Gros débat sur la rémunération des dirigeants en France !


Voici un article d’actualité qui présente la problématique des rémunérations excessives des dirigeants en France (et en Suisse). L’année 2013 s’annonce assez importante pour la mise en oeuvre de moyens destinés à mettre un frein aux rémunérations jugées abusives par les actionnaires. Cet article partagé par Patrice Camus, directeur de projet en développement durable au Groupe Desjardins (Canada), a été publié sur la page de Novethic, une filiale de la Caisse des Dépôts française qui diffuse des communiqués sur le développement durable ainsi qu’un centre de recherche sur l’investissement socialement responsable (ISR) et sur la responsabilité sociale des entreprises (RSE).

Le « Say on Pay » et les indemnités de départ et de non concurrence devraient être au menu des AG du CAC 40 ce printemps. Le rapport sur la gouvernance, publié le 20 février, laisse augurer d’un futur projet de loi limitant fortement les possibilités de rémunération « excessives». En attendant, la question du lien entre ces rémunérations et la performance des entreprises est posée plus systématiquement par les actionnaires.

Le retour du débat sur la rémunération des dirigeants

 

photograph of Novartis human resources buildin...
photograph of Novartis human resources building designed by Frank Gehry as part of the new campus built to replace the former Ciba-Geigy buildings in Basel, Switzerland (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Le patron de Novartis capitule

« … le cas le plus emblématique est celui de Daniel Vasella, le patron du   groupe pharmaceutique Novartis, qui a soulevé un tollé en Suisse début   février. Une émission de télévision a révélé le 5 février qu’il allait partir   avec 72 millions de francs suisses (plus de 58 millions d’euros). La   Fondation Ethos, qui défend le droit des actionnaires et qui a progressivement   imposé un « Say on Pay » dans le pays, a aussitôt lancé une campagne pour   demander l’annulation du contrat, en annonçant que dans le cas contraire elle   poursuivait juridiquement le conseil d’administration de Novartis pour avoir   manqué à sa mission de diligence en acceptant un tel système. Juste avant   l’AG, qui se tient ce 22 février, Daniel Vasella et son conseil ont capitulé;   le contrat a été annulé. Cette capitulation aurait été arrachée de haute   lutte même si l’intéressé a déclaré dans un communiqué : « j’ai compris que nombreux sont ceux, en   Suisse, qui jugent ce montant exagéré en dépit du fait que j’avais annoncé   mon intention de le verser à des œuvres caritatives ». Le   bénéfice de Novartis avait lui reculé de 7% en 2012… »

Newsletter de l’Institut français des administrateurs (IFA) | Édition de Février 2013


Découvrez le numéro 47 de la lettre de liaison mensuelle adressée aux adhérents de l’IFA. Cette publication électronique mensuelle au format pdf téléchargeable via le site internet a pour objectif de faciliter l’accès aux informations-clés sur les activités de l’IFA pour tous les adhérents : l’agenda des prochains évènements et séminaires, les activités en région, les actualités de la gouvernance, les dernières publications et les principaux services disponibles.

Newsletter de l’Institut français des administrateurs | Édition de Février 2013

Dans ce numéro, Andréa Bonhoure *, nous met à jour sur l’évolution du cadre de gouvernance en Europe et en France. J’ai reproduit ci-dessous les principales mesures annoncées telles qu’elles sont présentées à la une de la lettre de l’IFA. Bonne lecture.

Bruxelles dévoile ses ambitions sur la gouvernance

« Tandis que le gouvernement travaille sur un projet de texte instituant le say on pay, l’Europe n’est pas en reste. Mi-décembre, la direction du Marché Intérieur, pilotée par Michel Barnier, a publié son Plan d’action pour le droit européen des sociétés et la gouvernance d’entreprise. Le document, qui compte 19 pages, commence par souligner : « l’efficacité du cadre de la gouvernance d’entreprise est essentielle, car les sociétés bien gérées sont susceptibles d’être à la fois plus compétitives et plus viables à long terme ».

Stability, Security, Prosperity
Stability, Security, Prosperity (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Bruxelles note ensuite que le cadre européen est fait de dispositions législatives et de mesures non contraignantes, les codes nationaux, appliqués sur la base comply or explain. L’ambition de la commission ne consiste pas à remettre en cause cet équilibre. Toutefois, sans surprise, elle relève des lacunes dans l’application des règles de gouvernance par les sociétés cotées. Dans le prolongement du Livre vert de 2011, elle propose donc un certain nombre de mesures destinées à améliorer la gouvernance. Pas de grande directive à attendre dans ce domaine, les modifications annoncées seront introduites dans des textes existants en cours de réexamen (directive comptable et directive sur les actionnaires) ou encore seront énoncées sous forme de recommandation.

Voici les principales mesures annoncées :

Conseils d’administration

Pour encourager les entreprises à développer la diversité au sein de leurs conseils, ce qui permet une critique objective et constructive des décisions de la direction, la Commission entend introduire dans la directive comptable des dispositions visant à renforcer les obligations déclaratives concernant cette politique de diversification.

Comply or explain

L’AMF le dit et le répète chaque année, les entreprises ne fournissent pas suffisamment d’explications lorsqu’elles écartent une disposition du code auquel elles se réfèrent. C’est aussi l’avis de Bruxelles. La Commission annonce la publication d’une recommandation pour améliorer le comply or explain.

Identification des actionnaires

Faut-il mettre en place un mécanisme européen d’identification des actionnaires ? La question, soulevée par le Livre vert de 2011 fait débat, certains estimant qu’il suffirait de demander aux émetteurs de prévoir un forum dédié aux actionnaires sur leur site, quand d’autres évoquent une baisse des seuils de notification. La Commission, sans avancer de solution, plaide en faveur d’une plus grande transparence et proposera une initiative sur ce sujet dont le contenu n’est pas encore arrêté.

Transparence et investisseurs professionnels

Une modification de la directive sur les actionnaires est annoncée sur la publicité des politiques en matière de vote et d’engagements des actionnaires, ainsi que des votes antérieurs des investisseurs institutionnels.

Rémunération des dirigeants

La Commission estime que les actionnaires ont un rôle crucial à jouer dans la gouvernance, tout en regrettant leur faible implication. Elle propose donc d’accroitre leurs pouvoirs sur le chapitre des rémunérations, notamment via l’introduction du say on pay dans la directive sur les actionnaires. Elle annonce également sa volonté de renforcer le contrôle des actionnaires sur les transactions avec les parties liées.

Toutes ces réformes et recommandations interviendront dès cette année. Le Plan d’action prévoit également des améliorations du droit des sociétés portant sur les opérations transfrontières, (transferts de sièges, fusions, scissions), les groupes de sociétés ou encore les formes juridiques adaptées aux PME. Affaire à suivre… »

Andréa Bonhoure*, Labrador

Labrador est membre partenaire de l’IFA

http://blog.labrador.fr/2013/01/31/bruxelles-devoile-ses-ambitions-sur-la-gouvernance/

Un guide essentiel pour comprendre et enseigner la gouvernance | Version française


Plusieurs administrateurs et formateurs me demandent de leur proposer un document de vulgarisation sur le sujet de la gouvernance. J’ai déjà diffusé sur mon blogue un guide à l’intention des journalistes spécialisés dans le domaine de la gouvernance des sociétés à travers le monde. Il a été publié par le Global Corporate Governance Forum et International Finance Corporation (un organisme de la World Bank) en étroite coopération avec International Center for Journalists. Je n’ai encore rien vu de plus complet et de plus pertinent sur la meilleure manière d’appréhender les multiples problématiques reliées à la gouvernance des entreprises mondiales. La direction de Global Corporate Governance Forum m’a fait parvenir le document en français le 14 février.

