Gouvernance des sociétés d’État | une étude montre des problèmes dans la moitié d’entre elles


Yvan Allaire, président exécutif du conseil de l’Institut sur la gouvernance (IGOPP) vient de publier, en collaboration avec François Dauphin, un nouveau document de recherche intitulé « Nos sociétés d’État sont-elles bien gouvernées ? » lequel a fait l’objet d’une analyse succincte par le journaliste Gérald Fillion de la Société Radio-Canada.

Selon l’IGOPP, « les contribuables s’attendent à ce que ces sociétés fassent bon usage des fonds publics qui leur sont confiés, que leur gestion soit efficace, efficiente et transparente, que leur mandat soit clair et pertinent. Leur conseil d’administration, s’appuyant sur des règles et principes de saine gouvernance, devrait jouer un rôle essentiel à cet égard ».

Je crois que ce rapport de recherche saura intéresser les spécialistes de la gouvernance qui œuvrent dans les sociétés d’État et dans les autres organisations parapubliques. Personnellement, je crois que les auteurs ont élaboré une méthodologie de recherche tout à fait pertinente pour évaluer la bonne gouvernance, non seulement des sociétés d’État, mais également de tous les types d’organisation.

 

 

Vous trouverez ci-dessous une analyse de Gérald Filion, suivie de la référence au document de recherche de l’IGOPP.

 

Sur 46 sociétés d’État au Québec seulement 23 obtiennent la note de passage en matière de gouvernance, selon une étude préparée par les chercheurs Yvan Allaire et François Dauphin.

Si les grandes sociétés se démarquent, notamment la Caisse de dépôt, la SAQ et Loto-Québec, d’autres affichent de faibles résultats qui pourraient amener le gouvernement à devoir repenser leur modèle de gouvernance. Parmi les derniers de classe, on compte l’École nationale de police, le Musée national des beaux-arts de Québec et l’Institut de tourisme et d’hôtellerie du Québec.

Ce rapport, publié jeudi par l’Institut sur la gouvernance d’entreprises publiques et privées, s’intéresse à 47 instruments de mesure de la gouvernance des sociétés pour établir un pointage sur 100. La note de passage est établie à 60. Ont été exclues de l’étude 13 sociétés jugées inactives dans les faits ou trop petites. Les 46 sociétés d’État retenues encaissent annuellement des revenus de 63 milliards de dollars et comptent 65 000 employés.

L’Institut sur la gouvernance évalue les sociétés sur les compétences des administrateurs, la transparence, la reddition de compte, la structure du conseil et le déroulement des séances du conseil. Et les résultats sont très inégaux.

L’École nationale de police échoue sur tous les plans, tout particulièrement sur les questions de compétence et de nomination. À l’autre bout du spectre, la Société d’habitation du Québec se démarque à tous les niveaux, avec une note parfaite dans la composition et la structure de son conseil, qui touche surtout à la question de l’indépendance.

L’Institut recommande au gouvernement de revoir certaines lois jugées « désuètes » pour encadrer les sociétés, de rendre publics les profils d’expertise et d’expérience des administrateurs et une foule d’informations pertinentes à leur propos.

Il propose aussi que le gouvernement cesse de rendre le dépôt du rapport annuel des sociétés d’État obligatoire à l’Assemblée nationale avant de le rendre public. Les rapports doivent être disponibles dans des délais plus rapides selon l’Institut sur la gouvernance. Actuellement, il faut attendre 6 mois en moyenne après la fin de l’exercice pour avoir accès au rapport annuel.

Les conseils d’administration des sociétés d’État, écrivent les chercheurs, doivent adopter des principes qui dépassent les exigences de la loi, surtout au chapitre de la « divulgation des profils de compétence, divulgation non obligatoire, mais non prohibée. »

Les conseils doivent s’assurer également que l’information, sur les sites internet des sociétés d’État, est facilement accessible, notamment les résultats de la société, ses stratégies ainsi que les indicateurs de performance. De plus, « une divulgation exhaustive des éléments de rémunération des hauts dirigeants est incontournable. »

Le gouvernement se mêle de tout

L’Institut illustre, chiffres à l’appui, combien le gouvernement s’assure de garder le contrôle sur les nominations des administrateurs.

« Ainsi, écrivent Yvan Allaire et François Dauphin, dans seulement cinq cas avons-nous trouvé une participation claire de la part du conseil dans le processus de sélection des candidats et candidates au poste d’administrateur. Bien sûr, le manque de transparence fausse peut-être en partie les données pour cet élément. Néanmoins, la participation du conseil dans le processus de sélection est extrêmement importante pour assurer non seulement la présence de compétences et d’expériences complémentaires au groupe, mais aussi pour faciliter l’obtention (ou le maintien) d’une dynamique de groupe fonctionnelle. »

Sur les 46 sociétés d’État, seulement trois établissent publiquement sur leur site un lien entre la biographie des administrateurs et les compétences recherchées au conseil.

L’Institut sur la gouvernance est d’avis également qu’une personne ne devrait pas siéger à plus de cinq conseils d’administration en même temps. Or, « au moins quinze (32,6 %) des sociétés comptaient au minimum un membre du conseil siégeant sur plus de cinq conseils d’administration, incluant quelques présidents de conseil. »

Aussi, « 19 sociétés (41,3 %) ne fournissent pas l’information sur l’assiduité des membres aux réunions du conseil. »

Les auteurs constatent également qu’il y a « une différence importante entre les organisations assujetties à la Loi québécoise sur la gouvernance des sociétés d’État promulguée en 2006 et celles qui ne le sont pas. En effet, les sociétés assujetties doivent divulguer davantage d’information, ne serait-ce que pour s’y conformer. Aussi, elles ont en moyenne une note de 70,7, comparativement à 45,2 pour les sociétés qui ne se conforment qu’aux exigences de leurs lois respectives. »

Manque de transparence

C’est pas moins de dix sociétés sur les 46 qui n’ont pas d’indicateur de performance ou de cible pour les évaluer, ou qui ne publient pas leur plan stratégique. Ce manque de transparence touche notamment la Commission de la capitale nationale, Héma-Québec et la Société de la Place des Arts de Montréal.

Yvan Allaire et François Daupin affirment également que « la transparence quant à la rémunération des hauts dirigeants des sociétés d’État peut et devrait être grandement améliorée, ne serait-ce que pour se rapprocher des exigences imposées aux sociétés pourtant dites “privées”.»

Enfin, les auteurs invitent les sociétés d’État à rendre publics la teneur des formations offertes aux administrateurs et les processus d’évaluation des membres du conseil. Cela dit, près du quart des sociétés d’État ne font pas d’évaluation et ne dévoilent pas cette information.

 

Je vous invite à lire l’ensemble du document sur le site de l’IGOPP, notamment pour connaître les 47 critères de mesure de la gouvernance.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Nos sociétés d’État sont-elles bien gouvernées? |  L’IGOPP leur attribue des notes de gouvernance

 

Le rôle du secrétaire général d’une société


Plusieurs personnes se questionnent sur le rôle d’un secrétaire général (corporatif) dans la gouvernance des entreprises.

Simon Osborne, directeur général de l’ICSA (Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators), explique en quoi les tâches des secrétaires corporatifs sont importantes pour tous les types d’organisations, même quand celles-ci sont de petites tailles. Le secrétaire a essentiellement un rôle-conseil auprès des administrateurs et du président du conseil.

Même si les PME n’ont pas l’obligation d’avoir un secrétaire à leur service, Osborne souligne les nombreux avantages pour celles-ci d’embaucher une personne qui fera le lien entre la gouvernance du conseil et la direction de l’entreprise.

Quelles sont les qualifications des personnes qui occupent de telles fonctions ? L’extrait ci-dessous résume assez bien leurs profils.

There is a qualification standard in the 2006 Companies Act and that includes barristers, solicitors, someone from a regulated accountancy body or, if you’re from Scotland, an advocate. Ideally, the individual will be a chartered secretary. A business should appoint someone with emotional intelligence and the ability to form good working relationships – the person needs to be able to negotiate, listen and influence. It’s not a role for prima donnas. They need resilience and fortitude because the pressures under which they will work are significant. Choose someone with the ability to give wise advice without upsetting people.

L’article présente également une petite vidéo sur le rôle du secrétaire d’entreprise.

Que pensez-vous de l’importance de cette fonction trop souvent mal comprise, ou carrément négligée ?

Bonne lecture !

The company secretary

 

Private businesses don’t have a legal duty to appoint a company secretary, yet many astute firms still fill the position. Simon Osborne, chief executive of qualifying body ICSA, explains why the job is crucial to companies of all sizes

Following the Companies Act 2006, private businesses are no longer legally required to employ a company secretary, but with British firms facing ongoing regulatory change and corporate governance pressures, many still fill the role.

This, says Simon Osborne, chief executive of the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA), is because the burden of duties that was previously undertaken by a company secretary has not eased: “Private companies that have abolished the role have suffered the loss of an independent thinker – someone with a sharp focus on the way the company does business,” he says.

Osborne has spent more than two decades as a company secretary for public and private businesses. He took over the helm of ICSA, which has 33,000 members across 72 countries, in 2011. Here, he explains what the role of company secretary entails – and why it can be vital to small businesses…

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « secrétaire administratif »

 

Director What does the role of the company secretary involve?

The company secretary is an adviser to the chair and the board on a company’s values, purpose, and governance framework. It involves strategic thinking around why and how the company is doing business and the compliance procedures needed to ensure it operates in accordance with its values. Duties include maintaining company registers, ensuring filings are made promptly and on time with Companies House, keeping the minutes of board and committee meetings, and ensuring director service contracts are up to date. But a company secretary can also be involved with HR, pensions, risk management and insurance.

Why do some private companies still employ a company secretary even though there is no longer a legal requirement? And who does the burden fall on if a firm doesn’t have one?

The burden falls on the directors. Despite the requirement being abolished for private businesses [it still exists for public companies], the work hasn’t gone away and there are liabilities that directors face if particular work isn’t undertaken. Companies House is vigilant in chasing up directors if, for example, accounts aren’t filed on time. There is a much more serious risk of fixed penalties being levied these days, so it doesn’t pay to cut corners. It’s important that SMEs understand that as they grow they will have to move away from ‘kitchen table governance’ to a more mature form of governance, and that means having access to someone who can be a wise friend to members of the board.

What about small businesses that can’t afford to employ a full-time company secretary?

It’s very important that small companies have access to someone who can assist them with the duties that a company secretary in a bigger business would undertake. SMEs don’t necessarily have to employ someone full time – they could, for instance, have an arrangement with a freelance chartered secretary or hire on a part-time basis. There is evidence that shows good governance and better financial performance go hand-in-hand, and a company secretary can help with that.

What are the biggest benefits of employing a company secretary?

Having access to a governance, risk and compliance professional – someone with a grounding in finance, risk, strategy and law, and an understanding of the law of meetings. It’s easy to think of some meetings as a doddle, but sometimes they go wrong or unexpected things happen. Agenda-setting can be viewed as a bureaucratic function but it actually needs some thought, and so do meeting minutes – it’s important to remember that one day those minutes may be read by a judge in a court of law.

What qualifications does a company secretary need and what should business leaders look for when appointing?

There is a qualification standard in the 2006 Companies Act and that includes barristers, solicitors, someone from a regulated accountancy body or, if you’re from Scotland, an advocate. Ideally, the individual will be a chartered secretary. A business should appoint someone with emotional intelligence and the ability to form good working relationships – the person needs to be able to negotiate, listen and influence. It’s not a role for prima donnas. They need resilience and fortitude because the pressures under which they will work are significant. Choose someone with the ability to give wise advice without upsetting people.

What advice would you give to business leaders who might not have a great understanding of the importance of the role, particularly new or young directors?

Good chief executives recognise the value of a company secretary, but ICSA did some research with Henley Business School [The Company Secretary: Building trust through corporate governance report] and discovered that there is still a need to educate some non-executive directors and head-hunting firms. Increasingly, search firms are being used for recruitment purposes and I’m not sure they understand what the role involves. Younger directors have more humility on the matter. Most new directors would be able to see the value of having a wise adviser. The role of a director is becoming increasingly professionalised – you wouldn’t go to a doctor, dentist or accountant who doesn’t keep up to date so it shouldn’t be any different with boards. A company secretary is a valuable employee so should be cherished.

_________________________________________

Simon Osborne, Chief executive of the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA)

Pour télécharger le rapport de l’ICSA et de la Henley Business School, visitez le site icsa.org.uk

Le démantèlement de la réglementation « Dodd-Frank Act » est-il souhaitable du point de vue de la bonne gouvernance ?


Plusieurs experts de la gouvernance des sociétés cotées se demandent ce qu’il adviendra de la législation Dodd-Frank Act, sachant que Donald Trump a promis d’effectuer un démantèlement presque total de cette réglementation qui a été mise en place à la suite de la crise financière de 2007-2008.

L’article de Gregg Gelzinis* du Center for American Progress publié sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, tente de faire la lumière sur une proposition gouvernementale appelée Financial CHOICE Act ou FCA.

L’auteur montre que les raisons invoquées pour modifier la réforme Dodd-Frank Act ne tiennent pas la route. Voici un extrait de la conclusion.

The question remains: What is the problem President Trump and his allies in Congress are trying to solve? Lending is up. Bank profits are up. Consumer credit costs are down. The economy is steadily improving.

Yes, much more needs to be done to make the economy work for hard-working Americans, but financial deregulation is not the path to that end. [16]

In fact, it is a path toward exactly the opposite: booms and busts that leave taxpayers holding the bag for Wall Street’s excesses, greater concentration of economic power and less accountability for wrongdoing that harms ordinary consumers and investors, and major changes to financial regulation and monetary policy that would damage the real economy. Now that is a problem.

L’avenir nous dira ce que nous réservent les « nouvelles » règles de gouvernance prônées par la nouvelle administration américaine.

Évidemment, la réglementation canadienne, toujours très liée à celle de la SEC, devra s’ajuster, sans trop de heurts !

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont appréciés des lecteurs.

 

President Trump’s Dangerous CHOICE

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « dodd frank law »

 

During his campaign, Donald Trump promised a near-dismantling of the Dodd-Frank Act, the core piece of financial reform legislation enacted following the 2007-2008 financial crisis. [1] He doubled down on that promise once in office, vowing to both “do a big number” on and give “a very major haircut” to Dodd-Frank. [2] In early February, he took the first step in fulfilling this dangerous promise by signing an executive order directing U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Steve Mnuchin to conduct a review of Dodd-Frank. [3] Per the executive order, Secretary Mnuchin will present the findings in early June. [4] While the country waits for President Trump’s plan, it is useful to analyze one prominent way Trump and Congress might choose to gut financial reform—through the Financial CHOICE Act, or FCA. [5]

Introduced in the last Congress by U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX) and expected to be reintroduced in the coming weeks, the Financial CHOICE Act offers a blueprint for how Trump might view these issues. During the presidential campaign, Rep. Hensarling briefed Trump on his ideas regarding financial deregulation and was reportedly on Trump’s short list for treasury secretary. [6] The FCA would deregulate the financial industry and put the U.S. economy in the same perilous position it was in right before the 2007–2008 financial crisis. The precrisis regime of weak regulation and little oversight created an environment of unchecked financial sector risk and widespread predatory consumer practices, which precipitated the Great Recession and brought the U.S. economy to the brink of collapse. And the argument repeated by President Trump and other advocates of financial deregulatory proposals—that bank lending has been crushed under the weight of financial regulations over the past six years—has been thoroughly debunked by bank lending data. [7]

Before delving into the specifics of the Financial CHOICE Act, it is helpful to put Rep. Hensarling’s deregulatory efforts in context. To justify dismantling financial reform, President Trump and his congressional allies know that they must outline a problem. President Trump argues that the main problem with financial reform is bank lending. He believes that banks are not making enough loans due to the burdens of Dodd-Frank. What is his evidence? Nothing more than anecdotal remarks that his friends cannot get loans. [8] As Figure 1 demonstrates, a lack of loans is simply not the case. Overall lending and business lending in particular, has increased significantly since the financial crisis and the passage of Dodd-Frank. Moreover, credit card lending, auto lending, and mortgage lending have increased since 2010, when Dodd-Frank was passed. [9] Bank profits are also higher than ever. [10]

 

 

Chairman Hensarling makes similar arguments about the perceived unavailability of credit, adding that financial reform has not encouraged economic growth and has hurt community banks. [11] Again, the data contradict these charges. Figure 2 highlights the steady economic growth the country experienced under President Barack Obama. And while the scars of the devastating Great Recession remain, the financial reforms put in place to prevent the recurrence of exactly that kind of economic catastrophe have not damaged growth. Indeed, since the end of the financial crisis and the passage of Dodd-Frank, community bank lending and profitability are both up. [12] It is fair to say that the number of community banks has declined over time. This trend, however, started in the 1980s and is caused by economies of scale, technology, and long-running trends toward banking deregulation, as well as other factors—not the 2010 passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. [13]

 

 

Hensarling presents his approach as a moderate adjustment to Dodd-Frank, but in reality it is a thorough demolition of financial reform. The complete publication (available here) analyzes how Hensarling’s approach erodes the financial stability safeguards that the real economy needs to thrive, from mitigation of systemic risk to financial sector accountability and consumer protection. It also explains how the bill further concentrates—and makes even more unaccountable—economic power in the hands of those that will serve their own interests at the expense of the real economy. Finally, the report details how the FCA eliminates the consumer and investor protections that guard against the predatory financial practices that wreaked havoc on consumers and investors prior to the financial crisis.

