Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 12 juillet 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 12 juillet 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « top 10 »

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 5 juillet 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 5 juillet 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « top 10 »

 

 

  1. ESG and Sustainability: The Board’s Role
  2. Fiduciary Duties of Buy-Side Directors: Recent Lessons Learned
  3. Passive Mutual Funds and ETFs: Performance and Comparison
  4. The Directors’ E&S Guidebook
  5. Creditor Control Rights and Board Independence
  6. When Political Spending and Core Values Conflict
  7. Enterprise Liability and the Organization of Production Across Countries
  8. Impact of SEC Guidance on Shareholder Proposals in the 2018 Proxy Season
  9. Passive Investors
  10. Spotify Case Study: Structuring and Executing a Direct Listing

Les administrateurs de la nouvelle génération


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, le résultat d’une enquête réalisée par SpencerStuart portant sur le renouvellement des conseils d’administration et les attentes des administrateurs de ladite nouvelle génération.

Le texte a été publié en anglais. Vous pouvez le lire dans cette langue en cliquant sur le titre ci-dessous. Je vous invite à le faire puisque le texte original contient des tableaux et des statistiques que l’on ne retrouve pas dans ma version.

Afin de faciliter la compréhension, j’ai révisé la traduction électronique produite. Je crois que cette traduction est très acceptable.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

 

How Next‑Generation Board Directors Are Having an Impact

 

 

Guide du Secrétariat à la jeunesse
GUIDE POUR FAVORISER LE RECRUTEMENT ET L’INTÉGRATION DES ADMINISTRATEURS DE LA RELÈVE AU SEIN DES CONSEILS D’ADMINISTRATION D’OBNL

 Consultez le guide du SAJ

 

Les conseils font l’objet des pressions croissantes pour démontrer leur pertinence à un moment où de multiples forces perturbatrices menacent les modèles d’affaires établis et créent de nouvelles possibilités d’innovation et de croissance. De plus en plus, les investisseurs s’attendent à ce que les conseils aient des processus significatifs en place pour renouveler leur adhésion et maximiser leur efficacité.

En conséquence, un nombre croissant « d’administrateurs de prochaine génération » sont nommés aux conseils d’administration à travers le monde. Beaucoup apportent des connaissances dans des domaines tels que la cybersécurité, l’IA (intelligence artificielle), l’apprentissage automatique et les technologies de l’industrie 4.0 ; d’autres ont une expérience directe de la transformation numérique, de la conception organisationnelle, de la connaissance du client ou de la communication sociale. Inévitablement, les experts de ces disciplines ont tendance à provenir d’une génération différente de celle de la majorité des membres du conseil d’administration.

Les jeunes administrateurs ont un impact sur le contenu et la dynamique du débat en salle de réunion. Ils incitent d’autres administrateurs à s’engager sur des sujets qui ne leur sont pas familiers et à apporter une approche et une perspective différentes au rôle. Tout comme les entreprises élargissent leur réflexion sur la valeur de la diversité et reconnaissent les avantages de la main-d’œuvre intergénérationnelle, les conseils bénéficient de recrutements d’administrateurs qui apportent non seulement une expertise foncièrement nécessaire, mais aussi une vision contemporaine de la façon dont les décisions affectent les parties prenantes — des employés et des fournisseurs aux clients et à la communauté. Ces administrateurs font face à un ensemble différent de défis en milieu de travail dans leurs rôles exécutifs ; en tant qu’administrateurs, ils peuvent rarement exprimer leurs préoccupations et leurs points de vue, autour de la table du conseil d’administration.

Les conseils qui choisissent sagement leurs jeunes administrateurs peuvent bénéficier grandement de leur présence. Cependant, il ne suffit pas d’amener de nouveaux administrateurs compétents dans la salle du conseil ; il est vital que les conseils les préparent au succès en combinant une intégration complète, une intégration réfléchie et une attitude ouverte, réceptive et respectueuse envers leurs contributions.

Nous avons interrogé un groupe de présidents de conseil d’administration et d’administrateurs de la prochaine génération sur plusieurs continents à propos de leur expérience de cette dernière phase de l’évolution des conseils d’administration.

 

Qu’y a-t-il pour la prochaine génération?

 

Avant de rejoindre le conseil d’administration d’une entreprise publique, il est important d’être clair sur la motivation. Pourquoi maintenant ; et pourquoi cette entreprise ? Être un administrateur non exécutif est un engagement important, et vous devez vous assurer que vous et le conseil d’administration considérez que c’est un investissement qui en vaut la peine. Nous constatons que la plupart des administrateurs next-gén sont motivés par trois choses : (1) le développement personnel. (2) la possibilité d’enrichir leur rôle exécutif avec de nouvelles idées et de nouvelles expériences acquises en tant qu’administrateur et (3) le désir de faire une contribution.

Un cadre qui commençait à se familiariser avec son propre conseil estimait qu’il était temps de se joindre à un conseil externe : « Je voulais élargir mon point de vue, acquérir des expériences différentes et voir une entreprise sous un autre angle. Je sentais que cela finirait par faire de moi un leader meilleur et plus efficace ». Une autre gestionnaire d’entreprise a souligné l’occasion unique d’apprendre d’autres personnes plus expérimentées qu’elle-même : « Je pourrais voir que je serais parmi les gens inspirants et que je serais exposé à un secteur différent, mais aussi, à une culture différente et à de nouvelles façons de faire des affaires. “Un troisième a décrit la décision de rejoindre un conseil comme” l’une des choses les plus utiles que j’ai fait dans ma vie ».

Les nouveaux administrateurs citent un certain nombre d’expériences et de compétences qu’ils espèrent acquérir en siégeant à un conseil, allant d’un style de leadership différent et travaillant avec une culture organisationnelle différente à l’apprentissage d’un nouveau secteur ou marché géographique.

Bien sûr, rejoindre un conseil d’administration doit être un exercice mutuellement bénéfique. « C’est utile pour moi parce que j’apprends sur la gouvernance, et sur le fonctionnement interne du conseil ». Je peux appliquer ce que j’apprends dans mon autre travail. Le conseil, quant à lui, obtient quelqu’un avec un ensemble différent de spécialités et une perspective légèrement plus fraîche ; ils ont quelqu’un qui veut être plus ouvert et plus direct, un peu plus non-conformiste par rapport aux autres membres du conseil.

Les présidents de conseil d’administration sont de plus en plus ouverts au recrutement de talents de prochaine génération, citant plusieurs raisons allant du besoin de compétences et de compétences spécifiques à des voix plus diverses à la table. Un président recherchait spécifiquement quelqu’un pour déplacer le centre du débat : « Un nouvel administrateur plus jeune peut voir un dilemme d’un point de vue différent, nous faisant réfléchir à deux fois. Je cherche une personne intègre qui est prête à parler ouvertement et à défier la gestion. Ce que je ne peux pas nécessairement attendre de ces personnes, bien sûr, c’est l’expérience d’avoir vu beaucoup de situations similaires sur 30-40 ans dans les affaires. C’est un compromis, et c’est l’une des raisons pour lesquelles la diversité des âges au sein du conseil est si importante. L’expertise des spécialistes doit être équilibrée avec l’expérience, et avec l’expérience vient un bon jugement ».

 

Préparation au rôle

 

Si vous êtes un dirigeant actif qui rejoint le conseil d’administration d’une entreprise publique, beaucoup de temps est en jeu (ainsi que votre réputation), vous devez donc être sûr que vous prenez la bonne décision. Un processus de vérification préalable approfondi offre non seulement cette sécurité, mais contribue également à accélérer votre préparation au rôle. « Au cours de mes entrevues, j’ai lu énormément de choses sur l’entreprise », a déclaré un administrateur récemment nommé. « J’ai regardé les appels des analystes, j’ai lu les documents de la SEC et j’ai posé beaucoup de questions, en particulier sur la dynamique du conseil. Ils m’ont fait rencontrer tous les membres du conseil d’administration et j’ai pu voir comment ils se parlaient entre eux ».

Il est important d’avoir une compréhension claire de ce que le conseil recherche et de la façon dont vos antécédents et votre expérience ajouteront de la valeur dans le contexte de l’entreprise. Par exemple, bien que les membres du conseil les plus séniors puissent avoir un aperçu raisonnable de la perturbation de l’entreprise, ils n’auront pas d’expérience pratique d’une initiative de transformation numérique. Vous êtes peut-être parfaitement placé pour fournir ces connaissances de première main, mais il se peut que le président du conseil d’administration veuille bien faire face à certaines difficultés, ait appris à relever le défi technologique d’un point de vue commercial et sache quel type de questions poser. Seule une due diligence approfondie révélera si vos attentes sont alignées avec celles du conseil et vous permettront de procéder en toute confiance.

 

Embarquement (Onboarding)

 

L’une des choses les plus courantes que nous entendons des administrateurs de prochaine génération est qu’ils auraient aimé un processus d’intégration plus approfondi avant leur première réunion — c’est quelque chose que les conseils d’administration doivent clairement aborder. Il revient souvent aux nouveaux administrateurs de prendre l’initiative et de concevoir un programme qui les aidera à s’intégrer dans l’entreprise. « Une grande partie de l’immersion dont j’ai eu besoin est venue des étapes que j’ai suivies moi-même », a déclaré un administrateur qui estimait que rencontrer quelques dirigeants et présidents de comité du conseil ainsi qu’une lecture du matériel fourni par le secrétaire de la société constituait une préparation insuffisante.

Un bon programme d’initiation comprendra des présentations de la direction sur le modèle d’affaires, la rentabilité et la performance ; visites de site ; et des réunions avec des conseillers externes tels que des comptables, des banquiers et des courtiers. Assister avec le responsable des relations avec les investisseurs pour revoir les perspectives des investisseurs et des analystes peut aussi être utile.

Les administrateurs de la prochaine génération ont demandé à rencontrer les chefs d’entreprise pour un examen plus détaillé d’une filiale ou d’une activité particulière où leur propre expérience est particulièrement pertinente. Dans une entreprise de vente au détail, par exemple, il serait logique de rencontrer le responsable du merchandising d’un magasin phare pour se familiariser avec le positionnement des produits et l’expérience client.

Le temps passé avec le PDG pour en apprendre davantage sur l’entreprise est essentiel. La plupart des chefs d’entreprise seront ravis de faire en sorte que le nouvel administrateur puisse voir directement les principaux projets et rencontrer les personnes qui les dirigent, ainsi que passer du temps avec d’autres membres de l’équipe de la haute direction. « Ils étaient complètement ouverts à la possibilité de rencontrer d’autres personnes, mais cela ne faisait pas partie du programme d’initiation formel. J’ai trouvé ces conversations les plus éclairantes parce que je me suis simplement rapproché de l’entreprise et du travail. »

Un président d’une société de produits de consommation a ajouté une touche intéressante à l’intégration d’un nouvel administrateur nommé pour son expérience de leadership en matière de commerce électronique. Il a invité la nouvelle recrue à faire une présentation à toute l’équipe de direction au sujet de son propre cheminement. « Le genre de perturbation et la vitesse à laquelle fonctionne sa société en ligne étaient stupéfiants, et cet exercice s’est avéré une source d’apprentissage pour le conseil d’administration et l’équipe de direction », a déclaré le président. « Cela a également renforcé sa crédibilité auprès du reste du conseil ».

 

Faire la transition à un rôle d’administrateur non exécutif

 

La plupart des administrateurs de la prochaine génération comprennent qu’ils devront aborder les responsabilités de leur conseil d’une manière différente d’un rôle exécutif, mais la plupart sous-estiment les difficultés à faire cette transition dans la pratique.

Il est important d’être en mesure de faire la distinction entre les questions sur lesquelles seul le conseil peut se prononcer (par exemple, la relève du chef de la direction) et les sujets que le conseil doit laisser à la direction (questions opérationnelles). La stratégie est un domaine où, dans la plupart des marchés, le conseil d’administration et la direction ont tendance à collaborer étroitement, mais il y a beaucoup d’autres moyens où les administrateurs de la prochaine génération peuvent apporter leur expertise particulière.

