Êtes-vous intéressés à comprendre les comportements à court terme adoptés par les organisations en réponse aux nombreuses occasions qu’ont les gens de profiter de situations non-éthiques, à l’encontre de la création de valeur à long terme ?
Si vous vous demandez quels sont les facteurs-clés qui conduisent aux abus reliés à des comportements de court terme et, surtout, si vous voulez connaître les moyens susceptibles d’améliorer la situation, l’article de Malcolm Salter, professeur à la Harvard Business School, vous fascinera.
Vous pouvez lire le résumé qui suit. Si votre curiosité l’emporte, vous pouvez télécharger le document au complet.
Researchers and business leaders have long decried short-termism: the excessive focus of executives of publicly traded companies—along with fund managers and other investors—on short-term results. The central concern is that short-termism discourages long-term investments, threatening the performance of both individual firms and the U.S. economy.
English: Detail from Corrupt Legislation. Mural by Elihu Vedder. Lobby to Main Reading Room, Library of Congress Thomas Jefferson Building, Washington, D.C. Main figure is seated atop a pedestal saying « CORRUPT LEGISLATION ». Artist’s signature is dated 1896. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
In the paper, How Short-Termism Invites Corruption…and What To Do About It, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, I argue that short-termism also invites institutional corruption—that is, institutionally supported behavior that, while not necessarily unlawful, erodes public trust and undermines a company’s legitimate processes, core values, and capacity to achieve espoused goals. Institutional corruption in business typically entails gaming society’s laws and regulations, tolerating conflicts of interest, and persistently violating accepted norms of fairness, among other things.
My argument starts by describing the twin problems of short-termism and institutional corruption and showing how the latter has led to a diminution of public trust in many of our leading firms and industries. Focusing most specifically on the pervasive gaming of society’s rules (with examples drawn from the finance industry, among others), I then explain how short-termism invites gaming and identify the principal sources of short-termism in today’s economy. The most significant sources of short-termism that collectively invite institutional corruption include: shifting beliefs about the purposes and responsibilities of the modern corporation; the concomitant rise of a new financial culture; misapplied performance metrics; perverse incentives; our vulnerability to hard-wired behavioral biases; the decreasing tenure of institutional leaders; and the bounded knowledge of corporate directors, which prevents effective board oversight.
I next turn to the question of what is to be done about short-termism and the institutional corruption it invites. In this final section of the paper, I discuss reforms and recommendations related to the improvement of board oversight; the adoption of compensation principles and practices that can help mitigate the destructive effects of inappropriate metrics, perverse incentives, and hard-wired preferences for immediate satisfactions; the termination of quarterly earnings guidance; and the elimination of the built-in, short-term bias embedded in our current capital gains tax regime.
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture de l’excellent article d’Ira Millstein* de la firme Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, paru dans Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, sur la saga JPMorgan Chase qui a alimenté les discussions en gouvernance au cours des derniers mois. Maintenant que la poussière sur l’échec de la séparation des rôles de PCD et PCA et sur l’opportunité d’utiliser un « administrateur principal » (Lead Directeur) est tombée, il y a certainement lieu d’en tirer des leçons très pertinentes pour le futur. C’est ce que fait admirablement bien l’auteure en précisant les différences fondamentales entre les rôles.
Dans le cas de JPMorgan Chase, la bataille de M. Dimon pour conserver ses fonctions de CEO et de Chairman a été féroce. Celui-ci a gagné son pari parce que les circonstances lui étaient favorables (le timing était bon). Selon l’auteure, il aurait été préférable de faire voter les actionnaires sur la séparation des rôles, pour le prochain CEO. L’article montre (1) qu’il est préférable d’avoir une séparation des rôles, (2) que la nomination d’un administrateur principal n’est pas la solution miracle parce que celui-ci n’aura jamais tout le pouvoir et toute la légitimité d’un président du conseil indépendant et (3) que dans les cas où un administrateur principal est requis, il faut définir son rôle en lui donnant le pouvoir et l’autorité nécessaire.
Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase (Photo credit: jurvetson)
Voici un extrait de cet article ainsi qu’un tableau montrant les comparaisons entre deux modèles de gouvernance : le modèle du président de conseil indépendant et le modèle dual « Chair/CEO ».
Substantial work was done on this issue by the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), in its Blue Ribbon Commission Report “The Effective Lead Director.” The role of the lead director as viewed in that report is not as strong a position as the independent chair, as indicated in a comparison chart included as Appendix A (below). In comparing the key duties of a typical independent chair to a lead director, the powers and duties of a lead director fall short in the following areas:
Power to call a board meeting: Unlike the chair, the lead director typically does not have convening power but only suggests to the chair/CEO that a meeting be called.
Control of the board agenda and board information: Unlike the chair who bears responsibility and authority for determining both the board agenda and the information that will be provided, the lead director collaborates with the chair/CEO and other directors on these issues.
Authority to represent the board in shareholder and stakeholder communications: Typically the chair/CEO represents the board with shareholders and external stakeholders; the lead director plays a role only if specifically asked by the chair/CEO or the board directly.
Appendix A Comparison of the Non-Executive Chair and the Chair/CEO Models
*Ira Millsteinis a senior partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP and co-chair of the Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership at Columbia Law School.
Voici, en rappel, un ensemble de questions très pertinentes que vous devriez poser avant d’accepter un poste sur un conseil d’administration. Cet article, rédigé par Ellen B. Richstone*, a récemment été publié dans NACD Directorship; il présente un « check list » qui vous sera sûrement d’une grande utilité au moment de considérer une offre de participation à un C.A.
Je sais; on ne se préoccupe généralement pas de faire un examen (« due diligence ») aussi serré que ce qui est proposé ici mais, si vous avez la chance d’avoir une offre, pourquoi ne pas considérer sérieusement les questions ci-dessous.
C’est un prélude au genre de travail que vous aurez à faire lorsque vous siégerez à un conseil : poser des questions!
L’article nous invite à se questionner sur les aspects suivants (la liste n’est pas exhaustive) :
(1) La mission, la vision, les stratégies, le plan d’action
(2) La dynamique du marché et la part de marché
(3) Les produits
(4) Les compétiteurs
(5) Les clients
(6) Les aspects financiers
(7) Les aspects légaux et l’assurance-responsabilité des administrateurs
(8) Les relations entre le C.A. et la direction
(9) La structure du conseil et la nature des relations entre les administrateurs
(10) Les relations avec les actionnaires
(11) La qualité des produits et services
(12) La qualité des ressources humaines et les relations de travail
(13) Vos valeurs personnelles
(14) Le risque de réputation
(15) Le modèle de gouvernance
Après avoir obtenu des réponses à ces questions, vous devez voir si la culture organisationnelle vous sied et, surtout, si votre contribution peut apporter une valeur ajoutée à ce conseil.
You are considering joining a company’s board. You reviewed the publicly available financial, legal, and business information; spoke with management, internal and external legal counsel, and auditors; and evaluated the D&O policy.
Question 2 (Photo credit: Blue Square Thing)
You are all set, right? In fact, this is the beginning of your due diligence process: the hardest questions are the least measurable, but equally and sometimes more important than the measurable ones.
With many questions, a company might not want to share the details until you have actually joined the board. In those cases, focus on whether the board and management have a process in place that supports a thoughtful discussion. In particular, think about these questions against the backdrop of your board value and effectiveness.
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*Ellen B. Richstone has extensive board and operating experience, both as a CEO and a CFO, and as a director in companies ranging in size from venture capital-backed to S&P 500, public, and private. She currently serves on the board of the NACD New England Chapter, along with several other boards.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait de l’avis du Conseil économique, social et environnemental (CESE) présenté par Amélie Rafael dans le Journal officiel de la république française, le 28 mai 2013.
Cet avis met en exergue les attentes du CESE eu égard aux responsabilités sociales de l’entreprise, plus particulièrement et impérativement, celles à l’égard de toutes les parties prenantes. Bonne lecture. Cette approche est-elle comparable à l’approche québécoise et nord-américaine ?
