Le démantèlement de la réglementation « Dodd-Frank Act » est-il souhaitable du point de vue de la bonne gouvernance ?


Plusieurs experts de la gouvernance des sociétés cotées se demandent ce qu’il adviendra de la législation Dodd-Frank Act, sachant que Donald Trump a promis d’effectuer un démantèlement presque total de cette réglementation qui a été mise en place à la suite de la crise financière de 2007-2008.

L’article de Gregg Gelzinis* du Center for American Progress publié sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, tente de faire la lumière sur une proposition gouvernementale appelée Financial CHOICE Act ou FCA.

L’auteur montre que les raisons invoquées pour modifier la réforme Dodd-Frank Act ne tiennent pas la route. Voici un extrait de la conclusion.

The question remains: What is the problem President Trump and his allies in Congress are trying to solve? Lending is up. Bank profits are up. Consumer credit costs are down. The economy is steadily improving.

Yes, much more needs to be done to make the economy work for hard-working Americans, but financial deregulation is not the path to that end. [16]

In fact, it is a path toward exactly the opposite: booms and busts that leave taxpayers holding the bag for Wall Street’s excesses, greater concentration of economic power and less accountability for wrongdoing that harms ordinary consumers and investors, and major changes to financial regulation and monetary policy that would damage the real economy. Now that is a problem.

L’avenir nous dira ce que nous réservent les « nouvelles » règles de gouvernance prônées par la nouvelle administration américaine.

Évidemment, la réglementation canadienne, toujours très liée à celle de la SEC, devra s’ajuster, sans trop de heurts !

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont appréciés des lecteurs.

 

President Trump’s Dangerous CHOICE

 

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During his campaign, Donald Trump promised a near-dismantling of the Dodd-Frank Act, the core piece of financial reform legislation enacted following the 2007-2008 financial crisis. [1] He doubled down on that promise once in office, vowing to both “do a big number” on and give “a very major haircut” to Dodd-Frank. [2] In early February, he took the first step in fulfilling this dangerous promise by signing an executive order directing U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Steve Mnuchin to conduct a review of Dodd-Frank. [3] Per the executive order, Secretary Mnuchin will present the findings in early June. [4] While the country waits for President Trump’s plan, it is useful to analyze one prominent way Trump and Congress might choose to gut financial reform—through the Financial CHOICE Act, or FCA. [5]

Introduced in the last Congress by U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX) and expected to be reintroduced in the coming weeks, the Financial CHOICE Act offers a blueprint for how Trump might view these issues. During the presidential campaign, Rep. Hensarling briefed Trump on his ideas regarding financial deregulation and was reportedly on Trump’s short list for treasury secretary. [6] The FCA would deregulate the financial industry and put the U.S. economy in the same perilous position it was in right before the 2007–2008 financial crisis. The precrisis regime of weak regulation and little oversight created an environment of unchecked financial sector risk and widespread predatory consumer practices, which precipitated the Great Recession and brought the U.S. economy to the brink of collapse. And the argument repeated by President Trump and other advocates of financial deregulatory proposals—that bank lending has been crushed under the weight of financial regulations over the past six years—has been thoroughly debunked by bank lending data. [7]

Before delving into the specifics of the Financial CHOICE Act, it is helpful to put Rep. Hensarling’s deregulatory efforts in context. To justify dismantling financial reform, President Trump and his congressional allies know that they must outline a problem. President Trump argues that the main problem with financial reform is bank lending. He believes that banks are not making enough loans due to the burdens of Dodd-Frank. What is his evidence? Nothing more than anecdotal remarks that his friends cannot get loans. [8] As Figure 1 demonstrates, a lack of loans is simply not the case. Overall lending and business lending in particular, has increased significantly since the financial crisis and the passage of Dodd-Frank. Moreover, credit card lending, auto lending, and mortgage lending have increased since 2010, when Dodd-Frank was passed. [9] Bank profits are also higher than ever. [10]

 

 

Chairman Hensarling makes similar arguments about the perceived unavailability of credit, adding that financial reform has not encouraged economic growth and has hurt community banks. [11] Again, the data contradict these charges. Figure 2 highlights the steady economic growth the country experienced under President Barack Obama. And while the scars of the devastating Great Recession remain, the financial reforms put in place to prevent the recurrence of exactly that kind of economic catastrophe have not damaged growth. Indeed, since the end of the financial crisis and the passage of Dodd-Frank, community bank lending and profitability are both up. [12] It is fair to say that the number of community banks has declined over time. This trend, however, started in the 1980s and is caused by economies of scale, technology, and long-running trends toward banking deregulation, as well as other factors—not the 2010 passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. [13]

 

 

Hensarling presents his approach as a moderate adjustment to Dodd-Frank, but in reality it is a thorough demolition of financial reform. The complete publication (available here) analyzes how Hensarling’s approach erodes the financial stability safeguards that the real economy needs to thrive, from mitigation of systemic risk to financial sector accountability and consumer protection. It also explains how the bill further concentrates—and makes even more unaccountable—economic power in the hands of those that will serve their own interests at the expense of the real economy. Finally, the report details how the FCA eliminates the consumer and investor protections that guard against the predatory financial practices that wreaked havoc on consumers and investors prior to the financial crisis.

It is necessary to note that just about every provision in the report could fit under the rubric of financial stability safeguards. For example, consumer financial protection protects ordinary consumers from abuses and the broader financial system from the proliferation of dangerous consumer loans that can bring down entire firms and markets. Similarly, the Volcker Rule is a key bulwark against the high-risk bets that brought down major firms in 2008, and yet it also aims to reorient large bank trading toward real economy-serving purposes. The report discusses certain provisions under one section rather than another should not be taken as a substantive comment on the merit or usefulness of the provision to financial stability. The report’s different sections reflect an effort to highlight how the Dodd-Frank Act and financial reform yield a broad array of public benefits. Similarthe report highlights examples of broader themes in the FCA rather than focusing on minute details: Failure to discuss any particular provision should not be read as a substantive judgment regarding its relative merits.

The report is based on the version of the Financial CHOICE Act released in September 2016, as well as a memo outlining this year’s planned changes to that version. [14] A new version, which may have some further modifications, is expected to be released in the coming weeks.

Financial reform enacted through the Dodd-Frank Act has made a lot of necessary progress since the crisis. U.S. banks have more substantial loss-absorbing capital cushions, increasingly rely on stable sources of funding, undergo rigorous stress testing, and plan for their orderly failure. President Trump’s intent to dismantle these reforms only helps Wall Street’s bottom line—ignoring the memory of every family who lost their home, every worker who lost his or her job, and every consumer who was peddled a toxic financial product. [15]

The question remains: What is the problem President Trump and his allies in Congress are trying to solve? Lending is up. Bank profits are up. Consumer credit costs are down. The economy is steadily improving. Yes, much more needs to be done to make the economy work for hard-working Americans, but financial deregulation is not the path to that end. [16] In fact, it is a path toward exactly the opposite: booms and busts that leave taxpayers holding the bag for Wall Street’s excesses, greater concentration of economic power and less accountability for wrongdoing that harms ordinary consumers and investors, and major changes to financial regulation and monetary policy that would damage the real economy. Now that is a problem.