Qui dirige l’entreprise : Guide pratique de médiatisation du gouvernement d’entreprise – document en français

Ce guide est un outil pédagogique indispensable pour acquérir une solide compréhension des diverses facettes de la gouvernance des sociétés. Les auteurs ont multiplié les exemples de problèmes d’éthiques et de conflits d’intérêts liés à la conduite des entreprises mondiales. On apprend aux journalistes économiques – et à toutes les personnes préoccupées par la saine gouvernance – à raffiner les investigations et à diffuser les résultats des analyses effectuées. Je vous recommande fortement de lire le document, mais aussi de le conserver en lieu sûr car il est fort probable que vous aurez l’occasion de vous en servir.

Vous trouverez ci-dessous quelques extraits de l’introduction à l’ouvrage.

Who’s Running the Company ? A Guide to Reporting on Corporate Governance

À propos du Guide

English: Paternoster Sauqre at night, 21st May...

« This Guide is designed for reporters and editors who already have some experience covering business and finance. The goal is to help journalists develop stories that examine how a company is governed, and spot events that may have serious consequences for the company’s survival, shareholders and stakeholders. Topics include the media’s role as a watchdog, how the board of directors functions, what constitutes good practice, what financial reports reveal, what role shareholders play and how to track down and use information shedding light on a company’s inner workings. Journalists will learn how to recognize “red flags,” or warning  signs, that indicate whether a company may be violating laws and rules. Tips on reporting and writing guide reporters in developing clear, balanced, fair and convincing stories.

Three recurring features in the Guide help reporters apply “lessons learned” to their own “beats,” or coverage areas:

– Reporter’s Notebook: Advise from successful business journalists

– Story Toolbox:  How and where to find the story ideas

– What Do You Know? Applying the Guide’s lessons

Each chapter helps journalists acquire the knowledge and skills needed to recognize potential stories in the companies they cover, dig out the essential facts, interpret their findings and write clear, compelling stories:

  1. What corporate governance is, and how it can lead to stories. (Chapter 1, What’s good governance, and why should journalists care?)
  2. How understanding the role that the board and its committees play can lead to stories that competitors miss. (Chapter 2, The all-important board of directors)
  3. Shareholders are not only the ultimate stakeholders in public companies, but they often are an excellent source for story ideas. (Chapter 3, All about shareholders)
  4. Understanding how companies are structured helps journalists figure out how the board and management interact and why family-owned and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), may not always operate in the best interests of shareholders and the public. (Chapter 4, Inside family-owned and state-owned enterprises)
  5. Regulatory disclosures can be a rich source of exclusive stories for journalists who know where to look and how to interpret what they see. (Chapter 5, Toeing the line: regulations and disclosure)
  6. Reading financial statements and annual reports — especially the fine print — often leads to journalistic scoops. (Chapter 6, Finding the story behind the numbers)
  7. Developing sources is a key element for reporters covering companies. So is dealing with resistance and pressure from company executives and public relations directors. (Chapter 7, Writing and reporting tips)

Each chapter ends with a section on Sources, which lists background resources pertinent to that chapter’s topics. At the end of the Guide, a Selected Resources section provides useful websites and recommended reading on corporate governance. The Glossary defines terminology used in covering companies and corporate governance ».

Here’s what Ottawa’s new rules for state-owned buyers may look like (business.financialpost.com)

The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value (greenbackd.com)

Effective Drivers of Good Corporate Governance (shilpithapar.com)

La gouvernance chez Desjardins selon Monique Leroux | Grande conférence annuelle du CAS


Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) présentait, le mercredi 6 février dernier au Parquet du Centre CDP Capital à Montréal, la 7e Grande conférence annuelle en gouvernance de sociétés et la remise des prix Reconnaissance CAS 2013.

Près de 200 administrateurs de sociétés, hauts dirigeants et partenaires du CAS étaient présents pour assister à cette soirée qui débutait par une conférence de Mme Monique F. Leroux, présidente du conseil et chef de la direction du Mouvement Desjardins. Mme Leroux a traité des atouts et défis d’un groupe coopératif de l’ampleur de celui du Mouvement Desjardins, à travers divers exemples et en faisant part de ses convictions.

7e Grande conférence annuelle en gouvernance de sociétés et la remise des prix Reconnaissance CAS 2013

centre
centre (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Vous pouvez consulter la présentation Power Point de la conférence de Mme Monique Leroux.

Article relié :

For Desjardins the time is now (scansite3.wordpress.com)

La séparation des pouvoirs PCA (Chair) et PCD (CEO) | Avis des experts en gouvernance


J’ai récemment suivi les échanges sur le groupe de discussion LinkedIn –  Boards & Advisors portant sur l’à-propos de la séparation des pouvoirs des PCA (Chairperson) et des PCD (CEO).  Le sujet est certainement l’un des plus cruciaux … et des plus controversés en gouvernance car, à mon avis, tout commence par l’établissement d’un principe de base prônant la souveraineté du C.A. sur la gouvernance des organisations. Le reste devrait suivre naturellement…

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un solide échantillon des points de vue des experts en gouvernance. Je vous invite à lire les commentaires issus de cette riche conversation. Vous comprendrez aisément qu’il y a des différences significatives entre les positions des experts en gouvernance, la plupart optant pour une séparation des rôles. Notons cependant que les pratiques en vigueur aux É.U. se démarquent de toutes celles des pays occidendaux car environ 60 % des conseils de sociétés cotées sont présidées par le PCD (CEO) ! Également, il est important de considérer que l’article le plus souvent cité sur le sujet (voir le billet du 3 septembre 2011  –   Séparation ou combinaison des rôles – Président du Conseil et CEO ?), est très nuancé eu égard aux avantages et aux inconvénients de cette pratique.

English: Eric E. Schmidt, Chairman and CEO of ...
English: Eric E. Schmidt, Chairman and CEO of Google Inc and a member of the Board of Directors of Apple Computer. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Bien qu’un PCA indépendant ne garantisse pas l’exercice d’un leadership exemplaire et bien que le poste puisse aussi être occupé par un « Lead Director » indépendant, je crois personnellement que la gouvernance des organisations est mieux servie par l’emploi d’un président du Conseil totalement indépendant du management et que, conséquemment, les deux rôles de PCA et de PCD devraient être séparés.

Dans ce débat, l’opinion de Al Errington reflète en bonne partie mon point de vue :

« … a chair being a CEO is a conflict of interest. The fundamental responsibility of a board of directors is to hire, set objectives and direction, and evaluate performance of the CEO. The chair’s fundamental responsibility is facilitate and focus the board in doings it’s work of hiring, setting objectives and direction, and evaluating performance of the CEO. If the chair is also the CEO they are focusing and facilitating the setting of their own objectives and performance evaluations. Even if performance is good, accountability is very weak which may have long-term issues… Chairs who are CEOs, or dependent on CEOs, are bad governance. Lead directors are an attempt to have your cake and eat it too, a workaround bad governance but still retains bad governance. The board of directors is supposed to be the CEO’s boss. If the roles and relationship is not separated and defined, the relationship is murky along with accountability. Many organizations either don’t want change or are afraid of the unknown. Good governance, I am sorry to say is largely unknown, in our culture and economy ».

La séparation des pouvoirs PCA (Chair) et PCD (CEO)  |  Avis

des experts en gouvernance

Henry D. Wolfe

Henry D. Wolfe  – I support the split of the Chairman and CEO roles but where is the focus and emphasis on 1)The importance of the chairman’s role in setting the tone and expectations for the performance of the company and 2) The qualifications that are needed in a non-executive chairman? « Independendence is not enough,,,purpose and competence needs to be included in the mix.

