Voici le document de consultation de l’OCDE sur la révision des principes de gouvernance |2014, présenté à Paris le 17 mars 2014. Ce document est en version anglaise seulement. Après la révision, l’OCDE produira des versions dans toutes les langues !
Celui-ci explicite les objectifs de politiques publiques en gouvernance, explore le nouveau paysage qui commande des changements en gouvernance et suggère sept (7) domaines susceptibles d’engendrer des changements importants au document Principe de gouvernance de 2004 (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance).
Je vous invite à participer à cette consultation si vous croyez utile de le faire. Ci-dessous, une introduction, suivie des 7 développements qui influeront sur la nouvelle version des principes de gouvernance de l’OCDE.
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance is a public policy instrument intended to assist governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, regulatory and institutional framework for corporate governance. As formulated in the mandate that was given to the OECD Corporate Governance Committee in 2010, the objective is to contribute to « economic efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability ». In practice, this objective is achieved by formulating principles for policies that give market participants sound economic incentives to perform their respective roles within a framework of checks and balances where transparency, supervision and effective enforcement provides confidence in market practices and institutions.
English: The logo of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
While the Principles may inspire voluntary initiatives and influence practices in individual companies, the Principles do not aspire to include a shopping list of what individual market participants, such as shareholders, boards, managers and other stakeholders, from their unique perspectives, may consider good business judgment or sound commercial practices. What works in one company or for one investor may not necessarily be generally applicable as public policy or of systemic economic importance to society.
In order to be relevant and effective, the legal and regulatory framework must be shaped with respect to the economic reality in which it will be implemented. This is true also for the recommendations made in the Principles. And since they were last revised in 2004, the world has experienced a number of important events and structural developments in both the financial and corporate sectors. This obviously includes the financial crisis. But equally important for the review of the Principles are the far reaching changes in corporate ownership and investment practices. In some respects, these changes have come to challenge conventional wisdom and the relevance of current corporate governance standards. Several of these developments have been documented and analysed by the Corporate Governance Committee and the Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables and some of the background reports that have been written to support the review are annexed to this note for reference.
Seven main events and developments of importance to the review of the Principles can be identified:
The financial crisis.
The financial crisis revealed severe shortcomings in corporate governance. When most needed, existing standards failed to provide the checks and balances that companies need in order to cultivate sound business practices. Corporate governance weaknesses in remuneration, risk management, board practices and the exercise of shareholder rights played an important role in the development of the financial crisis and such weaknesses extended not only to the financial sector, but to companies more generally. The lessons from the financial crisis are discussed in the Committee’s report « Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Conclusions and Emerging Good Practices to Enhance Implementation of the Principles » (2010).
Developments in institutional ownership, investment strategies and trading techniques.
Since the Principles were revised in 2004, assets under management by institutional investors have increased considerably. We have also seen a surge in new types of institutional investors, investment vehicles and trading techniques. Taken together, these developments have affected the character and quality of ownership engagement. Many of the largest institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds use indexing as the prime investment strategy. A special, and increasingly popular, version of indexing is the use of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), which increased by more than 1000 percent between 2004 and 2011. A common characteristic of these investment practices is that they motivate investors to pay little or no attention to the fundamentals of individual companies, since the composition of the index is pre-defined and adjustments in the portfolio is not by active choice but rather a result of the index weighting. The same effect results from the surge in so-called high frequency trading where the investment strategy and ultra-short holding periods do not motivate any corporate specific analysis or ownership engagement. A fourth development that has attracted a lot of interest and debate is co-location of brokers, data vendors and other participants’ computer capacity within the stock exchanges’ data centres. This has raised concerns about confidence in a level playing field among different categories of investors with respect to market information. These developments and their implications for the economic incentives for ownership engagement among institutional investors are further discussed in « Institutional Investors as Owners – Who Are They and What Do They Do? » (2013).
Developments in the investment chain and the use of service providers.
The real world of ownership characterised by institutional (or intermediary) investors is a very different reality than the model textbook world of company law and economics, which assumes a strict and uncompromised alignment of interest between the performance of the company and the income of the ultimate shareholder. Instead of a straight line from « from profit to pocket », which is assumed in theory, we have an extended and sometimes very complex investment chain where different actors may have different incentives. The implications for the quality of ownership engagement are discussed in the background report « Institutional Investors as Owners – Who Are They and What Do They Do? » (2013). Among other aspects, the report highlights the possible implications of cross-investments between different institutional investors and the extensive use of proxy advisers, which is sometimes argued to impose a box ticking culture of « one-size-fits-all ». The last couple of decades have also seen an increase in outsourcing of asset management to external asset managers who may also be charged with carrying out the ownership functions. The complexity of the investment chain is also influenced by changes in stock market structures, trading practices and investment strategies. One example is the increased use of dark pools and off-exchange trading platforms that has increased concerns about the quality of the price discovery process and equal access to market information, which is so essential for efficient allocation of capital.
Developments in shareholder rights and participation.
Since the last review of the Principles, shareholder rights in many countries have been strengthened and there is a general trend to empower the shareholder meeting in the corporate decision-making process, particularly with respect to board nomination and remuneration policies. Technological advancements have also contributed to facilitating shareholder participation in the shareholder meetings. As documented in the report « Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today’s Equity Markets » (2013), several studies illustrate a relatively high level of participation in shareholder meetings in most OECD countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States that have predominantly dispersed ownership at corporate level. Today, the discussion on shareholder participation is mainly focused on the actual quality of shareholder monitoring and engagement, with the exception of issues related to shareholder co-operation. In some countries, particularly in emerging market economies, it is also argued that ownership engagement is impeded by difficulties with respect to placing items on the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting; the rules for convening shareholders’ meetings; limited access to relevant documentation and restrictions on share ownership by institutional investors.
Developments in corporate characteristics and business models.
Investments in fixed assets, such as machinery and buildings, have for decades been seen as the main source of capital formation. A recent OECD study1, however, shows that business investment in intangible assets has been increasing faster than investments in fixed assets for a number of years in many OECD countries and already accounts for more than half of the total business investment in some countries. The result is an increased dependence on human capital and intangible assets for innovation and value creation at firm level. At the same time, there has been significant number of acquisitions by some large established companies in more intangible-asset-intensive industries, partly through their venture units. Together with the decrease in the number of new listings in advanced stock markets, these developments have raised concerns about the ability of growth companies to develop and expand as independent companies. One preliminary indicator is the decrease in the share of young companies as percentage of the total number of companies in the US by 16% over the last decade. Another important development in terms of corporate characteristics and business models is the creation and surge of alternative corporate structures, mainly in the form of partnerships. This includes publicly traded partnerships (PTPs) and master limited partnerships (MSPs) that trade on securities exchanges.
Developments in corporate ownership.
Traditionally, the international corporate governance debate has focused on situations with dispersed ownership where the conflict is a zero sum game between dispersed owners on the one hand and incumbent management on the other hand. This « agency » approach has its merits but it also has important weaknesses. One important weakness is that most listed companies around the world are not characterized by dispersed ownership. Rather, they have a controlling or dominant owner. This is particularly true in emerging markets. But controlling owners are also common in most advanced economies, including the US and continental Europe. It has been argued that the focus on dispersed ownership is of limited help when addressing corporate governance issues in companies that have a controlling owner. The presence of controlling owners is generally assumed to provide strong incentives for informed ownership engagement and to overcome the fundamental agency problem between shareholders and managers. There are also arguments that the incentives for controlling owners to assume the costs for this ownership engagement are weakened by restrictions on the possibilities of controlling owners to exercise their rights and be properly compensated for their efforts to monitor. Some of these are discussed in the background paper « The Law and Economics of Controlling Owners in Corporate Governance » (2013). At the same time, there are concerns that controlling owners in a weak regulatory framework may take advantage of minority shareholders through abusive related party transactions. This is discussed in the report « Related Party Transactions and Minority Shareholder Rights » (2012).
