Catégorie : Audit interne

Le contrôle interne dans les OBNL !


Dans ce billet, je fais référence à un très bon article de Richard Leblanc, paru récemment dans CanadianBusiness.com, qui met l’accent sur la sensibilisation du Conseil à l’importance accrue du contrôle interne dans les OBNL.

L’auteur donne quelques bons exemples d’organisations où le contrôle interne a été défaillant et il montre que les OBNL sont particulièrement vulnérables à des malversations, surtout lorsque l’on sait que le contrôle interne est à peu près inexistant !

C’est la responsabilité du conseil d’administration de s’assurer que les bons contrôles sont en place. L’intérêt public l’exige !

Non-profit boards need a hands-on approach

 

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Non-profit and charitable organizations have stretched resources, which makes them particularly vulnerable to fraudsters.

The Salvation Army is currently going through such a situation after a whistleblower informed the organization that $2 million in donated toys had disappeared from—or wasn’t delivered to—their main warehouse in north Toronto over roughly two years.

Fortunately, the police have recovered the majority of stolen items, but not before the Salvation Army fired David Rennie, the executive director of the warehouse, last week. Rennie turned himself into detectives on Monday and was charged with multiple offences, including theft and breach of trust.

It’s highly unlikely that 100,000 toys were carried out under one’s arm. Instead, it’s possible that internal controls over the segregation of duties and the safeguarding of assets were inadequate. Theft happens when there is opportunity, incentives and a lack of internal controls. A board happens to control and approve all these factors, especially the latter one. The trouble is that many boards aren’t exercising their power over internal controls.

After the XL Foods crisis, I spoke to a room full of directors on beef association boards in Calgary. “Do you approve the internal controls over food safety?” I asked. Not many hands went up. “Do you take tours of the plant, see the production line and talk to workers? Do you have an internal audit function that tests the design and effectiveness of internal controls? If so, does it report directly to you?” Again, not many hands went up.

A proper board will want to see confirmation and accountability of the internal controls over all material risks, which aren’t just financial. This includes operational controls, such as the line in a meat plant, or the warehouse with toys in it.

Internal controls basically constrain management. No one likes being controlled and there’s an obvious aversion to management controlling itself. But in a non-profit environment with tight resources and volunteers, vulnerabilities can be exploited by fraudsters. Controls need to be person-proofed and require a diligent board with authority and competency.

Sadly, the Salvation Army was exploited to the tune of $2 million. The organization has a national advisory board, but it’s unclear whether it has a proper, functioning board of directors that oversees risk and controls. Advisory committees advise, but cannot direct.

By exercising greater authority over internal controls, the Salvation Army’s board may have been able to prevent this situation from happening in the first place.

 

Documentation récente en gouvernance | Deloitte


Voici une documentation très récente et pertinente sur la gouvernance des sociétés que vous retrouverez sur le site de Deloitte | US. Je vous encourage à visiter le site du Center for Corporate Governance | US ainsi que le site du Centre de la gouvernance d’entreprise | Canada. Ci-dessous un extrait des principaux défis des conseils d’administration au cours des prochaines années.

Board Governance US – Deloitte

 

English: Deloitte Office Building in Downtown ...
English: Deloitte Office Building in Downtown Chicago (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« Today’s business environment is influenced by a fluctuating economy, greater scrutiny, and increased regulatory requirements, all of which are creating challenges and increased responsibilities for boards of directors. Because their role in governance has been heightened and the demands for accountability and transparency are at an all-time high, directors need current information and perspectives from independent sources to help make the tough decisions.

Select Challenges for Boards of Directors in the Current Environment

  1. Overseeing enterprise risk management
  2. Focusing on executive compensation programs and related regulations
  3. Ensuring corporate strategy will achieve long-term value creation
  4. Addressing heightened levels of shareholder activism
  5. Responding to environmental and business sustainability concerns »
Articles reliés :
Good advice from Deloitte for boards on risk oversight (normanmarks.wordpress.com)

Scoring des C.A. américains | les plus forts et les plus faibles ! (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Cadre conceptuel et méthodologie pour évaluer la santé de la gouvernance


Rajeev Peshawaria, dans forbes.com, présente un excellent cadre conceptuel pour évaluer la santé d’une organisation. Cette approche s’appuie sur un sondage réalisé auprès des employés et qui porte (1) sur les stratégies et les avantages concurentiels, (2) sur la force de la structure organisationnelle et (3) sur la culture organisationnelle. C’est un article vraiment très stimulant et de surcroît facile à lire; la méthodologie est relativement aisée à mettre en oeuvre. On peut imaginer de nombreuses retombées positives de l’analyse des données. Vous trouverez, ci-joint, un court extrait de l’article ainsi qu’un aperçu des résultats d’un sondage. À lire autant par les membres de conseils que par les membres de la direction d’une organisation…                               

The Other Duty of Corporate Governance

« According to BusinessDictionary.com, corporate governance is “The Framework of rules and practices by which a board of directors ensures accountability, fairness, and transparency in a company’s relationship with its all stakeholders.”  OECD.org defines it as the “Procedures and processes according to which an organisation is directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in the organisation – such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays down the rules and procedures for decision-making”
 

Most definitions place significant emphasis on enterprise value preservation, which largely comprises of rules, regulatory compliance, risk management, and other types of watchdog activities.  Clearly, value preservation  is an important duty of the Board of Directors.  In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis and the recession that followed, defending against downsides has become more important than ever before.  However, there is another equally important side to the board’s responsibilities – enterprise value enhancement – that I believe might be slightly under served by boards today.

