Étiquette : Board

Connaître ecoDa (European Confederation of Directors’ Associations)


EcoDa (European Confederation of Directors’ Associations), est une organisation dont l’objectif est de repésenter les positions des administrateurs de sociétés européennes en matière de gouvernance à l’échelle européenne. Il est donc important de connaître la mission, les objectifs et les activités de cette organisation afin d’être au fait de l’évolution des règles de gouvernance au parlement européen.
 
Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) est membre de ecoDa dans la catégorie RESEARCH ASSOCIATES. Je vous encourage donc à visiter ce site.
 
 
European Confederation of Directors’ Associations
 

ecoDa, the European Confederation of Directors’ Associations, is a not-for-profit association acting as the “European voice of directors ”, active since March 2005 and based in Brussels .

Through its national institutes of directors (the main national institutes existing in Europe ), ecoDa represents around fifty-five thousand board directors from across the EU. ecoDa’s member organisations represent board directors from the largest public companies to the smallest private firms, both listed and unlisted.

ecoDa’s mission is to promote Corporate Governance at large, to promote the role of directors towards shareholders and corporate stakeholders, and to promote the success of its national institutes.

Que penser de la gouvernance des entreprises de la Silicon Valley ?


Voici un excellent article, paru dans Dealbook.nytimes.com, et partagé par Louise Champoux-Paillé, dans le groupe de discussion Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance sur LinkedIn. « Les entreprises de la Vallée favorisent une nouvelle gouvernance où les administrateurs et les actionnaires jouent un rôle effacé comparativement au président et chef de la direction. Une structure sans grand contrepoids ».

Cet article présente plusieurs exemples de cette «nouvelle gouvernance» et se questionne sur les tendances de ce mouvement : une exception (a blip) ou l’annonce de changements qui vont s’étendre à l’ensemble des modes de gouvernance des entreprises ?

In Silicon Valley, Chieftains Rule With Few Checks and Balances

English: Silicon Valley, seen from a jetliner ...
English: Silicon Valley, seen from a jetliner in the direction of San Jose (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

So the new thing in Silicon Valley appears to be for public companies to be run as private ones without significant input from boards and shareholders. This leaves the wunderkinder of the Internet free to run their companies without interference. The question is whether this is merely a bubble in corporate governance or a trend that will spread to the rest of corporate America.

Exigence de divulgation du nombre de femmes sur les C.A. en Nouvelle-Zélande


La Nouvelle-Zélande fait un pas crucial afin d’inciter les entreprises cotées à accroître le nombre de femmes sur les C.A. et dans des postes de direction. La nouvelle directive est alignée sur celle de l’Australie qui exige également une autoévaluation de la politique formelle de diversité. Encore une fois, on assiste à une certaine globalisation des codes de gouvernance et des directives en découlant. 

 

New Zealand Exchange
New Zealand Exchange (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« Listed companies will be required to disclose how many women they have on their boards and in senior management, the NZX announced last night. In addition to publishing a gender breakdown of directors and senior management, firms with a formal diversity policy will be required to evaluate their performance with respect to that policy, NZX said…

… The NZX’s new rule brings New Zealand into closer alignment with Australia, where similar requirements introduced by the Australian Stock Exchange resulted in a big jump in the level of female representation on listed company boards. As of last August, 12.7 per cent of Australia’s top 200 listed firms had women directors, compared with just 9.3 per cent for the top 100 listed companies in this country ».

Révision du code de gouvernance de Singapour


Le nouveau code de gouvernance de Singapour contient des changements significatifs en ce sens qu’il insiste sur les standards éthiques à respecter et la notion de parties prenantes.  De plus, il précise que les entreprises doivent considérer les facteurs liés au développement durable dans la formulation de la stratégie. Cet article, paru dans csr-asia.com, est intéressant à lire parce qu’il illustre clairement la tendance à concevoir des codes de gouvernance semblables à l’échelle mondiale.

 

CSR Asia – Corporate Social Responsibility in Asia

English: Integrated boardroom designed and ins...
English: Integrated boardroom designed and installed by EDG in 2003. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
« These changes are and address areas of corporate governance best practice – director independence, board composition, director training, multiple directorships, alternate directors, remuneration practices and disclosures, risk management, as well as shareholder rights and roles plus fundamental changes to the very first principle, which sets out that ‘every company should be headed by an effective board’….

