Peter Tunjic* avance que les actes de gouvernance, de la part d’un conseil d’administration, et les actes de direction, au sens de management, correspondent à deux systèmes de pensée fondamentalement différents.
Dans son article, l’auteur présente une matrice que vous trouverez peut-être utile de considérer. Je vous invite à lire l’article pour plus de détails.
A recent survey of CEO attitudes to their boards by respected commentator Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and his colleagues, shouldn’t surprise anyone: ‘CEOs complain that boards often lack the intestinal fortitude for the level of risk taking that healthy growth requires.
“Board members are supposed to bring long-term prudence to a company”, as one CEO says, but this often translates to protecting the status quo and suppressing the bold thinking about reinvention that enterprises need when strategic contexts shift.’ Consensus is emerging that public company boards are too focused on compliance and are ignoring their role as creators of enduring value for the firms they direct. But it’s not for lack of will on their part.
The board’s role in strategy is considered the biggest issue for 67 per cent of respondents to the 2012 Spencer Stuart US Board Index want to spend more time on strategy. Despite this, according to Heidrick & Struggles, 84 per cent of directors of the top 2,000 largest publicly traded companies in the US thought ‘they are now spending more time on monitoring and less on strategy. Consequently, only one-third of respondents to a 2013 McKinsey & Company report say they have a complete understanding of current strategy. If directors have their eyes on value creation why is it that their feet are still pointing in a different direction? It’s because the system is not designed to create value. Best practice in corporate governance produces too many ‘governors’ focused on protecting value and not enough directors focused on creating it.
Public companies have become over governed and under directed because corporate governance regulation and education is designed to ensure the ‘correct’ board structure, process and composition rather than ensure ‘imagination, creativity, or ethical behavior in guiding the destinies of corporate enterprises’
This paper argues that in order to create enduring value, public company directors must go beyond governing and governance and must also embrace ‘directing’ and ‘directorship’. I propose that governance and directorship are two distinct systems of thought and action in the boardroom.
The difference between the two lies primarily in their attitude to value. Governance concerns right structure and process. The focus is on protecting and preserving value through maintaining control and managing risk. In contrast, directorship involves bold choices that necessarily create risk.
Directing involves designing the ways in which value is created, making decision of consequence and inspiring CEO’s to lead their organisations into strength, resilience and endurance. The boundaries between the two might blur in the heat of a board meeting, but the differences in attitude, competencies and outcome are clear. Here are four tests to help you decide whether you stand on the question of value.
Governing for shareholder value versus directing for firm value
Measuring value versus creating value
Governing for transparency versus directing with discretion
Managing risk versus creating risk
…. The DLMA Matrix graphically represents the similarities and differences of each perspective as well as the inherent dilemma required to balance them all.
THE DLMA MATRIX ™
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*Peter Tunjic is an independent corporate advocate and commercial lawyer based in Melbourne, Australia. He is the author of ondirectorship.com and has co-authored several learning programmes for the Australian Institute of Company Directors. He consults on creating value in the boardroom and improving board/manager relations.
L’orientation et la formation des nouveaux membres de conseils d’administration ne semblent pas toujours faire partie des priorités des organisations; loin de là ! Pourtant, cette activité est cruciale pour les nouveaux administrateurs de sociétés car elle leur procure une information de qualité qui raccourcira leur apprentissage du métier.
Dans la plupart des cas, on se contente de leur fournir une documentation mal organisée, rébarbative, peu pertinente et, surtout, sans suivi personnalisé.
Le document présenté dans ce billet est issu du site de l’IoD et il origine de Atom Content Marketing Ltd. Il donne un aperçu très complet, un checklist des principales informations à fournir aux nouveaux administrateurs, regroupées selon les thèmes suivants :
Le rôle de l’administrateur
La gestion opérationnelle du conseil
Les caractéristiques de l’industrie et du modèle d’affaires
Une compréhension de l’organisation et de sa gestion
Une documentation sur les relations avec les actionnaires
Des informations d’ordre pratique
Des personnes de références à consulter
Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de cet article pour connaître la liste des éléments à inclure dans le document d’induction des nouveaux administrateurs.
New directors are likely to require some key information and training when they are first appointed. The checklist below highlights the key information new directors will need and will help them understand their role and responsibilities, fulfil their obligations and comply with the law.
You can use this checklist to help you prepare a structured induction program, deciding when and how to provide all the required information. For example, you might want to ensure that key legal information is provided immediately on appointment. While some information can be provided in writing, an effective induction program is also likely to include discussions with the company secretary and/or the company’s legal advisors.
Dans cette entrevue,Robert Borghese, avocat en pratique privée, discute avec Michael Useem, directeur du Wharton’s Center for Leadership and Change Management, et co-auteur (avec Ram Charan et Dennis C. Carey), du nouveau livre : Boards That Lead.
Le livre explique que les « Boards » ne sont pas uniquement des organismes de contrôle, de surveillance et de conformité, mais ils sont également des agents de changement et de création de valeur en exerçant un rôle essentiel de leadership, en collaboration avec la haute direction.
Les fonctions d’administrateurs de sociétés sont de plus en plus exigeantes, ceux-ci étant de plus en plus sollicités pour représenter les intérêts des actionnaires, tout en préservant les droits des parties prenantes.
Les administrateurs ne sont plus des pions à la solde des CEO comme autrefois nous dit Useem; ils sont choisis parmi les meilleurs leaders du monde des affaires, ils sont indépendants, rigoureux, visionnaires; les actionnaires investisseurs, qui occupent une place toujours plus grande, s’attendent à des conseils d’administrations de la plus haute qualité, capables de questionner les actions des dirigeants et de les aider à accroître la valeur de l’organisation.
L’auteur discute également de la fine ligne à préserver entre le leadership actif du « Board » et le management de l’entreprise et la gestion des opérations. Il est important que les responsabilités entre ces deux groupes soient bien délimitées. Useem constate que dans les grandes entreprises cotées contemporaines, les rôles sont assez clairement identifiés.
Voici un extrait de cette entrevue. J’espère que vous apprécierez le langage clair et simple de la conversation. Bonne lecture !
In this interview, Useem explains why monitoring is no longer the only responsibility of the board, where board directors should draw the line in their leadership of organizations and where some companies and boards are getting it right, including Lenovo.
_______________________
RobertBorghese: Mike, thanks for being with us today. What led you to write a book on board leadership?
Michael Useem: Corporate governance has been a topic of great interest for many people, including myself, for a number of years. My colleagues Ram Charan, who is a very high-end consultant, and Dennis Carey, who is the vice-chair of Korn/Ferry, which is a very large executive search firm, and I got into a dialogue on what exactly is happening in boardrooms these days….
English: Integrated boardroom designed and installed by EDG in 2003. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Boards have to monitor, and they do that much better after Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, these two legislative acts that strengthen the hands of boards of directors. But increasingly, directors are also exercising a leadership function in the boardroom and with top management.
As we drew upon our experience – and all three of us have been in boardrooms – we did inductively conclude that it is good for all of us to rethink what boards do [beyond] just monitoring, which is what they are required to do, but to also see boards as helping the company to be going where it has to go, [which we will] call leadership.
Borghese: Mike, give us a little historical perspective on the role that boards have played over time and how that role has evolved beyond the monitoring function to more of a leadership function.
Useem: If we go way back, boards were aptly described by the title of a very well known book, which was Pawns or Potentates, by a professional colleague, Jay Lorsch, who is on the faculty of the HarvardBusinessSchool. He had a bit of a question mark there, but his conclusion was that historically – 30, 40 years ago – boards tended to be pawns. They had become passive. They were really under the thumb of the chief executive. They met, had a great lunch together and all went home.
“If you are a director, it is good to think of what you are doing both as a defender of shareholder value and as a leader of the company.”