The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

Endnotes

1Billy House and Kevin Cirilli, “Trump’s Dodd-Frank Plan Will Be Early Test of Republican Unity,” Bloomberg, May 19, 2016, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-05-19/trump-s-dodd-frank-plan-will-be-early-test-of-republican-unity. (go back)

2Glenn Thrush, “Trump Vows to Dismantle Dodd-Frank ‘Disaster,’” The New York Times, January 30, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-dodd-frank-regulations.html?_r=0; Jessica Dye, “Trump vows ‘major haircut’ for Dodd-Frank,” Financial Times, April 4, 2017, available at https://www.ft.com/content/fb08a355-f7fc-3021-8c92-d94af9a2f35b. (go back)

3Executive Order no. 13,772, Code of Federal Regulations (2017), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/03/presidential-executive-order-core-principles-regulating-united-states. (go back)

4Ibid. (go back)

5Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H. Rept. 5983, 114 Cong. 2 sess. (Government Printing Office, 2016), available at https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr5983/BILLS-114hr5983rh.pdf. (go back)

6Donna Borak, “Donald Trump, Jeb Hensarling Meet on Dodd-Frank Alternative,” The Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2016, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-jeb-hensarling-meet-on-dodd-frank-alternative-1465335535; Damien Palette, Ryan Tracy, and Michael C. Bender, “Trump Team Considering Rep. Jeb Hensarling as Treasury Secretary,” The Wall Street Journal, November 10, 2016, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-considering-rep-jeb-hensarling-as-treasury-secretary-1478812583. (go back)

7Jim Puzzanghera, “Trump says businesses can’t borrow because of Dodd-Frank. The numbers tell another story,” Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2017, available at http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trump-bank-loans-20170226-story.html; Matt Egan, “Banks are lending a ton, despite Trump’s claims,” CNN Money, February 13, 2017, available at http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/13/investing/bank-business-lending-dodd-frank-trump/. (go back)

8Zeke Faux, Yalman Onaran, and Jennifer Surane, “Trump Cites Friends to Say Banks Aren’t Making Loans. They Are.,” Bloomberg, February 4, 2017, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-04/trump-cites-friends-to-say-banks-aren-t-making-loans-they-are. (go back)

9Kate Berry, “Four myths in the battle over Dodd-Frank,” American Banker, March 10, 2017, available at https://www.americanbanker.com/news/four-myths-in-the-battle-over-dodd-frank. (go back)

10Matt Egan, “American bank profits are higher than ever,” CNN Money, March 3, 2017, available at http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/03/investing/bank-profits-record-high-dodd-frank/. (go back)

11Jeb Hensarling, “After Five Years, Dodd-Frank Is a Failure,” The Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2015, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-five-years-dodd-frank-is-a-failure-1437342607. (go back)

12Gregg Gelzinis and others, “The Importance of Dodd-Frank, in 6 Charts,” Center for American Progress, March 27, 2017, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2017/03/27/429256/importance-dodd-frank-6-charts/. (go back)

13Ibid. (go back)

14Ylan Mui, “Memo from a key congressman outlines plan to gut Dodd-Frank bank rules,” CNBC, February 9, 2017, available at http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/09/dodd-frank-hensarling-memo-reveals-plan-to-scrap-bank-regulations.html. (go back)

15Wall Street is not monolithic, and firms may have differing views on the provisions of the Financial CHOICE Act, but on the whole, this agenda is clearly aligned with the interests of financial institutions and not the American public.

_______________________________________

*Gregg Gelzinis is a Special Assistant for the Economic Policy team at the Center for American Progress. This post is based on a Center for American Progress publication by Mr. Gelzinis, Ethan GurwitzSarah Edelman, and Joe Valenti. Additional posts addressing legal and financial implications of the Trump administration are available here.

Lutte de pouvoir entre le président du conseil et les actionnaires | Un cas délicat


Voici un cas de gouvernance, publié en mai 2017 sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan* qui présente une situation dans laquelle le président du conseil d’une société publique se place en porte-à-faux avec les membres de son conseil, et éventuellement avec les actionnaires.

Les administrateurs ont été à l’écoute des principaux actionnaires en mettant en place une procédure acceptable pour les deux parties. Cependant, Oliver constate que le processus adopté a pour effet de décourager certains candidats.

De plus, il semble que le président du conseil a sa petite idée sur le choix du candidat que le conseil devrait promouvoir. Il invoque également le fait que, comme président du comité des ressources humaines, il aura le dernier mot !

Le cas présente la situation de manière assez succincte, mais explicite ; puis, trois experts en gouvernance se prononcent sur le dilemme qui se présente aux personnes qui vivent des situations similaires. Je vous invite donc à lire ces opinions en allant sur le site de Julie.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

 

Lutte de pouvoir entre le président du conseil et les actionnaires | Un cas délicat

 

Our case study this month looks at a listed company that has inadvertently triggered a power struggle between its chair and its shareholders.

Oliver is a board member and audit committee chair of a medium sized listed company; he also sits on the nominations and remuneration committee which is chaired by the board Chairman. Some of the larger shareholders complained after the last board renewal that they had not been given any chance to influence the selection criteria or, as one director stood for one vacancy, any real choice.

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The board took these complaints seriously and when looking to recruit another new director they engaged with these shareholders to agree selection criteria, appointment of a consultant to help the board source from a wider pool of potential applicants, and a process. It was agreed that the board would put two candidates to the AGM so that shareholders had a meaningful choice and only the candidate with the most votes would be appointed. This strategy was not popular with the applicants and several withdrew because they felt it would harm their reputations to stand for, and then fail to gain, a competitive board election.

However, the process continued and the board now has two excellent candidates who are willing to give the shareholders a choice at the AGM. The Chairman is very keen on one of the applicants and less keen on the other. He has asked the board to put forward only his preferred candidate as “the chair should have the final say on composition of his board”. The board meeting discussion got quite heated and the Chairman stamped out of the room in a fit of temper.

Oliver’s colleagues are looking to him, as the longest serving director, to lead the board out of this mess.

How should he start?


*Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia. www.mclellan.com.au/newsletter.html

Deux théories de la gouvernance des sociétés


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The activists’ claim of value creation is further clouded by indications that some of the value purportedly created for shareholders is actually value transferred from other parties or from the general public. Large-sample research on this question is limited, but one study suggests that the positive abnormal returns associated with the announcement of a hedge fund intervention are, in part, a transfer of wealth from workers to shareholders. The study found that workers’ hours decreased and their wages stagnated in the three years after an intervention. Other studies have found that some of the gains for shareholders come at the expense of bondholders. Still other academic work links aggressive pay-for-stock-performance arrangements to various misdeeds involving harm to consumers, damage to the environment, and irregularities in accounting and financial reporting.

We are not aware of any studies that examine the total impact of hedge fund interventions on all stakeholders or society at large. Still, it appears self-evident that shareholders’ gains are sometimes simply transfers from the public purse, such as when management improves earnings by shifting a company’s tax domicile to a lower-tax jurisdiction—a move often favored by activists, and one of Valeant’s proposals for Allergan. Similarly, budget cuts that eliminate exploratory research aimed at addressing some of society’s most vexing challenges may enhance current earnings but at a cost to society as well as to the company’s prospects for the future.

Hedge fund activism points to some of the risks inherent in giving too much power to unaccountable “owners.” As our analysis of agency theory’s premises suggests, the problem of moral hazard is real—and the consequences are serious. Yet practitioners continue to embrace the theory’s doctrines; regulators continue to embed them in policy; boards and managers are under increasing pressure to deliver short-term returns; and legal experts forecast that the trend toward greater shareholder empowerment will persist. To us, the prospect that public companies will be run even more strictly according to the agency-based model is alarming. Rigid adherence to the model by companies uniformly across the economy could easily result in even more pressure for current earnings, less investment in R&D and in people, fewer transformational strategies and innovative business models, and further wealth flowing to sophisticated investors at the expense of ordinary investors and everyone else.