 
However, the Revised Code also included a fundamental change to the very first principle, which sets out that ‘every company should be headed by an effective board’.   Previously the 2005 Code of Corporate Governance had set out that the role of the board was to do all those things stated below in black text. The Revised Code added the text in red, broadening its requirements to cover sustainability and ethical standards and embedding them in company strategy. Arguably, a huge shift.
  1. provide entrepreneurial leadership, set strategic objectives, and ensure that the necessary financial and human resources are in place for the company to meet its objectives;
  2. establish a framework of prudent and effective controls which enables risks to be assessed and managed, including safeguarding of shareholders’ interests and the company’s assets;
  3. review management performance;
  4. identify the key stakeholder groups and recognise that their perceptions affect the company’s reputation;
  5. set the company’s values and standard (including ethical standards), and ensure that obligations to shareholders and other(s) stakeholders are understood and met; and
  6. consider sustainability issues, e.g. environmental and social factors, as part of its strategic formulation ».

Élaboration d’un continuum de comportements (soft-hard) en gouvernance


L’auteur, Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers, (Professeur de Corporate Governance à Nyenrode Business University et Directeur de l’Institute Nyenrode Corporate Governance des Pays-Bas) présente un continuum très utile en gouvernance : à une extrémité, l’approche comportementale (soft); à l’autre extrémité, la législation stricte (hard).

Pour éviter d’accroître induement la législation, l’auteur propose une réflexion sur les éléments culturels relatifs au C.A. et l’utilisation de mécanismes d’évaluation du C.A.

Learning Mores and Board Evaluationsblogs.law.harvard.edu

English: Corporate Governance
English: Corporate Governance (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« In the paper, Learning Mores and Board Evaluations – Soft Controls in Corporate Governance, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, I argue that the prevailing boardroom mores, the unwritten rules, are at one end of having an impact on board effectiveness. Legislation, the more tangibly written rules, is at the other end. In between are voluntary codes of conduct, or legally embedded corporate governance codes….

… How, non-executive directors can avoid further legislation. In other words, how can they take a closer look at their own mores and unwritten rules? The answer lies in the board evaluation. A formal and rigorous evaluation will bring to light whether

1) the highly desired open culture is present,

2) the individual non-executive directors are sufficiently dedicated,

3) the supervisory board and its members do indeed operate sufficiently, independently, and have a critical attitude towards each other and executive directors, and

4) the board is sufficiently diverse to prevent group thinking and tunnel vision. The evaluation needs to discuss these themes seriously and formally. In the end, when it comes to board effectiveness, mores may have more authority than legislation ».

Avantages à la dissociation des rôles de Président du Conseil (PCA) et de Président et chef de la direction (PCD)


Voici un excellent article paru dans 24/7 WALL St qui montre clairement le besoin de séparer les fonctions de PCA et de PCD. Les études montrent que la rémunération globale des deux postes séparés est significativement moindre que la rémunération d’un PCA/PCD.

Breaking Up Chairman and CEO Roles

New York Stock Exchange
New York Stock Exchange (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« CEOs do not like it. More and more often, it seems, the roles of  chairman and CEO become separate from one another. And the arrangement  usually is forced on the chief executive. A major problem at a big corporation  is often the catalyst of these actions. That certainly happened at many of the  nation’s banks after the financial crisis. Troubled Chesapeake Energy (NYSE:  CHK) ripped the chairman’s role from CEO Aubrey Mc Clendon when  it became clear that he took advantage of his position to financially enrich  himself… It turns out that there may be reasons other than good corporate governance  practices to separate the two jobs. A new  study by GMI Ratings, a corporate governance research firm, claims that  the decision to separate the roles also saves a public company, and thus, its  shareholders, money. In a new piece of research GMI found :

The cost of employing a combined CEO/chair is 151 percent of what it  costs to employ a separate CEO and chairman.

Specifically, the data show :

– Executives with a combined CEO and chair role earn a median total summary  compensation of just over $16 million.

– CEOs who do not serve as chair earn $9.8 million in median total summary  compensation.

– A separate CEO and chairman earn a combined $11 million ».