With the rise of big institutional investors – the California pension fund, Fidelity, BlackRock, hedge funds – the pressure came from investors for directors to not be pawns, but to get in there and to keep management’s feet to the fire to avoid malfeasance. Think Enron. On the affirmative side, [in order] to get great growth at a reasonable degree of risk, boards [needed to] move from that pawn role to a much more active monitoring role. We can see that [in the research] on the background of directors and how boards are organized. Virtually all the major Standard & Poor’s 500 boards, for example, now have an independent audit committee, an independent governance committee and an independent compensation committee. “Independent” meaning that they are not under the thumb of the chief executive. They actually have that relationship turned around.
With a more vigilant monitoring function pushed by the big stockholders out there and reinforced by legislation coming out of the early part of the last decade after the Enron failure, boards began to exercise more leadership – in an unanticipated way and in an almost unplanned way. What we mean by that is that directors now often come from top management positions themselves. Many former CEOs, for example, occupy board rooms now. When they come into a board meeting, they are helping the top executive think through a spin-off, an acquisition. They are helping top executives think about how they develop top talent here so they have a great replacement once their day is up.
We ended up titling this book,Boards That Lead. Implicit in that is that boards also monitor on behalf of stockholders. That is the deal set forward by the SEC and the New York Stock Exchange. We all want that to happen, but in addition, because of this historical and quite profound transformation, boards now increasingly are at the plate, helping the company to go where it ought to get to, substantively.
Ci-dessous, vous trouverez un billet, partagé par Denis Lefort, expert-conseil en gouvernance et en audit interne, qui vous incite à prendre connaissance du Bulletin de janvier 2014 du Conference Board intitulé « Risk Oversight: Evolving expectation for Board« .
Ce document, très intéressant, fait un retour en arrière sur les différentes analyses et recommandations effectuées par différents groupes dont, le NACD, la SEC, le SSG, Dodd-Frank, ICGN, FSB, FRC (les acronymes sont explicitées dans le document de 10 pages), dans la foulée des scandales financiers de 2008.
English: Contribution and prioritizing threats and risks to Risk Management Effectiveness (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Le document est très critique quant au rôle très actif que devraient jouer les conseils d’administration au niveau de la surveillance des risques. Il est aussi très critique des approches mises en œuvre par les fonctions Gestion des risques et audit interne. Enfin, des recommandations sont formulées pour ces trois instances.
Bien qu’au départ, le document ait ciblé les institutions financières, ses propos peuvent s’appliquer à un grand éventail d’organisations. C’est pourquoi je vous encourage tous à en prendre connaissance et à le partager avec vos dirigeants, membres de conseils, collègues et contacts professionnels. Voici un extrait. Bonne lecture !
The Risk Oversight Committee is responsible for :
a. determining where and when formal documented risk assessments should be completed, recognizing that additional risk management rigor and formality should be cost/benefit justified
b. ensuring that business units are identifying and reliably reporting the material risks to the key objectives identified in their annual strategic plans and core foundation objectives necessary for sustained success, including compliance with applicable laws and regulations
c. reviewing and assessing whether material risks being accepted across XYZ are consistent with the corporation’s risk appetite and tolerance
d. developing, implementing, and monitoring overall compliance with this policy
e. overseeing development, administration and periodic review of this policy for approval by the board of directors
f. reviewing and approving the annual external disclosures related to risk oversight processes required by securiti esregulators
g. reporting periodically to the CEO and the board on the corporation’s consolidated residual risk position
h. ensuring that an appropriate culture of risk-awareness exists throughout the organization
Business unit leaders are responsible for:
a. managing risks to their unit’s business objectives within the corporation’s risk appetite/tolerance
b. identifying in their business when they believe the benefits of formal risk assessment exceed the costs, or when requested to by the CEO or risk oversight committee
Risk management and assurance support services unit is responsible for :
a. providing risk assessment training, facilitation, and assessment services to senior management and business units upon request
b. annually preparing a consolidated report on XYZ’s most significant residual risks and related residual risk status, and a report on the current effectiveness and maturity of the Corporation’s risk management processes for review by the risk oversight committee, senior management, and the corporation’s board of directors
c. completing risk assessments of specific objectives that have not been formally assessed and reported on by business units when asked to by the risk oversight committee, senior management, or the board of directors; or if the risk management support services team leader believes that a formal risk assessment is warranted to provide a materially reliable risk status report to senior management and the board of directors
d. conducting independent quality assurance reviews on risk assessments completed by business units and providing feedback to enhance the quality and reliability of those assessments
e. participating in the drafting and review of the corporation’s annual disclosures in the Annual Reports and Proxy Statement related to risk management and oversight
Aujourd’hui, je vous soumets une autre lecture très bien documentée sur les interventions ciblées des actionnaires activistes.
Il s’agit d’un article de Jeff Green et de Beth Jinks paru sur le site de Bloomberg – Personal finance, le 23 janvier 2014. Les auteurs montrent qu’il y a principalement deux formes d’activismes :
(2) l’activisme axé sur la valeur ajoutée (Les « ValueAct Guys », plus doux, plus subtiles).
Dans les deux cas, les auteurs expliquent et donnent des exemples concrets de ce que ces groupes veulent, comment ils procèdent, avec quelles autres organisations ils s’allient, sur quelles entreprises ils jettent leur dévolu, pour le bénéfice de qui, etc…
Je vous invite donc à lire cet article qui nous montre l’évolution rapide de la gouvernance et la portée du « nouveau » pouvoir d’influence des actionnaires, vu sous l’angle des grands activistes.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait de l’article ainsi que trois autres billets récemment parus sur le groupe de discussion du CAS : Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance
Corporate directors, who for years often dismissed activist investors as quick-profit seeking gadflys, are starting to listen when opinionated shareholders like Carl Icahn, Nelson Peltz and Mason Morfit come calling.
EBay Inc. (EBAY) pre-empted a public lashing from Icahn yesterday by disclosing his proposal to spin off its PayPal unit before he did. Peltz on Jan. 21 was invited to join the board of Mondelez International Inc. (MDLZ), the food maker he once urged to merge with PepsiCo Inc. (PEP) The same day, Dow Chemical Co. (DOW) said it welcomes “all constructive input” as Daniel Loeb’s Third Point LLC took a stake and called for it to spin off a petrochemical business.
Time was, companies typically resisted activists’ ideas and efforts to reconfigure boards. Now directors are increasingly engaging with would-be agitators, rather than risk losing control of strategy or the company itself. For their part, activists are more often aiming at healthy companies such as Apple Inc. (AAPL) and General Motors Co. (GM) that are sitting on a tempting $3.5 trillion pile of corporate cash and investments.
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un article de Kim Winser, paru sur le site de Forbes et que j’ai trouvé vraiment pertinent pour quiconque souhaite mettre toutes les chances de son côté pour progresser dans sa carrière : l’apparence, le look physique.
On passe trop souvent sous silence l’effet que peux avoir cette variable sur la réussite professionnelle, particulièrement en affaires et … au conseil d’administration. Pourtant, comme l’indique l’article, plusieurs études montrent qu’il y a une relation positive entre une apparence soignée et le respect de soi, la fierté et la confiance en soi.
L’auteure donne plusieurs exemples de personnes qui ont compris la force (intuitivement, peut-être) de cet épiphénomène et l’utilise pour se démarquer … et se faire remarquer.
Je crois que cet article vous convaincra de la place à accorder à ce facteur dans notre vie professionnelle. Je sais, il y aurait des nuances à apporter. Il faut d’abord la compétence et … il ne faut pas trop en faire … ni trop laisser faire ! Mais, comment dirait mon ami éthicien René Villemure : Que faire pour bien faire?
Qu’en pensez-vous ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Picture the scene: a class of students are graduating from Yale, one of America’s pre-eminent universities. They sit, waiting to hear words of wisdom from one of their high profile alumna, New York Senator and former first Lady Hillary Clinton. She steps up to the podium to deliver her speech, looks around the room at her audience, and begins.