Consider the following. By some estimates, 65% of a company’s stock price is attributable to intangible value, promises of future economic benefits based on  the quality of leadership and management, the company’s ability to innovate, the depth of talent, employee engagement, etc.  While most boards recognize this duty to ensure that management does all it can to maximize this future value as well as stave off present dangers, in this article, I want to offer a simple but powerful information system that can help boards better fulfill this duty ».

Article relié :

Board of Directors’ Training and Evaluation Alliance Promotes Board Excellence (prweb.com)

Actions à considérer par les C.A. eu égard aux situations de corruption dans les pays émergents !


English: Transparency International logo
English: Transparency International logo (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Voici, ci-joint, un excellent billet de Richard Lebanc publié sur son blogue Governance Gateway, hier. Cet article traite de l’état de la corruption dans les pays émergents (en se basant sur  l’index produit par Transparency International’s corruption perception index) et montre comment les gouvernements des pays occidentaux interviennent afin d’assurer un minimun de cohérence dans la gouvernance des sociétés à vocation internationale. Richard Leblanc propose six actions à prendre afin de répondre à ce défi de taille. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait des moyens privilégiés pour réagir à ces situations de corruption.

Regulators turning up anti-bribery heat on corporate boards: But will practices change?

English: Overview of the Corruption Perception...
English: Overview of the Corruption Perceptions Index (last update: 2009) Français : Carte du monde de l’indice de perceptions de la_corruption (année 2009) Italiano: Mappa mondiale con indice di corruzione percepita, stilata dall’organizzazione Transparency International che fonda i dati su interviste agli imprenditori delle varie nazioni. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« What should boards that have operations in emerging market jurisdictions do? Six things. First, if you are doing business in such a market, you need a director with extensive on-the-ground experience at the board table, who can tell you and management what the hotspots are. You should move a board meeting to the jurisdiction once a year so directors can get a first hand look. Second, boards must make it crystal clear to management that if the company is not going to bribe, management must walk away from certain business. And the board must support this and not have incentives that promote bribery. Third, the internal controls over financial reporting must be as strong in the emerging market as it is in the home market. Investment and resource commitments need to be made. Fourth, boards must have their own experts to scrutinize off-balance sheet and related-party transactions and complex structures; validate and assure internal controls; and provide foreign language document translation. Fifth, local auditors should have the same oversight, scrutiny, and as necessary direct contact with the audit committee that the home auditors have. Lastly, there needs to be zero tolerance by the board communicated to each employee and supplier. The UK is even banning facilitating payments, which are regarded as a “tip,” as these may be bribes in disguise ».

Le code de gouvernance UK vingt ans plus tard | Encore l’éthique et l’intégrité !


English: Frame of reference for research of in...
English: Frame of reference for research of integrateg Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

L’article publié par John Plender dans le FT.com du 11 novembre présente une très bonne synthèse de l’application des règles de gouvernance sur une période de 20 ans (à l’occasion du vingtième anniversaire de l’introduction du Code de gouvernance des sociétés britanniques – UK). Il reste encore beaucoup à faire, surtout au niveau du « Comply or Explain » qui permet à plusieurs organisations de passer outre à des pratiques de gouvernance exemplaires. On a également beaucoup de problèmes avec la « mesure » de l’éthique des dirigeants, les cultures organisationnelles viciées et les conflits d’intérêts, surtout lorsqu’il s’agit de rémunération. Un excellent article partagé par Richard Leblanc sur LinkedIn.

 Ethics and integrity in governance

Voici un court extrait de l’article que je vous encourage à lire.

« There was a fundamental failure, he said, to distinguish governance, which is a responsibility of the board, from management, whose job is to turn purpose into action. And he rightly placed emphasis on how formalising the board appointment process helped dispel a clubby ethos. The subtlety of the market-oriented comply or explain formula ensured that business leaders went along with all-important proposals such as the split of the chairman and chief executive roles.

That said, the limits to the code’s achievements are today painfully clear. The biggest failure concerns remuneration, where the formalisation of boardroom pay setting led to a ratchet whereby non-executives never feel that their chief executive is third or fourth quartile material and chief executives who are not primarily motivated by money nonetheless want pay that looks good in relation to their peers. The sheer complexity and flawed metrics that characterise so many incentive schemes cannot be blamed on the code. But there is no question that this is the biggest area of unfinished business in corporate governance in the English-speaking world ».