The Director’s Dilemma – Juillet 2012


Voici un cas présenté par Julie Garland McLelland www.mclellan.com.au. À chaque mois Julie présente un cas qui est analysé par trois experts. Vous pouvez vous abonner à la série Director’s Dilemma.

Welcome to the July 2012 edition of The Director’s Dilemma.

This newsletter provides case studies that have been written to help you to develop your judgement as a company director. The case studies are based upon real life; they focus on complex and challenging boardroom issues which can be resolved in a variety of ways. There is often no one ‘correct’ answer; just an answer that is more likely to work given the circumstances and personalities of the case.

These are real life cases; the names and some circumstances have been altered to ensure anonymity. Each potential solution to the case study has different pros and cons for the individuals and companies concerned. Every month this newsletter presents an issue and several responses.

Consider: Which response would you choose and why?

Miriam is the Regional Managing Director for a large multi-national company. She oversees a group of companies that manufacture and sell products across the region and also export from it. One of the subsidiaries in her group is in a country that has a small market for the products and is fundamentally unprofitable. She has recommended on several occasions that the board allow her to close this subsidiary and supply that market by importing product from other group companies. She has backed her recommendations with detailed market analyses and projections as well as implementation plans.

Each time the board has denied her request and she is forced to continue to see the subsidiary drain her region’s profits and the shareholders’ returns. Last time the board met in her region she made the usual request and was denied again. She lost her temper and said some fairly harsh words in an unprofessional tone.

Miriam is a professional manager and has produced good results so her transgression was forgiven. However the board is, once again, meeting in her region and she has another invitation to present her recommended strategy to them.

What should Miriam do?

Eli’s Answer

Before addressing the board again, Miriam needs to find out why its members have so far refused to close the subsidiary. There may be a surface agenda as well as a hidden agenda, and she needs to uncover both. Once she finds out what the real concerns are, she needs to factor them into any proposed solution, which may be something other than her first choice.

When proposing the eventual solution, Miriam should first acknowledge respectfully the concerns about the proposed closing, and then explain the challenge she has in balancing these concerns with the need to be fiscally viable. The fact that she acknowledges the board’s concerns with utmost respect will likely make it easier for the board to listen to her proposed solution. Again, the proposed solution would probably not be an outright shutdown, but one that would somehow optimize the positive outcomes and minimize the risks.

Of course, there is a possibility that Miriam will discover that the board’s resistance to a shutdown is not legitimate but is emotionally or personally-based (e.g., the board Chair is the one who orchestrated the start-up of this subsidiary and takes personal offence to any suggestion of a shut down). If this is the case, Miriam may consider whether she can tolerate working in this setting. If her professionalism is substantially compromised, she should consider resigning.

One other issue to consider is whether the board should even be involved in decisions to start-up or wind-down a subsidiary, or whether such decisions should be delegated to the CEO who would make them on strictly professional considerations. However, such a change would require a revision of board policy to delegate more authority to management and remain focused primarily on strategic priorities, fiduciary duties, and organizational policies.

Eli Mina is a consultant on board effectiveness, shared decision making, and meeting procedures. He is the author of « 101 Boardroom Problems and How to Solve Them » and is based in Vancouver, Canada.

Julie’s Answer

Miriam must set the correct strategic context for a board discussion. She should investigate and understand the reasons the subsidiary was established and the assumptions presented to the board when they approved establishment. She should ask:

  1. Were the assumptions wrong?
  2. Were the assumptions right but the world has now changed?
  3. Have the reasons for setting up in such a small market ceased to exist?
  4. Can the aims of the subsidiary be addressed by another strategy?

Loss of temper (or any emotional control) is not acceptable behaviour for a senior executive. Miriam is lucky to have a second chance. She must make the most of this by establishing a strong shared understanding of strategy for the subsidiary. She needs to present the facts and align herself with the board by building agreement about what the subsidiary was set up to accomplish before she asks the board to endorse a change of strategy.

She then needs to demonstrate that the board can rely on her leadership to implement the strategy she is recommending. This is not just a question of financial logic and brief implementation plans; she must address risks including legal issues around staff redundancies and closure of facilities. The board needs to satisfy itself that the strategy recommended will be satisfactorily implemented under her leadership.