“The most important thing I have to say to you today is that hair matters,” she declares, to a sea of quizzical looks. “Your hair will send significant messages to those around you: what hopes and dreams you have for the world, but more, what hopes and dreams you have for your hair. Pay attention to your hair, because everyone else will.”
This surprising piece of advice was delivered back in 2001, and Clinton has of course risen rapidly through Washington’s corridors of power since then. Now widely acknowledged as an intelligent, informed politician and diplomat, and regarded by many as a serious candidate for the next Presidency of the United States, she has nevertheless found her appearance is a constant subject for comment …
… So, why are we so preoccupied with appearance in the workplace – especially when it comes to women? What does it matter how we dress, or style our hair, or whether we apply cosmetics for the board room / court room / news room, etc? If you are good at your job, surely that should be enough in this post-feminist era of gender equality?
Well, as Hillary Clinton was wise enough to recognize and share, no it isn’t enough just to be good at what you do. I strongly believe that – for both men and women – your appearance says a lot about you as an individual, and presenting yourself with polish demonstrates a pride in yourself and respect for those around you. The way you look is a visual communication tool that should be carefully coded to talk to those around you, saying exactly what you want to say.
As human beings, we place a level of confidence in those who look groomed: think of President Obama and, like his politics or not, he always look Statesman-like, on and off duty. This gives him the air of being ready for anything, that his mind is focused and prepared for the responsibilities of his role. It’s subliminal, but it’s very much part of our psyche as a race to make those judgements about people we meet.
Vous êtes intéressés par la problématique de la rémunération des hauts dirigeants, et préoccupés par les effets pervers de celle-ci, l’article de Richard Leblanc dans le HuffPost explique clairement et succinctement pourquoi la gouvernance de la rémunération dans les organisations ne fonctionne pas …
Vous trouverez-ci dessous le lien vers son récent article ainsi qu’une énumération des 10 raisons évoquées pour expliquer les défaillances de la gouvernance. Bonne lecture !
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un compte rendu, rédigé par Elizabeth Mullen dans le magazine du NACD (National Association of Corporate Directors), et résultant d’une table ronde portant sur le phénomène des investisseurs activistes.
On notera que plusieurs experts, dans certaines circonstances, considèrent les activistes comme des agents de changement. Voici quelques extraits très intéressants :
Directors must take care to balance their business acumen against shareholders’ opinions, new governance developments, proxy advisory firms’ recommendations, and management’s strategy.
While it is widely accepted that directors’ primary duty is to protect shareholder interests, directors must take care to balance their business acumen against shareholders’ opinions, new governance developments, proxy advisory firms’ recommendations, and management’s strategy, participants said in a recent National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) roundtable, presented in partnership with AIG and WilmerHale.
Ellen B. Richstone (left), Jeffrey Rudman, and Steve Maggiacomo
“Shareholder activist” and “shareholder activism” are umbrella terms that encompass a range of groups, interests, and modes of action, so boards’ responses naturally will vary depending on their particular situations. Some companies may face the Icahns and Ackmans of the world, who purchase ownership stakes in companies with the hope of gaining board seats and strategic control; or institutional investors like CalPERS, which are vocal in their opinions of the companies in which they invest; and retail investors with less influence but important opinions of their own.
“Fidelity is more likely to be at your feet while Icahn is more likely to be at your throat,” said WilmerHale’s Jeffrey Rudman. Even the types of shareholder activism can vary, said Martin M. Coyne II, ranging from Harvard Business School’s Shareholder Rights Project, to derivative suits following an M&A event, to family-owned companies facing strategic differences, to private companies with initial investors who are highly involved in strategic planning, to highly influential proxy firms.
While all these voices deserve to be heard, Coyne advised boards to remain focused on an end goal, rather than trying to satisfy all parties involved. “When that topic becomes omnipresent and goes from a discussion topic that should be discussed by the board and decided upon—and you start making bad business decisions to satisfy—what it does is take away from succession planning discussions, strategy discussions, operational discussions. It distracts the board and becomes an operational weakness,” he said.
The opinions of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Glass, Lewis & Co., and other proxy advisors should be considered guidelines, not scripture; ensuring a solid reasoning process behind decisions is more important, participants said. Their influence can be a “good wake-up call,” said Shaun B. Higgins, to reevaluate governance practices, such as joint CEO-chair roles or certain types of compensation plans that proxy firms often campaign against. Bringing up these opinions is a jumping-off point for boards to ensure their policies are sound and defensible, and communicate those justifications to shareholders.
“What they bring is awareness to boards that there are certain issues of concern to the public that they have to address thoroughly,” said James J. Morris. “If the board can have a good rationale of why they want it that way, they’re going to be okay.”…
… Boards today must also consider investors’ and stakeholders’ interests beyond the bottom line, particularly when it comes to environmental concerns. Higgins noted that today’s reports and disclosures are more extensive than ever: “If you told me back in 2000 we were going to put corporate social responsibility in the annual report I would have said, ‘Are you kidding me?’ It wasn’t even on our radar screen.”
Participants à la table ronde :
Martin M. Coyne II, Director, Akamai Technologies, RockTech
Peter T. Francis, Director, Dover Corp., Stanford Graduate School of Business
Shaun B. Higgins, Director, Aryzta AG, Carmine Labriola
Scott Hunter, FCA, Director, Allied World Assurance Company Holdings
James G. Jones, CFA, Founder/Portfolio Manager Sterling Investment Advisors; Director, CFA Institute
Jerry L. Levens, Director, Hancock Holding Co.
Steve Maggiacomo, SVP Financial Lines, AIG
James J. Morris, Principal, 2 Ventures; Director, Esterline Technologies, JURA Corp., LORD Corp.
Craig W. Nunez, Chairman and CEO, Bocage Group; Director, Goodwill Industries of Houston, Medical Bridges
Steve Pannucci, Professional Liability Underwriting Manager, AIG
Donald K. Peterson, Director, Sanford C. Bernstein Fund, TIAA-CREF
Ellen B. Richstone, Director, ERI, OpEx Engine, NACD New England
Andrea Robinson, Partner, WilmerHale
Jeffrey Rudman, Partner, WilmerHale
Carole J. Shapazian, Director, Baxter International
Richard Szafranski, Director, Corporate Office Properties Trust, Cleared Solutions
En ce début d’année 2014, voici un court billet de Tom Okarma, président fondateur de Vantage Point | For NonProfit, exposant certaines idées pour accroître l’efficacité de C.A. d’OBNL.
Ci-dessous, un extrait de son billet ainsi que quelques liens utiles pour améliorer la performance des « Boards ». Bonne lecture !
Here are a few ideas to help ministry and nonprofit leaders work more closely (and pleasurably) with their boards. Who knows, maybe everyone will actually start enjoying board meetings!
Nonprofit_Expo_01 (Photo credit: shawncalhoun)
Reconnect regularly with each director, one-to-one if possible, to tap into their wisdom, learn their perspective, and gain valuable confidential input
Invest to improve on your strengths through seminars, workshops, or conferences…like CLA 2014
Identify existing nonprofit board best practices and install the top two that you feel add the most value to your organization
When meeting with key external stakeholders, ask how they think the organization is performing
Be more available to your staff, volunteers, and key community partners
Become a director on another nonprofit or ministry board and gain valuable perspective of just what that is like
Review your calendar monthly and the organization’s budget to determine if you are allocating time and treasure in line with the year’s goals
Conduct periodic board update (they hate “training”) sessions
For a few other easy and effective ideas on how to improve board relations and effectiveness in 2014, read :
Voici un rapport de recherche de PwC qui tend à démontrer que les administrateurs et les investisseurs partagent les mêmes points de vue sur les plusieurs priorités, dont les suivantes :
There is considerable alignment between directors’ and investors’ views on the important issues directors should be focusing on in the coming year, according to the report. Both groups include strategic planning, risk management, and succession planning as top priorities. Ninety-five percent of investors say strategic planning is the “most or a very important” area for director focus while nearly eight of 10 directors say they want to spend more time in that area going forward.