Developments in the functioning of public stock markets.
Corporate governance policies are focused on companies that are traded on the public stock market. To understand the functioning and structure of public stock markets is therefore essential for getting the corporate governance rules right. And today, stock markets look very different from what they did when the OECD Principles were first established. The developments are well documented in the background reports « Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today’s Equity Markets » (2013) and « Making Stock markets Work to Support Economic Growth » (2013), which address issues such as market fragmentation, increased use of dark pools, changes in « tick-size », high-frequency trading and co-location. The reports also show that during the last decade, some of the leading stock markets in the world have lost as much as half of their listed companies and that the average size of companies that find their way to the stock market has increased. At the same time, stock exchanges in emerging markets, notably in Asia, have increased the number of listed companies significantly. Between 2008 and 2012 a majority of all new listings in the world were in emerging markets. Since the free float (the portion of outstanding shares regularly available for public trading) is relatively small in these markets, one consequence of this development is an increase in the number of publicly traded companies that have a controlling owner. Another important development is the occurrence of cross-listings and secondary listings, which raises issues related to the standards and procedures for recognizing of corporate governance standards in primary listing venues and the allocation of supervisory obligations between listing stock exchanges. We have also seen a development where stock exchanges have demutualised and become listed companies on themselves; so called self-listing. At the same time, there has been a certain degree of consolidation through mergers of regulated exchanges both at national and international level, which was coupled with the emergence of new venues for trading; such as alternative trading venues and dark pools.
First released in May 1999 and last revised in 2004, the OECD Corporate Governance Committee has launched a further review of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. The review process starts in 2014 with the objective of conclusion within one year.
The OECD Principles are one of the 12 key standards for international financial stability of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and form the basis for the corporate governance component of the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes of the World Bank Group.
The rationale for the review is to ensure the continuing high quality, relevance and usefulness of the Principles taking into account recent developments in the corporate sector and capital markets. The outcome should provide policy makers, regulators and other rule-making bodies with a sound benchmark for establishing an effective corporate governance framework.
The basis for the review will be the 2004 version of the Principles, which embrace the shared understanding that a high level of transparency, accountability, board oversight, and respect for the rights of shareholders and role of key stakeholders is part of the foundation of a well-functioning corporate governance system. These core values should be maintained and, as appropriate, be strengthened to reflect experiences since 2004.
As the Principles are a global standard also adopted by the FSB, all FSB member jurisdictions are invited to participate in the review as Associates and have the same decision-making rights as OECD members.
The review will benefit from consultations with stakeholders, including the business sector, investors, professional groups at national and international levels, trade unions, civil society organisations and other international standard setting bodies.
Peer reviews – In response to the corporate governance challenges that came into focus in the wake of the financial crisis, the Corporate Governance Committee launched a thematic review process designed to facilitate the effective implementation of the OECD Principles and to assist market participants and policy makers to respond to emerging corporate governance risks. These peer reviews will provide valuable background support to the review.
Voici une série de huit articles, publiés le 31 mars 2014 par les experts du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) dans le volet Dossier de l’édition Les Affaires.com
Découvrez comment les entreprises et les administrateurs doivent s’adapter afin de tirer profit des meilleures pratiques. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture !
Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un document de la firme Thomson Reuters (White paper) qui aborde les écueils que n’ont pas su toujours éviter les responsables d’audit interne lors du déploiement de leur processus de planification annuelle/triennale fondé sur les risques.
Votre planification prend-t-elle vraiment en compte les objectifs stratégiques de votre organisation ainsi que les risques qui pourraient prévenir leur réalisation…
Votre planification prend-t-elle vraiment en compte les travaux réalisés par les autres fonctions d’assurance de votre organisation (Gestion des risques, Conformité, Finance, etc..)…
Votre planification prend-t-elle vraiment en compte les préoccupations des dirigeants….
Voici un aperçu de la table des matières du document. Bonne lecture et bonne réflexion.
As the COSO Internal Control – Integrated Framework (2013) states, « risk assessment involves a dynamic and iterative process for identifying and assessing risks to the achievement of objectives ». Yet many in-house internal audit functions look at the annual internal audit risk assessment process as a check-the-box activity, required mainly to be in compliance with the IIA professional practices framework.
Typically, a three or five-year review cycle for the entire organization is already in place, and the annual internal audit risk assessment barely scratches the surface: It is merely used to justify minor modifications in the risk-based internal audit plan. Yet the internal audit risk assessment presents an often missed opportunity for internal auditors to understand their organization’s evolving objectives and implement a more dynamic risk-based approach to the internal audit process. Let’s take a look at a typical scenario played out every day and see if we, as uninvolved by-standers, can audit the process and see it if falls short in any way.
In advance of this year’s risk assessment, the internal audit department reviewed and revised their risk assessment process and the various preparation materials for management participants. The preparation materials included a list of key management participants with their preferred contact method, a list of internal audit risk assessment questions, an announcement letter explaining the importance of the annual risk assessment process, and a presentation that provided examples of beneficial insight received from the previous year’s risk assessment.
During the risk assessment, the internal audit staff rigorously captures each management remarks in an effort to record each detail, be it quantitative or qualitative. As the « scribe, » the internal audit staff is responsible for note taking, while the internal audit director asks management a series of questions from the annual list of internal audit risk assessment queries. The internal audit director conducts the interview in a way that illustrates both their tremendous understanding of the business and their ability to not get bogged down in the details. The individual representing management, on the other hand, usually provides general responses highlighting a few generic risks inherent in their business, but not enough for one to actually audit. One of those general responses was around an increase in the organization’s credit risk exposure.
The Future of Information Technology (Photo credit: MDGovpics)
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les résultats d’un sondage très poussé effectué par la firme PROTIVITI qui présente les priorités 2014 dans le domaine des technologies de l’information.
Ce document expose une liste assez exhaustive de thèmes à considérer sur diverses problématiques IT. On y commente les principaux résultats du sondage et on fait état des questions-clés susceptibles d’intéresser les administrateurs et les dirigeants.
À l’instar de Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, je vous encourage à lire ce document récent et très pertinent pour les organisations aux prises avec diverses problématiques liées au champ IT.
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose une très intéressante lecture publiée par David F. Larcker et Brian Tayan, de la Stanford Graduate School of Business qui porte sur la conception que se fait Charles Munger de la bonne gouvernance des sociétés.
Les auteurs nous proposent de répondre à trois questions relatives à la position de Munger, vice-président du conseil de Berkshire :
1. Le système de gouvernance basé sur la confiance avancé par Munger pourrait-il s’appliquer à différents types d’organisations ?
2. Quelles pratiques de gouvernance sont-elles nécessaires et quelles pratiques sont-elles superflues ?
3. Comment s’assurer que la culture organisationnelle survivra à un processus de succession du PCD ?
À la suite de la lecture de l’article ci-dessous, quelles seraient vos réponses à ces questions.
