Enseignements de l’année 2012 en gouvernance au Canada | Quelles sont les tendances pour 2013 ?


Aujourd’hui, j’ai choisi de partager avec vous le billet de Berl Nadler, associé de Davies, Ward, Phillips & Vineberg LLP, qui a été publié dans  HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. Ce compte rendu reprend essentiellement le sommaire exécutif du rapport de Davies sur la gouvernance 2012 que l’on peut retrouver sur le site de l’entreprise (en anglais). On y aborde les sujets qui « deviendront d’actualité pour les conseils d’administration au Canada dans les mois et les années à venir ». Le rapport met l’accent sur la capacité accrue des actionnaires à dicter l’agenda et l’orientation des pratiques de gouvernance. Voici un bref résumé des thèmes abordés dans le rapport que je vous invite à lire au complet car on y présente la perspective canadienne.

Governance Insights 2012  |  Canada

Rapport de Davies sur la gouvernance 2012

Canada
Canada (Photo credit: palindrome6996)

« Dans la section intitulée Le pouvoir et l’influence des actionnaires canadiens, nous traitons de trois cas très différents où les actionnaires ont réussi à modifier la structure de gouvernance.

Dans Les conseils d’administration recherchent l’équité pour tous les actionnaires, nous examinons la façon dont TELUS s’est prise pour contrer le phénomène du vote vide ainsi que la tendance qu’ont les sociétés minières d’adopter un règlement obligeant l’actionnaire activiste à transmettre un avis préalable. Dans un cas comme dans l’autre, on constate que les conseils d’administration cherchent à se défendre contre des initiatives qui ne profiteraient pas à l’ensemble des actionnaires.

Dans Le mouvement de démocratie pour les actionnaires se poursuit, nous abordons la question de l’état actuel du vote majoritaire et celle du vote consultatif sur la rémunération. Dans L’importance accordée à l’intégrité du vote des actionnaires s’accentue, nous nous penchons sur les faits nouveaux touchant le système de vote par procuration au Canada, domaine important mais complexe.

Dans Les défis de la supervision des opérations dans les marchés émergents, nous faisons le point sur les défis pressants qui se posent aux administrateurs et aux dirigeants des émetteurs qui exercent des activités dans les marchés émergents.

En dernier lieu, dans Les nouveaux critères, classements et lignes directrices en matière de gouvernance, nous nous intéressons aux nouveautés en matière de normes de gouvernance ».

Les billets en gouvernance les plus populaires de 2012 | NACD (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Engagement accru des investisseurs institutionnels avec les C.A. et les directions en 2012 (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Say What? Smaller Reporting Companies Subject to Say-on-Pay in 2013. (securitiesnewswatch.com)

Newsletter de l’Institut français des administrateurs (IFA) | Édition de Février 2013


Découvrez le numéro 47 de la lettre de liaison mensuelle adressée aux adhérents de l’IFA. Cette publication électronique mensuelle au format pdf téléchargeable via le site internet a pour objectif de faciliter l’accès aux informations-clés sur les activités de l’IFA pour tous les adhérents : l’agenda des prochains évènements et séminaires, les activités en région, les actualités de la gouvernance, les dernières publications et les principaux services disponibles.

Newsletter de l’Institut français des administrateurs | Édition de Février 2013

Dans ce numéro, Andréa Bonhoure *, nous met à jour sur l’évolution du cadre de gouvernance en Europe et en France. J’ai reproduit ci-dessous les principales mesures annoncées telles qu’elles sont présentées à la une de la lettre de l’IFA. Bonne lecture.

Bruxelles dévoile ses ambitions sur la gouvernance

« Tandis que le gouvernement travaille sur un projet de texte instituant le say on pay, l’Europe n’est pas en reste. Mi-décembre, la direction du Marché Intérieur, pilotée par Michel Barnier, a publié son Plan d’action pour le droit européen des sociétés et la gouvernance d’entreprise. Le document, qui compte 19 pages, commence par souligner : « l’efficacité du cadre de la gouvernance d’entreprise est essentielle, car les sociétés bien gérées sont susceptibles d’être à la fois plus compétitives et plus viables à long terme ».

Stability, Security, Prosperity
Stability, Security, Prosperity (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Bruxelles note ensuite que le cadre européen est fait de dispositions législatives et de mesures non contraignantes, les codes nationaux, appliqués sur la base comply or explain. L’ambition de la commission ne consiste pas à remettre en cause cet équilibre. Toutefois, sans surprise, elle relève des lacunes dans l’application des règles de gouvernance par les sociétés cotées. Dans le prolongement du Livre vert de 2011, elle propose donc un certain nombre de mesures destinées à améliorer la gouvernance. Pas de grande directive à attendre dans ce domaine, les modifications annoncées seront introduites dans des textes existants en cours de réexamen (directive comptable et directive sur les actionnaires) ou encore seront énoncées sous forme de recommandation.

Voici les principales mesures annoncées :

Conseils d’administration

Pour encourager les entreprises à développer la diversité au sein de leurs conseils, ce qui permet une critique objective et constructive des décisions de la direction, la Commission entend introduire dans la directive comptable des dispositions visant à renforcer les obligations déclaratives concernant cette politique de diversification.

Comply or explain

L’AMF le dit et le répète chaque année, les entreprises ne fournissent pas suffisamment d’explications lorsqu’elles écartent une disposition du code auquel elles se réfèrent. C’est aussi l’avis de Bruxelles. La Commission annonce la publication d’une recommandation pour améliorer le comply or explain.

Identification des actionnaires

Faut-il mettre en place un mécanisme européen d’identification des actionnaires ? La question, soulevée par le Livre vert de 2011 fait débat, certains estimant qu’il suffirait de demander aux émetteurs de prévoir un forum dédié aux actionnaires sur leur site, quand d’autres évoquent une baisse des seuils de notification. La Commission, sans avancer de solution, plaide en faveur d’une plus grande transparence et proposera une initiative sur ce sujet dont le contenu n’est pas encore arrêté.

Transparence et investisseurs professionnels

Une modification de la directive sur les actionnaires est annoncée sur la publicité des politiques en matière de vote et d’engagements des actionnaires, ainsi que des votes antérieurs des investisseurs institutionnels.

Rémunération des dirigeants

La Commission estime que les actionnaires ont un rôle crucial à jouer dans la gouvernance, tout en regrettant leur faible implication. Elle propose donc d’accroitre leurs pouvoirs sur le chapitre des rémunérations, notamment via l’introduction du say on pay dans la directive sur les actionnaires. Elle annonce également sa volonté de renforcer le contrôle des actionnaires sur les transactions avec les parties liées.

Toutes ces réformes et recommandations interviendront dès cette année. Le Plan d’action prévoit également des améliorations du droit des sociétés portant sur les opérations transfrontières, (transferts de sièges, fusions, scissions), les groupes de sociétés ou encore les formes juridiques adaptées aux PME. Affaire à suivre… »

Andréa Bonhoure*, Labrador

Labrador est membre partenaire de l’IFA

http://blog.labrador.fr/2013/01/31/bruxelles-devoile-ses-ambitions-sur-la-gouvernance/

À propos des administrateurs dysfonctionnels !


Avez-vous déjà siégé sur des conseils d’administration avec des membres qui ne s’engagent pas vraiment et qui ne contribuent en rien à la valeur du groupe ? Si oui, vous n’êtes pas les seuls ! Cependant, en tant que membres de C.A., je crois que vous devez vous inquiéter si vous constatez certains comportements déficients tels ceux identifiés dans le billet de Jack and Suzy Welch, publié dans Bloomberg | BusinessWeek. Ces administrateurs sont souvent élus, années après années !Réfléchissons un peu; que pouvons-nous faire ?