In the area of IT, more than three-quarters of investors believe directors should be at least “moderately” focused on new business models enabled by IT, but only 45% of directors say they are very or moderately engaged in doing so.
For director Mike Monahan, deciding on how to provide oversight of new IT-enabled business models versus major IT project implementations is not black and white.
“They are both important, and the relative importance depends a great deal on the core mission and market characteristics of the company,” said Monahan, audit committee chair for CMS Energy.
He points to a development at a large public gas and electric utility where he sits on the board. “We are in the process of installing a so-called smart energy system whereby the company will provide meters with the capability of providing significant value to customers by enabling them to better manage their energy consumption,” he said. “The communication regime with the customer is important, but the IT-based development and installation project is more important. Without an effective application there would be no smart energy system.”
Other key findings from the PwC comparison of the director and investor surveys include:
Compensation
Directors and investors both believe that compensation consultants are “very influential” over board decisions on executive compensation (41% and 37%, respectively). And, each group had similar views on the influence of institutional shareholders, rating them “very influential” at 22% and 18%, respectively. However, by a margin of 38 percentage points investors are more likely than directors to believe that CEO pressure has a “very influential” effect on board decisions about compensation.
At least 70% of directors and investors indicate that some type of action was taken by their company in response to say on pay voting results. But investors believe that directors should reconsider their companies’ executive compensation plan at relatively lower levels of negative voting.
Regulatory and enforcement
Forty-seven percent of investors and 64% of directors say recent legislative, regulatory and enforcement initiatives have increased investor protections “not very much” or “not at all,” with very few (2% and 4%, respectively) indicating that they have helped “very much.” At the same time, one-third of directors and almost one in five investors think the costs to companies of such increased activities have “very much” exceeded the potential benefits. Eighty percent of investors and three-fourths of directors also conclude these initiatives have increased public trust in the corporate sector “not very much” or “not at all.”
Board composition, structure and performance
Twenty-eight percent of directors say the ability of boards to provide effective oversight has increased in the last 12 months, compared to 19% of investors. Similarly, 33% of directors say that board effectiveness in overseeing risk has increased compared to 27% of investors.
Nineteen percent of investors indicate the board should reconsider re-nomination of a director if he/she receives between 11% and 15% negative shareholder voting, compared to only 8% of directors who would use the same benchmark.
The report also compares CEO viewpoints alongside directors and investors regarding company strategy and risk management. It showed that all three parties believe customers and clients have the most significant influence on company strategy. As for the greatest impediment to growth, directors and investors said it is “uncertain or volatile economic growth” (91%) while CEOs said it is government response to “fiscal deficit and debt burden” (93%).
Voici un document australien de KPMG, très bien conçu, qui répond clairement aux questions que tous les administrateurs de sociétés se posent dans le cours de leurs mandats.
Même si la publication est dédiée à l’auditoire australien de KPMG, je crois que la réalité règlementaire nord-américaine est trop semblable pour se priver d’un bon « kit » d’outils qui peut aider à constituer un Board efficace. C’est un formidable document électronique de 130 pages, donc long à télécharger. Voyez la table des matières ci-dessous.
J’ai demandé à KPMG de me procurer une version française du même document mais il ne semble pas en exister. Bonne lecture en cette fin d’année 2013 et Joyeuses Fêtes à tous et à toutes.
Our business environment provides an ever-changing spectrum of risks and opportunities. The role of the director continues to be shaped by a multitude of forces including economic uncertainty, larger and more complex organisations, the increasing pace of technological innovation and digitisation along with a more rigorous regulatory environment.
At the same time there is more onus on directors to operate transparently and be more accountable for their actions and decisions.
To support directors in their challenging role KPMG has created The Directors’ Toolkit. This guide, in a user-friendly electronic format, empowers directors to more effectively discharge their duties and responsibilities while improving board performance and decision-making.
Key topics :
Duties and responsibilities of a director
Oversight of strategy and governance
Managing shareholder and stakeholder expectations
Structuring an effective board and sub-committees
Enabling key executive appointments
Managing productive meetings
Better practice terms of reference, charters and agendas
Aujourd’hui, veille de Noel, je vous présente les sommaires des Think-tank produit par Board Intelligence, une firme spécialisée dans les informations sur les conseils d’administration. Celle-ci a tenu une série de débats sur la réinvention des règles de gouvernance en demandant aux panels de se prononcer sur la question suivante :
“If you could rip up the rule book, what would good governance look like ?”
Voici les résumés des résultats les plus remarquables présentés dans FT.com. Bonne lecture et Joyeux Noel !
Stressing the importance of company boards can weaken the sense of accountability among management and staff, according to participants in a recent debate.
They agreed there is a strong case for saying an organisation lives or dies by the actions and inactions of its management team, rather than the board, and that employees were a better indicator of how a company is run than scrutiny of the board.
An alternative boardroom model was suggested, drawing on the way some executive committees operate, where the chief executive seeks consultation rather than consensus. Perhaps the chairman could have a similar function.
Chairmen of the Bored (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
This might also reflect the reality of the near-impossible task faced by non-executive directors. One participant said: “A non-executive is on a hiding to nothing – and to do the job properly, they need smaller portfolios and better pay. When things go wrong, they can expect to be tried in the court of public opinion.”
It was argued that this is becoming such a trend that many talented candidates are no longer willing to take on the role. “I wouldn’t take a non-executive role in a big and complex global bank. The mismatch between what you are accountable for and your ability to affect it is enormous,” one commented.
“To do the job of the non-exec properly you have to get out of the boardroom and into the organisation. You have to experience the business for yourself and not just take management’s word for it.”
There were also complaints about the amount of time required to do the job of the non-executive: “It’s not 12 days a year at £1,500 per day – it’s at least 30 days. Given the opportunity cost of what an accomplished person could be doing with their time, and given the risk you carry as a non-executive, why do it?”
If we don’t go so far as to rip up the governance rule book, at least we should make it shorter, they agreed. Rules will always have unintended consequences and breed perverse outcomes – and fear of falling foul of the rules can
lead boards to document as little as possible to maintain “plausible deniability”.
At a subsequent debate it was proposed there should be a register to name and shame – and praise – the performance of non-executives. At present, shareholders’ opinion of a non-executive and their decision on re-electing them is based on gut feeling. A public register would be helpful in forming a judgment, listing statistics about the number of boards the non-executive is on, the time they allocate to each and notable events that took place on their watch
There are chairmen with such large portfolios they could not possibly allocate sufficient time to each board, they argued. A public register would make this much more transparent.
Débats entre cinq présidents de conseils et un PCD
The five chairmen and chief executives attending a recent think-tank discussion accepted that even improved boards cannot prevent all corporate crises and expressed concern at this overly “defensive” role. They argued that “stopping bad things happening” must be tempered by helping “good things happen”.
The participants agreed that non-executives must have the confidence to challenge the chairman and chief executive. One said: “Having sat on the board of my employer as an executive, I have come to the conclusion that it is a hopeless role. When the chief executive is sitting opposite, it is fairly obvious how you’re supposed to respond to the question ‘what do you think?’
“Board meetings are not a good use of time. We don’t question why we’re doing what we’re doing.”
The group concluded that “small is beautiful: small boards, small briefing packs, small agenda, and small rule book”.
At a subsequent dinner, also attended by chairmen and chief executives, a call was made for boards to be more realistic about their limitations and to be more discerning about where they focus their efforts
For example, boards attempt to scrutinise specific investment decisions when the information they can absorb and the time available for discussion mean substantive challenge or insights are unlikely.