Voici un résumé de la pensée de Munger, suivi d’un court extrait. Bonne lecture !
Berkshire Hathaway Vice Chairman Charlie Munger is well known as the partner of CEO Warren Buffett and also for his advocacy of “multi-disciplinary thinking” — the application of fundamental concepts from across various academic disciplines to solve complex real-world problems. One problem that Munger has addressed over the years is the optimal system of corporate governance.Munger advocates that corporate governance systems become more simple, rather than more complex, and rely on trust rather than compliance to instill ethical behavior in employees and executives. He advocates giving more power to a highly capable and ethical CEO, and taking several steps to improve the culture of the organization to reduce the risk of self-interested behavior.
How should an organization be structured to encourage ethical behavior among organizational participants and motivate decision-making in the best interest of shareholders? His solution is unconventional by the standards of governance today and somewhat at odds with regulatory guidelines. However, the insights that Munger provides represent a contrast to current “best practices” and suggest the potential for alternative solutions to improve corporate performance and executive behavior.
Trust-Based Governance
The need for a governance system is based on the premise that individuals working in a firm are selfinterested and therefore willing to take actions to further their own interest at the expense of the organization’s interests. To discourage this tendency, companies implement a series of carrots (incentives) and sticks (controls). The incentives might be monetary, such as performance-based compensation that aligns the financial interest of executives with shareholders. Or they might be or cultural, such as organizational norms that encourage certain behaviors. The controls include policies and procédures to limit malfeasance and oversight mechanisms to review executive decisions.
Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un document de la firme KPMG qui présente le concept de pensée critique (critical thinking) adapté à l’audit interne. Ce document présente également une pyramide des différents niveaux de maturité de l’audit interne, laquelle culmine avec la pensée critique, puis la création de valeur.
Ce document propose trois ajustements au cycle d’audit interne pour bien refléter une approche intégrant la pensée critique.
À l’instar de Denis Lefort, je vous encourage à lire ce document très intéressant lequel saura peut-être vous inspirer !
In an uncertain and challenging economy, organizations are seeking an approach to internal audit that goes beyond reviewing past activities. Instead, they want internal audits that are insightful, forward looking, and go beyond preserving value to creating value on a departmental, divisional, or organization-wide level.
To meet these expectations, internal audit leaders must strive to migrate to more advanced stages of maturity that evolve basic auditing processes and skills towards an approach to create value and insight to an organization. Many internal audit functions establish goals to achieve higher value; however, they fall short in one of two ways:
The skill sets and competencies of the team are not sufficiently cross-functional or developed in each team member to deliver the expected value
The internal audit approach is not redesigned to facilitate a new approach in planning, execution, and reporting of results.
This is where the critical thinking approach comes into play. Critical thinking is defined as an open-minded approach to analyzing a situation or task for the development of supportable conclusions and conveying the assessed results in a logical manner. The application of this concept in internal audit is where value can be unleashed within an organization. Applying critical thought to internal audit is more than just a planning exercise, but one in which every element of your process is challenged. This step-by-step exercise of identifying existing or new interdependencies, inputs, relationships, and opportunities in each phase of the audit can create new information for eager business leaders about how to approach risks and improvement opportunities from a new angle.
Critical thinking can help shift the purpose of internal audit to create value and expand or develop the positive perception of the department across the organization. The full maturity, when successfully implemented, goes a level beyond operational auditing and should result in opening more doors for internal audit to sit on steering committees, task forces, and other strategic initiatives. Critical thinking as a core approach for internal audit establishes a strategic partner within the business, focused on achieving balance between risk management and business performance.
Peter Tunjic* avance que les actes de gouvernance, de la part d’un conseil d’administration, et les actes de direction, au sens de management, correspondent à deux systèmes de pensée fondamentalement différents.
Dans son article, l’auteur présente une matrice que vous trouverez peut-être utile de considérer. Je vous invite à lire l’article pour plus de détails.
A recent survey of CEO attitudes to their boards by respected commentator Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and his colleagues, shouldn’t surprise anyone: ‘CEOs complain that boards often lack the intestinal fortitude for the level of risk taking that healthy growth requires.
“Board members are supposed to bring long-term prudence to a company”, as one CEO says, but this often translates to protecting the status quo and suppressing the bold thinking about reinvention that enterprises need when strategic contexts shift.’ Consensus is emerging that public company boards are too focused on compliance and are ignoring their role as creators of enduring value for the firms they direct. But it’s not for lack of will on their part.
The board’s role in strategy is considered the biggest issue for 67 per cent of respondents to the 2012 Spencer Stuart US Board Index want to spend more time on strategy. Despite this, according to Heidrick & Struggles, 84 per cent of directors of the top 2,000 largest publicly traded companies in the US thought ‘they are now spending more time on monitoring and less on strategy. Consequently, only one-third of respondents to a 2013 McKinsey & Company report say they have a complete understanding of current strategy. If directors have their eyes on value creation why is it that their feet are still pointing in a different direction? It’s because the system is not designed to create value. Best practice in corporate governance produces too many ‘governors’ focused on protecting value and not enough directors focused on creating it.
Public companies have become over governed and under directed because corporate governance regulation and education is designed to ensure the ‘correct’ board structure, process and composition rather than ensure ‘imagination, creativity, or ethical behavior in guiding the destinies of corporate enterprises’
This paper argues that in order to create enduring value, public company directors must go beyond governing and governance and must also embrace ‘directing’ and ‘directorship’. I propose that governance and directorship are two distinct systems of thought and action in the boardroom.
The difference between the two lies primarily in their attitude to value. Governance concerns right structure and process. The focus is on protecting and preserving value through maintaining control and managing risk. In contrast, directorship involves bold choices that necessarily create risk.
Directing involves designing the ways in which value is created, making decision of consequence and inspiring CEO’s to lead their organisations into strength, resilience and endurance. The boundaries between the two might blur in the heat of a board meeting, but the differences in attitude, competencies and outcome are clear. Here are four tests to help you decide whether you stand on the question of value.
Governing for shareholder value versus directing for firm value
Measuring value versus creating value
Governing for transparency versus directing with discretion
Managing risk versus creating risk
…. The DLMA Matrix graphically represents the similarities and differences of each perspective as well as the inherent dilemma required to balance them all.
THE DLMA MATRIX ™
_______________________________
*Peter Tunjic is an independent corporate advocate and commercial lawyer based in Melbourne, Australia. He is the author of ondirectorship.com and has co-authored several learning programmes for the Australian Institute of Company Directors. He consults on creating value in the boardroom and improving board/manager relations.
Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un document de la firme Thomson Reuters (White Paper) très intéressant sur le rôle de l’audit interne dans l’identification des risques émergents.
Reinsurance company Swiss Re defines emerging risks as “newly developing or changing risks which are difficult to quantify and which may have a major impact on the organisation.” This identifies their key elements.
Emerging risks may be entirely new, such as those posed by social media or technological innovation. Or they may come from existing risks that evolve or escalate – for example, the way counterparty credit risk or liquidity risk sky-rocketed during the 2008 financial crisis.
Newly developing risks lack precedent or history, and their precise form may not be immediately clear, which makes them difficult to measure or model. Changing risks are at least familiar in their shape and nature, although the rate of transformation and intensity can make them hard to quantify.