James McRitchie

James McRitchie  – I don’t think there is much doubt that, in general, it is better that the roles be split. http://www.commpro.biz/ir-therefore-i-am/governance-and-compliance/splitting-the-chairman-ceo-titles-practice-good-corporate-governance-while-saving-money/#.UQwWlqU7Mmk

Carl Hagberg

Carl Hagberg – I feel strongly that having a totally independent Lead Director – one with a clear and robust Charter – is far superior to the idea of having a totally independent Chairman. For starters; « No man can serve two masters » – and that is often what one ends up getting with such deals. Secondly; in difficult times – and certainly when there is a business crisis – it is usually a major strategic blunder to divide one’s forces among two « leaders. » My biggest fear – and we have seen this play out recently at several large companies – is to end up with a trigger-happy « Imperial Chairman » – who turns out to be at least as bad – and often worse – than the old-time Imperial CEO. So called « Independent Unlike a « Lead Director », who must have, and continue to maintain the support of the Board as a whole – so called « Independent Chairmen » often seem to think they are free to have a « Charter » of their own making – that is often subject to change at their own whim. Yes; sometimes an Independent Chairman can be a good thing…But at other times, the need for a single strong leader – who can speak and act with one voice is an overriding concern. (And just as an aside; of late, we see CEOs getting ousted far more often in such situations than we see the « Independent Chair » being shown the door…which may, or may not be the best thing in the end.) A strong Lead Director – with a strong Charter – and with strong Board support – is a far better and safer way to go in my book.

Richard Leblanc

Richard Leblanc  – Carl you raise good points. The quality and leadership of the person, and relationships and context, are important. Both models can work and both cannot, depending. Most Anglo American companies other than the US choose the separate chair, where the US prefers the Lead Director. Both models can work. The disadvantage I see is the LD does not chair meetings. But then again I have seen separate chairs not effective at chairing meetings. I saw one where the Chair did not say a single word all meeting… And there is no causal relationship academics have found between separate chairs and shareholder performance, chiefly because independence is being measured not effectiveness.

Henry D. Wolfe

Henry D. Wolfe  – I would suggest that the lack of the causal relationship is due to the complete lack of understanding of what is required in a high peformance non-executive chairman. The focus is too tilted toward independence alone rather than delving into the understanding of what is required of the leader who should be setting the standards for the group (board) that is in place to ensure the maximization of company performance.

Michael Wildenauer

Michael Wildenauer  – I’m sure that not many in the US would agree that the separation of powers in the system of government be abolished; splitting the chair/CEO roles serves the same purpose (albeit not quite so large in scope, importance etc.). Sure having the « single strong leader – who can speak and act with one voice  » can be useful in times of trouble, but it seems likely to get companies into trouble just as often. Its about checks and balances. As with government, its an imperfect system, but possibly less imperfect than others… Just my opinion, obviously.

Richard Leblanc

Richard Leblanc  – Henry, I think if you asked many academics what they would need to actually measure what you write above, they wouldn’t have the foggiest. Indeed the case for execution of this heightened role beyond independence may also be true for some boards or chairs. I think the role and importance of the chair is the most misunderstood, opaque, understudied yet vitally important board positions.

Michael, there is a strong cultural, military and entrepreneurial tradition in the US of unity in command or one person in charge. So I agree. But the flip side is power unchecked. Proponents of the lead director position would say that there are adequate protections such as an independent board leader, a majority of independent directors, executive sessions, and exclusively independent committees. But you really need an effective lead director who can push back against a combined Chair and CEO, with authority of both offices, if or when needed.
Michael Wildenauer

Michael Wildenauer  – Richard, to counter your first point may initial analogy of the US not vesting all power in the President, but also in Congress and the judicial system, seems appropriate. The Chair has one very important source of power, the power to explicitly or implicitly set the agenda. If that Chair is also the CEO, the ability of the board to even consider the wisdom of certain strategies, let alone how they are being executed for example may be curtailed. Or not, depending on the character/abilities/integrity of the individual who holds the position.
I’m sure that Lead Directors work fine in most situations, but its not a very lean solution to add something new rather than fix something that’s already there. It seems to me that the LD argument seems to be wanting to have it both ways: we need a strong unified CEO/Chair voice & the LD will ensure that one voice won’t speak over the top of others. As usual, just my opinion.

Richard Leblanc

Richard Leblanc  – You know Michael after I wrote my response I thought of yours, and the very good point you are making is that there are strong balance (one could argue too stong) of powers in the US political context (legislative, executive, judicial), but not as much in the corporate sector (a company can still have a chair, ceo and president AND controlling shareholder). And I agree with your second paragraph. It is not just agenda setting but the meting itself and who says what, when. A CEO and chair combined is proposing and assessing. The LD role has been criticized for not having the authority of the office. A good chair can speak over the head of the CEO but I don’t know that a LD has the same klout. I am not sure the US will ever truly adopt a NEC model, but there is constant movement in this direction I find.

Jason Masters

Jason Masters  – In corporate Australia we have a preference (strong) for the separation of the Chair and the CEO, with the Chair obviously having a key role in the Board room, and with the REM committee the performance of the CEO. The Chairs also provide a mentoring, support role for the CEO which can be incredibly useful for CEO’s. There have been some recent examples where this has not been followed, and generally the market has been supportive usually given the particular enterprise and the particular CEO.

Henry D. Wolfe

Henry D. Wolfe  – Re your point above re academics, I think the same goes for the governance community in general. I would suggest that this is due to a continuation of viewing governance through the lens of compliance, oversight and related frameworks rather than seeing the board as the entity with the primary responsibility to ensure that the company’s performance is maxmizied. When viewed through the latter lens, a entire series of different questions arise in regard to what is needed in a non-executive chairman.

Richard Leblanc

Richard Leblanc  – Jason it is similar for Canada – there is a strong emphasis on independent chairs, of all public companies, but there in it stops. I recommended a position description to our regulator and they went with it, but in retrospect that was a mistake. The management lawyers draft the chair role to be NOT what Henry describes above, but to keep the board and chair at bay. You get what you regulate. If you want an independent chair and are silent on mindset, strategic role, performance and value creation, then you get an independent chair, only. I am not suggesting regulation, but I am suggesting more guidance in terms of the qualities and attributes required of the chair, and directors, and their responsibilities beyond compliance. My interviews I am undergoing are very revealing. It frustrates activists what is happening and how chairs and directors are chosen, and that indeed many are not independent as believed or intended. Shareholders clearly understand what is needed, and have the experience and track record. I interviewed someone Friday who has been involved in 50 activist situations.

Steven Wood

Steven Wood  – Great discussion. I am a clear advocate of separation of powers of Chair from the CEO. I remember the advantages of Procter & Gamble separating these more than 50 years ago. It was principally based on separate of powers argument. Over time more of the strategy review and general performance of the company has come under the perview of the independent Chairman. Agree that this situation is an exception in US corporations, but one that can be found in more than P&G. In China there is usually no spliting of Chairman and CEO role, which I think causes many of the governance issues that are coming out frequently in the press globally about Chinese companies under investigation for false representation of their business. Of course, you could say that corruption is endemic in China and this is just another reflection of this. I think that an independent Chairman could help in bringing better governance. HK is considering such a measure. On the other hand in Israel, the Chairman and CEO are usually split. It is traditional with little law in this area. It is clear that an independent Chair would be better at representing the interest of the owners/shareholders. The Chairs in Israel usually come from the industry (retired) or in advisory capacity in the industry, so know it well. Their is a bias to focus on company performance.

Brenda Kelleher-Flight

Brenda Kelleher-Flight  – Which model works depends on the ability of the chair to i) facilitate meetings without imposing his/her views, ii) accept differences of opinion and weigh the benefits associated with each perspective, iii) ensure the board is a team (rather than just a group), iv) ensure all data is on the table and refrain from assuming that the information provided by the CEO is all inclusive, v) view the work of the board from a longitudinal perspective (rather than a one-meeting at a time), vi) maintain focus on the mandate of the entity, vii) ensure the effectiveness of the board is evaluated, and viii) ensure that the board does not see its role as being synonymoous with pleasing the CEO or backing away when the CEO uses any strong-armed tactics.

Al Errington

Al Errington  – My opinion is that a chair being a CEO is a conflict of interest. The fundamental responsibility of a board of directors is to hire, set objectives and direction, and evaluate performance of the CEO. The chair’s fundamental responsibility is facilitate and focus the board in doings it’s work of hiring, setting objectives and direction, and evaluating performance of the CEO. If the chair is also the CEO they are focusing and facilitating the setting of their own objectives and performance evaluations. Even if performance is good, accountability is very weak which may have long-term issues.