To counter short-termism and activism, Bower and Paine embrace the corporation-centric/constituency theory of governance. They argue that the corporation and its board of directors have a fiduciary duty not just to its shareholders, but to its employees, customers, suppliers and to the community. This is the theory I argued in Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom (1979) and regularly since in a long series of articles and memoranda. While Bower and Paine say:

The new model has yet to be fully developed, but its conceptual foundations can be outlined …[T]he company-centered model we envision tracks basic corporate law in holding that a corporation is an independent entity, that management’s authority comes from the corporation’s governing body and ultimately from the law, and that managers are fiduciaries (rather than agents) and are thus obliged to act in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders (which is not the same as carrying out the wishes of even a majority of shareholders). This model recognizes the diversity of shareholders’ goals and the varied roles played by corporations in society. We believe that it aligns better than the agency-based model does with the realities of managing a corporation for success over time and is thus more consistent with corporations’ original purpose and unique potential as vehicles for projects involving large-scale, long-term investment.

In fact the corporation-centric theory—that the directors have a fiduciary duty to the corporation and all of its stakeholders—is reflected in a number of state corporation laws. Perhaps the most cogent example is the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law which provides:

A director of a business corporation shall stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of any committee of the board upon which he may serve, in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, skill and diligence, as a person of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances.

In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors, committees of the board and individual directors of a business corporation may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider to the extent they deem appropriate:

  1. The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such action, including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located.
  2. The short-term and long-term interests of the corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.
  3. The resources, intent and conduct (past, stated and potential) of any person seeking to acquire control of the corporation.
  4. All other pertinent factors.

While wider adoption and strengthening of laws like the Pennsylvania statute would provide some more ability to boards of directors to temper short-termism and resist attacks by activist hedge funds, voting control of corporations will remain in the hands of the major institutional investors and asset managers. To achieve a truly meaningful change and effectively promote long-term investment, corporations and institutional investors and asset managers will need to endorse and adhere to The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth (2016) (discussed on the Forum here) promulgated by the World Economic Forum or A Synthesized Paradigm for Corporate Governance, Investor Stewardship, and Engagement (2017) (discussed on the Forum here) based on it and on The Principles of the Investor Stewardship Group (2017). The alternative would be legislation, something that both corporations and investors should assiduously avoid.

_________________________________

*Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton publication by Mr. Lipton. Additional posts by Martin Lipton on short-termism and corporate governance are available here.

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 20 avril 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 20 avril 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

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  1. The Law and Brexit XI
  2. Lowering the Bar on Bad Faith Claims in MLP Transactions? Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy
  3. Do Independent Directors Curb Financial Fraud? The Evidence and Proposals for Further Reform
  4. From Boardroom to C-Suite: Why Would a Company Pick a Current Director as CEO?
  5. A Synthesized Paradigm for Corporate Governance, Investor Stewardship, and Engagement
  6. Securities Class Action Settlements: 2016 Review and Analysis
  7. Sustainability Matters: Focusing on your Future Today
  8. In Defense of Fairness Opinions: An Empirical Review of Ten Years of Data
  9. Behavioral Implications of the CEO-Employee Pay Ratio
  10. Do Staggered Boards Affect Firm Value?

Étude sur les pratiques des CA américains | ISS


La firme-conseil ISS, (Institutional Shareholder Services) publie chaque année une étude de l’évolution des pratiques de gouvernance aux É.U. (Board Practices Study).

Rob Yates, vice-président d’ISS, est l’auteur de cet article paru sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance. Il y aborde cinq tendances majeures.

Les investisseurs continuent d’exercer des pressions sur les administrateurs du conseil, entre autres en continuant de demander d’inclure de nouvelles candidatures dans la circulaire de procuration.

On constate que les pratiques généralement reconnues de bonne gouvernance sont adoptées dans presque toutes les grandes sociétés ; elles sont de plus en plus acceptées dans les plus petites entreprises. On fait ici référence aux élections annuelles, au vote majoritaire et à l’élimination des pilules empoisonnées.

La question du choix d’un président du conseil totalement indépendant et différent du CEO semble être moins problématique si la société fait appel à président désigné (lead director) indépendant et fort.

La rémunération des administrateurs de sociétés a continué de croître significativement. Les CA évaluent différentes approches à la compensation des administrateurs. Ainsi, on élimine de plus en plus les jetons de présence pour les réunions et les conférences téléphoniques. La rémunération des administrateurs s’est accrue de 17 % de 2012 à 2016 tandis que celle des PDG a augmenté de 10 % pendant la même période.

ISS a produit plusieurs études sur les tendances en matière de limite des mandats (tenure), du renouvellement des administrateurs du CA et de l’importance de la diversité. Si le sujet vous intéresse, l’auteur vous réfère à plusieurs études américaines et mondiales.

Bonne lecture !

U.S. Board Practices

 

This year’s Board Practices Study focuses not only on longstanding issues traditionally covered, but on those which have driven increased shareholder interest in the boardroom over the past several years. Governance continues to evolve, but investor focus in recent years has been particularly pointed as new concerns have emerged, and the ways in which companies address those concerns adapts to meet market demands. Particular focus has been placed on the role of the board as a representative of shareholders at a company, and how the board’s structure and practices promulgate this responsibility. As always, this study provides a snapshot of these facets of public company boards in the S&P 1500 for investors and issuers to compare and contrast.

 

Investors are continuing to push for board accountability

 

The pyroclastic spread of proxy access over the past two years has arguably been the most prominent governance story in the United States. In two short years, the S&P went from having only a handful of companies with proxy access, to having over half its constituents offering shareholders the right. Proxy access is also starting to show up in shareholder proposals at smaller firms; as of March 14, ISS is tracking a dozen such proposals at S&P 400 companies.

 

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Advisory Board Best Practices: Roles and Advice

 

Proxy access is the most recent chapter in the much longer story of shareholders seeking board accountability. The next chapters are underway, with investors focusing on board self-regulation practices and measures, such as director tenure and board refreshment, board diversity, board evaluations, mandatory retirement ages, and more. Some of these are showing promise—such as board refreshment and continuing progress on gender diversity—while others are lagging, such as non-gender measures of board diversity.

Central to these concerns is shareholders’ desire that boards develop the skills, expertise, awareness, and experience to accurately assess and effectively manage emerging risks, such as cyber and environmental risks, and ensure that boards are constantly searching for weaknesses (and, when and where appropriate, soliciting external help to identify blind spots).

 

Traditional concerns still exist, but companies are making progress

 

More traditional approaches to increasing accountability, such as majority vote standards and annual elections in the director election process—features that are near-ubiquitous in the largest companies—have been adopted in greater frequency by smaller companies. Many problematic governance practices, such as poison pills, are also increasingly rare.

 

Investors are more accepting of alternative independent board leadership structures

 

Demonstrating that governance is both a give and take endeavor, investors are more accepting of alternative forms of independent board leadership. Whereas investors have historically favored independent chairs, many are increasingly comfortable with an alternative structure whereby a strong and empowered lead independent director counterbalances a combined chair/CEO.

 

Director compensation increased sharply

 

A new feature in this year’s study is an evaluation of director pay covering the preceding five years. While compensation disclosure for non-employee directors is not new itself, the rules and guidelines governing director pay disclosure have only recently standardized. Beginning in December 2006, SEC rules required the disclosure of director pay in a standardized table format. This disclosure increased transparency and comparability between companies. Additionally, both the NYSE and NASDAQ require that boards consider director pay when determining director independence for purposes of meeting listing requirements.

Director compensation has received increased scrutiny in recent years, particularly given rising pay levels and high-profile shareholder lawsuits alleging excessive pay. Amid this atmosphere, many companies have taken a proactive approach to director compensation programs, mainly through altering equity plans or, in a few rare instances, introducing ballot items.

As companies weigh the potential benefits of changing director pay structures, median pay continues to rise. In fact, non-employee director compensation grew 17 percent between 2012 and 2016, while median CEO pay in the S&P 500 (reported in ISS’ 2016 US Compensation Postseason Report) rose by less than 10 percent. One positive development is the streamlining observed among director compensation programs. For example, the elimination of meeting and telephonic meeting fees in many compensation structures.

