Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 15 novembre 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 15 novembre 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

 

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Les pratiques émergentes à long terme


Voici un article que je ne peux passer sous silence tellement le travail de recherche de Brian Tomlinson* est exemplaire eu égard à l’exploration des pratiques émergentes à long terme.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance des points soulevés dans cet article paru sur le site de Harvard Law School on Corporate Governance.

Bonne lecture !

 

Emerging Practice in Long-Term Plans

 

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Executive Summary

The information asymmetry between corporations and investors is particularly severe regarding long-term strategic plans: existing market infrastructure for disclosure is very short-term focused and underserves sources of long-term value creation. The CEO-delivered long-term plan gives corporations an opportunity to reorient disclosures to the long-term. The Strategic Investor Initiative provides comprehensive guidance to CEOs and their Investor Relations teams on the key components of a long-term plan—set out in our Investor Letter to CEOs.

Through feedback from institutional investors we have identified content elements essential to an effective investor-facing CEO-delivered long-term plan:

  1. Additive to existing disclosures: Add information to the public domain or provide additional context for existing disclosures.
  2. More than marketing—contextualized disclosures: A strategic plan narrative is not a recitation of good news stories. Initiatives should be contextualized to help investors assess their significance.
  3. Focused by materiality: A long-term plan should disclose information that is material to the operating performance and financial prospects of the business.
  4. Integrated discussion of material Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) issues: Part of an integrated discussion—not a silo or presented as a list of “awards.”
  5. Forward looking information: A long-term plan is an opportunity for a company to meaningfully talk about the future across a broad range of value-relevant topics, accompanied by goals, metrics and milestones.

Emerging Practice in Long-Term Plans—By Key Theme

In this paper we set out key themes that CEOs have addressed in their long-term plan presentations delivered at CEO Investor Forums convened by the Strategic Investor Initiative. We identify why each theme is an enduring subject of investor interest (and identified in our Investor Letter to CEOs) and provide examples from CEO presentations of content that was well-received by institutional investors. We also provide suggestions of key additions that CEOs can make to enhance the utility of disclosures on these key themes:

  1. Risk factors and mega-trends: Highlights presentations by Delphi and PG&E
  2. Corporate governance: Highlights presentations by Medtronic and Merck
  3. Capital allocation: Highlights the presentation by Becton Dickinson
  4. Human capital management: Highlights the presentation by Aetna
  5. Shareholder and stakeholder engagement: Highlights the presentations by Merck, Telia, and Prudential

We are delighted to feature Insights from FCLTGlobal in the corporate governance theme.

Introduction: The Long-Term Imperative

A gap exists between a corporation’s knowledge of its practices and prospects and the knowledge of its investors. Periodic disclosures are intended to reduce the level of this information asymmetry. This structural information gap between corporations and investors appears particularly severe regarding forward-looking information about a corporation’s long-term strategic plans—an issue long-term institutional investors are increasingly vocal about wanting companies to address.

Corporations endure, and often plan, over decades through long-term-focused management and strategic planning processes. Although a strategic plan can address periods of 3, 5, or 15 years, corporations tend to communicate in quarters (through the 10-Q and earnings call).

Some corporations do, of course, communicate with investors through a variety of other forums (in addition to the earnings call), including investor days, industry conferences, and, increasingly, common year-round bilateral engagements, in addition to mandatory disclosures such as the 10-K and voluntary disclosures, such as sustainability reports. However, the landscape of corporate communications with shareholders does not include a disclosure venue focused on long-term sustainable value creation. The existing market infrastructure for disclosure remains very short-term focused and the mix of information provided underserves sources of long-term value creation—to the continuing of frustration of long-term institutional investors.

Through our convening of CEO Investor Forums, we provide a venue for a curated conversation between leading CEOs and long-term investors to help plug an unmet need for information with a long-term time horizon and reorient capital markets toward the long term. To date, over 25 companies (representing over $2 trillion in market cap) have presented long-term plans at a CEO-Investor Forum to an investor audience representing in excess of $25 trillion in AUM.

In this paper, we set out examples of emerging practices in CEO-presented long-term plans, identify core investor content expectations, and highlight how CEOs are seeking to tackle key themes for improved corporate disclosure. We hope both investors and corporations find it useful.

Six Reasons Companies Should Share Their Long-Term Thinking

  1. To demonstrate that there is an effective long-term strategy
  2. To show that the company can anticipate and capitalize on mega-trends
  3. To help investors understand ESG issues “through the eyes of management”
  4. To encourage the C-Suite to reflect on the corporate ecosystem, including a consideration of its stakeholders
  5. To help inspire—and retain—both employees and investors over the long-term
  6. To foster leadership in corporate-shareholder communications

Adapted from “Far Beyond the Quarterly Call: CECP’s first CEO Investor Forum” published in the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance

SII’s Investor Letter to CEOs

In the Strategic Investor Initiative’s Investor Letter to CEOs, signed by Bill McNabb and nine leading institutional investors, we ask CEOs to present their long-term plans for sustainable value creation at our CEO Investor Forums.

The letter asks CEOs to: set out a long-term plan with a five-year trajectory accompanied by goals, metrics and milestones; offer commentary on the role of the board in formulating and monitoring strategy; discuss financially material risks and the firm’s framework for identifying material ESG risks; and review the company’s capital allocation strategy.

The Themes of the Seven Questions Every CEO Should Be Able to Answer

How Do These Themes Connect to Long-Term Strategy:

  1. Risk factors and mega-trends
  2. Corporate purpose and role in society
  3. Frameworks for shareholder engagement
  4. Financially material business issues and frameworks for identifying those issues
  5. Human capital management
  6. Board composition
  7. Role of the board

Investor Feedback: Helping CEOS Meet Investors’ Content Expectations

CEO-delivered long-term plans can help plug a gap in existing market infrastructure and help meet the information needs of long-term investors. To date, we’ve received feedback, both in person and online, from hundreds of institutional investors on the long-term plans presented at CEO Investor Forums. We asked these investors to identify in each CEO presentation the themes that were most useful and the themes that were least useful for informing their investment outlook, voting, and engagement activities.

Building on this investor feedback, we have identified content elements essential to an effective investor-facing long-term plan—in addition to the expectations set out in our Investor Letter to CEOs:

Additive to existing disclosures: A long-term plan should add information to the public domain or provide additional contextualizing commentary to such existing disclosures (e.g., build on disclosures made at the investor day or in other disclosure forums).

More than marketing—Contextualized disclosures: a strategic plan narrative is not a recitation of good news stories. A long-term plan presentation is an opportunity to delineate key risks and challenges facing the business and to help investors see those issues “through the eyes of management,” given management’s “unique perspective on its business that only it can present.” Highlighting key initiatives within the business is useful for expanding investor understanding. However, to avoid being dismissed as marketing, such initiatives should be contextualized to help investors assess their significance within the business.

Focused by materiality—A long-term plan should disclose information that is material to the operating performance and financial prospects of the business over the long term. Material business issues tend to vary systematically by sector, giving management an opportunity to provide a focused presentation on issues of enduring investor interest and relevance for that sector. The disclosure framework provided by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) gives corporations a method to identify and organize such disclosures in a way relevant to investors.

Integrated discussion of material ESG issues—These issues are widely acknowledged as core to business success over the long term. As a result, ESG issues should be part of an integrated discussion—not be placed in a silo or presented as list of “awards.”

Forward looking information—Corporate disclosure abounds with backward-looking information. A long-term plan is an opportunity for a company to meaningfully talk about the future across a broad range of value-relevant topics, accompanied by goals, metrics, and milestones.

Least Useful CEO Disclosures

  1. Disclosures unconnected to long-term strategy
  2. Sustainability presented as a silo or eye-catching initiatives without adequate context
  3. Extended commentary on the history of the corporation
  4. Discussions of “corporate purpose” unconnected to operations and strategy
  5. Extended discussion of issues immaterial to the industry or sector

Emerging Practice in Long-Term Plans: Early Evidence From a Year of CEO Investor Forums

The long-term plan is an experimental form. CEOs who have presented their corporations’ plans to date have been guided by our Investor Letter to CEOs—but they do have broad flexibility to set out their corporations’ authentic long-term narratives.

Set out below are key themes addressed in long-term plans presented at our CEO Investor Forums and examples of how companies have tackled those themes. In each case, we identify the broad market need for such information and why it is relevant to long-term-focused investors.

Risk Factors and Mega-Trends

Leading executives spend much of their time addressing long-term business issues and strategy with their teams—and increasingly with their boards. Such thinking requires a consideration of the mega-trends impacting the operating model, product markets, and geographies in which their company operates. Capitalizing on these long-range trends is a key informing context for the development of a corporation’s strategic plan and the capital allocation decisions that will enable the plan to be implemented.

To date, existing disclosures have not proved effective in enabling corporations to talk about these long-term, forward-looking trends with their investors—and, when disclosures are made on these topics, they tend to be of low utility to investors.

For example, the MD&A section of the 10-K 9 requires disclosures regarding “known trends and uncertainties.” In considering disclosure, the corporation is asked to assess the likelihood of the trend occurring and, if it is reasonably likely to occur, seek to quantify the potential impact of that trend. This gives a corporation an opportunity to reflect on long-range trends—information highly valuable to investors. The wide discretion provided by the two-part materiality determination significantly reduces the extent of such disclosures, which also tend to be static—with only a small percentage of firms making significant changes to MD&A language over time. Risk factor disclosures are also a requirement in the 10-K. Specific risk factor disclosures are decision-relevant to investors.