It is necessary to note that just about every provision in the report could fit under the rubric of financial stability safeguards. For example, consumer financial protection protects ordinary consumers from abuses and the broader financial system from the proliferation of dangerous consumer loans that can bring down entire firms and markets. Similarly, the Volcker Rule is a key bulwark against the high-risk bets that brought down major firms in 2008, and yet it also aims to reorient large bank trading toward real economy-serving purposes. The report discusses certain provisions under one section rather than another should not be taken as a substantive comment on the merit or usefulness of the provision to financial stability. The report’s different sections reflect an effort to highlight how the Dodd-Frank Act and financial reform yield a broad array of public benefits. Similarthe report highlights examples of broader themes in the FCA rather than focusing on minute details: Failure to discuss any particular provision should not be read as a substantive judgment regarding its relative merits.

The report is based on the version of the Financial CHOICE Act released in September 2016, as well as a memo outlining this year’s planned changes to that version. [14] A new version, which may have some further modifications, is expected to be released in the coming weeks.

Financial reform enacted through the Dodd-Frank Act has made a lot of necessary progress since the crisis. U.S. banks have more substantial loss-absorbing capital cushions, increasingly rely on stable sources of funding, undergo rigorous stress testing, and plan for their orderly failure. President Trump’s intent to dismantle these reforms only helps Wall Street’s bottom line—ignoring the memory of every family who lost their home, every worker who lost his or her job, and every consumer who was peddled a toxic financial product. [15]

The question remains: What is the problem President Trump and his allies in Congress are trying to solve? Lending is up. Bank profits are up. Consumer credit costs are down. The economy is steadily improving. Yes, much more needs to be done to make the economy work for hard-working Americans, but financial deregulation is not the path to that end. [16] In fact, it is a path toward exactly the opposite: booms and busts that leave taxpayers holding the bag for Wall Street’s excesses, greater concentration of economic power and less accountability for wrongdoing that harms ordinary consumers and investors, and major changes to financial regulation and monetary policy that would damage the real economy. Now that is a problem.

The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

Endnotes

1Billy House and Kevin Cirilli, “Trump’s Dodd-Frank Plan Will Be Early Test of Republican Unity,” Bloomberg, May 19, 2016, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-05-19/trump-s-dodd-frank-plan-will-be-early-test-of-republican-unity. (go back)

2Glenn Thrush, “Trump Vows to Dismantle Dodd-Frank ‘Disaster,’” The New York Times, January 30, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-dodd-frank-regulations.html?_r=0; Jessica Dye, “Trump vows ‘major haircut’ for Dodd-Frank,” Financial Times, April 4, 2017, available at https://www.ft.com/content/fb08a355-f7fc-3021-8c92-d94af9a2f35b. (go back)

3Executive Order no. 13,772, Code of Federal Regulations (2017), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/03/presidential-executive-order-core-principles-regulating-united-states. (go back)

4Ibid. (go back)

5Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H. Rept. 5983, 114 Cong. 2 sess. (Government Printing Office, 2016), available at https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr5983/BILLS-114hr5983rh.pdf. (go back)

6Donna Borak, “Donald Trump, Jeb Hensarling Meet on Dodd-Frank Alternative,” The Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2016, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-jeb-hensarling-meet-on-dodd-frank-alternative-1465335535; Damien Palette, Ryan Tracy, and Michael C. Bender, “Trump Team Considering Rep. Jeb Hensarling as Treasury Secretary,” The Wall Street Journal, November 10, 2016, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-considering-rep-jeb-hensarling-as-treasury-secretary-1478812583. (go back)

7Jim Puzzanghera, “Trump says businesses can’t borrow because of Dodd-Frank. The numbers tell another story,” Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2017, available at http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trump-bank-loans-20170226-story.html; Matt Egan, “Banks are lending a ton, despite Trump’s claims,” CNN Money, February 13, 2017, available at http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/13/investing/bank-business-lending-dodd-frank-trump/. (go back)

8Zeke Faux, Yalman Onaran, and Jennifer Surane, “Trump Cites Friends to Say Banks Aren’t Making Loans. They Are.,” Bloomberg, February 4, 2017, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-04/trump-cites-friends-to-say-banks-aren-t-making-loans-they-are. (go back)

9Kate Berry, “Four myths in the battle over Dodd-Frank,” American Banker, March 10, 2017, available at https://www.americanbanker.com/news/four-myths-in-the-battle-over-dodd-frank. (go back)

10Matt Egan, “American bank profits are higher than ever,” CNN Money, March 3, 2017, available at http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/03/investing/bank-profits-record-high-dodd-frank/. (go back)

11Jeb Hensarling, “After Five Years, Dodd-Frank Is a Failure,” The Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2015, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-five-years-dodd-frank-is-a-failure-1437342607. (go back)

12Gregg Gelzinis and others, “The Importance of Dodd-Frank, in 6 Charts,” Center for American Progress, March 27, 2017, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2017/03/27/429256/importance-dodd-frank-6-charts/. (go back)

13Ibid. (go back)

14Ylan Mui, “Memo from a key congressman outlines plan to gut Dodd-Frank bank rules,” CNBC, February 9, 2017, available at http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/09/dodd-frank-hensarling-memo-reveals-plan-to-scrap-bank-regulations.html. (go back)

15Wall Street is not monolithic, and firms may have differing views on the provisions of the Financial CHOICE Act, but on the whole, this agenda is clearly aligned with the interests of financial institutions and not the American public.

_______________________________________

*Gregg Gelzinis is a Special Assistant for the Economic Policy team at the Center for American Progress. This post is based on a Center for American Progress publication by Mr. Gelzinis, Ethan GurwitzSarah Edelman, and Joe Valenti. Additional posts addressing legal and financial implications of the Trump administration are available here.

L’histoire récente des courants de pensée en gouvernance aux É.U.


Aujourd’hui, je ne peux passer sous silence la petite histoire de l’évolution de la pensée en gouvernance publiée par , professeur à la George Washington University Law School.

Ce court article a été publié sur le site du HLS Forum. Il décrit les grands courants de pensée et met l’accent sur les publications des bonzes universitaires américains.

Je suis assuré que cette brève chronologie des événements, à compter de 1976, vous donnera une vue d’ensemble utile de l’évolution de la discipline.

Bonne lecture !

The Ivory Tower on Corporate Governance

 

In 1976, [Directors & Boards]’s founding year, two influential academic works in corporate governance appeared: Berkeley law professor Melvin Eisenberg urged transforming the board from an advisory role to a monitoring model and mandating significant internal control systems, while University of Rochester economists Michael Jensen and William Meckling portrayed the firm as a nexus of contracts whose optimal design is for participants to choose.

 

These contrasting visions—obligatory uniformity versus free tailoring—have defined the field since, setting the boundaries of debate and helping participants think through positions. Into the early 1980s, the Eisenberg view dominated, with Columbia University law professor William Cary urging preemptive federal oversight of the field, traditionally handled by state law, and a generally pro-regulatory atmosphere imposing fiduciary mandates on independent directors and board committees.

But the nexus of contracts school soon ascended to greater influence, through the 1990s, after law professors such as Frank Easterbrook (now a judge) and Daniel Fischel, both of the University of Chicago, explored how the separation of ownership from control is a problem of agency costs, best addressed by contractual devices geared to maximizing shareholder value. Rather than federal mandates, states should experiment to offer a menu of tools for different corporations to tailor. Yale University law professor (also now judge) Ralph Winter theorized that competition among states for corporate charters constrained managers to promote shareholder interests.

While normative corporate governance scholarship has divided between the pro- and anti-regulatory camps of the 1970s and 1980s, the best academics learned from their intellectual opponents to refine stances and often forge consensus. For example, though assessments of the deal decade’s disruptive takeovers and comparative studies of non-U.S. practice found a place for non-shareholder constituents in corporate governance, a shareholder primacy norm nevertheless took root.

Even as both schools of thought contributed to the discourse, each had their heyday when current events cut in their favor. So the 1990s boom was a time of great enthusiasm for the economic approach, adding a productive trend of increasingly sophisticated empirical research, including on the value of state competition in corporate law. After the burst, however, and as widespread accounting fraud was revealed, scholars cited Eisenberg to diagnose failures to monitor and control—and prescribed cures found in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). An industry-specific version of the dynamic transpired after the financial crisis, culminating in the Dodd-Frank Act.

In each case, scholarship was diverse, as pragmatic centrist resolution of pending challenges, exemplified by Columbia’s John Coffee, contended with cries on both normative sides of either too little or too much regulation (Yale’s Roberta Romano called SOX “quack governance”). Such episodes updated the Cary-Winter debate: full-scale federal preemption is probably dead but, as Harvard University law professor Mark Roe explained, less due to state competition than the threat to states of incremental federal incursion, a la SOX and Dodd-Frank.

Since 1976, scholars have helped shift power from managers to owners, especially institutional investors. Today, scholars such as Harvard Law professor Lucian Bebchuk urge continued expansion of shareholder power, while others, like UCLA law professor Stephen Bainbridge, observe and support a propensity toward director primacy instead. In the balance is the fate of shareholder activism, which though novel in some ways, at bottom raises issues debated for 40 years, particularly agency cost mitigation. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.

Colloque sur la gouvernance et la performance | Une perspective internationale


C’est avec plaisir que je partage l’information et l’invitation à un important colloque intitulé « Gouvernance et performance : une perspective internationale » qui aura lieu à l’Université McGill les 11 et 12 mai 2017.

C’est mon collègue, le professeur Félix ZOGNING NGUIMEYA, Ph.D., Adm.A., qui est le responsable de l’organisation de ce colloque en gouvernance à l’échelle internationale.

À la lecture du programme, vous constaterez que les organisateurs n’ont ménagé aucun effort pour apporter un éclairage très large de ce phénomène.

Ce colloque traite des récents développements et des sujets émergents en matière de gouvernance. La gouvernance, comme thématique transversale, est abordée dans tous ses aspects : gouvernance d’entreprise, gouvernance économique, gouvernance publique, en lien avec la création de valeur ou la performance des organisations, des politiques ou des programmes concernés. Dans chacun des contextes, les travaux souligneront l’effet des mécanismes de gouvernance sur la performance des organisations, institutions ou collectivités.

La perspective internationale du colloque a pour but d’examiner les modèles et structures de gouvernance présents dans différents pays et dans les différentes organisations, selon que ces modèles dépendent fortement du système juridique, du modèle économique et social, ainsi que le poids relatif des différentes parties prenantes. Les contributions sont donc attendues des chercheurs et professionnels de plusieurs champs disciplinaires, notamment les sciences économiques, les sciences juridiques, les sciences politiques, la comptabilité, la finance, l’administration et la stratégie.

Je vous invite à consulter le site web du colloque : https://gouvernance.splashthat.com/

Vous trouverez le programme détaillé du colloque à l’adresse suivante : http://www.acfas.ca/evenements/congres/programme/85/400/449/c

Les administrateurs doivent susciter le débat sur l’avenir de l’entreprise


Je vous recommande la lecture de l’article de Stuart Jackson publié dans la Harvard Business Review de janvier 2017.

L’auteur suggère, qu’en général, les conseils d’administration ne font pas suffisamment preuve de combativité et qu’ils ne jouent pas leur rôle principal, soit d’offrir une vision à long terme et de se concentrer sur la création de valeur.

Les administrateurs doivent offrir diverses perspectives de changement et proposer des stratégies propres à pérenniser l’organisation.

Les administrateurs doivent faire preuve de courage et apprendre à formuler des critiques positives envers le PDG. Le conseil d’administration est essentiellement un lieu de débat sur le futur de l’entreprise.

Les membres du conseil doivent être capables de réfléchir à l’évolution du modèle d’affaires et prévoir un plan d’action opérationnel pour un changement à long terme.

L’auteur propose une limitation de la durée des mandats des administrateurs afin d’éviter la complaisance susceptible de se manifester avec le temps. Également, on doit viser le choix d’administrateurs indépendants, capables de questionner et de contester les actions de la direction.

À cet égard, il me semble que les administrateurs devraient suivre une solide formation en gouvernance, notamment une formation telle que celle offerte par le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) qui propose une simulation des débats autour de la table du conseil.

On constate que le rôle d’un administrateur est très exigeant et que celui-ci doit penser en termes de compétitivité de l’entreprise.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Boards Must Be More Combative

 

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Boards of directors play two roles. They must protect value by helping companies avoid unnecessary risks, and they must build value by ensuring that companies change quickly enough to address emerging competitive threats, evolving customer preferences, and disruptive technologies.

With technology and business model cycles becoming shorter and companies facing unrelenting pressure to innovate or suffer the consequences, more and more boards need to focus on the second of these roles. To do so, they must be willing to challenge executive teams and stress-test their strategies to ensure they go far enough and fast enough. For boards used to preserving the status quo, this shift can be uncomfortable. Here are four ways boards can become better challengers and champions of change.

Confront Unwelcome News and Trends

Changing strategy is extremely difficult, especially for successful businesses. In the early 1990s Blockbuster commissioned a study on the future of video-on-demand technologies and how they would impact traditional video rentals. The report concluded that expanded cable offerings and broadband internet would begin to impact video rentals around 2000, and would grow rapidly thereafter. The good news was that Blockbuster had a good 10 years to prepare for the new environment. But the shift never happened: Management ignored the study’s findings and continued with the same strategy, supported by the board. In September 2010 Blockbuster filed for bankruptcy protection. In this case, value protection was not enough. The company had clear advance notice that seismic change was coming.

The board’s role was to acknowledge the warning signs and challenge management’s lack of action — even if it meant contention and dispute in the boardroom.

Make Sure You Have Challengers in Your Midst

Boards will be far more effective in their challenger role if they offer seats to individuals with professional experiences and viewpoints that are very different from those of the executive team. Directors can learn to be more direct with management, but it’s hard to fake contrarianism when everyone is of the same mind. When a board resembles the CEO in mindset and outlook, it’s a recipe for a gatekeeper board, not a challenger board. But when boards mix it up by bringing in members with different perspectives, they can effect powerful strategic changes, something I have seen many times in my work with corporate boards.

Often, these “challengers” will be tech-savvy young executives from digitally disruptive companies who can press their fellow directors and senior management about potential blind spots related to digital disruption. But disruption is not always about technology. For example, one highly successful, privately-held producer of canned foods actively sought a board member who could challenge management to think differently but who would still fit with the company’s family-oriented governance culture. The successful candidate was the CEO of a well-known, family-owned California wine business that catered to consumers who would not dream of buying canned food. The board member helped the company “think outside the can” to identify new product forms that would broaden their customer base and appeal to health-conscious consumers.

In another instance, a leading chain of retail pharmacies appointed as vice chair someone with a background in health care manufacturing and pharmacy benefit management. The new board member helped management better understand the efficiency advantages of mail-order pharmacies, which rely on automation. As a result, the company added low-cost automated pharmacy services to its existing retail outlets, giving it a competitive advantage over traditional retail pharmacies.

Stay Fresh with Term Limits and Checks and Balances

Beyond accessing the right expertise, boards can maintain a challenger perspective by ensuring they don’t become complacent and drift toward an approver role. One of the most effective ways to do this is to establish mandatory term limits as a part of the board’s bylaws. Term limits can help boards maintain a level of independence between the outside directors and executive leadership.

Moreover, if the CEO and chair roles are separated, the chair can take more active responsibility for ensuring that alternative views and perspectives are brought before the board. Separating the roles is a common practice in Europe, and it’s becoming more so in the United States. Another option is to appoint an independent lead director, a less drastic change that can have a similar effect. In fact, the New York Stock Exchange essentially requires listed companies with nonindependent chairs to appoint one of their independent directors as lead director. The lead position, among other duties, is responsible for scheduling and helming board meetings that take place without management. Today the majority of S&P companies with combined CEO and chair roles have chosen to counterbalance this arrangement by appointing an independent lead director.

Turn Courage and Candor into Core Competencies

Having directors with valuable insights is worthless if they do not feel comfortable sharing their perspectives and debating issues with management. A recent study by Women Corporate Directors and Bright Enterprises found that more than three-quarters (77%) of director respondents believed that their boards would make better decisions if they were more open to debate, and 94% said that criticism can help bring about change when it is used properly.

Nevertheless, board members are often hesitant to offer criticism, especially to CEOs. The same survey found that only about half (53%) of respondents felt that the CEOs of their companies take criticism well. This is not surprising. As a board member it is much easier to empathize with a CEO under pressure than with an abstract group of shareholders. One way to address this issue is to offer board members training in giving and receiving constructive criticism. Board members need to understand that failing to confront difficult issues will not help the CEO. If a CEO’s first indication that the board is dissatisfied is hearing they are searching for his or her replacement, then the board is not fulfilling its responsibilities.

Challenger boards are those with the strength to put the hard questions to management and to poke holes in suboptimal strategies. They bring a diversity of perspective that can help management understand the company’s vulnerabilities and how to overcome them. For companies struggling to exist in a world where disruption is rapidly becoming a business constant, challenger boards may well be one of their most important survival tools.

Dix thèmes majeurs pour les administrateurs de sociétés en 2017


Aujourd’hui, je partage avec vous la liste des dix thèmes majeurs en gouvernance que les auteurs Kerry E. Berchem* et Rick L. Burdick* ont identifiés pour l’année 2017.

Vous êtes assurément au fait de la plupart de ces dimensions, mais il faut noter l’importance accrue à porter aux questions stratégiques, aux changements politiques, aux relations avec les actionnaires, à la cybersécurité, aux nouvelles réglementations de la SEC, à la composition du CA, à l’établissement de la rémunération et aux répercussions possibles des changements climatiques.