On the other hand, it was pointed out that boards are also held liable for the detail as well as the big picture. Even so, attempting to meet these conflicting responsibilities by “clogging up the board agenda with too many matters to explore properly” cannot be the answer, they agreed.
The participants argued that the governance rule book is ineffective and that boards should instead be subject to an annual review of their effectiveness.
A need for “better memories, rather than better rules or regulations”, was stressed and the recommendation that non-executives should stand down after nine years was criticised for institutionalising the short-term memory of the boardroom.
One said: “When our bank repeated its mistakes from the early 1990s, it wasn’t the bank that suffered from amnesia – it was just the board.”
The chairmen and chief executives concluded that UK business suffers from a short-term “sell-out” culture. It was argued that in the US, business leaders who are successful will strive to be yet more successful and in Germany, successful businesses are nurtured for the next generation. But in the UK, business people aspire to have just enough to “retire to the Old Rectory”. One said: “We lack the ambition – or greed – of the Americans and we don’t feel the duty of the Germans. We need to raise the level of ambition – and sense of duty.”
Débats entre présidents de conseils
Boards are failing at strategy and becoming increasingly focused on costs, according to a think-tank debate attended by chairmen. One said: “We need the conversation in the boardroom to be two levels ‘higher’. Many of our largest companies are sitting on cash and they need to get back to strategy and invest in the future – or there won’t be one.”
It was suggested that advisory boards, unfettered by concerns of liability and governance, might be better at tackling strategy – and might attract creative people who would otherwise be put off joining boards by the burden of governance.
The chairmen also asked whether more of a board’s work could be handled by committees, as they can be more focused and effective.
They also questioned whether age and experience should continue to take precedence over training and education when appointing board members. One view was that boardroom skills are becoming more specialised and need to be learned.
Regulators came under fire from the chairmen. They were accused of not understanding the businesses they are regulating and of treating non-executives as executives.
The meeting also referred to the spread of regulation from the financial services sector. One said: “We have a two-tier corporate world: financial services and the rest. But what starts as regulation of financial services bleeds through to the rest.”
The participants warned that because boards are out of touch with society, there is a danger of a backlash and the emergence of an “anti-business” movement.
The relationship between society and business was also raised at a subsequent debate. One view was that the future of the corporation depends on it being redesigned and finance returned to its proper, subservient role of supporting the wider economy.
All businesses should demonstrate public benefit – just as charities have to show a public benefit in return for charitable status, businesses should do the same, perhaps in return for limited liability status.
Another view was that voluntary sector leaders should be encouraged to join corporate boards, because of their specific skills, including in reputation and risk management.
Participants went on to call for younger, more vibrant boards. “You should see the faces of the future – not just the past,” said one. The concern that young executives are too busy to join boards was rejected and some chairmen were blamed for claiming to support diversity of age but then not allowing their executives to join someone else’s board.
It was also argued that businesses and boards need permission to fail. “What business or person can achieve great things without the possibility of failure?” one asked.
Vous pouvez lire les résultats des dix autres débats en vous référant à l’article en référence.
Je vous invite à prendre connaissance du texte de Jean-Christophe Vidal, directeur du développement à Sciences Po Executive Education, publié dans LesÉchos.fr, sur l’état de la situation de la gouvernance dans les entreprises françaises.
Sciences Po! (Photo credit: mulloy)
Le 10e rapport de l’AMF sur la gouvernance et la rémunération des dirigeants des sociétés cotées « dresse un panorama particulièrement intéressant de 60 sociétés françaises ».
Voici de larges extraits qui présentent les meilleures pratiques de gouvernance ainsi que les principales suggestions d’amélioration.
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Comme en 2012, l’AMF se plonge dans les pratiques en gouvernance de 60 entreprises françaises et met en valeur les bonnes pratiques adoptées ainsi que certains axes d’amélioration. Ces entreprises prennent toutes comme référence le code Afep-Medef, dans sa version de 2010. Les codes de gouvernance en France ont fortement évolué depuis 1995 et la publication du premier rapport Viénot. Mais une caractéristique subsiste : rapprocher les pratiques des conseils d’administration et de surveillance français des américains et des anglais qui constituent l’état de l’art de la gouvernance depuis la publication en 1992 du rapport Cadbury au Royaume-Uni.
Plusieurs bonnes pratiques montrent un rapprochement avec ce qui se fait de mieux à l’étranger en matière de gouvernance, notamment dans les pays anglo-saxons qui restent le modèle dans ce domaines :
la formalisation du « comply or explain » : 22 des 60 sociétés indiquent les recommandations du code Afep-Medef qui ne sont pas retenues par l’entreprise et les raisons correspondantes ;
la rémunération des dirigeants mandataires sociaux : la quasi-totalité des entreprises de l’échantillon présentent des informations sur les rémunérations conformes aux principes du code Afep-Medef ;
la diversification des membres des conseils avec une féminisation (25% de l’échantillon, 26,2% pour le CAC40) et une internationalisation (25% des administrateurs des entreprises publiant leurs nationalités) accrues ;
l’indépendance des administrateurs : 55% des administrateurs de l’échantillon (61% du CAC 40) sont identifiés comme indépendants ;
la présence d’un administrateur référent dans près de 20% des conseils de ces entreprises.
Quelques spécificités françaises fortes sont relevées par l’AMF :
une structure moniste à conseil d’administration pour 80% de ces entreprises, 75% d’entre elles ayant un PDG, le président du conseil étant également directeur général ;
un nombre élevé (48%) de dirigeants mandataires sociaux détenant un seul mandat, ce qui va de pair avec une diversification croissante de la composition des conseils.
Les principaux points d’amélioration relevés par l’AMF constituent autant de défis pour les conseils, au sens positif du terme car ils permettent une amélioration en continu des pratiques sans pour autant freiner le fonctionnement des conseils :
1) le formalisme des critères d’indépendance des administrateurs :
Nombre d’administrateurs considérés indépendants siègent depuis plus de 12 ans au sein d’un même conseil. Si leur expérience apporte indéniablement au conseil, le regard extérieur attendu des administrateurs indépendants ne peut que s’atténuer après plusieurs années ; – les relations d’affaires qu’entretiennent certains administrateurs, notamment les banquiers d’affaires, avec les entreprises où ils siègent ne peuvent être systématiquement décrites et de ce simple fait devraient constituer un critère exclusif d’indépendance ; – le cumul par les dirigeants d’un mandat social et d’un contrat de travail : les dirigeants ayant un contrat de travail avec leur entreprise doivent abandonner ce contrat de travail lorsqu’ils prennent un mandat social, sauf si les fonctions remplies dans le contrat de travail sont très différentes de celles exercées dans le cadre du mandat social. Le maintien du contrat de travail nécessite dès lors une information précise auprès des investisseurs;
2) l’évaluation des administrateurs :
Beaucoup d’entreprises arguent de la nature collégiale du fonctionnement des conseils pour écarter une évaluation de la contribution individuelle de chaque administrateur aux travaux du conseil. Ce point fait fortement débat dans les conseils. La collégialité des décisions prises par les administrateurs crée un équilibre salutaire face aux décisions souvent prises de façon solitaire par les dirigeants. Pour l’AMF l’évaluation comprendrait des éléments objectifs comme la présence aux réunions du conseil et la participation à un ou plusieurs comités spécialisés, mais aussi une évaluation plus subjective de chaque administrateur par ses pairs, correspondant à la réalité de la collégialité du conseil;
3) les critères permettant d’évaluer la nature significative ou non des relations d’affaires entretenues entre l’administrateur et l’entreprise où il siège;
4) la notion de « cercle élargi de bénéficiaires des retraites à prestations définies » doit être précisée, tout comme plusieurs catégories de rémunérations et avantages dont les conditions d’information vis-à-vis des investisseurs ne sont pas précisées dans le code Afep-Medef
5) les moyens et les pouvoirs de l’administrateur référent tout comme les critères de son indépendance.