However, disclosures of risk factors often lack corporation-specific elements, tend toward generic or vague language—best characterized as boilerplate—drafted more as a litigation shield than as a medium through which to inform investors.

As a result, existing disclosures inadequately capture the elements and outcomes of the strategic planning process and often fail to address long-range trends (whether market, environmental or societal) in a manner useful to investors.

Mega-trends Identified at CEO Investor Forums: Investor Letter Question:
  1. The transition to a low-carbon economy (PG&E)
  2. Disruption and democratization of product markets (UPS)
  3. Aging societies (BD)
  4. Unsustainable health care systems (Aetna, Medtronic)
  5. Technology amplifying corporate risk from cybersecurity to reputation (Delphi)

 

Mega-trends“What are the key risk factors and mega-trends (such as climate change) your business faces over the next three to seven years and how have these influenced corporate strategy?”

Mega-trends represent a formidable set of financial, operational, governance, and policy challenges; these cross-cutting issues vary in intensity by sector.

Kevin Clark of Delphi highlighted how the major disruptions of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, such as AI and drive-train electrification, are changing the nature of the automobile—and, consequently, the nature of the automobile technology business. Clark identified the mega-trends of “Safe, Green, and Connected” that are broadly impacting the automotive sector and sought to identify how trends were having impacts on long-term strategy across the business. One element identified was the extent to which new technology required significant adjustments in workplace skills and recruitment patterns. Delphi had responded to these new requirements through collaborations in “talent rich” recruitment markets among other initiatives.

Anthony Earley and Geisha Williams of PG&E structured their presentations in the context of the transition to a low-carbon economy in both energy generation and transport and highlighted how that trend was driven by regulation, the urgency of climate change, and consumer demand. That overview was contextualized by commentary on PG&E’s science-based emission reduction targets and proportion of renewable energy in its overall energy generation mix. Both presentations set out comparisons of carbon intensity with peer utilities and identified the trajectory of future energy generation and use.

Examples of Key Issues for Discussion in “Mega-Trends and Key Risks”

Climate Change and Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD): In those sectors with large exposures to issues involved in climate change, investors expect a structured discussion on the implications of climate change.

The TCFD provides a four-part framework through which corporations can address climate change:

  1. Governance
  2. Strategy
  3. Risk management
  4. Metrics and targets

Commentary, structured around the operating model of the business, enables investors to assess whether climate change adaptation is being implemented at an adequate scale and the extent of exposures to related risks, such as regulatory change.

The extent of scenario analysis conducted and the assumptions underlying it gives investors critical visibility into a corporation’s preparedness for climate change under various scenarios. Given the board-centric view of many long-term investors, commentary around the governance arrangements for assessing and responding to climate risk is particularly well received.

Corporate Governance: Long-Term Strategy, Compensation, and Composition

Long-term investors are deeply interested in effective governance and high-quality boards. Shareholders have some agency here as the boards of directors of listed companies are appointed by shareholders. This focus on the board is also a product of the board’s key responsibility as overseer of long-term strategy, although recent work suggests that many public boards neglect this key strategic role and are mired in issues of compliance.

Expectations of the competence and workload of corporate boards have expanded significantly as institutional investors have taken increasingly clear positions on key corporate governance issues such as risk and strategy oversight, entrenchment, pay, tenure, refreshment, and diversity. Investors have also set out broad elements they expect to see in effective corporate governance practices, providing companies with key signals to reflect in their governance arrangements. This more assertive stance is partly driven by a concern that boards have been too passive, unwilling to interrogate the strategy of assertive management teams. Boards have also been identified as a source of short-term performance pressures.

At the CEO Investor Forums, long-term plans are presented by CEOs. Therefore, we ask the CEO to provide commentary on the role of the board (included in our Investor Letter to CEOs). A CEO’s stated understanding of the role expected of the board and its functioning will give investors valuable insights into how effectively a corporation is governed and the extent to which the board is meaningfully involved in strategy formation, oversight and challenge. In a CEO’s discussion of the long-term plan, what is useful is setting out a commentary on the way the board signals for management to take the long-term view—but employ language that isn’t a boilerplate description of formal corporate governance arrangements.

Investor Letter Question: Board’s Involvement in Strategy

How will the composition of your board (today and in the future) help guide the corporation to its long-term strategic goals?

What is the role of the board in setting corporate strategy, setting incentives for and overseeing management?

We note that a useful discussion of the role of the board in corporate strategy, incentives, and oversight could take many forms and that an effective board may have a variety of characteristics beyond a box-tick of observable formal elements.

Omar Ishrak provided an overview of Medtronic’s corporate governance practices. He described a board deeply immersed in the strategy of the business at the business unit level in addition to the overall strategy for the firm (at country-specific and global levels). He indicated that an effort had been made to limit the time spent on compliance issues at the full board level to enable discussion of strategy by business unit and region (which consumed 4-6 hours of every board meeting). Ishrak indicated that these were real, iterative discussions with business unit heads. This is vital commentary as one of the most valuable activities for a board is to debate within itself and with the CEO and senior management the appropriateness and effectiveness of strategy; increasing the likelihood that the board does not take a reflexively subordinate role to CEO and senior management but rather adopts a stance of “constructive support and engaged challenge.”

Ishrak talked about the value of diversity within Medtronic’s board and throughout the organization. This complemented similar discussions in the presentations by Ken Frazier (CEO and Chairman of Merck) and Alex Gorsky (CEO and Chairman of Johnson & Johnson) about the need for corporations operating in health care, pharmaceuticals and medical devices to maintain a significant proportion of the board dedicated to professionals with a science background.

Going Further with the Board

Is the board enabled to be effective on long-term strategy:

Investors want to know that boards are performing well and are engaged in meaningful discussions on long-term strategy and related risks. A CEO can spend valuable time explaining the governance structures and procedures the company uses to ensure meaningful strategy discussions:

  1. Is the full board and relevant board committees structured to facilitate strategy discussion? Is time carved out for strategy discussion?
  2. Does the board test the assumptions underlying strategy and with what frequency?
  3. How does the board monitor strategy implementation? Does it seek external views in testing strategy?
  4. How is the board’s composition, now and in the future, related to long-term strategy?

Insights From FCLTGlobal

FCLTGlobal, a member-supported not-for-profit organization dedicated to developing practical tools that encourage long-term business and investment behaviors, recently published, “Long-term Boards in a Short-term World,” outlining a set of potential tools to aid boards considering taking a longer-term approach.

Directors, as shareholders’ representatives and leaders of the company, typically with average tenures that exceed management, are uniquely positioned to keep a company focused on the distant horizon, setting an appropriate long-term tone for both corporate management and shareholders.

One of the hallmarks of a successful long-term board is direct engagement with long-term shareholders. Companies that have developed board-level relationships with their key shareholders, hearing from them regularly on not just governance topics but also matters related to strategy and investment, benefit from investors’ perspective—lending invaluable insight that serves as a counterpoint to the often short-term views presented by media, the sell-side, and transient or activist investors.

Practical solutions to enable board-level dialogue with shareholders include:

  1. Appointing a lead independent director or directors as shareholder relationship manager(s),
  2. Encouraging director attendance and availability for shareholder meetings and at events like investor days, and
  3. Having a published statement which spells out the Board’s belief of its duty to long-term shareholders.

Capital Allocation

Capital allocation is the fuel that enables strategy implementation—making the investments the strategic plan identifies as key to long-term performance. Corporations strive to maintain enduring capital allocation frameworks. However, these must be adaptable to allow the corporation to make critical long-term investments and capitalize on the competitive landscape, market, and mega-trends it faces.

A long-term plan is an opportunity to highlight those long-term investments that will take time to pay off and perhaps how those investments distinguish the corporation from its industry peers. Investors should be given a working understanding of those investments and be able to track progress against the strategy over time. In Q&A, investors have sought commentary on how CEOs think about capital allocation in the context of the current concerns regarding the extent, timing, and impact of share buy-backs.

Investor Letter Context: Capital Allocation

A corporation should communicate its view of key financially material risks, including long-range mega-trends and the relevant frameworks used to identify ESG factors. The majority of this discussion should focus on the strategy and resources allocated to address future risks.

Investors expect a CEO to outline the corporation’s framework for allocating capital and how that framework enables strategy implementation. CEOs at our Forums have presented such frameworks supplemented by long-range capital distribution goals such as maintaining the historic dividend trajectory.

Vince Forlenza of Becton Dickinson (BD) described how capital allocation and business-relevant stakeholder investments were the keys to the long-term success of his business. Forlenza provided a detailed discussion of the capital allocation framework, with specific dollar allocations to each segment. That set up the discussion of strategy, beginning with BD’s 2020 Sustainability Strategy and Goals—with sustainability discussed as a whole-firm concept. Taking a similar approach, Kevin Clark of Delphi embedded the discussion of capital allocation in the context of the “Safe, Green, and Connected” mega-trends identified earlier. This commentary was well received as it placed the capital allocation framework in the context of core strategy.

Building on These Presentations—The Pozen Framework

Enhancing the discussion of capital allocation through Senior Lecturer, MIT Sloan School of Management Robert Pozen’s capital allocation template:

For the next 3 to 5 years a corporation should outline the target percentage of its annual free cash flow allocated to the following:

Return to shareholders in the form of dividends (and share repurchases); and

Reinvest in the corporation for growth:

How much will be allocated to external growth via acquisitions (or how much will be funded by divestitures), even if this is a qualitative indication?