Board time is precious and Miriam should write a good board paper so that all directors are able to engage in a productive discussion and confidently make a decision.

If the board is still unwilling to close the subsidiary she will just have to carry on running it. By engaging in a proper high level discussion Miriam should gain an insight into the reasons for retaining a loss-making subsidiary. She may even find that she agrees with the directors.

Miriam needs to relax. It is the board’s decision, not hers. She has done her duty by providing the information required to facilitating a proper debate and decision.

Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia.

Michelle’s Answer

Miriam is forgetting that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over again and expecting different results! If the board is saying ‘no’ – then it’s ‘no’! The good news for Miriam is that ‘no’ is just feedback that she didn’t properly understand her audience’s attitude. Miriam simply hasn’t reflected to the board that she understands their perspective before seeking approval. ‘No’ means try again, just do something different!

To date Miriam has presented her logic, data and analysis and only covered what she wanted to say, and it’s not working. Miriam should remember, ‘it’s not about me, it’s all about the audience’. I suggest Miriam think about the issues from the board member’s (not her own) perspective. She should ask herself, ‘what is this audience thinking, feeling and doing in relation to this issue?’ She could phone each board member prior to the board meeting and elicit their concerns. She could seek feedback from her direct reports as they are possibly more connected to the issues at the coal face. I expect Miriam would find that her previous approach was misdirected. Instead of focusing on profitability (her main concern) there’s probably a different matter getting in the way of their approval, such as a prior commitment to the staff in the unprofitable subsidiary or to the wider financial market regarding the closure of the subsidiary.

We are more likely to be influenced by our emotions first and then substantiate our views with logic and data. It’s important that Miriam dedicates some time in the opening of her upcoming board presentation to re-establish rapport with her board. Only then is she in a position to deliver the relevant facts and data based on her assessment of their perspective.

This matter is important, so I encourage her to allocate the time important matters deserve. Miriam must plan her approach and rehearse until she is confident. A professional presentation skills coach can help dramatically with the necessary preparation for this type of business presentation.

Michelle Bowden, CSP is a Master of Influence and presentations coach. She is the author of « Don’t Picture me Naked » – how to present your ideas and influence people using techniques that actually work. She is based in Sydney, Australia.

Disclaimer

The opinions expressed above are general in nature and are designed to help you to develop your judgement as a director. They are not a definitive legal ruling. Names and some circumstances in the case study have been changed to ensure anonymity. Contributors to this newsletter comment in the context of their own jurisdiction; readers should check their local laws and regulations as they may be very different.

This newsletter – If you have any ideas for improving the newsletter please let me know. If you are reading a forwarded copy please visit my website and sign up for your own subscription.

www.mclellan.com.au | PO Box 97 Killara NSW 2071 email julie@mclellan.com.au | phone +61 2 9499 8700 | mobile +61 411 262 470 | fax +61 2 9499 8711

Le C.A. et l’utilisation des médias sociaux


Excellent document de Santiago Chaher et James David Spellman paru dans Global Corporate Governance Forum Publication. La publication présente plusieurs facteurs qui devraient inciter les conseils d’administration à se préoccuper sérieusement des médias sociaux. À lire. 

Corporate Governance and Social Media

« What should board members know about social media as it relates to a company’s ability to do business and safeguard its image? And what is the board’s role in helping a company make the best use of social media—and defending against its misuse? Two corporate governance practitioners provide insights on the power of new social technologies to shape boards’ decisions and bolster stakeholders’ influence ».
 
Image representing Twitter as depicted in Crun...
Image via CrunchBase

« In short, today’s corporate directors have the ‘necessary’ skills in terms of compliance and financial performance, but not the ‘sufficient’ skills in terms of strategic or technological know how, » says Barry Libert, chief executive officer of OpenMatters, a consultancy for boards. « Why? Because for years, astute corporate directors believed the tools that companies like Facebook and Twitter offered weren’t essential. In their view, these new means of communications were for kids, had little, if any, business value, and created minimal strategic, operational or financial risks. Wow, were they wrong. »

This circumstance will change as business and personal needs require more extensive use of social media.For a 2011 Deloitte questionnaire, 79 percent of all public company respondents reported that their board’s use of technology is increasing.