Cependant, il faut du temps pour apprendre comment ajouter de la valeur aux discussions du conseil sans pour autant saper l’autorité de la direction. L’écoute et l’apprentissage sont un aspect crucial pour gagner le respect et la crédibilité auprès du reste du conseil. « Il faut être très conscient du moment où il faut intervenir, quand il est nécessaire d’insister sur un sujet difficile, et quand il faut prendre du recul », explique un administrateur. « La compétence consiste à poser la bonne question de la bonne façon — à ne pas affaiblir ou à décourager la direction, mais à les encourager à voir les choses un peu différemment ».

En tant qu’administrateur non exécutif, vous devez vous engager à un niveau supérieur et de manière plus détachée que dans votre rôle exécutif. Avec des réunions mensuelles ou bimestrielles, il peut être difficile de déterminer si vous ajoutez de la valeur, ou même à quoi ressemble la valeur, surtout lorsque votre travail régulier implique de prendre la responsabilité d’une exécution de haute qualité. En tant qu’administrateur non exécutif, vous pouvez voir des choses qui doivent être prises en compte et vouloir vous impliquer plus activement, mais vous devez faire confiance en la capacité de l’équipe de direction à le faire. « J’avais l’impression que le conseil d’administration pourrait être un peu plus engagé. Nous avons des zones très précises dans lesquelles nous sommes censés contribuer à orienter les décisions et les actions, et il y en a d’autres où nous sommes plus consultatifs ; c’est une question de trouver le bon équilibre ».

Cependant, le travail des administrateurs de prochaine génération ne commence pas et ne se termine pas avec les réunions du conseil d’administration. Beaucoup interagiront avec la direction en dehors des réunions. Un directeur britannique nommé pour son expertise numérique prend le temps de se mettre à jour avec l’équipe numérique de l’entreprise lorsqu’elle est à New York « pour savoir à quoi ils travaillent, comprendre ce qui les motive et quelles sont leurs préoccupations ». Un nouvel administrateur indépendant a été invité par le PDG (CEO) à passer une journée avec l’équipe de management du développement de l’entreprise, après quoi il a passé en revue l’expérience client. « J’ai reçu des commentaires très clairs, mais je me suis contenté de l’envoyer au chef de la direction, pas à l’équipe que j’ai rencontrée ou à un autre membre du conseil ». Offrir de l’aide à l’équipe de direction de façon informelle.

Votre rôle n’est pas nécessairement de comprendre les problèmes, mais de proposer des idées et de poser des questions à l’équipe de direction.

 

Obtenir de la rétroaction

 

Les administrateurs de prochaine génération qui sont habitués à recevoir des commentaires dans leur capacité de direction peuvent avoir du mal à s’adapter à un rôle où il est moins facilement disponible. « La rétroaction est la chose la plus difficile à laquelle je me suis attaqué », explique un administrateur. « Avec votre propre entreprise, c’est un succès ou pas. Si vous êtes un employé, on vous dit si vous faites du bon travail. Ce n’est pas le cas sur un conseil ».

Les nouveaux administrateurs doivent identifier une personne avec laquelle ils se sentent à l’aise et qui peut leur offrir un aperçu de certaines des règles non écrites du conseil. Certains préfèrent une relation de mentorat plus formelle avec un membre du conseil d’administration, mais cette idée ne plaît pas à tout le monde. Des vérifications régulières auprès du président du conseil (et du chef de la direction) les aideront à évaluer leur rendement et à apprendre comment ils peuvent offrir une contribution plus utile.

Au-delà de la rétroaction individuelle informelle, le conseil peut avoir un processus pour fournir une rétroaction à chaque administrateur dans le cadre de l’auto-évaluation annuelle du conseil. Sur les conseils où cette pratique est en place, les administrateurs de la prochaine génération ont tendance à être très à l’aise avec elle et à accueillir les commentaires. S’il n’y a pas de processus de rétroaction individuelle des administrateurs en place, l’administrateur de la prochaine génération peut servir de catalyseur pour établir cette saine pratique en s’enquérant directement à ce sujet.

 

Le rôle du président du conseil

 

Les présidents de conseil ont une influence significative sur le succès des administrateurs de prochaine génération dans le rôle. Il peut être difficile d’arriver à un conseil qui compte beaucoup d’administrateurs plus âgés et plus expérimentés, en particulier s’il existe une dynamique « collégiale » établie de longue date. Le président a la double tâche de guider le nouvel administrateur, tout en s’assurant que les autres membres du conseil restent ouverts aux nouvelles idées et perspectives que celui-ci apporte au conseil. Cela peut impliquer de travailler dur pour encourager les relations à se développer à un niveau personnel, ce qui permettra ensuite d’émettre des points de vue divergents, et même dissidents sur le plan professionnel.

Un président peut faire un certain nombre de choses pour soutenir l’administrateur de la prochaine génération, par exemple : s’intéresser de près au processus d’intégration ; fournir un encadrement sur la meilleure façon de représenter les intérêts des investisseurs ; offrir des commentaires constructifs après les réunions ; et encourager le nouvel administrateur à se tenir à l’écart plutôt que de jouer la carte de la sécurité et à simplement s’aligner sur la culture existante du conseil d’administration. Comme l’a dit un président : « Certains conseils se méfient d’un nouvel administrateur qui pense différemment et qui menace, bien que respectueusement, de faire bouger les choses. Mais parfois, vous avez besoin que le nouvel administrateur perturbe le conseil avec des idées nouvelles, acceptant que cela puisse entraîner un changement culturel. C’est mon travail de laisser cela se produire ». Cela dit, si un nouvel administrateur est en désaccord avec certains éléments contenus dans la documentation du conseil d’administration ou s’il ne comprend pas, il serait sage d’en discuter avec le président du conseil en premier lieu.

Pour le nouvel administrateur, l’adaptation à la structure et à la formalité des réunions du conseil d’administration signifie adopter une approche mesurée et s’inspirer de la décision du président, en particulier à contre-courant. « Bien que je n’aie assisté qu’à trois réunions, je teste les barrières qui font que je peux être ouvert et direct, tout en en apprenant davantage sur l’entreprise », rapporte un administrateur. Un autre a défendu une position non partagée par la majorité du conseil d’administration, convaincu que le président est heureux de donner une tribune à ses opinions. Vous devez être respectueux et faire valoir votre point de vue et vos arguments, mais si ceux-ci ne prévalent pas, c’est bien aussi. Bien sûr, si cela devient une question de principe, vous êtes toujours libre de démissionner, n’est-ce pas ?

 

Vers un nouveau genre de conseil

 

Au fur et à mesure que les entreprises relèvent de nouveaux défis et qu’une jeune génération de cadres issus de milieux très différents accède à des postes d’administrateurs indépendants, les conseils d’administration devront trouver le bon équilibre entre expérience et pertinence. Ils devront également devenir plus dynamiques en matière de composition, de diversité, de discussion et d’occupation. Les administrateurs de longue date qui s’intéressent à la gouvernance et à la gestion des risques côtoieront des représentants de la prochaine génération nommés pour leur excellente connaissance du domaine ou leur expérience en temps réel des environnements transformationnels, mais le mandat de ces administrateurs sera probablement plus court que la moyenne actuelle.

Les conseils doivent être réalistes quant à la durée du mandat d’un candidat de la prochaine génération. Ils doivent également réfléchir soigneusement à la question de savoir si cet administrateur se sentirait moins isolé et plus efficace s’il était accompagné par un autre administrateur d’un âge et d’un passé similaires. « En tant que femme, j’ai été une minorité tout au long de ma carrière, donc c’est étrange d’être une minorité à cause de mon expertise numérique », a déclaré une administratrice. Tout comme la présence d’autres femmes au sein du conseil d’administration réduit le fardeau d’une femme administratrice, il y a lieu de nommer deux ou plusieurs administrateurs de la nouvelle génération.

Les conseils d’administration résolus à rester au fait des problèmes critiques affectant leurs entreprises devraient considérer les avantages potentiels de nommer au moins un administrateur de la prochaine génération, non seulement pour leur expertise, mais aussi pour leur capacité à apporter une pensée alternative et des perspectives multipartites dans la salle du conseil. Soutenus par un président du conseil attentif et par des administrateurs ouverts d’esprit, les administrateurs de la prochaine génération peuvent avoir un impact positif et durable sur l’efficacité du conseil en cette période de changement sans précédent.

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 28 juin 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 28 juin 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « top 10 »

  1. Gender Quotas on California Boards
    _______________________________________________________________

  2. Chairman Clayton Testimony on the Oversight of the SEC
    ________________________________________________________________

  3. The General Counsel as Key Corporate Social Responsibility Advisor
    ____________________________________________________________________________

  4. Web-Delivery of Shareholder Reports
    _________________________________________________________________________

  5. The Highest-Paid CEO by U.S. State
    ________________________________________________________________________

  6. Political and Social Issues in the Boardroom: Examples from the Gun Industry
    _______________________________________________________________________________________

  7. The Missing Profits of Nations
    _________________________________________________________________

  8. Trade Secrets Protection and Antitakeover Provisions
    _________________________________________________________________________

  9. Surprises from the 2018 Proxy Season
    ________________________________________________________________________

  10. The SEC Draft Strategic Plan for 2018-2022
    _________________________________________________________________________

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 21 juin 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 21 juin 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « top 10 »

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 14 juin 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 14 juin 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « top 10 »

 

La gouvernance des grandes institutions bancaires européennes au cours des dix années qui ont suivi la crise financière des 2008


Voici un article publié par Lisa Andersson*, directrice de la recherche à Aktis et Stilpon Nestor, paru sur le site du Forum de Harvard Law School, qui brosse un portrait de l’évolution de la gouvernance des grandes institutions bancaires européennes au cours des dix années qui ont suivi la crise financière des 2008.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de ce document illustré d’infographies très éclairantes. J’ai reproduit, ci-dessous, l’introduction à l’article.

Si vous avez un intérêt pour la gouvernance dans le milieu bancaire, cet article est pour vous.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Governance of the 25 Largest European Banks a Decade After the Crisis

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « gouvernance bancaire européenne »

 

 

This summer marked the 10-year anniversary of the start of the global financial crisis. Over the 18 months following August 2007, several bank collapses in the United States, Germany and Britain, culminating with the demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 shook the financial system to its core. The interconnectivity of the world’s financial system meant that the repercussions would be felt globally, and on a monumental scale. The US Department of the Treasury has estimated that total household wealth would lose some $19.2 trillion following a publicly-funded government bailout program. Over the last decade governments, regulators, banks and their investors have revamped the financial system and its supervision in order to recover the public subsidy and prevent a similar crash from happening again.

In Europe, politicians and regulators at both the national and European level abandoned the path of deregulation and dramatically increased regulatory requirements and the scope of prudential supervision with an unparalleled focus on governance. The Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) and the ensuing European Banking Authority (EBA) and European Central Bank (ECB) guidance implied stricter suitability reviews for board members and senior management, along with individual responsibility and in some cases criminal liability of non-executive directors (“NEDs”), as well as strict limits on variable remuneration. Higher regulatory requirements were compounded by the creation of a single supervisor for all systemic Eurozone banks. In many countries, especially the smaller ones, familiarity with supervisors usually allow a larger margin of forbearance and greater tolerance in assuming local sovereign risk. This has since disappeared. New rules and stricter oversight practices in the financial industry have translated into higher governance requirements and expectations for European banks’ boards of directors and senior management. So how do the boards and management committees of the top European banks measure up to their former selves? Data from the 25 largest listed banks [1] in Europe shows that boards today are smaller, work harder, and have a higher level of expertise than a decade ago.

While board sizes are getting smaller, the number of committees supporting the board has consistently grown over the years. This is in part driven by the mandatory separation of the audit and risk committee into two separate committees, but also by a general trend towards establishing more and more committees focusing on regulatory and compliance issues, as well as bank culture, conduct and reputation.

On average, 86% of board membership has been refreshed post-crisis. New board members brought with them greater independence, banking experience and general financial expertise among NEDs, as well as an improved gender balance on the board. In fact, women now comprise on average 34% of top European banks’ board membership, a development largely driven by national initiatives. Another significant change since 2007 is the fact that all the bank boards in the group now conduct regular assessments of the effectiveness of the board, a Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) requirement. The disclosure of this process has also improved significantly, with 48% of banks now disclosing specific challenges identified and actions taken to address these.