How much will be allocated to internal growth: i. R&D and innovation? ii. Major capital expenditures? iii. Human capital development? iv. Investments in other capitals or significant stakeholder groups as long-term system-health investments, investments in brand and reputation and in risk mitigation?

Human Capital Management

Human capital management is a key source of resilient business performance. As intangibles have become the dominant location of business value, how a business recruits, retains and incentivizes its people has become a value-relevant issue of investor interest.

Human capital management is an extremely broad topic for a CEO to address concisely in a long-term plan as it could include: high-level commentary on establishing and maintaining a strong organizational culture to support the firm’s mission and vision; Occupational Health and Safety compliance; or managing performance on key metrics such as training and development spend, employee turnover and employee engagement survey results. The picture is complicated further by effective human capital management tending not to rely on a single management technique or metric but rather a bundle of supportive practices that work together to drive value.

Corporations collect a wealth of human capital metrics for internal management purposes, much of which are not disclosed; regulatory requirements to disclose human capital are very limited.

Investors seek expanded disclosures on human capital. The Human Capital Management Coalition recently submitted a rule-making petition to the SEC to request that the Commission’s required disclosures be extended to include decision-useful information on human capital “policies, practices, and performance”. Investors such as BlackRock and Vanguard have identified human capital as a priority issue in their engagement strategies with investee companies. Index providers, including Thomson Reuters, have developed products (the Diversity & Inclusion Index is one) that acknowledge both the demand for good human capital practices and their value-relevance.

Given the complexity of the issue, a CEO must give priority to telling the corporation’s authentic human capital management story: how is the corporation investing in human capital? how does that relate to long-term strategy? what does the firm expect those investments to achieve in terms of improved performance?

Human Capital—Financially Material—The Evidence: Investor Letter Question:
  1. Companies identified as best to work for, outperform
  2. High-quality human capital management delivers enhanced returns
  3. Employee engagement correlated with performance
  4. Human capital analytics enable better performance
Human Capital“How do you manage your future human capital requirements over the long term and how do you communicate your future human capital management plans to your investors?”

A valuable example was provided by Mark Bertolini of Aetna; he spoke about human capital in the context of developing a culture of health for employees, in addition to addressing pay equity, as keys to long-term business performance.

Bertolini identified how employee engagement surveys were uncovering a pattern of employees talking about the difficulties of their working lives. These lower-income employees tended to be on food stamps and Medicaid. Bertolini explained his decision to raise wages and reduce the health care costs of these workers. He then identified key costs and outcomes: $27 million cost in year one, 5,700 workers affected, on average 22% increase in disposable income. This initiative was combined with programs on mindfulness, tuition assistance, and life style practices associated with productivity (e.g., paying employees to get 8 hours of sleep a night). Bertolini indicated that these measures were associated with significant increases in employee engagement scores—but he emphasized that it was vital for management to “get beyond the spreadsheet” to understand the benefits (hard and soft) of such investments in human capital over the long term. This commentary provides investors with an understanding of management’s view of the business and some of its thinking about its people and how that relates to the operating performance and financial prospects of the business.

Meeting Investor Needs on Human Capital

Human capital is a material issue across industries, though the relevance of human capital-related factors can vary by sector. Investors have identified a variety of measures by which corporations can enhance their disclosure of human capital issues.

Nine broad categories of information were deemed fundamental to human capital analysis as a starting point to ongoing dialogue with investors:

Workforce demographics Workforce stability Workforce composition
Workforce skills and capabilities Workforce culture and empowerment Workforce health and safety
Workforce productivity Human rights Workforce compensation and incentives

Shareholder and Stakeholder Engagement

Shareholder expectations of the volume and quality of engagement with investee companies have expanded significantly. The Commonsense Corporate Governance Principles regard effective corporate governance as requiring constructive engagement between a company and its shareholders. This is reflected in companies taking more time to prepare directors for on-going engagements and relationship building with investors and devoting significant time and resources to such engagements. Investors use these year-round engagements to inform their investing outlook, voting, and future engagement activities—and expect companies to be responsive, to some extent, to these engagements.

Shareholders expect investee companies to develop a rigorous process and framework for managing shareholder engagement and responding to the themes on which meaningful investor engagement takes place. Corporations can take several approaches. However, it is key that they enable their shareholders to understand the approach and structure of investor engagement efforts—this allows investors to respond and coordinate their activities accordingly.

A long-term plan also gives a CEO an opportunity to reflect on the company’s relationship with its broader community of stakeholders. As a long-term plan is an investor-facing presentation, it is useful for a CEO to highlight the framework through which the corporation identifies which stakeholder interests are critical to the long-term success of the company and how the corporation seeks to manage those stakeholder relationships.

Investor Letter Question: Shareholder and Stakeholder Engagement

What is the corporation’s framework/strategies for interacting with its shareholders and key stakeholders?

Prudential’s presentation by Marc Grier, Chairman of the Board, outlined a set of leading corporate governance practices that it has adopted, including designating its Lead Independent Director as the primary point of engagement with shareholders. Prudential had also sought to describe its approach to shareholder engagement, quantify such engagement, and account for its outcomes in expanded proxy statement disclosures (identified as an example of best practice by the Council of Institutional Investors).

Corporations have taken different approaches to identifying key stakeholder interests and describing the business, strategy and governance implications of that effort. Merck’s CEO Ken Frazier described a stakeholder matrix in which more than 40 stakeholder issues were analyzed in the context of long-term business performance. Frazier identified how that matrix helped inform board-level strategy considerations—and had proved useful in guiding the long-term direction of the company.

Telia CEO Johan Dennelind explained how its board of directors had adopted a statement of significant audiences and materiality. Through this kind of statement, a board acknowledges a specific set of stakeholders (broader than shareholders) relevant to its future success and key material issues for its business. The statement is a new tool on the corporate reporting landscape. In addition to the benefits it offers a board in thinking through key issues and stakeholders, such a statement may help CEOs provide investors with an overview of how the corporation thinks about and manages material stakeholder interests.

__________________________________________________________

*Brian Tomlinson is Research Director of the Strategic Investor Initiative at CECP. This post is based on a CECP memorandum by Mr. Tomlinson. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here) and Social Responsibility Resolutions by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 8 novembre 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 8 novembre 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

 

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Quelles sont les tendances eu égard à l’évaluation des conseils d’administration à l’échelle internationale ?


Voici un article très intéressant sur les tendances en évaluation des CA à l’échelle internationale.

Les auteurs, Mark Fenwick* et Erik P. M. Vermeulen, ont étudié l’état de la situation de l’évaluation des conseils dans 20 juridictions différentes qu’ils ont classifiées en 5 groupes, allant d’absence de législation, à des réglementations détaillées et explicites.

Dans l’ensemble, l’étude montre que les juridictions qui sont explicites eu égard aux meilleures pratiques en matière d’évaluation des conseils sont plus susceptibles d’adopter des processus d’évaluation efficaces. La législation et la réglementation ont un grand pouvoir d’influence sur les pratiques exemplaires.

Les auteurs retiennent un certain nombre de constats sur les meilleures pratiques en évaluation des CA :

 

(1) Although there is “no one-size-fits-all” solution, and the design of the evaluation should be tailored to meet the needs of the individual company and the particular circumstances of that company, board evaluation needs to be a continuous and on-going process rather than a periodic event.

(2) Evaluation should include not only compliance and risk-management competencies, but also skills and experience in business-related and organization-related areas, such as strategy, innovation, marketing, globalization, and growth.

(3) Regulator-issued “best practice” principles and guidelines should provide enough detail to offer genuine help to companies in implementing and evaluation processes, but also leave enough flexibility for companies to tailor the process to their specific needs. Additional guidelines need to provide more information about the criteria, methods, and form of the evaluation process (without compelling companies to make use of them).

(4) The board member or committee responsible for driving the evaluation process should actively involve external experts if, and when, necessary. In addition, “Legal Tech”, specifically board evaluation software and application, can help facilitate the assessment process.

(5) Boards should engage in a more open and detailed form of communication and disclosure about the evaluation process and its outcomes.

 

Bonne lecture !

 

Board Evaluation: International Practice

 

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Corporate Governance Practice Framework

 

 

Although there is a broad consensus that we need “better corporate governance,” there is often less agreement as to what this actually means or how we might achieve it. Such uncertainties are hardly surprising. Contemporary corporate governance frameworks were significantly re-worked in the 2000s in response to a series of high-profile scandals. But these reforms appear to have had little effect on the performance of listed companies during the 2008 Financial Crisis. Moreover, the number, scale, and damage of corporate scandals and economic failures do not appear to be diminishing.

One possible reason for the poor performance of corporate governance measures has been an over-emphasis on the regulatory design of “checks-and-balances” in listed companies, rather than on the equally important question of how governance structures can add value to a firm. Our new paper, Evaluating the Board of Directors: International Practice, explores this latter issue, with particular reference to the role of boards and board evaluation.

In the conventional “checks and balances” model of corporate governance, authority and empowerment flow “downwards” from the shareholders (the legal and moral owners of a company) through the board of directors/supervisory board to the management and, eventually, employees. Corporate governance mechanisms are intended to curtail agency problems, notably those that arise between (potentially) self-interested management and investor-owners.