Carl Hagberg

Carl Hagberg – This is excellent, Brenda – and a close-to-perfect statement, in my opinion, of the kind of Charter there should be for the Lead Director…and yes, I guess for an « Independent Chair » as well. I think that EVERYONE agrees that there needs to be a strong system of « checkpoints » on the CEO – and a very strong process for making sure the CEO stays on task, uses the Board as it SHOULD be used, serves the needs of all shareholders and, above all, does not revert to the old « Imperial » Chair/CEO model…My big fear. as I noted earlier, is that many so-called « Independent Chairmen » unilaterally grant themselves too MUCH independence and, unless there is a strong Charter that is designed, managed and closely supervised by the Board as a whole, there is a very real and present danger of creating an « Imperial Chairman. » To me, the Lead Director, who is primarily a « creature of the Board » – and who, almost invariably is the choice of the Board rather than a nominee of the Chairman – and who operates under a strong but frequently reviewed Charter – is the way to go…

Brenda Kelleher-Flight

Brenda Kelleher-Flight  – Unfortunately, human nature intervenes. Often those in power (or think they should have the power) chose others who will agree with them and support their position. I agree that one way is to ensure the charter is supervised by the board. The question I often grapple with is how to get boards to see diversified opinions as positive rather than time wasters, especially when they have a blocked agenda and strict time limits.

James McRitchie

James McRitchie  – The move for years has been to have « independent » board members on the board and chairing important committees. That whole effort means little if the chair is not independent of the CEO. Lead directors are a poor substitute for the real thing.

Carl Hagberg

Carl Hagberg  – What in the world would make someone think that a « Lead Director » would not be an « Independent Director » who is « independent of the CEO »…much less a « poor substitute for the real thing »??? This, of course, is the whole point of having an official – and publicy available Charter – regardless of whether one calls the person who « leads the meeting » and sets the agenda an « Independent Chairman » or a « Lead Director. »

Richard Leblanc

Richard Leblanc  – My understanding (and observation) is that a Lead Director does not set the agenda nor lead the meeting, like a Chair does, but rather is consulted on the agenda and chairs the executive session when the Chair exits the meeting. In other words, Carl, what I hear from some folk in this stream is that, notwithstanding the Charter for a Lead Director, the issue is still that the Non Executive Chair still sets the agenda and runs the meeting, whereas the Lead Director does not. The NEC and LD roles are not synonymous. I hear (and agree with) that all else equal, the NEC is superior to the LD role. Of course it goes without saying that an effective LD is preferable to a non-effective NEC, but what Jim, Brenda and Henry and others above are saying (I think) is that the best [superior to a LD] is an « effective » NEC, accomplishing the role and responsibilities they set out above.

Lee Mathias

Lee Mathias  – Here in the Antipodes, NZ, the roles are split. The Chair’s role is to set the tone and guide the decisions on the strategic direction of the firm. That goes for Board meetings too i.e. to set/establish the context of the decision and, through canvassing the opinions of all directors, reach a decision. It is beneficial for the CEO to hear the Board reaching a decision. The CEO puts those decisions in action.

James McRitchie

James McRitchie  – I really think there is something in a name. Getting named a « lead director » will never be seen in the eyes of many the same as taking on the title of « board chair. » Why all the workarounds to make it appear that lead directors are equivalent. Is a civil union equivalent to marriage? I don’t think so. If lead directors are equivalent in every way, why the hesitation to call them board chairs?

Al Errington

Al Errington  – Chairs who are CEOs, or dependent on CEOs, are bad governance. Lead directors are an attempt to have your cake and eat it too, a workaround bad governance but still retains bad governance. The board of directors is supposed to be the CEO’s boss. If the roles and relationship is not separated and defined, the relationship is murky along with accountability. Many organizations either don’t want change or are afraid of the unknown. Good governance, I am sorry to say is largely unknown, in our culture and economy.

What is a non-executive chairman? (aviationblog.dallasnews.com)

Que font les « bons » administrateurs pour faciliter le succès des organisations ?


Excellente vidéo* de Richard Leblanc et Robert Kueppers qui discutent des comportements efficaces des administrateurs pour assurer le succès des organisations. Très pertinent.

What Good Board Members Do to Help Organizations Succeed

« Since Dodd Frank and Sarbanes- Oxley, board members play a critical role in the success of their organizations. Yet, what constitutes a “good” board member? Dr. Leblanc, an award winning teacher and researcher says, he or she is one who oversees management and the interest of shareholders; oversees financial statements and risk, sets the strategy for the organization and assures compensation is appropriate. Bob Kueppers, cited by Directorship Magazine, as one of the top 100 most influential professionals in corporate governance, believes there are three activities that should take up most of a director’s time, energy and talent. The activities include: the strategy of the organization and where it is headed, making sure the right person is in charge, and how risk relates to strategy and how the organization can see what’s coming. He emphasizes that oversight is different from managing the business ».

De gauche à doite : Richard Leblanc et Robert J. Kueppers

« Too often strategy is underemphasized at the expense of risk and compliance. They advise growth, innovation and competiveness, a true creation of shareholder value- with a #1 value that of strategy and succession planning. Today, 39% of US companies do not have an immediate successor for their CEO! Another area that must be looked at is diversity. Too few boards represent their constituents and culture, with a challenge in the US and not Canada of too few women represented.

Good board members have skill sets and behaviors that include being a good communicator, listening, leadership and integrity. The softer skills- working as a team- are important. And- surprise, company CEO’s do not necessarily make the best directors, as they often have a dominant style and are overstretched! What is important and critical is good governance, meetings called with plenty of notice, preparation, agendas and information so the best decisions can be made. Good board members are chosen and cultivated. Yet, while behaviors can really change board dynamics, there is no one right way or magic bullet ».

______________________________________

*Joining host, Dennis McCuistion, are:

Richard Leblanc, PhD: Co-author of Inside the Boardroom and an Associate Professor at York University in Toronto, Canada

Robert J. Kueppers: Deputy CEO of Regulation & Public Policy,Vice Chairman, Deloitte, LLC

Mieux planifier la relève du PCD (CEO) | Une approche systématique pour en garantir le succès ?


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un article paru dans la section Boards & Governance du site de Spencer Stuart portant sur un sujet très négligé dans le domaine de la gouvernance des entreprises : La planification de la relève du PCD (CEO).

Comme environ 80% des PCD du S&P 500 sont issus de l’interne, les organisations sont dans une bien meilleure position pour planifier la relève de la haute direction, notamment celle du PCD. L’article s’interroge sur la prédictibilité du succès du PCD et énumère plusieurs facteurs qui contribuent au manque de précision dans la définition des critères de réussite :

      1. « The articulated strategy is too rooted in the present and often includes status quo assumptions, rather than taking a view of where the company needs to be in five to 10 years.
      2. The criteria for the future CEO are not based on a deep, analytical review of the company’s financial performance versus industry peers; nor are they tied to the strategic, organizational and operational levers that the next CEO will need to employ.
      3. Evaluations of succession candidates often are loose and relative to the roles executives are in today rather than mapped to the future. Complicating matters, predicting the likely success of internal succession candidates is even more challenging because the CEO role is vastly more complex than their current jobs ».

How Do You Predict CEO Success? The Case for a New Succession Planning Approach

NYC: American Intl Building and Manhattan Comp...
NYC: American Intl Building and Manhattan Company Building (Photo credit: wallyg)

Les entreprises doivent se doter d’un processus systématique de recherche et de préparation d’un successeur potentiel. L’article suggère les étapes suivantes. Veuillez lire l’article pour bieux comprendre chaque actions proposée.

■ Focuses on company performance
■ Defines criteria for the next CEO based on future performance    drivers
■ Challenges traditional assumptions about succession    candidates
■ Assesses succession candidates with a forward-looking lens

« Even as they adopt a more thoughtful succession planning process, boards should remember that no one individual can meet every requirement in equal measure; tradeoffs will be necessary. Boards will be in a better position to navigate these tradeoffs, and increase the odds of a successor coming from within, if they have defined success for the company — and the CEO — through a rigorous review of the performance of the company, its strategic imperatives and the necessary capabilities for the next CEO ».