The role of a bank NED has evolved post-crisis. With increased scrutiny, boards of financial institutions are now required to adopt a more hands-on approach, requiring a greater time-commitment by their non-executive directors. On average, the workload per director has increased by over 30% compared to pre-crisis levels.

In contrast to the board, the size of management committees has grown in recent years. The top management committee now tend to include more heads of functions, reflected by the increased presence of the Chief Risk Officer, Head of Compliance and Head of Legal. Despite the positive development of a better gender balance on the board of directors, the number of women on the highest management committee has not increased significantly over the last ten years. This may suggest that the “top-down” approach of board quotas adopted in many European countries might be less than effective in promoting gender equality.


*Lisa Andersson is Head of Research of Aktis and Stilpon Nestor is Managing Director and Senior Advisor at Nestor Advisors. This post is based on their recent Nestor Advisors/Aktis publication.

 

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 7 juin 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 7 juin 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « top dix »

 

  1. Global Governance: Board Independence Standards and Practices
  2. Caremark and Reputational Risk Through #MeToo Glasses
  3. Nomination Committees and Corporate Governance: Lessons from Sweden and the UK
  4. How To Avoid Bungling Off-Cycle Engagements with Stockholders
  5. The Importance of Inferior Voting Rights in Dual-Class Firms
  6. Anticipating and Planning for Geopolitical & Regulatory Changes
  7. The Hypocrisy of Hedge Fund Activists
  8. Board Lessons: Succeeding with Investors in a Crisis
  9. Measuring the Impact of Median Employee Pay on the CEO Pay Ratio
  10. Statement at Open Meeting on Inter-Agency Proposal for Amendments to the Volcker Rule

L’indépendance des administrateurs, c’est bien ; mais, des administrateurs qui sont impérativement crédibles et légitimes, c’est mieux !


C’est avec enthousiasme que je vous recommande la lecture de cette dixième prise de position d’Yvan Allaire* au nom de l’IGOPP.

L’indépendance des administrateurs est une condition importante, mais d’autres considérations doivent nécessairement être prises en compte, notamment la légitimité et la crédibilité du conseil d’administration.

Comme l’auteur le mentionne, il faut parfois faire des arbitrages afin de se doter d’un conseil d’administration efficace.

J’ai reproduit, ci-dessous, le sommaire exécutif du document. Pour plus de détails sur ce document de 40 pages, je vous invite à lire le texte au complet.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Ils orienteront les nouvelles exigences en matière de gouvernance.

 

D’indépendant à légitime et crédible : le défi des conseils d’administration

 

 

L’indépendance de la plupart des membres de conseils d’administration est maintenant un fait accompli. Bien qu’ayant contribué à un certain assainissement de la gouvernance des sociétés, force est de constater que cette sacro-sainte indépendance, dont certains ont fait la pierre angulaire, voire, la pierre philosophale de la «bonne» gouvernance, n’a pas donné tous les résultats escomptés.

Déjà en 2008, au moment de publier une première prise de position sur le thème de l’indépendance, l’IGOPP argumentait que ce qui faisait défaut à trop de conseils, ce n’était pas leur indépendance mais la légitimité et la crédibilité de leurs membres. Le fait qu’un administrateur n’ait pas d’intérêts personnels contraires aux intérêts de la société, son indépendance, devait être vu comme une condition nécessaire mais non suffisante au statut d’administrateur légitime.

Les évènements depuis lors, en particulier la crise financière de 2008, ont donné raison à cette prise de position et ont suscité de nouveaux enjeux de légitimité, comme la diversité des conseils, la représentation au conseil de parties prenantes autres que les actionnaires, le droit, contingent à la durée de détention des actions, de mettre en nomination des candidats pour le conseil, les limites d’âge et de durée des mandats comme administrateur.

Quant à la crédibilité d’un conseil, l’IGOPP proposait en 2008 que celle-ci devait s’appuyer sur «une expérience et une expertise pertinentes aux enjeux et aux défis avec lesquels l’organisation doit composer» ainsi que sur une connaissance fine «du modèle d’affaires de l’entreprise, de ses moteurs de création de valeurs économique et sociale» (Allaire, 2008). Pour l’IGOPP, la crédibilité du conseil suppose également l’intégrité et la confiance réciproque entre les membres du conseil et la direction. Donc, celle-ci devenait si importante qu’il serait acceptable, voire nécessaire, de suspendre l’exigence d’indépendance pour certains membres si c’était le prix à payer pour relever la crédibilité du conseil.

Depuis 2008

Profondément perturbés par la crise financière, les sociétés, les agences de règlementation et tous les observateurs de la gouvernance durent admettre que l’indépendance des membres du conseil et leur expérience de gestion dans des secteurs d’activités sans similarité avec l’entreprise à gouverner étaient nettement insuffisants. Ceux-ci devaient également posséder des compétences et une expérience à la mesure des enjeux et défis précis de la société qu’ils sont appelés à gouverner.Résultats de recherche d'images pour « indépendance des administrateurs »

Graduellement, pour la sélection des membres de conseil, on s’est préoccupé de leur expérience et connaissance spécifiques au type d’organisation qu’ils sont appelés à gouverner ainsi que de leur intégrité et leur fiabilité. Ainsi, l’évolution du monde de la gouvernance depuis 2008 a conforté la position de l’IGOPP et lui a donné un caractère prescient.

Toutefois, certains ont constaté que cette crédibilité pouvait être parfois difficile à concilier avec l’indépendance. En effet, si la crédibilité d’un candidat provient d’une longue expérience à œuvrer dans l’industrie à laquelle appartient la société-cible, il est bien possible que pour cette raison cette personne ne satisfasse pas à tous les desiderata d’une indépendance immaculée.

La prise de position de 2018 de l’IGOPP offre des précisions et des solutions aux nouveaux enjeux apparus depuis 2008.

Ainsi, l’IGOPP propose un net changement dans les démarches d’évaluation des conseils, dans les critères de sélection des nouveaux membres ainsi que pour l’établissement du profil de compétences recherchées.

La démarche d’évaluation du conseil

L’évaluation du conseil constitue le premier pilier d’une nécessaire réforme de la gouvernance. Cette évaluation doit répondre aux questions suivantes : le conseil est-il légitime par la façon dont les membres ont été mis en nomination? Par qui furent-ils élus ou nommés?

L‘IGOPP estime qu’une recherche de légitimité relevée et élargie pour un conseil deviendra un enjeu à plus ou moins brève échéance. Même dans le contexte juridique actuel, il est possible de s’interroger sur la qualité des démarches de mise en nomination et d’élection ainsi que du sens à donner aux variations dans le support électif reçu par les différents membres d’un conseil.

Puis, le conseil est-il crédible? L’IGOPP propose une évaluation des connaissances et de l’expérience spécifiques au type d’industries dans lequel œuvre la société que le conseil est appelé à gouverner. Il est important que la plupart des membres du conseil (tous?) possèdent des connaissances économique et financière pertinentes à ce secteur d’activités.

Un conseil d’administration n’est crédible que dans la mesure où une grande partie de ses membres peuvent soutenir un échange avec la direction sur ces aspects de performance et sur les multiples facteurs qui exercent une influence dynamique sur cette performance. Ce type de questionnement suppose, de la part du conseil, une fine et systémique compréhension du modèle d’affaires de la société.

Les critères de sélection de nouveaux membres:

Le président du conseil et le comité de gouvernance doivent s’équiper d’une grille de sélection à la mesure des enjeux actuels. Ainsi, plus de la moitié des membres doivent être indépendants et le conseil doit se préoccuper de la diversité de sa composition. Idéalement, le conseil devrait rechercher des nouveaux membres qui sont indépendants, ajoutent à la diversité du conseil et sont crédibles selon le sens donné à ce terme dans ce texte.

Toutefois, il pourra arriver qu’un conseil doive faire des arbitrages, des compromis entre ces trois qualités souhaitables pour un nouveau membre du conseil.

Si une personne par ailleurs dotée de qualités attrayantes pour le conseil ne possédait pas une expérience qui en fasse un membre crédible dès son arrivée, il faut s’assurer préalablement que celle-ci dispose du temps nécessaire, possède la formation et la rigueur intellectuelle essentielles pour acquérir en un temps raisonnable, un bon niveau de crédibilité; il est essentiel qu’un programme fait sur mesure soit mis en place pour relever rapidement la crédibilité de ce nouveau membre du conseil

Le profil d’expertise recherché:

Cette prise de position propose que le profil établi pour la recherche de nouveaux candidats pour le conseil débute par l’identification de secteurs d’activités proches de celui dans lequel œuvre la société en termes de cycle d’investissement, d’horizon temporel de gestion, de technologie, de marchés desservis (industriels, consommateurs, international), de facteurs de succès et de stratégie (leadership de coûts, différenciation/segmentation, envergure de produits).

Des dirigeants ayant une expérience de tels secteurs apprivoiseront plus rapidement les aspects essentiels d’une société œuvrant dans un secteur s’en rapprochant. Cette façon de procéder permet de concilier «indépendance» et «crédibilité».

Puis, si l’éventail des expertises au conseil indique une carence, disons, en termes de «finance», la recherche ne doit pas se limiter à identifier une personne qui fut une chef de la direction financière, mais bien une personne dont l’expérience en finance fut acquise dans le type de secteurs d’activités identifiés plus tôt. La gestion financière, des ressources humaines, des risques ou de la technologie d’information sont sans commune mesure selon que l’entreprise en est une de commerce au détail ou une minière ou une banque ou une entreprise du secteur aéronautique.

Conclusion

Notre prise de position de 2008 conserve toute sa pertinence. En fait les évènements survenus depuis 2008 appuient et confortent nos propositions d’alors. Si, à l’époque, nous étions une voix dans le désert, notre propos est maintenant sur la place publique, appuyé par des études empiriques et repris par tous ceux qui ont un peu réfléchi aux dilemmes de la gouvernance contemporaine.

Cette révision de notre prise de position de 2008 y ajoute des clarifications, aborde des enjeux devenus inévitables et veut rappeler à tous les conseils d’administration que:

«Si c’est par sa légitimité qu’un conseil acquiert le droit et l’autorité d’imposer ses volontés à la direction, c’est par sa crédibilité qu’un conseil devient créateur de valeur pour toutes les parties prenantes d’une organisation.» (Allaire, 2008).


*Ce document a été préparé et rédigé par Yvan Allaire, Ph. D. (MIT), MSRC, président exécutif, IGOPP

La gestion des notes de réunion par les administrateurs | Bonnes pratiques pour éviter les quiproquos


Aujourd’hui, je partage avec vous une lecture très inintéressante, intrigante même, sur les bonnes façons de prendre des notes et de les sécuriser lors des réunions du conseil d’administration.

Les organisations ont tout avantage à avoir une politique relative à la gestion des notes prises par les administrateurs avant, durant et après les réunions du CA.

L’auteur, David A. Katz*, fait très bien ressortir les problématiques entourant la prise de notes :

  1. Les notes sur les documents du CA
  2. Les notes électroniques
  3. Les courriels

Comme vous le constaterez, l’article présente une perspective très rigoureuse de la gestion des notes (1) pour éviter les conséquences des fuites et (2) pour se protéger en cas d’éventuelles enquêtes judiciaires.

Directors must prepare carefully for and be actively engaged during board meetings. When they leave the boardroom, it is incumbent upon directors to handle their notes and board materials in a manner that is consistent with board policy and applicable law. Directors should review the board’s record retention policy and fully commit to following it. For electronic materials, such as board portals, the retention policy should automatically function to delete notes or other annotations of the materials. The consistent application of a thoughtful and well-tailored policy is in the best interests of the company, the board, and the directors themselves.

Bonne lecture ! Et vous, quels moyens utilisez-vous pour protéger vos informations ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Directors’ Notes: A Trap for the Unwary?