Since management is responsible to the board of directors or supervisory board that, in turn, owes a responsibility to the shareholders or owners of the firm, board members have also been heavily affected by the regulations that have been implemented over the last two decades. In particular, policymakers have emphasized the monitoring and oversight role of “independent” or “outside” directors as crucial in protecting shareholder interests and preventing self-interested transactions. In countries with controlling shareholders, which is common in Europe and Asia, board members are also expected to protect the interests of “minority investors” and other stakeholders in the company. This is deemed necessary because controlling block shareholders may engage in activities that are detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders or other stakeholders in the company.

As such, the dominant view of policymakers has been to treat the board as supervisor/monitors of the senior managers. In consequence, the board of directors has tended to focus on the control of management behavior and the monitoring of company past-performance and sustainability.

An alternative way of framing the issue, however, would be to move beyond a control perspective and recognize that a well-balanced board can be a competitive advantage for a company looking to create value and build its capacity for delivering innovation. Such a broader view can be found in the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, for instance, or, more recently, The New Paradigm, A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, issued on 2 September 2016 by the World Economic Forum.

Moreover, companies themselves, as well as their investors, now recognize that the “monitoring” role is no longer sufficient and that the model of board supervision and independence constitutes a missed opportunity. Instead, more innovative firms have integrated a diverse range of individuals onto their boards in the expectation that they will work in collaboration with the firm’s CEO and other senior managers in developing new business strategies. These directors can help a firm stay relevant via the inclusion of diverse perspectives that are directly relevant to a company’s core business operation. A more collaborative model of the relationship between the board and senior management (and the companies’ investors) ensures that these different perspectives are properly integrated into the decision-making processes in a way that can add genuine value to a firm’s business performance.

It is in this context that policymakers, regulators and companies seek to understand better the factors that impact the effectiveness of board performance. As a consequence, board evaluation and evaluation processes have become a key point of interest. In particular, many boards have recognized that it is vital for them to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of their performance on a regular basis. This has resulted in more attention to board evaluations in many jurisdictions. Again, this trend can be seen in the G20/OECD Corporate Governance Principles which recommend including regular board evaluations in a country’s corporate governance framework

As is often the case, however, the risk of regulatory initiatives aimed at forcing or “nudging” changes in corporate behavior is that it merely encourages “box-ticking” in which managing the appearance of compliance becomes the overriding objective. Resources devoted to managing an image of compliance and not substantive compliance are wasted, and the potential gains from meaningful compliance—in this case, effective board evaluation—are never realized.

Our paper, therefore, aims to evaluate regulatory measures aimed at promoting meaningful board evaluation. An empirical study of twenty different jurisdictions was conducted employing multiple criteria. The jurisdictions were classified into five groups ranging from no legal provision for board evaluation to jurisdictions with detailed rules and procedures.

The evidence presented in our paper seems to indicate that companies that are listed in countries with more specific principles and rules, as well as substantive guidance on “best practice” do tend to adopt more meaningful and open forms of board evaluation practice than their counterparts in jurisdictions with no or less detailed requirements, i.e., there seems to be evidence that “law matters” in this context.

As to what constitutes “best practice” in board evaluation the paper makes a number of findings and suggestions. Crucial amongst them are the suggestions that (1) Although there is “no one-size-fits-all” solution, and the design of the evaluation should be tailored to meet the needs of the individual company and the particular circumstances of that company, board evaluation needs to be a continuous and on-going process rather than a periodic event. (2) Evaluation should include not only compliance and risk-management competencies, but also skills and experience in business-related and organization-related areas, such as strategy, innovation, marketing, globalization, and growth. (3) Regulator-issued “best practice” principles and guidelines should provide enough detail to offer genuine help to companies in implementing and evaluation processes, but also leave enough flexibility for companies to tailor the process to their specific needs. Additional guidelines need to provide more information about the criteria, methods, and form of the evaluation process (without compelling companies to make use of them). (4) The board member or committee responsible for driving the evaluation process should actively involve external experts if—and when—necessary. In addition, “Legal Tech”—specifically board evaluation software and applications—can help facilitate the assessment process. (5) Boards should engage in a more open and detailed form of communication and disclosure about the evaluation process and its outcomes.

“Done right”, board evaluation has the potential to enhance a board’s supervisory functions but—just as importantly—it can allow a firm to identify (and fill) expertise gaps on the board and leverage the expertise of board members to improve firm performance by building strategic partnerships with executives and senior management.

The complete paper is available for download here.


*Mark Fenwick is a Professor at Kyushu University Graduate School of Law and Erik P. M. Vermeulen is Professor of Business & Financial Law at Tilburg University. This post is based on a recent paper by Professor Fenwick and Professor Vermeulen.

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 1er novembre 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 1er novembre 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « top ten »

 

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Top 5 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 25 octobre 2018


 

Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 25 octobre 2018.

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « top 5 »

Cette fois-ci, j’ai relevé les cinq principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

 

 

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Quelles tendances en gouvernance, identifiées en 2014, se sont avérées au 20 octobre 2018


Dans un premier temps, j’ai tenté de répondre à cette question en renvoyant le lecteur à deux publications que j’ai faites sur le sujet. C’est du genre check-list !

Puis, dans un deuxième temps, je vous invite à consulter les documents suivants qui me semblent très pertinents pour répondre à la question. Il s’agit en quelque sorte d’une revue de la littérature sur le sujet.

  1. La gouvernance relative aux sociétés en 2017 | Un « Survey » des entreprises du SV 150 et de la S&P 100
  2. Principales tendances en gouvernance à l’échelle internationale en 2017
  3. Séparation des fonctions de PDG et de président du conseil d’administration | Signe de saine gouvernance !
  4. Six mesures pour améliorer la gouvernance des organismes publics au Québec | Yvan Allaire
  5. Cadre de référence pour évaluer la gouvernance des sociétés | Questionnaire de 100 items
  6. La gouvernance française suit-elle la tendance mondiale ?
  7. Enquête mondiale sur les conseils d’administration et la gouvernance

 

J’espère que ces commentaires vous seront utiles, même si mon intervention est colorée par la situation canadienne et américaine !

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « tendances en gouvernance »

 

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

 

J’ai réalisé une entrevue avec le Journal des Affaires le 17 mars 2014. Une rédactrice au sein de l’Hebdo des AG, un média numérique qui se consacre au traitement des sujets touchant à la gouvernance des entreprises françaises, m’a contacté afin de connaître mon opinion sur quelles « prédictions » se sont effectivement avérées, et lesquelles restent encore à améliorer.

J’ai préparé quelques réflexions en référence aux douze tendances que j’avais identifiées le 17 mars 2014. J’ai donc revisité les tendances afin de vérifier comment la situation avait évolué en quatre ans. J’ai indiqué en rouge mon point de vue eu égard à ces tendances.

 « Si la gouvernance des entreprises a fait beaucoup de chemin depuis quelques années, son évolution se poursuit. Afin d’imaginer la direction qu’elle prendra au cours des prochaines années, nous avons consulté l’expert en gouvernance Jacques Grisé, ex- directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, de l’Université Laval. Toujours affilié au Collège, M. Grisé publie depuis plusieurs années le blogue www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com, un site incontournable pour rester à l’affût des bonnes pratiques et tendances en gouvernance. Voici les 12 tendances dont il faut suivre l’évolution, selon Jacques Grisé »

 