5 Tips to Get a Head Start on Succession Planning (hiscoxusa.com)

CIO succession: Promote from within vs. hire an outsider (networkworld.com)

BDC Insight: Succession plan includes value creation (business.financialpost.com)

Succession Plans for Businesses (lawprofessors.typepad.com)

Comment le Board doit-il jouer son rôle à l’ère des réseaux « sociaux » ?


Aujourd’hui, je retiens un article fascinant écrit par Barry Libert* et paru dans NACD Directorship le 17 janvier 2013. L’auteur avance qu’il est de plus en plus évident que les conseils d’administration ont de nouvelles responsabilités, dont celles de s’assurer que l’entreprise a bien pris le virage des communications dans ce nouveau monde des médias sociaux.

Plusieurs organisations, au Québec et au Canada, dont Lassonde et SNC-Lavalin, ont été « sensibilisées » à la vigueur des réseaux sociaux !  Comme le rappelle, Barry Libert : « The boards and executives of Best Buy, Kodak, Blockbuster, Hewlett Packard, and Susan G. Komen have all learned this reality the hard way.  So did the 12 nations of the Arab Spring ». Alors, comment le Board doit-il jouer son rôle dans un monde de réseaux « sociaux » ?

Cet article présente (1) le contexte dans lequel oeuvrent les conseils d’administration, (2) les faits entourant les changements dans l’univers des médias sociaux et (3) les sept règles à observer dans cette nouvelle ère des réseaux sociaux.

7 Rules for Corporate Governance Success in the Social Age

Arab Spring [LP]
Arab Spring [LP] (Photo credit: Painted Tapes)

(1) Le contexte :

« We live in a connected world in which more than one billion people use social media and another five billion use mobile devices to communicate, collaborate and do commerce. In business, social, mobile, and cloud technologies are enabling emerging leaders and investors to re-imagine entire industries, companies, products, and services, according to the Kleiner Perkins 2012 Internet Trends Report. This emerging reality is creating unprecedented risks and rewards for corporate directors and shareholders of existing enterprises. The result: It is time for directors to think anew about the meaning of corporate governance in the social age.  In addition to all their existing roles, boards now have the added responsibility of shepherding their leaders and organizations into today’s digital world. Boards that avoid this obligation risk having their organizations fall prey to the speed and might of today’s social networks as they seek corporate reform and accountability ».

(2) Les faits :

  1. « Social Technologies Change Performance :  Enterprises that fully deploy social and mobile technologies to engage their crowds (customers, prospects, and alumni) in the cloud produce 9 percent more revenues, 26 percent more profits, and a 12 percent higher market valuation than their peers, according to research by MIT and Cap Gemini.
  2. Social Technologies Change Engagement Less than 30 percent of CEOs use social media according to recent research, despite the fact that more than one billion of their customers, employees and investors do.  Furthermore, The Conference Board and the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University report that 93 percent of boards do not use social intelligence to make informed decisions about their networks’ sentiments or engagement.
  3. Social Technologies Change Investor Relations :  Finally, research at University of California at Berkeley and MIT reveals that social media is a leading indicator of stock price movement.  As such, directors of publicly traded companies need to be receiving this information in real time or risk not knowing what their institutional investors know and how they will act based on insights derived from social and cloud networks ».

 

(3) les sept règles à observer

L’auteur propose sept réflexions « en profondeur » vraiment très intéressantes que je vous invite à lire avec attention.

7 Rules for Corporate Governance Success in the Social Age

Barry Libert
Barry Libert (Photo credit: paloma.cl)
            1. Rethink Strategy
            2. Rethink People
            3. Rethink Processes
            4. Rethink Technology
            5. Rethink Leadership
            6. Rethink Finance
            7. Rethink Governance

« The bottom line: Boards need to think anew about their role in the social and mobile world. For corporate directors, there is no time to waste.  Directors must join the social and mobile ranks. New board members must be recruited, and new business models must be fashioned based on these technology realities.  Social enterprises are here to stay and they are faster, better, and more competitive than traditional businesses ».

* Barry Libert,  :CEO of OpenMatters, is a technology investor, corporate director, and strategic advisor to boards and their leaders seeking to become great social enterprises.

Social Media Report 2012: Social Media Comes of Age (anthonyomenya.wordpress.com)

It’s Time to Rethink Social Media Marketing (jnferree.wordpress.com)

Attentes du Conseil envers la Direction, et vice-versa


Je vous invite à lire le billet de Richard Leblanc publié sur son blogue le 27 janvier. Ces réflexions sont le fruit d’un sondage auprès de participants à un atelier animé par Richard. On constate donc qu’il s’agit d’idées peu souvent exprimées mais qui sont fondamentales dans la qualité des relations entre le C.A. et la direction de l’entreprise.

On entend plus parler des attentes que le Board a envers le PCD (CEO) car on a peu l’occasion d’avoir le feedback des hauts dirigeants sur les attentes qu’ils ont à propos du conseil. Il est donc important d’avoir les avis des deux groupes pour mieux appréhender les questions de confiance au coeur des relations entre le C.A. et la direction.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les grandes lignes des résultats en français. Veuillez vous référer à l’article pour plus d’informations.

What a Board Expects from Management, and What Management Expects from a Board

Chess Board before Sanding
Chess Board before Sanding (Photo credit: Dan Zen)

« Here is what a good board is entitled to expect from management, in no particular order : »

1.         Le Management ne doit pas créer d’effets de surprise

2.         Le Board doit être le premier à savoir

3.         Le Management doit avoir une connaissance approfondie de l’entreprise et de son industrie

4.         Le Board doit connaître les options étudiées par le management

5.         La transmission de l’information doit être totale

« Management, in turn, has expectations of the board. They are: »

1.         Candeur et franchise

2.         Integrité et indépendance

3.         Direction

4.         Le Board doit réagir de manière nuancée

5.         Confiance

6.         Connaissance de l’entreprise

7.         Bonne préparation aux réunions

8.         Poser de bonnes questions

« Many of the above topics are not visible from outside a boardroom. Nor can they be, for the most part, regulated. But they all contribute to the quality of the board-management relationship, board decision-making, and whether the organization is well governed ».

Women in Economic Decision-making | Panel of the World Economic Forum


Voici une vidéo vraiment exceptionnelle réalisée dans le cadre du World Economic Forum (WEF). Le panel est composée d’un groupe remarquable de femmes (et d’un homme), leaders engagées au plus haut niveau dans diverses organisations internationales.

« Several panellists shared their personal experiences about how they made their way to leadership positions and how they addressed stereotyping and implicit biases along the way. Too often women are held back by such barriers, which are frequently not recognized, discussed or addressed ».

Le visionnement de cette vidéo est un « must » si vous souhaitez avoir une bonne compréhension de l’expérience des femmes en situation de leadership. Un document essentiel pour tout administrateur et PCD !

Animatrice :

Herminia Ibarra,

The Cora Chaired Professor of Leadership and Learning and Professor of Organizational Behaviour, INSEAD, France

Panelistes :

Christine Lagarde

Managing Director, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington DC

Drew Gilpin Faust

President, Harvard University, USA

Viviane Reding

Vice-President and Commissioner, Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, European Commission, Brussels

Lubna S. Olayan

Deputy Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer, Olayan Financing Company, Saudi Arabia

Sheryl Sandberg

Chief Operating Officer and Member of the Board, Facebook, USA

Kevin Kelly

Chief Executive Officer, Heidrick & Struggles, USA

Women in Economic Decision-making: Overview

Women in Economic Decision-making | Panel of the World Economic Forum

« For the second consecutive year, the World Economic Forum held a plenary session on women*. This year, the session focused on women in high-level economic decision-making in both the private and public sector. There has been an explosion of research in the past several years, including the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report, which demonstrates a strong link between closing the gender gap and improving economic competitiveness and corporate performance.

The panel recognized that real progress has been made in increasing the number of women in top economic position, including more women on boards and in high-level management. However, statistics around the world indicate that we are still far from closing the economic gender gap and progress remains slow.