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « notes des réunions de CA »

 

“To take notes or not to take notes—that is the question” often asked in corporate board rooms today. As a matter of good governance, it is important that the minutes serve as the single, clear, official record of each in-person or telephonic board and committee meeting. Board materials that are circulated and discussed at the meeting should be part of the official record and either attached to the minutes or maintained in the corporate secretary’s files, as appropriate. In connection with significant transactions, board minutes will be reviewed by third parties for diligence purposes and to confirm that all appropriate (and required) actions have been taken. Moreover, these minutes will be scrutinized closely in the event that a decision taken at the board meeting is subsequently challenged in litigation or otherwise. Directors should use caution in creating or retaining any notes, texts or emails that could be considered an unofficial record of a board meeting. Directors’ notes and emails are discoverable in litigation and can confuse or even undermine the official account of the meeting in question. Various forms of notes—paper, electronic, and email—raise slightly different issues, all of which directors need to understand in advance of their creation.

 

Notes on Paper

 

Note-taking can be a useful and, for some directors, a necessary element of preparation as they review board materials in order to participate in a meeting, particularly one involving complex topics. Important documents that will be discussed during a meeting should generally be provided to directors sufficiently ahead of the meeting so that directors can review them in advance and be ready to ask questions and discuss key points at the meeting. During a meeting, some directors may jot down questions or comments as reminders to make certain that their concerns are addressed before the meeting concludes.

While note-taking can be helpful to some directors, the question becomes what to do with these notes once the meeting has concluded, or once the minutes have been finalized. Many corporate secretaries, as well as outside counsel, discourage any note-taking by directors to minimize the possibility that these notes could create issues at some future time. Directors are often counseled that the length of their deposition in any shareholder litigation will have a direct correlation to the amount of notes they have taken and retained. It is a common practice among many boards to collect all directors’ meeting notes (and copies of unneeded meeting materials) at the conclusion of a meeting so that they can be destroyed. Some boards have a policy of note destruction after the minutes have been finalized so that directors who wish to refer to their notes as they review the draft minutes can do so. This practice should be discouraged, as in the event that litigation arises after the meeting and before the notes are destroyed, the notes may need to be preserved and produced. In order to minimize the need to retain notes, in most circumstances, draft minutes should be prepared promptly after the meeting.

Some directors may feel that their notes could protect them in litigation, by demonstrating that they have been diligent and fully engaged during board meetings. However, properly-drafted minutes can serve the same purpose without the risks inherent in retaining meeting notes. In many cases, notes are informal comments or questions in document margins whose import may be easily misinterpreted by others or even misremembered by the author, since litigation may occur months after the event. Moreover, notes taken during a meeting are by nature often incomplete and cryptic. If a director annotates material with a question, but does not then write down the answer, it can appear that an issue was not fully discussed or resolved. Inconsistencies between notes and board-approved minutes can undermine the official record of the meeting and could even cause directors to become adversely positioned against each other in litigation. If a director jots down unrelated notes, such as doodles or a shopping list, these can be used to show that the director lacked diligence and attention to the matter at hand. Similarly, if a director sends numerous emails during a meeting unrelated to the matter at hand (which may be discoverable in litigation), the director may be accused of not being appropriately engaged in the matters addressed at the meeting.

Electronic Notes

 

There is a growing trend toward electronic delivery of board materials using portals and iPads. This environmentally friendly approach enables immediate, cost-free delivery of board materials anywhere in the world. Nonetheless, electronic documents create issues of their own, and board portals may not be the panacea that directors and corporate secretaries imagine. Because there is no natural limit to the quantum of materials that can be uploaded to the board portal, some boards will find themselves inundated with documents. Too much in the way of board materials can be as dangerous as too little. Management teams should monitor the quantum of materials to be reviewed prior to each board meeting to make sure that action items have sufficient documentation and that directors are not overwhelmed with information.

The use of electronic board portals can create other headaches for directors and corporate secretaries. Documents that are downloaded to directors’ personal computers raise security issues as well as difficulties in ensuring that the documents and related notes are deleted in accordance with company policy. Documents that are not downloadable but are read-only may be difficult or impossible to annotate, making them less useful to directors as they try to prepare for an upcoming meeting. Corporate secretaries should have specific discussions with board members to make sure that the directors are comfortable with the materials provided, that they take appropriate actions to safeguard materials, and that they refrain from creating additional documents discoverable in pending or subsequent litigation. If directors are permitted to annotate their electronic board materials, these annotations should be automatically deleted at the conclusion of the board meeting.

Chief Justice Leo Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court has raised additional concerns about online documents and electronic board portals. He observes that it is difficult to focus on materials that, unlike paper documents, are necessarily viewed on a device that contains many other distractions; and at the same time, the online data room can be monitored for access and active use. (Monitoring should be strongly discouraged, and usage should not be tracked, but this information can be automatically generated by the portal without directors’ knowledge unless this functionality is fully disabled.) Chief Justice Strine cites an example of a director, on a long flight to a board meeting, opening his computer to review board documents and ending up spending much of his time watching movies, sending emails, and attending to his primary work, rather than focusing on the board materials. If access to an online board portal can be monitored, the log later may reveal that the director spent very little time—potentially even negligently little time—reviewing the materials available. The use of electronic documents and notes should be carefully managed to avoid becoming a trap for the unwary.

Emails

 

Email is also used to deliver board materials, and directors often communicate with each other and with the company via email, but directors should exercise caution in using email, texts, or similar means (including mobile applications such as Messenger or WhatsApp) for substantive board business. In addition to the security issues inherent in sending emails or messages with confidential information and attachments outside the company, there are also potentially significant discovery issues. After the 2016 Yahoo! case in the Delaware Chancery Court, it is clear not only that electronically stored information is explicitly required to be produced in discovery under Delaware law, but also that if a director uses her own work or personal email account for board materials, those email accounts may be subjected to a highly intrusive search in litigation discovery. Directors should be aware that using these accounts for board business means potentially opening them up to intense and unfriendly scrutiny in litigation.

It can be particularly difficult to implement document destruction policies with respect to email. Often backups are made automatically on one or more servers, of which the director may not even be aware, and these backup copies are subject to discovery as well. Moreover, if a director conducts board business using her external business email, those emails may be subject to routine or litigation-driven searches and reviews relating to that other workplace. Although unrelated to the company on which she serves as a director, these searches could compromise the confidentiality of the company information contained therein and call into question any attorney-client privilege that would have applied.

The asymmetric use of email can also yield a distorted version of events. When emailed concerns are addressed in a subsequent phone call, there remains a record of only the concern and not its resolution, which, years later, may be forgotten or misremembered. It is a wiser practice to raise concerns in person or on the phone rather than with an email or text inquiry. The purpose of this practice is not to subvert discovery but to avoid creating an incomplete and misleading record that may be difficult to defend after the fact.

 

Consistency and Control

 

Each board should have a policy regarding directors’ notes, draft minutes, and other board documents that best serves that board’s specific needs. Policies can and will differ across companies. The key element is to implement a policy consistently, across all directors of a particular company and across time. The company should be able to rely on directors’ following the policy systematically and without exception. It will be problematic if, for example, discovery reveals that a director retained notes from every meeting except the one at which a material transaction was approved. Of course, if litigation or an investigation or audit is pending or reasonably foreseeable, directors must preserve all relevant materials, including emails, texts and notes.

Directors should make sure that they will continue to have access to minutes and board materials from the term of their directorship if necessitated by a subsequent litigation or investigation, even one commencing after their directorship has ended. Directors should not maintain their own files of notes and materials for this purpose. The creation of a personal set of documents would increase the risks of inconsistencies and other issues arising that would be to the detriment of both the director and the company.

Directors’ notes, if not properly handled, can result in unintentional waivers of privilege and violations of confidentiality obligations. In order to preserve attorney-client privilege where applicable, official minutes indicate that a lawyer was present and simply note the general topic discussed. Directors’ notes may not be annotated in the same manner and may contain more detail than is advisable; if these notes are treated carelessly, privilege may not survive. Similarly, if directors’ meeting notes are not destroyed, confidential information reflected in such notes may not be secure.

Directors must prepare carefully for and be actively engaged during board meetings. When they leave the boardroom, it is incumbent upon directors to handle their notes and board materials in a manner that is consistent with board policy and applicable law. Directors should review the board’s record retention policy and fully commit to following it. For electronic materials, such as board portals, the retention policy should automatically function to delete notes or other annotations of the materials. The consistent application of a thoughtful and well-tailored policy is in the best interests of the company, the board, and the directors themselves.

________________________________________________________________

*David A. Katz* is partner and Laura A. McIntosh is consulting attorney at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton publication by Mr. Katz and Ms. McIntosh that originally appeared in the New York Law Journal.

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 31 mai 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 31 mai 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « top 10 »

 

 

  1. Proposed Amendments to Delaware’s LLC and LP Acts
  2. Taxes and Mergers: Evidence from Banks During the Financial Crisis
  3. Labor Representation in Governance as an Insurance Mechanism
  4. Directors’ Notes: A Trap for the Unwary?
  5. Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms that Go Public?
  6. US Contentious Situations Update
  7. CEO Pay Ratio: A Deep Data Dive
  8. Principles and Best Practices for Virtual Annual Shareowner Meetings
  9. Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact
  10. Spotlight on Boards 2018

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 24 mai 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 24 mai 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « top 10 »

 

  1. Board Performance Evaluations that Add Value
  2. Cryptocurrency Compensation: A Primer on Token-Based Awards
  3. Does it Pay to Pay Attention?
  4. Non-Delaware Decisions on Director Nominations
  5. The Conflicted Role of Proxy Advisors
  6. How Valuable are Independent Directors? Evidence from External Distractions
  7. Elon Musk’s Compensation
  8. Why Shareholder Wealth Maximization Despite Other Objectives
  9. Congress Increases Pressure on Proxy Advisory Firms
  10. The DOJ’s New “Piling On” Policy

Quel client les firmes d’audit servent-elles ?


Voici un article-choc publié par Chris Hughes dans la revue Bloomberg qui porte sur l’indépendance (ou le manque d’indépendance) des quatre grandes firmes d’audit dans le monde.

Il y a une sérieuse polémique eu égard à l’indépendance réelle des grandes firmes d’audit.

Cet article donne les grandes lignes de la problématique et il esquisse des avenues de solution.

Qu’en pensez-vous ?

 

 

Just Whom Does an Auditor Really Serve?

 

Shareholders need to be the client, not company executives.

L’une des quatre grandes firmes

 

British lawmakers are pushing for a full-blown antitrust probe into the country’s four big accountancy firms following the demise of U.K. construction group Carillion Plc.

The current domination of KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, EY and Deloitte isn’t working for shareholders. But creating more competition among the bean counters won’t be enough on its own. The fundamental problem is who the client is. The thrust of reform should be on making auditors see that their client is the investor and not the company executive. Randgold Resources is the only FTSE 100 company not to be audited by one of the Big Four !

Carillion’s accounts weren’t completely useless. Recent annual reports contained red flags of the company’s deteriorating financial health that were apparent to the smart money. Some long funds cut their holdings and hedge funds took large short positions, as my colleague Chris Bryant points out.

If the evidence was there to those who looked hard, it’s odd that the company was given a clean bill of health from accountancy firm KPMG months before it went bust. The impression is that auditors are on the side of the company rather than the shareholder. (KPMG says it believes it conducted its audit appropriately.)

Would more competition have made a difference? Companies may have only one accountant available if the few competing firms are already working for a rival. A lack of choice in any market usually leads to lower quality.

One response would be to force the Big Four to shed clients to mid-tier firms, creating a Big Five or Big Six. The risk is this greater competition just leads to a race to the bottom on fees with no improvement in quality. Other remedies are needed first.

The combination of audit and more lucrative consultancy work has long been chided – with good reason. Consultancy creates a client-pleasing culture. That’s at odds with the auditor’s role in challenging the assumptions behind company statements.

Opponents of a separation say combining the two services helps attract talent. This is a weak argument. Further lowering the current cap on consultancy fees, or completely separating audit and consultancy, is hard to argue with.

The accountancy firm should clearly serve the non-executive directors on the company’s audit committee which, in turn, is charged with looking out for shareholders. The risk is that the auditor’s main point of contact is the executive in the form of the chief financial officer.

Shareholders already have a vote on the appointment of the auditor. But annual reports could provide more useful disclosure on the frequency and depth of the last year’s contact between the firm and the audit committee, and between the latter and shareholders.