 

Increased scrutiny of certain board practices has necessitated a more detailed review

 

Previous versions of the board study included an in-depth snapshot of new-director demographics and trends, such as tenure, refreshment, and diversity. As these components of board composition have become a significant part of the governance conversation, ISS has produced in-depth studies on each of these issues.

For a vast and comprehensive look at board refreshment trends in the U.S., please see the joint ISS/IRRC study, Board Refreshment Trends at S&P 1500 Firms.

For a look at gender parity advancement on boards in the U.S. and around the world, please see the April 2016 joint study carried out by ISS and European Women on Boards, Gender Diversity on European Boards—Realizing Europe’s Potential: Progress and Challenges, and ISS’ December 2016 study, Gender Diversity on Boards—A Review of Global Trends.

The complete publication is available here.

_____________________________________

*Rob Yates is Vice President at Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. This post is based on an ISS publication by Mr. Yates, Rachel Hedrick, and Andrew Borek.

L’histoire récente des courants de pensée en gouvernance aux É.U.


Aujourd’hui, je ne peux passer sous silence la petite histoire de l’évolution de la pensée en gouvernance publiée par , professeur à la George Washington University Law School.

Ce court article a été publié sur le site du HLS Forum. Il décrit les grands courants de pensée et met l’accent sur les publications des bonzes universitaires américains.

Je suis assuré que cette brève chronologie des événements, à compter de 1976, vous donnera une vue d’ensemble utile de l’évolution de la discipline.

Bonne lecture !

The Ivory Tower on Corporate Governance

 

In 1976, [Directors & Boards]’s founding year, two influential academic works in corporate governance appeared: Berkeley law professor Melvin Eisenberg urged transforming the board from an advisory role to a monitoring model and mandating significant internal control systems, while University of Rochester economists Michael Jensen and William Meckling portrayed the firm as a nexus of contracts whose optimal design is for participants to choose.

 

These contrasting visions—obligatory uniformity versus free tailoring—have defined the field since, setting the boundaries of debate and helping participants think through positions. Into the early 1980s, the Eisenberg view dominated, with Columbia University law professor William Cary urging preemptive federal oversight of the field, traditionally handled by state law, and a generally pro-regulatory atmosphere imposing fiduciary mandates on independent directors and board committees.

But the nexus of contracts school soon ascended to greater influence, through the 1990s, after law professors such as Frank Easterbrook (now a judge) and Daniel Fischel, both of the University of Chicago, explored how the separation of ownership from control is a problem of agency costs, best addressed by contractual devices geared to maximizing shareholder value. Rather than federal mandates, states should experiment to offer a menu of tools for different corporations to tailor. Yale University law professor (also now judge) Ralph Winter theorized that competition among states for corporate charters constrained managers to promote shareholder interests.

While normative corporate governance scholarship has divided between the pro- and anti-regulatory camps of the 1970s and 1980s, the best academics learned from their intellectual opponents to refine stances and often forge consensus. For example, though assessments of the deal decade’s disruptive takeovers and comparative studies of non-U.S. practice found a place for non-shareholder constituents in corporate governance, a shareholder primacy norm nevertheless took root.

Even as both schools of thought contributed to the discourse, each had their heyday when current events cut in their favor. So the 1990s boom was a time of great enthusiasm for the economic approach, adding a productive trend of increasingly sophisticated empirical research, including on the value of state competition in corporate law. After the burst, however, and as widespread accounting fraud was revealed, scholars cited Eisenberg to diagnose failures to monitor and control—and prescribed cures found in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). An industry-specific version of the dynamic transpired after the financial crisis, culminating in the Dodd-Frank Act.

In each case, scholarship was diverse, as pragmatic centrist resolution of pending challenges, exemplified by Columbia’s John Coffee, contended with cries on both normative sides of either too little or too much regulation (Yale’s Roberta Romano called SOX “quack governance”). Such episodes updated the Cary-Winter debate: full-scale federal preemption is probably dead but, as Harvard University law professor Mark Roe explained, less due to state competition than the threat to states of incremental federal incursion, a la SOX and Dodd-Frank.

Since 1976, scholars have helped shift power from managers to owners, especially institutional investors. Today, scholars such as Harvard Law professor Lucian Bebchuk urge continued expansion of shareholder power, while others, like UCLA law professor Stephen Bainbridge, observe and support a propensity toward director primacy instead. In the balance is the fate of shareholder activism, which though novel in some ways, at bottom raises issues debated for 40 years, particularly agency cost mitigation. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 13 avril 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 13 avril 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

harvard_forum_corpgovernance_small

 

 

 

  1. Director Appointments—Is It “Who You Know”?
  2. Voluntary Corporate Governance, Proportionate Regulation, and Small Firms: Evidence from Venture Issuers
  3. Should Executive Pay Be More “Long-Term”?
  4. Dealmakers Expect a “Trump Bump” on M&A
  5. A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy
  6. Earnouts: Devil in the Details
  7. On Regulatory Reform, Better Process Means Better Progress
  8. Tread Lightly When Tweaking Sarbanes-Oxley
  9. Corporations and Human Life
  10. Is Executive Pay Broken?

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 30 mars 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 30 mars 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

harvard_forum_corpgovernance_small

  1. Is the American Public Corporation in Trouble?
  2. Corporate Governance Update: Preparing for and Responding to Shareholder Activism in 2017
  3. New York Cybersecurity Regulations for Financial Institutions Enter Into Effect
  4. Does the Market Value Professional Directors?
  5. Did Say-on-Pay Reduce or “Compress” CEO Pay?
  6. The Americas – 2017 Proxy Season Preview
  7. Controlling Systemic Risk Through Corporate Governance
  8. 2017 Institutional Investor Survey
  9. 2017 Compensation Committee Guide
  10. Corporate Employee-Engagement and Merger Outcomes
  11. The Investor Stewardship Group: An Inflection Point in U.S. Corporate Governance?

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 16 mars 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 16 mars 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

harvard_forum_corpgovernance_small

 

 

  1. The Modern Slavery Act 2015: Next Steps for Businesses
  2. Stock Rising
  3. The Delaware Trap: An Empirical Study of Incorporation Decisions
  4. Acting SEC Chair’s Steps to Centralize the Process of Issuing Formal Orders—Are Commentators Drawing the Right Lessons?
  5. Defusing the Antitrust Threat to Institutional Investor Involvement in Corporate Governance
  6. Board of Directors Compensation: Past, Present and Future
  7. The Dealmaking State
  8. SEC Enforcement: 2016 in Review and Looking Ahead to 2017
  9. Super Hedge Fund
  10. Diversity Investing

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 9 mars 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 9 mars 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

harvard_forum_corpgovernance_small

 

  1. Uncapping Executive Pay
  2. The Trajectory of American Corporate Governance: Shareholder Empowerment and Private Ordering Combat
  3. Focus on Annual Incentives: Metrics, Goals, and More
  4. A Look at Board Composition: How Does Your Industry Stack Up?
  5. Teaming Up and Quiet Intervention: The Impact of Institutional Investors on Executive Compensation Policies
  6. The Regulatory and Enforcement Outlook for Financial Institutions in 2017
  7. The Materiality Gap Between Investors, the C-Suite and Board
  8. Pilot CEOs and Corporate Innovation
  9. Shareholder Engagement: An Evolving Landscape
  10. State Street Global Advisors Announces New Gender Diversity Guidance

Comment composer avec l’engagement accru des actionnaires et des investisseurs institutionnels ?