The panellists discussed quotas and other policy and organizational changes to accelerate progress. For example, Viviane Reding, Vice-President and Commissioner, Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, European Commission, Brussels, described new European legislation setting a target of 40% for women on boards of European corporations. Another panellist noted that low turnover among existing board members slows the process of increasing gender diversity on corporate boards.

Several panellists shared their personal experiences about how they made their way to leadership positions and how they addressed stereotyping and implicit biases along the way. Too often women are held back by such barriers, which are frequently not recognized, discussed or addressed ».

Key Points

Gender parity is linked to global competitiveness and economic performance. In recent years, there has been an explosion of academic research confirming this link.

Real gains have been made in the number of women in top economic decision-making positions, but we are still far from closing the economic gender gap and progress is slow.

Stereotyping and implicit biases continue to impede the advancement of women to top leadership positions in economic decision-making. As more and more women rise to the top, they can “dare to embrace their diversity” and work with their organizations to address these barriers to ensure that diversity is a foundation of success.

___________________________________

*Le bref compte rendu du forum a été réalisé par Laura D’Andrea Tyson, S. K.  Angela Chan Professor of Global Management, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, USA.

Questions que tout futur administrateur devrait se poser ?


Dans le billet du Huffingtonpost.ca du 27 janvier 2013, Richard Leblanc procède à un inventaire assez complet des questions que tout nouvel administrateur ou que toute nouvelle administratrice de sociétés devrait se poser avant d’accepter le poste qu’on lui propose. Ce sont des questions qu’il faut se poser personnellement, tout en cherchant à obtenir les informations pertinentes et les documents nécessaires. Il faut également obtenir des informations sur la culture organisationnelle et se faire une tête sur le climat qui règne au conseil d’administration. Notons que la plupart de ces questions sont aussi valables pour les conseils d’administration d’OBNL..

Thinking of Joining a Board ? Ask These Questions First

Question Mark
Question Mark (Photo credit: auntiepauline)

« Here are the questions I would ask before joining a NFP board. Some or many of them can apply to other types of boards. It is important to scrutinize the organization for professionalism and fit, particularly for NFPs where resources can be stretched, as your reputation and even financial assets may be at risk. Many directors I interview, when I ask for their greatest regret, they say not firing the CEO earlier, and joining the wrong board.

These questions try to address the downside of joining the wrong board ».

Je vous invite à consulter ce court billet pour connaître la nature des questions qu’un nouvel administrateur d’OBNL devrait se poser.

20 ANS D’ÉVOLUTION DES CONSEILS D’ADMINISTRATION EN FRANCE | 1992-2010


Voici une enquête menée par  l’Institut Français du Gouvernement des Entreprises (I.F.G.E) de l’EMLYON Business School, sous la direction de Pierre-Yves Gomez et Zied Guedri, qui présente une excellente synthèse des changements dans les modes de gouvernance française depuis 1992. À mon avis, l’on y traite des dimensions-clés de la gouvernance, notamment des changements dans la composition des conseil d’administration en France. À lire !

20 ANS D’ÉVOLUTION DES CONSEILS D’ADMINISTRATION EN FRANCE  |  1992-2010

Voici un résumé du document :

Octobre rouge
Octobre rouge (Photo credit: ouistitis)

« Ce cahier présente une étude systématique de l’évolution des conseils d’administration des quatre catégories d’entreprises : géantes, grandes, ETI et PME sur la période 1992-2010. Cette étude permet de contredire certaines idées reçues sur les caractéristiques de la gouvernance des entreprises françaises. Elle montre, en particulier, que les deux tiers des entreprises séparent les fonctions de surveillance et les fonctions exécutives. Les conseils d’administration les plus ouverts à la diversité sont ceux des entreprises géantes, mais ils sont très loin de représenter la diversité des parties prenantes. En revanche, les conseils des PME étaient plus favorables aux femmes avant la loi sur la parité de 2009. Enfin, si la pratique de participation à de nombreux conseils d’administration a fortement diminué, elle demeure néanmoins pour une petite élite « d’administrateurs puissants » essentiellement détenteurs de mandats dans les très grandes entreprises ».

Engagement accru des investisseurs institutionnels avec les C.A. et les directions en 2012


Cet article a été publié le 22 janvier 2013 par Noam Noked, co-éditeur du blogue Harvard Law School (HLS) Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, à partir d’un document partagé par David Drake, président de Georgeson Inc; il est basé sur le sommaire exécutif de Georgeson’s 2012 Annual Corporate Governance Review. Cette recherche montre que les investisseurs institutionnels ont été sensiblement plus actifs et engagés en 2012, ce qui fait dire à l’auteur que ce fut « The Year of Engagement« . L’article synthèse du blogue du HLS fait état des changements significatifs survenus au cours de 2012 et dresse plusieurs constats qui devraient orienter l’évolution de la « conversation » entre les conseils, les directions et les investisseurs.

The Rise of Engagement in the 2012 Proxy Season

14a-9 - Solicitation of Proxies, False or Misl...
14a-9 – Solicitation of Proxies, False or Misleading Statements (Photo credit: 1001 words)

« For many years Georgeson’s Annual Corporate Governance Review has promoted the concept of engagement between public companies and their institutional investors. While Georgeson has noticed increased engagement, the nature of the engagement has generally been incremental and devoted to specific governance and compensation issues from year to year. After years of this slow, incremental growth, the 2012 proxy season became the Year of Engagement and witnessed a marked increase in company/shareholder interaction — engagement that was not limited to a few days out of the five- or six-week period between the mailing of the corporate proxy statement and the last days of a proxy solicitation campaign prior to the annual meeting.

The types of issues discussed leading up to and during the 2012 proxy season ranged from executive compensation and board structure to negotiations with proponents over the potential withdrawal of shareholder-sponsored ballot resolutions to just open-ended discussions to understand each other better. The voting statistics contained between these covers cannot fully measure that activity — although they do make it clear that the level of communication was more frequent and intense than in the past« .

Introduction & Literature Review on Corporate Governance and the Relationship between EVA and Created Shareholder Value (ivythesis.typepad.com)

Say What? Smaller Reporting Companies Subject to Say-on-Pay in 2013. (securitiesnewswatch.com)

Why minority investors lose out against corporates (rediff.com)

Les billets en gouvernance les plus populaires de 2012 | NACD (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Myths and Realities of Say on Pay « Engagement » (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

La lettre de L’IFA | Gouvernance et compétitivité


Découvrez le N°46 de la lettre de janvier 2013 de l’Institut français des administrateurs (IFA), partenaire du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS). Cette publication électronique mensuelle au format pdf téléchargeable via le site Internet a pour objectif de faciliter l’accès aux informations-clés sur les activités de l’IFA pour tous les adhérents : l’agenda des prochains événements et séminaires, les activités en région, les actualités de la gouvernance, les dernières publications et les principaux services disponibles.

Voici l’éditorial de Daniel Lebègue, président de l’IFA portant sur la relation entre la gouvernance et la compétitivité :

P1000503

« Le club des administrateurs certifiés de l’IFA a retenu comme fil conducteur de ses réflexions pour 2013 la contribution que peut apporter la bonne gouvernance au redressement de la compétitivité de nos entreprises et de notre pays. C’est une excellente initiative que notre Institut Français des Administrateurs prend lui-même à son compte.

La matière est riche et elle a été alimentée dans les dernières semaines de l’année 2012 par plusieurs rapports qui permettent à la fois de mesurer les progrès de grande ampleur réalisés au cours des dernières années et ceux qui restent à accomplir : communication de la Commission Européenne sur le droit européen des sociétés et la gouvernance d’entreprise, rapport de l’AMF et rapport AFEP-MEDEF sur l’application du code de gouvernement d’entreprise des sociétés cotées du SBF 120, présentation des conclusions du groupe de travail de l’IFA sur la mise en oeuvre en France du principe « appliquer ou s’expliquer » (comply or explain).