Face aux bouleversements économiques, sociaux et environnementaux, l’entreprise est soumise à des injonctions contradictoires et doit redéfinir son rôle dans la société et ses responsabilités vis-à-vis des parties prenantes sur lesquelles elle influe : dirigeants, salariés, actionnaires et sur de nombreux acteurs ou partenaires ainsi que son environnement et la collectivité dans son ensemble.
Le CESE entend montrer dans cet avis que la performance globale de l’Entreprise doit s’appuyer sur une gouvernance capable de conjuguer les intérêts parfois contradictoires de ses parties prenantes pour proposer une vision stratégique partagée, en particulier instaurer une confiance durable entre la direction de l’entreprise, ses salariés et ses actionnaires.
Vers un nouveau concept de l’entreprise Une approche statistique des entreprises en France
La statistique permet de mieux analyser le tissu économique à partir de critères entrepreneuriaux et non plus uniquement à partir des unités légales, distinguant les entreprises en fonction de leur indépendance décisionnelle.
A titre d’illustration : plus de 95 % des entreprises sont des micro-entreprises et plus de 99 % d’entre elles sont indépendantes ; les groupes emploient 64 % des salariés et réalisent 70 % de la valeur ajoutée ; 28 % des ETI françaises sont sous contrôle d’un groupe étranger.
Français : Le siège de l’entreprise Michelin (Clermont-Ferrand, France). (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
La moitié des entreprises ont une « personnalité morale », dont la plus répandue est la SARL. L’autre moitié agit sous la « personnalité physique » du chef d’entreprise.
Le CESE regrette que des données systématiques et régulières ne soient pas disponibles concernant la structure capitalistique des entreprises.
Une définition de l’entreprise
Les entreprises sont diverses par leur taille, leur activité et leur structuration juridique. Leurs réalités sont plus encore hétérogènes selon leur positionnement et leur prépondérance dans la chaîne de valeur productive. L’entreprise constitue une communauté organisée ayant pour objet de se pérenniser et de développer de nouvelles capacités.
Le CESE propose que soit défini un droit de l’entreprise reconnaissant sa mission de création collective, l’autorité de gestion confiée au chef d’entreprise et de nouvelles règles de solidarité entre ses parties prenantes et les modalités de participation des salariés à l’élaboration de sa stratégie.
L’entreprise doit être enseignée dans toute sa diversité dans l’ensemble des programmes scolaires et universitaires.
La contribution des parties prenantes à la performance de l’entreprise Les salariés : de l’information à la participation comme levier de la performance
Mettre la confiance au coeur du management
La bonne information des composantes du collectif est une condition minimale de l’engagement des salariés.
En tout état de cause, le management par la confiance requiert une mise en cohérence entre discours et actes. Il ouvre, à terme, sur une association de tous à l’élaboration du projet de l’entreprise.
Développer les pratiques participatives mobilisant les différentes ressources humaines au travail
Ces pratiques sont particulièrement adaptées à la bataille de l’innovation. Des plans de formation devraient désormais prévoir des formations à la gestion et à l’élaboration de la stratégie de l’entreprise.
L’intéressement et la participation : outils de compétitivité
L’intéressement et la participation doivent être maintenus dans leur esprit initial, notamment en rétablissant le blocage de la participation.
Une réflexion de fond devrait être engagée pour ouvrir ces dispositifs à l’ensemble des salariés quelle que soit la taille de l’entreprise.
L’environnement de l’entreprise : contraintes et opportunités
La relation donneur d’ordres/sous-traitants
Cette relation doit être améliorée pour aboutir à la « co-traitance » et la mise en place de filières industrielles et de services performantes et tenir compte de la valeur ajoutée de chaque niveau de sous-traitance.
La relation avec les clients/fournisseurs
Des mesures d’ordre réglementaire devraient encadrer certaines pratiques (transparence des tarifications, par exemple).
La stratégie d’entreprise nécessite des relations sur la durée avec les clients comme avec les fournisseurs et doit se traduire par la mise en place d’indicateurs permettant de vérifier l’effectivité des progrès réalisés.
L’entreprise et les territoires : une relation gagnant-gagnant
Le CESE préconise le soutien aux initiatives de coopération territoriale ainsi qu’aux formes innovantes d’entrepreneuriat collectif associant de multiples parties prenantes à leur gouvernance.
La maîtrise du capital de l’entreprise : condition de sa performance sur le long terme
Le niveau de capitalisation comme la typologie des actionnaires sont des leviers essentiels de la performance de l’entreprise.
Besoins et outils de financement
On s’accorde assez généralement pour dénoncer certaines stratégies d’investissement, souvent décidées pour satisfaire des attentes de forte rentabilité de très court terme. Certains investisseurs financiers peuvent adopter une attitude qui les porte à rechercher un retour sur investissement sur le long terme.
Il faut renforcer les outils de financement en fonds propres capables d’accompagner les entreprises sur le long terme sans déséquilibrer leur gouvernance.
L’actionnariat salarié
L’actionnariat salarié est un outil de stabilité et de financement de long terme pour l’entreprise. Il peut contribuer à renforcer la motivation des salariés et à créer une communauté d’intérêt entre eux et les actionnaires. Pour autant, il comporte des risques notamment en cas de difficultés conduisant à la cessation d’activité de l’entreprise, les salariés perdant à la fois leur emploi et leur épargne.
L’actionnariat salarié doit être encouragé, en particulier dans les PME par : l’incitation à la mise en place de plans d’actionnariat salarié lors de certains financements en fonds propres des fonds territoriaux ou de la BPI ; l’accès aux financements de ces fonds territoriaux aux PME ayant choisi la forme SCOP ; un nouveau dispositif juridique et fiscal hybride : la coopérative holding de salariés.
Le fonctionnement des instances de décision
Vue d’ensemble
Les instances de décisions sont très diverses selon la situation juridique des sociétés. Les entreprises cotées (moins de mille pour environ 3 millions d’entreprises en France) peuvent recourir à des codes de gouvernance d’application volontaire suivant le principe comply or explain.
La place des administrateurs
La composition des conseils d’administration et de surveillance doit s’ouvrir à des compétences professionnelles et humaines plus diverses. L’indépendance des administrateurs constitue un gage dans l’égalité de traitement des différentes parties prenantes à l’entreprise.
La représentation des salariés
Si leur présence est prévue, leur place dans les conseils d’administration, en France (0,4 % des sièges), n’apparaît pas à la hauteur des enjeux.
Le CESE constate que les propositions du rapport « Gallois » et la loi de « sécurisation de l’emploi » constituent une étape dans le renforcement de cette représentation. Toutefois, un bilan devra en être tiré avant que le dispositif ne soit éventuellement élargi à un plus grand nombre d’entreprises et/ou de salariés.
Il préconise que soit donnée aux salariés administrateurs une formation adéquate pour pouvoir jouer tout leur rôle.
Les spécificités des PME et de leurs dirigeants
L’accompagnement des dirigeants de PME est indispensable. Il repose sur deux éléments ; la formation et la formalisation :
information et formation du dirigeant en matière de management, gestion, innovation, commerce international… ;
formalisation de la stratégie, de la gouvernance et des relations aux parties prenantes, par exemple en mettant en pratiques des outils adaptés aux TPE/PME sur la base du référentiel RSE ;
formalisation des relations avec les salariés (information, IRP, accords de participation ou d’intéressement) ;
formalisation par une structuration juridique adaptée au projet stratégique.
Voici un article intéressant publié dans ASEAN Briefing le 11 juin 2013 et qui présente un système d’évaluation de la qualité de la gouvernance dans un certain nombre de pays asiatiques, basé sur cinq (5) principes-clés. Cette façon de juger de la valeur de la gouvernance par secteur d’activité m’a intéressée.
