Étiquette : Comportements

La définition d’un « bon » conseil d’administration !


Article très intéressant qui a fait pas mal de vagues dans les médias sociaux.

Reuters

The one definition of a good board

Rather predictably, after the death of Steve Jobs, Apple Inc.’s board of directors has come under fire for being pliant toadies: yes-men and women.

The board is rather unconventional by current standards. Just seven members, many hand-picked by Jobs, and by most accounts, subservient to him and his personal quirks and needs (particularly regarding his health in recent years). The other notable feature has been the optical and functional irrelevance of the chairperson. This was Steve Jobs’s board — full stop.

Étude sur les relations entre les V-P Finances et les comités d’audit


Très intéressante recherche publiée le 4 avril 2012 par le CFERF (Canadian Financial Executives Research Foundation) sur les relations entre les V-P finances et les comités d’audit. À lire.
 

Les C.A. doivent-ils accorder la primauté aux actionnaires ?


Voici une excellente analyse de la primauté du droit des actionnaires aux États-Unis : les actionnaires d’abord, ou toutes les parties prenantes ? Richard Leblanc commente cet article à propos de l’idéologie de la primauté des actionnaires.

« This is an interesting piece. It argues that the duty to stockholders [only] is inaccurate. I would agree. In Canada and the UK, the duty is to the corporation. The corporation includes shareholders and shareholders are residual claimants, but there are also non-shareholder stakeholders boards must consider. In the US, most corporate statutes are similar, except CA and Delaware also include explicit reference to shareholders, but do not negate to mention the corporation, as I understand. There appears to be a greater recognition overall of shareholders within these two states, and the .. moins

The idea that a corporation’s sole duty is to stockholders is a dangerous fad with no basis in U.S. law or…

L’importance de la qualité des explications dans le cadre de l’application des codes de gouvernance européens basés sur le concept du « Comply or explain »


Vous trouverez, ci-joint, un court résumé de la conférence organisée par European Confederation of Directors’ Associations (ECODA) sur l’application du « Comply or explain » dans les pays de l’EU. Ce document  a été rédigé par Béatrice RICHEZ-BAUM beatrice.richez-baum@ecoda.org, secrétaire générale de ECODA. Voilà donc le sommaire du  point de vue d’un groupe d’expert sur la question.

…. « Bringing together about 90 high profile participants from diverse background and nationality, including EU and national decision-makers, representatives from the business sector, as well as regulators and supervisors, the event provided an informed platform to explore ways to improve the existing model for meaningful and verifiable explanations.

The EU-study by RiskMetrics (supported by ecoDa, BusinessEurope and Landwell) and the European Green Paper on Corporate Governance Framework stressed the need for improving the quality of the explanations and for a better monitoring of these explanations.

All the speakers acknowledged that the “comply or explain” principle has played a useful role in offering an incentive for continuous improvement in Corporate Governance practices and that flexibility is the condition for companies to have the tailored governance they need. However they stressed the need to have a credible system working well in terms of enforcement and being acceptable by society at large.

The speakers clearly call companies to take more responsibility on their governance to prevent regulation that would kill the whole discussion about the quality of explanations and that would reduce the governance debate to a compliance debate with regulators and a box ticking exercise.

If the quality of explanations and the quantity of supervision is improving, all markets’ actors have still a role to play to increase transparency and to enhance not only the content but also the process of good quality explanations »…. Pour plus d ‘information www.ecoda.org

SNC-Lavalin: Quelles leçons les conseils d’administration doivent-ils retenir ?