Voici un article publié par Tom Johnson dans Ethical Boardroom, et paru aujourd’hui sur le site de HLS Forum on Corporate Governance.

L’un des plus grands changements au cours des dix dernières années dans la gouvernance des entreprises est l’engagement accru des actionnaires et des investisseurs institutionnels dans les affaires de l’organisation. Cela se manifeste concrètement par des interventions activistes mal anticipées.

L’article ci-dessous est un bijou de réalisme et de pragmatisme eu égard au diagnostic de la situation de l’engagement des actionnaires ainsi qu’aux moyens à la disposition des entreprises pour favoriser le dialogue avec les grands actionnaires-investisseurs.

L’auteur propose six moyens à prendre en compte par l’entreprise afin d’assurer une meilleure communication avec les intéressés…

Les dirigeants d’entreprises ainsi que les présidents des conseils d’administration devraient prendre bonne note des suggestions présentées dans cet article.

Ils ont tout avantage à être proactif afin d’éviter les mauvaises surprises et les contestations susceptibles d’émerger de la part de groupes d’actionnaires mécontents ou opportunistes.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

In today’s environment, companies cannot wait for a pressing issue to engage with their shareholders. By the time the issue becomes public because an activist has shown up or some other concern has emerged that affects the stock, it is often too late to have a productive conversation

 

Shareholder Engagement: An Evolving Landscape

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « shareholder engagement »
The significant rise of activism over the last decade has sharpened the focus on shareholder engagement in boardrooms and executive suites across the US.

 

Once considered a perfunctory exercise, designed to simply answer routine questions on performance or, occasionally, drum up support for a corporate initiative, shareholder engagement has become a strategic imperative for astute executives and board members who are no longer willing to wait until the annual meeting to learn that their shareholders may not support change of some sort, or their strategic direction overall.

When active shareholder engagement works, it leads to a productive dialogue with the voters—the governance departments established by the big institutional firms, which typically oversee proxy voting. It is important to remember the reality of public company ownership. The vast majority of public companies have shareholder bases dominated by a diverse set of large, institutional funds. Engagement with these voters not only helps head off potential problems and activists down the road, but it also gives management valuable insight into how patient and supportive their shareholder base is willing to be as they implement strategies designed to generate long-term growth. Indeed, the rising level of engagement is a positive trend that could, over time, help mitigate the threat of activism if properly managed.

This all sounds encouraging in theory and, in some cases, it works in practice as well. But the simple fact remains that this kind of dialogue is unobtainable for the vast majority of public companies, despite the best of intentions on both sides.

 

Struggles with Engagement

 

Even the largest institutional investors, many of whom are voting well in excess of 10,000 proxies a year, have at most 25-30 people in their governance departments able to engage directly with companies. Those teams do yeoman’s work to meet demands, taking several hundred and in some cases well more than 1,000 meetings with company executives or board members a year. But with more issues on corporate ballots than ever before that need to be researched and analysed, companies are finding it increasingly hard to get an audience with proxy voters even when a determination is made to more proactively engage. This can be true for even large companies with market capitalisations in the billions.

Indeed, for small-cap companies, the idea is almost always a non-starter, though there are workarounds. Some institutional funds are willing

to use roundtable discussions with several issuers at once to cover macro topics. Most mid-cap companies are out of luck as well, unless they are able to make a compelling case around a particular issue that catches a governance committee’s eye (more on that in a minute). Large-cap companies certainly meet the size threshold, but even they need to be smart in making the request. The net result is a conundrum at companies that are willing to engage but find their institutional investors less willing to do so, or are stretched too thin to make it happen.

The problem is a difficult one to solve. In today’s environment, companies cannot wait for a pressing issue to engage with their shareholders. By the time the issue becomes public because an activist has shown up or some other concern has emerged that affects the stock, it is often too late to have a productive conversation. Investors in those situations must decide what they know or can learn in a condensed period; they have little ability to become invested in the long-term thinking behind, for instance, a company’s change to executive pay or corporate governance. At the same time, institutional investors, while very open to and, in many cases, strong advocates for meeting with executives, cannot always handle the number of requests they receive, particularly when the requests come in during a condensed period. This has led some investors to establish requirements around which companies ‘qualify’ for a meeting, leaving some executives that don’t meet the thresholds frustrated that they can’t get an audience. Both sides are striving to improve the process in this rapidly evolving dynamic. The fact is that both sides have a lot of room for improvement. Here are a few guidelines we advise companies to use when deciding how or even if they should more proactively engage with their largest investors.

In today’s environment, companies cannot wait for a pressing issue to engage with their shareholders. By the time the issue becomes public because an activist has shown up or some other concern has emerged that affects the stock, it is often too late to have a productive conversation

 

1. If a meeting is unlikely, make your case in other ways

 

Just because you can’t get a meeting does not mean you can’t effectively influence how your investors vote on an issue. Most companies today fall well short in communicating effectively with the megaphones they do control—namely, the financial reports that are distributed to all shareholders. When a governance committee sits down to review an issue, the first thing it does is pull out the proxy. Yet most companies bury the most compelling arguments under mountains of legalese or financial jargon that is off-message or confusing. In today’s modern era, proxies need to tell an easily digestible story from start to finish. They need to be short, compelling and to the point.

Figure out the three to four things you need your investors to understand and put it right up front in the proxy in clear, compelling language. Be concise and to the point. Remove unnecessary background and encourage questions. Add clear graphic elements to illustrate the most important points. And be sure not to contradict yourself with a myriad of financial charts and footnotes, or provide inconsistent information with what you’ve said before. The proxy statement is the most powerful disclosure tool companies have, yet most are produced by disparate committees, piecing the behemoth filing together with little recognition of the overall document coming to life.

 

2. Know when to make contact

 

Most large, institutional shareholders and even some mid-sized ones, are open to meeting with management and/or board members under certain circumstances, but timing is key. Go see your investors on a “clear day”when a meaningful discussion on results and strategy can be had without the overhang of activist demands. For most companies, this means making contact during the summer and fall months after their annual meeting and when the filing window opens for the next year’s proxy.

Institutional investors do lots of meetings during proxy season as well, but those tend to focus on whatever issues have emerged in the proxy, or even worse, whatever demands an activist is making. If you believe you are vulnerable to an activist position, address that concern before it becomes an issue with the right combination of people who will ultimately vote the shares.

 

3. Know who to talk to

 

The hardest part of this equation for most companies is figuring out who the right person is at the funds for these conversations. Is it the portfolio manager (PM) who follows the company daily and typically has the most robust relationship with the company’s investor relations department? Is it the governance department that may have more sway over voting the shares? The answer is likely some combination of both. Each institution has its own process for making proxy voting decisions.

In many cases, it involves input from the portfolio manager, internal analyst and the governance department, as well as perhaps some influence from proxy advisory firms, such as ISS or Glass Lewis. But the ultimate decision-maker is always somewhere in that mix. The trick is to find out where. Start with the contacts you know best, but don’t settle for one relationship. If you don’t know your portfolio manager and governance analyst, then you are not going to get a complete picture on where you stand. In many cases, the PM can be a helpful advocate in having a governance analyst understand why certain results or decisions make sense. Once you find the right mix of people, selling the story will be much easier.

 

4. Don’t assume passive investors are passive

 

Today, many so-called passive investors are anything but. One passive investor told me his firm held more than 200 meetings with corporations last year.

A governance head at another institution said there is little difference today in how the firm evaluated proxy questions between its active and passive holdings. You may not always get an audience, but on important matters, treat your passive investors like anyone else. You may be surprised at how active they are. These firms also tend to be the busiest, so be assertive and creative in building a relationship. The front door may not be the only option.