La méthodologie utilisée n’est pas suffisamment décrite mais la pondération accordée aux cinq dimensions a attiré mon attention, particulièrement le fait que l’on accorde 40 % des points à la « responsabilité du conseil d’administration ».
Vous trouverez ci-dessous les objectifs poursuivis ainsi que la pondération retenue, suivi de l’exemple indonésien. Je vous invite donc à lire cet article et à partager vos impressions d’une telle démarche d’évaluation de la gouvernance. Le lien suivant vous mènera à la version complète du rapport : ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard – rapport complet.
The ASEAN Capital Markets Forum (ACMF) and the Asian Development Bank recently established a joint initiative called the ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard. Corporate governance refers to the system of governance which controls and directs corporations, and monitors their actions and policies.
The stated objective of the ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard is to:
(1) Raise the corporate governance standards and practices of ASEAN publicly listed companies (PLCs);
(2) Give greater international visibility to well-governed ASEAN PLCs and showcase them as investable companies; and
(3) Complement other ACMF initiatives and promote ASEAN as an asset class.
English: The flags of ASEAN nations raised in MH Thamrin Avenue, Jakarta, during 18th ASEAN Summit, Jakarta, 8 May 2011. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The Scorecard judges five key principles of corporate governance in each nation:
Rights of shareholders (10 percent);
Role of stakeholders (10 percent);
Equitable treatment of shareholders (15 percent);
Disclosure and transparency (25 percent); and
Responsibilities of the board (40 percent)
The percentages indicate the allocated weight of each principle in determining the Scorecard of each country.
The ASEAN countries that participated in the initiative include Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Please find below a summary of how the ASEAN countries fared.
The higher scores listed for banks and SOEs are a result of those sectors being held under closer scrutiny by the Indonesian Central Bank and Ministry of SOEs, which significantly enhances the corporate governance practices of these companies.
The report found that a majority of PLCs in Indonesia still do not practice corporate governance at an international standard. Many of the corporate governance practices included in the Scorecard are voluntary practices, but the report details that Indonesian PLCs often only implement the mandatory practices, or the bare minimum necessary.
Furthermore, Indonesia’s corporate governance code does not have a “comply or explain” requirement, which has resulted in many PLCs not referring to the code at all. Therefore, they are potentially unaware of the other corporate governance practices that can be voluntarily implemented.
Voici un excellent article publié par Jeffrey Gandz, Mary Crossan, Gerard Seijts et Mark Reno* dans la revue Ivey Business Journal. Les auteurs insistent sur trois critères d’évaluation du rôle d’administrateur de sociétés : (1) compétences, (2) engagement et (3) caractère. Bien que ces trois critères soient déterminants dans l’exercice du rôle d’administrateur, la dimension la plus difficile à appréhender est le leadership qui se manifeste par le « caractère » d’un administrateur.
Les auteurs décrivent 11 caractéristiques-clés dont il faut tenir compte dans le recrutement, la sélection, l’évaluation et la rotation des administrateurs.
Je vous invite donc à lire cet article. En voici un extrait. Qu’en pensez-vous ?
« When it comes to selecting and assessing CEOs, other C-suite level executives or board members, the most important criteria for boards to consider are competencies, commitment and character. This article focuses on the most difficult of these criteria to assess – leadership character – and suggests the eleven key dimensions of character that directors should consider in their governance roles ».
Competencies matter. They define what a person is capable of doing; in our assessments of leaders we look for intellect as well as organizational, business, people and strategic competencies. Commitment is critical. It reflects the extent to which individuals aspire to the hard work of leadership, how engaged they are in the role, and how prepared they are to make the sacrifices necessary to succeed. But above all, character counts. It determines how leaders perceive and analyze the contexts in which they operate. Character determines how they use the competencies they have. It shapes the decisions they make, and how these decisions are implemented and evaluated.
Seasonal Reflection on Ivey Business building (Photo credit: Marc Foster)
Focus on character
Our research has focused on leadership character because it’s the least understood of these three criteria and the most difficult to talk about. Character is foundational for effective decision-making. It influences what information executives seek out and consider, how they interpret it, how they report the information, how they implement board directives, and many other facets of governance.
Within a board, directors require open, robust, and critical but respectful discussions with other directors who have integrity, as well as a willingness to collaborate and the courage to dissent. They must also take the long view while focusing on the shorter-range results, and exercise excellent judgment. All of these behaviors hinge on character.
Our research team at Ivey was made very conscious of the role of character in business leadership and governance when we conducted exploratory and qualitative research on the causes of the 2008 financial meltdown and the subsequent recession. In focus groups and conference-based discussions, where we met with over 300 business leaders on three continents, participants identified character weaknesses or defects as being at the epicenter of the build-up in financial-system leverage over the preceding decade, and the ensuing meltdown. Additionally, the participants identified leadership character strengths as key factors that distinguished the companies that survived or even prospered during the meltdown from those that failed or were badly damaged.
Participants in this research project identified issues with character in both leadership and governance. Among them were:
Overconfidence bordering on arrogance that led to reckless or excessive risk-taking behaviors
Lack of transparency and in some cases lack of integrity
Sheer inattention to critical issues
Lack of accountability for the huge risks associated with astronomical individual rewards
Intemperate and injudicious decision-making
A lack of respect for individuals that actually got in the way of effective team functioning
Hyper-competitiveness among leaders of major financial institutions
Irresponsibility toward shareholders and the societies within which these organizations operated.
These character elements and many others were identified as root or contributory causes of the excessive buildup of leverage in financial markets and the subsequent meltdown. But the comments from the business leaders in our research also raise important questions about leadership character. Among them:
What is character? It’s a term that we use quite often: “He’s a bad character”; “A person of good character”; “A character reference.” But what do we really mean by leadership “character”?
Why is it so difficult to talk about someone’s character? Why do we find it difficult to assess someone’s character with the same degree of comfort we seem to have in assessing their competencies and commitment?
Can character be learned, developed, shaped and molded, or is it something that must be present from birth – or at least from childhood or adolescence? Can it change? What, if anything, can leaders do to help develop good character among their followers and a culture of good character in their organizations?
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*Jeffrey Gandz is a Professor of Strategic Leadership and Managing Director, Program Design, in Ivey Business School’s Executive Development division at Western University, Mary Crossan is Professor of Strategic Management and the Taylor/Mingay Chair in Business Policy at Ivey Business School, Gerard Seijts is a Professor of Organizational Behavior, holds the Ian O. Ihnatowycz Chair in Leadership, and is Executive Director of the Ian O. Ihnatowycz Institute of Leadership at the Ivey Business School, Mark Reno is a post-doctoral fellow at Ivey Business School working on several leadership-related projects.
Je vous invite à visionner la vidéo de ReutersVideo dans laquelle Lucy Marcus discute ouvertement et candidement avec Robert Monks, actionnaire activiste avéré et conseiller en gouvernance de sociétés, à propos des réformes entreprises au Royaume-Uni, en comparaison avec les É.U.
boardroom (Photo credit: The_Warfield)
M. Monks donne son avis sur les comportements des administrateurs de demain et montre comment ceux-ci peuvent se préparer et surmonter une situation de crise.
Vous serez probablement aussi intéressés à plusieurs autres vidéos de la série In the Boardroom présentée sur YouTube. Bon visionnement !
English: Tactical Risk Management model, comparing and valuing 10 different risk or opportunity propositions (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Vous pouvez consulter les résultats de l’enquête menée par Aon sur la gestion globale des risques en 2013 : Global Risk Management Survey 2013.
The ability to anticipate opportunities and effectively respond to threats is critical for organizations to grapple with new challenges. Fact-based insights are the best way to ensure optimal decision making. Aon’s 2013 Global Risk Management Survey report is part of this process, capturing the latest risk trends and priorities facing companies around the world. The report unveiled the top 10 risks now and three years in the future. Conducted in Q4 2012, the web-based survey gathered input from 1,415 respondents — a 47 percent increase in respondents from the 2011 survey — from 70 countries in all regions of the world and was conducted in 10 languages.