L’article des Welch vous permettra d’identifier les cas problèmes afin de mieux évaluer la situation. Les auteurs nous rappellent que les C.A sont responsables de gérer leur efficacité ! « But imagine how much better it would be if nominating committees, usually just focused on vetting potential members, dealt with the hard cases right in front of them. After all, nothing can keep a board on its best behavior but itself ».

Voici quelques comportements dysfonctionnels d’administrateurs tels qu’identifiés par les auteurs :

          1. Ceux qui ne font rien de rien  (The Do-Nothing)
          2. Ceux qui manquent de courage (The White Flag)
          3. Ceux qui agissent à l’extérieur du C.A. en tentant de faire valoir leurs points de vue (The Cabalists)
          4. Ceux qui font du micro-management (The Meddlers)
          5. Ceux qui pontifient (The Pontificators)

Je vous invite à lire l’article pour plus de détails. Qu’en pensez-vous ? Que pouvez-vous faire ?

Directors Who Don’t Deliver

Cover of BusinessWeek
Cover of BusinessWeek (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« I sit on a board with two members who, for the past year, have said and done little. Both were just reelected unanimously with the support of the nominating committee. What’s your take? — Anonymous, New York. So, two seat-warmers on your board were just reelected unanimously, you say? Doesn’t that mean you voted for them too? If so, don’t worry. You’re not the only director in history to endure an ineffective or otherwise dysfunctional peer. Not to slam boards; on the whole, they add real value. But boards frequently tolerate troublesome performance from one or two of their own. It’s simply too time-consuming or impolitic to eradicate. And that is why too many boards, in both the public and private sectors, don’t make the contribution they should. To be clear, we’re not talking about board behavior that is criminal. With a few famous exceptions, boards will remove anyone who breaks the law. No, we’re referring to boardroom behaviors that are perfectly legal but perfectly destructive as well ».

Articles reliés :

Que font les « bons » administrateurs pour faciliter le succès des organisations ? (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

5 huge mistakes startups make when choosing board members (venturebeat.com)

Comment: Self-appointed boards can’t serve the public well (timescolonist.com)

Un guide essentiel pour comprendre et enseigner la gouvernance | Version française


Plusieurs administrateurs et formateurs me demandent de leur proposer un document de vulgarisation sur le sujet de la gouvernance. J’ai déjà diffusé sur mon blogue un guide à l’intention des journalistes spécialisés dans le domaine de la gouvernance des sociétés à travers le monde. Il a été publié par le Global Corporate Governance Forum et International Finance Corporation (un organisme de la World Bank) en étroite coopération avec International Center for Journalists. Je n’ai encore rien vu de plus complet et de plus pertinent sur la meilleure manière d’appréhender les multiples problématiques reliées à la gouvernance des entreprises mondiales. La direction de Global Corporate Governance Forum m’a fait parvenir le document en français le 14 février.

Qui dirige l’entreprise : Guide pratique de médiatisation du gouvernement d’entreprise – document en français

Ce guide est un outil pédagogique indispensable pour acquérir une solide compréhension des diverses facettes de la gouvernance des sociétés. Les auteurs ont multiplié les exemples de problèmes d’éthiques et de conflits d’intérêts liés à la conduite des entreprises mondiales. On apprend aux journalistes économiques – et à toutes les personnes préoccupées par la saine gouvernance – à raffiner les investigations et à diffuser les résultats des analyses effectuées. Je vous recommande fortement de lire le document, mais aussi de le conserver en lieu sûr car il est fort probable que vous aurez l’occasion de vous en servir.

Vous trouverez ci-dessous quelques extraits de l’introduction à l’ouvrage.

Who’s Running the Company ? A Guide to Reporting on Corporate Governance

À propos du Guide

English: Paternoster Sauqre at night, 21st May...

« This Guide is designed for reporters and editors who already have some experience covering business and finance. The goal is to help journalists develop stories that examine how a company is governed, and spot events that may have serious consequences for the company’s survival, shareholders and stakeholders. Topics include the media’s role as a watchdog, how the board of directors functions, what constitutes good practice, what financial reports reveal, what role shareholders play and how to track down and use information shedding light on a company’s inner workings. Journalists will learn how to recognize “red flags,” or warning  signs, that indicate whether a company may be violating laws and rules. Tips on reporting and writing guide reporters in developing clear, balanced, fair and convincing stories.

Three recurring features in the Guide help reporters apply “lessons learned” to their own “beats,” or coverage areas:

– Reporter’s Notebook: Advise from successful business journalists

– Story Toolbox:  How and where to find the story ideas

– What Do You Know? Applying the Guide’s lessons

Each chapter helps journalists acquire the knowledge and skills needed to recognize potential stories in the companies they cover, dig out the essential facts, interpret their findings and write clear, compelling stories:

  1. What corporate governance is, and how it can lead to stories. (Chapter 1, What’s good governance, and why should journalists care?)
  2. How understanding the role that the board and its committees play can lead to stories that competitors miss. (Chapter 2, The all-important board of directors)
  3. Shareholders are not only the ultimate stakeholders in public companies, but they often are an excellent source for story ideas. (Chapter 3, All about shareholders)
  4. Understanding how companies are structured helps journalists figure out how the board and management interact and why family-owned and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), may not always operate in the best interests of shareholders and the public. (Chapter 4, Inside family-owned and state-owned enterprises)
  5. Regulatory disclosures can be a rich source of exclusive stories for journalists who know where to look and how to interpret what they see. (Chapter 5, Toeing the line: regulations and disclosure)
  6. Reading financial statements and annual reports — especially the fine print — often leads to journalistic scoops. (Chapter 6, Finding the story behind the numbers)
  7. Developing sources is a key element for reporters covering companies. So is dealing with resistance and pressure from company executives and public relations directors. (Chapter 7, Writing and reporting tips)

Each chapter ends with a section on Sources, which lists background resources pertinent to that chapter’s topics. At the end of the Guide, a Selected Resources section provides useful websites and recommended reading on corporate governance. The Glossary defines terminology used in covering companies and corporate governance ».

Here’s what Ottawa’s new rules for state-owned buyers may look like (business.financialpost.com)

The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value (greenbackd.com)

Effective Drivers of Good Corporate Governance (shilpithapar.com)

La gouvernance chez Desjardins selon Monique Leroux | Grande conférence annuelle du CAS


Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) présentait, le mercredi 6 février dernier au Parquet du Centre CDP Capital à Montréal, la 7e Grande conférence annuelle en gouvernance de sociétés et la remise des prix Reconnaissance CAS 2013.

Près de 200 administrateurs de sociétés, hauts dirigeants et partenaires du CAS étaient présents pour assister à cette soirée qui débutait par une conférence de Mme Monique F. Leroux, présidente du conseil et chef de la direction du Mouvement Desjardins. Mme Leroux a traité des atouts et défis d’un groupe coopératif de l’ampleur de celui du Mouvement Desjardins, à travers divers exemples et en faisant part de ses convictions.

7e Grande conférence annuelle en gouvernance de sociétés et la remise des prix Reconnaissance CAS 2013

centre
centre (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Vous pouvez consulter la présentation Power Point de la conférence de Mme Monique Leroux.

Article relié :

For Desjardins the time is now (scansite3.wordpress.com)

La compréhension de la gouvernance est largement fonction du poste occupé au C.A. !


Voici une lecture très intéressante publiée dans McKinsey Quaterly par William George*, professeur à la Harvard Business School et membre des conseils suivants : ExxonMobil, Goldman Sachs et Mayo Clinic. L’article est basé sur l’expérience de l’auteur en tant que membre d’une grande variété de C.A.

M. George tente de montrer que l’on ne peut comprendre la gouvernance d’une entreprise et le comportement des membres du conseil qu’en considérant les rôles qui y sont exercés :

(1) administrateur indépendant;

(2) président du C.A. (PCA) et président et chef de la direction (PCD);

(3) uniquement PCD et

(4) uniquement PCA.

