition of The Director’s Dilemma.

This newsletter provides case studies that have been written to help you to develop your judgement as a company director. The case studies are based upon real life; they focus on complex and challenging boardroom issues which can be resolved in a variety of ways. There is often no one ‘correct’ answer; just an answer that is more likely to work given the circumstances and personalities of the case.

These are real life cases; the names and some circumstances have been altered to ensure anonymity. Each potential solution to the case study has different pros and cons for the individuals and companies concerned. Every month this newsletter presents an issue and several responses.

Consider: Which response would you choose and why?

Miriam is the Regional Managing Director for a large multi-national company. She oversees a group of companies that manufacture and sell products across the region and also export from it. One of the subsidiaries in her group is in a country that has a small market for the products and is fundamentally unprofitable. She has recommended on several occasions that the board allow her to close this subsidiary and supply that market by importing product from other group companies. She has backed her recommendations with detailed market analyses and projections as well as implementation plans.

Each time the board has denied her request and she is forced to continue to see the subsidiary drain her region’s profits and the shareholders’ returns. Last time the board met in her region she made the usual request and was denied again. She lost her temper and said some fairly harsh words in an unprofessional tone.

Miriam is a professional manager and has produced good results so her transgression was forgiven. However the board is, once again, meeting in her region and she has another invitation to present her recommended strategy to them.

What should Miriam do?

Eli’s Answer

Before addressing the board again, Miriam needs to find out why its members have so far refused to close the subsidiary. There may be a surface agenda as well as a hidden agenda, and she needs to uncover both. Once she finds out what the real concerns are, she needs to factor them into any proposed solution, which may be something other than her first choice.

When proposing the eventual solution, Miriam should first acknowledge respectfully the concerns about the proposed closing, and then explain the challenge she has in balancing these concerns with the need to be fiscally viable. The fact that she acknowledges the board’s concerns with utmost respect will likely make it easier for the board to listen to her proposed solution. Again, the proposed solution would probably not be an outright shutdown, but one that would somehow optimize the positive outcomes and minimize the risks.

Of course, there is a possibility that Miriam will discover that the board’s resistance to a shutdown is not legitimate but is emotionally or personally-based (e.g., the board Chair is the one who orchestrated the start-up of this subsidiary and takes personal offence to any suggestion of a shut down). If this is the case, Miriam may consider whether she can tolerate working in this setting. If her professionalism is substantially compromised, she should consider resigning.

One other issue to consider is whether the board should even be involved in decisions to start-up or wind-down a subsidiary, or whether such decisions should be delegated to the CEO who would make them on strictly professional considerations. However, such a change would require a revision of board policy to delegate more authority to management and remain focused primarily on strategic priorities, fiduciary duties, and organizational policies.

Eli Mina is a consultant on board effectiveness, shared decision making, and meeting procedures. He is the author of « 101 Boardroom Problems and How to Solve Them » and is based in Vancouver, Canada.

Julie’s Answer

Miriam must set the correct strategic context for a board discussion. She should investigate and understand the reasons the subsidiary was established and the assumptions presented to the board when they approved establishment. She should ask:

  1. Were the assumptions wrong?
  2. Were the assumptions right but the world has now changed?
  3. Have the reasons for setting up in such a small market ceased to exist?
  4. Can the aims of the subsidiary be addressed by another strategy?

Loss of temper (or any emotional control) is not acceptable behaviour for a senior executive. Miriam is lucky to have a second chance. She must make the most of this by establishing a strong shared understanding of strategy for the subsidiary. She needs to present the facts and align herself with the board by building agreement about what the subsidiary was set up to accomplish before she asks the board to endorse a change of strategy.

She then needs to demonstrate that the board can rely on her leadership to implement the strategy she is recommending. This is not just a question of financial logic and brief implementation plans; she must address risks including legal issues around staff redundancies and closure of facilities. The board needs to satisfy itself that the strategy recommended will be satisfactorily implemented under her leadership.

Board time is precious and Miriam should write a good board paper so that all directors are able to engage in a productive discussion and confidently make a decision.

If the board is still unwilling to close the subsidiary she will just have to carry on running it. By engaging in a proper high level discussion Miriam should gain an insight into the reasons for retaining a loss-making subsidiary. She may even find that she agrees with the directors.

Miriam needs to relax. It is the board’s decision, not hers. She has done her duty by providing the information required to facilitating a proper debate and decision.

Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia.

Michelle’s Answer

Miriam is forgetting that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over again and expecting different results! If the board is saying ‘no’ – then it’s ‘no’! The good news for Miriam is that ‘no’ is just feedback that she didn’t properly understand her audience’s attitude. Miriam simply hasn’t reflected to the board that she understands their perspective before seeking approval. ‘No’ means try again, just do something different!

To date Miriam has presented her logic, data and analysis and only covered what she wanted to say, and it’s not working. Miriam should remember, ‘it’s not about me, it’s all about the audience’. I suggest Miriam think about the issues from the board member’s (not her own) perspective. She should ask herself, ‘what is this audience thinking, feeling and doing in relation to this issue?’ She could phone each board member prior to the board meeting and elicit their concerns. She could seek feedback from her direct reports as they are possibly more connected to the issues at the coal face. I expect Miriam would find that her previous approach was misdirected. Instead of focusing on profitability (her main concern) there’s probably a different matter getting in the way of their approval, such as a prior commitment to the staff in the unprofitable subsidiary or to the wider financial market regarding the closure of the subsidiary.