The final key element of emerging risks is their potential impact. New or changing risks can be as menacing as those the organisation deals with on a daily basis, and sometimes even more so. To give just one example, the way in which the music business failed to address the implications of digital downloads allowed a complete outsider, the computer company Apple, to step in and define and dominate the new market.
Emerging risks also threaten through their apparent remoteness or their obscurity. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld distinguished between things we know we do not know (‘known unknowns’), and things we do not know we do not know (‘unknown unknowns’). In the first category are risks whose shape might be familiar, but where we do not necessarily understand all of their elements – causes, potential impact, probability or timing. Unknown unknowns are events that are so out of left field or seemingly farfetchedthat it takes great insight or a leap of the imagination to even articulate them. These include the ‘black swan’ events highlighted by the investor-philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb, where the human tendency is to dismiss them as improbable beforehand, then rationalise them after they occur. The 9/11 terrorist attack, or the financial crash of 2008, or the invention of the internet show that not only do black swan events happen, but they do so more frequently than is generally recognised, and they have an historically significant impact (and not always negative).
Many emerging risks are characterised by their global nature, their scale or their longer-term horizon – climate change is an example that displays all of these elements. In other cases, it is less the individual events themselves, some of which may be relatively moderate or manageable on their own, as the conflation of circumstances that creates a ‘perfect storm’.
“The clear message from the survey is that internal audit functions need to stop thinking about themselves as compliance specialists and start taking on a much larger, more strategic role within the organization,” Ernst & Young LLP internal audit leader Brian Schwartz said in a news release. “IA is increasingly being asked by senior management and the board to provide broader business insights and better anticipate traditional and emerging risks, even as they maintain their focus on non-negotiable compliance activities.”
New risks
As strategic opportunities emerge, internal auditors also are adjusting to new compliance duties, according to the survey. Globalization has resulted in increased revenue from emerging markets for many companies, so new regulatory, cultural, tax, and talent risks are emerging.
Internal audit will play a more prominent role in evaluating these risks, according to the survey report. Although slightly more than one-fourth (27%) of respondents are heavily involved in identifying, assessing, and monitoring emerging risks now, 54% expect to be heavily involved in the next two years.
The biggest primary risks that respondents said their organizations are tracking are:
Economic stability (54%).
Cybersecurity (52%).
Major shifts in technology (48%).
Strategic transactions in global locations (44%).
Data privacy regulations (39%).
Survey respondents said the skills most often found to be lacking in internal audit functions are:
Data analytics;
Business strategy;
Deep industry experience;
Risk management; and
Fraud prevention and detection.
“As corporate leaders demand a greater measure of strategy and insight from their internal audit functions, CAEs will need to move quickly to close competency gaps and ensure that they have the right people in the right place, at the right time.” Schwartz said. “If they fail to meet organizational expectations, they risk being left behind or consigned to more transactional compliance activities.”
Ci-dessous, vous trouverez un billet, partagé par Denis Lefort, expert-conseil en gouvernance et en audit interne, qui vous incite à prendre connaissance du Bulletin de janvier 2014 du Conference Board intitulé « Risk Oversight: Evolving expectation for Board« .
Ce document, très intéressant, fait un retour en arrière sur les différentes analyses et recommandations effectuées par différents groupes dont, le NACD, la SEC, le SSG, Dodd-Frank, ICGN, FSB, FRC (les acronymes sont explicitées dans le document de 10 pages), dans la foulée des scandales financiers de 2008.
English: Contribution and prioritizing threats and risks to Risk Management Effectiveness (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Le document est très critique quant au rôle très actif que devraient jouer les conseils d’administration au niveau de la surveillance des risques. Il est aussi très critique des approches mises en œuvre par les fonctions Gestion des risques et audit interne. Enfin, des recommandations sont formulées pour ces trois instances.
Bien qu’au départ, le document ait ciblé les institutions financières, ses propos peuvent s’appliquer à un grand éventail d’organisations. C’est pourquoi je vous encourage tous à en prendre connaissance et à le partager avec vos dirigeants, membres de conseils, collègues et contacts professionnels. Voici un extrait. Bonne lecture !
The Risk Oversight Committee is responsible for :
a. determining where and when formal documented risk assessments should be completed, recognizing that additional risk management rigor and formality should be cost/benefit justified
b. ensuring that business units are identifying and reliably reporting the material risks to the key objectives identified in their annual strategic plans and core foundation objectives necessary for sustained success, including compliance with applicable laws and regulations
c. reviewing and assessing whether material risks being accepted across XYZ are consistent with the corporation’s risk appetite and tolerance
d. developing, implementing, and monitoring overall compliance with this policy
e. overseeing development, administration and periodic review of this policy for approval by the board of directors
f. reviewing and approving the annual external disclosures related to risk oversight processes required by securiti esregulators
g. reporting periodically to the CEO and the board on the corporation’s consolidated residual risk position
h. ensuring that an appropriate culture of risk-awareness exists throughout the organization
Business unit leaders are responsible for:
a. managing risks to their unit’s business objectives within the corporation’s risk appetite/tolerance
b. identifying in their business when they believe the benefits of formal risk assessment exceed the costs, or when requested to by the CEO or risk oversight committee
Risk management and assurance support services unit is responsible for :
a. providing risk assessment training, facilitation, and assessment services to senior management and business units upon request
b. annually preparing a consolidated report on XYZ’s most significant residual risks and related residual risk status, and a report on the current effectiveness and maturity of the Corporation’s risk management processes for review by the risk oversight committee, senior management, and the corporation’s board of directors
c. completing risk assessments of specific objectives that have not been formally assessed and reported on by business units when asked to by the risk oversight committee, senior management, or the board of directors; or if the risk management support services team leader believes that a formal risk assessment is warranted to provide a materially reliable risk status report to senior management and the board of directors
d. conducting independent quality assurance reviews on risk assessments completed by business units and providing feedback to enhance the quality and reliability of those assessments
e. participating in the drafting and review of the corporation’s annual disclosures in the Annual Reports and Proxy Statement related to risk management and oversight
Voici un document du National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) qui aborde une question cruciale sur le rôle des conseils d’administration en matière de prévention et de réactions à la suite de problèmes de sécurité informatique.
computer security (Photo credit: justonlysteve)
Le document de 10 pages est disponible gratuitement sur le site du NACD si vous vous inscrivez. Je vous invite à prendre connaissance des principales questions qu’un administrateur devrait poser à la direction.
Voici un extrait de l’article, notamment les questions concernant la planification d’une attaque à la sécurité, et d’autres questions concernant les mesures à prendre à la suite de ces problèmes.
Ten Questions Directors Can Ask Management in Planning for a Breach
How will we know we have been hacked or breached, what makes us certain or how will we find out?
What are best practices for cybersecurity and where do our practices differ?
In management’s opinion, what is the biggest weakness in our IT systems? If we wanted to deal the most damage to the company, how would we go about it?
Does our external auditor indicate we have deficiencies in IT? If so, where?
Where do management and our IT team disagree on cybersecurity?
Were we told of cyber attacks that already occurred and how severe they were? For significant breaches, is the communication adequate as information is obtained regarding the nature and type of breach, the data impacted, and potential implications to the company and the response plan?
What part of our IT infrastructure can contribute to a significant deficiency or material weakness?
What do we consider our most valuable assets; how does our IT system interact with those assets; do we think there is adequate protection in place if someone wanted to get them or damage them; what would it take to feel comfortable that they were protected? Do we believe we can ever fully protect those assets? How should we monitor the status of their protection?