Guide à l’intention des émetteurs opérant dans des pays en émergence | CVMO-OSC


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un guide, publié hier par la CVMO (Commission des Valeurs Mobilières de l’Ontario), à l’intention des émetteurs canadiens qui ont des opérations dans les marchés en émergence. Ce document est excellent et doit être lu par toute personne impliquée sur des C.A., dont l’entreprise fait des affaires à l’étranger. Comme vous le constaterez, le guide présente huit domaines dans lesquels les firmes doivent exercer une grande vigilance. La version française n’est pas disponible à ce stade-ci.

1. BUSINESS AND OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

2. LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

3. CORPORATE STRUCTURE

4. RELATED PARTIES

5. RISK MANAGEMENT AND DISCLOSURE

6. INTERNAL CONTROLS

7. USE OF AND RELIANCE ON EXPERTS

8. OVERSIGHT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR 

English: Map of Emerging Markets
English: Map of Emerging Markets (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Pour chacun des points ci-dessus, le rapport fait état des éléments essentiels à considérer,  des exigences de divulgation requises, d’exemples et de conseils précieux sur la manière de faire la divulgation. Encore une fois, il s’agit ici d’un document essentiel, clair et facile à lire.

Guide for Issuers Operating in Emerging Markets | OSC

« We believe directors and management of all market issuers will benefit from specific guidance that help them meet the regulatory and investor expectations in Ontario’s capital markets. We are publishing this Guide to provide assistance to emerging market issuers and their directors and management on their governance and disclosure practices in light of the unique challenges they face. Specifically, this Guide:

1. highlights to emerging market issuers and their directors and management potential areas of risk or red flags that may warrant further scrutiny;

2. sets out questions that directors and management of emerging market issuers should consider when deciding how to address risks of doing business in emerging markets; and

3. outlines our expectations regarding compliance with existing disclosure requirements »

Constats sur les lacunes de la gouvernance au Japon


Excellent article paru dans The Economist qui montre un des aspects les plus déficients de la gouvernance des sociétés publiques au Japon : Un manque flagrant de diversité dans les conseils d’administration !

Plus d’un an après que la saga Olympus (voir l’article du 18 octobre 2011 en référence) ait démontré la nécessité d’une meilleure surveillance de la part des C.A. ainsi que d’une plus grande indépendance des administrateurs, on croyait que les autorités de règlementation japonaises avaient pris bonne note et que plusieurs changements étaient dans le collimateur! L’article semble démontrer que la situation n’a pas vraiment évoluée, loin de là … À lire.

 
 
 
« MICHAEL WOODFORD was sacked as president of Olympus last year after he revealed a $1.7 billion accounting cover-up. The board of the Japanese cameramaker lied about the mystery for weeks. When the truth at last came out, the board kept their jobs and the whistleblowing boss lost his. Mr Woodford called it a “black comedy”. In no other developed market, he lamented, could this happen. Mr Woodford’s frustration is understandable. At one point Olympus’s shares lost about 80% of their value, yet its institutional shareholders uttered not “one word” of criticism againstthe company’s board. Such passivity is one reason why firms listed on Japan’s stockmarket have an average price-to-book ratio of 0.7, roughly half the norm for rich nations, says Nicholas Benes, head of the Board Director Training Institute of Japan, which promotes better corporate governance.

The Asian Corporate Governance Association, a watchdog, recently downgraded Japan to fourth in Asia for corporate governance, tying with Malaysia. It noted that “Japan is also lagging most markets in not requiring any training of directors.” It added that this was “shocking”.

À lire aussi le billet paru le 18 octobre 2011 :

Leadership et gouvernance à la japonnaise !

À la suite du congédiement du PDG d’Olympus, The Economist adopte une position très arrêtée quant à l’efficacité des styles de leadership au Japon ainsi que sur la bonne gouvernance des organisations japonaises en général.  À lire pour mieux comprendre la gestion dans un contexte culturel différent.

UN CADRE DE SURVEILLANCE DES RISQUES À L’INTENTION DES C. A.


L’Institut Canadien des Comptables Agréés (ICCA) a récemment publié un ouvrage présentant un cadre conceptuel en gestion des risques à l’intention des conseils d’administration. Cette publication est unique en ce sens qu’elle met l’accent sur le rôle du conseil d’administration en matière de risques. Ce cadre de surveillance des risques est le plus récent, le plus complet, le mieux ciblé, le plus englobant et le plus opérationnel sur le marché. À l’instar des autres publications de l’ICCA, celle-ci deviendra une référence dans le domaine. Voici un extrait de la préface de l’ouvrage. Bonne lecture.

UN CADRE DE SURVEILLANCE DES RISQUES À L’INTENTION  DES C. A.