En rappel : Un nouveau modèle de gouvernance de sociétés


Voici, en rappel, un excellent billet de Richard Leblanc qui a fait un travail colossal de synthèse afin de dégager les bases d’un modèle de gouvernance, bâti à partir des nombreuses et riches discussions dans le groupe Boards & Advisers de LinkedIn. Richard a développé un modèle vraiment très pertinent que vous pouvez télécharger à partir de son blogue. Je vous encourage à lire ce document synthèse qui est le fruit de centaines d’échanges sur LinkedIn. Par la même occasion, je vous invite à vous inscrire à son blogue et à suivre son groupe Boards & Advisers sur LinkedIn.

Shareholder Spring and A New Model of Corporate Governance

« Shareholder activism at CP Rail, Yahoo, Research in Motion, Chesapeake Energy and BMC Software continues, trying to prevent the destruction of billions of dollars of shareholder value. Shareholders rejected Citigroup’s, Aviva’s, Knight Capital’s, FirstMerit’s and Cairn Energy’s executive pay packages. Activists and hedge funds such as Bill Ackman at Pershing Square, Dan Loeb of Third Point Capital, Vic Alboini at Jaguar Financial Corp., Paul Singer at Elliot Management and Carl Icahn reveal defects in the current corporate governance system. What do they all have in common? And are boards listening ? »

Trois éléments que les comités d’audit ne doivent pas oublier !


Voici un article publié dans bankdirector.com qui nous rappelle les trois éléments essentiels qu’un comité d’audit doit tenir en ligne de compte au cours des prochaines années.

Trois points que les comités d’audit ne doivent pas oublier !

Against this backdrop, the work of audit committees has taken on added importance. With a slim margin of error and a shifting regulatory landscape, verifying that the proper internal controls and compliance measures are in place can be the difference between thriving, barely surviving, and falling behind the competition. Here are the top three issues that audit committees of community banks need to have on their radar for the coming year.

Voici les trois points présentés dans l’article. Pour une information complète, veuillez lire l’article.

1. Don’t Neglect Audit Fundamentals

2. Try to Anticipate What Comes Next

The following sources can provide important hints of what to expect.

– The Center for Audit Quality, based in Washington, D.C., regularly publishes insight and the latest developments. Its board includes leaders from public auditing firms and it is affiliated with the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

– The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was established by Congress to oversee the audits of public companies and seeks to promote informative, accurate and independent audit reports.

– The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has a list of proposed rules on its website that offer evidence on currents trends and areas that the agency is exploring.

– The business press, both in its coverage and the mix of stories, can be a barometer of where policymakers and enforcement agencies are directing their focus.

3. Be Forthright in Communicating About Negative Audits

Comment un PDG peut-il mieux communiquer avec son C.A. ?


Voici un article paru dans blog.openviewpartners.com qui montre la nécessité d’établir une bonne communication entre le PDG et le C.A. Si les réunions avec le C.A. sont un cauchemar pour vous, dépêchez-vous de lire cet article !

How to Take Advantage of Your Board of Directors

« It’s no secret a lot of CEOs aren’t big fans of their boards of directors. They derive very little value from them and in some cases find the board to be an utter distraction. Even seasoned CEOs who have managed to assemble a valuable team of advisors and mentors sometimes struggle with board management. They’re not sure how often to communicate with them, how involved they should allow board members to be, or in which areas the board could provide the most value…

The most common Board of Directors (BOD) challenges are often functions of these three issues:

  1. You don’t communicate with your BOD: If the only time you talk with your board is during quarterly meetings, an information gap will inevitably exist. That can cause a huge operational disconnect that results in ineffective and inefficient meetings. Too much of the BOD meetings are spent getting caught up, versus having a meaningful dialogue about the key issues.
  2. You don’t want to show your weaknesses: CEOs are very often hesitant to open up and reveal their weaknesses. This may be born out of a bad experience in the past or just pure ego. They worry that if they’re candid about the challenges the business is facing, they’ll be viewed as incompetent.
  3. You don’t want to bother them: Entrepreneurs too often assume that their board members are too busy to be bothered with seemingly menial issues, and they feel like a nuisance if they ask for help ». 