Excellente intervention de Diane Bérard sur le blogue Les Affaires.com. Dans ce billet, Mme Bérard pose plusieurs questions fort pertinentes à Richard Leblanc, expert en gouvernance à l’Université York. Et comme c’est son habitude, Richard Leblanc formule des réponses claires et précises. D’abord, Mme Bérard brosse un résumé de la situation :

« Pierre Duhaime, pdg de SNC-Lavalin, a démissionné.  Ce geste marque la conclusion du premier chapitre d’une saga qui dure depuis plusieurs semaines. Celle-ci a débuté avec des allégations de pots-de-vin en Libye pour un montant d’une trentaine de millions de dollars. Après enquête, on apprend que cette somme s’élèverait plutôt à  56 M$ et elle ne serait pas nécessairement reliée à la Libye.  Il s’agirait de fonds utilisés pour payer des “agents” à l’étranger. Cette somme aurait été soumise au chef de la direction financière ainsi qu’au président du conseil qui ne l’aurait pas autorisée. En dépit de cela, Pierre Duhaime aurait permis cette dépense. Je résume: une somme de 56M$, sans aucun lien apparent avec les projets de SNC, aurait été dépensée sans  autorisation. Et l’usage pour lequel celle-ci aurait été dépensée contreviendrait au code d’éthique de SNC ».

Lisez cet article pour connaître le point de vue de Richard Leblanc sur les questions suivantes :

SNC-Lavalin: cinq leçons pour les conseils

Q: Il doit y avoir beaucoup de gens nerveux aujourd’hui?

Q: Pourquoi s’en faire, SNC est canadienne et le Canada n’a pas de loi sur la corruption?

Q: “L’ incident SNC” aura-t-il des répercussions chez d’autres conseils de sociétés canadiennes?

Q:  Quelles leçons les conseils devraient-ils tirer de ce dérapage?

Pourquoi les Boards n’ont pas le contrôle sur les décisions du Management ?


Cet article scientifique, publié dans Social Science Research Network, pose une question cruciale sur les fondements de la gouvernance. On explique pourquoi les Boards n’ont pas « l’autorité » requise pour exercer une influence significative sur les orientations stratégiques des organisations. L’article expose aussi les processus dont les Boards doivent se doter afin de mieux jouer leur rôle de supervision et de contrôle de la direction.

Les auteurs n’y vont pas « avec le dos de la cuillère », comme vous le constaterez. Je vous réfère au groupe de discussion LinkedIn – Boards & Advisors pour analyser la teneur des contributions des membres sur ce sujet ! Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un « abstract » de l’article.

Questioning Authority: Why Boards Do Not Control Managers and How a Better Board Process Can Help

Fewer than half of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) believe their boards of directors understand the strategic factors that determine their corporation’s success; in fact, some long term directors “confess that they don’t really understand how their companies make money.” Yet corporate law expects that boards of directors will stop managers from behaving badly. It assumes that the ultimate governing authority within corporations rests with their boards, and not with the managers who run them. Broadly accepted theories of corporate governance are based on the faulty assumption that boards have actual authority over managers. This Article directly challenges that assumption and argues that managers, not boards, control corporate decision-making processes. The problem is that scholars and policymakers have ignored the connection between decision-making processes and authority. This Article is the first to examine this largely unexplored relationship, which is essential to helping boards live up to their normative mandates.

Without an effective decision-making process, regulators will continue to expect boards to perform tasks that exceed their capabilities. Even more concerning, conventional structural reforms, such as increased director independence, actually have dangerous consequences. These reforms lessen boards’ actual authority by reducing their ability to utilize effective decision-making processes. Boards must take active steps to improve the quality of their decision making. Unless they do so, they will continue to fail because they lack to the power to perform as law and theory expect. This Article argues that effective decision-making processes, which can be found in organizational behavior theory, are the key means by which the board can exercise actual authority. Analyzing the components of such a process, and identifying which components are truly controlled by boards as opposed to managers, provides a roadmap for what boards need in order to have both de facto and de jure authority in their corporations. This Article provides that original analysis and applies insights into group decision making from organizational behavior theory to identify the attributes of an effective decision-making process that are essential to securing a board’s de facto authority.