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Afin de mieux connaître l’ampleur de ces priorités de gouvernance pour les administrateurs de sociétés, je vous invite à lire l’ensemble du rapport publié par Akin Gump.

Bonne lecture !

Dix thèmes majeurs pour les administrateurs de sociétés en 2017

 

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1. Corporate strategy: Oversee the development of the corporate strategy in an increasingly uncertain and volatile world economy with new and more complex risks

Directors will need to continue to focus on strategic planning, especially in light of significant anticipated changes in U.S. government policies, continued international upheaval, the need for productive shareholder relations, potential changes in interest rates, uncertainty in commodity prices and cybersecurity risks, among other factors.

2. Political changes: Monitor the impact of major political changes, including the U.S. presidential and congressional elections and Brexit

Many uncertainties remain about how the incoming Trump administration will govern, but President-elect Trump has stated that he will pursue vast changes in diverse regulatory sectors, including international trade, health care, energy and the environment. These changes are likely to reshape the legal landscape in which companies conduct their business, both in the United States and abroad.

With respect to Brexit, although it is clear that the United Kingdom will, very probably, leave the European Union, there is no certainty as to when exactly this will happen or what the U.K.’s future relationship, if any, with the EU will be. Once the negotiations begin, boards will need to be quick to assess the likely shape of any deal between the U.K. and the EU and to consider how to adjust their business model to mitigate the threats and take advantage of the opportunities that may present themselves.

3. Shareholder relations: Foster shareholder relations and assess company vulnerabilities to prepare for activist involvement

The current environment demands that directors of public companies remain mindful of shareholder relations and company vulnerabilities by proactively engaging with shareholders, addressing shareholder concerns and performing a self-diagnostic analysis. Directors need to understand their company’s vulnerabilities, such as a de-staggered board or the lack of access to a poison pill, and be mindful of them in any engagement or negotiation process.

4. Cybersecurity: Understand and oversee cybersecurity risks to prepare for increasingly sophisticated and frequent attacks

As cybercriminals raise the stakes with escalating ransomware attacks and hacking of the Internet of Things, companies will need to be even more diligent in their defenses and employee training. In addition, cybersecurity regulation will likely increase in 2017. The New York State Department of Financial Services has enacted a robust cybersecurity regulation, with heightened encryption, log retention and certification requirements, and other regulators have issued significant guidance. Multinational companies will continue implementation of the EU General Data Protection Regulation requirements, which will be effective in May 2018. EU-U.S. Privacy Shield will face a significant legal challenge, particularly in light of concerns regarding President-elect Trump’s protection of privacy. Trump has stated that the government needs to be “very, very tough on cyber and cyberwarfare” and has indicated that he will form a “cyber review team” to evaluate cyber defenses and vulnerabilities.

5. SEC scrutiny: Monitor the SEC’s increased scrutiny and more frequent enforcement actions, including whistleblower developments, guidance on non-GAAP measures and tougher positions on insider trading

2016 saw the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) award tens of millions of dollars to whistleblowers and bring first-of-a-kind cases applying new rules flowing from the protections now afforded to whistleblowers of potential violations of the federal securities laws. The SEC was also active in its review of internal accounting controls and their ability to combat cyber intrusions and other modern-day threats to corporate infrastructure. The SEC similarly continued its comprehensive effort to police insider trading schemes and other market abuses, and increased its scrutiny of non-GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) financial measure disclosures. 2017 is expected to bring the appointment of three new commissioners, including a new chairperson to replace outgoing chair Mary Jo White, which will retilt the scales at the commissioner level to a 3-2 majority of Republican appointees. 2017 may also bring significant changes to rules promulgated previously under Dodd-Frank.

6. CFIUS: Account for CFIUS risks in transactions involving non-U.S. investments in businesses with a U.S. presence

Over the past year, the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has been particularly active in reviewing—and, at times, intervening in—non-U.S. investments in U.S. businesses to address national security concerns. CFIUS has the authority to impose mitigation measures on a transaction before it can proceed, and may also recommend that the President block a pending transaction or order divestiture of a U.S. business in a completed transaction. Companies that have not sufficiently accounted for CFIUS risks may face significant hurdles in successfully closing a deal. With the incoming Trump administration, there is also the potential for an expanded role for CFIUS, particularly in light of campaign statements opposing certain foreign investments.

7. Board composition: Evaluate and refresh board composition to help achieve the company’s goals, increase diversity and manage turnover

In order to promote fresh, dynamic and engaged perspectives in the boardroom and help the company achieve its goals, a board should undertake focused reassessments of its underlying composition and skills, including a review and analysis of board tenure, continuity and diversity in terms of upbringing, educational background, career expertise, gender, age, race and political affiliation.

8. Executive compensation: Determine appropriate executive compensation against the background of an increased focus on CEO pay ratios

Executive compensation will continue to be a hot topic for directors in 2017, especially given that public companies will soon have to start complying with the CEO pay ratio disclosure rules. Recent developments suggest that such disclosure might not be as burdensome or harmful to relations with employees and the public as was initially feared.
The SEC’s final rules allow for greater flexibility and ease in making this calculation, and a survey of companies that have already estimated their ratios indicates that the ratio might not be as high, on average, as previously reported.

9. Antitrust scrutiny: Monitor the increased scrutiny of the antitrust authorities and the implications on various proposed combinations

Despite the promise of synergies and the potential to transform a company’s future, antitrust regulators have become increasingly hostile toward strategic transactions, with the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission suing to block 12 transactions since 2015. Although directors should brace for a longer antitrust review, to help navigate the regulatory climate, work upfront can dramatically improve prospects for success. Company directors should develop appropriate deal rationales and, with the benefit of upfront work, allocate antitrust risk in the merger agreement. Merger and acquisition activity may also benefit from the Trump administration, taking, at least for certain industries, a less-aggressive antitrust enforcement stance.

10. Environmental disasters and contagious diseases: Monitor the impact of increasingly volatile weather events and contagious disease outbreaks on risk management processes, employee needs and logistics planning

While the causes of climate change remain a political sticking point, it cannot be debated that volatile weather events, environmental damage and a rise in the diseases that tend to follow, are having increasingly adverse impacts on businesses and markets. Businesses will need to account for, or transfer the risk of, the increasing likelihood of these impacts. The SEC recently announced investigations into climate-risk disclosures within the oil and gas sector to ensure that they adequately allow investors to account for these effects on the bottom line. The growing number of shareholder resolutions and suits addressing climate change confirm that investors want this information, regardless of the position of the next administration.

The complete publication is available here.


*Kerry E. Berchem is partner and head of the corporate practice, and Rick L. Burdick is partner and chair of the Global Energy & Transactions group, at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.

Principales tendances en gouvernance à l’échelle internationale en 2017


Voici un excellent résumé des principales tendances en gouvernance à l’échelle internationale. L’article paru sur le site de la Harvard Law School Forum est le fruit des recherches effectuées par Rusty O’Kelley, membre de CEO and Board Services Practice, et Anthony Goodman, membre de Board Effectiveness Practice de Russell Reynolds Associates.

Les auteurs ont interviewé plusieurs investisseurs activistes et institutionnels ainsi que des administrateurs de sociétés publiques et des experts de la gouvernance afin d’appréhender les tendances qui se dessinent pour les entreprises cotées en 2017.

Parmi les conclusions de l’étude, notons :

  1. Le besoin de se coller plus étroitement à des normes de gouvernance universellement acceptées ;
  2. La nécessité de bien se préparer aux nouveaux risques et aux nouvelles opportunités amenées par la montée des gouvernements populistes de droite ;
  3. Une responsabilité accrue des administrateurs de sociétés pour la création de valeur à long terme ;
  4. L’importance d’une solide compréhension des changements globaux eu égard à l’exercice d’une bonne gouvernance, notamment dans les états suivants :

–  États-Unis

–  Union européenne

–  Japon

–  Inde

–  Brésil

Cette lecture nous donne une perspective globale des défis qui attendent les administrateurs et les CA de grandes sociétés publiques en 2017.

Bonne lecture !

 

Global and Regional Trends in Corporate Governance for 2017

 

Russell Reynolds Associates recently interviewed numerous institutional and activist investors, pension fund managers, public company directors and other governance professionals about the trends and challenges that public company boards will face in 2017. Our conversations yielded a wide array of perspectives about the forces that are driving change in the corporate governance landscape.

 

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The changing pressures and dynamics that boards will face in the coming year are diverse and significant in their impact. Institutional investors will continue their push for more uniform standards of corporate governance globally, while also increasing their expectations of the role that boards should play in responsibly representing shareholders. Political uncertainty and the surprise results of the US Presidential and “Brexit” votes may require that boards take a more active role in scenario planning and helping management to navigate increasingly costly risks. The movement for companies and investors to adopt a more long-term orientation has gained momentum, with several large institutional investors now pressuring boards to demonstrate that they are actively involved in guiding a company’s strategy for long-term value creation.

Higher Expectations and Greater Alignment Around Corporate Governance Norms

Continuing the trend from last year, large institutional investors and pension funds are pushing for more aligned approaches to corporate governance across borders to support long-term value creation. Regulators are responding, particularly in emerging economies and those with nascent corporate governance regimes. Recent reforms in Japan, India and Brazil have borrowed heavily from the US or UK models. Where regulators have not yet caught up to or agreed with investor expectations, institutional investors are engaging companies directly to advocate for the governance reforms they want to see. These investors also expect more from their boards than ever before and are increasingly willing to intervene when they do not feel they are being responsibly represented in the boardroom.

Corporate Governance in an Era of Political Uncertainty

Populist political movements have gained broad support in several countries around the world, contributing to uncertainty about the future regulatory and political environments of two of the world’s five largest economies. In the UK, the Conservative government has signaled potential support for shareholder influence over executive pay and disclosure of the CEO-employee pay ratio. In the US, President-elect Trump has demonstrated a willingness to “name and shame” specific companies that he perceives to have benefited unfairly from trade deals or moved jobs overseas. Boards must be prepared to navigate these new reputational risks and intense media scrutiny, and review management’s assumptions about the political implications of certain decisions.

Increasing Board Accountability for Long-Term Value Creation

Efforts to encourage a more long-term market orientation have intensified in recent years, with several prominent business leaders and investors, most notably Larry Fink, Chairman and CEO of BlackRock, urging companies to focus on sustained value creation rather than maximizing short-term earnings. In his 2016 letter to chief executives of S&P 500 companies and large European corporations, Mr. Fink specifically called for increased board oversight of a company’s strategy for long-term value creation, noting that BlackRock’s corporate governance team would be looking for assurances of this oversight when engaging with companies.

Global and Regional Trends in Corporate Governance in 2017

Based on our global experience as a firm and our interviews with experts around the world, we believe that public companies will likely face the following trends in 2017:

  1. Increasing expectations around the oversight role of the board, to include greater oversight of strategy and scenario planning, investor engagement, and executive succession planning.
  2. Continued focus on board refreshment and composition, with particular attention being paid to directors’ skill profiles, the currency of directors’ knowledge, director overboarding, diversity, and robust mechanisms for board refreshment that go beyond box-ticking exercises.
  3. Greater scrutiny of company plans for sustained value creation, as concerns increase that activist settlements and other market forces are causing short-term priorities to compromise long-term interests.
  4. Greater focus on Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) issues, and in particular those related to climate change and sustainability, as industries beyond the extractive sector begin to feel investor pressure in this area.

We explore these trends and their implications for five key regions and markets: the United States, the European Union, India, Japan and Brazil.

United States

The surprise election of Donald Trump has increased regulatory and legislative uncertainty. Certain industries, such as financial services, natural resources and healthcare, may face less pressure and government scrutiny. We expect nominees to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to be less supportive of the increased disclosure requirements around executive pay and diversity. However, public pension funds and institutional investors will continue to push governance issues through increased specific engagement with individual companies.

  1. Investors continue to push boards to demonstrate that they are taking a strategic and proactive approach to board refreshment. In particular, they are looking for indicators that boards are adding directors with the skill sets necessary to complement the company’s strategic direction, and ensuring a diversity of backgrounds and perspectives to guide that strategy. Some investors see tenure and age limits as too blunt an instrument, preferring internal or external board evaluations to ensure that every director is contributing effectively. Several large institutional investors will continue to push boards to conduct external board evaluations by third parties to increase the quality of feedback and improve governance.
  2. Ongoing fallout from the Wells Fargo scandal will increase pressure on boards to split the CEO/Chair role, particularly in the financial services sector. Given investor pressure, particularly from pension funds, we also anticipate increased demand for clawbacks, a trend that is likely to go beyond the banking sector.
  3. We expect that 2017 will be a significant year for ESG issues, and in particular those related to climate change and sustainability. Industries beyond the extractive sector will begin to feel investor pressure in this area. While this pressure is being exerted by a number of stakeholder groups, the degree to which the baton has been picked up by mainstream institutional investors is notable.
  4. Increased attention on climate risk is also changing the way many companies and investors think about materiality and disclosure, which will have significant implications for audit committees. Michael Bloomberg is currently leading the Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, which will seek to develop consistent, voluntary standards for companies to provide information about climate-related financial risk. The Task Force’s recommendations are expected in mid-2017.
  5. Boards will increasingly be expected to ensure sufficient succession planning not just at the CEO level but in other key C-suite roles as well, as investors want to know that boards are actively monitoring the pipeline of talent. Additionally, there is a relatively new trend of some boards conducting crisis management exercises as a supplement to the activism risk assessment we have seen over the past couple of years.
  6. In the event that all or parts of the Dodd-Frank regulations are repealed, investors will likely turn to private ordering—seeking to persuade companies to change their by-laws—to keep the elements that are most important to them (e.g. “say on pay”). Current SEC rules require that companies begin disclosing their CEO-employee pay ratio in 2018, but we believe this to be a likely target for repeal.

European Union

Across many countries in Europe, the push for board and management diversity will continue apace in 2017. Executive pay continues to be the focus of government, investor and media attention with various proposals for reining in compensation. Work being done in the UK on board oversight of corporate culture has the potential to spill across European borders and travel farther afield over the next few years.

  1. Many countries in Europe continue to push ahead with encouraging gender diversity at the board level, as national laws regulating the number of female directors proliferate. In the UK, the Hampton-Alexander Review recommended that the Corporate Governance Code be amended to require FTSE 350 companies to disclose the gender balance of their executive committees in their annual report.
  2. After ebbing slightly in 2014, activism has made a comeback in Europe: whereas 51 companies were targeted in 2014, 64 were targeted in the first half of 2016 alone. We anticipate that European activists will continue to apply less aggressive and more collaborative tactics than those seen in the US. Additionally, we expect to see US and European institutional investors to be supportive of European activist investors, particularly those who are self-described “constructive activists”, who take a less aggressive approach than their US counterparts.
  3. The EU is expected to amend its Shareholder Rights Directive in 2017 to include an EU-wide “say on pay” framework that would give shareholders the right to regular votes on prospective and retrospective remuneration. While these votes are not expected to be binding, the directive does require that pay be based on a shareholder-approved policy and that issuers must address failed votes. Germany saw a sharp increase in dissents on “say on pay” proposals this year, jumping from 8% to over 20%. In France, the government is currently debating whether to make “say on pay” votes binding, spurred by the public outcry about the Renault board’s decision to confirm the CEO’s 2015 compensation, despite a rejection by a majority of shareholders.
  4. The UK government is expected to continue its push for compensation practice reform in 2017, having recently published a series of proposed policies, including mandatory disclosure of the CEO pay ratio, employee representation in executive compensation decisions, and making shareholder votes on executive compensation binding. We also expect continued strong media coverage and related public opposition to large public company pay packages, which could put UK boards in the spotlight.
  5. In Germany, the ongoing fallout from the Volkswagen scandal is the likely impetus for proposed amendments to the corporate governance code that would underscore boards’ obligations to adhere to ethical business practices. The proposed amendments also acknowledge the increasingly common practice of investor engagement with the supervisory board, and recommend that the supervisory board chair be prepared to discuss relevant topics with investors.
  6. In the UK, boards will be focused on implementing the recommendations of the recent Financial Reporting Council (FRC) report on corporate culture and the role of boards, which makes the case that long-term value creation is directly linked to company culture and the role of business in society.

India

Indian boards continue to struggle with the implementation of many of the major changes to corporate governance practices required by the 2013 Companies Act, but reform is progressing. While the complete fallout from the recent Tata leadership imbroglio is not yet clear, it will almost certainly reverberate through the Indian corporate governance landscape for years to come.

  1. Recent regulatory changes have increased the scope of responsibilities for the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, requiring boards to ensure that directors have the right set of skills to deliver on these new responsibilities. Increased emphasis on CEO succession planning and board evaluations have necessitated that Committee members become more fluent in these governance processes and methodologies, particularly as the requirement to report on them annually has increased the spotlight on the board’s role in these processes.
  2. The introduction in 2013 of a mandatory minimum of at least one female director for most listed companies has increased India’s gender diversity at the board level to one of the highest rates in Asia, with 14% of all directorships currently held by women. However, concerns persist about the potential for “tokenism”, as a sizeable portion of the women appointed come from the controlling families of the company.
  3. India has also attempted to integrate ESG and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) issues at the board level, having mandated that every board establish a CSR committee and that the company spend 2% of net profits on CSR activities. However, companies will need to ensure that their approach to CSR amounts to more than a box-ticking exercise if they want to attract the support of the growing cadre of ESG-focused investors.
  4. Boards are increasingly expected to take a more active role in risk management, particularly cybersecurity risks. Boards should also ensure that their companies are adequately anticipating and responding to cybersecurity threats.
  5. Changes to the 2013 Companies Act have considerably enhanced the duties and liabilities of directors, along with strict penalties for any breach of these duties and the potential for class action lawsuits against individual directors. While potentially helpful in increasing director accountability, these changes also significantly increase the personal risk that a director assumes when joining a board.