Les administrateurs doivent exercer un jugement sûr : Quelques éléments fondamentaux à considérer


The logo of KPMG.
The logo of KPMG. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, quelques conseils que les administrateurs de sociétés devraient suivre afin de s’assurer d’avoir un jugement robuste dans le cadre de la prise de décision. Cet article paru dans NACD Directorship le 24 juin 2012 met l’accent sur le texte « Enhancing Board Oversight: Avoiding Judgment Traps and Biases », un document du COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission) dont les auteurs sont KPMG et les professeurs Steven M. Glover and Douglas F. Prawitt de Brigham Young University.

Good Judgment Requires Discipline, Awareness of Traps and Biases

It used to be that exercising good judgment largely meant “using common sense.” But today, while common sense is still essential, exercising good judgment—consistently— in a business environment that is increasingly complex and dynamic, volatile and uncertain, and under high pressure requires a disciplined process. It also requires an understanding of common traps and biases that can undermine the judgments of even seasoned professionals and boards.

Voici quelques considérations importantes à connaître. Il faut lire l’article au complet lequel réfère au document du COSO.

A good judgment process followed consistently can help improve decision-making and oversight, but “traps and biases” can undermine the process.

Our “intuitive” judgment can betray us.

Beware of three particularly common judgment traps How you “frame” an issue largely determines how you see it (or don’t see it).

Beware of four common biases that can undermine good judgment (unwittingly).

Exemple de révolte des actionnaires : Chesapeake Energy


Voici un article paru récemment dans le New-York Times et qui présente le résultat de la révolte des actionnaires lors de l’assemblée annuelle de Chesapeake Energy. On voit de plus en plus de situations où les administrateurs d’importantes sociétés sont l’objet de désapprobation de la part des actionnaires. La voix des actionnaires, par l’intermédiaire d’organisation comme ISS, se fait de plus en plus entendre et les C.A. doivent être de plus en plus vigilent.

Shareholders rebuke to the failed leadership of the board of directors at Chesapeake

Chesapeake Energy
Chesapeake Energy (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

 

Shareholders sent an angry message to the board and management of Chesapeake Energy on Friday, withholding support for the two directors up for election, rejecting the pay plan for top executives and urging the company to allow major shareholders to nominate their own board candidates.

Réforme majeure de la rémunération des dirigeants au Royaume-Uni


Le Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (UK) a récemment rendu public un projet de réforme visant à renforcer la gouvernance et les droits des actionnaires.

English: Corporate Governance
English: Corporate Governance (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Government announces far-reaching reform of directors’ pay

The Business Secretary, Vince Cable today announced the most comprehensive reforms of the framework for directors’ remuneration in a decade. This package of measures will address failures in corporate governance by empowering shareholders to engage effectively with companies on pay. It will:

· Give shareholders binding votes on pay policy and exit payments, so they can hold companies to account and prevent rewards for failure;

· Boost transparency so that what people are paid is easily understood and the link between pay and performance is clearly drawn; and

· Ensure that reform has a lasting impact by empowering business and investors to maintain recent activism.

Directors’ pay: guide to Government reforms

Over the past decade, directors’ pay in the UK’s largest listed companies has quadrupled with no clear link to company performance.

« In the way we pay ourselves…now is the time to be more transparent, more responsible and more accountable. High pay must be for exceptional performance, not mere attendance. »

 

Le Board : dernier rempart | ultimement responsable !


Voici une excellente prise de position de Richard Leblanc dans Listed Magazine à propos du rôle du conseil d’administration dans les cas de fraudes, malversations, corruption, contrôles internes déficients, problèmes éthique, etc. L’article explique que le C.A. est ultimement responsable de la conformité, de la surveillance des processus de contrôle et de la conduite éthique des dirigeants. Comme le dit Leblanc,  « The buck stops at the Board… Saying the “directors didn’t know” is no excuse ».

Headquarters of SNC-Lavalin engineering firm i...

The buck stops at the board

Un extrait de l’article :

« If the CEO of SNC-Lavalin allegedly overrode his own CFO and breached the company’s code of ethics in authorizing $56 million of questionable payments to undisclosed agents that the federal Canadian police are now investigating, did the board of directors of SNC-Lavalin have a role to play? If RBC, as alleged by a U.S. regulator, made “material false statements” in connection with non-arm’s length trades, did the board of directors of RBC have a role to play?