In addition to identifying the top risk concerns facing companies today, the survey findings also cover the following topics:
How companies identify and assess risk
Approach to risk management and board involvement
Risk management functionsInsurance markets
Risk financing
Global programs
Captives
The survey is still open for participation and risk decision makers are invited to participate in the survey and will receive a complimentary customized report based on their industry, geography and revenue size. To take the survey, visit aon.com/grms2013.
Note: When the survey page loads, please select « First Time Users Click Here » to start the survey.
Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, vient de me faire parvenir l’édition 2013 de l’étude de Thompson/Reuters sur l’audit interne. On le sait, le domaine des contrôles internes et de l’audit interne prennent de plus en plus d’importance dans la gouvernance des sociétés.
Ce document sera donc très utile à tout administrateur soucieux de parfaire ses connaissances de l’état de la situation en 2013 dans le monde.
Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Voici le sommaire de l’étude.
Regulatory guidance and industry best practice expects internal audit to take a higher-level view of risks and controls in a firm.
Process assurance and monitoring activities remain key areas of focus for internal audit functions.
Focus on corporate governance is down from last year.
Immature risk management processes in firms and insufficient input by internal audit functions.
Weaknesses in risk reporting to the board.
Insufficient communication with other risk and control functions.
Challenge to audit committees to reassess the activities of internal audit.
Thomson Reuters Accelus surveyed more than 1,100 internal audit practitioners worldwide in February and March 2013 to canvass their views on the state of internal audit and their greatest challenges for the year ahead.
The responses received covered 76 countries including Europe, the Americas, Australasia, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The respondents represented firms from a wide set of industries including financial services, manufacturing, government, education, life sciences, energy and other highly-regulated industries. Feedback came from internal audit departments of all sizes, ranging from fewer than five auditors to global conglomerates exceeding 100 auditors.
Oracle Audit (Photo credit: Fenng(dbanotes))
The world of internal audit is diverse and challenging. The global financial crisis has sparked a reassessment of the internal audit function’s role in financial services in particular, but the deepening crisis has impacted all industries. The focus from policymakers and regulators alike has been on culture, corporate governance and risk management, together with a growing acknowledgement of the need for a strong, well-resourced independent audit function operating — and in particular reporting— in close coordination with other risk and compliance functions.
Expectations have changed and continue to change. On the one hand chief executives, boards, and audit and risk committees all have increased expectations of the depth and quality of the work which needs to be performed by internal audit functions, while on the other regulators and policy makers are placing more reliance on internal audit functions not only to ensure “fair play” in organizations but also to undertake their business at board level and to become actively involved with high-level strategic risk and corporate governance issues.
The Thomson Reuters Accelus Internal Audit Survey 2013 analyses the replies from respondents and highlights the specific challenges and priorities that the current fog of information has presented the industry. There are lessons to be learnt: When compared with the detailed yardstick of the policies and guidance published, the results present a challenging picture, and one that requires action at all levels. From the audit committee’s oversight role to the detailed testing behind audit findings, internal audit functions — many of which need to be able to accomplish more with fewer resources — are urged to review what they do and reprioritize to gain maximum effectiveness.
« We do want to see the internal audit profession taken seriously within the institutions that we regulate. We want it to have an appropriate profile and thereby bolster the standing of the professions, because it is important. »
(Andrew Bailey, deputy governor for prudential regulation at the Bank of the England and chief executive officer of the UK Prudential Regulation Authority, in an interview which appeared in Audit and Risk Magazine, May 2012).
La formation en gouvernance est de plus en plus un préalable à l’exercice du rôle d’administrateur de sociétés. L’article retenu montre que l’apprentissage sur le tas est en voie de disparition dans les conseils d’administration de grandes sociétés. La formation préparatoire peut prendre différentes formes : training sur mesure, coaching, séminaires, etc.
Cependant, il semble de plus en plus évident que les programme de formation en gouvernance (tels que IoD, C.dir., ASC, IAS) menant à une certification reconnue, constituent la voie à suivre dans le futur. L’article de Hannah Prevett, paru dans le Sunday Times, montre que les formations organisées sont de meilleurs endroits pour un apprentissage de qualité que les tables de conseils d’administration… Bonne lecture.
Diplômés ASC du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés 2012
The received wisdom is that new directors learn on the job. If they are not equipped with the necessary skills when they accept their first board appointment, they will need to be quick on the uptake.
Not any more: the tidal wave of new governance requirements means it is not good enough to acquire expertise over time. And, as a result, many prospective boardroom stars are seeking training to help them do the job they’re paid to do from day one. When Alan Kay learnt he was to join the executive board of Costain in 2003, he immediately began considering how to prepare for his new role at the engineering and construction group.
“A lot of people haven’t really thought about how to prepare for a board role. [They think] it’s something that happens naturally: you get on the board and then you think, I’m going to learn on the job,” said Kay, who is Costain’s technical and operations director. “But once you’re appointed, becoming competent and learning as you go takes several months, which is not ideal.”
He researched training options for new board members and came across the Institute of Directors’ accredited programmes, including the certificate and diploma in company direction. The IoD fills 6,000 places on such courses annually with representatives of both large and small organisations — not all of them young guns, as Roger Barker, head of corporate governance at the IoD, explained.
“The directors of large organisations were reluctant to undertake any form of formalised director training. These were typically seasoned former executives, with extensive experience of serving on boards as chief executives or chief financial officers. It has been difficult to persuade such individuals that director training is relevant to them,” said Barker.
Articles d’intérêt reliés au thème de la formation en gouvernance
Cet article rédigé par Geoffrey KIEL, James BECK et Jacques GRISÉ (1) et paru dans les Documents de travail de la Faculté des sciences de l’administration en 2008 est toujours d’actualité.
Il présente un guide pratique des questions clés que les conseils d’administration doivent prendre en considération lorsqu’ils planifient une évaluation.
On met l’accent sur l’utilité d’avoir des évaluations bien menées ainsi que sur les sept étapes à suivre pour des évaluations efficaces d’un conseil d’administration et des administrateurs. Bonne lecture.
Lorsqu’une crise se produit au sein d’une société, comme celles qu’ont connues Nortel et Hollinger International, les intervenants, les médias, les organismes de réglementation et la collectivité se tournent vers le conseil d’administration pour trouver des réponses. Étant donné que ce dernier est le chef décisionnel ultime de la société, il est responsable des actions et du rendement de la société.
Le défi actuel que doivent relever les conseils d’administration consiste à accroître la valeur des organisations qu’ils gouvernent. Grâce à l’évaluation du rendement, les conseils d’administration peuvent s’assurer qu’ils ont les connaissances, les compétences et la capacité de relever ce défi.
Plusieurs guides et normes de pratiques exemplaires reconnaissent cette notion. Ainsi, la Commission des valeurs mobilières de l’Ontario indique dans les lignes directrices sur la gouvernance des sociétés (NP 58-201) que « le conseil d’administration, ses comités et chacun de ses administrateurs devraient faire l’objet régulièrement d’une évaluation à l’égard de leur efficacité et de leur contribution ».
L’évaluation du conseil d’administration est trop souvent perçue comme un mal nécessaire – un processus mécanique consistant à cocher des points sur une liste qui, en bout de ligne, a peu de valeur réelle pour le conseil d’administration si ce n’est pour satisfaire aux exigences en matière de conformité. Toutefois… un processus efficace d’évaluation du conseil d’administration peut donner lieu à une transformation.
Une publication du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), sous forme de questions et réponses sur la gouvernance, a été conçue à l’intention des administrateurs nommés par le gouvernement du Québec comme membre d’un conseil d’administration d’une société d’État ou d’un organisme gouvernemental. Celle-ci vise à répondre aux questions les plus courantes qu’un administrateur nouvellement nommé peut légitimement se poser en matière de gouvernance. On y indique qu’ « une évaluation faite à intervalles périodiques est essentielle pour assurer le maintien d’une gouvernance efficace » (2).