  1. Les conseils d’administration réaffirmeront leur autorité. « Auparavant, la gouvernance était une affaire qui concernait davantage le management », explique M. Grisé. La professionnalisation de la fonction d’administrateur amène une modification et un élargissement du rôle et des responsabilités des conseils. Les CA sont de plus en plus sollicités et questionnés au sujet de leurs décisions et de l’entreprise. Cette affirmation est de plus en plus vraie. La formation certifiée en gouvernance est de plus en plus prisée. Les CA, et notamment les présidents de CA, sont de plus en plus sollicités pour expliquer leurs décisions, leurs erreurs et les problèmes de gestion de crise.
  2. La formation des administrateurs prendra de l’importance. À l’avenir, on exigera toujours plus des administrateurs. C’est pourquoi la formation est essentielle et devient même une exigence pour certains organismes. De plus, la formation continue se généralise ; elle devient plus formelle. Il va de soi que la formation en gouvernance prendra plus d’importance, mais les compétences et les expériences reliées au secteur d’activité de l’entreprise seront toujours très recherchées.
  3. L’affirmation du droit des actionnaires et celle du rôle du conseil s’imposeront. Le débat autour du droit des actionnaires par rapport à celui des conseils d’administration devra mener à une compréhension de ces droits conflictuels. Aujourd’hui, les conseils doivent tenir compte des parties prenantes en tout temps. Il existe toujours une situation potentiellement conflictuelle entre les intérêts des actionnaires et la responsabilité des administrateurs envers toutes les parties prenantes.
  4. La montée des investisseurs activistes se poursuivra. L’arrivée de l’activisme apporte une nouvelle dimension au travail des administrateurs. Les investisseurs activistes s’adressent directement aux actionnaires, ce qui mine l’autorité des conseils d’administration. Est-ce bon ou mauvais ? La vision à court terme des activistes peut être néfaste, mais toutes leurs actions ne sont pas négatives, notamment parce qu’ils s’intéressent souvent à des entreprises qui ont besoin d’un redressement sous une forme ou une autre. Pour bien des gens, les fonds activistes sont une façon d’améliorer la gouvernance. Le débat demeure ouvert. Le débat est toujours ouvert, mais force est de constater que l’actionnariat activiste est en pleine croissance partout dans le monde. Les effets souvent décriés des activistes sont de plus en plus acceptés comme bénéfiques dans plusieurs situations de gestion déficiente.
  5. La recherche de compétences clés deviendra la norme. De plus en plus, les organisations chercheront à augmenter la qualité de leur conseil en recrutant des administrateurs aux expertises précises, qui sont des atouts dans certains domaines ou secteurs névralgiques. Cette tendance est très nette. Les CA cherchent à recruter des membres aux expertises complémentaires.
  6. Les règles de bonne gouvernance vont s’étendre à plus d’entreprises. Les grands principes de la gouvernance sont les mêmes, peu importe le type d’organisation, de la PME à la société ouverte (ou cotée), en passant par les sociétés d’État, les organismes à but non lucratif et les entreprises familiales. Ici également, l’application des grands principes de gouvernance se généralise et s’applique à tous les types d’organisation, en les adaptant au contexte.
  7. Le rôle du président du conseil sera davantage valorisé. La tendance veut que deux personnes distinctes occupent les postes de président du conseil et de PDG, au lieu qu’une seule personne cumule les deux, comme c’est encore trop souvent le cas. Un bon conseil a besoin d’un solide leader, indépendant du PDG. Le rôle du Chairman est de plus en plus mis en évidence, car c’est lui qui représente le conseil auprès des différents publics. Il est de plus en plus indépendant de la direction. Les É.U. sont plus lents à adopter la séparation des fonctions entre Chairman et CEO.
  8. La diversité deviendra incontournable. Même s’il y a un plus grand nombre de femmes au sein des conseils, le déficit est encore énorme. Pourtant, certaines études montrent que les entreprises qui font une place aux femmes au sein de leur conseil sont plus rentables. Et la diversité doit s’étendre à d’autres origines culturelles, à des gens de tous âges et d’horizons divers. La diversité dans la composition des conseils d’administration est de plus en plus la norme. On a fait des progrès remarquables à ce chapitre, mais la tendance à la diminution de la taille des CA ralentit quelque peu l’accession des femmes aux postes d’administratrices.
  9. Le rôle stratégique du conseil dans l’entreprise s’imposera. Le temps où les CA ne faisaient qu’approuver les orientations stratégiques définies par la direction est révolu. Désormais, l’élaboration du plan stratégique de l’entreprise doit se faire en collaboration avec le conseil, en profitant de son expertise. Certes, l’un des rôles les plus importants des administrateurs est de voir à l’orientation de l’entreprise, en apportant une valeur ajoutée aux stratégies élaborées par la direction. Les CA sont toujours sollicités, sous une forme ou une autre, dans la conception de la stratégie.
  10. La réglementation continuera de se raffermir. Le resserrement des règles qui encadrent la gouvernance ne fait que commencer. Selon Jacques Grisé, il faut s’attendre à ce que les autorités réglementaires exercent une surveillance accrue partout dans le monde, y compris au Québec, avec l’Autorité des marchés financiers. En conséquence, les conseils doivent se plier aux règles, notamment en ce qui concerne la rémunération et la divulgation. Les responsabilités des comités au sein du conseil prendront de l’importance. Les conseils doivent mettre en place des politiques claires en ce qui concerne la gouvernance. Les conseils d’administration accordent une attention accrue à la gouvernance par l’intermédiaire de leur comité de gouvernance, mais aussi par leurs comités de RH et d’Audit. Les autorités réglementaires mondiales sont de plus en plus vigilantes eu égard à l’application des principes de saine gouvernance. La SEC, qui donnait souvent le ton dans ce domaine, est en mode révision de la réglementation parce que le gouvernement de Trump la juge trop contraignante pour les entreprises. À suivre !
  11. La composition des conseils d’administration s’adaptera aux nouvelles exigences et se transformera. Les CA seront plus petits, ce qui réduira le rôle prépondérant du comité exécutif, en donnant plus de pouvoir à tous les administrateurs. Ceux-ci seront mieux choisis et formés, plus indépendants, mieux rémunérés et plus redevables de leur gestion aux diverses parties prenantes. Les administrateurs auront davantage de responsabilités et seront plus engagés dans les comités aux fonctions plus stratégiques. Leur responsabilité légale s’élargira en même temps que leurs tâches gagnent en importance. Il faudra donc des membres plus engagés, un conseil plus diversifié, dirigé par un leader plus fort. C’est la voie que les CA ont empruntée. La taille des CA est de plus en plus réduite ; les conseils exécutifs sont en voie de disparition pour faire plus de place aux trois comités statutaires : Gouvernance, Ressources Humaines et Audit. Les administrateurs sont de plus en plus engagés et ils doivent investir plus de temps dans leurs fonctions.
  12. L’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration deviendra la norme. La tendance est déjà bien ancrée aux États-Unis, où les entreprises engagent souvent des firmes externes pour mener cette évaluation. Certaines choisissent l’auto-évaluation. Dans tous les cas, le processus est ouvert et si les résultats restent confidentiels, ils contribuent à l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’administration. Effectivement, l’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration est devenue une pratique quasi universelle dans les entreprises cotées. Celles-ci doivent d’ailleurs divulguer le processus dans le rapport aux actionnaires. On assiste à un énorme changement depuis les dix dernières années.

 

À ces 12 tendances, il faudrait en ajouter deux autres qui se sont révélées cruciales pour les conseils d’administration depuis quelques années :

(1) la mise en œuvre d’une politique de gestion des risques, l’identification des risques, l’évaluation des facteurs de risque eu égard à leur probabilité d’occurrence et d’impact sur l’organisation, le suivi effectué par le comité d’audit et par l’auditeur interne.

(2) le renforcement des ressources du conseil par l’ajout de compétences liées à la cybersécurité. La sécurité des données est l’un des plus grands risques des entreprises.

 

Aspects fondamentaux à considérer par les administrateurs dans la gouvernance des organisations

 

 

Récemment, je suis intervenu auprès du conseil d’administration d’une OBNL et j’ai animé une discussion tournant autour des thèmes suivants en affirmant certains principes de gouvernance que je pense être incontournables.

Vous serez certainement intéressé par les propositions suivantes :

(1) Le conseil d’administration est souverain — il est l’ultime organe décisionnel.

(2) Le rôle des administrateurs est d’assurer la saine gestion de l’organisation en fonction d’objectifs établis. L’administrateur a un rôle de fiduciaire, non seulement envers les membres qui les ont élus, mais aussi envers les parties prenantes de toute l’organisation. Son rôle comporte des devoirs et des responsabilités envers celle-ci.

(3) Les administrateurs ont un devoir de surveillance et de diligence ; ils doivent cependant s’assurer de ne pas s’immiscer dans la gestion de l’organisation (« nose in, fingers out »).

(4) Les administrateurs élus par l’assemblée générale ne sont pas porteurs des intérêts propres à leur groupe ; ce sont les intérêts supérieurs de l’organisation qui priment.

(5) Le président du conseil est le chef d’orchestre du groupe d’administrateurs ; il doit être en étroite relation avec le premier dirigeant et bien comprendre les coulisses du pouvoir.

(6) Les membres du conseil doivent entretenir des relations de collaboration et de respect entre eux ; ils doivent viser les consensus et exprimer leur solidarité, notamment par la confidentialité des échanges.

(7) Les administrateurs doivent être bien préparés pour les réunions du conseil et ils doivent poser les bonnes questions afin de bien comprendre les enjeux et de décider en toute indépendance d’esprit. Pour ce faire, ils peuvent tirer profit de l’avis d’experts indépendants.

(8) La composition du conseil devrait refléter la diversité de l’organisation. On doit privilégier l’expertise, la connaissance de l’industrie et la complémentarité.

(9) Le conseil d’administration doit accorder toute son attention aux orientations stratégiques de l’organisation et passer le plus clair de son temps dans un rôle de conseil stratégique.

(10) Chaque réunion devrait se conclure par un huis clos, systématiquement inscrit à l’ordre du jour de toutes les rencontres.

(11) Le président du CA doit procéder à l’évaluation du fonctionnement et de la dynamique du conseil.

(12) Les administrateurs doivent prévoir des activités de formation en gouvernance et en éthique.

 

Voici enfin une documentation utile pour bien appréhender les grandes tendances qui se dégagent dans le monde de la gouvernance aux É.U., au Canada et en France.

 

  1. La gouvernance relative aux sociétés en 2017 | Un « Survey » des entreprises du SV 150 et de la S&P 100
  2. Principales tendances en gouvernance à l’échelle internationale en 2017
  3. Séparation des fonctions de PDG et de président du conseil d’administration | Signe de saine gouvernance !
  4. Six mesures pour améliorer la gouvernance des organismes publics au Québec | Yvan Allaire
  5. Cadre de référence pour évaluer la gouvernance des sociétés | Questionnaire de 100 items
  6. La gouvernance française suit-elle la tendance mondiale ?
  7. Enquête mondiale sur les conseils d’administration et la gouvernance

 

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 18 octobre 2018


Une autre semaine prolifique sur le site de HLS !Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Top 10 en gouvernance Harvard Law School »

Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 18 octobre 2018.

