Voici un article très pertinent sur l’utilisation du commerce électronique « mobile » en 2012. L’article d’Eric Koester, fondateur de la firme Zaarly, publié dans Forbes présente une liste de sept points à connaître à propos du « mCommerce« . Tous les dirigeants d’entreprises devraient être interpellés par l’avenir de cette technologie dans le domaine des affaires car celle-ci risque de chambarder les façons de faire. C’est un article facile à lire et un sujet incontournable pour tous les gestionnaires, spécialement pour ceux dont les entreprises oeuvrent dans le domaine des services.
« Mobile is hot – the innovation fortune tellers (aka venture capitalists) have dipped into their wallets and doled out big bucks to mobile-focused companies. Even more than just mobile, we’ve seen a veritable gold rush into the mobile commerce market from mobile payments to mobile couponing to location-based discounts to the ‘buzzy-sounding’ MoLoSo (it’s short for mobile-local-social integrated technologies). For CEOs and other business leaders, the big question is what they really need to know about mobile commerce right ».
Le choix d’un bon président et chef de la direction (PCD-CEO) est certainement l’une des tâches les plus importantes d’un conseil d’administration. L’article de Ram Charan publié dans Fortune est très instructif à cet égard et je vous encourage à le lire afin de mieux jouer votre rôle de membre de C.A. L’auteur a étudié les cas d’échecs les plus probants dans le choix des PCD et il a identifié plusieurs étapes afin de les éviter. Ces étapes peuvent être regroupées en quatre catégories :
Reverse the usual process
Place the selection criteria into five buckets
Ann Livermore, VP at Hewlett Packard (HP) at OracleOpenWorld 2008 (Photo credit: TechShowNetwork)
« It’s becoming an epidemic: the dead-on-arrival CEO who is doomed from day one because he or she was the wrong choice. Look at Yahoo (YHOO), which just got its fifth CEO in five years, or think of Leo Apotheker, who lasted only 11 months at the top of Hewlett-Packard (HPQ). Investors blame the CEO when he or she flames out, but the real culprit is the board. The directors blew their most important job: making sure the company always has the right CEO.
To avoid such damaging failures, directors must seize control of CEO selection and pursue the task in a way that’s fundamentally new at most companies. I’ve analyzed 82 CEO failures from the past 20 years and have been on the scene of many successions, good and bad. I’ve observed what works and what doesn’t. The winning approach is clear, and more boards should go firmly on offense and follow it. Corporate leadership has shifted from the CEO to the board. In this age of intense competition and accelerating change, boards must above all demonstrate excellence in their No. 1 job of having the right CEO at all times. Following these four practices will vastly improve their chances. Is your board good enough to do the job they’re accountable for? »
Voici un rapport américain très intéressant, publié par Pearl Meyer & Partners et partagé par Richard Leblanc, qui présente les dix items les plus importants des ordres du jour des comités de ressources humaines (CRH) en 2012. Le document expose en détail chacune des priorités des CRH pour cette année. Voici un bref extrait du rapport.
« Compensation Committees in 2012 will need to focus continued attention to the design details of executive pay programs, along with how they are administered and communicated to all stakeholders, including investors. With that in mind, Pearl Meyer & Partners’ annual look at the Top 10 issues facing Compensation Committees focuses on how Boards can effectively address the key elements – and the sometimes overlooked nuances – of a robust and effective pay-for-performance orientation.With that in mind, Pearl Meyer & Partners’ annual look at the Top 10 issues facing Compensation Committees focuses on how Boards can effectively address the key elements – and the sometimes overlooked nuances – of a robust and effective pay-for-performance orientation ».