Japan

Japan’s Corporate Governance Code was reformulated in 2015, as part of the “Abenomics” push for structural reforms. Japanese companies continue to implement the corporate governance principles resulting from the new regulations, with many hoping that the adoption of more Western norms will help prompt the return of foreign investors.

  1. The overhaul of Japan’s corporate governance model in 2015 has begun to yield significant results, as 96% of Japanese boards now have at least one outside director and 78% have at least two. However, Japan’s famously deferential corporate culture may make it difficult for boards to unlock the value of these independent perspectives, as seniority and family ownership often still take precedence.
  2. Increasing investor interest in the Japanese market is likely to increase pressure on boards to adopt more Western norms of corporate governance. CalPERS, the California public pension fund, recently began an explicit program of engagement in Japan, their second-largest equity market, in order to encourage the adoption of more Western norms, including increased board independence and diversity, defining narrower standards of independence, and increasing the disclosure of director qualifications.
  3. Gender diversity remains a challenge for Japanese boards, with only 3% of directorships held by women. However, women account for 22% of outside directors, suggesting that gender diversity on boards will likely continue to increase as the appointment of independent directors becomes more common. A new law, introduced in April 2016, now requires companies with more than 300 employees to publish data on the number of women they employ and how many hold management positions. We anticipate this increased scrutiny at all levels of the company to have a knock-on effect for boards.
  4. While other elements of the new Corporate Governance Code have seen near unanimous compliance, only 55% of listed companies have complied with the stipulation to conduct formal board evaluations. Moreover, the quality and format of the evaluations that are occurring vary significantly, with many adopting a self-evaluation process that amounts to little more than a box-ticking exercise.
  5. The common Japanese practice of former executives and chairs remaining in “advisor” roles beyond the end of their formal tenure is now coming under increasing scrutiny. ISS will now generally vote against amendments to create new advisory positions, unless the advisors will serve on the board and therefore be held accountable to shareholders.

Brazil

Brazil’s corporate governance regime has evolved significantly in the last decade, as various regulatory entities have sought to apply greater protections for minority shareholders and better align standards with other Western models to attract greater foreign investment.

  1. As Brazil continues to navigate the fallout of the Petrobras scandal, many are questioning how the mechanisms for encouraging and enforcing investor stewardship and corporate governance can be strengthened.
  2. AMEC, Brazil’s association of institutional investors, recently released the country’s first Investor Stewardship Code, calling on investors to adhere to seven principles, including implementing mechanisms to manage conflicts of interest, taking ESG issues into account, and being active and diligent in the exercise of voting rights.
  3. In an effort to address the high levels of absenteeism among institutional investors at general meetings, Brazil’s Security and Exchange Commission (CVM) will, beginning in 2017, require that listed companies allow shareholders to vote by mail or email, rather than requiring that they (or their proxy) be physically present to cast their vote. Brazilian companies, and their boards, should be prepared for the increased requests for investor engagement that are likely to result from the more active participation of institutional investors in the voting process.
  4. New regulations for the country’s Novo Mercado segment of listed companies will be announced in 2017. Highlights of the proposed changes include the required establishment of audit, compensation and appointment committees, a minimum of two independent directors, and more stringent disclosure of directors’ relationships to related companies and other parties.

Le rôle du conseil d’administration dans les procédures de conformité


Voici un cas de gouvernance, publié en décembre sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan* qui illustre comment la direction d’une société publique peut se retrouver en situation d’irrégularité malgré une culture du conseil d’administration axée sur la conformité.

L’investigation du vérificateur général (VG) a révélé plusieurs failles dans les procédures internes de la société. De ce fait, Kyle le président du comité d’audit, risque et conformité, est interpellé par le président du conseil afin d’aider la direction à trouver des solutions durables pour remédier à la situation.

Même si Kyle est conscient qu’il ne possède pas l’autorité requise pour régler les problèmes constatés par le VG, il comprend qu’il est impératif que son message passe.

Le cas présente la situation de manière assez succincte, mais explicite ; puis, trois experts en gouvernance se prononcent sur le dilemme qui se présente aux personnes qui vivent des situations similaires.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

Le rôle du conseil d’administration dans les procédures de conformité

 

Business audit concept . Flat design vector illustration

Kyle is chairman on the Audit, Risk and Compliance committee of a government authority board which is subject to a Public Access to Information Act. The auditor general has just completed an audit of several authorities bound by that Act and Kyle’s authority was found to have several breeches of the Act, in particular;

–  some contracts valued at $150,000 or more were not recorded in the contracts register

–  some contracts were not entered into the register within 45 working days of the contracts becoming effective

–  there were instances where inaccurate information was recorded in the register when compared with the contracts, and

–  additional information required for certain classes of contracts was not disclosed in some registers.

The Board Chairman is rightly concerned that this has happened in what all directors believed to be a well governed authority with a strong culture of compliance. The Board Chairman has asked Kyle to oversee management’s response to the Auditor General and the development of systems to ensure that these breeches do not reoccur. Kyle is mindful that he remains a non-executive and has no authority within the chain of management command. He is keen to help and knows that the CEO is struggling with the complexity of her role and will need assistance with any increase in workload.

How can Kyle help without getting embroiled in management affairs?

Raz’s Answer

The issue I spot here, is one which I’ve encountered myself – as a seasoned professional, you have the internal urge to roll your sleeves and get right into it, and solve the problem. From the details disclosed in this dilemma, there’s evidence that the authority’s internal culture is compliant, therefore it’s hard to believe there’s foul play which caused these discrepancies in the reports. I would have guessed that there are some legacy processes, or even old technology, which needs to be looked at and discover where the gap is.

The CEO is under immense pressure to fix this issue, being exposed to public scrutiny, but with the government’s limited resources at her disposal, the pressure is even higher. Making decisions under such pressure, especially when a board member, the chair of the Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee is looking over her shoulder, will likely to force her to make mistakes.

Kyle’s dilemma is simple to explain, but more delicate to handle: « How do I fix this, without sticking my nose into the operations? »

As a NED, what Kyle needs to be is a guide to the CEO, providing a calm and supportive environment for the CEO to operate in. Kyle needs to consult with the CEO, and get her on side, to ensure she’ll devote whichever resources she does have, to deal with this issue. This won’t be a Band-Aid solution, but a solution which will require collaboration of several parts of the organisations, orchestrated by the CEO herself.

Raz Chorev is Partner at Orange Sky and Managing Director at CXC Global. He is based in Sydney, Australia.

Julie’s Answer

The Auditor General has asked management to respond and board oversight of management should be done by and through the CEO.

Kyle cannot help without putting his fingers (or intellect) into the organisation. To do that without causing upset he will need to inform the CEO of the Chairman’s request, offer to help and make sure that he reports to her before he reports elsewhere. Handled sensitively the CEO, who appears to be struggling, should welcome any assistance with the task. Handled insensitively this could be a major issue because the statutory definitions of directors’ roles in public sector companies are less fluid than those in the private sector.

Kyle should also take this as a wake-up call – he assumes a culture of compliance and good governance but that is obviously not correct. The audit committee should regularly review the regulatory and legislative compliance framework and verify that all is as it should be; that has clearly not happened and Kyle should work with the company secretary or chief compliance/legal officer to review the entire framework and make sure nothing else is missing from the regular schedule of reviews. The committee must ask for what it needs to oversight effectively not just read what they are given.

The prevailing attitude should be one of thankfulness that the issue has been found and can be corrected. If Kyle detects a cultural rejection of the need to comply and cooperate with the AG in establishing good governance then Kyle must report to the whole board so remedial action can be planned.

Once management have responded to the AG with their proposed actions to remedy the matter. The audit committee should review to check that the actions have been implemented and that they effectively lead to compliance with the requirements. Likely remedies include amending the position descriptions of staff doing tendering or those setting up vendors in the payments system to include entry of details to the register, training in compliance, design of an internal audit system for routine review of registers and comparison to workloads to ensure that nothing has ‘dropped between the cracks’, and regular reporting of register completion and audit to the board audit committee.

Sean’s Answer

The Audit Risk and Compliance Committee (« Committee ») is to assist the Board in fulfilling its corporate governance and oversight responsibilities in relation to the bodies’ financial reporting, internal control structure, risk management systems, compliance and the external audit function.

The external auditors are responsible for auditing the bodies’ financial reports and for reviewing the unaudited interim financial reports. The Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 calls for auditing financial statements and performance reviews by the Auditor General.

As Committee Chairman Kyle must be independent and must have leadership experience and a strong finance, accounting or business background. So too must the CEO and CFO have appropriate and sufficient qualifications, knowledge, competence, experience and integrity and other personal attributes to undertake their roles.

It should be the responsibility of the Committee to maintain free and open communication between the Committee, external auditors and management. The Committee’s function is principally oversight and review.

The appointment and ongoing assessment, mentoring and discipline of the CEO rests with the board but the delegation of this authority in relation to compliance often rests with the Committee and Board Chairs.

Kyle may invite members of management (CFO and maybe the CEO) or others to attend meetings  and the Committee should have  authority, within the scope of its responsibilities, to seek information it requires, and assistance  from any employee or external party. Inviting the CFO and or CEO to the Committee allows visibility and a holistic and independent forum where deficiencies may be isolated and functions (but not responsibility) delegated to others.

There is a disconnect or deficiency in one or more functions; Kyle should ensure that the Committee holistically review its own charter, discuss with management and the external auditors the adequacy and effectiveness of the internal controls and reporting functions (including the Bodies’s policies and procedures to assess, monitor and manage these controls), as well as a review of the internal quality control procedures (because these are also suspected to be deficient).

It will rapidly become apparent to management, the Committee, Kyle, the board and the Chairman where the deficiencies lie or did lie, and how they have been corrected. Underlying behavioural problems and or abilities to function will also become apparent and with these appropriately addressed similar deficiencies in other areas of the body may be contemporaneously corrected and all reported to the Auditor General.

Sean Rothsey is Chairman and Founder of the Merkin Group. He is based in Cooroy, Queensland, Australia.


*Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia. www.mclellan.com.au/newsletter.html

L’évolution de la divulgation des comités d’audit aux actionnaires


Voici un article d’Ann Yerger, directrice du Center for Board Matters, de la firme Ernst & Young, qui porte sur l’évolution significative des politiques de divulgation des comités d’audit aux actionnaires des entreprises cotées en bourse aux États-Unis en 2106. L’article est paru sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance le 9 octobre.

L’étendue des divulgations aux actionnaires est vraiment très importante dans certains cas. Par exemple, en 2012, seulement 42 % des entreprises dévoilaient explicitement que le comité d’audit était responsable de l’engagement, de la rémunération et de la surveillance des auditeurs externes, alors qu’en 2016, 82 % divulguent, souvent en détail, les informations de cette nature.

Plusieurs autres résultats font état de changements remarquables dans la reddition de compte des comités d’audit aux actionnaires des entreprises.

Ceux-ci sont maintenant plus en mesure d’évaluer la portée des décisions des comités d’audit eu égard à la qualité du travail des auditeurs externes, aux raisons invoquées pour changer d’auditeur externe, à la fixation du mandat de l’auditeur externe, à la composition du comité d’audit, à l’augmentation des honoraires des firmes comptables dans les quatre catégories suivantes : audit, relié aux travaux d’audit, fiscalité et autres services connexes, etc.

Bonne lecture !

Audit Committee Reporting to Shareholders in 2016

 

audit

 

Audit committees have a key role in overseeing the integrity of financial reporting. Nevertheless, relatively little information is required to be disclosed by US public companies about the audit committee’s important work. Since our first publication in this series in 2012, we have described efforts by investors, regulators and other stakeholders to seek increased audit­-related disclosures, as well as the resulting voluntary disclosures to respond to this interest.

Over 2015–2016, US regulators have placed a spotlight on audit-related disclosures and financial reporting more generally. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) have both taken action to consider the possibility of requiring new disclosures relating to the audit.

SEC representatives also have used speeches to urge companies and audit committees to increase disclosures in this area voluntarily. While additional disclosure requirements for audit committees are not expected in the near term, regulators continue to monitor developments in this area. This post seeks to shed light on the evolving audit­-related disclosure landscape.

Context

Public company audit committees are responsible for overseeing financial reporting, including the external audit. Under US securities laws, audit committees are “directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, retention and oversight” of the external auditor, and must include a report in annual proxy statements about their work. This audit committee report, however, currently must affirm only that the committee carried out certain specific responsibilities related to communications with the external auditor, and this requirement has not changed since 1999.

In recent years, a variety of groups have brought attention to the relative lack of information available about the audit committee and the audit, including their view that this area of disclosure may not have kept up with the needs of investors and other proxy statement users. These groups include pension funds, asset managers, investors, corporate governance groups, and domestic and foreign regulators. As efforts to seek additional information have continued, there has been a steady increase in voluntary audit-related disclosures.

Over the last year, the SEC has taken a series of actions to consider whether and how to improve transparency around audit committees, audits and financial reporting more generally. The combined effect of these activities has been to increase engagement by issuers, audit firms, investors and other stakeholders in discussions about the current state of financial reporting­ related disclosure as well as how it should change.

Findings

Our analysis of the 2016 proxy statements of Fortune 100 companies indicates that voluntaryaudit-related disclosures continue to trend upward in a number of areas. The CBM data for this review is based on the 78 companies on the 2016 Fortune 100 list that filed proxy statements each year from 2012 to 2016 for annual meetings through August 15, 2016. Below are highlights from our research:

  1. The percentage of companies that disclosed factors considered by the audit committee when assessing the qualifications and work quality of the external auditor increased to 50%, up from 42% in 2015. In 2012, only 17% of audit committees disclosed this information.
  2. Another significant increase was in disclosures stating that the audit committee believed that the choice of external auditor was in the best interests of the company and/or the shareholders. In 2016, 73% of companies disclosed such information; in 2015, this percentage was 63%. In 2012, only 3% of companies made this disclosure.
  3. The audit committees of 82% of the companies explicitly stated that they are responsible for the appointment, compensation and oversight of the external auditor; in 2012, only 42% of audit committees provided such disclosures.
  4. 31% of companies provided information about the reasons for changes in fees paid to the external auditor compared to 21% the previous year. Reasons provided in these disclosures include one­-time events, such as a merger or acquisition. Under current SEC rules, companies are required to disclose fees paid to the external auditor, divided into the following categories: audit, audit-related, tax and all other fees. They are not, however, required to discuss the reasons why these fees have increased or decreased. From 2012 to 2016, the percentage of companies disclosing information to explain changes in audit fees rose from 9% to 31%. Additional CBM research examined the disclosures of the subset of studied companies (43) that had changes in audit fees of +/-­ 5% or more compared to the previous year. Out of these 43 companies, roughly 20% provided explanatory disclosures regarding the change in audit fees.
  5. 29 of the 43 companies had fee increases of 5% or more, out of which 8 companies disclosed the reasons for the increases. 14 of the 43 companies had fee decreases of 5% or more, out of which only one company provided an explanatory disclosure.
  6. 53% of companies disclosed that the audit committee considered the impact of changing auditors when assessing whether to retain the current auditor. This was a 6 percentage point increase over 2015. In 2012, this disclosure was made by 3% of the Fortune 100 companies. Over the past five years, the number of companies disclosing that the audit committee was involved in the selection of the lead audit partner has grown dramatically, up to 73% in 2016. In 2015, 67% of companies disclosed this information, while in 2012, only 1% of companies did so.
  7. 51% of companies disclosed that they have three or more financial experts on their audit committees, up from 47% in 2015 and 36% in 2012.

Summary: Trends in Audit Committee Disclosure

(Cliquez pour agrandir)

ey-summary-trends-in-audit-committee

 

Malaise au conseil | Les effets pervers de l’obligation de divulgation des rémunérations de la haute direction (en rappel)


Aujourd’hui, je cède la parole à Mme Nicolle Forget*, certainement l’une des administratrices de sociétés les plus chevronnées au Québec (sinon au Canada), qui nous présente sa vision de la gouvernance « réglementée » ainsi que celle du rôle des administrateurs dans ce processus.

L’allocution qui suit a été prononcée dans le cadre du Colloque sur la gouvernance organisée par la Chaire de recherche en gouvernance de sociétés le 6 juin 2014. Je pensais tout d’abord faire un résumé de son texte, mais, après une lecture attentive, j’en ai conclu que celui-ci exposait une problématique de fond et constituait une prise de position fondamentale en gouvernance. Il me semblait essentiel de vous faire partager son article au complet.

Nous avons souvent abordé les conséquences non anticipées de la réglementation, principalement celles découlant des exigences de divulgation en matière de rémunération. Cependant, dans son allocution, l’auteure apporte un éclairage nouveau, inédit et audacieux sur l’exercice de la gouvernance dans les sociétés publiques.

Elle présente une solide argumentation et expose clairement certains malaises vécus par les administrateurs eu égard à la lourdeur des mécanismes réglementaires de gouvernance. Les questionnements présentés en conclusion de l’article sont, en grande partie, fondés sur sa longue expérience comme membre de nombreux conseils d’administration.