 

5. Choose the best Messenger

 

There is an interesting debate going on in the governance community right now about how involved CEOs and board members should be in shareholder discussions. As a rule, we view it this way: routine conversations around results and performance can be handled by investor relations (IR). More sophisticated financial questions get elevated to CFOs. Once the conversations delve into strategy and growth plans, CEOs should be involved, but usually only with the largest current or potential shareholders. And, finally, when it comes to matters of governance policy, consider having a board member involved.

Board engagement with shareholders is a relatively new trend, but an important one. Investors are often reassured when they see and hear from an engaged board and many will confess that those meetings can change their thinking. But having the right board member who can handle those conversations and be credible is key. A former CEO, who is used to shareholder interactions, or a savvy lead independent director can fit the bill.

But with investors increasingly asking for—and indeed many boards starting to offer—meetings with directors, every board should be evaluating who that representative will be if the opportunity comes along.

 

6. Be prepared and walk in with a clear set of goals

 

Too often, companies spend too much time just trying to determine what not to say in meetings with investors and not nearly enough time working on what they want to communicate. This mistake leads to frustration and missed opportunities, not to mention a reduced likelihood that it can get an audience again.

Every investor meeting is an opportunity to better refine or explain your corporate growth story. Walk into every meeting with clear goals in mind. Better yet, get the investor to articulate their own agenda as well. Know exactly what each of you wants to get out of the meeting and then get down to business. Be upfront and honest about why you are requesting the meeting. Governance investors are far more engaged when companies walk in with stated goals in mind. Surface potential problems and your solution to them, before they emerge.

 

Making the effort

 

Even with this level of planning, large companies can still find their requests for engagement on governance topics unheeded. Many of the large, institutional investors have installed various thresholds, generally predicated to a company’s size, that companies need to meet to receive an audience. But that does not mean companies should give up. Continue to work the contacts you do have within each institution. Tell your best story in routine discussions, such as earnings calls or conference presentations. Those are too often missed opportunities. Look for other opportunities to get in front of investors.

Conferences can be great forums, as can organisations, such as the Society of Corporate Governance, Council for Institutional Investors or National Association of Corporate Directors. Every time you communicate externally, it is a chance to tell your story and make the right disclosures. History is littered with companies that waited too long to do so, came under attack and lost control of their own destiny. Don’t waste any opportunity to make your best case to whomever is listening.

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 2 mars 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 2 mars 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

harvard_forum_corpgovernance_small

 

  1. Corporate Officers as Agents
  2. 2015 Short- and Long-Term Incentive Design Criteria Among Top 200 S&P 500 Companies
  3. Private Funds Year in Review and 2017 Outlook
  4. Should Mutual Funds Invest in Startups?
  5. Shareholder Proposals Regarding Lead Director Tenure: A Harbinger of Things to Come?
  6. Hot-Button Issues for the 2017 Proxy Season
  7. 2017 Investor Corporate Governance Report
  8. 2017: Where Things Stand—Appraisal, Business Judgment Rule and Disclosure Section 16(B)—If at First You Don’t Succeed…
  9. Considerations for U.S. Public Companies Acquiring Non-U.S. Companies
  10. The 100 Most Overpaid CEOs

The Directors Toolkit 2017 | Un document complet de KPMG sur les bonnes pratiques de gouvernance et de gestion d’un CA


Voici la version 4.0 du document australien de KPMG, très bien conçu, qui répond clairement aux questions que tous les administrateurs de sociétés se posent dans le cours de leurs mandats.

Même si la publication est dédiée à l’auditoire australien de KPMG, je crois que la réalité réglementaire nord-américaine est trop semblable pour se priver d’un bon « kit » d’outils qui peut aider à constituer un Board efficace.

C’est un formidable document électronique interactif. Voyez la table des matières ci-dessous.

J’ai demandé à KPMG de me procurer une version française du même document, mais il ne semble pas en exister.

Bonne lecture !

The Directors’ Toolkit 2017 | KPMG

 

 

 

Now in its fourth edition, this comprehensive guide is in a user friendly electronic format. It is designed to assist directors to more effectively discharge their duties and improve board performance and decision-making.

Key topics

  1. Duties and responsibilities of a director
  2. Oversight of strategy and governance
  3. Managing shareholder and stakeholder expectations
  4. Structuring an effective board and sub-committees
  5. Enabling key executive appointments
  6. Managing productive meetings
  7. Better practice terms of reference, charters and agendas
  8. Establishing new boards.

What’s new in 2017

In this latest version, we have included newly updated sections on:

  1. managing cybersecurity risks
  2. human rights in the supply chain.

Register

Register here for your free copy of the Directors’ Toolkit.

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 23 février 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 23 février 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

harvard_forum_corpgovernance_small

  1. A Trump Appointed AG May Not Translate to Less Aggressive Enforcement
  2. It’s Time for the Pendulum to Swing Back
  3. SEC Enforcement in Financial Reporting and Disclosure—2016 Year in Review
  4. Tactical Approaches to Proxy Season 2017
  5. The Activist Investing Annual Review 2017
  6. Company Stock Reactions to the 2016 Election Shock: Trump, Taxes and Trade
  7. Directors Must Navigate Challenges of Shareholder-Centric Paradigm
  8. A Broader Perspective on Corporate Governance in Litigation

 

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 27 janvier 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 27 janvier 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

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  1. Why Do Managers Fight Shareholder Proposals? Evidence from No-Action Letter Décisions
  2. Bridging the Data Gap through Shareholder Engagement
  3. Top 10 Topics for Directors in 2017
  4. Mutual Funds As Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns
  5. Broadening the Boardroom
  6. 2016 Year in Review: Securities Litigation and Regulation
  7. Bebchuk Leads SSRN’s 2016 Citation Rankings
  8. Do Director Elections Matter?
  9. White Collar and Regulatory Enforcement: What to Expect in 2017
  10. Financial Regulatory Reform in the Trump Administration
  11. Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors

 

Dix thèmes majeurs pour les administrateurs de sociétés en 2017


Aujourd’hui, je partage avec vous la liste des dix thèmes majeurs en gouvernance que les auteurs Kerry E. Berchem* et Rick L. Burdick* ont identifiés pour l’année 2017.

Vous êtes assurément au fait de la plupart de ces dimensions, mais il faut noter l’importance accrue à porter aux questions stratégiques, aux changements politiques, aux relations avec les actionnaires, à la cybersécurité, aux nouvelles réglementations de la SEC, à la composition du CA, à l’établissement de la rémunération et aux répercussions possibles des changements climatiques.

sans-titre-gump

Afin de mieux connaître l’ampleur de ces priorités de gouvernance pour les administrateurs de sociétés, je vous invite à lire l’ensemble du rapport publié par Akin Gump.

Bonne lecture !

Dix thèmes majeurs pour les administrateurs de sociétés en 2017

 

top-10

 

1. Corporate strategy: Oversee the development of the corporate strategy in an increasingly uncertain and volatile world economy with new and more complex risks

Directors will need to continue to focus on strategic planning, especially in light of significant anticipated changes in U.S. government policies, continued international upheaval, the need for productive shareholder relations, potential changes in interest rates, uncertainty in commodity prices and cybersecurity risks, among other factors.

2. Political changes: Monitor the impact of major political changes, including the U.S. presidential and congressional elections and Brexit

Many uncertainties remain about how the incoming Trump administration will govern, but President-elect Trump has stated that he will pursue vast changes in diverse regulatory sectors, including international trade, health care, energy and the environment. These changes are likely to reshape the legal landscape in which companies conduct their business, both in the United States and abroad.

With respect to Brexit, although it is clear that the United Kingdom will, very probably, leave the European Union, there is no certainty as to when exactly this will happen or what the U.K.’s future relationship, if any, with the EU will be. Once the negotiations begin, boards will need to be quick to assess the likely shape of any deal between the U.K. and the EU and to consider how to adjust their business model to mitigate the threats and take advantage of the opportunities that may present themselves.