Les quatre (4) plus grands risques de la rémunération incitative


Voici le résumé d’article qui décrit assez bien les écueils de la rémunération incitative (Pay for Performance P4P). L’auteur, E. James Brennan, est un partisan de la rémunération incitative. Son article a pour but de mettre les administrateurs en garde contre quatre problèmes susceptibles de rendre l’exercice périlleux !

 

Stickman top 4 p4p risks

The Top 4 Risks in Pay for Performance

« Pay for Performance, (« P4P » for us cool compensation pros) is all the rage. Those of you who read my postings regularly know that I’m a big proponent of performance-based compensation, in its many forms. Despite being a big supporter, or perhaps because of it, I think its important to discuss the major risks involved with these programs.

1. Incorrect Metrics

Metrics are the “things” that are being measured. These are the foundation of your plan and must represent the measurements of success. I will save you the time of repeating what I, and others, have already said. A couple of interesting articles are here and here.

2. Poorly Set Goals

Goals are the levels that define the success of each metric. These are the drivers of your plan and must represent your destination. Again, I will save time, by pointing out some other articles, here and here.

3. Underwhelming Communication

Performance compensation is often confusing. Clean, clear communications are essential to engaging and motivating your staff. This is a topic we cover here often at the Compensation Cafe. Some good examples are here, here and here.

4. Human Nature

Human nature is the one thing that you cannot build into your compensation programs, yet it is the single biggest risk to pay for performance. A colleague of mine often says that the problem isn’t that P4P programs don’t work well, it’s that they work TOO well. Results and actions must be in alignment. Many companies create great metrics, goals and communications and still have compensation plans blow up.  Why is this? For programs that demand high-performance, you must also provide strong management and oversight. Many companies use their compensation plans as a form of management. This may lead to participants slowly defining the good and bad ».

Les femmes sont-elles de meilleures leaders que les hommes ?


Article très intéressant publié dans Harvard Business Review Blog Network. Les résultats de cette étude me semblent très concluants eu égard à l’exercice du leadership des hommes et des femmes. Les résultats vous surprendront certainement !

« We’ve all heard the claims, the theories, and the speculation about the ways leadership styles vary between women and men. Our latest survey data puts some hard numbers into the mix.

….Similarly, most stereotypes would have us believe that female leaders excel at « nurturing » competencies such as developing others and building relationships, and many might put exhibiting integrity and engaging in self-development in that category as well. And in all four cases our data concurred — women did score higher than men.

But the women’s advantages were not at all confined to traditionally women’s strengths. In fact at every level, more women were rated by their peers, their bosses, their direct reports, and their other associates as better overall leaders than their male counterparts — and the higher the level, the wider that gap grows (see chart) »:

Vers un Board sans papier !


Read the last issue of Corporate Board Member magazine on boardmember.comVers un Board sans papier ! boardmember.com

“Directors no longer like having to carry thick manuals of paper documents, and

Image representing iPad as depicted in CrunchBase
Image via CrunchBase

 there are better graphics on the iPad versus paper copies, along with the ease of making notes and annotations,” Thompson says. “Plus, it was so much easier for management to make updates via the portal versus having to hand out updated hard copies to the board at our meeting.

“I also like how easy it is to synch documents and document updates into the ‘briefcase’ and take them with you on board the plane for reading—there’s no need for an ongoing Internet connection,” he continues. “And the pushpins are a big plus in getting back to reading where I left off or to key pages of interest.”

Advocates of board portals point to the seamless ability to prepare documents online, eliminating the back-and-forth process of making changes, securing approvals, and managing addendums. Agendas and calendars are easily updated and information can be shared interactively between meetings, including the ability to handle written consents and conduct director questionnaires. In addition, absent directors can access meetings online, and emergency meetings can be held virtually with videoconferencing capabilities.

La formation en gouvernance s’internationalise : l’exemple de Singapour


Voici un article intéressant paru dans Channelnewsasia.com qui montre les besoins de formation en gouvernance des hauts dirigeants de Singapour et les efforts entrepris afin d’explorer les formations à l’internationnal, notamment en Europe.