Now consider the nature of the job itself. Companies present the accounts, auditors check them. Out pops a financial statement that gives the false impression of extreme precision. Numbers that are the based on assumptions might be better presented as a range, accompanied by a critique of the judgments applied by the company.

Creating more big audit firms may create upward pressure on quality. But so long as they aren’t incentivized to have shareholders front of mind, it won’t be a long wait for the next Carillion.

__________________________________________________________

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

L’évaluation du conseil d’administration et des administrateurs | Une activité essentielle


Il y a quelques années, j’ai publié, en collaboration avec Geoffrey KIEL et James BECK (1), un guide pratique des questions clés que les conseils d’administration devraient prendre en considération lorsqu’ils planifient une évaluation du conseil d’administration.

Cet article est toujours d’actualité ; il met l’accent sur l’utilité d’avoir des évaluations bien menées ainsi que sur les sept étapes à suivre pour obtenir des évaluations efficaces. Vous pouvez consulter cet article sur mon blogue : « SEPT ÉTAPES À SUIVRE POUR DES ÉVALUATIONS EFFICACES D’UN CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION ET DES ADMINISTRATEURS ».

Récemment, les auteurs Geoffrey KIEL* et James BECK, ont publié un livre sur l’importance de l’évaluation du conseil d’administration dans une perspective de valeur ajoutée : « Reviewing Your Board—A Guide to Board and Director Evaluation ».

Après avoir brossé un tableau de la progression très marquée de l’activité d’évaluation, les auteurs reviennent sur l’approche conceptuelle idéale à adopter.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de cette documentation afin de valider la portée de cette activité qui relève du comité de gouvernance.

Bonne lecture !

 

Board Performance Evaluations that Add Value

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « évaluation du fonctionnement du conseil d'administration »

 

Annual board evaluations are now commonplace for both for-profit and non-profit organizations, with specific board evaluation recommendations forming a key component in nearly every major corporate governance standard, review or report internationally.

Recent data on US boards from the global consulting firm Spencer Stuart shows that 98% of S&P 500 boards conduct a board evaluation of some type, although only about a third review the board as a whole, individual directors and committees as part of the process. [1] In the UK, the majority of boards on the FTSE 150 conduct board reviews, with 60.7% conducting their evaluations internally, while 38% of boards used an external facilitator. [2] Encouragingly, PwC reports that in 2017 68% of public company directors in the US say that the board has taken action based on the results of their last board review, which was an increase on the 49% from PwC’s survey in 2016. [3]

In a cross sector review of board effectiveness by the UK arm of Grant Thornton, more than 60% off those surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that there were “adequate processes in place to evaluate the performance of the whole board.” [4] But are “adequate processes” good enough? For example, adequate processes might mean a perfunctory activity is conducted annually to meet listing requirements or pay lip service to best practice governance. And what about the 40% of boards in the UK survey that do not have adequate processes?

Our experience, having been involved in many board evaluations in large and small, for-profit and non-profit organisations, is that the effectiveness of board reviews ranges from counterproductive exercises, which exacerbate already fractious and poorly performing boards, to truly transformational change leading to superior governance and organisational outcomes. Further, our experience suggests that understanding the relative advantages and disadvantages of the different types of board reviews, and properly planning and implementing the board’s evaluation significantly increases the likelihood of positive outcomes.

 

A seven step framework for board evaluations

 

We wrote our recently released book, Reviewing Your Board—A Guide to Board and Director Evaluation, to address this need for more information about board and director evaluations to give boards and their directors the opportunity to think about board evaluations and how they can be carried out to add—rather than subtract—value to the organization.

Our approach to effective board and director evaluations uses a seven-step framework (see Figure 1) that asks the vital questions all boards should consider when planning an evaluation. [5] While these questions must be asked for all board evaluations, the combined answers can be quite different. Thus, although the seven questions may be common to each, the subsequent review processes can range markedly in their scope, complexity and cost. Further, while our framework is described sequentially, in practice, most boards will not follow such a linear process.

 

Figure 1

Framework for a board evaluation

 

Source: Kiel, et al., 2018, p. 4

 

1. What are our objectives?

 

The first (and, in our opinion, most important) aspect of any evaluation is establishing why the board is doing it. The primary motivation can be characterized as “conformance” or “value adding”:

– conformance focuses on meeting the expectations of external scrutiny through compliance with various laws and following appropriate governance standards—whether mandated or self-imposed; and

– value adding focuses on improving both organizational and board performance. For example, taking proactive steps to ensure the board is effective in bringing new talent into the boardroom to maintain a proper mix of skills.

In practice, most board reviews will be aimed at meeting both conformance and value-adding objectives.

Without a solid rationale shared by the directors, any evaluation is likely to meet resistance and/or fail. There are many aspects of its performance the board may wish to evaluate. Apart from a desire to contribute to firm performance, many boards feel that regular evaluation contributes significantly to group processes within the board. A regular board review can indicate potential problems or differences of opinion that can be addressed before they become a source of conflict.

Generally, the answer to the first question in the seven-step framework will fall into one of the following two categories:

– organizational leadership, e.g., “We want to clearly demonstrate our commitment to performance management”; or

– problem resolution, e.g., “We do not seem to have the appropriate skills, competencies or motivation on the board”.

Clearly identified objectives enable the board to set specific goals for the evaluation and make decisions about the scope of the review; e.g., the approach the board will take, how many people will be involved, how much time and money will be allocated.

 

2. Who will be evaluated?

 

Comprehensive governance evaluations can entail reviewing the performance of a wide range of individuals and groups. Boards need to consider three groups:

– the board as whole (including committees);

– individual directors (including the role of the chair); and

– key governance personnel (generally the CEO and corporate/company secretary).

Considerations such as cost or time constraints, however, may prevent reviewing all three groups.

Alternatively, a board may have a very specific objective for the review process that does not require the review of all individuals and groups identified. In both cases, an effective evaluation requires the board to select the most appropriate individuals or groups to review, based on its objectives.

 

3. What will be evaluated?

 

The third stage in establishing a framework for a board evaluation involves deciding the criteria for the evaluation process. This is necessary whether the board is seeking general or specific performance improvements, and will suit boards seeking to improve areas as diverse as board processes, director skills, competencies and motivation, or even boardroom relationships.

To cover the range of objectives the board may have, including meeting any compliance requirements, board evaluations generally use some form of leading practice framework, such as the National Association of Corporate Directors’ Key Agreed Principles [6]or the Business Roundtable Principles of Corporate Governance[7] Of course, a comprehensive list of areas for investigation will need to be balanced with the scope of the evaluation and the resources available for the process. At this stage, a realistic assessment of the resources available, a component of which is the time availability of directors and other key governance personnel, can be made.

 

4. Who will be asked?

 

The vast majority of board and director evaluations concentrate exclusively on the board as the sole sources of information for the evaluation process. However, this discounts other potentially rich sources of feedback. Participants in the evaluation can be drawn from within or from outside the organization. Internally, directors, the CEO, senior executives and, in some cases, other management personnel and employees may be able to provide useful feedback on elements of the governance system. Externally, depending on the ownership structure, shareholders may provide valuable data for the review. Similarly, in some situations, key stakeholders such as government departments or agencies, major clients and suppliers may have close links with the board and be in a position to provide useful information on its performance.

 

5. What techniques will be used?

 

Depending on the degree of formality, the objectives of the evaluation, and the resources available, boards may choose between a range of qualitative and quantitative techniques. Quantitative data are in the form of numbers. They can be used to answer questions of “how much” or “how many”. Questionnaire-based surveys are by far the most common form of quantitative technique used in board evaluations and can be an important information-gathering tool.

Questions of “what”, “how”, and “why” require qualitative research methods. The three main methods used for collecting qualitative data are:

  1. Interviews, either one-on-one or in small groups, provide an excellent way of assessing directors’ perceptions, meaning and constructions of reality by asking for information in a way that allows them to express themselves in their own terms;
  2. Board meeting observation is especially useful when the evaluation objectives relate to issues of boardroom dynamics or relationships between individuals; and
  3. Document analysis of board packs, governance policies and similar can also be a rich source of information to identify areas of improvement in board processes.

When the board evaluation’s objectives are to identify governance issues, qualitative research is particularly useful. Qualitative data does, however, have several drawbacks. The major one being that interpreting the results requires judgment and experience on the part of the person undertaking the review and analysis.

There is no best methodology. Research techniques need to be adapted to the evaluation objectives and board context. However, there are advantages to be gained from combining a questionnaire with interviews. The questionnaire (most often delivered online) allows directors to benchmark the board along a series of dimensions (e.g. very poor to very good; 1 to 5; etc.), which allows directors to see where they have differing viewpoints from other directors. This can then be followed-up by interviews to allow directors to provide further context to the topics covered in the questionnaire and to raise areas of concern not covered in the survey.

 

6. Who will do the evaluation?

 

Who conducts the evaluation process will depend on whether the review is to be conducted internally or externally and what methodology is chosen. Internal reviews are conducted within the organization, either by one or more directors or governance personnel such as the corporate secretary. External reviews are conducted by external parties, most often either specialist consulting firms in corporate governance, large generalist consulting firms or law firms.

Internal reviews are more likely to provide board members with confidence surrounding the confidentiality of the process and are likely to cost less. All of these are important considerations when making the decision.

There are, however, several limitations to an internally conducted review. The internal reviewer may lack the skills required (e.g., interview technique, survey design), they are likely to have a bias (often unconscious) that carries over into the assessment and it is a less transparent process where the review process is carried out by one of the board’s own. Perhaps most significantly, the review is likely to achieve little if the reviewer (e.g., the chair) is the source of the problems or it may not be appropriate given the objectives of the review.

An external facilitator can offer a number of advantages including that:

– a good external facilitator is more likely to have undertaken a significant number of reviews and will often provide important insights into techniques, comparison points and new ideas;

– an external party often aids transparency and objectivity;

– a good external party can play a mediating role for boards facing sensitive issues through being the messenger for difficult matters involving group dynamics and egos.

Ultimately, factors such as the complexity of the governance problems faced, the experience of the board and cost considerations will determine whether the board decides to conduct the evaluation internally or seek external advice. However, it is now becoming more and more common for boards to alternate between an internal review one year and an external review the next.

 

7. What will we do with the results?

 

The evaluation’s objectives should be the determining factor when deciding to whom the results will be released. Most often, the board’s central objective will be to agree a series of actions that it can take to improve governance. Since the effectiveness of the governance system relies on people within the organization, communicating the results to all directors and key governance personnel is critical for boards seeking performance improvement. Where the objective of the board evaluation is to assess the quality of board—management relationships, a summary of the evaluation may also be shared with the senior management team.

If the board wishes to build its reputation for transparency and/or to develop relationships with external stakeholders, a positive, focused board evaluation is an excellent way of demonstrating that it is serious about governance and is committed to improving its performance. Obviously, when considering what information to communicate externally, a balance needs to be struck between transparency on the one hand and the need for shareholders and other external stakeholders to retain faith in the board’s ability and effectiveness on the other hand. Such communication outline how the evaluation was conducted (e.g. internal or external review), the focus of the review (e.g. role fulfilment) and, perhaps, some of the major outcomes (e.g. identified need to further focus on strategy or requirements for new skills on the board).

In communicating board review outcomes, it should be remembered that the confidentiality of the process contributes significantly to full and frank insights being provided by participants and provides the board with defensible results. As such, director confidentiality must be protected.

 

Implementing the outcomes

 

Once the annual performance evaluation is over, the board’s attention will move on to other issues and any stimulus for change that may have come when the results were first delivered can dissolve. Worse still, directors along with any executives who participated in the process will feel the evaluation has been a waste of their valuable time if recommendations for improvement were accepted, but not acted on. Therefore, it is critical that any agreed actions that come out of an evaluation are implemented and monitored. Many boards include a review of action steps as an agenda item to be tracked at each meeting. Milestones can be established for the achievement of the action plans and progress reviewed until all agreed changes have been implemented.

 

Other approaches to board evaluation

 

There are a number of different approaches to evaluating board performance that may better suit a board’s objectives and differ from the “traditional” board, individual director (self and peer), chair or committee evaluations. For example, board skills assessment and board maturity assessment all serve a different purpose and can bring about significant improvements to the board’s performance if appropriately implemented.