3. Shareholder relations: Foster shareholder relations and assess company vulnerabilities to prepare for activist involvement

The current environment demands that directors of public companies remain mindful of shareholder relations and company vulnerabilities by proactively engaging with shareholders, addressing shareholder concerns and performing a self-diagnostic analysis. Directors need to understand their company’s vulnerabilities, such as a de-staggered board or the lack of access to a poison pill, and be mindful of them in any engagement or negotiation process.

4. Cybersecurity: Understand and oversee cybersecurity risks to prepare for increasingly sophisticated and frequent attacks

As cybercriminals raise the stakes with escalating ransomware attacks and hacking of the Internet of Things, companies will need to be even more diligent in their defenses and employee training. In addition, cybersecurity regulation will likely increase in 2017. The New York State Department of Financial Services has enacted a robust cybersecurity regulation, with heightened encryption, log retention and certification requirements, and other regulators have issued significant guidance. Multinational companies will continue implementation of the EU General Data Protection Regulation requirements, which will be effective in May 2018. EU-U.S. Privacy Shield will face a significant legal challenge, particularly in light of concerns regarding President-elect Trump’s protection of privacy. Trump has stated that the government needs to be “very, very tough on cyber and cyberwarfare” and has indicated that he will form a “cyber review team” to evaluate cyber defenses and vulnerabilities.

5. SEC scrutiny: Monitor the SEC’s increased scrutiny and more frequent enforcement actions, including whistleblower developments, guidance on non-GAAP measures and tougher positions on insider trading

2016 saw the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) award tens of millions of dollars to whistleblowers and bring first-of-a-kind cases applying new rules flowing from the protections now afforded to whistleblowers of potential violations of the federal securities laws. The SEC was also active in its review of internal accounting controls and their ability to combat cyber intrusions and other modern-day threats to corporate infrastructure. The SEC similarly continued its comprehensive effort to police insider trading schemes and other market abuses, and increased its scrutiny of non-GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) financial measure disclosures. 2017 is expected to bring the appointment of three new commissioners, including a new chairperson to replace outgoing chair Mary Jo White, which will retilt the scales at the commissioner level to a 3-2 majority of Republican appointees. 2017 may also bring significant changes to rules promulgated previously under Dodd-Frank.

6. CFIUS: Account for CFIUS risks in transactions involving non-U.S. investments in businesses with a U.S. presence

Over the past year, the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has been particularly active in reviewing—and, at times, intervening in—non-U.S. investments in U.S. businesses to address national security concerns. CFIUS has the authority to impose mitigation measures on a transaction before it can proceed, and may also recommend that the President block a pending transaction or order divestiture of a U.S. business in a completed transaction. Companies that have not sufficiently accounted for CFIUS risks may face significant hurdles in successfully closing a deal. With the incoming Trump administration, there is also the potential for an expanded role for CFIUS, particularly in light of campaign statements opposing certain foreign investments.

7. Board composition: Evaluate and refresh board composition to help achieve the company’s goals, increase diversity and manage turnover

In order to promote fresh, dynamic and engaged perspectives in the boardroom and help the company achieve its goals, a board should undertake focused reassessments of its underlying composition and skills, including a review and analysis of board tenure, continuity and diversity in terms of upbringing, educational background, career expertise, gender, age, race and political affiliation.

8. Executive compensation: Determine appropriate executive compensation against the background of an increased focus on CEO pay ratios

Executive compensation will continue to be a hot topic for directors in 2017, especially given that public companies will soon have to start complying with the CEO pay ratio disclosure rules. Recent developments suggest that such disclosure might not be as burdensome or harmful to relations with employees and the public as was initially feared.
The SEC’s final rules allow for greater flexibility and ease in making this calculation, and a survey of companies that have already estimated their ratios indicates that the ratio might not be as high, on average, as previously reported.

9. Antitrust scrutiny: Monitor the increased scrutiny of the antitrust authorities and the implications on various proposed combinations

Despite the promise of synergies and the potential to transform a company’s future, antitrust regulators have become increasingly hostile toward strategic transactions, with the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission suing to block 12 transactions since 2015. Although directors should brace for a longer antitrust review, to help navigate the regulatory climate, work upfront can dramatically improve prospects for success. Company directors should develop appropriate deal rationales and, with the benefit of upfront work, allocate antitrust risk in the merger agreement. Merger and acquisition activity may also benefit from the Trump administration, taking, at least for certain industries, a less-aggressive antitrust enforcement stance.

10. Environmental disasters and contagious diseases: Monitor the impact of increasingly volatile weather events and contagious disease outbreaks on risk management processes, employee needs and logistics planning

While the causes of climate change remain a political sticking point, it cannot be debated that volatile weather events, environmental damage and a rise in the diseases that tend to follow, are having increasingly adverse impacts on businesses and markets. Businesses will need to account for, or transfer the risk of, the increasing likelihood of these impacts. The SEC recently announced investigations into climate-risk disclosures within the oil and gas sector to ensure that they adequately allow investors to account for these effects on the bottom line. The growing number of shareholder resolutions and suits addressing climate change confirm that investors want this information, regardless of the position of the next administration.

The complete publication is available here.


*Kerry E. Berchem is partner and head of the corporate practice, and Rick L. Burdick is partner and chair of the Global Energy & Transactions group, at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 19 janvier 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 19 janvier 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

harvard_forum_corpgovernance_small

 

  1. Playing It Safe? Managerial Preferences, Risk, and Agency Conflicts
  2. Shareholder Challenges Pay Practice at Apple, Inc.
  3. Corporate Donations and Shareholder Value
  4. Delaware Supreme Court Rules on Director Independence
  5. Proxy Access Reaches the Tipping Point
  6. Acquisition Financing: the Year Behind and the Year Ahead
  7. Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, CEO Pay Slice, and Firm Value around the World
  8. The Importance of the Business Judgment Rule
  9. 2016 Year-End FCPA Update
  10. Delaware Court of Chancery Dismissal of Complaint Based on Post-Closing Disclosure Claims

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 12 janvier 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 12 janvier 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

harvard_forum_corpgovernance_small

 

  1. Global and Regional Trends in Corporate Governance for 2017
  2. Compensation Season 2017
  3. Sustainability Practices: 2016 Edition
  4. The Ivory Tower on Corporate Governance
  5. Constitutionality of SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Headed to Supreme Court?
  6. Moving Beyond Shareholder Primacy: Can Mammoth Corporations Like ExxonMobil Benefit Everyone?
  7. Mergers and Acquisitions—A Brief Look Back and a View Forward
  8. Top 250 Report on Long-Term Incentive Grant Practices for Executives
  9. Corporate Governance: The New Paradigm
  10. A Strategic Cyber-Roadmap for the Board
  11. 2016 Year-End Activism Update
  12. Short-Termism and Shareholder Payouts: Getting Corporate Capital Flows Right

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 5 janvier 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 5 janvier 2017.

Bonne lecture !

 

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  1. Are Directors Really Irrelevant to Capital Structure Choice?
  2. 2017 Board Priorities Report
  3. The Life (and Death?) of Corporate Waste
  4. Progress in Understanding Proxy Access and the Shareholder Proposal Process
  5. Rethinking Compensation Philosophies: Top 5 Questions for Boards
  6. Controlling Stockholder M&A Does Not Automatically Trigger Entire Fairness Review
  7. Are Shareholder Votes Rigged?
  8. Jury Verdict in “Spread Bet” Insider Trading Case: A Reminder of U.S. Long-Arm Regulatory Risk
  9. REIT M&A, Governance and Activism—Themes for 2017
  10.  Activism, Strategic Trading, and Liquidity
  11. The Delaware General Corporation Law, Simplified
  12. Gender Parity on Boards Around the World

L’activisme de Bill Ackman a du succès dans le cas de CP Rail | Quelles leçons en retirer ?