The answer is “Yes” in these and similar cases. Speaking generally, as all allegations have yet to be proven, it is not credible to argue—as some do—that boards do not have a determinative role to play in compliance and reputational failure, or that directors did not know. A board is the only body that has the legal authority and power to control management and designate all compliance and control systems. It alone acts or fails to act. A board is paid to take all reasonable steps consistent with best practices, to ensure that it does know ».

Les actionnaires exigent plus d’information sur le processus de planification de la relève des CEO


Excellent rapport du Conference Board sur les responsabilités du conseil d’administration en matière de planification de la relève du CEO.

 

CEO Succession Planning : Current Developments

Given the importance of the CEO role within a corporation and the potential disruption that can result from an unexpected loss or change in top leadership, succession planning is considered one of a board’s most important oversight responsibilities. This report examines recent governance developments in the area of CEO succession, including shareholder activism during the 2011 and 2012 proxy seasons, and current examples of corporate disclosure and policies.

Despite the importance of leadership succession planning to a company’s continued success, companies, up until recently, rarely disclosed information about their succession planning processes to shareholders. Investors began asking for such information by filing shareholder proposals seeking annual disclosure about succession planning.

Dix leçons de gouvernance en provenance de l’Europe


Voici une synthèse de François Couillard de la firme Strategies & Directions sur les grandes leçons à retirer en gouvernance à partir de l’expérience européenne. Ce résumé a été établi lors d’une session de International Economic Forum of the Americas, tenue récemment à l’occasion de la Conférence de Montréal. Ce résumé est évocateur des changements auxquels nous pouvons nous attendre dans le domaine de la gouvernance en Europe.
 
 
« One of the sessions was sponsored by a business think tank to which I belong, the Canada-Belgium Committee. It brought together a few European experts in the field: Herman Daems, Chairman of the Board, BNP Paribas Fortis, and Yves Leterme, deputy Secretary General, OECD and past Prime Minister of Belgium. The room was packed and the audience was very engaged. The following are 10 insightful comments from Daems and Leterme:
 
1. Good governance should not be a box ticking exercise.
2. Even with robust governance systems in place, companies are not immune from failure.
3. Boards need to find a cooperative equilibrium between the interests of various stakeholders.
4. There should be more attention paid to ensuring the competence of Directors.
5. There is a lack of appropriate internal checks and balances. Don’t give senior management “Carte Blanche”.
6. Existing executive financial incentives drive short-term results at the expense of long-term performance and foster excessive risk taking.
7. Boards should be open and transparent and have the courage to communicate.
8. Achieving gender balance on boards is highly desirable but difficult to attain in practice.
9. Boards must ensure corporate and business strategies are aligned with the risk appetite and long-term success of the company.
10. Running a company is like driving a car. Even with best road regulations and traffic signs, you can’t guarantee the driver won’t get in trouble: you need good road signs and good drivers! (Daems) ».
 

L’évaluation du conseil d’administration : Une pratique exemplaire


Cet article publié sur le Board Blog de Boardmember.com, présente les raisons pour lesquelles le processus d’évaluation des conseils d’administration est devenu, au fil des ans, une quasi-exigence.

En effet, une étude de PwC montre que 94 % des sociétés publiques ont mis en place des processus d’évaluation des membres de C.A. et de l’efficacité des C.A. Je vous encourage à lire cet article; il est cependant requis que vous vous inscriviez, mais vous trouverez plusieurs avantages à consulter ce site.

Ci-dessous, quelques extraits de cet article.

Boardmember.com

Board Evaluations: Honor Spoken Rules of Engagement

« I have always been a big fan of the benefits that can be afforded a company’s board after it undergoes a prudent board evaluation.  Next to executive board sessions, I believe a well-structured board evaluation is one of the best corporate governance practices of the last 10 years and it appears the practice is quite prevalent.  PwC’s 2011 Annual Corporate Directors Study found 94% of public companies conduct some level of board evaluation.  Obviously, that finding partly reflects the requirement by the NYSE for all its listed companies to conduct a board evaluation.  NASDAQ doesn’t require an evaluation as part of its listing requirements but has repeatedly promoted those benefits, as well.