If the board’s primary objective in undertaking a review of its performance is to focus on the current and required skills of the board, a dedicated skills analysis rather than a board evaluation would be the best way to identify the skills that currently exist on the board and consequently, highlight any skills gaps.

More recently, a new type of board review is being used, board maturity assessment. Maturity assessments involve benchmarking the board against what is regarded as good practice. Maturity models have become popular in several management disciplines. They involve establishing different levels of practice from “basic” to “advanced” over the key functions of an activity, based on contemporary views of best practice. In corporate governance, the key functions include the role of the board in relation to the CEO, risk practices, compliance, the conduct of board meetings, effective use of board committees, and so on. The governance activity of the organization in all these governance dimensions is then assessed by an external evaluator experienced in corporate governance against the maturity model to provide a current maturity rating. Directors’ views can be part of the process, with directors indicating what level of maturity is desirable for the organization given its circumstances. Looking at the gaps between the current level of governance practice and the appropriate level as agreed by directors shows where better practice may be implemented. This approach also has the benefit of indirectly educating directors as to what is good governance practice.

 

Conclusion

 

Performance evaluation is an increasingly important feature of boardrooms across the globe. These reviews have benefits for individual directors, boards and the organizations for which they work. Boards also need to recognize that the evaluation process is an effective team-building, ethics-shaping activity. Our observation is that boards often neglect the process of engagement when undertaking evaluations; unfortunately, boards that fail to engage their members are missing a major opportunity for developing a shared set of board norms and inculcating a positive board and organizational culture. In short, the process is as important as the content.

______________________________________________________________-

Endnotes

1Spencer Stuart, 2017 Spencer Stuart US Board Indexwww.spencerstuart.com/research-and-insight/ssbi-2017, accessed 7 March 2018.(go back)

2Spencer Stuart, 2017 Spencer Stuart UK Board Indexwww.spencerstuart.com/research-and-insight/uk-board-index-2017, accessed 7 March 2018.(go back)

3 PwC, 2017 Annual Corporate Directors Surveyhttps://www.pwc.com/us/en/governance-insights-center/annual-corporate-directors-survey/assets/pwc-2017-annual-corporate–directors–survey.pdf, accessed 7 March 2018.(go back)

4Grant Thornton UK, 2017, The Board: creating and protecting valuehttps://www.grantthornton.co.uk/globalassets/1.-member-firms/united-kingdom/pdf/publication/board-effectiveness-report-2017.pdf, accessed 8 March 2018, p 10(go back)

5G Kiel, G Nicholson, J Tunny, and J Beck, 2018, Reviewing Your Board: A Guide to Board and Director Evaluation, Australian Institute of Company Directors, Sydney.(go back)

6National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), 2011, Key Agreed Principleshttps://www.nacdonline.org/files/PDF/KEY%20AGREED%20PRINCIPLES%202011.pdf, accessed 1 May 2018.(go back)

7Business Roundtable, 2016, Business Roundtable Principles of Corporate Governancehttps://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/Principles-of-Corporate-Governance-2016.pdf, accessed 1 May 2018.(go back)

___________________________________________________

*Professor Geoffrey Kiel is a Specialist Advisor and James Beck is Managing Director at Effective Governance Pty Ltd. This post is based on an Effective Governance publication by Prof. Kiel and Mr. Beck.

(1) Geoffrey KIEL, James BECK et Jacques GRISÉ (1) Geoffrey Kiel, Ph.D., premier vice-chancelier délégué et doyen de l’École d’administration, University of Notre Dame, Australie, et président de la société Effective Governance Pty Ltd, James Beck, directeur général, Effective Governance Pty Ltd, Jacques Grisé, Ph.D., F.Adm.A., collaborateur spécial du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), Faculté des sciences de l’administration, Université Laval, Québec.

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 17 mai 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 17 mail 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

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Conséquences à la non-divulgation d’une cyberattaque majeure


Quelles sont les conséquences de ne pas divulguer une intrusion importante du système de sécurité informatique ?

Les auteurs, Matthew C. Solomon* et Pamela L. Marcogliese, dans un billet publié sur le forum du HLS, ont étudié de près la situation des manquements à la sécurité informatique de Yahoo et ils nous présentent les conséquences de la non-divulgation d’attaques cybernétiques et de bris à la sécurité des informations des clients.

Ils exposent le cas très clairement, puis ils s’attardent aux modalités des arrangements financiers avec la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 

Comme ce sont des événements susceptibles de se produire de plus en plus, il importe que les entreprises soient bien au fait de ce qui les attend en cas de violation des obligations de divulgation.

Les auteurs font les cinq (5) constats suivants eu égard à la situation vécue par Yahoo :

 

— First, public companies should take seriously the SEC’s repeated warnings that one of its top priorities is ensuring that public companies meet their obligations to adequately disclose material cybersecurity incidents and risks. This requires regular assessment of cyber incidents and risks in light of the company’s disclosures, with the assistance of outside counsel and auditors as appropriate, and ensuring that there are adequate disclosure controls in place for such incidents and risks.

— Second, the SEC’s recently released interpretive guidance on cybersecurity disclosure is an important guidepost for all companies with such disclosure obligations. The guidance specifically cited the fact that the SEC views disclosure that a company is subject to future cybersecurity attacks as inadequate if the company had already suffered such incidents. Notably, the Yahoo settlement specifically faulted the company for this precise inadequacy in its disclosures. Similarly, the recent guidance encouraged companies to adopt comprehensive policies and procedures related to cybersecurity and to assess their compliance regularly, including the sufficiency of their disclosure controls and procedures as they relate to cybersecurity disclosure. The Yahoo settlement also found that the company had inadequate such controls.

— Third, at the same time the SEC announced the settlement, it took care to emphasize that “[w]e do not second-guess good faith exercises of judgment about cyber-incident disclosure.” [7] The SEC went on to note that Yahoo failed to meet this standard with respect to the 2014 Breach, but by articulating a “good faith” standard the SEC likely meant to send a message to the broader market that it is not seeking to penalize companies that make reasonable efforts to meet their cyber disclosure obligations.

— Fourth, it is also notable that the SEC charges did not include allegations that Yahoo violated securities laws with respect to the 2013 Breach. Yahoo had promptly disclosed the 2013 Breach after learning about it in late 2016, but updated its disclosure almost a year later with significant new information about the scope of the breach. The SEC’s recent guidance indicated that it was mindful that some material facts may not be available at the time of the initial disclosure, as was apparently the case with respect to the 2013 Breach. [8] At the same time, the SEC cautioned that “an ongoing internal or external investigation – which often can be lengthy – would not on its own provide a basis for avoiding disclosures of a material cybersecurity incident.” [9]

— Finally, it is worth noting that the Commission did not insist on settlements with any individuals. Companies, of course, can only commit securities violations through the actions of their employees. While it is not unusual for the Commission to settle entity-only cases on a “collective negligence” theory, the SEC Chair and the Enforcement Division’s leadership have emphasized the need to hold individuals accountable in order to maximize the deterrent impact of SEC actions. [10]

 

Bonne lecture !

 

Failure to Disclose a Cybersecurity Breach

 

 

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On April 24, 2018, Altaba, formerly known as Yahoo, entered into a settlement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), pursuant to which Altaba agreed to pay $35 million to resolve allegations that Yahoo violated federal securities laws in connection with the disclosure of the 2014 data breach of its user database. The case represents the first time a public company has been charged by the SEC for failing to adequately disclose a cyber breach, an area that is expected to face continued heightened scrutiny as enforcement authorities and the public are increasingly focused on the actions taken by companies in response to such incidents. Altaba’s settlement with the SEC, coming on the heels of its agreement to pay $80 million to civil class action plaintiffs alleging similar disclosure violations, underscores the increasing potential legal exposure for companies based on failing to properly disclose cybersecurity risks and incidents.

Background

As alleged, Yahoo learned in late 2014 that it had recently suffered a data breach affecting over 500 million user accounts (the “2014 Breach”). Yahoo did not disclose the 2014 Breach until September 2016. During the time period Yahoo was aware of the undisclosed breach, it entered into negotiations to be acquired by Verizon and finalized a stock purchase agreement in July 2016, two months prior to the disclosure of the 2014 Breach. Following the disclosure in September 2016, Yahoo’s stock price dropped 3% and it later renegotiated the stock purchase agreement to reduce the price paid for Yahoo’s operating business by $350 million.

In or about late 2016, following its disclosure of the 2014 Breach, Yahoo learned about a separate breach that had taken place in August 2013 and promptly announced that such breach had affected 1 billion users (the “2013 Breach”). In October 2017, Yahoo updated its disclosure concerning the 2013 Breach, announcing that it now believed that all 3 billion of its accounts had been affected.

The Settlement

Altaba’s SEC settlement centered on the 2014 Breach only. The SEC found that despite learning of the 2014 Breach in late 2014—which resulted in the theft of as many as 500 million of its users’ Yahoo usernames, email addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, hashed passwords, and security questions and answers, referred to internally as Yahoo’s “crown jewels”— Yahoo failed to timely disclose the material cybersecurity incident in any of its public securities filings until September 2016. Although Yahoo senior management and relevant legal staff were made aware of the 2014 Breach, according to the SEC, they “did not properly assess the scope, business impact, or legal implications of the breach, including how and where the breach should have been disclosed in Yahoo’s public filings or whether the fact of the breach rendered, or would render, any statements made by Yahoo in its public filings misleading.” [1] The SEC also faulted Yahoo’s senior management and legal staff because they “did not share information regarding the breach with Yahoo’s auditors or outside counsel in order to assess the company’s disclosure obligations in its public filings.” [2]

Among other things, the SEC found that Yahoo’s risk factor disclosures in its annual and quarterly reports from 2014 through 2016 were materially misleading in that they claimed the company only faced the risk of potential future data breaches, without disclosing that “a massive data breach” had in fact already occurred. [3]

The SEC also alleged that Yahoo management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations (“MD&A”) in those reports was also misleading to the extent it omitted known trends or uncertainties with regard to liquidity or net revenue presented by the 2014 Breach. [4]Finally, the SEC further found that Yahoo did not maintain adequate disclosure controls and procedures designed to ensure that reports from Yahoo’s information security team raising actual incidents of the theft of user data, or the significant risk of theft of user data, were properly and timely assessed to determine how and where data breaches should be disclosed in Yahoo’s public filings. [5]

Based on these allegations, the SEC found that Yahoo violated Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act and Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. [6] To settle the charges, Altaba, without admitting or denying liability, agreed to cease and desist from any further violations of the federal securities laws and pay a civil penalty of $35 million.

Takeaways

There are several important takeaways from the settlement:

— First, public companies should take seriously the SEC’s repeated warnings that one of its top priorities is ensuring that public companies meet their obligations to adequately disclose material cybersecurity incidents and risks. This requires regular assessment of cyber incidents and risks in light of the company’s disclosures, with the assistance of outside counsel and auditors as appropriate, and ensuring that there are adequate disclosure controls in place for such incidents and risks.

— Second, the SEC’s recently released interpretive guidance on cybersecurity disclosure is an important guidepost for all companies with such disclosure obligations. The guidance specifically cited the fact that the SEC views disclosure that a company is subject to future cybersecurity attacks as inadequate if the company had already suffered such incidents. Notably, the Yahoo settlement specifically faulted the company for this precise inadequacy in its disclosures. Similarly, the recent guidance encouraged companies to adopt comprehensive policies and procedures related to cybersecurity and to assess their compliance regularly, including the sufficiency of their disclosure controls and procedures as they relate to cybersecurity disclosure. The Yahoo settlement also found that the company had inadequate such controls.

— Third, at the same time the SEC announced the settlement, it took care to emphasize that “[w]e do not second-guess good faith exercises of judgment about cyber-incident disclosure.” [7] The SEC went on to note that Yahoo failed to meet this standard with respect to the 2014 Breach, but by articulating a “good faith” standard the SEC likely meant to send a message to the broader market that it is not seeking to penalize companies that make reasonable efforts to meet their cyber disclosure obligations.