Cette semaine, j’ai choisi les dix billets suivants.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « top dix »

 

 

  1. SEC Sanctions Investment Firm for Inadequate Cybersecurity and Identity Theft Prevention Policies
  2. The CEO Pay Ratio: Data and Perspectives from the 2018 Proxy Season
  3. Shareholder Activism: 1H 2018 Developments and Practice Points
  4. How Common is a Female CEO-CFO Duo?
  5. Shedding Light on Diversity-Based Shareholder Proposals
  6. The California Board Diversity Requirement
  7. Disclosure of the CEO Pay Ratio: Potential Impact on Stakeholders
  8. Managing Reputation: Evidence from Biographies of Corporate Directors
  9. Mandated Gender Diversity for California Boards
  10. Making Sense of the Current ESG Landscape

L’état de la situation en matière d’activisme des actionnaires


Il est important pour les administrateurs de sociétés d’être bien informés de l’état de la situation eu égard au phénomène de l’activisme.

Qu’y a-t-il de nouveau à l’aube de 2019 ?

Martin Lipton* associé fondateur de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, spécialisée dans les questions de fusions et acquisitions ainsi que dans les activités relatives à la gouvernance des entreprises cotées, nous offre une mise à jour des principales tendances dans le monde de l’activisme et des investissements à long terme.

L’article, publié par HLS Forum on Corporate Governance, peut être traduit en français instantanément en utilisant l’outil de traduction du navigateur Chrome. Même si le résultat est imparfait, cela permet de mieux comprendre certaines parties de l’article.

Voici donc les principaux facteurs à prendre en compte en 2019.

Bonne lecture !

 

Activism: The State of Play

 

 

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Conférencier d’honneur lors de la célébration du 10e anniversaire de l’IGOPP

 

  1. The threat of activism remains high, and has become increasingly global.
  2. Activist assets under management remain at elevated levels, encouraging continued attacks on many large successful companies in the U.S. and abroad.
  3. In the current robust M&A environment, deal-related activism is prevalent, with activists instigating deal activity, challenging announced transactions (e.g., the “bumpitrage” strategy of pressing for a price increase) and/or pressuring the target into a merger or a private equity deal with the activist itself.
  4. “Short” activists, who seek to profit from a decline in the target’s market value, are increasingly aggressive in both the equity and corporate debt markets.
  5. Activists continue to garner extensive coverage in both the business and broader press, including a lengthy profile of Paul Singer and Elliott Management in an August New Yorker article, “Paul Singer, Doomsday Investor”. “Singer has excelled in this field in part because of a canny ability to discern his opponents’ weaknesses and a seeming imperviousness to public disapproval.”
  6. Momentum for enhanced ESG disclosures is growing. The Coalition for Inclusive Capitalism continues to study ways to measure long-term sustainable value creation that will demonstrate the value companies create beyond financial results. Embankment Project for Inclusive Capitalism. And earlier this month, two prominent business law professors, supported by investors and other entities with over $5 trillion in assets under management, filed a petition for rulemaking calling for the SEC to “develop a comprehensive framework requiring issuers to disclose identified environmental, social, and governance (ESG) aspects of each public-reporting company’s operations.”
  7. In turn, activists have sought to enhance their profile among governance professionals, passive institutional investors and ESG-oriented investors, e.g., JANA Partners’ “impact investing” fund which has partnered with CalSTRS to request that Apple address overuse of its devices among youth, and Elliott Management’s “Head of Investment Stewardship” position, highlighted in an October 8, 2018 Wall Street Journal article.
  8. An important new study by Ed deHaan, David Larcker and Charles McClure, Long-Term Economic Consequences of Hedge Fund Activist Interventions, has found that on a value weighted basis, long-term returns are “insignificantly different from zero.”
  9. Gender diversity has become an increasingly prominent focus in the corporate governance conversation, with California recently becoming the first state to enact legislation instituting gender quotas for boards of directors of public companies headquartered in the state. In the current climate, it is prudent for public companies to work toward developing policies to promote equality in the workplace and ensure appropriate disclosure and shareholder engagement in that regard.

As we recently noted, with the (1) embrace of corporate purpose, ESG, and long-term investment strategy by BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard, (2) adoption and promotion by the World Economic Forum of The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, (3) enactment of a benefit corporation law by Delaware and some 30 states, (4) introduction of legislation by Senator Warren to achieve stakeholder corporate governance by way of mandatory federal incorporation, and (5) the activities of Focusing Capital on the Long Term, Coalition for Inclusive Capitalism and Investors Stewardship Group, it is clear that we are reaching a new inflection point in corporate governance.

However, it is unlikely that today’s elevated level of activism will be curbed by legislation, regulation or market forces in the near term. Companies will have to follow closely activist developments and the opinions of their major investors. Companies should perfect and maintain their engagement activities. Companies should regularly review and adjust their plans designed to avoid an activist attack and to successfully deal with an activist attack if one should occur.

________________________________________________________

Martin Lipton* is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum authored by Mr. Lipton and Zachary S. Podolsky . Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here); and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 11 octobre 2018


Résultats de recherche d'images pour « 10 top »

 

Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 11 octobre 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Top 10 en gouvernance Harvard Law School »

 

 

Top 15 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 4 octobre 2018


Semaine prolifique sur le site de HLS !Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Top 10 en gouvernance Harvard Law School »

Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 4 octobre 2018.

Cette semaine, j’ai relevé les quinze principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Top 15 »

  1. How Blockchain will Disrupt Corporate Organizations
  2. Corporate Governance Update: Shareholder Activism Is the Next Phase of #MeToo
  3. On Elon Musk, Donald Trump, and Corporate Governance
  4. Testimony on “Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management”
  5. Cyber Lessons from the SEC?
  6. Public Short Selling by Activist Hedge Funds
  7. A Tale of Two Earnouts
  8. The Rise of the Working Class Shareholder
  9. 2018 Q2 Gender Diversity Index
  10. 2019 Proxy and Annual Reporting Season: Let the Preparations Begin
  11. Are Active Mutual Funds More Active Owners than Index Funds?
  12. UN Sustainable Development Goals—The Leading ESG Framework for Large Companies
  13. Micro(structure) before Macro?
  14. 2018 Relative TSR Prevalence and Design of S&P 500 Companies
  15. No Long-Term Value From Activist Attacks

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 27 septembre 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 27 septembre 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

 

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Les enjeux de la diffusion des informations stratégiques sur les réseaux sociaux


Ce matin un article de Alissa Amico*, paru sur le forum de Harvard Law School, a attiré mon attention parce que c’est sur un sujet qui fait couler beaucoup d’encre dans le domaine la gouvernance des entreprises publiques (cotées en bourse).

En effet, quels sont les moyens appropriés de diffusion et de divulgation des informations à l’ère des médias sociaux ? L’auteure fait le tour de la question en rappelant qu’il existe encore beaucoup d’ambiguïté dans l’acceptation des nouveaux outils de communication.

On le sait, la SEC a réagi promptement aux annonces de Elon Musk, PDG et Chairman de Telsa, faites par le biais de Twitter qui ont été jugées trompeuses et qui ne respectaient pas le principe d’une diffusion de l’information à la portée de tous les actionnaires.

L’auteure rappelle que l’Autorité des Marchés Financiers français a pris une position ferme à ce propos en exigeant que les entreprises divulguent leurs réseaux sociaux privilégiés de communication sur leur site Internet.

La conclusion de l’article est révélatrice de grands changements à l’égard de la diffusion d’information stratégique.

The ultimate twist of irony is of course that the SEC, investigating Tesla and its CEO, is part of the same government whose President’s tweeting activity has been far from uncontroversial. Both Mr. Musk’s and Mr. Trump’s use of Twitter highlight that—whether we like it or not—social media may soon be the most consulted sort of media. Its impact, in both corporate or political circles, needs hence to be considered by policymakers seriously. It is clear that every boat—whether corporate or political—needs a captain responsible for setting the course and communicating it to the lighthouse to avoid collisions and confusion at sea. Yet, captains are not pirates, and in the era of social media, regulators need to devise new rules of the game to avoid investor collusion and collision.

Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Bonne lecture !

 

On Elon Musk, Donald Trump, and Corporate Governance

 

 

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SEC sues Tesla CEO Elon Musk for ‘misleading’ tweet »- ABC News

 

There was something Trumpian in Elon Musk’s tweet about taking Tesla private. “Am considering taking Tesla private at $420. Funding secured”, he boldly and succinctly announced on August 7, claiming that the necessary capital has been confirmed from the Public Investment Fund (PIF), the Saudi sovereign fund that is seeking to become the region’s largest according to the ambitions of its government, including through the much-debated public offering of Saudi Aramco.

Like in a Mexican soap opera, news about the PIF raising fresh capital through the transfer of its 70% stake in SABIC, the Saudi $100 billion petrochemicals giant and the largest listed company in the Kingdom to Saudi Aramco, as well its talks with Tesla’s rival Lucid followed shortly, immediately highlighting the perils of instant communication. As it turns out, tweeting 280-character messages is straightforward, explaining them takes a little more character and significantly more characters.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has reacted promptly, issuing a subpoena to Tesla to probe into the accuracy of its communication to investors. Elon Musk is unfortunately not the first CEO to pay for taking to Twitter. Nestle’s attempt at humor on Twitter, which likened a massacre of Mexican students to its candy bar, resulted in calls for boycott, ultimately forcing the company to erase the message and apologize. Even the CEO of Twitter itself, Jack Dorsey, has had to apologize for one of his personal tweets, which unlike Tesla and Nestle cases, had nothing to do with his company.