La formation en gouvernance s’internationalise : l’exemple de Singapour

« Going back to school after climbing the corporate ladder – that’s what some top corporate executives are doing to keep up with rapid changes in the business world especially on corporate governance issues. Besides partnering SMU to conduct a certificate and diploma programme in company directorship, the Singapore Institute of Directors is also exploring the possibility of working with a leading a leading international institution to run an annual senior director and chairman programme for experienced senior directors.

With recent changes in Singapore’s corporate governance landscape, experts said there is a need for directors to upgrade their knowledge.

Irving Low, Partner and Risk Consulting Head at KPMG Singapore, said: « If you talk to the old boys from 10, 15 years ago, (you would realise that) how they manage risk and govern companies these days is very different. The old guards would say the world has changed completely. »

Boardroom Burnout !


Voici un résumé des recommandations présentées par Kaye O’Leary dans innovationexcellence.com pour éviter de surcharger les membres de conseils d’administration.

Boardroom Burnout !

Practical tips from board members on how to avoid wearing-out your directors!

« The challenge:  It’s no secret that there are an increasing number of demands on boards.  Directors are expected to keep abreast of the organization’s business model, performance, strategic challenges and risk environment, understand the industry, understand the legislative environment, be knowledgeable of and ensure compliance with regulatory and reporting requirements and changes, evaluate the CEO and board’s performance, has a compliant and effective compensation program, be current on applicable accounting rules and ensure that the organization has a solid succession plan and effective culture.

Tip 1:  Don’t waste precious meeting time presenting information that was distributed in the board materials

Effective Board Suggestion: Skip the presentations of the information that was distributed and move directly to questions on the material distributed.  (PS – make sure you get your materials out well in advance of the meeting!  Do not distribute materials on a Friday afternoon for a Tuesday board meeting; board members do not enjoy spending their weekend reading board materials.)

Tip 2:  Utilize Committees Effectively

Effective Board Suggestion: Rely on your committees and avoid repeating the committee work with the full board.

Tip 3:  Annually Assess the Work of the Board

Effective Board Suggestion: As part of your annual board assessment process, take the time to review how the board spends its time vs. the organization’s strategic priorities.  Is your board focused on your strategic priorities? Do you have special purpose committees that are no longer relevant?  Are there things your board can stop doing?   Review the materials you are sending out in your board book.  If you send it, you are obliging your board members to read the material; don’t send 60 pages of financial information if 15 pages will suffice ».

Comment améliorer la gestion d’un conseil d’administration d’OBNL ?


Article intéressant de Richard Leblanc, paru dans Canadian Business qui propose plusieurs moyens visant l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’admistration d’OBNL. À la liste présentée, j’ajouterais l’importance de choisir un solide leader comme président du conseil.




Comment améliorer un conseil d’administration d’OBNL ?

 

Not-for-profit organizations are among the most important in our economy—some are hospitals, while others are schools, universities or charities. Many are large, complex organizations with multiple moving parts and interdependent stakeholders. They are tough to lead and govern, but must be as effectively led as for-profits. They require CEOs, directors and staff who are at the top of their game and willing to make the necessary commitment.

Le système de gouvernance à BP : un exemple à suivre !


Voici une référence au site de BP qui décrit en détail le système de gouvernance en vigueur. La présentation du rapport est impeccable et le cadre conceptuel pourrait servir d’exemple à beaucoup d’organisations. Pourtant les difficultés rencontrées par l’entreprise ont été, et sont encore, énormes… Sans cet appareillage de gouvernance, l’entreprise aurait-elle pu affronter la crise du Golfe du Mexique ? Pas sûr !

Le système de gouvernance à BP

Il faut cependant ajouter qu’un bon système de gouvernance ne sera efficace que si la culture organisationnelle et le système de rémunération encouragent des comportement appropriés. BP a un excellent système de gouvernance, sur papier, mais il faut également que la direction et le C.A. aient un sens aigu de l’éthique pour « bien gouverner » (Tone at the Top). La culture a-t-elle évoluée depuis cette crise… Pas sûr non plus !