— Fourth, it is also notable that the SEC charges did not include allegations that Yahoo violated securities laws with respect to the 2013 Breach. Yahoo had promptly disclosed the 2013 Breach after learning about it in late 2016, but updated its disclosure almost a year later with significant new information about the scope of the breach. The SEC’s recent guidance indicated that it was mindful that some material facts may not be available at the time of the initial disclosure, as was apparently the case with respect to the 2013 Breach. [8] At the same time, the SEC cautioned that “an ongoing internal or external investigation – which often can be lengthy – would not on its own provide a basis for avoiding disclosures of a material cybersecurity incident.” [9]

— Finally, it is worth noting that the Commission did not insist on settlements with any individuals. Companies, of course, can only commit securities violations through the actions of their employees. While it is not unusual for the Commission to settle entity-only cases on a “collective negligence” theory, the SEC Chair and the Enforcement Division’s leadership have emphasized the need to hold individuals accountable in order to maximize the deterrent impact of SEC actions. [10]

_________________________________________________________________________

Endnotes

1Altaba Inc., f/d/b/a Yahoo! Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10485, Exchange Act Release No. 83096, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 3937, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3937 (Apr. 24, 2018) at ¶ 14.(go back)

2Idat ¶ 15.(go back)

3Idat ¶¶ 2, 16.(go back)

4Id.(go back)

5Idat ¶ 15.(go back)

6Idat ¶¶ 22-23.(go back)

7Press Release, SEC, Altaba, Formerly Known As Yahoo!, Charged With Failing to Disclose Massive Cybersecurity Breach; Agrees To Pay $35 Million (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-71.(go back)

8As we have previously discussed, the federal securities laws do not impose a general affirmative duty on public companies to continuously disclose material information and, as acknowledged in Footnote 37 of the interpretive guidance, circuits are split on whether a duty to update exists. However, in circuits where a duty to update has been found to exist, a distinction has often been drawn between statements of a policy nature that are within the company’s control and statements describing then current facts that would be expected to change over time. The former have been held subject to a duty to update while the latter have not. See In re Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation, 180 F.3d 525, 536 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he voluntary disclosure of an ordinary earnings forecast does not trigger any duty to update.”); In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1433 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Duane Reade Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 02 Civ. 6478 (NRB), 2003 WL 22801416, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2003), aff’d sub nom. Nardoff v. Duane Reade, Inc., 107 F. App’x 250 (2d Cir. 2004) (“‘company has no duty to update forward–looking statements merely because changing circumstances have proven them wrong.’”).(go back)

9See SEC, Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 Fed. Reg 8166, 8169 (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/02/26/2018-03858/commission-statement-and-guidance-on-public- company-cybersecurity-disclosures.(go back)

10See, e.g., Steven R. Peikin, Co-Director, Div. Enf’t., SEC, Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of the SEC’s Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Keynote Address at N.Y.U. Program on Corporate Law and Enforcement Conference: No Turning Back: 40 Years of the FCAP and 20 Years of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Impacts, Achievements, and Future Challenges (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peikin2017-11-09;
SEC Div. Enf’t., Annual Report A Look Back at Fiscal Year 2017, at 2 (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report2017.pdf.(go back)

_______________________________________________________________________

*Matthew C. Solomon and Pamela L. Marcogliese are partners and Rahul Mukhi is counsel at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary Gottlieb publication by Mr. Solomon, Ms. Marcogliese, Ms. Mukhi, and Kal Blassberger.

Top 10 de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance au 10 mai 2018


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 10 mai 2018.

Comme à l’habitude, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

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  1. Corporate Purpose: ESG, CSR, PRI and Sustainable Long-Term Investment
  2. Do Women CEOs Earn More and Have More Diverse Boards?
  3. The Business Case for Clawbacks
  4. Integrated Alpha: The Future of ESG Investing
  5. CEO Attributes, Compensation, and Firm Value: Evidence from a Structural Estimation
  6. The Future of Merger Litigation in Federal Courts?
  7. The Impact of DOL Guidance on ESG-Focused Plans
  8. The Uncertain Role of IPOs in Future Securities Class Actions
  9. An Investor Consensus on U.S. Corporate Governance & Stewardship Practices
  10. Netflix Approach to Governance: Genuine Transparency with the Board

     

Le cycle de vie des sociétés régies par des classes d’actions diverses


Les études montrent que ces types d’arrangements ne sont pas immanquablement dommageables pour les actionnaires, comme nous laissent croire plusieurs groupes d’intérêt tels que le Conseil des investisseurs institutionnels et la firme de conseil Institutional Shareholder Services (« ISS »). Plusieurs militent en faveur d’une durée limitée pour de telles émissions d’actions.

Les récentes émissions d’actions à classes multiples des entreprises de haute technologie ne nous permettent pas, à ce stade-ci, de statuer sur les avantages à long terme pour les actionnaires.

Les auteurs, Martijn Cremers et coll., concluent qu’il est trop tôt pour se prononcer définitivement sur la question, et pour réglementer cette structure de capital. Voir à cet égard l’article suivant : Are Dual-Class Companies Harmful to Stockholders? A Preliminary Review of the Evidence.

Bonne lecture !

 

The Life-Cycle of Dual Class Firms

 

 

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In our paper, The Life-Cycle of Dual Class Firms, we consider the market valuation of dual class firms over their life cycle. Dual class financing is on the rise in recent years, particularly among high-tech firms, following Google’s seminal 2004 dual-class IPO structure. This financing choice leaves control of the firms in the hands of entrepreneurs, giving outside investors with inferior-vote shares no direct mechanism to influence the board or management. Rather, public investors buying inferior vote shares at the IPO are betting that granting the entrepreneurs such control allows them to better implement their unique vision.

However, as dual class firms mature and their vision is largely accomplished, entrepreneurs’ leadership may no longer be needed, and entrepreneurs may start self-serving behavior. Public investors’ resentment may then develop, accusing dual class firms’ controlling shareholders for wanting their money without any accountability. Such public pressure arguably recently led MSCI to issue a proposal to reduce the weight of inferior-vote shares in MSCI indices by multiplying the regular weight by the shares fractional voting power. Notably, the same MSCI also issued a report a few months ago stating that “[o]ur research shows that unequal voting stocks in aggregate outperformed the market over the period from November 2007 to August 2017, and that excluding them from market indexes would have reduced the indexes’ total returns by approximately 30 basis points per year over our sample period.” Obviously, confusion reigns over the merits of dual class financing.

Bebchuk and Kastiel (2017) (The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, Virginia Law Review) argue that any initial benefits of dual class structures decay with firm age, while the potential agency costs associated with dual class structures increase with time. Thus, Professors Bebchuk and Kastiel advocate sunset clauses to dual class financing. The sunset clauses would require the “non-interested” public shareholders of the firm to vote on whether or not to extend the dual class structure, some pre-determined number of years after the IPO. If the extension proposal is declined, firms would unify the low- and high-vote shares, i.e., convert all shares into a single class of shares with “one share one vote”.

In our paper, we empirically investigate the desirability of sunset provisions by examining the life-cycle of dual class firms. Using an extensive sample of all single-and dual-class firm IPOs in the U.S. during 1980-2015, and relying on comparing dual class firms to similar single class firms, we document several novel phenomena in the life cycle of dual class firms.

First, the difference in firm valuation between dual and single class firms strongly varies over the corporate life cycle. At the IPO, dual class firms tend to have higher valuations, as at the IPO year-end the market valuation of dual class firms is, on average, 11% higher than that of matched single class firms. This initial valuation premium of dual class firms dissipates in the years after the IPO, and on average it becomes insignificantly negative about six to nine years after the IPO. We also find that the difference between the voting and equity stakes of the controlling shareholders of dual class firms (the “wedge”) tends to increase as the firm ages. According to one of our estimates, the mean wedge increases from 16% one year after the IPO to 22% five years after the IPO, and to 26% nine years after the IPO. The widening of the wedge is typically associated with more severe valuation reducing agency problems—see Masulis et al. (2009) (Agency Costs and Dual-Class Companies, Journal of Finance). Bebchuk and Kastiel (2018) (The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, forthcoming Georgetown Law Review) analyze the perils of the widening wedges and advocate informing the public and capping it.

Second, we document interesting differences between dual class firms with a valuation premium (relative to their matched single class firms) at the IPO and dual class firms with a valuation discount at the IPO. Dual class firms with a valuation premium at the end of their IPO year gradually tend to lose this premium, until their valuations become very similar to those of their single class counterparts about six to nine years after the IPO. In contrast, we find no evidence for a life cycle in the relative valuation of initially discounted dual class firms, as their valuation discount persists from the time of their IPO to when they are mature dual class firms as well. The behavior of the subsample of dual class firms with a valuation premium at the IPO suggests that for some firms the dual class structure does not harm valuations, at least in the first decade after the IPO. On the other hand, the behavior of the subsample of dual class firms with an initial valuation discount, which we find is highly persistent, suggests that a mandatory sunset provision may be useful for these firms.

Third, a natural solution to possible dual class inefficiency is a voluntary firm-initiated dual class share unification, in which all share classes are transformed into “one share one vote”. We find that only about 20% of dual class firms unify their shares within 9 years after the IPO. Furthermore, voluntary unifications become rare after six years following the IPO. Most of the mature dual class firms elect to retain a dual class structure, perhaps because unification is against the interests of their controlling shareholders. This implies that some inefficient dual class structures may persist.

Our findings suggest that some sort of a sunset provision might be useful, especially for firms that trade at a valuation discount. Further, regarding the set-in time of any sunset provision, our study suggests to wait at least six years after the IPO. Regulators should also be worried about some potential negative consequences of any sunset regulation. First, some founders may be more reluctant to issue publicly traded shares if their reign over the firm is likely to be more limited in time. Public may lose the opportunity to invest in some breakthrough firms. Second, controlling shareholders may intensify their private benefits extraction in the period before their extra power expires. Third, it is possible that shareholders may elect to abolish dual class structures even when they are (still) beneficial.

Finally, our paper also documents several other interesting life cycle phenomena of dual class firms such as their higher survival rates, similar stock returns and lower likelihoods of being taken over, compared to matched single class firms. We conclude that unequal vote structures are viable financing tools.

The complete paper is available for download here.

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*Martijn Cremers* is Bernard J. Hank Professor of Finance at University of Notre Dame Mendoza College of Business, and an ECGI research member; Beni Lauterbach is a Professor of Finance and the Raymond Ackerman Family Chair in Corporate Governance at Bar Ilan University Graduate School of Business Administration, and an ECGI research member; Anete Pajuste is an Associate Professor of Finance and Head of Accounting and Finance Department at the Stockholm School of Economics, and an ECGI research member. This post is based on their recent paper.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock (discussed on the Forum here) and The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers (discussed on the Forum here), both by Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel.

Les six principes qui gouvernent la conduite des investisseurs — ISG


Aujourd’hui, je vous présente le point de vue de l’association Investor Stewardship Group (the “ISG”) Governance Principles, eu égard aux principes de gouvernance que celle-ci entend promouvoir.

Je reproduis ici les principaux éléments de l’article publié par Anne Meyer* et paru sur le forum du Harvard Law School, notamment les six principes qui gouvernent leur conduite.

1 — Les CA sont redevables envers les actionnaires ;

2 — Les actionnaires doivent avoir des droits de vote qui sont proportionnels à leurs intérêts économiques ;

3 — Les CA doivent être à l’écoute des actionnaires et être proactifs dans la compréhension de leurs perspectives ;

4 — Les CA doivent avoir une solide structure de leadership indépendante ;

5 — Les CA doivent adopter des structures de gouvernance qui mènent à des pratiques efficaces ;

6 — Les CA doivent adopter des structures de rémunération des dirigeants qui sont alignées sur la stratégie à long terme de l’entreprise.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

The Investor Stewardship Group’s Governance Principles

 

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In this post, we provide an overview of the Investor Stewardship Group (the “ISG”) Governance Principles and steps for public companies to consider when evaluating how the principles may be incorporated into their own disclosure and engagement priorities. The ISG’s website, including a link to the ISG Governance Principles, is available here. In January 2017, the Investor Stewardship Group (the “ISG”), a collective of large U.S.-based and international institutional investors and asset managers, announced the launch of its Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance (the “Framework”). The measure is an unprecedented attempt to establish a set of elementary corporate governance principles for U.S. listed companies (the “ISG Governance Principles”) as well as parallel stewardship principles for U.S. institutional investors. The Framework’s effective date was January 1, 2018, in order to provide U.S. listed companies with time to adjust to the corporate governance principles prior to the 2018 proxy season.