English: Inside a Harvard Business School clas...
English: Inside a Harvard Business School classroom (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Selon le rôle occupé sur le C.A., l’auteur tire des conclusions sur le bon fonctionnement des mécanismes de gouvernance. Voici donc une lecture qui remet en question plusieurs principes de saine gouvernance (comme la séparation des rôles de PCD et PCA) en s’appuyant sur l’expérience de diverses positions au sein du conseil d’administration. Ainsi, l’efficacité du conseil dépend de la manière dont on comprend son rôle. L’auteur propose trois suggestions pour améliorer la gouvernance. Je vous invite à lire cet article. Quel est votre point de vue ?

Pour lire l’article au complet, vous devrez vous inscrire, mais c’est sûrement une belle occasion de recevoir les dernières communications de McKinsey. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait du document.

Board governance depends on where you sit  !

« Board governance is frequently discussed and often misunderstood. In this article, I offer an insider’s perspective on the topic. Over the years, I have had the privilege of serving on ten corporate boards, as well as being chairman and CEO of Medtronic, chairman only, and CEO only. I have also observed dozens of boards from outside the boardroom and engaged in numerous confidential conversations with members of these boards about the challenges they faced and how they handled them.

What I have learned from these experiences is that one’s perspective about a board’s governance is strongly influenced by the seat one holds—independent director, chair and CEO, CEO only, or chair only. That’s why it is essential to look at corporate governance through the eyes of each of these positions.

In surveying governance through the lens of different roles, I hope to address a problem in the prevailing dialogue: many of the governance experts exerting power over boards through shareholder proposals, media articles, and legislative actions have never participated in an executive session of a major board. It’s no surprise, therefore, that their proposals deal almost entirely with formal board processes and “check the box” criteria that generally have little to do with the substance of how boards operate.

I worry, in fact, that many of these proposals could weaken the performance of boards by burdening them with an excessive amount of ministerial details. That would be a shame, because corporate boards have made progress since the scandals of recent years, with a new generation of CEOs sharing with boards more openly, listening to them more closely, and working to achieve a healthier balance of power with independent directors ».

_________________________________________

* William George, a professor of management practice at the Harvard Business School, is a board member of ExxonMobil, Goldman Sachs, and the Mayo Clinic and previously served on the boards of Novartis AG and Target, among others. From 1991 to 2001, he was the CEO of Medtronic, whose board he chaired from 1996 to 2002. This article is an adaptation of a chapter George contributed to The Future of Boards: Meeting the Governance Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, edited by Jay W. Lorsch (Harvard Business School Publishing, July 2012).

Six raisons qui militent en faveur du choix d’administrateurs externes au C.A. (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

L’efficacité de l’audit interne dans le secteur des services financiers | Recommandations de IIA UK


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un document de consultation de l’IIA UK, partagé par Denis Lefort, CPA, CA, CIA, CRMA, concernant le rôle de l’audit interne dans le secteur financier. On y retrouvera plusieurs recommandation à l’intention de l’Institut des auditeurs internes certifiés, dont quelques-unes controversées. Je vous invite à lire ce document.

Effective Internal Audit in the Financial Services Sector

The Rewarding Profession of Internal Audit / C...
The Rewarding Profession of Internal Audit / Corporate Management (Photo credit: danielleherner)

« In the course of our consultation, the Committee asked a range of questions around the role, scope and position of internal audit in the organisation’s governance and risk management frameworks. The responses received highlight the range of practice across the industry, with a varying degree of uniformity of practice and aspiration between organisations.

There was a general consensus around the importance of the independence of Internal Audit; both independence from Executive Management authority, from the Risk Management and Compliance functions, and from executive decision making responsibilities. There was also strong support for an unrestricted scope of Internal Audit, and for greater clarity and consistency of Internal Audit’s role in auditing areas such as strategy, culture, risk appetite and key corporate events.

Areas in which there was a greater divergence of response include the role and extent of Internal Audit involvement in challenging strategic decision making; whether there are circumstances in which it would be appropriate for Internal Audit to report to a Board Risk Committee rather than tothe Audit Committee, the nature of Internal Audit’s Executive reporting line and who this line should report into (e.g. CEO / CFO); and the appropriateness of the Chief Internal Auditor having the right to attend Executive Committee meetings. In these areas, the Committee has formed a view based on both the responses received and Committee discussion ».

Strongest Outlook for Internal Audit Resources in Five Years, Reports The Institute of Internal Auditors (virtual-strategy.com)

New UK internal auditor code seen needed to restore credibility (uk.reuters.com)

Mieux comprendre le rôle d’ambassadeur au sein des C.A. d’OBNL


Voici un article très intéressant sur l’importance d’utiliser certains membres de conseils d’OBNL comme « ambassadeurs » auprès de la communauté. Cet article, publié par R. Armstrong et S. Trillo de VISION Management Services, est basé sur une entrevue avec Lyn Baptist, présidente de la Fondation J.W. McConnell Family et experte dans la gestion des OBNL. L’article présente une typologie des rôles d’ambassadeurs sur des C.A. On y explique clairement ce que font les ambassadeurs et on y présente certains moyens à prendre pour rallumer la flamme de la passion.

Cet article sera assurément d’un grand intérêt pour les présidents de C.A. et les leaders dans le domaine de la gouvernance des OBNL.

Governing Beyond the Boardroom  |  Reigniting the Ambassadorial Role

2011 Board of Directors Retreat
2011 Board of Directors Retreat (Photo credit: sfbike)

« We interviewed Lyn about her ambassadorial approach to governance because of the impact she’s had. While the ambassadorial role is not new, it seems to have waned, despite the fact that many boards are populated by would-be ambassadors who are passionate, skilled and networked. Few organizations today seem to encourage or support board members to take on this valuable role.

In the start-up phase of an organization, many board members naturally assume an ambassadorial role. They reach out to friends, family, neighbours, and colleagues, driven by a passionate belief in a cause and a desire to act. Start-up phases are often characterized by few or no staff, and so board members do whatever it takes to build the organization. Not surprisingly, roles and responsibilities are rarely defined; and in the absence of an Executive Director (ED), board members connect to external stakeholders as a critical part of establishing and growing the organization.

Once the board succeeds in establishing the organization, they hire an ED to lead it. The ED takes on many of the roles formerly assumed by the board; and the ‘line’ between operations and governance is drawn. In the process, the board’s role is contained and its scope narrowed. While this has reduced the time commitment for busy board members, it has led to disengagement and dissatisfaction. Many board members comment that the governance work they’re asked to do does not leverage their skills and talents or engage their passion for the cause ».

5 huge mistakes startups make when choosing board members (venturebeat.com)

La séparation des pouvoirs PCA (Chair) et PCD (CEO) | Avis des experts en gouvernance


J’ai récemment suivi les échanges sur le groupe de discussion LinkedIn –  Boards & Advisors portant sur l’à-propos de la séparation des pouvoirs des PCA (Chairperson) et des PCD (CEO).  Le sujet est certainement l’un des plus cruciaux … et des plus controversés en gouvernance car, à mon avis, tout commence par l’établissement d’un principe de base prônant la souveraineté du C.A. sur la gouvernance des organisations. Le reste devrait suivre naturellement…

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un solide échantillon des points de vue des experts en gouvernance. Je vous invite à lire les commentaires issus de cette riche conversation. Vous comprendrez aisément qu’il y a des différences significatives entre les positions des experts en gouvernance, la plupart optant pour une séparation des rôles. Notons cependant que les pratiques en vigueur aux É.U. se démarquent de toutes celles des pays occidendaux car environ 60 % des conseils de sociétés cotées sont présidées par le PCD (CEO) ! Également, il est important de considérer que l’article le plus souvent cité sur le sujet (voir le billet du 3 septembre 2011  –   Séparation ou combinaison des rôles – Président du Conseil et CEO ?), est très nuancé eu égard aux avantages et aux inconvénients de cette pratique.