Les 10 items les plus importants sont les suivants :
1. Understand Your Company’s Pay-for-Performance Linkage
2. Understand Total Executive Compensation
3. Reassess Executive Compensation Benchmarking
4. Balance Short-Term and Long-Term Incentive Programs
5. Don’t Follow the Leader – Shareholders, Not ISS, Are Your Target Audience
6. Use a Persuasive Executive Summary in the CD&A
7. Continuously Assess Your Succession Planning Strategy
8. Test Your Pay Philosophy Against its Stated Objectives
9. Assess Executive Rewards Within Your Executive Talent Management Strategy
10. Revisit Consultant Independence and Selection Under Dodd-Frank
On se questionne souvent sur l’efficacité des membres de conseils d’administration qui appartiennent aux mêmes réseaux sociaux et qui ont des liens étroits. La recherche de B. D. Nguyen de l’Université Cambridge (Judge Business School) est assez concluante à cet effet. Voici un extrait de l’article qui montre trois impacts négatifs du « Old Boys’ Network ».
There were three main findings. Firstly, close ties within a board can adversely affect company performance. While his study was not designed to explain why this is the case, Dr Nguyen believes opposing forces are at play: the positive effects of connectedness on information asymmetry as well as the board’s advisory role versus its willingness to be tough on a CEO when circumstances demand.
Secondly, social networks seem to impact board effectiveness in its role of hiring and firing CEOs, a key duty for the board to enable them to protect shareholder value. It appears well connected CEOs are less likely to be ousted for poor performance than non-connected CEOs. For the same poor performance, the connected CEO is almost three-times less likely to be fired.
Old Boys Network (Photo credit: marksdk)
The third key finding is that a connected CEO ousted for poor performance is much more likely to find a better job, more quickly, than an unconnected CEO.
Voici un article, publié dans Forbes, qui insiste, encore, sur les avantages de recruter le PCD (CEO) à l’interne. L’article présente des statistiques intéressantes et donne des munitions à ceux qui croient que l’on devrait toujours donner préséance aux candidats provenant de l’interne. À lire.
This news may not come as a shocker but it bears repeating: It pays to hire from within, whether lower- or mid-level employees, or candidates for a company’s top job.
Last month I wrote about a study by a Wharton professor, Matthew Bidwell, who found that external hires get paid more than internal promotes. For their first two years on the job, external hires also get much lower marks in performance reviews, and they are more likely to be laid off than those promoted from within.
Wharton Park – Durham (Photo credit: drew | DROWNEDeffect™)
Yesterday, the consulting firm Booz & Co. released its twelfth annual study on CEO succession, and showed some similar findings about chief executives. The Booz study, of the world’s 2,500 largest companies, reports that from 2009 to 2011, companies let go 35% of CEOs hired from outside, compared to 19% of bosses who were promoted from within. Also, CEOs who come up from within, stay on their jobs for a year longer than outsiders, an average of five years, as opposed to four. Companies apparently recognize the advantages of hiring insiders. Four out of five new CEOs rise through the company ranks, says the study.
Il y a toujours eu beaucoup de discussions sur le sujet de la taille optimale des Boards d’OBNL. Mais que montrent les études et qu’en disent les experts à ce sujet ? Selon Richard Leblanc, on trouvera la réponse en analysant la mission et les fonctions de l’organisation et en étudiant le leadership du C.A. Voici un article intéressant à consulter si vous songez à modifier la taille de votre conseil.
« A 2011 study by Bain Capital reported in The Nonprofit Times asserts that the optimal board size for effective decision making is seven people. According to Bain, “every person added after that decreases decision-making ability by 10 percent.” So for boards with the median of 17 people, Bain would put their decision-making ability at zero.