Mon propos n’est certainement pas de faire le procès de BP car je ne sais pas quelles sont les leçons que l’entreprise a tirées de cette catastrophe et de la gestion de la crise. Je référe à BP parce que je crois y retrouver un très bon exemple de cadre conceptuel en gouvernance. Mais, bien sûr, cela ne garantit absolument pas que l’organisation possède la culture requise pour se comporter en bon citoyen corporatif.

Les conclusions du rapport sur la crise du Golfe du Mexique présentées au Président Obama mentionnent justement ces éléments : “ The disaster can be attributed to an organizational culture and incentives that encourage cost cutting and cutting corners that rewarded workers for doing it faster and cheaper but not better”.  Food for thought.

Succès et/ou échecs dans la planification de la relève du CEO !


Excellent article, paru dans bworldonline.com, sur les difficultés inhérentes à l’activité de planification de la relève. Le C.A., notamment le président du conseil et le président du comité des ressources humaines, doivent suivre attentivement le processus car rien n’est moins évident pour un CEO que de réussir à passer le relais à une autre personne désignée, longtemps d’avance. Un article à lire avec l’esprit bien ouvert.

 Success and succession

« It seems that the more successful a company is in terms of growth and profitability, the less concerned it is in looking for a replacement for the CEO responsible for talent management and business strategy. This holds true even for aging leaders already prone to repeat the same stories in one meeting. Is succession a dirty word for the one being succeeded.

Identifying a specific individual to take one’s place, even if he is already the clear number two, invites risks for the incumbent as an impatient deputy may already be assembling his own management team, not necessarily other successors ».

 

Étapes concrètes pour remédier aux manques de connaissances des Boards en matière de réseaux sociaux


Un autre excellent article de knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu qui montre les importantes lacunes des C.A. en matière de réseaux sociaux et qui indique clairement les étapes à suivre en vue de s’assurer que les membres de C.A. deviennent familiers avec ceux-ci. Voici quelques extraits de l’article :

« Let’s start with today’s reality. The world has changed but corporate boards haven’t kept pace. How do you know? Ask most boards what they monitor and measure at their organizations. There’s a big chance that most of them will say they are monitoring and measuring financial results, compliance and legal risks ».

« What’s surprising about such responses is that boards know that solid decision-making is essential to mitigating risks and ensuring the viability of their enterprises. How is it, then, that most of them don’t have a grip on the operational value these technologies offer, or the critical « big data » — about customer sentiment, employee engagement and investor insights — that they produce? The answer: They’re still using corporate governance tools and strategies that were developed in an age that was neither social nor mobile, or ever considered that the « cloud » would exist ».

« In short, today’s corporate directors have the « necessary » skills in terms of compliance and financial performance, but not the « sufficient » skills in terms of strategic or technological know how. Why? Because for years, astute corporate directors believed the tools that companies like Facebook and Twitter offered weren’t essential. In their view, these new means of communications were for kids, had little, if any, business value, and created minimal strategic, operational or financial risks. Wow, were they wrong ».

Application suédoise du principe « comply or explain »


Voici un bref document explicatif de Per Lekvall, membre du Swedish Corporate Governance Board, sur le modèle d’application du « comply or explain » à l’échelle suédoise. L’expérience suédoise en la matière est intéressante à plusieurs égards, notamment parce que l’on peut en évaluer les effets sur plusieurs années. Ce document a été transmis par ecoDa – The European Confederation of Directors’ Associations http://www.ecoda.org/ , association à laquelle le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés adhère.

Après une brève introduction, M. Lekvall explique comment le code suédois est appliqué et quels sont les résultats sur une périodes de 6 ans.