English: Eric E. Schmidt, Chairman and CEO of ...
English: Eric E. Schmidt, Chairman and CEO of Google Inc and a member of the Board of Directors of Apple Computer. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Bien qu’un PCA indépendant ne garantisse pas l’exercice d’un leadership exemplaire et bien que le poste puisse aussi être occupé par un « Lead Director » indépendant, je crois personnellement que la gouvernance des organisations est mieux servie par l’emploi d’un président du Conseil totalement indépendant du management et que, conséquemment, les deux rôles de PCA et de PCD devraient être séparés.

Dans ce débat, l’opinion de Al Errington reflète en bonne partie mon point de vue :

« … a chair being a CEO is a conflict of interest. The fundamental responsibility of a board of directors is to hire, set objectives and direction, and evaluate performance of the CEO. The chair’s fundamental responsibility is facilitate and focus the board in doings it’s work of hiring, setting objectives and direction, and evaluating performance of the CEO. If the chair is also the CEO they are focusing and facilitating the setting of their own objectives and performance evaluations. Even if performance is good, accountability is very weak which may have long-term issues… Chairs who are CEOs, or dependent on CEOs, are bad governance. Lead directors are an attempt to have your cake and eat it too, a workaround bad governance but still retains bad governance. The board of directors is supposed to be the CEO’s boss. If the roles and relationship is not separated and defined, the relationship is murky along with accountability. Many organizations either don’t want change or are afraid of the unknown. Good governance, I am sorry to say is largely unknown, in our culture and economy ».

La séparation des pouvoirs PCA (Chair) et PCD (CEO)  |  Avis

des experts en gouvernance

Henry D. Wolfe

Henry D. Wolfe  – I support the split of the Chairman and CEO roles but where is the focus and emphasis on 1)The importance of the chairman’s role in setting the tone and expectations for the performance of the company and 2) The qualifications that are needed in a non-executive chairman? « Independendence is not enough,,,purpose and competence needs to be included in the mix.

James McRitchie

James McRitchie  – I don’t think there is much doubt that, in general, it is better that the roles be split. http://www.commpro.biz/ir-therefore-i-am/governance-and-compliance/splitting-the-chairman-ceo-titles-practice-good-corporate-governance-while-saving-money/#.UQwWlqU7Mmk

Carl Hagberg

Carl Hagberg – I feel strongly that having a totally independent Lead Director – one with a clear and robust Charter – is far superior to the idea of having a totally independent Chairman. For starters; « No man can serve two masters » – and that is often what one ends up getting with such deals. Secondly; in difficult times – and certainly when there is a business crisis – it is usually a major strategic blunder to divide one’s forces among two « leaders. » My biggest fear – and we have seen this play out recently at several large companies – is to end up with a trigger-happy « Imperial Chairman » – who turns out to be at least as bad – and often worse – than the old-time Imperial CEO. So called « Independent Unlike a « Lead Director », who must have, and continue to maintain the support of the Board as a whole – so called « Independent Chairmen » often seem to think they are free to have a « Charter » of their own making – that is often subject to change at their own whim. Yes; sometimes an Independent Chairman can be a good thing…But at other times, the need for a single strong leader – who can speak and act with one voice is an overriding concern. (And just as an aside; of late, we see CEOs getting ousted far more often in such situations than we see the « Independent Chair » being shown the door…which may, or may not be the best thing in the end.) A strong Lead Director – with a strong Charter – and with strong Board support – is a far better and safer way to go in my book.

Richard Leblanc

Richard Leblanc  – Carl you raise good points. The quality and leadership of the person, and relationships and context, are important. Both models can work and both cannot, depending. Most Anglo American companies other than the US choose the separate chair, where the US prefers the Lead Director. Both models can work. The disadvantage I see is the LD does not chair meetings. But then again I have seen separate chairs not effective at chairing meetings. I saw one where the Chair did not say a single word all meeting… And there is no causal relationship academics have found between separate chairs and shareholder performance, chiefly because independence is being measured not effectiveness.

Henry D. Wolfe

Henry D. Wolfe  – I would suggest that the lack of the causal relationship is due to the complete lack of understanding of what is required in a high peformance non-executive chairman. The focus is too tilted toward independence alone rather than delving into the understanding of what is required of the leader who should be setting the standards for the group (board) that is in place to ensure the maximization of company performance.

Michael Wildenauer

Michael Wildenauer  – I’m sure that not many in the US would agree that the separation of powers in the system of government be abolished; splitting the chair/CEO roles serves the same purpose (albeit not quite so large in scope, importance etc.). Sure having the « single strong leader – who can speak and act with one voice  » can be useful in times of trouble, but it seems likely to get companies into trouble just as often. Its about checks and balances. As with government, its an imperfect system, but possibly less imperfect than others… Just my opinion, obviously.

Richard Leblanc

Richard Leblanc  – Henry, I think if you asked many academics what they would need to actually measure what you write above, they wouldn’t have the foggiest. Indeed the case for execution of this heightened role beyond independence may also be true for some boards or chairs. I think the role and importance of the chair is the most misunderstood, opaque, understudied yet vitally important board positions.

Michael, there is a strong cultural, military and entrepreneurial tradition in the US of unity in command or one person in charge. So I agree. But the flip side is power unchecked. Proponents of the lead director position would say that there are adequate protections such as an independent board leader, a majority of independent directors, executive sessions, and exclusively independent committees. But you really need an effective lead director who can push back against a combined Chair and CEO, with authority of both offices, if or when needed.
Michael Wildenauer

Michael Wildenauer  – Richard, to counter your first point may initial analogy of the US not vesting all power in the President, but also in Congress and the judicial system, seems appropriate. The Chair has one very important source of power, the power to explicitly or implicitly set the agenda. If that Chair is also the CEO, the ability of the board to even consider the wisdom of certain strategies, let alone how they are being executed for example may be curtailed. Or not, depending on the character/abilities/integrity of the individual who holds the position.
I’m sure that Lead Directors work fine in most situations, but its not a very lean solution to add something new rather than fix something that’s already there. It seems to me that the LD argument seems to be wanting to have it both ways: we need a strong unified CEO/Chair voice & the LD will ensure that one voice won’t speak over the top of others. As usual, just my opinion.

Richard Leblanc

Richard Leblanc  – You know Michael after I wrote my response I thought of yours, and the very good point you are making is that there are strong balance (one could argue too stong) of powers in the US political context (legislative, executive, judicial), but not as much in the corporate sector (a company can still have a chair, ceo and president AND controlling shareholder). And I agree with your second paragraph. It is not just agenda setting but the meting itself and who says what, when. A CEO and chair combined is proposing and assessing. The LD role has been criticized for not having the authority of the office. A good chair can speak over the head of the CEO but I don’t know that a LD has the same klout. I am not sure the US will ever truly adopt a NEC model, but there is constant movement in this direction I find.

Jason Masters

Jason Masters  – In corporate Australia we have a preference (strong) for the separation of the Chair and the CEO, with the Chair obviously having a key role in the Board room, and with the REM committee the performance of the CEO. The Chairs also provide a mentoring, support role for the CEO which can be incredibly useful for CEO’s. There have been some recent examples where this has not been followed, and generally the market has been supportive usually given the particular enterprise and the particular CEO.

Henry D. Wolfe

Henry D. Wolfe  – Re your point above re academics, I think the same goes for the governance community in general. I would suggest that this is due to a continuation of viewing governance through the lens of compliance, oversight and related frameworks rather than seeing the board as the entity with the primary responsibility to ensure that the company’s performance is maxmizied. When viewed through the latter lens, a entire series of different questions arise in regard to what is needed in a non-executive chairman.