« Le Conseil sur la surveillance des risques et la gouvernance (CSRG) de l’Institut Canadien des Comptables Agréés (ICCA) a élaboré le cadre de surveillance exposé dans le présent document afin d’aider les conseils d’administration à s’acquitter de leurs responsabilités en matière de surveillance des risques. La présente analyse des questions relatives à la surveillance des risques prend la forme d’un processus en neuf étapes qui vise à aider les conseils :

  1. à mieux identifier et traiter les risques cruciaux;
  2. à comprendre les liens entre les différents risques;
  3. à comprendre l’effet multiplicateur possible des risques lorsque plusieurs événements défavorables se produisent simultanément.

Bien qu’il n’appartienne pas aux conseils de participer à la gestion des risques au quotidien, les événements récents montrent la nécessité d’une participation plus proactive et plus directe de la part des conseils qui va au-delà du modèle traditionnel de surveillance des risques ».

Le rôle des secrétaires corporatifs eu égard à la diversité des C.A. des sociétés canadiennes


Le billet d’aujourd’hui a trait à la problématique de la diversité au sein des conseils d’administration. Afin d’avoir une perspective globale et synthétique sur cette question, j’ai demandé à un expert canadien en gouvernance, Richard W. Leblanc, professeur associé | Law, Governance & Ethics, York University, de nous donner son point de vue sur le sujet. Ce dernier a accepté de nous livrer les recommandations qu’il a faites aux membres de la  Canadian Society of Corporate Secretaries (CSCS) – Société canadienne des secrétaires corporatifs (SCSC) lors d’un récent panel à Toronto. Le professeur Leblanc a énoncé 10 recommandations très pertinentes sur les actions à entreprendre par les responsables afin de s’assurer du bon traitement du sujet de la diversité.

Par Richard W. Leblanc, PhD, Professeur associé | Law, Governance & Ethics, York University, Invited Guest

Board Diversity and the Role of Corporate Secretaries (CSs)

1. Consider Tenure Limits on Entrenchment

Boards are a fixed size and directors are self-interested. This may promote entrenchment and limit turnover. The UK, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore (and possibly India) have moved to 9-year tenure limits (10 years in India’s case). Beyond the cap, independence is questioned. CSs should track developments and educate their boards, particularly those with weighted director tenures > 10 years.

2. Draft a Diversity Policy

Many or most industrial democracies have moved to corporate board diversification, by regulatory disclosure, objectives or targets (hard and soft). Canada’s progress has been wholly inadequate, other than Quebec, which has been exemplary. CSs should participate if not lead the development of a diversity policy for their company and board, including defining diversity and setting objectives and reporting. Diversity should not be defined downward to be “perspective” or diversity of “opinion” or the like. Diversity should be defined to include, at a minimum, gender, age, ethnicity/cultural background diversity (Australia example), but tailored to Canadian circumstances.

3. Focus on Competency-Based Recruitment and Assessment

Financial regulators in Canada are taking the lead globally in requiring risk and relevant financial industry expertise (OSFI) and rigorous competency assessment of directors (DICO). 
The CSA began this in 2005. The SEC (citing my work) did so in 2009, requiring full disclosure of incumbent and prospective director qualifications. CSs should track best practices, as they will reach non-financial firms. “Competency” is broader than experience and includes SKEET (skills, knowledge, education, experience, education, training).

4. Underscore the Business Case for Diversity

Empirical evidence is mixed on the effects of women on boards upon shareholder performance (as is the case with independence); however, the evidence is greater on mitigation of groupthink and enhanced decision-making through diversification.

5. CEOs Do Not Necessarily Make Better Directors

That CEOs make better directors is unsupported by empirical evidence (see recent Stanford study), and this can lead to interlocks and reciprocity/favoritism. “CEO” is not a competency but a job title; however, “leadership” or “enterprise leadership” should be unpacked into sub-competencies, as is done by good boards. In addition, there is little if any empirical evidence that the “talent pool” in Canada is “shallow,” or that diversity candidates are less “qualified” than others. Proponents of these assertions, sometimes code for blocking diversification, should bear the burden of defining and demonstrating “qualifications” for board membership. CSs should track evidence-based governance and have an impactful role to play here.

6. Disclose Director Selection Criteria and Process

Director selection criteria and process disclosure is opaque in many instances. CSs should be aware of best practices. At a minimum, the competency matrix should be disclosed, as is best practice. All prospective directors (short listed) should be interviewed by the NGC (Nomination and Governance Committee), before ranking, to enable diverse candidates to come forward whom the board may not know, and who may not have served on a board. Most directors serve on one or possibly two boards, so first time directors are commonplace now. There should be full disclosure of the way directors are brought onto boards.

7. Facilitate Board Communications With Shareholders

Shareholder support (institutional in particular) of diversity candidates (including registers and leadership) has been inadequate in Canada compared to the US. CSs could contribute here by recommending shareholder dialogue directly with boards, and shareholder support of competency-based recruitment and diversification. Boarddiversity.ca (CBDC) is doing exemplary work here. In addition, shareholders should have proxy access.