L’administrateur référent joue un rôle croissant dans les conseils: administrateur expérimenté, il siège souvent depuis de nombreuses années dans l’entreprise, d’où le caractère parfois très relatif de son indépendance. Mais son rôle auprès du président du conseil est fondamental, tant dans la préparation des ordres du jour des réunions qu’en cas de crise majeure.
Voici un billet de David A. Bell, associé de la firme Fenwick & West LLP qui a récemment été publié sur le blogue du Harvard LawSchool.Ce texte est un résumé de la publication Corporate Governance Practices and Trends: A Comparison of Large Public Companies and Silicon Valley Companies (2013) dont le texte complet est disponible ici.
Depuis 2003, Fenwick fait l’inventaire des pratiques de gouvernance issues des corporations du Standard & Poor’s 100 Index (S&P 100) qui sont pertinentes pour les entreprises de haute technologie cotées de la Silicon Valley 150 Index (SV 150). Vous trouverez dans le document ci-joint des données comparatives, souvent étonnantes et très significatives, entre les deux groupes sur les thèmes suivants :
Composition du conseil d’administration;
Nombre d’administrateurs exécutifs sur le conseil;
Diversité du membership, notamment la proportion de femmes;
La taille et le nombre de réunions du C.A. et de ses comités statutaires;
Les pratiques du « majority voting » et du « board classification »;
L’utilisation de la structure du vote à classes multiples;
Les directives concernant l’actionnariat des administrateurs;
La fréquence ainsi que le nombre de propositions des actionnaires activistes.
Je vous invite à lire cet extrait, puis si vous souhaitez en savoir plus, lisez aussi le résumé du HLS. Enfin, si l’étude détaillée vous intéresse vous pouvez vous procurer le rapport complet ici.
In each case, comparative data is presented for the S&P 100 companies and for the high technology and life science companies included in the SV 150, as well as trend information over the history of the survey. In a number of instances we also present data showing comparison of the top 15, top 50, middle 50 and bottom 50 companies of the SV 150 (in terms of revenue), illustrating the impact of scale on the relevant governance practices.
Significant Findings
Governance practices and trends (or perceived trends) among the largest companies are generally presented as normative for all public companies. However, it is also somewhat axiomatic that corporate governance practices should be tailored to suit the circumstances of the individual company involved. Among the significant differences between the corporate governance practices of the SV 150 high technology and life science companies and the uniformly large public companies of the S&P 100 are:
English: Apple’s headquarters at Infinite Loop in Cupertino, California, USA. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The number of executive officers tends to be substantially lower in the SV 150 than in the S&P 100 (in the 2013 proxy season, average of 6.5 compared to 11.2). In both groups there has been a long-term, slow but steady decline in the average number of executive officers per company, as well as a narrowing in the range of the number of executive officers in each group.
While there has been a general downward trend in both groups, the SV 150 companies continue to be substantially less likely to have a combined board chair/CEO than S&P 100 companies (in the 2013 proxy season, 37% compared to 72%). Where there is a separate chair, they are also substantially more likely to be a non-insider at SV 150 companies (in the 2013 proxy season, 69% compared to 21%). Lead directors are substantially more common among S&P 100 companies (in the 2013 proxy season, 85% compared to 44%).
The S&P 100 companies tend to have larger boards than SV 150 companies (average of 12.0 compared to average of 8.1 in the 2013 proxy season), and tend toward larger primary committees (audit, compensation and nominating). They are also substantially more likely to have other standing committees (83% of S&P 100 companies do, compared to 23% of SV 150 companies in the 2013 proxy season).
Female directors are substantially more common among S&P 100 companies whether measured in terms of average number of female directors (in the 2013 proxy season, 2.4 compared to 0.8) or in terms of average percentage of each board that are women (in the 2013 proxy season, 19.9% compared to 9.1%). While female board membership peaked among SV 150 companies in the 2008 proxy season (average of 12.3% compared to 17.2% for the S&P 100), the overall trend is clearly upward in both groups (compared to averages of 10.9% in the S&P 100 and 2.1% in the SV 150 in the 1996 proxy season). From the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons, the percentage of companies with no women directors declined from 11% to 2% in the S&P 100 and 82% to 43% in the SV 150.
SV 150 companies continue to have more insiders as a percentage of the full board, while S&P 100 companies continue to have more insider directors measured in absolute numbers (while there has been and longer term downward trend in insiders, both groups have held essentially steady over the past five proxy seasons).
While there is a clear trend toward adoption of some form of majority voting in both groups, the rate of adoption is substantially higher among S&P 100 companies (92% compared to 44% of SV 150 companies in the 2013 proxy season), although it declined 5% from the 2011 proxy season (compared to a 7% increase for the SV 150).
Stock ownership guidelines for executive officers are substantially more common among S&P 100 companies (in the 2013 proxy season, 95% compared to 53%), although that is a substantial increase for both groups over the course of the survey (compared to 58% for the S&P 100 and 8% for the SV 150 in 2004), including a 9% increase in the SV 150 over the last year. Similar trends hold for stock ownership guidelines covering board members (although the S&P 100 percentage is about 20% lower for directors over the period of the survey).
While classified boards used to be similarly common among both groups (about 44% for S&P 100 and 47% for SV 150 in 2004), there has been a marked long-term decline in the rate of their use among S&P 100 companies but not among SV 150 companies (11% for S&P 100 compared to 45% for SV 150 in the 2013 proxy season). Our data shows that within the SV 150, the rate of adoption fairly closely tracks with the size of company (measured by revenue).
Stockholder activism, measured in the form of proposals included in the proxy statements of companies, continues to be substantially lower among the high technology and life science companies in the SV 150 than among S&P 100 companies (whether measured in terms of frequency of inclusion of any such proposals or in terms of number of proposals). However, over the last two proxy seasons, the largest companies in the SV 150 have closed the gap and are now comparable to the S&P 100 in terms of frequency of having a least one such proposal.
Il semble que les conseils d’administration dotés de personnes ayant une solide expérience des affaires, notamment à titre de PCD (CEO), mènent à des entreprises plus fortes et plus profitables. Tel est le constat que l’on peut faire à la suite de la lecture de l’article de Tom Groenfeldt, contributeur au magazine Forbes.
L’enquête menée par JamesDruryPartners auprès des cinq cent (500) plus grandes entreprises américaines montre que celles-ci se tournent davantage vers des PCD (CEO) en exercice ou retraités pour siéger sur les conseils d’administration, après avoir expérimenté diverses configurations de C.A. Les résultats peuvent être consultés sur le site de JamesDruryPartners.
L’article explique pourquoi il en est ainsi et décrit, en détail, les principaux changements dans la composition des C.A., en insistant sur la croissance des charges et responsabilités des membres de conseils. Par exemple, en 1990, les CEO siégeaient sur 2,2 conseils d’administration et 51 % participaient à quatre conseils ou plus. Aujourd’hui, ceux-ci siègent sur 1,2 conseil et seulement le quart (25%) participent à quatre conseils.
La recrudescence de cet engouement pour le recrutement de CEO, comme administrateurs, laisse peu de place aux femmes sur les conseils puisque la population de femmes CEO est encore très faible. L’étude montre que la recherche de CFO est également très faible en regard de la popularité des CEO.
The report notes that “A fundamental premise of our report is that we value business experience more highly than non-business experience in measuring governance capacity. Our research shows that the more accomplished a director is in business achievement, the more likely that director is to engage the CEO, management team, and other directors in rigorous discussion regarding critical business issues.”
The report also includes ways to improve ranking, and shows the companies that have had the greatest increases in their scores and the greatest declines. It is a detailed look at boards and has some excellent discussion of what makes for strong governance capacity. Boards can increase their capacity by enlarging its board if it is too small and upgrading its boardroom talent by adding directors of more substantive business accomplishment, particularly if active and retired CEOs are under-represented on the board.