Richard Leblanc

Richard Leblanc  – Jason it is similar for Canada – there is a strong emphasis on independent chairs, of all public companies, but there in it stops. I recommended a position description to our regulator and they went with it, but in retrospect that was a mistake. The management lawyers draft the chair role to be NOT what Henry describes above, but to keep the board and chair at bay. You get what you regulate. If you want an independent chair and are silent on mindset, strategic role, performance and value creation, then you get an independent chair, only. I am not suggesting regulation, but I am suggesting more guidance in terms of the qualities and attributes required of the chair, and directors, and their responsibilities beyond compliance. My interviews I am undergoing are very revealing. It frustrates activists what is happening and how chairs and directors are chosen, and that indeed many are not independent as believed or intended. Shareholders clearly understand what is needed, and have the experience and track record. I interviewed someone Friday who has been involved in 50 activist situations.

Steven Wood

Steven Wood  – Great discussion. I am a clear advocate of separation of powers of Chair from the CEO. I remember the advantages of Procter & Gamble separating these more than 50 years ago. It was principally based on separate of powers argument. Over time more of the strategy review and general performance of the company has come under the perview of the independent Chairman. Agree that this situation is an exception in US corporations, but one that can be found in more than P&G. In China there is usually no spliting of Chairman and CEO role, which I think causes many of the governance issues that are coming out frequently in the press globally about Chinese companies under investigation for false representation of their business. Of course, you could say that corruption is endemic in China and this is just another reflection of this. I think that an independent Chairman could help in bringing better governance. HK is considering such a measure. On the other hand in Israel, the Chairman and CEO are usually split. It is traditional with little law in this area. It is clear that an independent Chair would be better at representing the interest of the owners/shareholders. The Chairs in Israel usually come from the industry (retired) or in advisory capacity in the industry, so know it well. Their is a bias to focus on company performance.

Brenda Kelleher-Flight

Brenda Kelleher-Flight  – Which model works depends on the ability of the chair to i) facilitate meetings without imposing his/her views, ii) accept differences of opinion and weigh the benefits associated with each perspective, iii) ensure the board is a team (rather than just a group), iv) ensure all data is on the table and refrain from assuming that the information provided by the CEO is all inclusive, v) view the work of the board from a longitudinal perspective (rather than a one-meeting at a time), vi) maintain focus on the mandate of the entity, vii) ensure the effectiveness of the board is evaluated, and viii) ensure that the board does not see its role as being synonymoous with pleasing the CEO or backing away when the CEO uses any strong-armed tactics.

Al Errington

Al Errington  – My opinion is that a chair being a CEO is a conflict of interest. The fundamental responsibility of a board of directors is to hire, set objectives and direction, and evaluate performance of the CEO. The chair’s fundamental responsibility is facilitate and focus the board in doings it’s work of hiring, setting objectives and direction, and evaluating performance of the CEO. If the chair is also the CEO they are focusing and facilitating the setting of their own objectives and performance evaluations. Even if performance is good, accountability is very weak which may have long-term issues.

Carl Hagberg

Carl Hagberg – This is excellent, Brenda – and a close-to-perfect statement, in my opinion, of the kind of Charter there should be for the Lead Director…and yes, I guess for an « Independent Chair » as well. I think that EVERYONE agrees that there needs to be a strong system of « checkpoints » on the CEO – and a very strong process for making sure the CEO stays on task, uses the Board as it SHOULD be used, serves the needs of all shareholders and, above all, does not revert to the old « Imperial » Chair/CEO model…My big fear. as I noted earlier, is that many so-called « Independent Chairmen » unilaterally grant themselves too MUCH independence and, unless there is a strong Charter that is designed, managed and closely supervised by the Board as a whole, there is a very real and present danger of creating an « Imperial Chairman. » To me, the Lead Director, who is primarily a « creature of the Board » – and who, almost invariably is the choice of the Board rather than a nominee of the Chairman – and who operates under a strong but frequently reviewed Charter – is the way to go…

Brenda Kelleher-Flight

Brenda Kelleher-Flight  – Unfortunately, human nature intervenes. Often those in power (or think they should have the power) chose others who will agree with them and support their position. I agree that one way is to ensure the charter is supervised by the board. The question I often grapple with is how to get boards to see diversified opinions as positive rather than time wasters, especially when they have a blocked agenda and strict time limits.

James McRitchie

James McRitchie  – The move for years has been to have « independent » board members on the board and chairing important committees. That whole effort means little if the chair is not independent of the CEO. Lead directors are a poor substitute for the real thing.

Carl Hagberg

Carl Hagberg  – What in the world would make someone think that a « Lead Director » would not be an « Independent Director » who is « independent of the CEO »…much less a « poor substitute for the real thing »??? This, of course, is the whole point of having an official – and publicy available Charter – regardless of whether one calls the person who « leads the meeting » and sets the agenda an « Independent Chairman » or a « Lead Director. »

Richard Leblanc

Richard Leblanc  – My understanding (and observation) is that a Lead Director does not set the agenda nor lead the meeting, like a Chair does, but rather is consulted on the agenda and chairs the executive session when the Chair exits the meeting. In other words, Carl, what I hear from some folk in this stream is that, notwithstanding the Charter for a Lead Director, the issue is still that the Non Executive Chair still sets the agenda and runs the meeting, whereas the Lead Director does not. The NEC and LD roles are not synonymous. I hear (and agree with) that all else equal, the NEC is superior to the LD role. Of course it goes without saying that an effective LD is preferable to a non-effective NEC, but what Jim, Brenda and Henry and others above are saying (I think) is that the best [superior to a LD] is an « effective » NEC, accomplishing the role and responsibilities they set out above.

Lee Mathias

Lee Mathias  – Here in the Antipodes, NZ, the roles are split. The Chair’s role is to set the tone and guide the decisions on the strategic direction of the firm. That goes for Board meetings too i.e. to set/establish the context of the decision and, through canvassing the opinions of all directors, reach a decision. It is beneficial for the CEO to hear the Board reaching a decision. The CEO puts those decisions in action.

James McRitchie

James McRitchie  – I really think there is something in a name. Getting named a « lead director » will never be seen in the eyes of many the same as taking on the title of « board chair. » Why all the workarounds to make it appear that lead directors are equivalent. Is a civil union equivalent to marriage? I don’t think so. If lead directors are equivalent in every way, why the hesitation to call them board chairs?

Al Errington

Al Errington  – Chairs who are CEOs, or dependent on CEOs, are bad governance. Lead directors are an attempt to have your cake and eat it too, a workaround bad governance but still retains bad governance. The board of directors is supposed to be the CEO’s boss. If the roles and relationship is not separated and defined, the relationship is murky along with accountability. Many organizations either don’t want change or are afraid of the unknown. Good governance, I am sorry to say is largely unknown, in our culture and economy.

What is a non-executive chairman? (aviationblog.dallasnews.com)

Que font les « bons » administrateurs pour faciliter le succès des organisations ?


Excellente vidéo* de Richard Leblanc et Robert Kueppers qui discutent des comportements efficaces des administrateurs pour assurer le succès des organisations. Très pertinent.

What Good Board Members Do to Help Organizations Succeed

« Since Dodd Frank and Sarbanes- Oxley, board members play a critical role in the success of their organizations. Yet, what constitutes a “good” board member? Dr. Leblanc, an award winning teacher and researcher says, he or she is one who oversees management and the interest of shareholders; oversees financial statements and risk, sets the strategy for the organization and assures compensation is appropriate. Bob Kueppers, cited by Directorship Magazine, as one of the top 100 most influential professionals in corporate governance, believes there are three activities that should take up most of a director’s time, energy and talent. The activities include: the strategy of the organization and where it is headed, making sure the right person is in charge, and how risk relates to strategy and how the organization can see what’s coming. He emphasizes that oversight is different from managing the business ».

De gauche à doite : Richard Leblanc et Robert J. Kueppers

« Too often strategy is underemphasized at the expense of risk and compliance. They advise growth, innovation and competiveness, a true creation of shareholder value- with a #1 value that of strategy and succession planning. Today, 39% of US companies do not have an immediate successor for their CEO! Another area that must be looked at is diversity. Too few boards represent their constituents and culture, with a challenge in the US and not Canada of too few women represented.