8. Retain Independent Advisors

Advisors such as search and governance firms should have no prior dealings whatsoever with management. Management should not pre-select firms. From the candidate’s point of view, the advisor’s loyalty is to the committee. Search firms should be managed and accountable [with support of the CS to the NGC] to include competencies and behaviors of prospective directors and, in particular, validation of the foregoing. CSs have a role here to contribute, educate and facilitate.

9. Solicit Third Party Expert Board Reviews

Third party board reviews often surface directors whose contribution and competencies are no longer appropriate for the organization. Regulators in the UK and now in Canada (OSFI) are moving towards external board reviews. CSs should educate the board in this regard as well. There is an inherent conflict of interest if a self-review is conducted, especially if facilitated by the CS (e.g., part of management). Regulators are beginning to acknowledge benefits of an independent and objective facilitation.

10. Liaise with Colleagues and Promote Exemplars

Lastly, CSs should dialogue and contribute to the development of exemplary companies, individuals and best practices, as the Canadian Society of Corporate Secretaries and Corporate Secretary Magazine are doing.

* CV | Richard W. Leblanc

* Canadian Society of Corporate Secretaries (CSCS)  is widely regarded as the voice of Corporate Secretaries and other governance professionals in Canada. Every day, in corporate, government, not for profitand crown offices across the country, our members deal with disclosure, board of directors administration and their associated committees, matters of corporate governance, proxy processes, annual meetings and more. In this dynamic governance environment, CSCS serves as an unparalleled resource for answering questions about corporate governance, what is considered good corporate governance and how to deal effectively with issues of compliance. As part of our mandate, our organization strives to provide timely information about recent changes and developments in Canadian corporate governance, across all business sectors.

Our membership is composed principally of corporate secretaries, assistant secretaries and business executives in corporate governance, ethics and compliance functions, as well as others involved in duties normally associated with corporate governance in Canada. Associated titles include Corporate Secretaries, Assistant Corporate Secretaries, Corporate Governance Managers, General Counsels, Chief Compliance Officers, VPs of Regulatory Affairs, Board Administrators.

L’impact du mouvement « Occupy » sur la gouvernance des sociétés


Voici un excellent article publié par John Lorinc dans le numéro d’octobre 2012 de CA magazine. L’auteur n’hésite pas à faire des liens entre le mouvement Occupy Wall Street et le ras-le-bol des actionnaires et des parties prenantes des sociétés publiques dans la gouvernance des entreprises, notamment en ce qui concerne les rémunérations excessives, le manque d’indépendance des administrateurs (old boys’ networks), la divulgation et la communication déficiente, l’omnipotence du PCD, les perspectives à court terme, le manque de diversité dans la compositions des Boards, l’opacité des mécanismes de la gestion des risques, l’insuffisance de la formation en gouvernance, etc.

L’article donne de multiples exemples de problèmes reliés à une gouvernance laxiste et complaisante. L’auteur met également  l’accent sur la situation au Canada, ce qui est assez rare dans le grand débat sur l’adoption de meilleures pratiques en gouvernance. « The Occupy movement took corporations to task for, among other things, how they were being run. They were not the only ones ».

On peut conclure que les manifestations liées au mouvement « Occupy » ont mis en lumière de nombreux problèmes de gouvernance et, en conséauence, ont eu des retombées bénéfiques sur la conduite des entreprises.       

Occupy corporate governance

« In April, a group of angry Citigroup shareholders took what was once thought to be an unthinkable action against a corporate board and its well-paid CEO. In a so-called “say-on-pay” vote, they rejected a board-recommended US$15-million pay package for the bank’s top executive, Vikram Pandit. Though the resolution was not binding, it was nonetheless an unprecedented move that forced the Citigroup board to regroup and figure out how to compensate Pandit. The bank had a long history of generously remunerating its executives despite poor financial performance. While Pandit had accepted only a nominal salary in 2009 and 2010, the bank’s board gave him a US$40-million retention bonus the following year.Occupy corporate governance

Canadian advocacy groups have also connected the dots between growing income disparity, protesters and corporate conduct. “For all the hand-wringing in the media about what Occupy Wall Street is really about, and for all the assessments by pundits that the protesters there cannot articulate what they want, they have done something very profound,” commented Trish Hennessy, a communications adviser for the left-leaning research institute Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, on her blog. “They are showing us they are ready to stare down powerful corporate interests that prevent America from dealing with its serious fiscal and social issues.”

 Illustration: Michelle Thompson

En reprise – La gouvernance tient-elle le coup dans la tourmente? | Un rapport de KPMG


Dans le dernier rapport de l’Audit Committee Institute, la firme KPMG, présente un sommaire de ses observations sur la capacité des conseils d’administration à faire face au rythme accéléré des changements organisationnels et aux risques en résultant. Norman Marks, CRMA, CPA, vice-président de SAP, nous livre les pricipales conclusions.

Is Governance Keeping Pace ?

The basic conclusion seems to be that most organizations are struggling.

The logo of KPMG.
The logo of KPMG. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

– Only 39% are satisfied that governance activities are focused on the areas of greatest risk to reputation and brand.