Cet article offrira une approche pratique en matière d’évaluations efficaces des conseils d’administration et des administrateurs en appliquant un cadre comportant sept étapes qui pose les questions clés que tous les conseils d’administration devraient prendre en considération lorsqu’ils planifient une évaluation. Même les conseils d’administration efficaces peuvent tirer profit d’une évaluation bien menée.
Comme nous l’avons résumé dans le tableau 1, une évaluation menée adéquatement peut contribuer considérablement à des améliorations du rendement à trois niveaux : organisation, conseil d’administration et administrateur. Selon Lawler et Finegold « les conseils qui évaluent leurs membres et qui s’évaluent ont tendance à être plus efficaces que ceux qui ne le font pas ». Toutefois, il faut souligner que ces avantages ne sont possibles qu’au moyen d’une évaluation du conseil d’administration menée de manière appropriée; si l’évaluation n’est pas faite correctement, cela peut causer de la méfiance parmi les membres du conseil d’administration et entre le conseil lui-même et la direction.
Une publication de l’École d’administration publique du Québec (ENAP), produite en collaboration avec le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), présente une section traitant de l’évaluation de la performance du conseil d’administration (3).
Selon les auteurs, « L’évaluation est une composante essentielle d’une saine gouvernance d’entreprise. Elle permet de jeter un regard sur la façon dont les décisions ont été prises et sur la manière d’exercer la gestion des activités de l’organisation et ce, dans une perspective d’amélioration continue… Il incombe au président du conseil d’instaurer une culture d’évaluation du rendement et de la performance. Pour ce faire, il doit veiller à la mise en place d’un processus d’évaluation clair, à l’élaboration de règles et d’outils pertinents, à la définition des responsabilités de chaque intervenant dans le processus d’évaluation, à la diffusion de l’information et à la mise en place des correctifs nécessaires ». Dans cette publication, on présente dix outils détaillés d’évaluations (questionnaires) qui concernent les groupes cibles suivants :
1. l’évaluation du conseil
2. l’évaluation du fonctionnement du conseil
3. l’évaluation du président du conseil
4. l’évaluation d’un membre de conseil
5. l’évaluation du comité de gouvernance et d’éthique
6. l’évaluation du comité de vérification
7. l’évaluation du comité des ressources humaines
8. l’évaluation du fonctionnement d’un comité
9. l’évaluation d’un membre de comité
10. l’évaluation du président d’un comité
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(1) Geoffrey Kiel, Ph.D., premier vice-chancelier délégué et doyen de l’École d’administration, University of Notre Dame, Australie, et président de la société Effective Governance Pty Ltd, James Beck, directeur général, Effective Governance Pty Ltd, Jacques Grisé, Ph.D., F.Adm.A., collaborateur spécial du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), Faculté des sciences de l’administration, Université Laval, Québec.
(2) Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, Être un administrateur de sociétés d’état : 16 questions et réponses sur la gouvernance, Faculté des sciences de l’administration, Université Laval, 2007.
(3) ENAP, Les devoirs et responsabilités d’un conseil d’administration, Guide de référence, Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec, 2007.
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture de l’article d’Adam Davidson, publié dans le New York Times du 29 mai 2013. L’auteur présente une excellente analyse des facteurs qui influencent la rémunération du PCD et montre comment le conseil d’administration doit jouer un rôle capital dans l’établissement d’une rémunération juste et efficace.
Voici un extrait de l’article. Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
« Most C.E.O.’s used to be able to handle their pay negotiations in private, but the Dodd-Frank reforms, which were passed in 2010, now give shareholders the right to vote on executive compensation. This has helped usher in a so-called “say on pay” revolution, which tries to stop executives from making more money when their companies don’t do that well. In Switzerland, a recent nationwide referendum, passed 2 to 1, gave shareholders the right to restrict the pay for the heads of Swiss companies. The European Union is likely to vote on a similar measure by the end of the year.
Economically speaking, this is more than a little odd. Shareholders should be motivated to pay their C.E.O.’s according to their success. But doing so involves a tricky dance known to game theorists as the principal-agent problem: how does an employer (the principal) motivate a worker (the agent) to pursue the principal’s interest? This principal-agent problem is everywhere. (Do you pay a contractor per day of work or per project? Do you pay salespeople by the hour or on commission?) It becomes particularly thorny when the agent knows a lot more about his job than the principal.
Boards and chief executives don’t often suffer from Costanza-like ineptitude, but they are harder to rein in. They are often rewarded when they don’t succeed but are not usually penalized enough when they do a lackluster job. Lucian Bebchuk, a professor at Harvard Law School and perhaps the leading academic voice for corporate reform, told me that the problem isn’t (just) greed. It’s the boards of directors. The directors are supposed to represent the stockholders’ interests, he says, but most public firms, where C.E.O.’s can have considerable influence over board appointments, neuter those interests. They are structured so that a board tends to side with its chief.
Excessive C.E.O. pay, Bebchuk says, is a manifestation of a deeper problem. A bad C.E.O. pay package can cost shareholders millions; a corporation that is being poorly overseen by its board can cost billions. “Shareholder rights in the U.S. are still quite weak relative to what they are in other advanced economies,” he explained. His solution is to pass laws that make it easier for shareholders to vote out boardmembers who fail to discipline underperforming chief executives. This, he argues, will motivate them to push back against executives that do an underwhelming job. At the very least, all the attention would keep boardmembers and C.E.O.’s on their toes. And a multitude of better-run companies would result in billions, perhaps trillions, of wealth returned to the economy ».
Cet article, rédigé par Ted Kaufman, de Forbes expose une problématique de gouvernance déterminante et décisoire, une problématique à laquelle chaque administrateur est confronté. Dans la gestion d’une corporation publique (cotée en bourse), quelle importance un administrateur doit-il accorder à l’avis et au vote des actionnaires ?
Il est crucial, pour chaque administrateur, d’avoir une vision claire à ce sujet car son comportement sur le Conseil sera influencé, en grande partie, par la conception qu’il se fait de son rôle de fiduciaire. L’auteur adopte une position très campée, tranchante et … mordante à ce sujet : l’hégémonie et la primauté des actionnaires !
Encore une fois, il est difficile de trancher car on peut toujours répondre que ça dépend ! Mais, à mon avis, chaque administrateur a un point de vue sur la question, une prise de position qui façonne son système de valeur.
Attention cependant … La position de l’auteur doit être analysée en tenant compte de l’environnement légal américain. La thèse de Kaufman est que les actionnaires n’ont à peu près pas d’influence sur ce que le management ou le conseil fait ! Les actionnaires, selon lui, sont les véritables propriétaires et ils sont souverains. Les visiteurs du blogue sont-il d’accord avec cette position ? À vous de décider ! Que pensez-vous de la position de l’auteur ?
À qui les administrateurs d’une société publique doivent-ils allégeance : aux actionnaires, aux investisseurs dominants, aux parties prenantes, au management … ?
Ma réponse est que bien qu’ils soient élus par l’actionnariat, ils doivent exercer leur rôle de fiduciaire dans les MEILLEURS INTÉRÊTS DE LA SOCIÉTÉ, en prenant en compte la position des parties prenantes. C’est la réponse canadienne.
I can’t recall the venue, but it had to be in the late 1950s or early 1960’s, long before the major shareholders in our major corporations were mutual funds, pension funds, and other institutional investors. The speaker was from an organization called Americans for the Competitive Enterprise System (ACES). His topic was corporate democracy.
English: Sen. Ted Kaufman addresses engineering graduates at the University of Delaware. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
What he said stayed with me. Democracy, he said, was not only the way our political system worked but also how we ran our corporations. The people who owned common stock voted for a board of directors who in turn elected a chairman and hired a president to run the company. The board met regularly with the president and other hired managers to make sure the company was being run to maximize the economic return for the stockholders.
It sounds almost quaint, doesn’t it?