While a smaller board size does reflect new thinking about board functioning, I’ve seen too many boards that work extremely well with 17-22 people to buy into Bain’s assertion. Some boards grow quite large to enable greater engagement of key community leaders or to expand its fundraising capability. United Way is an excellent example of this done very effectively. »
Australian Securities Exchange (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Je crois qu’il est important d’avoir une perspective globale de la gouvernance et, pour ce faire, il est nécessaire d’explorer le phénomène sous un angle international. Comment se pratique la gouvernance ailleurs dans le monde, en Europe, en Asie et en Australie par exemple ? Et comment la situation se compare-t-elle aux États-Unis, notamment en ce qui a trait aux femmes siégeant sur des conseils d’administration ? Voilà ce que l’étude de D. M. Branson de l’Université de Pittsburgh aborde. Vous pouvez téléchager le document au complet. En voici quelques extraits :
« In the United States, the representation of women on corporate boards of directors has been flat for 6 years now. By contrast, elsewhere around the world the topic is a hot button issue. This includes Australia where the proportion of board seats held by women has suddenly jumped from 8% in 2010 to nearly 14% today. The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) has adopted a “comply or explain” diversity disclosure requirement (for emphasis termed an “if not, why not” disclosure requirement), which emphasizes gender diversity. The requirement is even more stringent than the London Stock Exchange (LSX) comply or explain regulation adopted after the Lord Mervyn Davies Report on women in corporate governance appeared in February 2011. The Australian Institute of Company Directors also has instituted a mentoring/sponsorship program, the first of its kind in the world, designed to obtain board seats for women. This article reviews these Australian as well as global developments, including enactment of quota laws (especially Norway and France), certificate and pledge programs (“Rooney Rules”), and hard law disclosure requirements (United States) ».
Je porte à votre attention un compte rendu du Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), paru dans triplepundit.com, qui propose des changements majeurs dans la divulgation des données sur la rémunération des hauts dirigeants, à l’échelle mondiale. Le GRI propose notamment la publication du ratio – rémunération de la direction par rapport à la moyenne des employés. Je vous encourage donc à appréhender l’ampleur du phénomène et à être mieux informés sur la mise en oeuvre d’un standard international en matière de rédaction de rapports de développement durable.
« The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a non-profit organization dedicated to promoting transparency around economic, social and environmental issues at all organizations – companies to NGOs to governments at any level. Basically, it’s an international standard for writing sustainability reports – and interest in the reporting standard is growing rapidly. In 2011, 2834 reports were registered with GRI.
The Global Reporting Initiative is tremendously popular in Europe with 47% of reports originating there. GRI reporting in the US is growing like gangbusters, however, with 350 reports registered in 2011 compared to only 100 in 2010. That’s partly thanks to the attention and commitment of Mike Wallace, Director of GRI’s Focal Point USA. The GRI guidelines are continuously updated based on feedback from users, which is filtered through working groups. I must say that when I dove into the guidelines, I wasn’t expecting any surprises. But I was wrong. Check out this note from the summaryon the changes to the “Governance” section of reporting :
EXECUTIVE PAY BY COUNTRY VS AVERAGE WORKER CRONY CAPITALISM (Photo credit: snowlepard)
G4 is proposing a number of changes to governance and remuneration disclosures to strengthen the link between governance and sustainability performance, taking into account the consistency within existing governance frameworks and developments in that field. The proposed changes include new disclosures in the Profile section of the report on the ratio of executive compensation to median compensation, the ratio of executive compensation to lowest compensation and the ratio of executive compensation increase to median compensation ».
La présidente du Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés, Mme Louise Champoux-Paillé, partage avec nous cet excellent document émanant du CFA Institute « prodiguant des conseils afin d’éviter le piège des orientations à court terme ». Le rapport présente également les résultats d’un « sondage sur les pratiques de gouvernance en matière de communication avec les actionnaires, de rémunération, de gestion des risques, de sélection des administrateurs et de l’importance accordée aux discussions stratégiques au sein des C.A. »
Une étude de Heidrick & Struggles du Center for Effective Organizations de University of Southern California’s Marshall School of Business montre que les perceptions qu’ont les présidents | chefs de la direction (PCD ou CEO) de l’efficacité du conseil d’administration (C.A., Board) sont significativement différentes de celles qu’ont les membres du conseil (C.A.) de leur propre utilité et efficacité ! Les auteurs proposent plusieurs moyens pour améliorer la dynamique entre le C.A et le management des sociétés. Vous pouvez lire l’article au complet sur le site de la NACD (nacdonline.org).
« Nine out of 10 directors think their boards are doing a good job. Their CEOs think only one director in five is effective. Who is right?