Indeed, the emergence of new communication channels has occurred at a faster pace than regulation on how these should be employed by companies has emerged, whilst over-excited executives have taken to social media in attempt to build hype around their companies. In the world where the number of Instagram, Twitter and Facebook followers counts more than the number of public investors, social media has the potential of becoming the main channel for communication in the corporate world.

Although this phenomenon has gone largely unnoticed, its implications need to be considered in a wider context that is beyond this immediate Bermuda Triangle involving Mr. Musk, the PIF and Tesla. In fact, this episode raises two important and distinct questions: first, who should be able to speak on behalf of public shareholding companies in order to ensure the accuracy of communication, and second, how should this communication be made such that it reaches its ultimate target, the investor community.

In developed markets such as the United States, where Tesla is incorporated, disclosure by public companies is subject to a myriad of regulations including Rule 10b-5—first issued 70 years ago—which prohibits the release or omission of material information, resulting in fraud or deceit. It is also subject to a more recent Fair Disclosure Regulation which essentially forbids companies from releasing non-public material information to third parties, effectively stamping out the practice of selective disclosure by companies to specific investors.

These regulations provide the colorful context behind the SEC’s investigation into Mr. Musk’s unfortunate tweet, allowing the regulator to question whether he had misled investors: that is, whether funding for taking Tesla private has indeed been “secured”. Another issue—and one not raised in the media—is whether Twitter can effectively be considered as an appropriate means of communication to the investor community. In the United States, where 70% of public share ownership today is in the hands of institutional investors, this is a moot point.

Indeed, the SEC has officially allowed listed companies to use social media in 2013, prompted by an investigation into a Facebook post by the Netflix CEO Reed Hastings about the company passing a billion hours watched for the first time. The SEC did not penalize him and decided that henceforth social media could be used for communicating corporate announcements as long as investors are warned that this would be the case.

In the context of emerging markets however, this position would be potentially quite dangerous. In Saudi Arabia for example, home to the PIF—Tesla’s alleged buyer—trading in the stock market is 90% retail, whereas its underlying ownership is largely institutional. Communicating company news via social media presupposes that all investors have equal access to it, which may not necessarily be the case in retail marketplaces. Regulators in emerging markets, where guidelines on the use of social media for corporate announcements are generally lacking, would do well to address this before executives take to Twitter and Facebook.

They would need to keep in mind however, that habits of emerging market investors may not have shifted fast enough to be comfortable in the world of Twitter. In Egypt for example, the officially recognised channel for publishing financial results remains the country’s newspapers. Expecting investors to run from conventional—not to say outdated—means of communication, to judiciously tracking social media announcements appears overly ambitious.

Using social media as a means of communicating material corporate news raises another non-semantic point which is equally important to address in both emerging and developed markets. It is not only tweets of CEOs like Elon Musk that have the potential to affect share prices and investor perceptions. If CFOs, CROs, CIOs, COOs and other C-suite members take to Twitter, Facebook, Instagram or other platforms to offer their interpretation of company developments, the potential impact on investors could be quite disheartening.

Just like the CEO’s or the CFO’s ability to write a cheque is circumscribed by internal controls and board oversight of material transactions related to mergers and acquisitions for instance, their ability to speak on behalf of their companies should be addressed by policies including specific approval processes. This would effectively limit the possibility of senior executives or board members using their iPhone as a Megaphone, instead requiring rigorous processes to be introduced such that social media announcements are coherent with other disclosure channels and indeed with corporate strategy.

From a governance perspective, further thought should be given to centralizing the communication function within companies in the hands of the Head of Investor Relations or equivalent. Indeed, given the value of information in our era of fast-paced communication powered by social media and fast-paced stock exchanges powered by algorithmic and high-frequency trading, the role of a Chief Communication Officer may be justified in large publicly listed companies, just as the role of a Chief Risk Officer reporting to the board has been introduced in many large organisations following the financial crisis.

While forcing companies in a straightjacket of yet more corporate governance rules on how they should handle their corporate communications may be unwise, some thought about legal distinctions and limits between what is considered personal and corporate announcements appears warranted. Investors may need to be told that unless corporate announcements come from official company channels—which personal Twitter accounts are not—their interpretation of tweets by excited executives are to be made at their own peril, not subject to usual investor protections.

Likewise, publicly-traded companies need to inform the investor community of what constitutes their official communication channels and ensure that financial and non-financial information announced through these is pre-approved, synchronized and not in conflict with existing regulations. Some regulators such as the French securities regulator, Authorité des Marches Financiers, has done so almost 5 years ago, recommending that companies specify their social media accounts on their website as well as establish a charter addressing how executives and staff are to use their personal social media accounts.

The ultimate twist of irony is of course that the SEC, investigating Tesla and its CEO, is part of the same government whose President’s tweeting activity has been far from uncontroversial. Both Mr. Musk’s and Mr. Trump’s use of Twitter highlight that—whether we like it or not—social media may soon be the most consulted sort of media. Its impact, in both corporate or political circles, needs hence to be considered by policymakers seriously. It is clear that every boat—whether corporate or political—needs a captain responsible for setting the course and communicating it to the lighthouse to avoid collisions and confusion at sea. Yet, captains are not pirates, and in the era of social media, regulators need to devise new rules of the game to avoid investor collusion and collision.

 


*Alissa Amico is the Managing Director of GOVERN. This post is based on a GOVERN memorandum by Ms. Amico.

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 20 septembre 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 20 septembre 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

 

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  1. Would a Shift to Semiannual Reporting Really Affect Short-Termism?
  2. Statement on Shareholder Voting
  3. Corporate Law Should Embrace Putting Workers On Boards: The Evidence Is Behind Them
  4. Corporate Governance Oversight and Proxy Advisory Firms
  5. Study of the German Corporate Governance Code Compliance
  6. The Universal Proxy Gains Traction: Lessons from the 2018 Proxy Season
  7. Growth in CEO Pay Since 1990
  8. Glass Lewis Response To SEC Statement Regarding Staff Proxy Advisory Letters
  9. The Law and Economics of Environmental, Social, and Governance Investing by a Fiduciary
  10. Unfair Exchange: The State of America’s Stock Markets

Le comportement d’Elon Musk est-il un signe de faible gouvernance chez Tesla ?


Depuis quelques années, on ne cesse de relater les faits d’armes de Elon Musk lequel gère ses entreprises de manières plutôt controversées, ou à tout le moins contraires aux principes de saine gouvernance.Dans cet article de Kevin Reed, publié sur le site de Board Agenda le 17 septembre 2018, on porte un jugement assez sévère sur le comportement autoritaire de Musk qui continue de bafouer les règles les plus élémentaires de gouvernance.

Les investisseurs qui croient dans le génie de cet entrepreneur sont en droit de s’attendre à ce que le fondateur mette en place des systèmes de gouvernance qui respectent les parties prenantes, dont les investisseurs.

Ces comportements de dominance sont tributaires du conseil d’administration où le fondateur joue le rôle de « Chairman, Product architect and CEO », comme s’il était le propriétaire de tout le capital de l’entreprise.

On peut comprendre la confiance que les investisseurs mettent en Musk, mais jusqu’à quel point doivent-ils ignorer certaines règles fondamentales de gouvernance d’entreprise ?

On connaît plusieurs entreprises qui sont dominées complètement par leur fondateur-entrepreneur. Ces comportements « dysfonctionnels » ne sont pas toujours signe de mauvaise performance à court terme. Mais, à long terme, sans de solides principes de gouvernance, ces entreprises rencontrent généralement des problèmes de croissance.

Selon l’auteur Kevin Reed,

Elon Musk, Tesla’s “chairman, product architect and CEO”, has recently the displayed classic traits of a dominant, idiosyncratic and controversial boss which, according to one commentator, is a sure sign of weak governance.

Voici un aperçu de l’argumentaire présenté dans l’article.

Bonne lecture !

 

Tale of Tesla’s Elon Musk is a ‘sadly familiar story’ of weak governance

 

 

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There has been a long history of dominant, sometimes idiosyncratic and often irascible CEOs.

They will court controversy—which can be directly related to the business’s strategy and operations, or linked to “non-corporate” behaviour or actions.

Names such as Mike Ashley, Lord Sugar and even “shareholder-return-friendly” Sir Martin Sorrell have shown how outspoken and autocratic leaders will find their approach strongly questioned or criticised.

Names such as Mike Ashley, Lord Sugar and even “shareholder-return-friendly” Sir Martin Sorrell have shown how outspoken and autocratic leaders will find their approach strongly questioned or criticised—usually during tough times, despite previous spells of success.

However, recent proclamations on social and traditional media by Tesla’s Elon Musk could well be viewed as beyond the pale.

Whether offering a mini-submarine to rescue children stuck in a Thai cave, to making lewd accusations about another rescuer, through to proclaiming on Twitter that he is considering taking Tesla private, it puts into question whether such behaviour damages shareholder value.

“The tale of Elon Musk is a sadly familiar story of a founder who through vision, drive, ambition and talent grows a company to fantastic levels, but who then seems unable to accept challenge and healthy criticism and feels unable to operate in an appropriate governance environment,” explains Iain Wright, director of corporate and regional engagement at the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW).