Le Gouvernement français devrait par ailleurs présenter dans les prochaines semaines un projet de loi relatif à la rémunération des dirigeants mandataires sociaux et au renforcement de la gouvernance des sociétés cotées.

Pour l’IFA et pour tous ceux qui s’intéressent à l’amélioration des pratiques de gouvernance dans notre pays et en Europe, l’année 2013 s’annonce donc active et stimulante. Elle sera en outre l’année du dixième anniversaire de notre Institut, l’occasion de revenir sur le chemin parcouru et de nous donner de nouveaux objectifs et de nouvelles ambitions… pour les dix années à venir ! »

Un guide essentiel pour comprendre et enseigner la gouvernance


Plusieurs administrateurs et formateurs me demandent de leur proposer un document de vulgarisation sur le sujet de la gouvernance. J’ai déjà diffusé sur mon blogue un guide à l’intention des journalistes spécialisés dans le domaine de la gouvernance des sociétés à travers le monde. Il a été publié par le Global Corporate Governance Forum et International Finance Corporation (un organisme de la World Bank) en étroite coopération avec International Center for Journalists. Je n’ai encore rien vu de plus complet de plus et de plus pertinent sur la meilleure manière d’appréhender les multiples problématiques reliées à la gouvernance des entreprises mondiales. La direction de Global Corporate Governance Forum m’a fait parvenir le document en français le 14 février.

Qui dirige L’entreprise : Guide pratique de médiatisation du gouvernement d’entreprise – document en français

Ce guide est un outil pédagogique indispensable pour acquérir une solide compréhension des diverses facettes de la gouvernance des sociétés. Les auteurs ont multiplié les exemples de problèmes d’éthiques et de conflits d’intérêts liés à la conduite des entreprises mondiales. On apprend aux journalistes économiques – et à toutes les personnes préoccupées par la saine gouvernance – à raffiner les investigations et à diffuser les résultats des analyses effectuées. Je vous recommande fortement de lire le document, mais aussi de le conserver en lieu sûr car il est fort probable que vous aurez l’occasion de vous en servir.

Vous trouverez ci-dessous quelques extraits de l’introduction à l’ouvrage.

Who’s Running the Company ? A Guide to Reporting on Corporate Governance

À propos du Guide

English: Paternoster Sauqre at night, 21st May...

« This Guide is designed for reporters and editors who already have some experience covering business and finance. The goal is to help journalists develop stories that examine how a company is governed, and spot events that may have serious consequences for the company’s survival, shareholders and stakeholders. Topics include the media’s role as a watchdog, how the board of directors functions, what constitutes good practice, what financial reports reveal, what role shareholders play and how to track down and use information shedding light on a company’s inner workings. Journalists will learn how to recognize “red flags,” or warning  signs, that indicate whether a company may be violating laws and rules. Tips on reporting and writing guide reporters in developing clear, balanced, fair and convincing stories.

Three recurring features in the Guide help reporters apply “lessons learned” to their own “beats,” or coverage areas:

– Reporter’s Notebook: Advise from successful business journalists

– Story Toolbox:  How and where to find the story ideas

– What Do You Know? Applying the Guide’s lessons

Each chapter helps journalists acquire the knowledge and skills needed to recognize potential stories in the companies they cover, dig out the essential facts, interpret their findings and write clear, compelling stories:

  1. What corporate governance is, and how it can lead to stories. (Chapter 1, What’s good governance, and why should journalists care?)
  2. How understanding the role that the board and its committees play can lead to stories that competitors miss. (Chapter 2, The all-important board of directors)
  3. Shareholders are not only the ultimate stakeholders in public companies, but they often are an excellent source for story ideas. (Chapter 3, All about shareholders)
  4. Understanding how companies are structured helps journalists figure out how the board and management interact and why family-owned and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), may not always operate in the best interests of shareholders and the public. (Chapter 4, Inside family-owned and state-owned enterprises)
  5. Regulatory disclosures can be a rich source of exclusive stories for journalists who know where to look and how to interpret what they see. (Chapter 5, Toeing the line: regulations and disclosure)
  6. Reading financial statements and annual reports — especially the fine print — often leads to journalistic scoops. (Chapter 6, Finding the story behind the numbers)
  7. Developing sources is a key element for reporters covering companies. So is dealing with resistance and pressure from company executives and public relations directors. (Chapter 7, Writing and reporting tips)

Each chapter ends with a section on Sources, which lists background resources pertinent to that chapter’s topics. At the end of the Guide, a Selected Resources section provides useful websites and recommended reading on corporate governance. The Glossary defines terminology used in covering companies and corporate governance ».

Here’s what Ottawa’s new rules for state-owned buyers may look like (business.financialpost.com)

The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value (greenbackd.com)

Effective Drivers of Good Corporate Governance (shilpithapar.com)

Étude scientifique sur la qualité des innovations | sociétés privées vs sociétés publiques


Voici un article publié par Leslie Kwoh dans The Wall Street Journal qui présente les résultats d’une importante recherche sur la production d’innovations attribuable au passage d’une société privée à une société cotée en bourse. L’étude du professeur Shai Bernstein, de la Stanford Graduate School of Business montre que les nouvelles entreprises publiques connaissent une diminution significative de la qualité de leurs innovations de l’ordre de 40 % au cours des cinq années suivant l’OPA. L’auteur avance certaines raisons susceptibles d’expliquer la portée des résultats : la perte de ressources humaines hautement stratégiques liée à la vente d’actions, l’attention accrue accordée à l’aspect conformité de la gouvernance, un accent plus important consenti aux stratégies d’acquisition, un comportement guidé par la pression des marchés qui privilégie les résultats à court terme, l’innovation étant une activité qui s’évalue sur le long terme.

Je vous invite à lire ce compte rendu de recherche. Ces résultats concordent-ils avec votre expérience ?

Ci-dessous, un extrait de l’article. Faites-nous part de vos réactions à ces résultats étonnants !

Want to Kill Innovation at Your Company? Go Public

Innovation
Innovation (Photo credit: Seth1492)

« While public offerings raise cash, new research suggests that IPOs can also result in stunted innovation at technology firms. In general, post-IPO companies create inventions that are less ambitious and valuable than do firms that remain private, found Shai Bernstein, an assistant finance professor at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. He analyzed patent data from 1,500 U.S. technology firms that either went public, or intended to go public but called off those plans, between 1985 and 2003. In all, he examined nearly 40,000 patents awarded to the companies both before and after their intended IPO date. The two groups were similar in size, age and research spending.

An IPO didn’t affect the rate at which a company obtained patents, but Bernstein found that public companies’ subsequent patents were far lower in quality, as measured by how often each patent was cited in other patent applications. Post-IPO companies saw an average 40% decline in such citations per patent in the five years after going public relative to the firms that remained private, the study found.

The diminishing innovation trend persisted despite the fact that public companies were more likely to make acquisitions and inherit talent from smaller companies, Bernstein found. Sixty-six percent of firms made at least one acquisition following their IPO, compared to just 20% of private firms ».

Changement de la culture de gouvernance dans le monde financier !


Quels sont les changements minimalement requis dans le domaine de la gouvernance des institutions financières pour regagner une confiance lamentablement érodée au cours de la dernière décennie ? C’est le sujet de l’article de Lucy P. Marcus dans son récent blogue du 16 janvier 2013. Elle présente quatre changements fondamentaux qui doivent s’opérer afin de recouvrer la confiance du public et contribuer à la stabilité des marchés.

Ces vecteurs de changements en gouvernance sont les suivants :

Des actions et des mesures concrètes destinées à « réformer la gouvernance, la rémunération incitative et l’approche globale de surveillance du milieu financier ». À ce stade-ci, l’auteure avance qu’il y a eu suffisamment de belles paroles et de mea culpa. Les gens ont perdu confiance et l’on s’attend à voir des résultats concrets à ce chapitre.

Les conseils d’administration doivent accroître le nombre de membres qui « comprennent parfaitement le monde de la finance, qui savent ce qu’il faut faire, qui sont capables de poser les questions difficiles, et qui sont aptes à prendre des actions courageuses ».