Comment réagissez-vous aux constats que fait Mme Forget ? Les autorités réglementaires vont-elles trop loin dans la prescription des obligations de divulgation ? Pouvons-nous éviter les effets pervers de certaines dispositions sans pour autant nuire au processus de divulgation d’informations importantes pour les actionnaires et les parties prenantes.

Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Je vous souhaite une bonne lecture.

 

MALAISE AU CONSEIL | Les effets pervers de l’obligation de divulgation en matière de rémunération

 par

Nicolle Forget*

 

Merci aux organisateurs de ce colloque de me donner l’occasion de partager avec vous quelques constatations et interrogations qui m’habitent depuis quatre ou cinq ans concernant diverses obligations imposées aux entreprises à capital ouvert (inscrites en Bourse). Je souligne d’entrée de jeu que la présentation qui suit n’engage que moi.

Depuis l’avènement de quelques grands scandales financiers, ici et ailleurs, on en a mis beaucoup sur le dos des administrateurs de sociétés. On voudrait qu’un administrateur soit un expert en semblable matière.  Il ne l’est pas.  Il arrive avec son bagage, c’est pourquoi on l’a choisi.  On lui prépare un programme de formation pour lui permettre de comprendre l’entreprise au conseil de laquelle il a accepté de siéger, mais il n’en saura jamais autant que la somme des savoirs de l’entreprise.  C’est utopique de s’attendre au contraire.  Même un administrateur qui ne ferait que cela, siéger au conseil de cette entreprise, ne le pourrait pas.

nicolle-forget

Des questions reviennent constamment dans l’actualité : où étaient les administrateurs ? N’ont-ils rien vu venir ou rien vu tout court?  Ont-ils rempli leur devoir fiduciaire?  Tout juste si on ne conclut pas qu’ils sont tous des incompétents.  Les administrateurs étaient là.  Ils savaient ce que l’on a bien voulu leur faire savoir. (ex. Saccage de la Baie-James. Les administrateurs de la SEBJ, convoqués en Commission parlementaire à Québec, au printemps 1983,  ont appris, par un avocat venu y témoigner, l’existence d’un avis juridique qu’il avait préparé à la demande de la direction.  La SEBJ poursuivait alors les responsables du saccage et un très long procès était sur le point de commencer.  Avoir eu connaissance de son contenu, au moment où il a été livré au PDG, aurait eu un impact sur nos décisions.  J’étais alors membre du conseil d’administration).

Posons tout de suite que la meilleure gouvernance qui soit n’empêchera jamais des dirigeants qui veulent cacher au conseil certains actes d’y parvenir — surtout si ces actes sont frauduleux. Même avec de belles politiques et de beaux codes d’éthique, plusieurs directions d’entreprise trouvent encore qu’un conseil d’administration n’est rien d’autre qu’un mal nécessaire.  Les administrateurs sont parfois perçus comme s’ingérant dans les affaires de la direction ou dans les décisions qu’elle prend. Aussi, ces dirigeants ont-ils tendance à placer les conseils devant des faits accomplis ou des dossiers tellement bien ficelés qu’il est difficile d’y trouver une fissure par laquelle entrevoir une faille dans l’argumentation au soutien de la décision à prendre. Pourtant, et nous le verrons plus loin, en vertu de la loi, le conseil « exerce tous les pouvoirs nécessaires pour gérer les activités et les affaires internes de la société ou en surveiller l’exécution ».

Les conseils d’administration, comme les entreprises et leurs dirigeants, sont soumis à quantité de législations, réglementations, annexes à celles-ci, avis, lignes directrices et autres exigences émanant d’autorités multiples — et davantage les entreprises œuvrent dans un secteur d’activités qui dépasse les frontières d’une province ou d’un pays. Et, selon ce que l’on entend, il faudrait que l’administrateur ait toujours tout vu, tout su…

Malaise!

En 2007, Yvan Allaire écrivait que « … la gouvernance par les conseils d’administration est devenue pointilleuse et moins complaisante, mais également plus tatillonne, coûteuse et litigieuse ; les dirigeants se plaignent de la bureaucratisation de leur entreprise, du temps consacré pour satisfaire aux nouvelles exigences » 1. Denis Desautels, lui, signalait que « Certains prétendent que le souci de la conformité aux lois et aux règlements l’emporte sur les discussions stratégiques et sur la création de valeur.  Et d’autres, que l’adoption ou l’endossement des nouvelles normes n’est pas toujours sincère et, qu’au fond, la culture de l’entreprise n’a pas réellement changé » 2.

Pour mémoire, voyons quelques obligations (de base) d’un administrateur de sociétés.

Au Québec, la Loi sur les sociétés par actions (L.r.Q., c. S-31.1) prévoit que les affaires de la société sont administrées par un conseil d’administration qui « exerce tous les pouvoirs nécessaires pour gérer les activités et les affaires internes de la société ou en surveiller l’exécution » (art. 112) et que, « Sauf dans la mesure prévue par la loi, l’exercice de ces pouvoirs ne nécessite pas l’approbation des actionnaires et ceux-ci peuvent être délégués à un administrateur, à un dirigeant ou à un ou plusieurs comités du conseil. »

De façon générale, les administrateurs de sociétés sont soumis aux obligations auxquelles est assujetti tout administrateur d’une personne morale en vertu du Code civil. « En conséquence, les administrateurs sont notamment tenus envers la société, dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions, d’agir avec prudence et diligence de même qu’avec honnêteté et loyauté dans son intérêt » (art. 119). L’intérêt de la société, pas l’intérêt de l’actionnaire.  La loi fédérale présente des concepts semblables.  (La Cour Suprême du Canada a d’ailleurs rappelé dans l’affaire BCE qu’il n’existe pas au Canada de principe selon lequel les intérêts d’une partie — les actionnaires, par exemple — doivent avoir priorité sur ceux des autres parties.)

Si la société fait appel publiquement à l’épargne, elle devient un émetteur assujetti. Alors s’ajoutent les règles de la Bourse concernant les exigences d’inscription initiale ainsi que celles concernant le maintien de l’inscription. S’ajoutent aussi les obligations édictées dans la Loi sur les valeurs mobilières (L.R.Q., c. V-1.1), de même que les règlements qui en découlent, et dont l’Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) est chargée de l’application. L’émetteur assujetti est tenu aux obligations d’information continue. Si vous êtes un administrateur ou un haut dirigeant d’un tel émetteur ou même d’une filiale d’un tel émetteur, vous êtes un initié avec des obligations particulières.

L’article 73 de cette Loi stipule que tel émetteur « … fournit, conformément aux conditions et modalités déterminées par règlement, l’information périodique au sujet de son activité et de ses affaires internes, dont ses pratiques en matière de gouvernance, l’information occasionnelle au sujet d’un changement important et toute autre information prévue par règlement. ». «L’émetteur assujetti doit organiser ses affaires conformément aux règles établies par règlement en matière de gouvernance». (art.73.1)

La mission de l’Autorité, (entendre ici AMF) telle qu’énoncée à l’article 276.1 de la Loi sur les valeurs mobilières se décline comme suit :

  1. Favoriser le bon fonctionnement du marché des valeurs mobilières ;
  2. Assurer la protection des épargnants contre les pratiques déloyales, abusives et frauduleuses ;
  3. Régir l’information des porteurs de valeurs mobilières et du public sur les personnes qui font publiquement appel à l’épargne et sur les valeurs émises par celles-ci ;
  4. Encadrer l’activité des professionnels des valeurs mobilières et des organismes chargés d’assurer le fonctionnement d’un marché des valeurs mobilières.

Dans sa loi constituante, l’Autorité a une mission plus élaborée qui reprend sensiblement les mêmes thèmes, mais en appuyant davantage sur la protection des consommateurs de produits et utilisateurs de services financiers. (art.4, L.R.Q., c. A-33.2)

Aux termes de la législation en vigueur, « L’Autorité exerce la discrétion qui lui est conférée en fonction de l’intérêt public» (art.316, L.R.Q., c. V-1.1) et un règlement pris en vertu de la présente loi confère un pouvoir discrétionnaire à l’Autorité » (art.334).  En outre, toujours selon cette Loi, « Les instructions générales sont réputées constituer des règlements dans la mesure où elles portent sur un sujet pour lequel la loi nouvelle prévoit une habilitation réglementaire et qu’elles sont compatibles avec cette loi et les règlements pris pour son application. »

Je vous fais grâce du Règlement sur les valeurs mobilières (Décret 660-83 ; 115 G.O.2, 1511) ; quant à l’Annexe (51-102A5), portant sur la Circulaire de sollicitation de procuration par la direction, et celle (51-102A6) portant spécifiquement sur la Déclaration de la rémunération de la haute direction, j’y reviendrai plus loin.

Ceci pour une société qui ne fait affaire qu’au Québec, et à l’exclusion de toutes les autres législations et les nombreux règlements portant sur un secteur d’activité en particulier. Pensons juste aux activités qui peuvent affecter l’environnement, même de loin.  Alors, si une société fait affaire ailleurs au Canada et aux É.-U. ou sur plusieurs continents — ajoutez des obligations, des modes différents de divulgation de l’information — et cela peut vous donner une petite idée de « l’industrie » qu’est devenue la gouvernance d’entreprise avec l’obligation de livrer l’information en continu et sous une forme de plus en plus détaillée.  Et les administrateurs devraient tout savoir, avoir tout vu…

Les très nombreuses informations que nous publions rencontrent-elles l’objectif à l’origine de ces exigences ? Carol Liao soutient que « les autorités réglementaires sont par définition orientées vers l’actionnaire ce qui aurait mené à une augmentation des droits de ces derniers, bien au-delà de ce que les lois canadiennes (sur les sociétés) envisageaient. »  On a vu plus haut que la Loi sur les sociétés par actions édicte que « les administrateurs sont notamment tenus envers la société dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions, d’agir avec prudence et diligence de même qu’avec honnêteté et loyauté dans son intérêt ».  Se pourrait-il que « ce qui est dans l’intérêt supérieur des actionnaires ne coïncide pas avec une meilleure gouvernance ? (doesn’t align with better governance – that’s where the practice falls down »3.)

J’aime à croire que l’origine de l’obligation qui est faite aux entreprises de dire qui elles sont, ce qu’elles font, comment elles le font, et avec qui elles le font, est la protection du petit investisseur — vous et moi qui plaçons nos économies en prévision de nos vieux jours — comme disaient les anciens.

À moins d’y être obligé par son travail, qui comprend le contenu des circulaires de sollicitation de procuration par la direction, émises à l’intention des actionnaires ? Les Notices annuelles ? D’abord, qui les lit?  Chaque fois que l’occasion m’en est donnée, je pose la question  – et partout le même commentaire :  si je n’avais pas les lire je ne les lirais pas. La quantité de papier rebute en partant ; la complexité des informations à publier en la forme prescrite est difficile à comprendre pour un non-expert, alors imaginez pour un petit investisseur.  Si même  il s’aventure à lire le document.

Donc, si tant est que les circulaires et les notices ne soient pratiquement lues que par ceux qui n’ont pas le choix de le faire, il serait peut-être temps de se demander à quoi, ou plutôt, à qui elles servent ? Et à quels coûts pour l’entreprise. A-t-on une idée de combien d’experts s’affairent avec le personnel de l’entreprise à préparer ces documents sans compter les réunions des comités d’Audit, de Ressources humaines, de Gouvernance et du conseil qui se pencheront sur diverses versions des mêmes documents ?

Encore une fois, pour quoi ? Pour qui ?

Pourquoi pas aux activistes de toutes origines ?

La dernière crise financière (2008/2009) semble avoir été l’accélérateur de l’activisme de groupes, autour des actionnaires, de même que l’arrivée d’experts de toutes sortes en gouvernance d’entreprise. Une industrie venait de naître!  Le Rapport sur la gouvernance 2013, de Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg, s.e. n.c. r. l., soutient qu’il s’agit d’une tendance alimentée surtout « par le nombre accru d’occasions d’activisme découlant de certaines  tendances actuelles de la législation et des pratiques à vouloir que plus de questions soient soumises à l’approbation des actionnaires » 4.

Mais, l’a-t-on oublié ? Les administrateurs ont un devoir de fiduciaire envers la société, pas juste envers les actionnaires.  Ils doivent assurer la pérennité de l’entreprise et pas juste afficher un rendement à court terme qui entraîne des effets pervers sur la gestion des ressources humaines et ne tient pas suffisamment compte d’une saine gestion des risques.  Question :  est-ce que la mesure de l’efficacité consiste en une reddition de compte trimestrielle ? Est-ce que cette reddition de compte, toute formatée, n’est pas en train de remplacer la responsabilité et l’engagement personnel des hauts dirigeants ? La pression  mise sur les conseils d’administration, par certains activistes (d’ailleurs pas toujours actionnaires de l’entreprise !), et de leurs conseillers divers, pour discuter avec le président du conseil et le président du comité de ressources humaines est perçue comme une tentative de la part de ces activistes d’imposer leur programme — au détriment des autres actionnaires et de l’intérêt même de l’émetteur.  Et comme certains fournisseurs de ces activistes (agences de conseils en vote) produisent des analyses pour leur clientèle en vue d’une recommandation de vote lors d’une assemblée annuelle — cette démarche peut être interprétée comme une pression à la limite de l’intimidation.

Venons-en aux obligations de divulgation portant sur la rémunération des membres de la haute direction visés.

Les prêteurs, les actionnaires, ont le droit de connaître — à terme — les obligations de l’entreprise, y compris celles envers ses hauts dirigeants. Remarquez, ils ont aussi le droit de savoir s’il y a exagération ou abus. Mais, ont-ils besoin, entre autres, de connaître dans le détail les objectifs personnels fixés à Monsieur X ou à Madame Y?; pour quel % cela compte-t-il dans la rémunération incitative à court terme?; à quel % tels objectifs ont-ils été rencontrés?; pourquoi l’ont-ils été à ce %?.  Peut-on sérieusement croire qu’une entreprise va publier que telle ou telle personne n’est pas à la hauteur, 12 à 15 mois après les faits?.  Ou bien cette personne a rencontré les objectifs fixés de façon satisfaisante ou bien elle n’est plus là.  Denis Desautels avance, dans le texte cité plus haut, qu’il « n’est pas sage d’appuyer les régimes de rémunération sur des formules trop quantitatives ou mathématiques et d’allouer une trop grande portion de la rémunération globale à la partie variable ou à risque de la rémunération ».  Pourtant, les pressions ne cessent d’augmenter pour que cela soit le cas (Pay for Performance) et que ce soit basé sur des mesures objectives et connues comme le cours de l’action ou le résultat par action… le tout par rapport au groupe de référence.  Performance devient le nouveau leitmotiv.  S’est-on jamais demandé ce que cette divulgation pouvait avoir comme effet d’« emballement » sur la rémunération des hauts dirigeants?  Et les politiques de rémunération doivent continuellement s’ajuster.

Le Règlement 51-102, à son Annexe A6 (Déclaration de la rémunération de la haute direction) prescrit non seulement le contenu, mais aussi la forme que doit prendre cette déclaration :

L’ensemble de la rémunération payée, payable, attribuée, octroyée, donnée ou fournie de quelque autre façon, directement ou indirectement, par la société ou une de ses filiales à chaque membre de la haute direction visé et chaque administrateur, à quelque titre que ce soit, notamment l’ensemble de la rémunération en vertu d’un plan ou non, les paiements directs ou indirects, la rétribution, les attributions d’ordre financier ou monétaire, les récompenses, les avantages, les cadeaux ou avantages indirects qui lui sont payés, payables, attribués, octroyés, donnés ou fournis de quelque autre façon pour les services rendus et à rendre, directement ou indirectement, à la société ou à une de ses filiales. (art. 1.3 par, 1 a).

L’émetteur assujetti doit, en outre, produire une analyse de la rémunération, laquelle doit :

1) Décrire et expliquer tous les éléments significatifs composant la rémunération attribuée, payée, payable aux membres de la haute direction visés, ou gagnée par ceux-ci, au cours du dernier exercice, notamment les suivants :

  1. a) les objectifs de tout programme de rémunération ou de toute stratégie en la matière ;
  2. b) ce que le programme de rémunération vise à récompenser ;
  3. c) chaque élément de la rémunération ;
  4. d) les motifs de paiement de chaque élément ;
  5. e) la façon dont le montant de chaque élément est fixé, en indiquant la formule, le cas échéant ;
  6. f) la façon dont chaque élément de la rémunération et les décisions de la société sur chacun cadrent avec les objectifs généraux en matière de rémunération et leur incidence sur les décisions concernant les autres éléments.

2) Le cas échéant, expliquer les actions posées, les politiques établies ou les décisions prises après la clôture du dernier exercice qui pourraient influencer la compréhension qu’aurait une personne raisonnable de la rémunération versée à un membre de la haute direction visé au cours du dernier exercice.

3) Le cas échéant, indiquer clairement la référence d’étalonnage établie et expliquer les éléments qui la composent, notamment les sociétés incluses dans le groupe de référence et les critères de sélection.

4) Le cas échéant, indiquer les objectifs de performance ou les conditions similaires qui sont fondés sur des mesures objectives et connues, comme le cours de l’action de la société ou le résultat par action. Il est possible de décrire les objectifs de performance ou les conditions similaires qui sont subjectifs sans indiquer de mesure précise.

Si les objectifs de performance ou les conditions similaires publiés ne sont pas des mesures financières conformes aux PCGR, en expliquer la méthode de calcul à partir des états financiers de la société.