Yvan Allaire*, président exécutif de l’Institut de la gouvernance des organisations privées et publiques (IGOPP), vient de me transmettre une synthèse de l’analyse de la saga CP-Ackman-Pershing Square, portant sur les leçons à tirer de cet épisode d’agression par un fonds « activiste ».

Cet article a été publié sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation le 23 décembre 2016.

Comme le disent les auteurs, l’une des leçons à retirer de cette saga est que les conseils d’administration de l’avenir doivent agir comme des activistes, en ce sens qu’ils doivent être continuellement à la recherche d’informations susceptibles de questionner leurs stratégies et leur modèle d’affaires. Sinon, certains fonds activistes seront bien tentés par l’aventure…

Le texte complet du cas est accessible en cliquant sur « here » en fin de texte.

Pershing Square Capital Management, an activist hedge fund owned and managed by Bill Ackman, began hostile maneuvers against the board of CP Rail in September 2011 and ended its association with CP in August 2016, having netted a profit of $2.6 billion for his fund. This Canadian saga, in many ways, an archetype of what hedge fund activism is all about, illustrates the dynamics of these campaigns and the reasons why this particular intervention turned out to be a spectacular success… thus far.

Et vous, quelles leçons en retirez-vous ?

Bonne lecture !

 

A “Successful” Case of Activism at the Canadian Pacific Railway: Lessons in Corporate Governance

In 2009, the Chairman of the board of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) asserted that the company had put in place the best practices of corporate governance; that year, CP was awarded the Governance Gavel Award for Director Disclosure by the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance. Then, in 2011, CP ranked 4th out of some 250 Canadian companies in the Globe & Mail Corporate Governance Ranking. [1] Yet, this stellar corporate governance was no insurance policy against shareholder discontent.

Pershing Square began purchasing shares of CP on September 23, 2011. They filed a 13D form on October 28th showing a stock holding of 12.2%; by December 12, 2011, their holding had reached 14.2% of CP voting shares, thus making Pershing Square the largest shareholder of the company.

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On February 6, 2012, Ackman, with Hunter S. Harrison (retired CEO of CN—direct competitor of CP and leader in efficiency among Class 1 North American railways—and his candidate for CEO of CP) by his side, made a fact-based presentation about the shortcomings and failings of the CP board and management. Harrison and Ackman stated that their goal for CP was to achieve an operating ratio of 65 for 2015 (down from 81.3 in 2011—the lower the ratio, the better the performance).

The Board qualified Harrison’s (and Ackman’s) targets of “shot in the dark”, showing a lack of research and a profound misunderstanding of CP’s reality. Relying on an independent consultant report (Oliver Wyman Group), Green mentioned that Harrison’s target for CP’s operating ratio was not achievable since CP’s network was characterized by steeper grades and greater curvature thus adding close to 6.7% to the operating ratio compared to its competitors. [2]

On April 4th 2012, Bill Ackman came out swinging in a scathing letter to CP shareholders disparaging CP’s Board of directors in general, and its CEO, Fred Green, in particular. According to Mr. Ackman, “under the direction of the Board and Mr. Green, CP’s total return to shareholders from the inception of Mr. Green’s CEO tenure to the day prior to Pershing Square’s investment was negative 18% while the other Class I North American railways delivered strong positive total returns to shareholders of 22% to 93%.” [3] Thus, according to him, “Fred Green’s and the Board’s poor decisions, ineffective leadership and inadequate stewardship have destroyed shareholder value.” [4]

A few hours before the annual meeting, CP issued a press release in which it stated that Fred Green had resigned as CEO, and that five other directors, including the Chairman of the Board, John Cleghorn, would not stand for re-election at the company’s shareholder meeting.

Pershing Square had won the proxy fight; all the nominees proposed by Ackman were elected.

Almost exactly five years after first buying shares of CP, Ackman confirmed in August 2016 that Pershing Square would sell its remaining shares of CP, thus formally exiting the “target.” Over those five years, CP has generated a compounded annualized total shareholder return of 45.39% (between September 23, 2011 and August 31, 2016), a performance well above the CN and the S&P/TSX 60 index (CP is a constituent of that index). Pershing Square pocketed an estimated $2.6 billion in profits for its venture into CP.

With massive reductions in the workforce, a transformation of the operations and a radical change of the CP’s organizational culture, CP is undoubtedly a different company from what it was before the proxy fight. In early September 2016, Bill Ackman resigned from CP’s Board, officially concluding this episode.

Lessons in corporate governance

In this day and age, the CP case teaches us that no matter its size or the nature of its business, a company is always at risk of being challenged by dissident shareholders, and most particularly by those funds which make a business of these sorts of operations, the activist hedge funds. Of course, a number of critical features of this saga can be singled out to explain the particular success of this intervention, but this is not the focal point of this post. [5] After all, a widely held company with weak financial results and a stagnating stock price will inevitably attract the attention of these funds.

But the puzzling question and it is an unresolved dilemma of corporate governance remains: how come the board did not know earlier what became apparent very quickly after the Ackman/Harrison takeover? Why would the board not call on independent experts to assess management’s claim that structural differences made it impossible for CP to achieve a performance similar to that of other railroads? The gap in operating ratio between CP and CN had not always been as wide. In fact, as shown in Figure 1, CP had a lower operating ratio than CN during a period of time in the 1990s (Of course, CN was a Crown corporation at that time). The gap eventually widened, reaching unprecedented levels during Fred Green’s tenure (the last full year of operating ratios attributable to Green was in 2011).

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Figure 1. Evolution of the operating ratio (%—left scale) for the CP and CN (1994-2015)

How could the board have known that performances far superior to those targeted by the CEO could be swiftly achieved?

Lurking behind these questions is the fundamental flaw of corporate governance: the asymmetry of information, of knowledge and time invested between the governors and the governed, between the board of directors and management. In CP’s case, the directors, as per the norms of “good” fiduciary governance, relied on the information provided by management, believed the plans submitted by management to be adequate and challenging, and based the executives’ lavish compensation on the achievement of these plans. The Chairman, on behalf of the Board, did “extend our appreciation to Fred Green and his management team for aggressively and successfully implementing our Multi-Year plan and creating superior value for our shareholders and customers.” [6] That form of governance is being challenged by activist investors of all stripes.

Their claim, a demonstrable one in the case of CP, is that with the massive amount of information now accessible about a publicly listed company and its competitors, it is possible for dedicated shareholders to spot poor strategies and call for drastic changes. If push comes to shove, these funds will make their case directly to other shareholders via a proxy contest for board membership.

Corporate boards of the future will have to act as “activists” in their quest for information and their ability to question strategies and performances.

The full paper is available for download here.

Endnotes

1The Board Games, The Globe & Mail’s annual review of corporate governance practices in Canada.(go back)

2Deveau, S. “CP Chief Fred Green Defends his Track Record.” Financial Post, March 27, 2012.(go back)

3Letter addressed by William Ackman to Canadian Pacific Railway shareholders, Proxy Circular from April 4th, 2012.(go back)

4Ibid.(go back)

5The case analysis identified four factors that are rarely present in other cases of activism, a fact which explains why few of these interventions achieve the level of success of the CP case.(go back)

6Cleghorn, John. Chairman’s letter to shareholders, CP’s Annual Information Form 2011.(go back)

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*Yvan Allaire is Emeritus professor of strategy at Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) and Executive Chair of the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations (IGOPP); François Dauphin is Director of Research of IGOPP and a lecturer at UQAM. This post is based on their recent paper.