Les institutions financières doivent accroître leur transparence et faire preuve d’ouverture aux changements de culture.

Dans une période où le monde financier fait l’objet de scandales, celui-ci doit faire preuve de jugement, de sensibilité et de réserve en matière de bonis, de rémunération des hauts dirigeants, de « package » financiers, etc. Elles doivent se sentir imputables envers les multiples parties prenantes – et cela doit se constater dans les actions qu’elles posent à cet égard.

An insulated boardroom is an ineffective boardroom

Finance
Finance (Photo credit: Tax Credits)

“The level of ignorance seems staggering to the point of incredulity. Not only were you ignorant of what was going on, but you were out of your depth.” – Andrew Tyrie, MP, chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS)

« The global financial system has depended on “trust me” and “we’re the experts,” and an implication that the whole thing is too complicated for people outside the upper echelons of the financial services industry to understand. But now, with the Libor-rigging scandal, with JPMorgan’s London Whale and with the perceived collapse of the banking system and bank bailouts, the financial services industry has broken that trust. It has become clear that a lot of the people in the industry, – indeed, a lot of people sitting around the industry’s board tables ‑ don’t understand what is happening there, either.

People did trust the financial services sector, but it broke that trust, several times over, and it is going to be a long road back. The industry will need to prove it is willing to be action-oriented and bring about real change, have oversight that counts and be transparent and accountable. Most of all, they have to know that people are watching, and that the attention is not going away ».

Modèles de gouvernance | Amérique VS Europe !


Les deux articles retenus aujourd’hui sont parus sur les 7 et 11 janvier 2013. Ils mettent l’accent sur les particularités des modèles de gouvernance américain et européen, en les expliquant et en les comparant. Ce sont des articles qui présentent simplement et brièvement l’essence des philosophies de gouvernance. On notera que les principes d’indépendance et les notions de stakeholders et de perspectives à long terme prennent de plus en plus d’importance dans les deux mondes. Ci-dessous, un bref extrait de chaque article. Bonne lecture.

Corporate Governance | USA Versus Europe

« The term Corporate Governance relates to the manner in which an organization should be governed or managed. The concept is more

Atlantic sunrise
Atlantic sunrise (Photo credit: David Darricau)

relevant in the case of companies which have germinated or grown based on equity capital taken from investors. Stocks of many such companies are listed in stock exchanges, which exposes them to the public and automatically brings them under closer regulatory scrutiny. As per the principles enshrined in quintessence of corporate governance, the affairs of any organization should at all times be managed as per the relevant regulatory framework where the interests of shareholders/stakeholders is supreme. Here, corporate governance refers to the spirit of the statute rather than its letter alone. Thus morality, ethics etc. come into play in a big way. Though these “Utopian” ideas may seem irrelevant on the capitalistic turf, past experience has shown that similar philosophies could have prevented fraud & mismanagement, therefore  ceasing the erosion of shareholder wealth.

It is also pertinent to mention that all enterprises are basically valued based on their present performance and expected long term success in achieving growth and profitability. For this purpose, there has to be a free flow of information (financial and strategic) amongst the shareholders, so that they can measure the economic potential and value of the organization’s strategies & activities. Also, since people (investors) have their money at stake in these companies, they have a right to decide on the selection of the Directors and influence the manner in which the organization should be run to achieve optimal results. Some schools of thought therefore highlight the importance of stakeholders as well as shareholders ».

Is Corporate Governance Better Across The Atlantic ?

« The European model gives importance to all stakeholders including the shareholders. The separation between ownership and management is not that clear with boards comprising of representatives of various stakeholders like majority shareholders, lenders (banks), employees, suppliers etc. The board is a two tier structure with a supervisory board comprising of Non-Executive Directors which controls decision making by the Executive Directors.

The presence of these stakeholders, who are also shareholders (owners), on the board further increases their influence in strategic management decisions. The ownership patterns are more concentrated & complex with cross-holdings being common. The relevant financial markets are less liquid and there is higher dependence on debt to fund growth and operations of the companies. The concept of audit committee is existent in the European model also, but the composition of the committee is not that stringently laid down. The Chairman & Chief Executive Officer positions may or may not be held by the same person ».

Les billets en gouvernance les plus populaires de 2012 | NACD


Quels ont été les billets les plus suivis parus sur le blogue de la  National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) en 2012 ? Voici la liste des « posts » les plus populaires, mesurés en nombre de visiteurs différents.

Most Popular NACD Blog Posts of 2012

    1. Self-Reflection: Three Questions Boards Must Answer. Three essential questions drive the assessment proces
    2. PCAOB Weighs Pros and Cons of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation. Alex Mandl, chairman of Dell’s audit committee, spoke on behalf of NACD at the PCAOB’s public meeting last March to share the director perspective.
    3. Five Boardroom Deficiencies: Early Warning Signals. At NACD’s Director Professionalism course in Charlotte, N.C., faculty member Michael Pocalyko listed the five boardroom deficiencies he has observed in almost every recent corporate failure.
    4. Undertaking an Honest Self-Assessment: Is Your Board Aligned? How boards conduct the assessments starting with the questions in post #1.
    5. Five Takeaways From Conference. The five takeaways from the 2012 Annual Board Leadership Conference, according to NACD’s Research team.
    6. Alphabet Soup: A Director’s Guide to Financial Literacy and the ABCs of Accounting and Auditing. Alexandra Lajoux’s guide to the seven roadblocks that impede understanding of accounting and auditing standards.
    7. An Update From the SEC. A mid-year update on SEC rules largely affecting the compensation committee.
    8. Five Guiding Points for Directors in the Digital Age of Corporate Governance. Former BD Chairman and CEO Ed Ludwig’s fundamentals for achieving sustainable long-term shareholder value creation.
    9. NACD Spearheads Alternative Solution to Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation. The collaborative effort to develop an alternative solution to PCAOB’s proposed rule mandating audit firm rotation.
    10. PCAOB’s Proposed Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation Misses the Point. NACD President and CEO Ken Daly on why mandating audit firm rotation will not necessarily improve auditor independence and objectivity.

NACD Directorship 100 Forum Focused on Reinvigorating America (virtual-strategy.com)

Spencer Stuart Board Index 2012


Vous trouverez, sur le site de Spencer Stuart, une excellente synthèse des résultats de l’étude 2012, menée auprès des 500 entreprises du S&P. Ce rapport sur l’état de la gouvernance des sociétés américaines révèle certaines tendances significatives en ce qui concerne (1) le recrutement d’administrateurs, (2) le processus du conseil et (3)  la rémunération des membres du conseil. En général, les résultats montrent que les tendances de 2011 se concrétisent en 2012.

Spencer Stuart Board Index 2012

Voici les principales tendances :

          1. Board turnover continues to decline
          2. Restrictions on other corporate directorships more common
          3. First-timers and other corporate executives prove to be attractive pool
          4. Mandatory retirement age rising
          5. Independent board leadership becoming the norm

« This year’s report also gives special attention to the issue of female representation on boards. Despite acknowledgement by boards that diversity in the boardroom generally results in increased value for shareholders, the pace of change in the U.S. is discouraging. Women now account for just over 17% of independent directors, up from 16% in 2007 and 12% in 2002 …

… As European governments have made diversification a priority, U.S. companies have lost their lead in female representation. The S&P 500 now trails Norway (40%), Finland (27%), Sweden (26%), France (22%), Denmark (18%) and the Netherlands (18%) and ties with Germany (17%) in the percentage of women on corporate boards. Several of these countries adopted regulation or voluntary targets to increase the percentage of women serving on corporate boards, and more may follow. And, while European boards strive to meet their gender goals, many are looking to recruit experienced female executives from the U.S., particularly those with specialized expertise in highly sought-after areas such as digital media, emerging markets and finance ».

Si vous souhaitez avoir une meilleure compréhension de la portée de l’étude de 2012,  plus de détails sur le sommaire, et même la possibilité de lire l’ensemble du rapport, veuillez vous rendre sur le site de Spencer Stuart :

http://www.spencerstuart.com/