– Just 24% are satisfied that management has an effective process that links risk ‘hot spots’ to strategy and execution activities.

Dix domaines de réforme en gouvernance | Richard Leblanc


LinkedinAnswers
LinkedinAnswers (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Voici, en rappel, un excellent billet de Richard Leblanc qui a fait un travail colossal de synthèse afin de dégager les bases d’un modèle de gouvernance, bâti à partir des nombreuses et riches discussions dans le groupe Boards & Advisers de LinkedIn. Richard a développé un modèle vraiment très pertinent, « Public Company Boards – Ten Areas of Reform« , que vous pouvez télécharger à partir de son blogue. Je vous encourage à lire ce document synthèse qui est le fruit de centaines d’échanges sur LinkedIn.

“Shareholder activism at CP Rail, Yahoo, Research in Motion, Chesapeake Energy and BMC Software continues, trying to prevent the destruction of billions of dollars of shareholder value. Shareholders rejected Citigroup’s, Aviva’s, Knight Capital’s, FirstMerit’s and Cairn Energy’s executive pay packages. Activists and hedge funds such as Bill Ackman at Pershing Square, Dan Loeb of Third Point Capital, Vic Alboini at Jaguar Financial Corp., Paul Singer at Elliot Management and Carl Icahn reveal defects in the current corporate governance system. What do they all have in common? And are boards listening ?”

Énoncés de principes de bonne gouvernance 2012 | Business Roundtable


Voici un document publié par l’organisation américaire Business Roundtable qui est la plus importante association de PCD (CEO) aux É.U. et qui regroupe les plus grandes sociétés avec un total de $6 trillion en revenus annuels et plus de 12 million d’employés. Ce document présente le point de vue des hauts dirigeants de ces sociétés sur les pratiques de bonne gouvernance. Le rapport est représentatif de ce que les membres pensent que devraient être les pratiques exemplaires en matière de gouvernance. C’est une lecture vraiment très pertinente.

 

English: Corporate Governance

Principles of Corporate Governance – 2012

« Business Roundtable supports the following guiding principles:

First, the paramount duty of the board of directors of a public corporation is to select a chief executive officer and to oversee the CEO and senior management in the competent and ethical operation of the corporation on a day-to-day basis.

Second, it is the responsibility of management, under the oversight of the board, to operate the corporation in an effective and ethical manner to produce long-term value for shareholders. The board of directors, the CEO and senior management should set a “tone at the top” that establishes a culture of legal compliance and integrity. Directors and management should never put personal interests ahead of or in conflict with the interests of the corporation.

Third, it is the responsibility of management, under the oversight of the board, to develop and implement the corporation’s strategic plans, and to identify, evaluate and manage the risks inherent in the corporation’s strategy. The board of directors should understand the corporation’s strategic plans, the associated risks, and the steps that management is taking to monitor and manage those risks. The board and senior management should agree on the appropriate risk profile for the corporation, and they should be comfortable that the strategic plans are consistent with that risk profile.

Fourth, it is the responsibility of management, under the oversight of the audit committee and the board, to produce financial statements that fairly present the financial condition and results of operations of the corporation and to make the timely disclosures investors need to assess the financial and business soundness and risks of the corporation.

Fifth, it is the responsibility of the board, through its audit committee, to engage an independent accounting firm to audit the financial statements prepared by management and issue an opinion that those statements are fairly stated in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, as well as to oversee the corporation’s relationship with the outside auditor.

Sixth, it is the responsibility of the board, through its corporate governance committee, to play a leadership role in shaping the corporate governance of the corporation and the composition and leadership of the board. The corporate governance committee should regularly assess the backgrounds, skills and experience of the board and its members and engage in succession planning for the board.

Seventh, it is the responsibility of the board, through its compensation committee, to adopt and oversee the implementation of compensation policies, establish goals for performance-based compensation, and determine the compensation of the CEO and senior management. Compensation policies and goals should be aligned with the corporation’s long-term strategy, and they should create incentives to innovate and produce long-term value for shareholders without excessive risk. These policies and the resulting compensation should be communicated clearly to shareholders.

Eighth, it is the responsibility of the corporation to engage with longterm shareholders in a meaningful way on issues and concerns that are of widespread interest to long-term shareholders, with appropriate involvement from the board of directors and management.

Ninth, it is the responsibility of the corporation to deal with its employees, customers, suppliers and other constituencies in a fair and equitable manner and to exemplify the highest standards of corporate citizenship.

These responsibilities and others are critical to the functioning of the modern public corporation and the integrity of the public markets. No law or regulation can be a substitute for the voluntary adherence to these principles by corporate directors and management in a manner that fits the needs of their individual corporations ».