Crashing companies onto rocks

Wright believes that we have seen “time and time again” dominant founders and chiefs “crash those companies onto the rocks” through “weak corporate governance”.

An important part of reining in such dominance is through the board and, namely, the chairman. They need to be able to support someone  with the vision and entrepreneurial spirit of someone like Musk, but also challenge them on behalf of the company and its stakeholders to “curb some of his erratic behaviour”.

“The board is subservient to the founder and chief executive rather than the other way round.”

He adds: “Good corporate governance would put in place a board who would challenge this, led by a chair who has the authority, experience and gravitas to stand up to Musk and tell him to have a holiday and get some sleep.”

And so, what of Tesla’s chairman? Well, that’s Elon Musk, whose full title is “chairman, product architect and CEO”. Attempts to separate the roles and appoint a chairman have been rebuffed by the board in the past, stating that it has a lead independent director in place.

This director is Antonio Gracias, a private equity investor who has reportedly shared many years associated with Musk.

“The board is subservient to the founder and chief executive rather than the other way round,” suggests Wright. “Musk is both chairman and CEO of Tesla, a situation relatively common in the States but quite properly frowned upon as inappropriate corporate governance in the UK.”

Separating the role is for the “long-term benefit of the company”, adds Wright. “This proposal should come back on the table soon.”

Robert Dutton donne son point de vue sur la vente de RONA !


Problèmes de gouvernance ?

Je suis certain que plusieurs seront intéressés à connaître la version de Robert Dutton, ex-PDG de RONA, parue dans un livre racontant les dessous de l’affaire. Je vous souhaite une bonne lecture de l’article publié par Michel Girard dans le Journal de Montréal aujourd’hui.
Mettez-vous à la place de Robert Dutton. Se faire mettre à la porte de «son» entreprise après 35 années de loyaux services, dont 20 à titre de président et chef de la direction, c’est à la fois blessant et révoltant.
La blessure est d’autant plus grande lorsque vous découvrez que votre départ avait en fait pour finalité de permettre aux gros actionnaires, dont la Caisse de dépôt et placement, de faire la piastre en vendant l’entreprise à une multinationale américaine.
Farouche défenseur d’un Québec inc. qui protège ses sièges sociaux, l’ancien grand patron de RONA, Robert Dutton, ne voulait rien savoir des offres d’acquisition de Lowe’s.

Inconcevable

Pour lui, il était inconcevable de voir RONA devenir une filiale d’une multinationale étrangère.
Pour les gros fonds institutionnels qui détiennent des blocs d’actions de votre entreprise, il était évident qu’un PDG comme Dutton représentait un obstacle majeur.
C’est le genre de gars capable de déplacer des montagnes pour protéger l’entreprise contre les prédateurs étrangers.

Les dessous de la vente de RONA : l’ex-PDG ne voulait rien savoir des offres de Lowe’s

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 6 septembre 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 6 septembre 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

 

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Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 30 août 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 30 août 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

 

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  1. High-Quality Sales Processes and Appraisal Proceedings
  2. Awakening Governance: ACGA China Corporate Governance Report 2018
  3. The CFIUS Reform Bill
  4. Does Transparency Increase Takeover Vulnerability?
  5. Performance Awards and Say on Pay
  6. Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon
  7. Securing Financial Stability: Systematic Regulation of Systemic Risk
  8. Gender Quotas in California Boardrooms
  9. The Race to the Bottom in Global Securities Regulation
  10. Supreme Court Nominee and the Derivative Suit

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 23 août 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 23 août 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

 

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  1. Corporate Governance; Stakeholder Primacy; Federal Incorporation
  2. Microcap Board Governance
  3. Taking Stock: Share Buybacks and Shareholder Value
  4. Shareholder Vote on Golden Parachutes: Determinants and Consequences
  5. Corporate Governance—The New Paradigm: A Better Way Than Federalization
  6. Board Diversity Developments
  7. Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets
  8. Dual-Class Index Exclusion
  9. Board Diversity, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies
  10. Shareholder Activism: Evolving Tactics

L’objectif visé par les fonds d’investissement activistes afin de profiter au maximum de leurs interventions : la vente de l’entreprise au plus offrant !


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un article de Roger L. Martinex-doyen de la Rotman School of Management de l’Université de Toronto, paru dans Harvard Business Review le 20 août 2018, qui remet en question la valeur des interventions des fonds activistes au cours des dernières années.

L’auteur pourfend les prétendus bénéfices des campagnes orchestrées par les fonds activistes en s’appuyant notamment sur une étude d’Allaire qui procure des données statistiques probantes sur les rendements des fonds activistes.

Ainsi, l’étude publiée par Allaire montre que les fonds d’investissement activistes réalisent des rendements moyens de 12,4 %, comparés à 13,5 % pour le S&P 500. Le rendement était de 13,9 % pour des firmes de tailles similaires dans les mêmes secteurs industriels.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance d’une présentation PPT du professeur Allaire qui présente des résultats empiriques très convaincants : Hedge Fund Activism : Some empirical evidence.

Le résultat qui importe, et qui est très payant, pour les investisseurs activistes est la réalisation de la vente de l’entreprise ciblée afin de toucher la prime de contrôle qui est de l’ordre de 30 %.

The reason investors keep giving their money to these hedge funds is simple. There is gold for activist hedge funds if they can accomplish one thing. If they can get their target sold, the compound annual TSR jumps from a lackluster 12,4 % to a stupendous 94,3 %.  That is why they so frequently agitate for the sale of their victim.

Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Activist Hedge Funds Aren’t Good for Companies or Investors, So Why Do They Exist?

 

 

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Activist hedge funds have become capital market and financial media darlings. The Economist famously called them“capitalism’s unlikely heroes” in a cover story, and the FT published an article saying we “should welcome” them.

But they are utterly reviled by CEOs. And at best, their performance is ambiguous.

The most comprehensive study of activist hedge fund performance that I have read is by Yvan Allaire at the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations in Montreal, which studies hedge fund campaigns against U.S. companies for an eight-year period (2005–2013).

Total shareholder return is what the activist hedge funds claim to enhance. But for the universe of U.S. activist hedge fund investments Allaire studied, the mean compound annual TSR for the activists was 12.4% while for the S&P500 it was 13.5% and for a random sample of firms of similar size in like industries, it was 13.9%. That is to say, if you decided to invest money in a random sample of activist hedge funds, you would have earned 12.4% before paying the hedge fund 2% per year plus 20% of that 12.4% upside. If instead you would have invested in a Vanguard S&P500 index fund, you would have kept all but a tiny fraction of 13.5%.

Since the returns that they produce underwhelm, why do activist hedge funds exist? Why do investors keep giving them money? It is an important question because the Allaire data shows the truly sad and unfortunate outcomes for the companies after the hedge funds ride off into the sunset, after a median holding period of only 423 unpleasant days. Over this span, employee headcount gets reduced by an average of 12%, while R&D gets cut by more than half, and returns don’t change.

The reason investors keep giving their money to these hedge funds is simple. There is gold for activist hedge funds if they can accomplish one thing. If they can get their target sold, the compound annual TSR jumps from a lackluster 12.4% to a stupendous 94.3%.  That is why they so frequently agitate for the sale of their victim.

But why is this such a lucrative avenue? It is because of the control premium. When a S&P500-sized company gets sold, the average premium over the prevailing stock price that is paid for the right to take over that company is in excess of 30%. This is ironic, of course, because studies show the majority of acquisitions don’t earn the cost of capital for the buyer. It is a case of the triumph of hope over reality – which is not unusual. It is not dissimilar to what happens in the National Football League where the trade price for a future draft pick is typically higher than the trade price for an accomplished successful player. That is because the acquiring team dreams that the player it will pick in the draft will be more awesome than that player is likely to turn out to be. But hope springs eternal!

The activist hedge funds have their eyes focused laser-like on the control premium — which for the S&P 500, which has a market capitalization of $23 trillion, is conservatively a $7 trillion pie assuming a 30% control premium. To get a piece of that scrumptious pie, all they need to do is pressure their victim to put itself up for sale and they will have “created shareholder value.” Of course, on average, they will have destroyed shareholder value for the acquiring firm, but they couldn’t care less. They are long gone by that time; off to the next victim.

And they have lots of friends to help them access the control premium pie. Investment bankers want to help them do the deal whether it is a good deal or not and that $7 trillion pie for hedge funds translates into a multibillion dollar annual slice for investment bankers. And for the M&A lawyers that need to opine on the deal. And the accounting firms that need to audit the deal. And for the proxy voting firms that collect the votes for and against the deal. And the consultants who get hired to do post-merger integration. And the financial press that gets to write stories about an exciting deal.

It is an entire ecosystem that sees the $7 trillion pie and wants a piece of it. It doesn’t matter a whit whether a hedge-fund inspired change of control is a good thing for customers, employees or the combined shareholders involved (selling plus acquiring). It is too lucrative a pie to pass up.

What will stop this lunacy? When shareholders come to their senses and realize that when an activist hedge fund has pressured a company intensively enough to put it up for sale, they are simply feeding the hedge fund beast and the vast majority of the time it will be at their own expense. When activist hedge funds’ access to the $7 trillion pie is shut off, they will have to rely on their ability to actually make their victims perform better. And their track record on that front is mediocre at best.

______________________________________________________________

Roger L. Martin is the director of the Martin Prosperity Institute and a former . He is a coauthor of Creating Great Choices: A Leader’s Guide to Integrative Thinking.