Are we investing enough so our corporate operating and network systems are not easy targets by a determined hacker?
Where can we generate more revenue and marginal profitability by making changes in IT?
Ten Questions Directors Can Ask Management Once a Breach Is Found
How did we learn about the breach? Were we notified by an outside agency or was the breach found internally?
What do we believe was stolen?
What has been affected by the breach?
Have any of our operations been compromised?
Is our crisis response plan in action, and is it working as planned?
Whom do we have to notify about this breach (materiality), whom should we notify, and is our legal team prepared for such notifications?
What steps is the response team taking to ensure that the breach is under control and the hacker no longer has access to the internal network?
Do we believe the hacker was an internal or external actor?
What were the weaknesses in our system that allowed it to occur (and why)?
What steps can we take to make sure this type of breach does not happen again,
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose de méditer sur le billet de Scott Stossel* paru le 6 janvier 2014 dans HBR Blog Networkqui aborde un sujet intrigant et très pertinent à quiconque se préoccupe de performance optimale.
On connaît la relation entre l’anxiété (ce sentiment diffus d’appréhension souvent injustifiée et infondée) et la performance – dans l’accomplissement d’une tâche. La performance est optimale lorsque l’on réussit à équilibrer l’intensité de l’anxiété : généralement, trop d’anxiété est nuisible à l’exécution de l’activité; peu d’anxiété conduit à une plus faible performance.
English: Signs & Symptoms of Anxiety (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
La maîtrise de l’anxiété est très importante dans la conduite de nos vies, plus particulièrement dans les activités liées à la performance au travail. Les administrateurs et les managers doivent apprendre à en bien connaître la manifestation, eux dont les tâches consistent à assurer une solide performance et une gouvernance exemplaire.
Si vous croyez être sujets à des accès d’angoisses immotivées, vous n’êtes pas les seuls … et il existe des moyens pour y faire face. Cet article vous ouvrira plusieurs voies d’accommodement possibles; bref, si vous expérimentez ce sentiment diffus d’anxiété – et que cela influence négativement votre travail – cet article est pour vous. Je vous invite aussi à lire les excellents commentaires à la fin de l’article.
En quoi ce sujet concerne-t-il la gouvernance ? Donnez votre point de vue. Bonne lecture !
An influential study conducted a hundred years ago by two Harvard psychologists, Robert M. Yerkes and John Dillingham Dodson, demonstrated that moderate levels of anxiety improve performance in humans and animals: too much anxiety, obviously, impairs performance, but so does too little. Their findings have been experimentally demonstrated in both animals and humans many times since then.
“Without anxiety, little would be accomplished,” David Barlow, founder of the Center for Anxiety and Related Disorders at Boston University, has written. “The performance of athletes, entertainers, executives, artisans, and students would suffer; creativity would diminish; crops might not be planted. And we would all achieve that idyllic state long sought after in our fast-paced society of whiling away our lives under a shade tree. This would be as deadly for the species as nuclear war.”
So how do you find the right balance? How do you get yourself into the performance zone where anxiety is beneficial? That’s a really tough question. For me, years of medication and intensive therapy have (sometimes, somewhat) taken the physical edge off my nerves so I could focus on trying to do well, not on removing myself from the center of attention as quickly as possible. For those who choke during presentations to board members or pitches to clients, for example, but probably aren’t what you’d call clinically anxious, the best approach may be one akin to what Beilock has athletes do in her experiments: redirecting your mind, in the moment, to something other than how you’re comporting yourself, so you can allow the skills and knowhow you’ve worked so hard to acquire to automatically kick into gear and carry you through. Your focus should not be on worrying about outcomes or consequences or on how you’re being perceived but simply on the task at hand. Prepare thoroughly (but not too obsessively) in advance; then stay in the moment. If you’re feeling anxious, breathe from your diaphragm in order to keep your sympathetic nervous system from revving up too much. And remember that it can be good to be keyed up: the right amount of nervousness will enhance your performance.
Ce matin, Richard Leblanc nous présente un « draft » de son nouveau syllabus de cours offert à l’Université York sur la gouvernance des OBNL et des entreprises/sociétés d’état.
Ce n’est pas qu’il n’y a pas de cours dans ce domaine – loin de là – mais je puis vous assurer qu’il n’y en pas de si complets … et de si exigeants.
Voyez par vous-même en suivant le lien ci-dessous pour vous rendre sur le groupe de discussion Boards & Advisors de LinkedIn et ouvrir le document présentant le syllabus.
Si vous êtes dans le domaine de la consultation, du coaching et de la formation en gouvernance, notamment des OBNL, les éléments de contenu de ce syllabus ainsi que les nombreuses références qu’il contient vous intéressera sûrement. Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Operation of the Board, Board and Committee Meetings, and Staff Relations
Development and Retirement of Directors
Fundraising and Donor Stewardship
Financial Oversight, Anti-Fraud, External Audit, and Internal Audit
Values, Mandate, Strategy and Prerogative
Risk, Internal Controls, and Assurance
Organizational Performance, CEO Succession, and Executive Compensation
Stakeholder Accountability of Crown Corporations and Other Public Entities: Government as Sole Shareholder, Taxpayors; Members, Donors, Funding Agencies, Beneficiaries, Volunteers, Staff, Partners, Sponsors, Community
Fraud, Corruption, Lack of Oversight, and Misbehavior Case Analysis: The Senate of Canada, The Quebec Corruption Inquiry, Ontario Power Generation, the Mayor of Toronto
Voici un rapport de recherche de PwC qui tend à démontrer que les administrateurs et les investisseurs partagent les mêmes points de vue sur les plusieurs priorités, dont les suivantes :
There is considerable alignment between directors’ and investors’ views on the important issues directors should be focusing on in the coming year, according to the report. Both groups include strategic planning, risk management, and succession planning as top priorities. Ninety-five percent of investors say strategic planning is the “most or a very important” area for director focus while nearly eight of 10 directors say they want to spend more time in that area going forward.
In the area of IT, more than three-quarters of investors believe directors should be at least “moderately” focused on new business models enabled by IT, but only 45% of directors say they are very or moderately engaged in doing so.
For director Mike Monahan, deciding on how to provide oversight of new IT-enabled business models versus major IT project implementations is not black and white.
“They are both important, and the relative importance depends a great deal on the core mission and market characteristics of the company,” said Monahan, audit committee chair for CMS Energy.
He points to a development at a large public gas and electric utility where he sits on the board. “We are in the process of installing a so-called smart energy system whereby the company will provide meters with the capability of providing significant value to customers by enabling them to better manage their energy consumption,” he said. “The communication regime with the customer is important, but the IT-based development and installation project is more important. Without an effective application there would be no smart energy system.”
Other key findings from the PwC comparison of the director and investor surveys include:
Compensation
Directors and investors both believe that compensation consultants are “very influential” over board decisions on executive compensation (41% and 37%, respectively). And, each group had similar views on the influence of institutional shareholders, rating them “very influential” at 22% and 18%, respectively. However, by a margin of 38 percentage points investors are more likely than directors to believe that CEO pressure has a “very influential” effect on board decisions about compensation.
At least 70% of directors and investors indicate that some type of action was taken by their company in response to say on pay voting results. But investors believe that directors should reconsider their companies’ executive compensation plan at relatively lower levels of negative voting.