 

Gouvernance des institutions financières fédérales | Lignes directrices du BSIF


Ligne directrice du BSIF– nouvelle version à l’étude

Objet : Gouvernance des institutions financières fédérales | Catégorie : Saines pratiques commerciales et financières | Date : Août 2012

Gouvernance des institutions financières fédérales

La présente ligne directrice vise à établir les attentes du BSIF à l’égard de la gouvernance des institutions financières fédérales (IFF). Elle vise toutes les IFF, exception faite des succursales de banques et de sociétés d’assurances étrangères. La présente ligne directrice chapeaute les autres lignes directrices et vient compléter ce qui suit :

– les dispositions pertinentes de la Loi sur les banques, de la Loi sur les sociétés d’assurances, de la Loi sur les sociétés de fiducie et de prêt, de la Loi sur les associations coopératives de crédit et des règlements connexes;

– le Cadre de surveillance et les Critères d’évaluation du BSIF.

L’importance et l’unicité d’une saine gouvernance des institutions financières sont décrites à la section II de la ligne directrice. Dans les sections III, IV et V, respectivement, il est question de trois composantes fondamentales de la gouvernance des IFF, à savoir :

– le rôle du conseil d’administration;

– la gouvernance du risque, un volet distinct et essentiel de la gouvernance des IFF;

– le rôle du comité d’audit.

Enfin, à la section VI, il est question du rôle essentiel de la gouvernance d’entreprise dans le processus de surveillance et de l’évaluation de la surveillance par le BSIF. Les zones de texte tout au long de la présente ligne directrice énoncent les déclarations clés ou les principales attentes du BSIF portant sur la saine gouvernance des IFF.

Le « risque réputationnel » : Une priorité des Boards


Voici un court article de sensibilisation publié dans CFO par Caroline McDonald. Il semble que cette préoccupation soit vitale; de plus en plus de conseils d’administration l’inscrivent à leur liste de priorités.

economics
economics (Photo credit: Sean MacEntee)

« Boards are taking the peril of the loss of their companies’ good names more seriously and are ready to beef up staff to help CFOs.

For a second straight year, boards of directors see reputational risk as their top concern. They’re also displaying a new optimism about a financial recovery, and are making plans to hire staff to support CFOs, according to a survey by EisnerAmper LLP. Looking at internal growth and expansion, “the fact that so many board members — 71% compared to 51% in 2011 — feel that the current economic environment will give new opportunities for internal growth and expansion is a tremendous increase over the prior year,” says Steve Kreit, an audit partner with the accounting firm in New York. The study, “Concerns About Risks Confronting Boards,” found that 66% of 193 directors see reputational risk as their top concern, compared with 59% who view regulatory risk as the top concern. Aided by the National Association of Corporate Directors, the firm polled directors by web-based survey ».

La gouvernance tient-elle le coup dans la tourmente? | Un rapport de KPMG


Dans le dernier rapport de l’Audit Committee Institute, la firme KPMG, présente un sommaire de ses observations sur la capacité des conseils d’administration à faire face au rythme accéléré des changements organisationnels et aux risques en résultant. Norman Marks, CRMA, CPA, vice-président de SAP, nous livre les pricipales conclusions.

Is Governance Keeping Pace ? 

The basic conclusion seems to be that most organizations are struggling.

The logo of KPMG.
The logo of KPMG. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

– Only 39% are satisfied that governance activities are focused on the areas of greatest risk to reputation and brand.

– Just 24% are satisfied that management has an effective process that links risk ‘hot spots’ to strategy and execution activities.

 

L’IFA publie un document phare sur la gouvernance des sociétés cotées en France


L’IFA publie un document phare sur la gouvernance des sociétés cotées dont l’objectif est d’attirer en France les investisseurs étrangers en les informant des atouts de l’hexagone.

 La gouvernance des sociétés cotées à l’usage des investisseurs 

Voici comment on présente l’ouvrage.

La qualité de la gouvernance des sociétés françaises constitue indiscutablement une valeur ajoutée et un renforcement de la sécurité économique et juridique. Afin de faire connaître ces pratiques en dehors de nos frontières, l’Institut Français des Administrateurs et Paris Ile-de-France Capitale Economique, en partenariat avec le Conseil Supérieur de l’Ordre des Experts-Comptables et la Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes, publient « La gouvernance des sociétés cotées à l’usage des investisseurs ».

Cette synthèse sur les pratiques sociétales de gouvernance en France a été réalisée à partir de l’expertise d’un groupe de travail piloté par la Commission Internationale de l’IFA présidée par Marie-Ange Andrieux et regroupant des institutions du monde économique et financier. Elle se veut, à la fois, un outil d’information des investisseurs étrangers et un document de valorisation de la gouvernance de nos sociétés.