Et le tout dans un langage clair, concis et « présenté de façon à permettre à une personne raisonnable, faisant des efforts raisonnables de comprendre (…)

  1. a) la façon dont sont prises les décisions concernant la rémunération des membres de la haute direction visés et des administrateurs ;
  2. b) le lien précis entre la rémunération des membres de la haute direction visés et des administrateurs et la gestion et la gouvernance de la société (par. 10). »

L’Instruction générale relative au règlement 51-102 sur les obligations d’information continue définit, en son article 1.5, ce qu’il faut entendre par langage simple.  C’est en quatorze points ; je vous en fais grâce.  Je rappelle ici qu’une instruction générale est réputée constituer un règlement.

Trop, c’est comme pas assez. C’est aussi ce que  pourrait se dire la personne raisonnable après avoir fait des efforts raisonnables pour comprendre tout cela. Cette personne pour laquelle l’entreprise publie toutes les informations réclamées par le législateur/autorité réglementaire poussé par l’industrie de la gouvernance qui, elle, bénéficie de la complexification des règles.

L’émetteur est placé devant ces obligations auxquelles il veut bien se conformer, mais pas au point de livrer des éléments importants de ses stratégies de développement au premier lecteur venu. Ce qui pourrait même être contre l’intérêt des actionnaires, et finalement ne bénéficier qu’à la concurrence.  Ce qui fait que l’on en est rendu à se demander comment éviter de divulguer « les secrets de familles », si je puis dire, sans indisposer les autorités réglementaires — surtout si on doit aller au marché dans les mois qui suivent.

Malaise!

Si mon souvenir est bon, les pressions sont venues de groupes divers (investisseurs institutionnels, gestionnaires de fonds et autres) qui jugeaient les rémunérations des hauts dirigeants extravagantes et non méritées. Pour eux, les administrateurs étaient responsables de cet état de fait. Alors, on a légiféré, réglementé, permis le Say on Pay et diverses propositions d’actionnaires.  La rémunération a-t-elle baissé ? Non. Les parachutes ont-ils disparu?  Non.  Chacun se compare à l’autre et ne voit pas pourquoi il ne serait pas rémunéré comme son vis-à-vis de l’entreprise Z.  Et les PDG de se négocier un contrat blindé — pourquoi pas?  Ils sont assis sur un siège éjectable.

Ne pourrait-on pas se demander maintenant si partie ou toutes ces exigences ne produisent pas davantage d’effets pervers que de bénéfices ? (Dans le plan d’affaires 2013-2016 des ACVM. Les deux dernières priorités sont :  réglementation des marchés ; et efficacité des mesures d’application de la loi).

Ne pourrait-on pas aussi se demander si exiger une durée minimale de détention de l’actionnariat pour obtenir le droit de vote à une assemblée générale ne serait pas souhaitable ?

Si publier les résultats deux fois l’an, au lieu de quatre, ne donnerait pas un peu d’oxygène aux entreprises — un début de délivrance de la tyrannie du rendement à court terme ? Et, quant à y être, pourquoi continuer de publier l’information telle qu’exigée, si elle n’est pas lue ?

Et puis, à quoi servent les administrateurs si les actionnaires peuvent s’immiscer dans la gestion d’une entreprise et imposer leurs volontés en tout temps ?

Et à quel actionnaire permettre quoi ? Un Hedge Fund qui achète et vend des millions d’actions par minute ? Un fond mutuel qui garde des actions quelques années ?  Un retraité qui conserve ses actions depuis 20 ans ?

D’ici à ce que l’on ait réfléchi à tout cela, ne peut-on pas marquer le pas ?


  1. 1. Allaire, Yvan, Pourquoi cette vague de privatisation d’entreprises cotées en Bourse, La Presse, mars 2007.
  2. 2. Desautels, Denis, OC, FCA, Les défis les plus difficiles des administrateurs de sociétés, Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, Conférence annuelle, 11 mars 2009.
  3. 3. Carol Liao, A Canadian Model of Corporate Governance, Where do shareholders really stand? Director Journal, January/February 2014, p. 37
  4. 4. p. 55.

*Nicolle Forget siège au conseil d’administration du Groupe Jean Coutu (PJC) Inc., de Valener Inc. et de ses filiales et du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés. Elle a, entre autres, fait partie d’un comité d’éthique de la recherche et des nouvelles technologies et de comités d’éthique clinique, de même que du Groupe de travail sur l’éthique, la probité et l’intégrité des administrateurs publics et a présidé le Groupe de travail sur les difficultés d’accès au financement pour les femmes entrepreneuses.

Madame Forget a été chargée de cours à l’École des Hautes Études commerciales et elle est l’auteure de cas en gestion de même que de quelques ouvrages biographiques. Madame Forget a d’abord fait du journalisme à Joliette avant de se consacrer à la gestion d’organismes de recherche et de formation durant les années 1970. Elle a aussi été membre (juge administratif) de tribunaux administratif et quasi judiciaire durant les années 1980 et 1990.

Madame Forget est diplômée de l’UQÀM (brevet d’enseignement spécialisé en administration), des HEC (baccalauréat en sciences commerciales) et de l’Université de Montréal (licence en droit et DESS en bioéthique). Elle fût membre du Barreau du Québec jusqu’en 2011.

Madame Forget a siégé à de nombreux conseils d’administration dont : Fédération des femmes du Québec, Conseil économique du Canada, SEBJ, Hydro-Québec, Hydro-Québec International, Gaz Métro Inc., Agence québécoise de valorisation industrielle de la recherche, Fonds de solidarité des travailleurs du Québec, Université de Montréal, École polytechnique, Innotermodal. Elle a, de plus, présidé les conseils de Accesum Inc., Nouveler Inc., Accès 51, Ballet Eddy Toussaint, Festival d’été de Lanaudière et Association des consommateurs du Québec.

Amendements à la loi canadienne sur les sociétés par actions : De quoi s’agit-il ?


Le 28 septembre 2016, le gouvernement fédéral a proposé un certain nombre de modifications à la Loi canadienne sur les sociétés par actions (projet de loi C-25) afin de clarifier les obligations de divulgation des émetteurs canadiens. Les amendements à la loi ont deux objectifs :

(1) s’assurer que certaines règles adoptées par le Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) soient clarifiées et incorporées dans la loi canadienne sur les sociétés par actions ;

(2) faire en sorte que la loi amendée reflète davantage les bonnes pratiques de gouvernance généralement reconnue.

Dans leur compte rendu sur les implications de ce projet de loi, paru sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, Louis-Martin O’Neill et Jennifer Longhurst, associés de la firme Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP, discutent de trois changements susceptibles d’affecter la gouvernance et les modes de divulgation des sociétés.

Voici les changements proposés :

  1. True majority voting: requiring shareholders to cast their votes “for” or “against” each individual director’s election (rather than slate voting), and prohibiting a director who has not been elected by a majority of the votes cast from serving as a direcror, except in “prescribed circumstances”;
  2. Annual director elections: requiring corporations to hold annual elections for all directors of a company’s board, effectively prohibiting staggered boards; and
  3. Diversity disclosures: requiring corporations to place before shareholders, at each AGM, information respecting diversity among the directors and among the members of senior management.

Je vous encourage à prendre connaissance de ce bref article.

L’article suivant est également : Proposed Changes to the Canada Business Corporations Act – How Could this Affect You?

Bonne lecture !

Proposed Canada Business Corporations Act Amendments: A New Era?

 

amendement-a-la-loi-canadienne-sur-les-societes-par-actions
Amendement à la loi canadienne sur les sociétés par actions | Proposed Changes to the Canada Business Corporations Act – How Could this Affect You?

 

True majority voting requirement

In 2014, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) implemented rules requiring majority voting for most TSX-listed issuers. This entailed adopting a majority voting policy requiring any undersupported director (i.e., a nominee who does not receive a majority of “for” votes) in an uncontested director election to tender his or her resignation to the board; the board is then required to consider and, save for “exceptional circumstances,” accept that resignation and publicly announce its decision. Since then, there has been some lingering controversy surrounding the TSX’s majority voting standard as a result of many boards rejecting the resignations of undersupported directors in reliance on those so-called exceptional circumstances, despite the expressed will of the shareholders.

For example, our Davies Governance Insights 2015 report revealed that in 2015 only one of 10 directors who failed to achieve majority support from shareholders had their resignation accepted by the board. The report explained how some of the boards relied on the “exceptional circumstances” carve-out to allow undersupported directors to remain on the board. Our most recent Davies Governance Insights 2016 report, however, suggests that this trend may be changing: in 2016, in those cases where directors of issuers on the TSX/S&P Composite and SmallCap indices received less than majority approval, the boards accepted their resignations.

The Proposed Amendments would put an end to this debate. They provide that (1) the shareholders of a distributing corporation will be able to vote only “for” or “against” each individual director (as opposed to withholding their votes); and (2) each director is elected only if the number of “for” votes represents a majority of the total shareholder votes cast. Slate voting would no longer be permitted, except for certain “prescribed corporations” (to be outlined in revised regulations, not yet published, to the CBCA). Moreover, the Proposed Amendments also provide that a director who is not elected by a majority cannot be appointed by the remaining directors to fill a vacancy on the board, except in “prescribed circumstances.”

In doing so, the Proposed Amendments would reverse the current practice that has developed under the TSX rules: rather than having an undersupported nominee elected as a matter of law and leaving to the board the decision on whether to accept their resignation, the Proposed Amendments would mean that a nominee who fails to get a majority of “for” votes is not elected as a matter of law, and may be appointed by the directors only in “prescribed circumstances.”  Whether the Proposed Amendments will result in meaningful change to the current practice for TSX-listed companies will, however, depend on what those “prescribed circumstances” are, to be set out in the not yet released regulations to the CBCA.

Annual elections now required

The TSX rules currently require its listed companies to hold annual director elections, effectively prohibiting staggered boards, a fairly uncommon practice in Canada. The Proposed Amendments will bring the CBCA up to speed with this current corporate governance best practice. We note that an exception included in the Proposed Amendments allows for elections to be held in accordance with existing CBCA requirements, which allow for three-year terms and staggered boards, in the case of “any prescribed class of distributing corporations” or “any prescribed circumstances respecting distributing corporations.” There is currently no such exception in the TSX rules, save for foreign issuers. The impact of this change will, therefore, depend upon the prescribed categories of corporations and circumstances that will be proposed in the CBCA regulations, if this change is implemented.

Disclosure relating to diversity

TSX-listed and other non-venture issuers are currently required, under National Instrument 58-101—Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices (NI 58-101), to disclose certain information relating to the diversity of their board and executive officers, including whether they have adopted a written policy regarding female representation on the board, whether they consider the level of female representation when making board or executive officer nominations or appointments, and whether they have adopted a target regarding the representation of women on the board or in senior management; if not, the issuer must disclose why not. The Proposed Amendments to the CBCA would require “prescribed corporations” to provide the “prescribed information” respecting diversity among their directors and members of senior management.

Once again, the “prescribed corporations” and “prescribed information” that will need to be disclosed have not yet been determined. Accordingly, until proposed regulations clarifying these concepts have been released, it remains unclear whether the Proposed Amendments will alter the existing “comply or explain” model under NI 58-101 or impose stricter requirements on subject companies. We do not, however, expect the Proposed Amendments to impose targets or quotas on issuers; instead, they are likely to promote a similar approach to that currently in place under securities laws.

Conclusions

The majority voting requirement set forth in the Proposed Amendments is likely to bring an end to the debate over those circumstances in which an undersupported director may remain on the board. The questions, however, that are still unanswered will be whether boards will be inclined to use the Proposed Amendments to fill a vacancy by appointing an undersupported director whose failed election created the vacancy in the first place; and, in such a situation, how stringent the “prescribed circumstances” will be that would allow the directors to appoint an undersupported director. We also note there are some inconsistencies between the TSX rules and the Proposed Amendments that could subject some TSX-listed CBCA companies to potentially different (and potentially conflicting) sets of rules. We expect the regulators are attuned to and will be focused on minimizing that risk. In any case, if the Proposed Amendments are adopted, we expect TSX-listed issuers that are governed by the CBCA may need to revisit and revise their majority voting policies to ensure compliance with the Proposed Amendments.

While some view the Proposed Amendments as a welcome modernization of the federal corporate statute and a reflection of the need to enhance companies’ corporate governance practices, in many ways the Proposed Amendments are entrenching practices or policies that are already addressed under the TSX rules and securities laws. By delving into these areas, there remains a risk that the Proposed Amendments could lead to compliance and interpretational issues, as well as confusion over the appropriate mandates for each of the regulators, a concern expressed by some commentators in response to Industry Canada’s initial December 2013 consultation paper on the potential CBCA amendments. In addition, several undetermined exceptions and terms that will be laid out in revised CBCA regulations have yet to be published—only once they are will the full impact of the Proposed Amendments be known.

Prélude à un code de gouvernance aux É.U. !


Voici un bref article de Gary Larkin, associé à The Conference Board Governance Center, qui porte sur la perspective de concevoir un code de gouvernance qui  s’adresse à l’ensemble des entreprises publiques (cotées) américaines.

Le projet de code est l’initiative de quelques leaders d’entreprises cotées, de gestionnaires d’actif, d’un gestionnaire de fonds de pension et d’un actionnaire activiste.

Cet énoncé des grands principes de gouvernance se veut un exercice devant jeter les bases d’un code de gouvernance comme on en retrouve dans plusieurs pays, notamment au Royaume-Uni.

Voici les points saillants des principes retenus :

 

Every board should meet regularly without the CEO present, and every board should have active and direct engagement with executives below the CEO level.

Directors should be elected by a majority  of either “for” or “against/withhold” votes (with abstentions and non-votes not be counted)

Board refreshment should always be considered in order that the board’s skillset and perspectives remain current.

Every board should have members with complementary and diverse skills, backgrounds and experiences.

If the board decides on a combined CEO/Chair role, it is essential that the board have a strong independent director.

Institutional investors that make decisions on proxy issues important to long-term value creation should have access to the company, its management, and, in some circumstances, the board.

Companies should only provide earnings guidance to the extent they believe it is beneficial to shareholders.

Bonne lecture !

 

It’s Commonsense to Have a U.S. Corporate Governance Code

 

lp-corp-gov-charter_880x330

 

Over the summer, one of the most interesting pieces of corporate governance literature was the Commonsense Corporate Governance Principles.

The publication was the result of meetings between a group of leading executives of public companies, asset managers, a public pension fund, and a shareholder activist. The principles themselves may not have broken new ground—they addressed such basic issues as director independence, board refreshment and diversity, the need for earnings guidance, and shareholder engagement.  But the fact that such a publication was released at a time when some in Congress to roll back Dodd-Frank corporate-governance-related regulations is impressive.

It’s impressive because of who was in the meetings. It’s impressive because the meetings took place without any government or third-party instigation. It’s impressive because it might be the beginning of a new strategy for overseeing corporate governance in the United States. It shows that sometimes industry can lead by example without rules and regulations to tell them how to govern their own companies and boards.

Maybe these principles could be the start of the first true US corporate governance code, something that our brethren in the UK have had for years. Even smaller markets such as South Africa and Singapore have codes that are used to guide corporate governance.

Granted, those at the meetings, some of who included J. P. Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon, Berkshire Hathaway chief Warren Buffett, General Motors head Mary Barra, BlackRock Chair and CEO Larry Fink, and Canada Pension Plan Investment Board President and CEO Mark Machin might not have envisioned themselves as U.S. corporate governance pioneers. But it’s a first step toward a true principles-based approach to good corporate governance in a country that is used to following rules and hiring attorneys to find the loopholes.

If you look at the main points made in the Commonsense Principles, you can see the foundation for such a code:

  1. Every board should meet regularly without the CEO present, and every board should have active and direct engagement with executives below the CEO level.
  2. Directors should be elected by a majority  of either “for” or “against/withhold” votes (with abstentions and non-votes not be counted)
  3. Board refreshment should always be considered in order that the board’s skillset and perspectives remain current.
  4. Every board should have members with complementary and diverse skills, backgrounds and experiences.
  5. If the board decides on a combined CEO/Chair role, it is essential that the board have a strong independent director.
  6. Institutional investors that make decisions on proxy issues important to long-term value creation should have access to the company, its management, and, in some circumstances, the board.
  7. Companies should only provide earnings guidance to the extent they believe it is beneficial to shareholders.

Microsoft, a Governance Center member, is satisfied with the Commonsense Principles because it aligns with what it has in place, according to a blog from Microsoft Corporate Secretary John Seethoff. “For example, we’ve made a concerted effort to assure board refreshment occurs with a focus on diversity in skillsets, backgrounds, and experiences,” he wrote. “The Principles agree with this emphasis, asserting, ‘Diversity along multiple dimensions is critical to a high-functioning board. Director candidates should be drawn from a rigorously diverse pool.’ Board tenure receives similarly thoughtful consideration, with the Principles underscoring the need to temper ‘fresh thinking and new perspectives’ with ‘age and experience.’”

Seethoff concluded: “At Microsoft, we’ve long believed that good corporate governance encourages accountability and transparency, as well as promotes sound decision-making to support our business over time. The ultimate goal is to create a system that provides appropriate structure for the company at present, allows flexibility to change in the future, and has a long-term perspective that matches our business objectives and strategy. As part of this open, constructive mindset, we applaud the leaders for outlining these Principles and look forward to continued dialogue on this important effort.”