We are more likely to be influenced by our emotions first and then substantiate our views with logic and data. It’s important that Miriam dedicates some time in the opening of her upcoming board presentation to re-establish rapport with her board. Only then is she in a position to deliver the relevant facts and data based on her assessment of their perspective.

This matter is important, so I encourage her to allocate the time important matters deserve. Miriam must plan her approach and rehearse until she is confident. A professional presentation skills coach can help dramatically with the necessary preparation for this type of business presentation.

Michelle Bowden, CSP is a Master of Influence and presentations coach. She is the author of « Don’t Picture me Naked » – how to present your ideas and influence people using techniques that actually work. She is based in Sydney, Australia.

Disclaimer

The opinions expressed above are general in nature and are designed to help you to develop your judgement as a director. They are not a definitive legal ruling. Names and some circumstances in the case study have been changed to ensure anonymity. Contributors to this newsletter comment in the context of their own jurisdiction; readers should check their local laws and regulations as they may be very different.

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www.mclellan.com.au | PO Box 97 Killara NSW 2071 email julie@mclellan.com.au | phone +61 2 9499 8700 | mobile +61 411 262 470 | fax +61 2 9499 8711

En rappel : Un nouveau modèle de gouvernance de sociétés


Voici, en rappel, un excellent billet de Richard Leblanc qui a fait un travail colossal de synthèse afin de dégager les bases d’un modèle de gouvernance, bâti à partir des nombreuses et riches discussions dans le groupe Boards & Advisers de LinkedIn. Richard a développé un modèle vraiment très pertinent que vous pouvez télécharger à partir de son blogue. Je vous encourage à lire ce document synthèse qui est le fruit de centaines d’échanges sur LinkedIn. Par la même occasion, je vous invite à vous inscrire à son blogue et à suivre son groupe Boards & Advisers sur LinkedIn.

Shareholder Spring and A New Model of Corporate Governance

« Shareholder activism at CP Rail, Yahoo, Research in Motion, Chesapeake Energy and BMC Software continues, trying to prevent the destruction of billions of dollars of shareholder value. Shareholders rejected Citigroup’s, Aviva’s, Knight Capital’s, FirstMerit’s and Cairn Energy’s executive pay packages. Activists and hedge funds such as Bill Ackman at Pershing Square, Dan Loeb of Third Point Capital, Vic Alboini at Jaguar Financial Corp., Paul Singer at Elliot Management and Carl Icahn reveal defects in the current corporate governance system. What do they all have in common? And are boards listening ? »

Comment un PDG peut-il mieux communiquer avec son C.A. ?


Voici un article paru dans blog.openviewpartners.com qui montre la nécessité d’établir une bonne communication entre le PDG et le C.A. Si les réunions avec le C.A. sont un cauchemar pour vous, dépêchez-vous de lire cet article !

How to Take Advantage of Your Board of Directors

« It’s no secret a lot of CEOs aren’t big fans of their boards of directors. They derive very little value from them and in some cases find the board to be an utter distraction. Even seasoned CEOs who have managed to assemble a valuable team of advisors and mentors sometimes struggle with board management. They’re not sure how often to communicate with them, how involved they should allow board members to be, or in which areas the board could provide the most value…

The most common Board of Directors (BOD) challenges are often functions of these three issues:

  1. You don’t communicate with your BOD: If the only time you talk with your board is during quarterly meetings, an information gap will inevitably exist. That can cause a huge operational disconnect that results in ineffective and inefficient meetings. Too much of the BOD meetings are spent getting caught up, versus having a meaningful dialogue about the key issues.
  2. You don’t want to show your weaknesses: CEOs are very often hesitant to open up and reveal their weaknesses. This may be born out of a bad experience in the past or just pure ego. They worry that if they’re candid about the challenges the business is facing, they’ll be viewed as incompetent.
  3. You don’t want to bother them: Entrepreneurs too often assume that their board members are too busy to be bothered with seemingly menial issues, and they feel like a nuisance if they ask for help ». 

Gouvernance universitaire vs gouvernance corporative !


Ci-dessous un article publié par Patricia McGuire, President, Trinity Washington University, dans le Huffingtonpost.com et partagé par Estelle Metayer. C’est une lecture qui présente un point de vue qui est partagé par plusieurs auteurs et qui met en garde l’application des principes de gouvernance des grandes entreprises à la gouvernance des uviversités.

 
 

Run It Like a Business? Really?

« Let’s stop trashing academic governance while exalting corporate governance as perfect. There’s a need for governance reform in many different kinds of businesses — for-profit and not-for-profit, academic and commercial — and that need often coalesces around the same issues: innovation, speed to market, inclusion of those affected, ethics.

There’s a lot to be said for the wisdom of the group, whether a board meeting in full session — not in one-off emails or phone calls about vitally important decisions — or academic committees vetting the latest great idea about new programs or technologies. In higher education we call this « shared governance, » but it’s not really just an academic notion. In fact, some of the best boards and companies in America honor exactly the same idea that the people affected by decisions should have some say in them.

Thomas Jefferson had something to say about that idea. He called it democracy — the basis for our most fundamental principles of governance ».