« L’étude réalisée montre, en effet, que les pratiques de gouvernance françaises des sociétés cotées se situent déjà au niveau des meilleurs standards européens et internationaux, indique ainsi Daniel Lebègue, Président de l’IFA. Ces pratiques devraient poursuivre leur dynamique de progression, dans les grands groupes comme dans les entreprises moyennes, et même s’étendre aux entreprises non cotées. Équilibre des pouvoirs, performance des instances de gouvernance, à travers, entre autres, les différents comités, et transparence sont des qualités dont peuvent se prévaloir aujourd’hui nombre de Conseils d’administration ; Qualités indiscutablement séduisantes pour des investisseurs internationaux… Et qu’il s’agit donc de leur faire connaître ! »

Paris
Paris (Photo credit: citronate)

« La qualité de la gouvernance des entreprises est devenue un facteur significatif d’attractivité et de confiance; il contribue à améliorer la réputation d’un pays ou d’une région économique vis-à-vis de ses partenaires industriels et financiers, souligne Pierre Simon, Président de Paris IDF Capitale Economique. Dans un contexte de concurrence mondiale, c’est un vrai atout. Nous l’avons en France. »

Les atouts de la gouvernance des sociétés cotées françaises sont multiples et détaillées dans la synthèse :

– Le poids prépondérant de la « soft law » par rapport à la réglementation, au regard des sources de la gouvernance,
– La composition des Conseils (indépendance, diversité, mixité, compétences…) et l’efficacité de leur fonctionnement (comités, secrétariat général…),
– La qualité de la transparence de l’information tant financière qu’extra financière,
– La clarté de la communication sur la rémunération des mandataires sociaux,
– Le bon équilibre des pouvoirs entre les actionnaires et le Conseil d’Administration, 
– Le respect du droit des actionnaires et les outils mis à disposition des non-résidents au service de l’engagement actionnarial,
– Une bonne gestion des risques, facilitée par le rôle efficient des organismes de vérification et de contrôle.

Les administrateurs doivent exercer un jugement sûr : Quelques éléments fondamentaux à considérer


The logo of KPMG.
The logo of KPMG. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, quelques conseils que les administrateurs de sociétés devraient suivre afin de s’assurer d’avoir un jugement robuste dans le cadre de la prise de décision. Cet article paru dans NACD Directorship le 24 juin 2012 met l’accent sur le texte « Enhancing Board Oversight: Avoiding Judgment Traps and Biases », un document du COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission) dont les auteurs sont KPMG et les professeurs Steven M. Glover and Douglas F. Prawitt de Brigham Young University.

Good Judgment Requires Discipline, Awareness of Traps and Biases

It used to be that exercising good judgment largely meant “using common sense.” But today, while common sense is still essential, exercising good judgment—consistently— in a business environment that is increasingly complex and dynamic, volatile and uncertain, and under high pressure requires a disciplined process. It also requires an understanding of common traps and biases that can undermine the judgments of even seasoned professionals and boards.

Voici quelques considérations importantes à connaître. Il faut lire l’article au complet lequel réfère au document du COSO.

A good judgment process followed consistently can help improve decision-making and oversight, but “traps and biases” can undermine the process.

Our “intuitive” judgment can betray us.

Beware of three particularly common judgment traps How you “frame” an issue largely determines how you see it (or don’t see it).

Beware of four common biases that can undermine good judgment (unwittingly).

Le Board : dernier rempart | ultimement responsable !


Voici une excellente prise de position de Richard Leblanc dans Listed Magazine à propos du rôle du conseil d’administration dans les cas de fraudes, malversations, corruption, contrôles internes déficients, problèmes éthique, etc. L’article explique que le C.A. est ultimement responsable de la conformité, de la surveillance des processus de contrôle et de la conduite éthique des dirigeants. Comme le dit Leblanc,  « The buck stops at the Board… Saying the “directors didn’t know” is no excuse ».

Headquarters of SNC-Lavalin engineering firm i...

The buck stops at the board

Un extrait de l’article :

« If the CEO of SNC-Lavalin allegedly overrode his own CFO and breached the company’s code of ethics in authorizing $56 million of questionable payments to undisclosed agents that the federal Canadian police are now investigating, did the board of directors of SNC-Lavalin have a role to play? If RBC, as alleged by a U.S. regulator, made “material false statements” in connection with non-arm’s length trades, did the board of directors of RBC have a role to play?

The answer is “Yes” in these and similar cases. Speaking generally, as all allegations have yet to be proven, it is not credible to argue—as some do—that boards do not have a determinative role to play in compliance and reputational failure, or that directors did not know. A board is the only body that has the legal authority and power to control management and designate all compliance and control systems. It alone acts or fails to act. A board is paid to take all reasonable steps consistent with best practices, to ensure that it does know ».

Capsules vidéos en gouvernance – Le comité d’audit et la gouvernance stratégique


Série « capsules d'experts »

Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés est fier de présenter les huit vidéos de sa première série « Capsules d’experts ». Huit experts du Collège partagent une réflexion le temps de 2 à 3 minutes en se prononçant sur des sujets d’actualité en gouvernance. Deux nouvelles « capsules d’experts » sont maintenant en ligne; elles ont pour thèmes « Le comité d’audit » par M. André Courville et « La gouvernance stratégique » par M. Yan Cimon.

par André Courville

Associé principal, Ernst & Young

par Yan Cimon

Professeur de management, Université Laval