Corporate governance today has nothing to do with socialism or democracy. What is now clear is that many of our major corporations are operated as dictatorships by their managements, and stockholders have virtually no say in how they are run.
Voici un ensemble de questions très pertinentes que vous pourriez (devriez) poser avant de vous joindre à un conseil d’administration. Cet article, rédigé par Ellen B. Richstone*, a été publié aujourd’hui dans NACD Directorship; il présente un genre de « check list » qui vous sera sûrement d’une grande utilité au moment de considérer une offre de participation à un C.A.
Je sais; on ne se préoccupe généralement pas de faire un examen (« due diligence ») aussi serré que ce qui est proposé ici mais, si vous avez la chance d’avoir une offre, pourquoi ne pas considérer sérieusement les questions ci-dessous. C’est un prélude au genre de travail que vous aurez à faire quand vous siégerez à ce conseil : poser des questions !
L’article nous invite à se questionner sur les aspects suivants :
(1) La mission, la vision, les stratégies, le plan d’action
(2) La dynamique du marché et la part de marché
(3) Les produits
(4) Les compétiteurs
(5) Les clients
(6) Les aspects financiers
(7) Les aspects légaux et l’assurance-responsabilité des administrateurs
(8) Les relations entre le C.A. et la direction
(9) La structure du conseil et la nature des relations entre les administrateurs
(10) Les relations avec les actionnaires
(11) La qualité des produits et services
(12) La qualité des ressources humaines et les relations de travail
(13) Vos valeurs personnelles
(14) Le risque de réputation
(15) Le modèle de gouvernance
Après avoir obtenu des réponses à ces questions, vous devez voir si la culture organisationnelle vous sied et, surtout, si votre contribution peut constituer une valeur ajoutée à ce conseil.
You are considering joining a company’s board. You reviewed the publicly available financial, legal, and business information; spoke with management, internal and external legal counsel, and auditors; and evaluated the D&O policy.
Question 2 (Photo credit: Blue Square Thing)
You are all set, right? In fact, this is the beginning of your due diligence process: the hardest questions are the least measurable, but equally and sometimes more important than the measurable ones.
With many questions, a company might not want to share the details until you have actually joined the board. In those cases, focus on whether the board and management have a process in place that supports a thoughtful discussion. In particular, think about these questions against the backdrop of your board value and effectiveness.
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*Ellen B. Richstone has extensive board and operating experience, both as a CEO and a CFO, and as a director in companies ranging in size from venture capital-backed to S&P 500, public, and private. She currently serves on the board of the NACD New England Chapter, along with several other boards.
Ce billet présente le résumé d’une étude, produite par le Conference Board et récemment publiée sur le site de Harvard Law School Forun on Corporate Governance and Financial Régulation, laquelle fait état de la planification de la relève des PCD (CEO). L’étude intitulée CEO Succession Practices (2013 Edition) analyse les cas de rotation des PCD dans les entreprises du S&P 500. Le rapport présente les résultats en quatre sections :
Les tendances en matière de planification de la relève de 2000 à 2012 ainsi que la relation entre la performance des entreprises et le départ ou l’arrivée d’un PCD;
Les pratiques en matière de succession du PCD en 2012 : les responsabilités du conseil, le rôle du PCD démissionnaire au conseil et la nature de la divulgation aux actionnaires;
Une analyse des particularités de plusieurs cas célèbres de succession de PCD en 2012;
Divers exemples montrant comment l’activisme des actionnaires a une influence grandissante sur le processus de la planification de la relève en 2012.
Despite steady average CEO succession rates, dismissals hit a 10-year high in 2012.
In 2012, 53 CEOs in the S&P 500 left their post. The rate of CEO succession in calendar year 2012 was 10.9 percent, consistent with the average number of annual succession announcements from 2000 through 2011. The rate of CEO dismissals varies widely across the 2000–2012 period, ranging from 40.0 percent in 2002 to 13.2 percent in 2005 (on average, 24.5 percent for the period). In 2012, 31.4 percent of all successions were non-voluntary departures, the highest rate recorded since 2003.
Companies in the services industries experienced higher than average CEO succession rates.
The rate of CEO succession had significant variation across industry groups during 2012. The services industry had a succession rate of 18.0 percent in 2012, higher than its 13-year average of 16.2 percent. By contrast, the extraction industry, which includes mining, petroleum products, and natural gas companies, had a succession rate of only 5.6 percent during 2012, lower than its 13-year average of 9.5 percent.
Companies increasingly look outside to hire their CEOs.
In 2012, 27.1 percent of S&P 500 companies that faced a CEO succession hired an outsider for the top job. While the rate confirms a trend recorded since the 1970s, it is much higher than the 19 percent reported in 2011. This finding may suggest that there is a need to continue to strengthen companies’ leadership development practices. The heated pay-for-performance debate of the last few years has induced boards of directors to increase the rigor of the CEO selection process: the growing percentage of outsiders chosen as new CEOs may show that directors don’t always like what they find within the companies’ ranks. Moreover, a number of companies that underwent a succession event in 2012 selected a director from their own board as the new CEOs. The director-turned-CEO succession model provides companies with a chief executive who is familiar with corporate strategy and key stakeholders, thereby reducing leadership transition risk.
CEO departure may offer opportunity to reconsider board leadership model.
Only 18.8 percent of successions in 2012 involved the immediate joint appointment of an individual as CEO and chairman of the board of directors. Based on succession announcements, one-third of departing CEOs remained as board chairman for at least a brief transition period, typically until the next shareholder meeting, while several departing CEOs retained significant influence with the company as board chairman. In some cases (Iron Mountain), the succession was used as an opportunity to reconsider the board leadership structure and adopt a CEO/board chairman separation model. Alternatively, the boards of Altria Group, Boston Scientific, CA Inc., and Murphy Oil retained the expertise of the departing CEO via a consulting contract rather than a position on the board.
Formal succession process is credited for the choice of new CEO, except when the CEO is hired from outside.
Perhaps surprisingly, only 22.9 percent of succession announcements among S&P 500 companies in 2012 explicitly stated that the incoming CEO was identified through the board’s succession planning process. This is noticeably lower than the 32.4 percent of successions that referred to the succession planning process in 2011. There appears to be a link between inside promotion to the CEO position and the succession planning process—31.6 percent of announcements that mention the board’s role in the succession planning process involve an insider appointment as incoming CEO, whereas no successions that involve an outside hire reference succession planning.
Mantatory CEO retirement policies remain seldom used.
Mandatory CEO retirement policies based on age are an infrequent element of CEO succession plans. Only 11.8 percent of manufacturing companies and 8 percent of nonfinancial services companies adopt an age-based mandatory retirement policy for CEOs; the number is lower in the financial industry. The highest level of policy adoption (19.4 percent) is reported by manufacturing and nonfinancial companies with annual revenue of $20 billion or greater.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous les grandes lignes d’un excellent article commandité par Deloitte et publié aujourd’hui dans le Wall Street Journal. L’article traite de plusieurs thèmes relatifs à l’intégrité au niveau du conseil, notamment l’intégrité comme valeur fondamentale, les effets de la dénonciation, un modèle de surveillance de l’intégrité, les principes d’une gouvernance efficace de C.A.
C’est une lecture recommandée pour tout administrateur de sociétés.
Integrity is critical to an organization’s culture and a requirement for effective dynamics in the boardroom. In view of recent headlines, a valid question is: What is integrity? Merriam-Webster defines integrity as “firm adherence to a code of especially moral or artistic values.” This, in turn, raises the question: Whose values? An individual’s? The organization’s? Society’s? All of these?
An effective board is concerned about integrity inside and outside the boardroom. It leads by example. The board plays a role in working with the CEO to help set the ethical tenor for the organization. It also promotes and monitors compliance with laws, regulations and organizational policies. Integrity in the boardroom is based on factors such as organizational values, the need to uphold the board’s fiduciary responsibilities and a willingness to be accountable.