Je remercie vivement tous les lecteurs qui ont exprimés, par vote, leur appréciation de mon blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé lors du concours organisé par Made In Blog (MiB) à l’échelle canadienne.
Dans un premier temps, notre blogue s’est classé parmi les dix (10) finalistes dans la catégorie Business/marketing/médias sociaux, une catégorie large à souhait ! Puis, aujourd’hui, nous apprenions le classement final du jury d’experts.
Le choix du jury a été effectué à partir de critères précis et d’un processus rigoureux : l’esthétique, l’ergonomie, la convivialité, la fonctionnalité, l’interactivité, la présence d’informations sur l’auteur, l’originalité du contenu, la clarté et l’écriture, la saisonnalité des articles, la transparence et authenticité, l’orthographe, la grammaire, l’esthétique des blog-posts, la forme, l’engagement, l’audience et influence du blogue.
Notre blogue a obtenu la deuxième position parmi les soixante-cinq (65)blogues de sa catégorie, le seul des trois lauréats dans le domaine de la gouvernance.
Nous sommes honorés de cette marque de reconnaissance. Merci !
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé
Par Jacques Grisé, Ph.D, F.Adm.A.
Collaborateur spécial au Collège des administrateurs de sociétés
Rappelons que ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets, « posts », est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revues, des blogues et sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.
Chaque jour, je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernancedans le monde francophone, en fournissant aux lecteurs une mine de renseignements récents (les billets quotidiens) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes.
Voici, en rappel, un billet publié le 22 novembre sur les principes fondamentaux de la bonne gouvernance ? Voilà un sujet bien d’actualité, une question fréquemment posée, laquelle appelle, trop souvent, des réponses complexes et peu utiles pour ceux qui siègent sur des conseils d’administration.
L’article de Jo Iwasaki, paru sur le site du NewStateman, a l’avantage de résumer très succinctement les cinq (5) grands principes qui doivent animer et inspirer les administrateurs de sociétés.
Les principes évoqués dans l’article sont simples et directs; ils peuvent même paraître simplistes mais, à mon avis, ils devraient servir de puissants guides de référence à tous les administrateurs de sociétés.
Les cinq principes retenus dans l’article sont les suivants :
Un solide engagement du conseil (leadership);
Une grande capacité d’action liée au mix de compétences, expertises et savoir être;
Une reddition de compte efficace envers les parties prenantes;
Un objectif de création de valeur et une distribution équitable entre les principaux artisans de la réussite;
De solides valeurs d’intégrité et de transparence susceptibles de faire l’objet d’un examen minutieux de la part des parties prenantes.
« What board members need to remind themselves is that they are collectively responsible for the long-term success of their company. This may sound obvious but it is not always recognised ».
Our suggestion is to get back to the fundamental principles of good governance which board members should bear in mind in carrying out their responsibilities. If there are just a few, simple and short principles, board members can easily refer to them when making decisions without losing focus. Such a process should be open and dynamic.
Back to basics: What are the fundamental principles of corporate governance? Photograph: Getty Images.
An effective board should head each company. The Board should steer the company to meet its business purpose in both the short and long term.
Capability
The Board should have an appropriate mix of skills, experience and independence to enable its members to discharge their duties and responsibilities effectively.
Accountability
The Board should communicate to the company’s shareholders and other stakeholders, at regular intervals, a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of how the company is achieving its business purpose and meeting its other responsibilities.
Sustainability
The Board should guide the business to create value and allocate it fairly and sustainably to reinvestment and distributions to stakeholders, including shareholders, directors, employees and customers.
Integrity
The Board should lead the company to conduct its business in a fair and transparent manner that can withstand scrutiny by stakeholders.
We kept them short, with purpose, but we also kept them aspirational. None of them should be a surprise – they might be just like you have on your board. Well, why not share and exchange our ideas – the more we debate, the better we remember the principles which guide our owbehaviour.
De son côté, l’Ordre des administrateurs agréés du Québec (OAAQ) a retenu six (6) valeurs fondamentales qui devraient guider les membres dans l’accomplissement de leurs tâches de professionnels. Il est utile de les rappeler dans ce billet :
Transparence
La transparence laisse paraître la réalité tout entière, sans qu’elle ne soit altérée ou biaisée. Il n’existe d’autre principe plus vertueux que la transparence de l’acte administratif par l’administrateur qui exerce un pouvoir au nom de son détenteur; celui qui est investi d’un pouvoir doit rendre compte de ses actes à son auteur.
Essentiellement, l’administrateur doit rendre compte de sa gestion au mandant ou autre personne ou groupe désigné, par exemple, à un conseil d’administration, à un comité de surveillance ou à un vérificateur. L’administrateur doit également agir de façon transparente envers les tiers ou les préposés pouvant être affectés par ses actes dans la mesure où le mandant le permet et qu’il n’en subit aucun préjudice.
Continuité
La continuité est ce qui permet à l’administration de poursuivre ses activités sans interruption. Elle implique l’obligation du mandataire de passer les pouvoirs aux personnes et aux intervenants désignés pour qu’ils puissent remplir leurs obligations adéquatement.
La continuité englobe aussi une perspective temporelle. L’administrateur doit choisir des avenues et des solutions qui favorisent la survie ou la croissance à long terme de la société qu’il gère. En lien avec la saine gestion, l’atteinte des objectifs à court terme ne doit pas menacer la viabilité d’une organisation à plus long terme.
Efficience
L’efficience allie efficacité, c’est-à-dire, l’atteinte de résultats et l’optimisation des ressources dans la pose d’actes administratifs. L’administrateur efficient vise le rendement optimal de la société à sa charge et maximise l’utilisation des ressources à sa disposition, dans le respect de l’environnement et de la qualité de vie.
Conscient de l’accès limité aux ressources, l’administrateur met tout en œuvre pour les utiliser avec diligence, parcimonie et doigté dans le but d’atteindre les résultats anticipés. L’absence d’une utilisation judicieuse des ressources constitue une négligence, une faute qui porte préjudice aux commettants.
Équilibre
L’équilibre découle de la juste proportion entre force et idées opposées, d’où résulte l’harmonie contributrice de la saine gestion des sociétés. L’équilibre se traduit chez l’administrateur par l’utilisation dynamique de moyens, de contraintes et de limites imposées par l’environnement en constante évolution.
Pour atteindre l’équilibre, l’administrateur dirigeant doit mettre en place des mécanismes permettant de répartir et balancer l’exercice du pouvoir. Cette pratique ne vise pas la dilution du pouvoir, mais bien une répartition adéquate entre des fonctions nécessitant des compétences et des habiletés différentes.
Équité
L’équité réfère à ce qui est foncièrement juste. Plusieurs applications en lien avec l’équité sont enchâssées dans la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés de la Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne et dans la Charte québécoise des droits et libertés de la personne. L’administrateur doit faire en sorte de gérer en respect des lois afin de prévenir l’exercice abusif ou arbitraire du pouvoir.
Abnégation
L’abnégation fait référence à une personne qui renonce à tout avantage ou intérêt personnel autre que ceux qui lui sont accordés par contrat ou établis dans le cadre de ses fonctions d’administrateur.
Aujourd’hui, je propose aux administrateurs de sociétés une lecture très utile pour mieux appréhender les défis reliés à l’utilisation de services juridiques dans le cas d’entreprises de petite capitalisation.
Cet article, publié par Adam J. Epstein* dans NACD Directorship, présente clairement les options qui s’offrent aux administrateurs de ces entreprises lorsque vient le temps de décider d’une stratégie gagnante pour l’achat de services juridiques.
Les conseils de l’auteur sont notamment très précieux pour aider l’entreprise à embaucher le bon type de firme et pour décider de la forme que prendra le paiement des honoraires.