A study conducted by Heidrick & Struggles with the Center for Effective Organizations at the University of Southern California’s Marshall School of Business surveyed 768 directors, nearly 75 percent of whom are outside directors, at 660 of the 2,000 largest publicly traded companies in the United States. CEOs confide that they have at most one or two effective directors who provide wise counsel, offer advice on key issues. But 95 percent of directors rate their boards as either effective or very effective overall ».
Closing the Gap
When CEOs see only about 10 to 20 percent of directors as effective and their top management teams often regard working with the board as a demotivating experience, what are the issues? The good news is that the causes of the demotivating disconnect are clear and there are readily available remedies to address them ».
Voici un article publié dans NACD qui présente le débat entre une gouvernance basée sur des valeurs et une gouvernance basée sur des règles. Fascinant !
« The emphasis on compliance and regulation de-emphasizes the basic building block of good business and good relationships: trust.
Simply put, values-based corporate governance has been referred to as the “institutionalization of ethics” into the conduct of the board and management. The belief is that the overwhelming majority of people behave in ethical ways, prefer the moral high ground and understand the short- and long-term benefits of doing the right thing by customers, suppliers, employees, communities and shareholders. The rules are still there, of course, but they are broadly written, serving to show where mismanagement, malfeasance and criminal behavior are present and also indicating the extent of negative consequences for behaving badly.
Rules-based corporate governance starts with an entirely different assumption. It assumes temptation and the desire for personal gain is rife in corporate life; therefore monitoring, reporting, strict guidelines and detailed restrictions on behavior are the avenue to achieving ethical and right behavior from management and boards. Clearly the cycles of dishonest, improper and criminal behavior in some companies over the past decade followed by increased legislation and regulation have squarely placed directors in a rules-based environment. Yet rules alone are not enough. They cannot easily adapt or allow for nuance and so, because of this, a rules-based system of governance alone is incapable of addressing the complexity and mutability of the global economy ».
Il y a dix ans, on parlait très peu de gouvernance dans la profession d’administrateur et dans la formation en administration. Voici dix événements qui ont radicalement changé la manière de concevoir et de vivre la gouvernance au cours des 10 dernières années. C’est un article très intéressant et je vous incite fortement à le lire pour être à la fine pointe des connaissances en gouvernance. Ci-dessous les dix facteurs de changement incontournables présentés dans l’article publié dans Corporate Secretary.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley
2. The fall of Lehman Brothers
3. Dodd-Frank
4. Social media governance
5. Say on pay
6. Protecting whistleblowers
7. Corporate social responsibility
8. The rise of the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA)
Ten years ago, corporate governance was still in the concept stage. There wasn’t much information available to the public about the way corporations were governed, and there were few regulations, websites or groups dealing with the topic on a daily basis. Over the years, however, the notion of good corporate governance has taken an interesting turn. After a string of corporate failures that crippled the economy, it has become clear that governance matters. So as Corporate Secretary celebrates its tenth anniversary as a publication, we take a look at ten significant events that have changed the face of corporate governance.
Encore un solide article, partagé par Richard Leblanc et publié dans Bloomberg.com, sur la propensité de plus en plus grande des actionnaires à dire NON à des « packages » de rémunération jugés excessifs. À lire.
« It is often said that social change can’t occur until what was seen as misfortune is seen as injustice. There is a corollary in the financial world. It says change can’t occur until what was seen as immaterial is seen as risky. That’s happening with executive compensation. Investors are recognizing that excessive pay for chief executive officers does more than shave a few cents off earnings; it also provides important clues about the alignment of executives’ and shareholders’ interests. Misalignment can be very expensive. More important, compensation provides crucial information about the effectiveness of a board’s independent oversight. If directors can’t say no to the CEO on pay, they probably can’t say no to poorly designed strategy or head off operational fiascos ».