If you ask me, the Commonsense Principles can definitely be the US Corporate Governance Code Version 1.0. They could be treated like climate change agreements (i.e. the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement) where countries come together and sign on. The original group of executives could hold a follow-up meeting or convention that would allow US companies to promise to follow the principles, similar to The Giving Pledge started by Buffet and Microsoft founder Bill Gates.

L’évolution de la divulgation des comités d’audit aux actionnaires


Voici un article d’Ann Yerger, directrice du Center for Board Matters, de la firme Ernst & Young, qui porte sur l’évolution significative des politiques de divulgation des comités d’audit aux actionnaires des entreprises cotées en bourse aux États-Unis en 2106. L’article est paru sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance le 9 octobre.

L’étendue des divulgations aux actionnaires est vraiment très importante dans certains cas. Par exemple, en 2012, seulement 42 % des entreprises dévoilaient explicitement que le comité d’audit était responsable de l’engagement, de la rémunération et de la surveillance des auditeurs externes, alors qu’en 2016, 82 % divulguent, souvent en détail, les informations de cette nature.

Plusieurs autres résultats font état de changements remarquables dans la reddition de compte des comités d’audit aux actionnaires des entreprises.

Ceux-ci sont maintenant plus en mesure d’évaluer la portée des décisions des comités d’audit eu égard à la qualité du travail des auditeurs externes, aux raisons invoquées pour changer d’auditeur externe, à la fixation du mandat de l’auditeur externe, à la composition du comité d’audit, à l’augmentation des honoraires des firmes comptables dans les quatre catégories suivantes : audit, relié aux travaux d’audit, fiscalité et autres services connexes, etc.

Bonne lecture !

Audit Committee Reporting to Shareholders in 2016

 

audit

 

Audit committees have a key role in overseeing the integrity of financial reporting. Nevertheless, relatively little information is required to be disclosed by US public companies about the audit committee’s important work. Since our first publication in this series in 2012, we have described efforts by investors, regulators and other stakeholders to seek increased audit­-related disclosures, as well as the resulting voluntary disclosures to respond to this interest.

Over 2015–2016, US regulators have placed a spotlight on audit-related disclosures and financial reporting more generally. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) have both taken action to consider the possibility of requiring new disclosures relating to the audit.

SEC representatives also have used speeches to urge companies and audit committees to increase disclosures in this area voluntarily. While additional disclosure requirements for audit committees are not expected in the near term, regulators continue to monitor developments in this area. This post seeks to shed light on the evolving audit­-related disclosure landscape.

Context

Public company audit committees are responsible for overseeing financial reporting, including the external audit. Under US securities laws, audit committees are “directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, retention and oversight” of the external auditor, and must include a report in annual proxy statements about their work. This audit committee report, however, currently must affirm only that the committee carried out certain specific responsibilities related to communications with the external auditor, and this requirement has not changed since 1999.

In recent years, a variety of groups have brought attention to the relative lack of information available about the audit committee and the audit, including their view that this area of disclosure may not have kept up with the needs of investors and other proxy statement users. These groups include pension funds, asset managers, investors, corporate governance groups, and domestic and foreign regulators. As efforts to seek additional information have continued, there has been a steady increase in voluntary audit-related disclosures.

Over the last year, the SEC has taken a series of actions to consider whether and how to improve transparency around audit committees, audits and financial reporting more generally. The combined effect of these activities has been to increase engagement by issuers, audit firms, investors and other stakeholders in discussions about the current state of financial reporting­ related disclosure as well as how it should change.

Findings

Our analysis of the 2016 proxy statements of Fortune 100 companies indicates that voluntaryaudit-related disclosures continue to trend upward in a number of areas. The CBM data for this review is based on the 78 companies on the 2016 Fortune 100 list that filed proxy statements each year from 2012 to 2016 for annual meetings through August 15, 2016. Below are highlights from our research:

  1. The percentage of companies that disclosed factors considered by the audit committee when assessing the qualifications and work quality of the external auditor increased to 50%, up from 42% in 2015. In 2012, only 17% of audit committees disclosed this information.
  2. Another significant increase was in disclosures stating that the audit committee believed that the choice of external auditor was in the best interests of the company and/or the shareholders. In 2016, 73% of companies disclosed such information; in 2015, this percentage was 63%. In 2012, only 3% of companies made this disclosure.
  3. The audit committees of 82% of the companies explicitly stated that they are responsible for the appointment, compensation and oversight of the external auditor; in 2012, only 42% of audit committees provided such disclosures.
  4. 31% of companies provided information about the reasons for changes in fees paid to the external auditor compared to 21% the previous year. Reasons provided in these disclosures include one­-time events, such as a merger or acquisition. Under current SEC rules, companies are required to disclose fees paid to the external auditor, divided into the following categories: audit, audit-related, tax and all other fees. They are not, however, required to discuss the reasons why these fees have increased or decreased. From 2012 to 2016, the percentage of companies disclosing information to explain changes in audit fees rose from 9% to 31%. Additional CBM research examined the disclosures of the subset of studied companies (43) that had changes in audit fees of +/-­ 5% or more compared to the previous year. Out of these 43 companies, roughly 20% provided explanatory disclosures regarding the change in audit fees.
  5. 29 of the 43 companies had fee increases of 5% or more, out of which 8 companies disclosed the reasons for the increases. 14 of the 43 companies had fee decreases of 5% or more, out of which only one company provided an explanatory disclosure.
  6. 53% of companies disclosed that the audit committee considered the impact of changing auditors when assessing whether to retain the current auditor. This was a 6 percentage point increase over 2015. In 2012, this disclosure was made by 3% of the Fortune 100 companies. Over the past five years, the number of companies disclosing that the audit committee was involved in the selection of the lead audit partner has grown dramatically, up to 73% in 2016. In 2015, 67% of companies disclosed this information, while in 2012, only 1% of companies did so.
  7. 51% of companies disclosed that they have three or more financial experts on their audit committees, up from 47% in 2015 and 36% in 2012.

Summary: Trends in Audit Committee Disclosure

(Cliquez pour agrandir)

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Résultats eu égard aux propositions des actionnaires lors des assemblées annuelles de 2016


Voici les principaux résultats eu égard aux propositions des actionnaires lors des assemblées annuelles de 2016. Ce sont des données relatives aux grandes sociétés publiques américaines.

Je crois qu’il est intéressant d’avoir le pouls de l’évolution des propositions des actionnaires, car cela révèle l’état de la gouvernance dans les grandes corporations ainsi que le niveau d’activités des activistes.

Cet article, publié par Elizabeth Ising, associée et co-présidente de la « Securities Regulation and Corporate Governance practice group » de la firme Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, est paru sur le forum de HLS hier.

L’auteure présente les résultats de manière très illustrée, sans porter de jugement.

Personnellement, je constate un certain essoufflement des propositions des actionnaires en 2016. Dans plusieurs cas cependant les entreprises ont remédié aux lacunes de gouvernance.

Vos commentaires sont recherchés et appréciés.

Bonne lecture !

 

Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2016 Proxy Season

 

This post provides an overview of shareholder proposals submitted to public companies for 2016 shareholder meetings, including statistics, notable decisions from the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission on no-action requests, and information about litigation regarding shareholder proposals. All shareholder proposal data in this post is as of June 1, 2016 unless otherwise indicated.

Submitted Shareholder Proposals

Overview

Fewer Proposals Submitted: According to ISS data, shareholders have submitted fewer shareholder proposals for 2016 meetings than they did for 2015 meetings.

However, the number of proposals submitted for 2016 meetings is still higher than the approximate number of proposals submitted for 2014 and 2013 meetings.

Support Declined: Average support for shareholder proposals is at its lowest in four years. [1]

Only 14.5% of proposals (61 proposals) voted on at 2016 meetings received support from a majority of votes cast, compared to 16.7% of proposals (75 proposals) at 2015 meetings.

Focus Remains on Governance

Across five broad categories of shareholder proposals, the approximate number of proposals submitted for 2016 meetings (as compared to 2015 meetings) was as follows:

 

Shareholder-Proposal-Developments-2016-Proxy-Seaso_2016-07-06_11-26-46

For the second year in a row, governance & shareholder rights proposals were the most frequently submitted proposals, largely due to the yet again unprecedented number of proxy access shareholder proposals submitted (201 proposals (or 21.9% of all proposals) submitted for 2016 meetings versus 108 proposals submitted for 2015 meetings).

Proxy Access Proposals Continue to Dominate

The most common 2016 shareholder proposal topics, along with the approximate numbers of proposals submitted and as compared to the most common 2015 shareholder proposal topics, were [2] [3]:

Shareholder-Proposal-Developments-2016-Proxy-Seaso_2016-07-06_11-26-57

Most Active Proponents

Chevedden & Co.: As is typically the case, John Chevedden and shareholders associated with him (including James McRitchie) submitted by far the greatest number of shareholder proposals—approximately 227 for 2016 meetings.

Most of these proposals (66.6%) have either been voted on or are pending. Twenty-three percent have been omitted after obtaining relief through the SEC no-action process; another 7% have ultimately not been included in proxy statements or have not been properly presented at the meeting; and only 3.1% of these proposals have been withdrawn.

By way of comparison, shareholder proponents withdrew approximately 19.2% of the proposals submitted for 2016 meetings, up from approximately 17% of the proposals withdrawn for 2015 meetings.

NYC Pension Funds: This season once again saw a large number of proposals submitted by the New York City Comptroller on behalf of five New York City pension funds, which submitted or cofiled at least 79 proposals (as compared to 86 proposals submitted for 2015 meetings), including approximately 72 proxy access proposals, [4] as part of the Comptroller’s continuation of its “Boardroom Accountability Project” for 2016.

Only 34.6% of these proposals have either been voted on or are pending; most (55.6%) of these proposals have been withdrawn. The remainder (9.8%) have been omitted or not otherwise included in proxy statements.

Other Proponents

Some of the Same Players (But Not Everyone Returned in 2016): As was true for 2015 meetings, with the exception of Calvert Asset Management and UNITE HERE!, several of the same proponents that were reported to have submitted or co-filed at least 20 proposals each for 2015 meetings, did so again for 2016 meetings:

Shareholder-Proposal-Developments-2016-Proxy-Seaso_2016-07-06_11-27-09

Same Subject Areas: As reflected in the chart above, the focus of these proponents remained largely consistent with their focus for 2015 meetings.

Public Pension Funds: In addition to the New York City and New York State pension funds, several other state pension funds submitted shareholder proposals as well:

California State Teachers’ Retirement System (18 proposals, largely focused on governance matters and climate change);

Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds (14 proposals, largely focused on governance, social, and political matters);

City of Philadelphia Public Employees Retirement System (10 proposals, largely focused on political and lobbying matters);

North Carolina Retirement Systems (two board diversity proposals);

California Public Employees’ Retirement System (one proxy access proposal); and

Firefighters’ Pension System of Kansas City, Missouri (one majority voting in director elections proposal).

Shareholder Proposal Voting Results

Majority Voting in Director Elections Receives the Highest Support

The following are the principal topics addressed in proposals that received high shareholder support at a number of companies’ 2016 meetings:

Majority Voting in Uncontested Director Elections: Ten proposals voted on averaged 74.2% of votes cast, compared to 76.6% in 2015;

Amendment of Bylaws or Articles to Remove Antitakeover Provisions: Two proposals voted on averaged 70.6% of votes cast, compared to 79% in 2015;

Board Declassification: Three proposals voted on averaged 64.5% of votes cast, compared to 72.6% in 2015;

Elimination of Supermajority Vote Requirements: Thirteen proposals voted on averaged 59.6% of votes cast, compared to 53.0% in 2015;

Proxy Access: Fifty-eight proposals voted on averaged 48.7% of votes cast, compared to 54.6% in 2015;

Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings: Sixteen proposals voted on averaged 39.6% of votes cast, compared to 44.4% in 2015; and

Written Consent: Thirteen proposals voted on averaged 43.4% of votes cast, compared to 39.4% in 2015.

Majority Votes on Shareholder Proposals

The table below shows the principal topics addressed in proposals that received a majority of votes cast at a number of companies:

Shareholder-Proposal-Developments-2016-Proxy-Seaso_2016-07-06_11-27-20

* * *

The complete publication is available here.

Endnotes:

[1] As of June 1, 2016, voting results were available through the ISS databases for a total of 422 proposals. As a matter of practice, the vast majority of shareholder proposals submitted to companies for shareholder meetings are submitted under Rule 14a-8 rather than pursuant to companies’ advance notice bylaws. However, because the ISS data does not indicate whether a shareholder proposal has been submitted under Rule 14a-8 or under a company’s advance notice bylaws, it is possible that the ISS data includes voting results for shareholder proposals not submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8. This discrepancy is likely to account for only a very small number of proposals.
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[2] Includes all corporate civic engagement proposals, except proposals relating to charitable contributions (one submitted as of June 1, 2016 for 2016 meetings).
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[3] Includes proposals relating to (i) reports on climate change; (ii) greenhouse gas emissions; and (iii) climate change action (i.e., proposals requesting increasing return of capital to shareholders in light of climate change risks). Note that climate change is a subtopic of the environmental and social category of proposals.
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[4] NYC Comptroller, Boardroom Accountability Project, available at http://comptroller.nyc.gov/boardroom-accountability/ (last visited June 1, 2016).
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Le modèle de la maximisation de la valeur aux actionnaires est toujours dominant !


Les théories contemporaines de la gouvernance sont basées sur le modèle de la « maximisation de la valeur aux actionnaires ».

Dans un article paru sur le forum du Harvard Law School on Corporate Governance, l’auteur Marc Moore* explique que, malgré l’émergence d’autres paradigmes des rouages de la gouvernance moderne (Post — Shareholders-Values | PSV), c’est encore le modèle de la maximisation de la valeur aux actionnaires qui domine.

C’est ainsi que le nouveau modèle de réallocation des profits des PSV, qui favoriserait le développement interne de l’entreprise et les investissements à long terme, cède le pas, la plupart du temps, à la redistribution des surplus aux actionnaires, notamment par la voie des dividendes ou par le rachat des actions.

Voici comment l’auteur conclut son article. Quel est votre point de vue ?

The somewhat uncomfortable truth for many observers is that, for better or worse, the American system of shareholder capitalism, and its pivotal corporate governance principle of shareholder primacy, are ultimately products of our own collective (albeit unintentional) civic design. Accordingly, while in many respects the orthodox shareholder-oriented corporate governance framework may be a social evil; it is nonetheless a necessary evil, which US worker-savers implicitly tolerate as the effective social price for sustaining a system of non-occupational income provision outside of direct state control. Until corporate governance scholars and policymakers are capable of coordinating their respective energies towards somehow alleviating US worker-savers’ significant dependence on corporate equity as a source of non-occupational wealth gains, the shareholder-oriented corporation is likely to remain a socially indispensable phenomenon. To those who rue this prospect, it might be retorted “better the devil you know than the devil you don’t.”

Bonne lecture !

The Indispensability of the Shareholder Value Corporation

 

Despite their differences of opinion on other issues, most corporate law and governance scholars have tended to agree upon one thing at least: that the overarching normative objective of corporate governance—and, by implication, corporate law—should be the maximization (or, at least, long-term enhancement) of shareholder wealth. Indeed this proposition—variously referred to as the “shareholder wealth maximization”, “shareholder value”, or “shareholder primacy” norm—is so ingrained within mainstream corporate governance thinking that it has traditionally been subjected to little serious policy or even academic question. However, the zeitgeist would appear to be slowly but surely changing. The financial crisis may not quite have proved the watershed moment it was initially heralded as in terms of resetting dominant currents of economic or political opinion. Nonetheless, in the narrower but still important domain of corporate governance thinking and policymaking, the past decade’s events have triggered the onset of what promises to be a potentially major paradigm shift in the direction of an evolving “Post-Shareholder-Value” (or “PSV”) consensus.

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On an academic level, this movement is represented by a growing body of influential legal and economic scholarship which contests most of the staple ideological tenets of orthodox corporate governance theory. Amongst the most noteworthy contributions to this literature are Professor Lynn Stout’s influential 2012 book The Shareholder Value Myth (Berret-Koehler), and also Professor Colin Mayer’s excellent 2013 work Firm Commitment: Why the corporation is failing us and how to restore trust in it (Oxford University Press). In particular, proponents of the PSV paradigm typically dismiss the common neo-classical equation of shareholder wealth maximization with economic efficiency in the broader social sense. They also typically eschew individualistic understandings of the firm in terms of its purported internal bargaining dynamics, in favour of alternative conceptual models which celebrate the distinctive value of the corporation’s inherently autonomous corporeal features.

Evidence of a potential drift from the formerly dominant shareholder primacy paradigm in corporate governance is additionally apparent on a practical policy-making level today, not least in the rapid proliferation of Benefit Corporations as a viable and popular alternative legal form to the orthodox for-profit corporation. At the same time, the increasing use by US-listed firms of dual-class voting structures designed to insulate management from outside capital market pressures, coupled with the seemingly greater flexibility afforded to boards over recent years in defending against unwanted takeover bids from so-called corporate “raiders,” both provide additional cause to question the longevity of the shareholder-oriented corporate governance status quo.

But while evolving PSV institutional mechanisms such as Benefit Corporations and dual-class share structures are prima facie encouraging from a social perspective, there is cause for scepticism about their capacity to become anything more than a relatively niche or peripheral feature of the US public corporations landscape. This is principally because such measures, in spite of their apparent reformist potential, are still ultimately quasi-contractual and thus essentially voluntary in nature, meaning that they are unlikely to be adopted in a public corporations context except in extraordinary instances. From a normative point of view, moreover, it is arguable that such measures—irrespective of the extent of their take-up over the coming years—ultimately should remain quasi-contractual and voluntary in nature, as opposed to being placed on any sort of mandatory basis.