English: Integrated boardroom designed and installed by EDG in 2003. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
A commitment to performance with integrity is widely recognized as a “must have” in organizations, yet many people and organizations struggle to put this ideal into practice. Board governance structures and practices should promote a corporate culture of integrity and ethics, coupled with corporate, environmental and social responsibility. The board should help to build trust and long-term relationships with shareholders, customers, regulators and employees.
The board’s role in maintaining integrity includes working with the CEO to establish the right tone at the top, understanding compliance requirements and establishing expectations for senior management, which then cascade to the entire organization. In addition, the board holds senior management accountable for meeting such expectations.
J’ai retenu les cinq principes de base suivants pour une gouvernance efficace du Conseil :
Integrity is critical to an organization’s sustained reputation and results. Effective boards help set the ethical tone for the entire organization and actively participate in programs designed to promote appropriate behavior with regard to compliance, integrity and ethics. A proactive role in continually setting standards and monitoring integrity is an effective way to guide an organization to improved principles, values and growth. Following are five principles for improving integrity in the boardroom:
1. Be active. The board should be informed about the organization and vigorous in management oversight.
2. Provide organizational leadership. The board, working with management, should set the organization’s strategic direction, review financial objectives and establish a strong ethical tone.
3. Comply with laws, regulations and ethics policies. The board should confirm that procedures and practices are in place to prevent and detect illegal or unethical conduct and to permit appropriate and timely action should such conduct occur.
4. Be informed, be transparent and listen. The board should take steps to confirm that management discloses fair, complete, accurate and timely information and that the organization maintains a two-way communication channel with the board.
5. Engage in continuous monitoring. The board should establish and review metrics related to ethical reporting and violations and remain aware of new developments in corporate governance that can help improve practices and procedures.
Je vous propose la lecture d’un essai sur les principaux courants de pensées en gouvernance des sociétés au cours des soixante dernières années. Ce document, écrit par Douglas M. Branson de l’École de Droit de l’Université de Pittsburgh et paru dans le Social Science Research Network (SSRN), représente certainement l’un des points de vue les plus articulés sur la recherche d’une explication valable à la thèse de Berle et Means concernant la séparation de la propriété de celle du contrôle des firmes.
Bien que l’essai soit rédigé dans un style assez provocateur, il est fascinant à lire, pour peu que l’on soit familier avec la langue de Shakespeare et que l’on s’accommode des accents grinçants de l’auteur. Je recommande fortement la lecture de ce texte à tout étudiant de la gouvernance; c’est un must pour comprendre le champ d’étude ! C’est un document que j’ai l’intention de traduire au cours des prochains mois.
Cover via Amazon
Voici les points saillants de l’essai de Branson (en anglais à ce stade-ci) :
In 1932, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means documented the widespread dispersion of corporate shareholders, and the atomization of corporate shareholdings. They noted that in the then modern corporation “ownership has become depersonalized.” The result was that a new form of property had come into being. The person who owned the property no longer controlled it, as the farmer who owned the horse had to feed it, teach it pull the plow, and bury it when it died. “In the corporate system, the ‘owner’ of industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of ownership while the power, the responsibility and the substance which have been an integral part of ownership in the past are being transferred to a separate group in whose hands lies control.” This was the fabled “separation of ownership from control.”
In one of the best known of his books (1956), American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, Galbraith rhetorically posed a number of solutions to the problem of unchecked corporate power, including the separation of ownership from control, although he generally did not use the Berle & Means terminology. He did not propose nationalization, as the British had done. Instead, he theorized that, indeed, corporations had grown too large, their shareholders no longer controlled them, competitive market forces no longer constrained them, and the potential for abuse was great. That potential would be checked however by the growth of countervailing power inherent in the growth of labor unions, consumer groups and government agencies. Galbraith pointed to the growth and influence of consumer cooperatives which enjoyed great growth in Scandinavia, at least in the post-War years. Essentially, those newly empowered groups would supply the controls historically owners had provided.
The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement of the Early 70s called for government intervention, as the nationalization movement had, but on discrete fronts rather than on a plenary basis. One scholar urged replacement of the one share one vote standard prevalent in U.S. corporate law with a graduated scale so that with acquisition of addition shares owners, particularly institutional owners who were perceived to be excessively mercenary would receive less and less voting power. A “power to the people” mandate would augment the power of individual owners, who generally held fewer shares but were thought to be more socially conscious. Calls for required installation of public interest directors on publicly held corporations’ boards sometimes included sub-recommendations that legislation also require that the publicly minded be equipped with offices and staffs, at corporate expense. Others proposed requirements for social auditing and for mandatory disclosure of social audit results.
Toward the second half of the 1970s, The Corporate Accountability Research Group, created and promoted by consumer advocate Ralph Nader, gathered evidence, marshaled arguments, and advocated the other, more drastic reform of the 1970s, federal chartering of large corporations. In certain of its incarnations, chartering advocates expanded the proposal’s reach, from the 500 largest enterprises to the 2000 largest U.S. corporations by revenue, to any corporation which did a significant amount of business with the federal government, and to certain categories of companies whose businesses were thought to be infected with the public interest. Whatever the universe of such corporations, these companies would have to re-register with a new federal entity, the Federal Chartering Agency. In addition, these corporations would no longer have perpetual existence as they had under state law. Instead the new federal statute corporations would have only limited life charters, good for, say, 20 or 25 years limited.
A Seismic Shift: the Swift Rise of Law and Economics Jurisprudence of the 1980s . Perhaps only once in a lifetime will one see as pronounced a jurisprudential shift as that from the corporate social responsibility and federal chartering movements to the minimalist, non-invasive take of economics on corporate law and corporate governance. Law and economics pointed to a minimalist corporate jurisprudence the core theory of which was that market forces regulated corporate and managerial behavior much better than regulation, laws, or lawsuits ever could.
An Antidote: The Good Governance Movement. The American Law Institute (ALI) Corporate Governance Project of 1994 constituted an implicit rejection of, and an antidote to, the law and economics movement. Succinctly, the ALI evinced a strong belief that, yes, corporate law does have a role to play. That belief, sometimes characterized as the constitutionalist approach, in contrast to the contractarian approach, underline and buttresses the entire ALI Project. The ALI crafted recommended rules for corporate objectives; structure, including board composition and committee structure; duty of “fair dealing” (duty of loyalty); duty of care and the business judgment rule; roles of directors and shareholders in control transactions and tender offers; and shareholders’remedies, including the derivative action and appraisal remedies.
The Early 1990s: The Emphasis on Institutional Investor Activism. Traditionally, though, institutional investors followed the “Wall Street Rule,” meaning that if they developed an aversion to a portfolio company’s performance or governance, they simply sold the stock rather than becoming embroiled in a corporate governance issue. Institutions voted with their feet. That is, they did so until portfolio positions had become so large that if an institutional investor liquidated even a sizeable portion of the portfolio’s stake in a company, the institution’s sales alone would push down the stock’s price. Thus, in the modern era, institutional investors are faced with more of a buy and hold strategy than they otherwise might prefer. So was born an opening to push for yet another proposed reform which would fill the vacuum created by the separation of ownership from control, namely, institutional activism, or “agents watching agents.” The case for institutional oversight was that because “product, capital, labor, and corporate control constraints on managerial discretion are imperfect, corporate managers need to be watched by someone, and the institutions are the only institutions available.”
The Shift to an Emphasis on “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance. In the second half of the 90s decade, the governance prognosticators did an abrupt about face, abandoning talk about the prospect of institutional shareholder activism in favor of pontification on the prospect of global convergence. The thesis went something like this. Through the process of globalization the world had become a much smaller place. Through use of media such as email and the Internet, governance advocates in Singapore now knew, or knew how to find out, what was happening on the corporate governance front in the United Kingdom and the United States. According to U.S. academics, the global model of good governance would replicate the U.S. model of corporate governance, of course…
Shift of the Emphasis to the Gatekeepers in 2001. Whatever the U.S. system was, it had a great many defects and it did not do the job for which it had been devised. In addition, of course, no sign existed that the convergence predicted had taken place. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) heads off in varying directions but a careful reader can discern that one of the legislation’s dominant themes is strengthening gatekeepers as a means of enhancing watchfulness over corporations. Thus, for example, SOX requires public corporations to have audit committees composed of independent directors, one or more of whom must be financial experts. Section 307 imposes whistleblowing duties upon attorneys who uncover wrongdoing. To enhance their independence, SOX requires that accountings firms which audit public companies no longer may provide a long list of lucrative consulting services for audit clients.