Pour débuter la deuxième année de mon blogue en gouvernance, je vous invite à lire cet excellent article publié sur le site de Blooberg.com. L’indépendance des présidents de conseils d’administration (PCA) est une règle et une pratique exemplaire de bonne gouvernance. Toutes les formations en gouvernance des sociétés énoncent cette règle comme étant cruciale. Pourtant, aux États-Unis, 80 % des entreprise du S&P 500 ont des PCA qui ne rencontrent pas les critères d’indépendance énoncés par les autorités règlementaires, contrairement au Canada ou au Royaume-Uni où , à la suite de pressions des autorités règlementaires et des investisseurs, une forte majorité des entreprises se sont données des PCA indépendants. Que se passe-t-il au pays de la libre entreprise ? Qui a raison ? Y-a-t-il des avantages financiers et stratégiques à ne pas scinder les fonctions de président du conseil (PCA, Chairman) et de président et chef de la direction (PCD, CEO) ? L’article ci-joint est très clair à cet égard : c’est un énorme conflit d’intérêt … au moins potentiellement ! « We don’t let students grade their own exams, but we let CEOs chair their own boards ».
« In the early 1990s, Adrian Cadbury, the former chairman of Cadbury Schweppes, led a committee that proposed reforms to improve governance and reassure the investor community after a series of high-profile scandals among British companies. One of the recommendations called for independent outside chairmen. Within a decade, most U.K. companies had adopted the recommendation due to pressure from regulators and investors.
Chairman (Photo credit: k-ideas)
Separating the chairman and CEO roles has never been widely accepted in the U.S., where CEOs like to pile up titles and don’t like answering to someone else. Chief Executive magazine reported in June that 63 percent of CEOs said in a survey that they would recommend a combined role for their replacements, despite the concerns of shareholder groups. The Council of Institutional Investors, for example, calls dual roles “a fundamental conflict of interest.”
Les actionnaires exercent de plus en plus de pressions sur les C.A. afin que ceux-ci prennent en compte les risques environnementaux et sociaux. Voici un article publié par E&Y qui fait un excellent résumé de la situation. À lire.
Aujourd’hui, c’est le premier anniversaire du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé et ce billet est le 365e de l’année, ce qui représente une moyenne d’une publication par jour. Je me propose de tenir le rythme pour les prochaines années.
Faites de mon blogue votre source d’information indispensable sur les activités et les actualités en gouvernance de sociétés. Merci.
« Shareholders are asking boards to mitigate risks tied to evolving regulations, shifting global weather patterns and heightened public awareness of climate change issues. Summary: Proposals from shareholders reveal that investors find their company’s social and environmental policies correlated with its risk management strategy — and ultimately its financial performance. We estimate that half of all shareholder resolutions in 2011 will center on social and environmental issues. »
In 2011, shareholder proposals are expected to focus on the following issues:
Social/environmental. Expected to make up the largest portion of proposals this year, these proposals will focus on political contributions and lobbying, human rights and labor practices, sustainability and greenhouse gases, environmental risk and toxic chemicals.
Board-focused matters. Expected to represent the second-largest category of proposals, these initiatives will center on board composition, independent leadership, majority voting to elect directors and board declassification.
Strategic and antitakeover-related-issues. Typically these proposals seek to eliminate supermajority vote requirements, and to allow shareholders to call special meetings or act by written consent.
Executive compensation. As this is the first year for mandatory say-on-pay provisions giving shareholders the right to vote on executive pay, fewer proposals will relate to compensation arrangements.
Il y a dix ans, on parlait très peu de gouvernance dans la profession d’administrateur et dans la formation en administration. Voici dix événements qui ont radicalement changé la manière de concevoir et de vivre la gouvernance au cours des 10 dernières années. C’est un article très intéressant et je vous incite fortement à le lire pour être à la fine pointe des connaissances en gouvernance. Ci-dessous les dix facteurs de changement incontournables présentés dans l’article publié dans Corporate Secretary.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley
2. The fall of Lehman Brothers
3. Dodd-Frank
4. Social media governance
5. Say on pay
6. Protecting whistleblowers
7. Corporate social responsibility
8. The rise of the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA)
Ten years ago, corporate governance was still in the concept stage. There wasn’t much information available to the public about the way corporations were governed, and there were few regulations, websites or groups dealing with the topic on a daily basis. Over the years, however, the notion of good corporate governance has taken an interesting turn. After a string of corporate failures that crippled the economy, it has become clear that governance matters. So as Corporate Secretary celebrates its tenth anniversary as a publication, we take a look at ten significant events that have changed the face of corporate governance.