Good board members have skill sets and behaviors that include being a good communicator, listening, leadership and integrity. The softer skills- working as a team- are important. And- surprise, company CEO’s do not necessarily make the best directors, as they often have a dominant style and are overstretched! What is important and critical is good governance, meetings called with plenty of notice, preparation, agendas and information so the best decisions can be made. Good board members are chosen and cultivated. Yet, while behaviors can really change board dynamics, there is no one right way or magic bullet ».

______________________________________

*Joining host, Dennis McCuistion, are:

Richard Leblanc, PhD: Co-author of Inside the Boardroom and an Associate Professor at York University in Toronto, Canada

Robert J. Kueppers: Deputy CEO of Regulation & Public Policy,Vice Chairman, Deloitte, LLC

La diversité au sein des conseils d’administration | Énoncé de politique du GNDI


Le Global Network of Director Institutes (GNDI) a récemment publié un énoncé « qui souligne l’impact important et positif d’un conseil d’administration diversifié sur les résultats d’une entreprise, mais soutient que des quotas obligatoires ne sont pas la meilleure façon d’y arriver« .

Cet énoncé représente la prise de position des grandes associations nationales d’administrateurs de sociétés. Beaucoup d’ouverture, peu de moyens d’action concrets, pas de quotas ! Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Poison Arrows
Poison Arrows (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Le communiqué de presse présente un résumé de l’énoncé de politique et fait notamment état des points suivants :

  1. Les nominations au conseil devraient toujours être effectuées en se fondant sur le mérite, par la sélection de la personne la plus appropriée, en tenant compte des attributs de la personne et des besoins du conseil en tant qu’entité collective ainsi que de la taille, des besoins et des impératifs stratégiques de l’organisation.
  2. La diversité englobe le genre, l’ethnicité/la race, la nationalité, les croyances religieuses, les antécédents culturels ou socio-économiques et l’âge, mais n’est pas limité à ces critères.
  3. La diversité au sein du conseil est un important enjeu de gouvernance. Toutefois, elle est un moyen d’atteindre une fin et non une fin en soi.
  4. Les systèmes de gouvernance organisationnelle varient considérablement de par le monde et il n’existe pas d’approche uniformisée.

Pour de plus amples informations, je vous invite à consulter le document Board diversity: policy perspective ou le communiqué de presse (en anglais uniquement … à ce stade-ci).

Six raisons qui militent en faveur du choix d’administrateurs externes au C.A. (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Comply or Explain | Rapport de ecoDa – The European Voice of Directors


Voici un rapport très attendu et d’un grand intérêt pour tout « étudiant » de la saine gouvernance européenne. On le sait, dans les États européens, le principe CoE (Comply or Explain – Se conformer au Code de gouvernance ou expliquer) est devenu, en 2009, une obligation pour les entreprises publiques (cotées). Les principes retenus ont été empruntés au Code de gouvernance de la G-B, lequel a été reconnu comme le meilleur du point de vue du monde des investisseurs.

Ce compte rendu est issu d’une conférence sur le sujet organisée par ecoDa (European Confederation of Directors’ Associations) dont le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) est membre. Ce rapport conclue qu’il y a un besoin de renforcer le principe du CoE et que plus d’efforts et de moyens doivent être consentis à la qualité des explications ainsi qu’aux suivis de ces explications. Je vous invite à lire ce bref rapport pour vous former une meilleure opinion de la position européennes en matière d’application des codes de gouvernance des pays membres.

Comply or Explain  |  Rapport de ecoDa – The European Voice of Directors

« Comply or Explain (CoE) offers the flexibility to fit with the large diversity among and within the different EU Member States. The quality of explanation is the core factor for upgrading the legitimacy of the CoE approach. However, defining the quality requirements is not a straightforward exercise. With its printed report, ecoDa wanted to feed further the debate and to enhance the European discussions.

Explaining
Explaining (Photo credit: theother66)

For some years, the quality of governance in general and of the explanations for not following the recommended best practices specified in corporate governance codes has been a key issue for policy makers, investors, companies and wider society. However, different factors have played a role in the gradual improvement of the quality of explanations. More should be done to increase the effectiveness of the governance codes and to foster a better dialogue between companies and their shareholders. Transparency and monitoring are only a first step in the direction of a well-governed company. Complementary monitoring capability is best provided by a regular and thorough (independent) governance (or board) assessment. Companies should develop a governance model that helps them to reach the corporate goal and allows them to make effective decisions in the long term interest of the company, shareholders and stakeholders. The board is a crucial factor to this end. But also shareholders have to play their role to foster growth, strategy, entrepreneurship and sustainability ».

« People should not forget that governance is not an end in itself but a means to an end ».

Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) | Février 2013


Voici le Bulletin de Février 2013 du CAS. On y retrouve beaucoup d’information sur les activités du Collège au cours des dernières semaines : la 26e cohorte du CAS, la Banque des ASC, le partenariat avec l’Association des MBA, le programme « Administrateurs de la relève », les événements en gouvernance auxquelles le CAS est associé, la capsule vidéo du mois, les programmes de formation, les ASC qui se sont distingués, les nombreuses nominations à des postes de C.A. et une série de liens utiles à consulter afin d’être à jour en gouvernance de sociétés.

Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS)  |  Février 2013

English: View of downtown Montreal. Français :...
English: View of downtown Montreal. Français : Vue du centre de Montréal. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Événements à l’agenda

Grande conférence en gouvernance COMPLET | Mercredi 6 février 2013à Montréal
180 minutes pour traiter des enjeux éthiques et des   valeurs au conseil d’administration | Lundi 11 février 2013à Montréal
Remise des Phares Korn/Ferry – Les Affaires | Mercredi 13 février 2013à Montréal
Petit-déjeuner conférence « Et votre réputation, qu’en est-il   ? » par le Cercle des ASC | Mardi 19 février 2013à Québec
Petit-déjeuner conférence « Rôle du conseil en temps de   crise » par l’IAS | Vendredi 22 février 2013à Montréal
Gala des Sociétés en Bourse | Mercredi 3 avril 2013à Québec

Six raisons qui militent en faveur du choix d’administrateurs externes au C.A.


Ce court article, publié par , blogueur en gouvernance, présente un argumentaire assez convaincant sur l’avantage d’avoir des administrateurs externes sur les conseils. Plusieurs personnes m’ont fait part de leur intérêt pour ce sujet. Je me permets donc de le resoumettre. Une lecture intéressante !

Qu’en pensez-vous ? Comme PCA ? Comme PCD ? Comme administrateurs de sociétés (ASC) ?

6 Reasons Why Every Board Needs ‘Fresh Eyes’

Fresh Eyes

« There is the board principle I’ve always subscribed to: “eyes in, fingers out.” This means the board function is not to run the company, but to pick the management and set policy.

If the board is micro-managing the company, there is definitely a problem and either you need new management or outside directors with fresh eyes to help the company get back on track. The board’s job is to govern and management’s job is to manage. Here are the right ways outside directors can use their fresh eyes to a board’s advantage.

6 Reasons ‘Fresh Eyes’ Can Help Your Company

    1. They have different perspective on issues…
    2. They have experiences and views from other industries that may have already experienced and solved the problems or issues being discussed…
    3. They have a new network of resources for the board to consult…
    4. They will ask new and different questions to stimulate the board’s decision-making process…
    5. You need to bring in someone who is not a specialist, but someone who has been involved in all areas of running a business…
    6. They can bring a new understanding of a subject that the board does not have…

Outside directors bring incredible value with their “fresh eyes.” I believe boards that have not brought somebody new to the organization in the last one to two years run the risk of stalling the growth of the company ».

Mieux planifier la relève du PCD (CEO) | Une approche systématique pour en garantir le succès ?


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un article paru dans la section Boards & Governance du site de Spencer Stuart portant sur un sujet très négligé dans le domaine de la gouvernance des entreprises : La planification de la relève du PCD (CEO).