Regulatory and enforcement
Forty-seven percent of investors and 64% of directors say recent legislative, regulatory and enforcement initiatives have increased investor protections “not very much” or “not at all,” with very few (2% and 4%, respectively) indicating that they have helped “very much.” At the same time, one-third of directors and almost one in five investors think the costs to companies of such increased activities have “very much” exceeded the potential benefits. Eighty percent of investors and three-fourths of directors also conclude these initiatives have increased public trust in the corporate sector “not very much” or “not at all.”
Board composition, structure and performance
Twenty-eight percent of directors say the ability of boards to provide effective oversight has increased in the last 12 months, compared to 19% of investors. Similarly, 33% of directors say that board effectiveness in overseeing risk has increased compared to 27% of investors.
Nineteen percent of investors indicate the board should reconsider re-nomination of a director if he/she receives between 11% and 15% negative shareholder voting, compared to only 8% of directors who would use the same benchmark.
The report also compares CEO viewpoints alongside directors and investors regarding company strategy and risk management. It showed that all three parties believe customers and clients have the most significant influence on company strategy. As for the greatest impediment to growth, directors and investors said it is “uncertain or volatile economic growth” (91%) while CEOs said it is government response to “fiscal deficit and debt burden” (93%).
Dans cet article paru sur mon blogue l’an dernier, je soulignais que de plus en plus d’administrateurs d’organisations à but non lucratif (OBNL) sont intéressés à en savoir davantage sur les règles de gouvernance et sur les modes de fonctionnement de ces types d’organisations.
Chez les professionnels de la gestion ainsi que chez les membres d’ordres professionnels, rares sont ceux qui ne sont pas membres de conseils d’administration d’OBNL. Il existe plusieurs entreprises québécoises qui s’intéressent aux OBNL, mais il y en a une qui se consacre en priorité à la formation des membres de ces organisations avec beaucoup de succès et qui a publié des volumes qui sont devenus, au fil des ans, des références auprès des administrateurs et des directeurs généraux d’organismes à but non lucratif.
Je vous invite à consulter le lien ci-dessous pour en connaître davantage portant sur la formation et sur les publications la gouvernance de ce type d’organisation très répandu.
“Quand vous acceptez un poste d’administrateur, savez-vous à quoi vous vous engagez ? Est-ce que les associations et les organismes sans but lucratif ont des règles de bonne gouvernance ? Est-ce que la reddition de compte se fait de façon responsable ? Face au déficit d’imputabilité dans notre société, les associations et autres organismes sans but lucratif, tant privés que publics, ont peu de pratiques de performance leur permettant d’assurer leur crédibilité et d’inspirer confiance”.
Série Gouvernance – Guides pratiques
Les Guides pratiques pour une Gouvernance Stratégique ® se veulent des publications qui abordent des aspects sensibles de la gestion d’OSBL et pour lesquelles on retrouve moins facilement des réponses. La série comprendra, au fil des années, une dizaine de titres.
Depuis le début de la parution du blogue, le 19 juillet, j’ai publié 820 billets en gouvernance et suscité l’intérêt d’environ 75 000 personnes. Le blogue a eu trois fois plus de visiteurs dans la dernière année. Beaucoup d’abonnés au blogue se servent de l’outil de recherche (situé au bas de la page) afin d’obtenir des informations pertinentes et d’actualité sur leurs questionnements en gouvernance. À ce stade-ci, mon objectif est d’avoir plus de 50 000 visiteurs pour l’année 2014.
Le référencement se fait principalement par LinkedIn (43 %) et par des engins de recherche tels que Google (43 %); le reste (14 %) se réparti entre plusieurs autres réseaux sociaux.
Le partage des billets se fait par l’intermédiaire de LinkedIn (40 %), Twitter (29 %), Facebook (22 %) et Tumblr (9 %).
Le site est fréquenté par des visiteurs provenant :
du Canada (59 %)
de la France (20 %) (incluant Suisse et Belgique)
du Magreb (4 %) (Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie)
d’autres pays de diverses provenance (17 %).
J’en profite pour remercier à nouveau tous les lecteurs qui, par leurs votes, ont exprimé leur appréciation du blogue lors du concours organisé par Made In Blog (MiB) à l’échelle canadienne. Notre blogue a obtenu la deuxième position parmi les soixante-cinq (65)blogues de la catégorie Business/marketing/médias sociaux, le seul candidat finaliste dans le domaine de la gouvernance. Nous sommes honorés de cette marque de reconnaissance.
Rappelons que ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets, « posts », est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revues, des blogues et sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.
Chaque jour, je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernancedans le monde francophone, en fournissant aux lecteurs une mine de renseignements récents (les billets quotidiens) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes
Notre groupe de discussion sur LinkedIn, Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance, sous l’égide du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), a connu une croissance remarquable au cours des dernières années, passant de 372 membres, au 1er septembre 2012, à 858 membres au 26 décembre 2013.
Notre objectif est de demeurer le groupe francophone de référence en gouvernance le plus actif et le plus influent en 2014 sur LinkedIn.
Au cours de cette période, nous avons réussi à maintenir un haut niveau de respect dans nos échanges, et à provoquer de saines discussions sur des thèmes relatifs à la gouvernance de tous les types d’entreprises évoluant dans des environnements règlementaires différents (USA, CANADA, UK, UE).
En tant qu’administrateur et contributeur principal de ce groupe, je vous remercie vivement de vos contributions à l’avancement des connaissances dans le domaine de la gouvernance.
Au nom du CAS, et en mon nom personnel, je vous souhaite un excellent temps des Fêtes et une année 2014 à la hauteur de vos aspirations.
Merci encore de votre présence soutenue au blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé ainsi qu’au groupe de discussion Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance du CAS.
Aujourd’hui, veille de Noel, je vous présente les sommaires des Think-tank produit par Board Intelligence, une firme spécialisée dans les informations sur les conseils d’administration. Celle-ci a tenu une série de débats sur la réinvention des règles de gouvernance en demandant aux panels de se prononcer sur la question suivante :
“If you could rip up the rule book, what would good governance look like ?”
Voici les résumés des résultats les plus remarquables présentés dans FT.com. Bonne lecture et Joyeux Noel !
Stressing the importance of company boards can weaken the sense of accountability among management and staff, according to participants in a recent debate.
They agreed there is a strong case for saying an organisation lives or dies by the actions and inactions of its management team, rather than the board, and that employees were a better indicator of how a company is run than scrutiny of the board.
An alternative boardroom model was suggested, drawing on the way some executive committees operate, where the chief executive seeks consultation rather than consensus. Perhaps the chairman could have a similar function.
Chairmen of the Bored (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
This might also reflect the reality of the near-impossible task faced by non-executive directors. One participant said: “A non-executive is on a hiding to nothing – and to do the job properly, they need smaller portfolios and better pay. When things go wrong, they can expect to be tried in the court of public opinion.”
It was argued that this is becoming such a trend that many talented candidates are no longer willing to take on the role. “I wouldn’t take a non-executive role in a big and complex global bank. The mismatch between what you are accountable for and your ability to affect it is enormous,” one commented.
“To do the job of the non-exec properly you have to get out of the boardroom and into the organisation. You have to experience the business for yourself and not just take management’s word for it.”
There were also complaints about the amount of time required to do the job of the non-executive: “It’s not 12 days a year at £1,500 per day – it’s at least 30 days. Given the opportunity cost of what an accomplished person could be doing with their time, and given the risk you carry as a non-executive, why do it?”