Who should facilitate your board evaluation:  Let me start by saying who I think shouldn’t be the facilitator (the person who directly receives and analyzes the results):  The lead director, chairman, or the chair of the nominating/governance (or similarly named) committee.  And here is the logical reason: How can you evaluate the entire board and all its members if one of those members is conducting the evaluation, especially if the board member facilitator is part of the problem?  Will other board members feel comfortable criticizing the facilitator when that insider will then know what each board member’s comments were?  Now, I recognize that some boards are so collegial and candid with one another that this self evaluation can work, but I still don’t think that having an existing board member, regardless of title, creates the right environment for candid feedback.  Now, again, before I get swamped with readers who think the chairman or the nominating/governance chair should own this process, I don’t disagree.  I just don’t think that it makes sense for them to be the facilitator of the evaluation ».

CRÉATION D’UNE CHAIRE DE RECHERCHE EN GOUVERNANCE DE SOCIÉTÉS


Le 13 juin 2012 – Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) est fier d’annoncer aujourd’hui sa participation à  la création de la nouvelle Chaire de recherche en gouvernance de sociétés de la Faculté des sciences de l’administration de l’Université Laval. La chaire de recherche est créée par le Programme pour l’avancement de l’innovation, de la recherche et de l’enseignement (PAIRE) de l’Université Laval et est financée à hauteur de 1 M$ par l’Autorité des marchés financiers et le CAS qui y verseront respectivement 100 000 $ par année pour les cinq prochaines années.

Nouvelle chaire de recherche vouée au développement et à la promotion de la bonne gouvernance  

M. Jean Bédard, professeur à la Faculté des sciences de l’administration de l’Université Laval a été nommé titulaire de la Chaire. Expert de réputation internationale dans les domaines de l’audit et de la gouvernance d’entreprise, il enseigne le contrôle interne ainsi que l’audit aux trois cycles universitaires et au Collège des administrateurs de sociétés.

« Le Collège se devait de bâtir un partenariat solide avec une équipe de chercheurs pour assurer une veille, innover, publier, renforcer la connaissance en gouvernance et, ultimement, contribuer au maintien du haut calibre de la formation offerte par le Collège et de sa position de leader en gouvernance », a souligné Bruno Déry, président et chef de la direction du CAS.

Pour connaître tous les détails concernant la Chaire de recherche en gouvernance de sociétés, consultez le communiqué.

Actionnaires minoritaires et sociétés cotées : relations difficiles !


Les actionnaires minoritaires doivent de plus en plus s’en remettre aux bons soins des grands propriétaires-dirigeants ! On veut leur argent mais on ne souhaite pas leur donner d’espoir de contrôle puisqu’avec le jeu des actions à votes multiples, les nouveaux tsars des affaires veulent conserver le pouvoir … total. Ceux-ci veulent jouer tous les rôles : président et chef de la direction, président du conseil, décideur en chef (nomination des membres du conseil, choix des grandes orientations stratégiques, décision du système de rémunération). Les actionnaires doivent faire confiance … même si ce sont eux qui sont en fait majoritaires !

 

Voir l’article suivant, publié sur le blog de Rivoli consulting

Actionnaires minoritaires et sociétés cotées : le dialogue de sourds ?

Les sociétés internet récemment introduites en bourse aux Etats-Unis (LinkedIn, Groupon, Zynga, et bien évidemment Facebook) ont en commun le fait qu’elles refusent de se plier aux règles de bonne gouvernance qui s’imposent depuis quelques années aux sociétés cotées. A l’exemple de Google, elles ont opté en particulier pour des structures de capital qui comportent des actions à droits de vote multiples, permettant à leurs dirigeants de contrôler les décisions en assemblée générale. L’intérêt de ces actions à droit de vote multiples est d’éviter que les sociétés soient soumises au court-termisme des investisseurs, selon les dirigeants qui dénoncent la “dictature actionnariale”.

Facebook va plus loin : Mark Zuckerberg, dirigeant avec 28% du capital et 57% des droits de vote, décide du vote des résolutions, et désigne les membres du conseil d’administration; il peut seul nommer son successeur, et est à la fois président et directeur général. Il a récemment négocié seul l’acquisition d’Instagram, mettant son conseil devant le fait accompli ».