Emphasis on Independent Directors and Independent Board Committees. The movement for independent directors gathered steam with the 2002 SOX legislation, which required that SEC reporting companies, that is, most publicly held corporations, have an audit committee comprised exclusively of independent directors. The New York Stock Exchange followed by amendments to its Listing Manual that listed public companies have a majority of directors who are independent, making the 1994 ALI recommendation of good practice into a hard and fast requirement. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act jumped on the independent director bandwagon with its requirement that exchanges refuse to list the shares of corporations who disclose they do not have a compensation committee comprised of independent directors. Observers who have written about the issue assume that the Dodd-Frank disclosure requirement is a de facto requirement that corporations have compensation committees, albeit a backhanded sort of requirement.
L’extrait que je vous présente vous donnera une bonne idée de la teneur des propos de Branson. Vous pouvez télécharger le document de 25 pages.
Vos commentaires sont grandement appréciés. Bonne lecture.
This article is a retrospective of corporate governance reforms various academics have authored over the last 60 years or so, by the author of the first U.S. legal treatise on the subject of corporate governance (Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance (1993)). The first finding is as to periodicity: even casual inspection reveals that the reformer group which controls the « reform » agenda has authored a new and different reform proposal every five years, with clock-like regularity. The second finding flows from the first, namely, that not one of these proposals has made so much as a dent in the problems that are perceived to exist. The third inquiry is to ask why this is so? Possible answers include the top down nature of scholarship and reform proposals in corporate governance; the closed nature of the group controlling the agenda, confined as it is to 8-10 academics at elite institutions; the lack of any attempt rethink or redefine the challenges which governance may or may not face; and the continued adhesion to the problem as the separation of ownership from control as Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means perceived it more than 80 years ago.
Aujourd’hui, j’ai choisi de partager avec les lecteurs un article de Holly J. Gregory, associé de Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, paru sur le blogue de Harvard Law School Forum (HLSF) on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. Ce billet présente un solide argumentaire en faveur de la préservation d’un juste équilibre entre les principaux acteurs de la gouvernance : les actionnaires, les administrateurs, les managers, les conseillers et les autorités règlementaires.
Il est clair que le conseil d’administration, élu par les actionnaires, a toujours la responsabilité de l’orientation, de la surveillance et du suivi de l’organisation. Mais l’environnement de la gouvernance a changé et les actionnaires peuvent maintenant se référer aux avis exprimés par les firmes spécialisées de conseils en procuration pour mieux faire entendre leurs voix.
L’auteur tente de clarifier les rôles de tous les acteurs en insistant sur les équilibres fragiles à préserver dans la gouvernance des sociétés. Que pensez-vous de la montée de l’influence des actionnaires activistes ?
In our annual missive last year, we wrote about the need to restore trust in our system of corporate governance generally and in relations between boards of directors and shareholders specifically. We continue to be troubled by the tensions that have developed over roles and responsibilities in the corporate governance framework for public companies. The board’s fundamental mandate under state law – to “manage and direct” the operations of the company – is under pressure, facilitated by federal regulation that gives shareholders advisory votes on subjects where they do not have decision rights either under corporate law or charter. Some tensions between boards and shareholders are inherent in our governance system and are healthy. While we are concerned about further escalation, we do not view the current relationship between boards and shareholders as akin to a battle, let alone a revolution, as some media rhetoric about a “shareholder spring” might suggest. However, we do believe that boards and shareholders should work to smooth away excesses on both sides to ensure a framework in which decisions can be made in the best interests of the company and its varied body of shareholders.
English: The former Gales Brewery Betrayed by shareholders who wanted the cash rather than a successful business. Sold to Fullers 2005, closed by Fullers 2006 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The board is charged with managing and directing the affairs of the corporation. State law does not dictate with specificity how the board should carry out this mandate, but rather imposes fiduciary duties on individual directors. This allows a degree of board self-determination within the flexible fiduciary framework of prudence, good faith and loyalty. However, while board and director responsibilities have not changed in any fundamental way, from a compliance, disclosure and risk management perspective, more is expected from the boards of public companies than ever before. Boards need to meet the expanding expectations of regulators, shareholders, and the public while maintaining focus on key board responsibilities. The corporate form enables shareholders to share in the benefits of corporate activity while limiting their potential liability to their investment. Their decision rights may be limited, but their voice and their influence is not. Of course, with power comes responsibility. If shareholders do not have the resources to become informed about a particular company and the issues that it faces, or if there are no performance issues or other red flags that would warrant special attention, it makes sense for shareholders to generally defer to the board’s recommendations made in the fiduciary decision-making framework the law promotes. This essential construct of corporate law should be respected as it has served all of us well. Shareholder powers should be exercised to strengthen this construct, not create a playground for special interests.
Preserving the delicate balance between board and shareholder responsibilities is vital to enable companies to maintain focus and efficiently create sustainable long-term value for shareholders, particularly in times of difficult economic conditions.
Il y a dix ans, on ne parlait pas de gouvernance dans les pays du MENA (Middle East and North Africa); le mot n’existait pas en arabe, ce qui ne veut pas dire qu’il n’y avait pas de préoccupation pour la gouvernance des sociétés… Mais, comme le décrit l’article de JaneWilliams,paru dans la revue Knowledge de l’INSEAD, « Attention to governance was piecemeal. Companies had their own practices and policies addressing accountability and social responsibility but there were no regulatory precepts and little attention paid to details of transparency or conflict of interest – issues crucial to the running of a modern business ».
La situation a beaucoup changée au cours des dernières années; la plupart des pays concernés ont développé des codes de Hawkamah (la nouvelle appellation pour qualifier la gouvernance) et mis sur pied des Instituts de gouvernance et des programmes de formation en gouvernance, semblables à ceux du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS).
C’est un article très intéressant qui nous montrent bien les progrès de la gouvernance dans les pays en développement – mais aussi les difficultés rencontrées, notamment, certains obstacles culturels, la prédominance de puissantes entreprises familiales, les problèmes liés aux habitudes des jeux d’influence, les difficultés liées à l’adoption d’un processus de prise de décision en groupe par des membres de conseils d’administration.
Je vous invite donc à lire cet article afin de vous familiariser avec le processus d’internationalisation de la gouvernance. Que pensez-vous de cet article de l’INSEAD ?
As the founder and former CEO of the Dubai-based Hawkamah Corporate Governance Institute, he has realistic expectations. “It’s going to be a long drawn-out process. The West is deluding itself if it thinks the issues can be addressed quickly… (but) we shouldn’t be impatient. What we’ve learned through (similar) processes in Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America is that these things take time.”
Accountability (Photo credit: Felix42 contra la censura)
While deep change in a political, societal and economic context could take five years (at least), integration of corporate governance into the local practice and business culture will take 10 years or more, says Ludo Van der Heyden, the Mubadala Professor of Corporate Governance and Strategy at INSEAD, noting effective management of these developments, and persistent and enlightened commitment of government and business leaders are essential for better practices to take root and become sustainable.“One should not be too harsh, things are changing, but more effort and time will be required. Governance is an answer to a question, or to a set of questions – and one ought to know and be clear on what these questions are, and how they can best be answered, including what contribution must be made through changed regulation.”
“So far in the Gulf, a lot of changed banking regulation has been discussed – but then, somehow, banks were exempted from particular regulations. This is one area where it will be useful for a clearer governance regime to exist.”
Click image to enlarge
Click image to enlarge
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 