If we don’t go so far as to rip up the governance rule book, at least we should make it shorter, they agreed. Rules will always have unintended consequences and breed perverse outcomes – and fear of falling foul of the rules can
lead boards to document as little as possible to maintain “plausible deniability”.
At a subsequent debate it was proposed there should be a register to name and shame – and praise – the performance of non-executives. At present, shareholders’ opinion of a non-executive and their decision on re-electing them is based on gut feeling. A public register would be helpful in forming a judgment, listing statistics about the number of boards the non-executive is on, the time they allocate to each and notable events that took place on their watch
There are chairmen with such large portfolios they could not possibly allocate sufficient time to each board, they argued. A public register would make this much more transparent.
Débats entre cinq présidents de conseils et un PCD
The five chairmen and chief executives attending a recent think-tank discussion accepted that even improved boards cannot prevent all corporate crises and expressed concern at this overly “defensive” role. They argued that “stopping bad things happening” must be tempered by helping “good things happen”.
The participants agreed that non-executives must have the confidence to challenge the chairman and chief executive. One said: “Having sat on the board of my employer as an executive, I have come to the conclusion that it is a hopeless role. When the chief executive is sitting opposite, it is fairly obvious how you’re supposed to respond to the question ‘what do you think?’
“Board meetings are not a good use of time. We don’t question why we’re doing what we’re doing.”
The group concluded that “small is beautiful: small boards, small briefing packs, small agenda, and small rule book”.
At a subsequent dinner, also attended by chairmen and chief executives, a call was made for boards to be more realistic about their limitations and to be more discerning about where they focus their efforts
For example, boards attempt to scrutinise specific investment decisions when the information they can absorb and the time available for discussion mean substantive challenge or insights are unlikely.
On the other hand, it was pointed out that boards are also held liable for the detail as well as the big picture. Even so, attempting to meet these conflicting responsibilities by “clogging up the board agenda with too many matters to explore properly” cannot be the answer, they agreed.
The participants argued that the governance rule book is ineffective and that boards should instead be subject to an annual review of their effectiveness.
A need for “better memories, rather than better rules or regulations”, was stressed and the recommendation that non-executives should stand down after nine years was criticised for institutionalising the short-term memory of the boardroom.
One said: “When our bank repeated its mistakes from the early 1990s, it wasn’t the bank that suffered from amnesia – it was just the board.”
The chairmen and chief executives concluded that UK business suffers from a short-term “sell-out” culture. It was argued that in the US, business leaders who are successful will strive to be yet more successful and in Germany, successful businesses are nurtured for the next generation. But in the UK, business people aspire to have just enough to “retire to the Old Rectory”. One said: “We lack the ambition – or greed – of the Americans and we don’t feel the duty of the Germans. We need to raise the level of ambition – and sense of duty.”
Débats entre présidents de conseils
Boards are failing at strategy and becoming increasingly focused on costs, according to a think-tank debate attended by chairmen. One said: “We need the conversation in the boardroom to be two levels ‘higher’. Many of our largest companies are sitting on cash and they need to get back to strategy and invest in the future – or there won’t be one.”
It was suggested that advisory boards, unfettered by concerns of liability and governance, might be better at tackling strategy – and might attract creative people who would otherwise be put off joining boards by the burden of governance.
The chairmen also asked whether more of a board’s work could be handled by committees, as they can be more focused and effective.
They also questioned whether age and experience should continue to take precedence over training and education when appointing board members. One view was that boardroom skills are becoming more specialised and need to be learned.
Regulators came under fire from the chairmen. They were accused of not understanding the businesses they are regulating and of treating non-executives as executives.
The meeting also referred to the spread of regulation from the financial services sector. One said: “We have a two-tier corporate world: financial services and the rest. But what starts as regulation of financial services bleeds through to the rest.”
The participants warned that because boards are out of touch with society, there is a danger of a backlash and the emergence of an “anti-business” movement.
The relationship between society and business was also raised at a subsequent debate. One view was that the future of the corporation depends on it being redesigned and finance returned to its proper, subservient role of supporting the wider economy.
All businesses should demonstrate public benefit – just as charities have to show a public benefit in return for charitable status, businesses should do the same, perhaps in return for limited liability status.
Another view was that voluntary sector leaders should be encouraged to join corporate boards, because of their specific skills, including in reputation and risk management.
Participants went on to call for younger, more vibrant boards. “You should see the faces of the future – not just the past,” said one. The concern that young executives are too busy to join boards was rejected and some chairmen were blamed for claiming to support diversity of age but then not allowing their executives to join someone else’s board.
It was also argued that businesses and boards need permission to fail. “What business or person can achieve great things without the possibility of failure?” one asked.
Vous pouvez lire les résultats des dix autres débats en vous référant à l’article en référence.
À chaque année, la firme Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) revoit son processus d’établissement des recommandations qui guide les actionnaires dans leurs votes aux assemblées annuelles.
On entend souvent parler des politiques de ISS concernant la gouvernance des sociétés mais on ne saisit pas toujours la méthodologie derrière les recommandations aux actionnaires.
Le document ci-dessous présente les mises à jour des recommandations qui s’adressent aux entreprises canadiennes cotées en bourse. Je crois que c’est un document de référence majeur pour les actionnaires qui doivent se doter d’un conseil d’administration exemplaire et de règles de gouvernance en relation avec les intérêts des actionnaires. Bonne lecture !
Ci-dessous, vous trouverez le sommaire du processus de formulation des politiques de ISS, suivi des éléments constituant la table des matières.
Each year, ISS’ Global Policy Board conducts a robust, inclusive, and transparent global policy formulation process that produces the benchmark proxy voting guidelines that will be used during the upcoming year.
The policy review and update process begins with an internal review of emerging issues and notable trends across global markets. Based on data gathered throughout the year (particularly from client and issuer feedback), ISS forms policy committees by governance topics and markets. As part of this process, the policy team examines academic literature, other empirical research, and relevant commentary. ISS also conducts surveys, convenes roundtable discussions, and posts draft policies for review and comment. Based on this broad input, ISS’ Global Policy Board reviews and approves final drafts and policy updates for the following proxy year. Annual updated policies are announced in November and apply to meetings held on and after February 1 of the following year.
Also, as part of the process, ISS collaborates with clients with customized approaches to proxy voting. ISS helps these clients develop and implement policies based on their organizations’ specific mandates and requirements. In addition to the ISS regional benchmark (standard research) policies, ISS’ research analysts apply more than 400 specific policies, including specialty policies for Socially Responsible Investors, Taft-Hartley funds and managers, and Public Employee Pension Funds, as well as hundreds of fully customized policies that reflect clients’ unique corporate governance philosophies. The vote recommendations issued under these policies often differ from those issued under the ISS benchmark policies. ISS estimates that the majority of shares that are voted by ISS’ clients fall under ISS’ custom or specialty recommendations.
This document presents the changes being made to ISS’ Benchmark Canadian Corporate Governance Policies. The full text of the updates, detailed results from the Policy Survey, and comments received during the open comment period, are all available on ISS’ Web site under the Policy Gateway.