Je vous invite donc à lire ce court article; en voici un court extrait. Bonne lecture !
Because so many small-cap companies— particularly those with market capitalizations below $500 million—operate without in-house counsel, and because many officers and directors lack legal backgrounds, there is a constant risk of either hiring the wrong attorneys or paying too much for legal services. And since few small-cap companies can afford either, directors should consider the following insights into common circumstances involving legal services.
Current Environment The law firm business model is in the midst of a historic transformation. After decades of hypergrowth and profitability, the law industry post-financial crisis is in many cases a shadow of its former self. Put differently, when it comes to purchasing legal services, it’s become a buyer’s market.
English: Law Firm Logo (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
For small-cap companies already saddled with comparatively crippling costs of “being public,” the evolution of the marketplace for legal services is unreservedly positive. But even in the face of a buyer’s market, many small-cap companies aren’t benefitting as much as they should.
For example, one of the most dramatic changes to the law firm model is an inexorable shift away from hourly billing to flat fees. According to The Wall Street Journal, the frequency of use of flat fee structures has nearly doubled at large law firms in the last several years. At a high level, this is beneficial to purchasers of legal services, because hourly fee billing can be susceptible to conflicts of interest (i.e., lawyers might be tempted to take more time to complete tasks because they are getting paid by the hour). But just because a company is paying a flat fee for a particular service doesn’t necessarily mean the company is getting a better deal. Especially when it comes to clients with less legal acumen, law firms still do their best to construct flat fees that aren’t demonstrably different than historic hourly fees when all is said and done. Accordingly, management needs to confirm that any flat fees agreed upon are, in fact, more advantageous to the company and its shareholders.
Notwithstanding the positive developments in the legal services marketplace for small-cap companies, there are three circumstances in particular that are always deserving of added director scrutiny.
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*Adam J. Epstein is lead director of OCZ Technology Group, an NACD Board Leadership Fellow, and advises smallcap boards through his firm, Third Creek Advisors. This article is excerpted, in part, from his book, The Perfect Corporate Board: A Handbook for Mastering the Unique Challenges of Small-Cap Companies (McGraw-Hill, 2012).
On assiste à de plus en plus de « contestations » de la part d’actionnaires activistes pour l’obtention du contrôle des entreprises cotées.
Qu’est-ce qu’une campagne de contestation (proxy contest) ? Quelles formes ces contestations prennent-elles ? Quels raisons incitent certains actionnaires activistes à aller de l’avant avec leurs propositions de changement ? Que peuvent faire les conseils d’administration pour se préparer à une attaque éventuelle et pour se protéger efficacement ?
Le document, préparé conjointement par Corporate Board Member du NYSE et Kroll, un leader mondial dans le conseil en gouvernance, répond très bien à ces questions. Voici un court extrait d’un article où Bob Brenner, associé de Kroll, répond aux questions. Bonne lecture.
In general, the term corporate contest refers to several different situations in which a shareholder(s) or other corporate entity tries to force a change of control in a company. The two most common situations where we get involved are proxy fights and takeover attempts.
Proxy fights generally arise in two types of situations. In the first, an existing shareholder(s) seeks board representation to change corporate behavior or governance because the shareholder is unhappy with the company’s performance and the unwillingness of the board of directors to alter course or change the status quo. Typically, such a contest begins after quiet, protracted negotiation between the board/management and a prominent shareholder, during which the shareholder expresses ideas for change or displeasure with policy or direction and is rebuffed.
The second type of proxy fight, which we describe as “opportunistic,” does not start with an existing investment or position. Instead, it is marked by a rapid accumulation of stock by a new shareholder. The shareholder, or group of shareholders, acquires the stock on the premise that the board and/or management is failing to maximize the company’s assets. If the new shareholder can pressure the company to change policy, management, or board composition, fine. If not, they are prepared to force the issue.
“Activist” investors have had great success in these types of corporate contests. Typically, they target companies that have seen a decrease in share price over time. The well-funded activist investor claims to be ready, able, and more than willing to roll up its sleeves and implement change.
Historically, outright unsolicited or hostile takeover bids have formed a large part of the corporate contest world. In the case of a takeover bid, one corporate entity offers to buy another, frequently a competitor or an entity with a good synergistic fit. In far fewer instances, an activist shareholder may desire to purchase the outstanding shares of an entity from existing shareholders in order to obtain control of that entity so that it may effectuate immediate change. These types of contests are rarely launched by activist funds as these efforts require large amounts of capital to be sunk into one investment, a tactic that hedge funds generally try to avoid. True hostile takeover bids have declined in recent years.
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un court article publié par George Bradt dans Forbes qui décrit les trois (3) stades de gouvernance qu’une organisation est susceptible de vivre au cours de son évolution.
En effet, plus une organisation croît, plus le besoin de structure devient nécessaire et plus le besoin d’une nouvelle gouvernance se fait sentir. L’auteur prend l’exemple d’un commerce qui prend rapidement de l’expansion et dont le propriétaire-dirigeant ressent, dans un premier temps, le besoin de s’entourer d’un conseil aviseur pour l’aider à franchir un nouveau cap.
Les stades de développement généralement vécus par les organisations sont les suivants :
(1) Stade informel : Aviseurs ad hoc;
(2) Stade de structuration et de formalisation : Conseil aviseur externe;
(3) Stade de croissance accélérée : Conseil d’administration et management professionnel.
Je vous invite à lire l’article dont voici un extrait. Pour plus d’information sur les modes de transition, rendez-vous sur le site de Prime Genesis
Just like you need different types of boards to ride surf, snow or street, you need different boards to help guide different stages of your business. While solo entrepreneurs can get by with an informal cadre of advisors, other organizations need more disciplined boards of advisors or formal boards of directors. The key is to evolve your board as your organization’s needs change similarly to how you must lead differently as your team grows.
Almost everybody has someone they turn to for advice: lawyer, accountant, priest, friend, spouse, local bartender or the like. These early advisors generally have a personal connection to the leader. Hopefully they have relevant, valuable expertise as well.
Advisory Boards
As Rob was putting together his initial advisory board, he looked for people with competency and character he could trust. At first, he started with those who had a connection to himself or to one of his key constituents. Over time, he’s learned to strike a balance on his board between people with direct, automobile industry experience and those with complementary experiences.
English: The Wikimedia Foundation’s Public Policy Initiative staff and Advisory Board members (from L-R): Board Member Robert Cummings, Head of Public Outreach Frank Schulenburg, Board Member Mary Graham, Campus Team Coordinator Annie Lin, Public Outreach Officer Pete Forsyth, Education Programs Manager Rod Dunican, Board Member Barry Rubin, Research Analyst Amy Roth, Board Member Rod Schneider, Communications Associate LiAnna Davis, and Board Member Wayne Mackintosh. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
While he was younger, he needed his board members to be “more supportive and somewhat paternal.” Now he looks to the board to provide an outside view, help refine the strategy, and push him and his leadership team to get better. The best advice he ever got from a board member was when he was told that “there are certain times when opportunities, situations arise where the right answer may create short term pain and a tough week, month, even year, in exchange for hopefully a better 20 years.”Rob compensates his advisory board members in two ways. First he gives them a stipend for the three meetings they come to each year, each lasting a day and half. But that’s really to let them know he’s serious about their involvement. It’s the second part of their compensation that’s most valuable: the learning and connections they get from being involved and the feeling of satisfaction from helping someone they like and respect.
At some point, he expects the board will help him transition leadership to the next generation.
Boards of Directors
Boards of directors come into play when the owners or key stakeholders of an organization cannot or choose not to manage the organization themselves. Instead of advising the owner/manager, boards of directors take on fiduciary responsibility in representing the owners or stakeholders in directing management. Both advisory boards and formal boards of directors should have their own strategic, organizational and operational processes. They just have different bases for their authority.
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 