The Swedish Corporate Governance Code, based on the comply-or-explain principle, was introduced 1 July 2005 for the about 100 largest companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Three years later, 1 July 2008, the requirement to apply the Code was widened to include all companies listed on a regulated market in Sweden, currently around 260 companies. Having initially been considerably questioned, after only a few years the Code became well accepted by the companies and is now generally seen as an integral part of the corporate governance regulatory system in Sweden. It is administered entirely within the Swedish business sector self-regulation framework, which has a long tradition as a complementary regulation to law and other statutory regulation in Sweden.

The system for managing, implementing and monitoring the Code is in short as follows:

The Swedish Corporate Governance Board is responsible for defining the Code and for keeping it up-to-date with regard to new developments in the field in Sweden and internationally. To this end, the Board annually follows up how the companies’ use the Code, but only as a means to analyze its functioning, not to supervise how individual companies apply the Code.

This duty instead rests with the two regulated markets in Sweden, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and NGM Equity. This is based on the fact that all companies listed on these exchanges are contractually obliged to apply the Code. The exchanges monitor the adequate application of the Code by their member companies on an individual basis according to a certain procedure, with the possibility to report unsatisfactory application, should a company refuse to respond properly to questions about this, to their respective Disciplinary Committees. Theses, in turn, have an arsenal of increasingly severe sanctions at their disposal, none of which, however, knowingly have been used so far.

Still the stock exchanges only monitor that companies apply the Code properly, not whether the corporate governance behavior they report is satisfactory or not from an investment point of view. This is entirely left to the capital market, i.e. the shareholders and their advisors and intermediaries, to decide on and act upon accordingly.

Hence the Swedish system can be described as strict on the requirement to apply the Code but relatively soft on obligations to comply with individual Code rules. The aim of the Swedish Corporate Governance Board is that all listed companies should apply the Code properly, but      not that all companies must comply with all its rules all the time. On the contrary, the Board encourages companies to use the Code with the flexibility intended with the comply-or-explain mechanism and would, in fact, be concerned if all companies would comply with all rules in the Code. Such a situation would indicate that the Code is not ambitious enough.

Nevertheless, Swedish listed companies are quite compliant to the Code, as shown by the latest follow-up numbers (referring to the reporting year 2010):  50% of the companies reported no case of non-compliance and another 39% reported non-compliance to a single Code rule adding up to almost 90% of the companies reporting no or at most one case of non-compliance. These numbers have been more or less the same over the last three years.

The Board considers these results slightly on the high side in terms of compliance. On the other hand they show that the companies find the Code relevant and can apply it without much trouble.

Another crucial issue of code application is the quality of the explanations given in terms of their information value to the capital market. This has been followed up annually since the introduction of the Code through a fixed methodology each year, thus ensuring a reasonable degree of consistency over time. (The methodology was also to some extent “validated” in the RiskMetrics study of code monitoring and enforcement practices in the EU some years ago, which reported results for Sweden very close to those produced by our method.)

According to this methodology all explanations reported each year are classified according to their information value to the market (not whether they are considered satisfactory or not from an investment point of view) into one of the categories Good, Acceptable and Unsatisfactory/Non-existent. The key issue here is the share of Unsatisfactory/Non-existent explanations, which has developed as follows since the introduction of the Code:

          2005          2006            2007          2008            2009            2010

          28%           23%             15%           27%             29%             15%

The interesting thing with this series is that it demonstrates, first, a learning curve of successive improvement 2005– 2007, during which time only the Large-Cap companies were obliged to apply the Code, then a bounce back up when the Code application was broadened to include all listed companies, and finally a second phase of  downwards learning curve leading back to the 15% level.

The significant drop in 2010 no doubt also has to do with an important change of the Code imposed this year, whereby companies were obliged not only to motivate any case of non-compliance but also to describe the solution they had chosen in lieu of what the Code prescribes. This simple measure has significantly improved the information value of the explanations.

Even though this later development is encouraging, the Board is not satisfied with a situation where about 15% of the explanations are non-existent or not deemed informative enough to the capital market. In principle a “zero tolerance vision” should be applied (although it may in practice be difficult to reach this level entirely). Therefore the Board is currently considering further measures to decrease the number of unsatisfactory explanations.