As the 2018 proxy season gets into full swing, there is evidence that ISG members will be utilizing the Framework as a tool for evaluating the governance regimes at their portfolio companies, informing their engagement priorities, and potentially factoring compliance with the ISG Governance Principles into selected voting policies and decisions. In December, the ISG issued a press release “encouraging companies to articulate how their governance structures and practices align with the ISG’s Corporate Governance Principles and where and why they differ in approach”, leaving it to companies to determine how and where to disclose such alignment. And at least one large investor, State Street Global Advisors, has specifically highlighted that it will screen portfolio companies for compliance with the principles.

As a result, companies and their boards should continue to benchmark and understand how their specific governance practices relate to ISG Governance Principles and remain cognizant of this new regime as they prepare for engagement with investors and draft public disclosures.

 

Background

 

The ISG’s global reach and financial influence is significant; currently consisting of 50 investors representing over $22 trillion invested in the U.S. equity markets. The ISG’s signatories includes some of the largest and most influential institutional investors, including BlackRock, CalSTRS, State Street Global Advisors, TIAA Investments, T. Rowe Price, ValueAct Capital and Vanguard, among others. The Framework’s stewardship principles emphasize that these institutional investors have a vested interest and responsibility for the long-term economic success of their portfolio companies.

The ISG’s roll-out of the Framework characterized it as a “sustained initiative” and emphasized an evolutionary view of the ability of U.S. companies and investors to work together under the Framework.

Corporate governance practices at U.S. listed companies have historically been informed by multiple regulatory and rules-based regimes. Rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, stock exchange listing requirements, state corporate codes, case law and federal legislation adopted in the wake of past financial market crises, have been the primary dictating standards. More recently, shareholders and other stakeholders have played a larger role in influencing corporate governance norms at U.S. listed companies through engagement and various forms of shareholder activism. In contrast, the ISG Governance Principles are based substantially on U.K., Continental European and other non-U.S. frameworks that establish principles-based corporate governance standards and tend to rely on “comply-or-explain” accountability. [1] Advocates for this type of principles-based approach stress the flexibility that it gives for companies to adopt a tailored response to important tenets such as boardroom transparency, as opposed to responding more narrowly to prescriptive rules. As institutional investors continue to focus more attention on environmental and social matters, including related governance concerns, the Framework’s principles-based approach will be a tool, for both institutions and companies, to promote mutually agreeable objectives, particularly given the lack of rulemaking or legislation mandating more specific disclosure on trending topics such as board diversity and environmental concerns.

 

The ISG Governance Principles

 

The six ISG Governance Principles are broad principles that will not look new to those who have been following key issues in corporate governance over the past several years. Indeed, they were designed to reflect the common corporate governance principles that are already embedded in member institutions’ proxy voting and engagement guidelines. The principles emphasize the importance of boardroom effectiveness and oversight, alignment of executive compensation with long-term financial results, and board accountability demonstrated in part through the adoption of governance best practices, including a one-share one-vote capital structure and independent board leadership.

Principle 1: Boards are accountable to shareholders

This principle encompasses the annual election of directors, majority voting, proxy access and more robust disclosure surrounding board practices and corporate governance. Companies are also asked to explain how any anti-takeover measures are in the best long-term interest of the company.

Interestingly, BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink recently published a letter to the CEOs at the world’s largest public companies in which he argued explicitly that boards are accountable to other stakeholders, such as employees and customers, in addition to shareholders.

Principle 2: Shareholders should be entitled to voting rights in proportion to their economic interest

This principle sets a base line of one-share one-vote and encourages companies with existing multi-class share structures to review and consider phasing out control shares.

In 2017, this issue became national news when Snap Inc. filed for an IPO of non-voting shares. Many large investors were vehemently opposed and at the urging of the Council for Institutional Investors and other investor advocates, the stock index provider FTSE Russell refused to include these shares in its indices.

Principle 3: Boards should be responsive to shareholders and be proactive in order to understand their perspectives

Under this principle, companies are expected to implement shareholder proposals that receive “significant” support or explain why they have not done so. Independent directors are encouraged to participate in engagement on matters that are meaningful to investors, and directors may be held accountable with “against” votes in instances where investors do not feel that their concerns have been adequately addressed.

Principle 4: Boards should have a strong, independent leadership structure

There are two common independent leadership structures at U.S. companies—an independent chairperson and an independent lead director (where the role of Chairman and CEO are combined)—and the principles acknowledge that signatory investors have differing opinions on whether they provide adequate independent oversight.

The overarching position under the principles is that the role of the independent board leader should be “clearly defined and sufficiently robust to ensure effective and constructive leadership.”

Principle 5: Boards should adopt structures and practices that enhance their effectiveness

This principle encompasses an array of board structure and effectiveness issues, including: strong board composition and board diversity; board and committee responsibilities; director attentiveness, preparedness and time commitments; and board refreshment.

Board diversity, in particular gender diversity, has emerged as a high priority for most of the largest institutional investors. There has also been a focus on screening for long-tenured directors and directors that are over-boarded or have poor attendance records as a proxy for identifying directors that may not be adequately engaged or independent.

Principle 6: Boards should develop management incentive structures that are aligned with the long-term strategy of the company

This principle emphasizes that the board, in particular the compensation committee, is responsible for ensuring that drivers and performance goals that underpin the company’s long-term strategy are adequately reflected in a company’s management incentive structure.

Steps to Consider

As noted, the ISG Governance Principles are intended to provide a framework of broad, high-level principles. The individual investors that comprise the ISG have their own voting guidelines and engagement priorities that are tailored to their own investment philosophy and strategy. Even on current hot button issues, such as board diversity, investors have differing views and companies should consider the practices they adopt depending upon their specific facts and circumstances. There are, however, general steps that we recommend companies take to address the growing influence of the Framework.

These include:

Understand how the company’s corporate governance structure and practices relate to the six ISG Governance Principles.

Review the company’s public disclosure regarding corporate governance structure and practices; consider enhancements to be responsive to the ISG’s request that companies disclose how their governance aligns or differs from the ISG Governance Principles.

As with other corporate governance benchmarking exercises, companies should be particularly cognizant of how and why their practices may differ from the ISG Governance Principles and whether these differences are adequately explained in public disclosures. As investors screen their portfolio companies’ governance practices, they will often consider valid explanations, but in the absence of effective disclosure the company may be unnecessarily penalized.

Management and the board should be informed and prepared to respond to questions about the company’s alignment with the ISG Governance Principles during shareholder engagements. Companies can also consider proactively addressing the issue in written materials or prepared remarks during investor presentations.

In preparing for shareholder engagements with ISG signatories, understand how and if they are explicitly incorporating the ISG Governance Principles into engagement and voting priorities and continue to screen their individual voting and engagement policies.

Companies should determine whether, and how, they wish to address and incorporate the ISG Governance Principles based upon their own specific governance profile, disclosure regime and approach to shareholder engagement.


Endnotes

See in particular the UK Investor Stewardship Code, on which the US ISG Principles are largely based. The UK Code “sets out a number of areas of good practice to which … institutional investors should aspire.” Available here.


*Anne Meyer is Senior Managing Director, Don Cassidy is Executive Vice President, and Rajeev Kumar is Senior Managing Director at Georgeson LLC. This post is based their recent Georgeson publication. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst.

L’application concrète d’un huis clos – en rappel


Nous avons déjà abordé l’importance d’inscrire un item « huis clos » à l’ordre du jour des réunions du conseil d’administration. Celui-ci doit normalement être à la fin de la réunion et comporter une limite de temps afin d’éviter que la réunion ne s’éternise… et que les membres de la direction (qui souvent attendent la fin de la rencontre) soient mieux informés.

Ensuite, le président du conseil d’administration (PCA) devrait rencontrer le président et chef de la direction (PCD) en privé, et dans les meilleurs délais, afin de rendre compte des résultats et de la portée du huis clos. Cette responsabilité du PCA est déterminante, car les dirigeants ont de grandes attentes et un souci eu égard aux discussions du huis clos.

Plusieurs dirigeants et membres de conseil m’ont fait part de leurs préoccupations concernant la tenue des huis clos. Il y a des malaises dissimulés en ce qui a trait à cette activité ; il faut donc s’assurer de bien gérer la situation, car les huis clos peuvent souvent avoir des conséquences inattendues, voire contre-productives !

Ainsi, le huis clos :

(1) ne doit pas être une activité imprévue et occasionnelle inscrite à l’ordre du jour

(2) doit comporter une limite de temps

(3) doit être piloté par le président du conseil

(4) doit comporter un suivi systématique, et

(5) doit se dérouler dans un lieu qui permet de préserver la confidentialité absolue des discussions.

J’insiste sur cette dernière condition parce que l’on a trop souvent tendance à la négliger ou à l’oublier, carrément. Dans de nombreux cas, la rencontre du conseil a lieu dans un local inapproprié, et les dirigeants peuvent entendre les conversations, surtout lorsqu’elles sont très animées…

Au début de la séance, les membres sont souvent insoucieux ; avec le temps, certains peuvent s’exprimer très (trop) directement, impulsivement et de manière inconvenante. Si, par mégarde, les membres de la direction entendent les propos énoncés, l’exercice peut prendre l’allure d’une véritable calamité et avoir des conséquences non anticipées sur le plan des relations interpersonnelles entre les membres de la direction et avec les membres du conseil.

 

registre-conseils-d-administration

 

L’ajout d’un huis clos à l’ordre du jour témoigne d’une volonté de saine gouvernance, mais, on le comprend, il y a un certain nombre de règles à respecter si on ne veut pas provoquer la discorde. Les OBNL, qui ont généralement peu de moyens, sont particulièrement vulnérables aux manquements à la confidentialité ! Je crois que dans les OBNL, les dommages collatéraux peuvent avoir des incidences graves sur les relations entre employés, et même sur la pérennité de l’organisation.

J’ai à l’esprit plusieurs cas de mauvaise gestion des facteurs susmentionnés et je crois qu’il vaut mieux ne pas tenir le bien-fondé du huis clos pour acquis.

Ayant déjà traité des bienfaits des huis clos lors d’un billet antérieur, je profite de l’occasion pour vous souligner, à nouveau, un article intéressant de Matthew Scott sur le site de Corporate Secretary qui aborde un sujet qui préoccupe beaucoup de hauts dirigeants : le huis clos lors des sessions du conseil d’administration ou de certains comités.

L’auteur explique très bien la nature et la nécessité de cette activité à inscrire à l’ordre du jour du conseil. Voici les commentaires que j’exprimais à cette occasion.

«Compte tenu de la “réticence” de plusieurs hauts dirigeants à la tenue de cette activité, il est généralement reconnu que cet item devrait toujours être présent à l’ordre du jour afin d’éliminer certaines susceptibilités.

Le huis clos est un temps privilégié que les administrateurs indépendants se donnent pour se questionner sur l’efficacité du conseil et la possibilité d’améliorer la dynamique interne; mais c’est surtout une occasion pour les membres de discuter librement, sans la présence des gestionnaires, de sujets délicats tels que la planification de la relève, la performance des dirigeants, la rémunération globale de la direction, les poursuites judiciaires, les situations de conflits d’intérêts, les arrangements confidentiels, etc. On ne rédige généralement pas de procès-verbal à la suite de cette activité, sauf lorsque les membres croient qu’une résolution doit absolument apparaître au P.V.

La mise en place d’une période de huis clos est une pratique relativement récente, depuis que les conseils d’administration ont réaffirmé leur souveraineté sur la gouvernance des entreprises. Cette activité est maintenant considérée comme une pratique exemplaire de gouvernance et presque toutes les sociétés l’ont adoptée.

Notons que le rôle du président du conseil, en tant que premier responsable de l’établissement de l’agenda, est primordial à cet égard. C’est lui qui doit informer le PCD de la position des membres indépendants à la suite du huis clos, un exercice qui demande du tact!

Je vous invite à lire l’article ci-dessous. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus».

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