Comme environ 80% des PCD du S&P 500 sont issus de l’interne, les organisations sont dans une bien meilleure position pour planifier la relève de la haute direction, notamment celle du PCD. L’article s’interroge sur la prédictibilité du succès du PCD et énumère plusieurs facteurs qui contribuent au manque de précision dans la définition des critères de réussite :

      1. « The articulated strategy is too rooted in the present and often includes status quo assumptions, rather than taking a view of where the company needs to be in five to 10 years.
      2. The criteria for the future CEO are not based on a deep, analytical review of the company’s financial performance versus industry peers; nor are they tied to the strategic, organizational and operational levers that the next CEO will need to employ.
      3. Evaluations of succession candidates often are loose and relative to the roles executives are in today rather than mapped to the future. Complicating matters, predicting the likely success of internal succession candidates is even more challenging because the CEO role is vastly more complex than their current jobs ».

How Do You Predict CEO Success? The Case for a New Succession Planning Approach

NYC: American Intl Building and Manhattan Comp...
NYC: American Intl Building and Manhattan Company Building (Photo credit: wallyg)

Les entreprises doivent se doter d’un processus systématique de recherche et de préparation d’un successeur potentiel. L’article suggère les étapes suivantes. Veuillez lire l’article pour bieux comprendre chaque actions proposée.

■ Focuses on company performance
■ Defines criteria for the next CEO based on future performance    drivers
■ Challenges traditional assumptions about succession    candidates
■ Assesses succession candidates with a forward-looking lens

« Even as they adopt a more thoughtful succession planning process, boards should remember that no one individual can meet every requirement in equal measure; tradeoffs will be necessary. Boards will be in a better position to navigate these tradeoffs, and increase the odds of a successor coming from within, if they have defined success for the company — and the CEO — through a rigorous review of the performance of the company, its strategic imperatives and the necessary capabilities for the next CEO ».

5 Tips to Get a Head Start on Succession Planning (hiscoxusa.com)

CIO succession: Promote from within vs. hire an outsider (networkworld.com)

BDC Insight: Succession plan includes value creation (business.financialpost.com)

Succession Plans for Businesses (lawprofessors.typepad.com)

Comment le Board doit-il jouer son rôle à l’ère des réseaux « sociaux » ?


Aujourd’hui, je retiens un article fascinant écrit par Barry Libert* et paru dans NACD Directorship le 17 janvier 2013. L’auteur avance qu’il est de plus en plus évident que les conseils d’administration ont de nouvelles responsabilités, dont celles de s’assurer que l’entreprise a bien pris le virage des communications dans ce nouveau monde des médias sociaux.

Plusieurs organisations, au Québec et au Canada, dont Lassonde et SNC-Lavalin, ont été « sensibilisées » à la vigueur des réseaux sociaux !  Comme le rappelle, Barry Libert : « The boards and executives of Best Buy, Kodak, Blockbuster, Hewlett Packard, and Susan G. Komen have all learned this reality the hard way.  So did the 12 nations of the Arab Spring ». Alors, comment le Board doit-il jouer son rôle dans un monde de réseaux « sociaux » ?

Cet article présente (1) le contexte dans lequel oeuvrent les conseils d’administration, (2) les faits entourant les changements dans l’univers des médias sociaux et (3) les sept règles à observer dans cette nouvelle ère des réseaux sociaux.

7 Rules for Corporate Governance Success in the Social Age

Arab Spring [LP]
Arab Spring [LP] (Photo credit: Painted Tapes)

(1) Le contexte :

« We live in a connected world in which more than one billion people use social media and another five billion use mobile devices to communicate, collaborate and do commerce. In business, social, mobile, and cloud technologies are enabling emerging leaders and investors to re-imagine entire industries, companies, products, and services, according to the Kleiner Perkins 2012 Internet Trends Report. This emerging reality is creating unprecedented risks and rewards for corporate directors and shareholders of existing enterprises. The result: It is time for directors to think anew about the meaning of corporate governance in the social age.  In addition to all their existing roles, boards now have the added responsibility of shepherding their leaders and organizations into today’s digital world. Boards that avoid this obligation risk having their organizations fall prey to the speed and might of today’s social networks as they seek corporate reform and accountability ».

(2) Les faits :

  1. « Social Technologies Change Performance :  Enterprises that fully deploy social and mobile technologies to engage their crowds (customers, prospects, and alumni) in the cloud produce 9 percent more revenues, 26 percent more profits, and a 12 percent higher market valuation than their peers, according to research by MIT and Cap Gemini.
  2. Social Technologies Change Engagement Less than 30 percent of CEOs use social media according to recent research, despite the fact that more than one billion of their customers, employees and investors do.  Furthermore, The Conference Board and the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University report that 93 percent of boards do not use social intelligence to make informed decisions about their networks’ sentiments or engagement.
  3. Social Technologies Change Investor Relations :  Finally, research at University of California at Berkeley and MIT reveals that social media is a leading indicator of stock price movement.  As such, directors of publicly traded companies need to be receiving this information in real time or risk not knowing what their institutional investors know and how they will act based on insights derived from social and cloud networks ».

 

(3) les sept règles à observer

L’auteur propose sept réflexions « en profondeur » vraiment très intéressantes que je vous invite à lire avec attention.

7 Rules for Corporate Governance Success in the Social Age

Barry Libert
Barry Libert (Photo credit: paloma.cl)
            1. Rethink Strategy
            2. Rethink People
            3. Rethink Processes
            4. Rethink Technology
            5. Rethink Leadership
            6. Rethink Finance
            7. Rethink Governance

« The bottom line: Boards need to think anew about their role in the social and mobile world. For corporate directors, there is no time to waste.  Directors must join the social and mobile ranks. New board members must be recruited, and new business models must be fashioned based on these technology realities.  Social enterprises are here to stay and they are faster, better, and more competitive than traditional businesses ».

* Barry Libert,  :CEO of OpenMatters, is a technology investor, corporate director, and strategic advisor to boards and their leaders seeking to become great social enterprises.

Social Media Report 2012: Social Media Comes of Age (anthonyomenya.wordpress.com)

It’s Time to Rethink Social Media Marketing (jnferree.wordpress.com)

Attentes du Conseil envers la Direction, et vice-versa


Je vous invite à lire le billet de Richard Leblanc publié sur son blogue le 27 janvier. Ces réflexions sont le fruit d’un sondage auprès de participants à un atelier animé par Richard. On constate donc qu’il s’agit d’idées peu souvent exprimées mais qui sont fondamentales dans la qualité des relations entre le C.A. et la direction de l’entreprise.

On entend plus parler des attentes que le Board a envers le PCD (CEO) car on a peu l’occasion d’avoir le feedback des hauts dirigeants sur les attentes qu’ils ont à propos du conseil. Il est donc important d’avoir les avis des deux groupes pour mieux appréhender les questions de confiance au coeur des relations entre le C.A. et la direction.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les grandes lignes des résultats en français. Veuillez vous référer à l’article pour plus d’informations.

What a Board Expects from Management, and What Management Expects from a Board

Chess Board before Sanding
Chess Board before Sanding (Photo credit: Dan Zen)

« Here is what a good board is entitled to expect from management, in no particular order : »

1.         Le Management ne doit pas créer d’effets de surprise

2.         Le Board doit être le premier à savoir

3.         Le Management doit avoir une connaissance approfondie de l’entreprise et de son industrie

4.         Le Board doit connaître les options étudiées par le management

5.         La transmission de l’information doit être totale

« Management, in turn, has expectations of the board. They are: »

1.         Candeur et franchise

2.         Integrité et indépendance

3.         Direction

4.         Le Board doit réagir de manière nuancée

5.         Confiance

6.         Connaissance de l’entreprise

7.         Bonne préparation aux réunions

8.         Poser de bonnes questions

« Many of the above topics are not visible from outside a boardroom. Nor can they be, for the most part, regulated. But they all contribute to the quality of the board-management relationship, board decision-making, and whether the organization is well governed ».