Table des matières du document de mise à jour
BOARD
Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections
Definition of Independence – TSX and TSXV
2014 ISS Canadian Definition of Independence
Persistent Problematic Audit Related Practices – TSX
Voting on Directors for Egregious Actions – TSX and TSXV
Board Responsiveness – TSX and TSXV
Director Attendance & Overboarding – TSX
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS & DEFENSES
Advance Notice Requirement for Director Nominations – TSX and TSXV
Enhanced Shareholder Meeting Quorum for Contested Director Election – TSX and TSXV
Le rapport annuel de Davies est toujours très attendu car il brosse un tableau très complet de l’évolution de la gouvernance au Canada. De plus, c’est un document publié en français.
Je vous invite donc à en prendre connaissance en lisant le court résumé ci-dessous et, si vous voulez en savoir plus sur les thèmes abordés, vous pouvez télécharger le document sur le site de l’entreprise.
Depuis la diversité au sein des conseils jusqu’aux risques liés aux marchés émergents, en passant par l’activisme actionnarial, cette troisième édition du Rapport de Davies sur la gouvernance, notre compte rendu annuel, analyse l’actualité sur de nombreuses questions d’intérêt pour les conseils d’administration et les observateurs du paysage de la gouvernance au Canada.
Dans le premier chapitre, Administrateurs et conseils d’administration, nous faisons le point sur l’évolution de la composition des conseils d’administration au Canada, les appels à la diversité au sein de ces conseils et des équipes de direction ainsi que les idées proposées par les autorités de réglementation et les investisseurs à cet égard. Dans le chapitre intitulé Rémunération des membres de la haute direction et des administrateurs, nous faisons état de la popularité grandissante du vote consultatif sur la rémunération de la haute direction et proposons des mesures que peuvent prendre les conseils d’administration pour éviter d’être pris de court par le résultat d’un tel vote. Dans le chapitre intitulé Questions relatives au vote des actionnaires, nous nous intéressons aux nouveautés concernant la question de l’intégrité du vote des actionnaires au Canada, les initiatives de réglementation des agences de conseil en vote et la pratique du vote à la majorité parmi les émetteurs. Dans le chapitre intitulé Initiatives des actionnaires, nous mettons en lumière les tendances et les questions d’actualité comme l’« achat de votes », la rémunération offerte aux administrateurs par les dissidents et le « vote vide » ainsi que les règlements de préavis. Dans le chapitre intitulé Surveillance des risques : les activités sur les marchés émergents, nous examinons comment les émetteurs gèrent les risques associés à leurs activités sur les marchés émergents ainsi que les nouveautés importantes touchant la législation et la mise en application de la loi en matière de lutte contre la corruption. Enfin, dans le chapitre intitulé Régimes de droits : gouvernance et changement de contrôle, nous analysons les deux cadres de réglementation des régimes de droits en situation de prise de contrôle proposés cette année par les autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières.
Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un document de la firme Thomson Reuters (White Paper) très intéressant sur le rôle de l’audit interne dans l’identification des risques émergents.
C’est un rôle très stimulant pour les administrateurs et les gestionnaires prêts à relever les défis. Voici un extrait du document. Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Reinsurance company Swiss Re defines emerging risks as “newly developing or changing risks which are difficult to quantify and which may have a major impact on the organisation.” This identifies their key elements.
Emerging risks may be entirely new, such as those posed by social media or technological innovation. Or they may come from existing risks that evolve or escalate – for example, the way counterparty credit risk or liquidity risk sky-rocketed during the 2008 financial crisis.
Newly developing risks lack precedent or history, and their precise form may not be immediately clear, which makes them difficult to measure or model. Changing risks are at least familiar in their shape and nature, although the rate of transformation and intensity can make them hard to quantify.
The final key element of emerging risks is their potential impact. New or changing risks can be as menacing as those the organisation deals with on a daily basis, and sometimes even more so. To give just one example, the way in which the music business failed to address the implications of digital downloads allowed a complete outsider, the computer company Apple, to step in and define and dominate the new market.
Emerging risks also threaten through their apparent remoteness or their obscurity. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld distinguished between things we know we do not know (‘known unknowns’), and things we do not know we do not know (‘unknown unknowns’). In the first category are risks whose shape might be familiar, but where we do not necessarily understand all of their elements – causes, potential impact, probability or timing. Unknown unknowns are events that are so out of left field or seemingly farfetchedthat it takes great insight or a leap of the imagination to even articulate them. These include the ‘black swan’ events highlighted by the investor-philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb, where the human tendency is to dismiss them as improbable beforehand, then rationalise them after they occur. The 9/11 terrorist attack, or the financial crash of 2008, or the invention of the internet show that not only do black swan events happen, but they do so more frequently than is generally recognised, and they have an historically significant impact (and not always negative).
Many emerging risks are characterised by their global nature, their scale or their longer-term horizon – climate change is an example that displays all of these elements. In other cases, it is less the individual events themselves, some of which may be relatively moderate or manageable on their own, as the conflation of circumstances that creates a ‘perfect storm’.
“The clear message from the survey is that internal audit functions need to stop thinking about themselves as compliance specialists and start taking on a much larger, more strategic role within the organization,” Ernst & Young LLP internal audit leader Brian Schwartz said in a news release. “IA is increasingly being asked by senior management and the board to provide broader business insights and better anticipate traditional and emerging risks, even as they maintain their focus on non-negotiable compliance activities.”
New risks
As strategic opportunities emerge, internal auditors also are adjusting to new compliance duties, according to the survey. Globalization has resulted in increased revenue from emerging markets for many companies, so new regulatory, cultural, tax, and talent risks are emerging.
Internal audit will play a more prominent role in evaluating these risks, according to the survey report. Although slightly more than one-fourth (27%) of respondents are heavily involved in identifying, assessing, and monitoring emerging risks now, 54% expect to be heavily involved in the next two years.
The biggest primary risks that respondents said their organizations are tracking are:
Economic stability (54%).
Cybersecurity (52%).
Major shifts in technology (48%).
Strategic transactions in global locations (44%).
Data privacy regulations (39%).
Survey respondents said the skills most often found to be lacking in internal audit functions are:
Data analytics;
Business strategy;
Deep industry experience;
Risk management; and
Fraud prevention and detection.
“As corporate leaders demand a greater measure of strategy and insight from their internal audit functions, CAEs will need to move quickly to close competency gaps and ensure that they have the right people in the right place, at the right time.” Schwartz said. “If they fail to meet organizational expectations, they risk being left behind or consigned to more transactional compliance activities.”
Voici une liste des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue au cours du mois de novembre 2013. Cette liste constitue, en quelque sorte, un sondage de l’intérêt manifesté par des dizaines de milliers de personnes sur différents thèmes de la gouvernance des sociétés.
On y retrouve des points de vue très bien étayés sur des sujets d’actualité tels que : des conseils pour une bonne préparation aux réunions du conseil, des guides de gouvernance à l’intention des OBNL, une documentation sur les fondements de la gouvernance, une présentation des principes de gouvernance universels, le pouls de l’audit interne, la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégiaux, le conseil d’administration sans papier sécurisé.
En terme géographique, près du quart (25 %) des visiteurs sont d’origine française ou proviennent de dizaines de pays francophones, et 58 % sont d’origine canadienne. Ceux-ci trouvent leur voie sur le site principalement via LinkedIn (43 %), via les engins de recherche (43 %) ou via d’autres réseaux sociaux (14 %), tels que Facebook, Twitter ou Tumblr.
Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus et ils sont grandement appréciés; je réponds toujours à ceux-ci. Bonne lecture !
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 