« The Ontario Securities Commission has asked whether proxy advisory firms should be regulated. (Proxy advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis, which is owned by Ontario Teachers Pension Plan, provide governance assessment and recommendations to institutional shareholders on their voting at annual meetings of companies.) In my view, proxy advisory firms should be regulated for three important reasons.
Conflicts of Interest
Lack of Qualitative Assessment of Governance Quality and Predictive Validity on Shareholder Value
Voici une présentation PTT issue d’un rapport de recherche de la firme Aon Hewitt partagé par Richard Leblanc dans LinkedIn. Ce document très important fait le point sur les réalisations de l’annéee 2011-2013 en matière de rémunération aux É.U. et présente les tendances anticipées pour 2013.
Bougainvillea (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
La présentation couvre essentiellement les sujets suivants : (1) Un état global de la situation (big picture), (2) Une mise à jour de la règlementation et des règles de gouvernance, (3) Les tendances en matière de rémunération, (4) Un aperçu des programmes de rémunération incitative à long terme. Bonne lecture !
Excellent article de Justin Fox et Jay W. Lorsch dans le dernier numéro (juillet-août) de Harvard Business Review. On y décrit les rôles que devraient jouer les actionnaires de nos jours et on présente plusieurs suggestions pour les aider à mieux contribuer au succès des organisations. Un must !
« The path forward for corporate executives and shareholders appears blocked. Executives complain, with justification, that meddling and second-guessing from shareholders are making it ever harder for them to do their jobs effectively. Shareholders complain, with justification, of executives who pocket staggering paychecks while delivering mediocre results. Boards are stuck in the middle—under increasing pressure to act as watchdogs and disciplinarians despite evidence that they’re more effective as friendly advisers…
Our aim here is to focus on shareholders. Who are they? What are their incentives? What are they good at? What are they bad at? The body of research and discussion on these questions is growing. (For a summary, see “Are Institutional Investors Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?,” a working paper by Ben W. Heineman Jr. and Stephen Davis, published by Yale’s Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance.) Our contribution is to offer a framework for thinking about shareholders’ role and to make some suggestions for changes. We’ve divided shareholders’ contributions into three areas: money, information, and discipline ».
Voici un excellent article paru dans 24/7 WALL St qui montre clairement le besoin de séparer les fonctions de PCA et de PCD. Les études montrent que la rémunération globale des deux postes séparés est significativement moindre que la rémunération d’un PCA/PCD.
« CEOs do not like it. More and more often, it seems, the roles of chairman and CEO become separate from one another. And the arrangement usually is forced on the chief executive. A major problem at a big corporation is often the catalyst of these actions. That certainly happened at many of the nation’s banks after the financial crisis. Troubled Chesapeake Energy (NYSE: CHK) ripped the chairman’s role from CEO Aubrey Mc Clendon when it became clear that he took advantage of his position to financially enrich himself… It turns out that there may be reasons other than good corporate governance practices to separate the two jobs. A new study by GMI Ratings, a corporate governance research firm, claims that the decision to separate the roles also saves a public company, and thus, its shareholders, money. In a new piece of research GMI found :
The cost of employing a combined CEO/chair is 151 percent of what it costs to employ a separate CEO and chairman.
Specifically, the data show :
– Executives with a combined CEO and chair role earn a median total summary compensation of just over $16 million.
– CEOs who do not serve as chair earn $9.8 million in median total summary compensation.
– A separate CEO and chairman earn a combined $11 million ».
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 