 

Problème de l’asymétrie du pouvoir et de l’information entre Board et CEO !


Voici un excellent article paru dans The Conference Board Review (winter 2012), publié par Simon C.Y. Wong, associé à la firme d’investissement Governance for Owners. 

Il s’agit ici d’un sujet capital pour quiconque possède une grande expérience en gouvernance de sociétés. Pourtant, il y a peu d’auteurs qui l’aborde de front et il y très peu de recherches empiriques dans le domaine. Cet article présente clairement les enjeux du déséquilibre d’autorité entre le PDG et les membres du conseil d’administration. L’auteur donne plusieurs exemples d’asymétrie entre le pouvoir du CEO et celui de son Board et il suggère des pistes d’action intéressantes en vue de rétablir l’équilibre :

– Solide expérience de leadership et grande crédibilité du président du conseil

– Indépendance d’esprit des administrateurs

– Connaissances approfondies du secteur d’affaires par les membres du C.A.

– Limite de temps imposé au PDG (10 ans par exemple)

– Séparation des rôles de président du conseil et de PDG

Mismatch in the Boardroom

« But as any board member would acknowledge, it’s no small thing to challenge the CEO, especially when he’s serving as chairman as well. All too often, there’s a stature gap between the CEO and other directors, and that gap can seriously hinder boards’ effectiveness. Indeed, the consequences of boards’ failure to robustly challenge their “star” CEOs can be devastating…. To serve as an effective counterweight to the chief executive, boards should ensure that the statures of their non-executive members are equal to or greater than the CEO’s.

What’s the best way for boards to protect their standing and influence against an all-powerful CEO? By separating the roles of chairman and CEO. Even after years of corporate-governance experts’ urging, most U.S. companies still concentrate power at the very top—indeed, many firms reward a well-performing CEO with the chairman’s title. Nothing could more clearly signal a board’s acquiescence to a diminished role ».

Pourquoi certains C.A. manquent-ils de courage ?


Très intéressant article de Richard Leblanc dans Canadian Business le 6 janvier 2012. Les C.A. résistent souvent à faire les changements requis pour créer de la valeur pour les actionnaires. Pourquoi ? Deux raisons fondamentales selon Richard Leblanc : manque d’indépendance (self interest) et manque de courage.
 

Pourquoi certains C.A. manquent-ils de courage ?

“Then, and only then—when a board is independent, composed of industry leaders and effectively led—will it rise up and have the will to act. The fact that this has not happened yet in many troubled companies means change must occur by shareholders rather than from within. Regulators would be well-served if corporate governance changes were more often spurred by investors”.

Présider un C.A. : Un art à maîtriser


Richard Leblanc révèle les principaux facteurs qui rendent un président de C.A. efficace. Excellente lecture.
 
 
The former Prime Minister whispered in my ear before the board meeting of the bank, “Watch the way I chair this meeting, Richard.” Seeing a meeting chaired almost perfectly is a rarity so I paid attention and was not…

Présider un C.A. : Un art à maîtriser

Procès Nortel : Le Board est-il responsable ?


À lire, l’excellent article de Sophie Cousineau publé dans la Presse le 17 janvier 2012.

Le C.A. de Nortel est-il responsable de la débâcle et des fraudes ? Vous, en tant qu’administrateurs de sociétés, quel est votre point de vue sur la situation ?

Procès Nortel : Le Board est-il responsable ?

« Employées avec intelligence et modération, les mesures incitatives au rendement peuvent avoir une certaine utilité. Mais le conseil d’administration de Nortel a complètement travesti ces outils pour récompenser des dirigeants accros aux options qui cherchaient le profit rapide sans penser aux lendemains.

C’est le procès de ces administrateurs nonchalants qu’on devrait faire. Malheureusement ou heureusement, récompenser l’échec et la cupidité n’est pas une infraction au Code criminel ».