Women in Economic Decision-making | Panel of the World Economic Forum


Voici une vidéo vraiment exceptionnelle réalisée dans le cadre du World Economic Forum (WEF). Le panel est composée d’un groupe remarquable de femmes (et d’un homme), leaders engagées au plus haut niveau dans diverses organisations internationales.

« Several panellists shared their personal experiences about how they made their way to leadership positions and how they addressed stereotyping and implicit biases along the way. Too often women are held back by such barriers, which are frequently not recognized, discussed or addressed ».

Le visionnement de cette vidéo est un « must » si vous souhaitez avoir une bonne compréhension de l’expérience des femmes en situation de leadership. Un document essentiel pour tout administrateur et PCD !

Animatrice :

Herminia Ibarra,

The Cora Chaired Professor of Leadership and Learning and Professor of Organizational Behaviour, INSEAD, France

Panelistes :

Christine Lagarde

Managing Director, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington DC

Drew Gilpin Faust

President, Harvard University, USA

Viviane Reding

Vice-President and Commissioner, Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, European Commission, Brussels

Lubna S. Olayan

Deputy Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer, Olayan Financing Company, Saudi Arabia

Sheryl Sandberg

Chief Operating Officer and Member of the Board, Facebook, USA

Kevin Kelly

Chief Executive Officer, Heidrick & Struggles, USA

Women in Economic Decision-making: Overview

Women in Economic Decision-making | Panel of the World Economic Forum

« For the second consecutive year, the World Economic Forum held a plenary session on women*. This year, the session focused on women in high-level economic decision-making in both the private and public sector. There has been an explosion of research in the past several years, including the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report, which demonstrates a strong link between closing the gender gap and improving economic competitiveness and corporate performance.

The panel recognized that real progress has been made in increasing the number of women in top economic position, including more women on boards and in high-level management. However, statistics around the world indicate that we are still far from closing the economic gender gap and progress remains slow.

The panellists discussed quotas and other policy and organizational changes to accelerate progress. For example, Viviane Reding, Vice-President and Commissioner, Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, European Commission, Brussels, described new European legislation setting a target of 40% for women on boards of European corporations. Another panellist noted that low turnover among existing board members slows the process of increasing gender diversity on corporate boards.

Several panellists shared their personal experiences about how they made their way to leadership positions and how they addressed stereotyping and implicit biases along the way. Too often women are held back by such barriers, which are frequently not recognized, discussed or addressed ».

Key Points

Gender parity is linked to global competitiveness and economic performance. In recent years, there has been an explosion of academic research confirming this link.

Real gains have been made in the number of women in top economic decision-making positions, but we are still far from closing the economic gender gap and progress is slow.

Stereotyping and implicit biases continue to impede the advancement of women to top leadership positions in economic decision-making. As more and more women rise to the top, they can “dare to embrace their diversity” and work with their organizations to address these barriers to ensure that diversity is a foundation of success.

___________________________________

*Le bref compte rendu du forum a été réalisé par Laura D’Andrea Tyson, S. K.  Angela Chan Professor of Global Management, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, USA.

La gouvernance et le financement des universités | La position des présidents de C.A.


Depuis quelque temps, dans le débat entourant le financement des universités et la position des associations étudiantes, lesquelles réclament le gel des frais de scolarité, voire la gratuité scolaire, la gouvernance des universités est interpellée et mise à mal. La gouvernance des universités est un modèle de gouvernance en soi et il me semble important que tous les intervenants au débat soient familiers avec les problématiques de gouvernance d’organismes aussi complexes qui, au fil des ans, se sont dotés de pratiques de bonne gouvernance, souvent exemplaires, mais distinctives, en ce sens qu’elles tiennent compte des intérêts d’un grand nombre de parties prenantes.

Je vous propose la lecture de la position des présidentes et présidents des conseils d’administration des universités québécoises à la rencontre thématique préparatoire au Sommet sur l’enseignement supérieur portant sur la gouvernance et le financement des universités du 18 janvier 2013.

La gouvernance et le financement des universités

"Science Friday" Recommendations
« Science Friday » Recommendations (Photo credit: LollyKnit)

« Dans le cadre du débat de société en cours sur l’avenir de l’enseignement supérieur, il est important que la voix des membres des conseils d’administration1 (CA) des universités soit entendue. Ce sont des acteurs à part entière dont le rôle est primordial à la bonne gouvernance des universités. Ce rôle est distinct et complémentaire à celui des chefs d’établissement. C’est aussi l’occasion de mettre en valeur la participation de représentants de la communauté citoyenne à la gouvernance de « leur » université, et leur implication dans son développement.

Notre contribution poursuit plusieurs objectifs : d’abord, faire le point sur le rôle et les responsabilités des administrateurs et le fonctionnement des CA. Ensuite, démontrer que la diversité des profils et des compétences des membres des CA des universités enrichit les pratiques de bonne gouvernance. Nous exposerons certaines mesures prises par les CA pour assurer la bonne gouvernance et la saine gestion universitaires. Enfin, nous traiterons de l’imputabilité des universités et de la responsabilité du CA, ainsi que de l’importance de préserver le rôle décisionnel du CA dans la gouvernance de l’université ».

Dix activités déterminantes du C.A. dans l’établissement d’un processus de préparation de la relève


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un excellent article publié par Thomas J. Saporito dans le Ivey Business Journal  de Janvier-Février 2013 qui porte sur un sujet crucial pour le succès d’une organisation : la gestion du processus de préparation de la relève par le conseil d’administration.  Bien sûr, c’est un processus ardu et laborieux car la coopération entière du PCD en place n’est pas toujours acquise ! Et, la volonté du C.A. de se lancer dans une telle opération n’est pas toujours au rendez-vous ! C’est ici que le rôle du président du conseil d’administration (PCA) dans l’animation de cette « pratique exemplaire » à long terme prend tout son sens.

L’article nous guide dans la mise en oeuvre d’un processus en dix phases qui couvrent l’ensemble des activités à accomplir. J’ai reproduit un court extrait de l’article ainsi que l’énumération des dix dimentions à considérer. Pour mieux comprendre et agir, il faut lire l’article au complet. Bonne lecture.

Ten Key Dimensions of Effective CEO Succession

English: Board of Directors
English: Board of Directors (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« In a joint RHR International/Chief Executive magazine study of 236 corporate directors, 95 percent of respondents acknowledged that CEO succession is a critical business continuity issue. Nevertheless, more than half (53 percent) rated themselves as “ineffective” in executing their responsibilities in the CEO succession process.

In the course of our succession-planning practice, we have concluded that there are 10 key dimensions for effective CEO succession planning. These essential elements – what we consider the ingredients for success – will help any organization build and maintain a successful CEO succession program. Each of these dimensions must be maintained to ensure that the risks inherent in each leadership transition are minimized and the best outcomes are achieved. Having best practices in place to manage each of these 10 dimensions in a continuous process will ensure that a board of directors is operating at peak effectiveness and efficiency, and that its CEO succession-planning program is, without question, a best practice ».

FIRST STEPS

1. Establish Board Ownership, Involvement and Oversight

2. Set Succession Time Frames

3. Prepare for Emergencies

WHO, WHAT, WHERE?

4. Align Strategy and Profile

5. Build a Talent Pipeline

6. Source External Talent and Manage Search Firms

PEOPLE & PROCESS

7. Select the CEO

8. Proactively Manage the Transition

9. Measure Performance and Improve Progress

10. Manage the Dynamics in CEO Succession

Succession Planning: Two Perspectives (healthcarevoice.typepad.com)

RHR International Proposes Best Practices for CEO Succession (virtual-strategy.com)

5 Tips to Get a Head Start on Succession Planning (hiscoxusa.com)