In this regard, it should be respected that public corporations are not only the predominant organizational vehicle for conducting large-scale industrial production projects over indefinite time horizons, as academic proponents of the PSV position have vigorously emphasized. Of comparable importance and ingenuity is that fact that—in the United States at least—public corporations are also a necessary structural means of enabling the residual income streams accruing from successful industrial projects to fund the provision of socially essential financial services, via the medium of public capital (and especially equity) markets. Unfortunately, though, these two dimensions of the public corporation are not always mutually compatible. Rather, it would seem that more often than not they are prone to antagonize, rather than complement, one another. This is especially so when it comes to the periodically-vexing managerial question of whether a firm’s residual earnings should be committed internally to the sustenance and development of the productive corporate enterprise itself, or else distributed externally to shareholders in the form of either enhanced dividends or stock buybacks. The problem is that the evolving PSV corporate governance paradigm—as manifested on both an intellectual and policy level today—focuses exclusively on the former of those dimensions at the expense of the latter.

The somewhat uncomfortable truth for many observers is that, for better or worse, the American system of shareholder capitalism, and its pivotal corporate governance principle of shareholder primacy, are ultimately products of our own collective (albeit unintentional) civic design. Accordingly, while in many respects the orthodox shareholder-oriented corporate governance framework may be a social evil; it is nonetheless a necessary evil, which US worker-savers implicitly tolerate as the effective social price for sustaining a system of non-occupational income provision outside of direct state control. Until corporate governance scholars and policymakers are capable of coordinating their respective energies towards somehow alleviating US worker-savers’ significant dependence on corporate equity as a source of non-occupational wealth gains, the shareholder-oriented corporation is likely to remain a socially indispensable phenomenon. To those who rue this prospect, it might be retorted “better the devil you know than the devil you don’t.”

The complete paper is available for download here.


Marc Moore* is Reader in Corporate Law and Director of the Centre for Corporate and Commercial Law (3CL) at the University of Cambridge. This post is based on a recent paper by Dr. Moore. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power by Lucian Bebchuk.

Le scandale de Volkswagen vu sous l’angle de la gouvernance corporative | Raymonde Crête


Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un article paru dans la revue European Journal of Risk Regulation (EJRR) qui scrute le scandale de Volkswagen sous l’angle juridique, mais, surtout, sous l’angle des manquements à la saine gouvernance.

Me Raymonde Crête, auteure de l’article, est professeure à la Faculté de Droit de l’Université Laval et elle dirige le Groupe de recherche en droit des services financiers (GRDSF).

Le texte se présente comme un cas en gouvernance et en management. Celui-ci devrait alimenter les réflexions sur l’éthique, les valeurs culturelles et les effets des pressions excessives à la performance.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, l’intégralité de l’article avec le consentement de l’auteure. Je n’ai pas inclus les références, qui sont très abondantes et qui peuvent être consultées sur le site de la maison d’édition lexxion.

Bonne lecture !

The Volkswagen Scandal from the Viewpoint of Corporate Governance

par Me Raymonde Crête

I. Introduction

Like some other crises and scandals that periodically occur in the business community, the Volkswagen (“VW”) scandal once again highlights the devastating consequences of corporate misconduct, once publicly disclosed, and the media storm that generally follows the discovery of such significant misbehaviour by a major corporation. Since the crisis broke in September 2015, the media have relayed endless détails about the substantial negative impacts on VW on various stakeholder groups such as employees, directors, investors, suppliers and consumers, and on the automobile industry as a whole (1)

The multiple and negative repercussions at the economic, organizational and legal levels have quickly become apparent, in particular in the form of resignations, changes in VW’s senior management, layoffs, a hiring freeze, the end to the marketing of diesel-engined vehicles, vehicle recalls, a decline in car sales, a drop in market capitalization, and the launching of internal investigations by VW and external investigations by the public authorities. This comes in addition to the threat of numerous civil, administrative, penal and criminal lawsuits and the substantial penalties they entail, as well as the erosion of trust in VW and the automobile industry generally (2).

FILE PHOTO: Martin Winterkorn, chief executive officer of Volkswagen AG, reacts during an earnings news conference at the company's headquarters in Wolfsburg, Germany, on Monday, March 12, 2012. Volkswagen said 11 million vehicles were equipped with diesel engines at the center of a widening scandal over faked pollution controls that will cost the company at least 6.5 billion euros ($7.3 billion). Photographer: Michele Tantussi/Bloomberg *** Local Caption *** Martin Winterkorn
FILE PHOTO: Martin Winterkorn, chief executive officer of Volkswagen AG, reacts during an earnings news conference at the company’s headquarters in Wolfsburg, Germany, on Monday, March 12, 2012. Volkswagen said 11 million vehicles were equipped with diesel engines at the center of a widening scandal over faked pollution controls that will cost the company at least 6.5 billion euros ($7.3 billion). Photographer: Michele Tantussi/Bloomberg *** Local Caption *** Martin Winterkorn

A scandal of this extent cannot fail to raise a number of questions, in particular concerning the cause of the alleged cheating, liable actors, the potential organizational and regulatory problems related to compliance, and ways to prevent further misconduct at VW and within the automobile industry. Based on the information surrounding the VW scandal, it is premature to capture all facets of the case. In order to analyze inmore depth the various problems raised, we will have to wait for the findings of the investigations conducted both internally by the VW Group and externally by the regulatory authorities.

While recognizing the incompleteness of the information made available to date by VW and certain commentators, we can still use this documentation to highlight a few features of the case that deserve to be studied from the standpoint of corporate governance.

This Article remains relatively modest in scope, and is designed to highlight certain organizational factors that may explain the deviant behaviour observed at VW. More specifically, it submits that the main cause of VW’s alleged wrongdoing lies in the company’s ambitious production targets for the U.S. market and the time and budget constraints imposed on employees to reach those targets. Arguably, the corporate strategy and pressures exerted on VW’s employees may have led them to give preference to the performance priorities set by the company rather than compliance with the applicable legal and ethical standards. And this corporate misconduct could not be detected because of deficiencies in the monitoring and control mechanisms, and especially in the compliance system established by the company to ensure that legal requirements were respected.

Although limited in scope, this inquiry may prove useful in identifying means to minimize, in the future, the risk of similar misconduct, not only at VW but wihin other companies as well (3). Given the limited objectives of the Article, which focuses on certain specific organizational deficiencies at VW, the legal questions raised by the case will not be addressed. However, the Article will refer to one aspect of the law of business corporations in the United States, Canada and in the EU Member States in order to emphasize the crucial role that boards in publicly-held companies must exercise to minimize the risk of misconduct (4).

II. A Preliminary Admission by VW: Individual Misconduct by a few Software Engineers

When a scandal erupts in the business community following a case of fraud, embezzlement, corruption, the marketing of dangerous products or other deviant behaviour, the company concerned and the regulatory authorities are required to quickly identify the individuals responsible for the alleged misbehaviour. For example, in the Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and Adelphia scandals of the early 2000s, the investigations revealed that certain company senior managers had acted fraudulently by orchestrating accounting manipulations to camouflage their business’s dire financial situation (5).

These revelations led to the prosecution and conviction of the officers responsible for the corporations’ misconduct (6). In the United States, the importanace of identifying individual wrongdoers is clearly stated in the Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations issued by the U.S. Department of Justice which provide guidelines for prosecutions of corporate misbehaviour (7). On the basis of a memo issued in 2015 by the Department of Justice (the “Yatesmemo”) (8), these principles were recently revised to express a renewed commitment to investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing.While recognizing the importance of individual prosecutions in that context, the strategy is only one of the ways to respond to white-collar crime. From a prevention standpoint, it is essential to conduct a broader examination of the organizational environment in which senior managers and employees work to determine if the enterprise’s culture, values, policies, monitoring mechanisms and practices contribute or have contributed to the adoption of deviant behaviour (9).

In the Volkswagen case, the company’s management concentrated first on identifying the handful of individuals it considered to be responsible for the deception, before admitting few weeks later that organizational problems had also encouraged or facilitated the unlawful corporate behaviour. Once news broke of the Volkswagen scandal, one of VW’s officers quickly linked the wrongdoing to the actions of a few employees, but without uncovering any governance problems or misbehaviour at the VW management level (10).

In October 2015, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the VW Group in the United States, Michael Horn, stated in testimony before a Congressional Subcommittee: “[t]his was a couple of software engineers who put this for whatever reason » […]. To my understanding, this was not a corporate decision. This was something individuals did » (11). In other words, the US CEO considered that sole responsibility for the scandal lay with a handful of engineers working at the company, while rejecting any allegation tending to incriminate the company’s management.

This portion of his testimony failed to convince the members of the Subcommittee, who expressed serious doubts about placing sole blame on the misbehaviour of a few engineers, given that the problem had existed since 2009. As expressed in a sceptical response from one of the committee’s members: « I cannot accept VW’s portrayal of this as something by a couple of rogue software engineers […] Suspending three folks – it goes way, way higher than that » (12).

Although misconduct similar to the behaviour uncovered at Volkswagen can often be explained by the reprehensible actions of a few individuals described as « bad apples », the violation of rules can also be explained by the existence of organizational problems within a company (13).

III. Recognition of Organizational Failures by VW

In terms of corporate governance, an analysis of misbehaviour can highlight problems connected with the culture, values, policies and strategies promoted by a company’s management that have a negative influence on the behaviour of senior managers and employees. Considering the importance of the organizational environment in which these players act, regulators provide for several internal and external governance mechanisms to reduce the risk of corporate misbehaviour or to minimize agency problems (14). As one example of an internal governance mechanism, the law of business corporations in the U.S., Canada and the EU Member States gives the board of directors (in a one-tier board structure, as prescribed Under American and Canadian corporation law) and the management board and supervisory board (in a two tier board structure, as provided for in some EU Member States, such as Germany) a key role to play in monitoring the company’s activities and internal dealings (15). As part of their monitoring mission, the board must ensure that the company and its agents act in a diligent and honest way and in compliance with the regulations, in particular by establishing mechanisms or policies in connection with risk management, internal controls, information disclosure, due diligence investigation and compliance (16).

When analysing the Volkswagen scandal from the viewpoint of its corporate governance, the question to be asked is whether the culture, values, priorities, strategies and monitoring and control mechanisms established by the company’s management board and supervisory board – in other words « the tone at the top »-, created an environment that contributed to the emergence of misbehaviour (17).

In this saga, although the initial testimony given to the Congressional Subcommittee by the company’s U.S. CEO, Michael Horn, assigned sole responsibility to a small circle of individuals, « VW’s senior management later recognized that the misconduct could not be explained simply by the deviant behaviour of a few people, since the evidence also pointed to organizational problems supporting the violation of regulations (18). In December 2015, VW’s management released the following observations, drawn from the preliminary results of its internal investigation:

« Group Audit’s examination of the relevant processes indicates that the software-influenced NOx emissions behavior was due to the interaction of three factors:

– The misconduct and shortcomings of individual employees

– Weaknesses in some processes

– A mindset in some areas of the Company that tolerated breaches of rules » (19).

Concerning the question of process,VW released the following audit key findings:

« Procedural problems in the relevant subdivisions have encouraged misconduct;

Faults in reporting and monitoring systems as well as failure to comply with existing regulations;

IT infrastructure partially insufficient and antiquated. » (20)

More fundamentally, VW’s management pointed out at the same time that the information obtained up to that point on “the origin and development of the nitrogen issue […] proves not to have been a one-time error, but rather a chain of errors that were allowed to happen (21). The starting point was a strategic decision to launch a large-scale promotion of diesel vehicles in the United States in 2005. Initially, it proved impossible to have the EA 189 engine meet by legal means the stricter nitrogen oxide requirements in the United States within the required timeframe and budget » (22).

In other words, this revelation by VW’s management suggests that « the end justified the means » in the sense that the ambitious production targets for the U.S. market and the time and budget constraints imposed on employees encouraged those employees to use illegal methods in operational terms to achieve the company’s objective. And this misconduct could not be detected because of deficiencies in the monitoring and control mechanisms, and especially in the compliance system established by the company to ensure that legal requirements were respected. Among the reasons given to explain the crisis, some observers also pointed to the excessive centralization of decision-making powers within VW’s senior management, and an organizational culture that acted as a brake on internal communications and discouraged mid-level managers from passing on bad news (23).

IV. Organizational Changes Considered as a Preliminary Step

In response to the crisis, VW’s management, in a press release in December 2015, set out the main organizational changes planned to minimize the risk of similar misconduct in the future. The changes mainly involved « instituting a comprehensive new alignment that affects the structure of the Group, as well as is way of thinking and its strategic goals (24).

In structural terms, VW changed the composition of the Group’s Board of Management to include the person responsible for the Integrity and Legal Affairs Department as a board member (25). In the future, the company wanted to give « more importance to digitalization, which will report directly to the Chairman of the Board of Management, » and intended to give « more independence to brand and divisions through a more decentralized management (26). With a view to initiating a new mindset, VW’s management stated that it wanted to avoid « yes-men » and to encourage managers and engineers « who are curious, independent, and pioneering » (27). However, the December 2015 press release reveals little about VW’s strategic objectives: « Strategy 2025, with which Volkswagen will address the main issues for the future, is scheduled to be presented in mid 2016 » (28).

Although VW’s management has not yet provided any details on the specific objectives targeted in its « Strategy 2025 », it is revealing to read the VW annual reports from before 2015 in which the company sets out clear and ambitious objectives for productivity and profitability. For example, the annual reports for 2007, 2009 and 2014 contained the following financial objectives, which the company hoped to reach by 2018.

In its 2007 annual report,VW specified, under the heading « Driving ideas »:

“Financial targets are equally ambitious: for example, the Volkswagen Passenger Cars brand aims to increase its unit sales by over 80 percent to 6.6 million vehicles by 2018, thereby reaching a global market share of approximately 9 percent. To make it one of the most profitable automobile companies as well, it is aiming for an ROI of 21 percent and a return on sales before tax of 9 percent.” (29).

Under the same heading, VW stated in its 2009 annual report:

“In 2018, the Volkswagen Group aims to be the most successful and fascinating automaker in the world. […] Over the long term, Volkswagen aims to increase unit sales to more than 10 million vehicles a year: it intends to capture an above-average share as the major growth markets develop (30).

And in its 2014 annual report, under the heading « Goals and Strategies », VW said:

“The goal is to generate unit sales of more than 10 million vehicles a year; in particular, Volkswagen intends to capture an above-average share of growth in the major growth markets.”

Volkswagen’s aim is a long-term return on sales before tax of at least 8% so as to ensure that the Group’s solid financial position and ability to act are guaranteed even in difficult market periods (31).

Besides these specific objectives for financial performance, the annual reports show that the company’s management recognized, at least on paper, the importance of ensuring regulatory compliance and promoting corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability (31). However, after the scandal broke in September 2015, questions can be asked about the effectiveness of the governance mechanisms, especially of the reporting and monitoring systems put in place by VW to achieve company goals in this area (33). In light of the preliminary results of VW’s internal investigation (34), as mentionned above, it seems that, in the organizational culture, the commitment to promote compliance, CSR and sustainability was not as strong as the effort made to achieve the company’s financial performance objectives.

Concerning the specific and challenging priorities of productivity and profitability established by VW’s management in previous years, the question is whether the promotion of financial objectives such as these created a risk because of the pressure it placed on employees within the organizational environment. The priorities can, of course, exert a positive influence and motivate employees to make an even greater effort to achieve the objectives (35). On the other hand, the same priority can exert a negative influence by potentially encouraging employees to use all means necessary to achieve the performance objectives set, in order to protect their job or obtain a promotion, even if the means they use for that purpose contravene the regulations. In other words, the employees face a « double bind » or dilemma which, depending on the circumstances, can lead them to give preference to the performance priorities set by the company rather than compliance with the applicable legal and ethical standards.

In the management literature, a large number of theoretical and empirical studies emphasize the beneficial effects of the setting of specific and challenging goals on employee motivation and performance within a company (36). However, while recognizing these beneficial effects, some authors point out the unwanted or negative side effects they may have.

As highlighted by Ordóñez, Schweitzer, Galinsky and Bazerman, specific goal setting can result in employees focusing solely on those goals while neglecting other important, but unstated, objectives (37). They also mention that employees motivated by « specific, challenging goals adopt riskier strategies and choose riskier gambles than do those with less challenging or vague goals (38). As an additional unwanted side effet, goal setting can encourage unlawful or unethical behaviour, either by inciting employees to use dishonest methods to meet the performance objectives targeted, or to “misrepresent their performance level – in other words, to report that they met a goal when in fact they fell short (39). Based on these observations, the authors suggest that companies should set their objectives with the greatest care and propose various ways to guard against the unwanted side effects highlighted in their study. This approach could prove useful for VW’s management which will once again, at some point, have to define its objectives and stratégies.

V. Conclusion

In the information released to the public after the emissions cheating scandal broke, as mentioned above, VW’s management quickly stated that the misconduct was directly caused by the individual misbehaviour of a couple of software engineers. Later, however, it admitted that the individual misconduct of a few employees was not the only cause, and that there were also organizational deficiencies within the company itself.

Although the VW Group’s public communications have so far provided few details about the cause of the crisis, the admission by management that both individual and organizational failings were involved constitutes, in our opinion, a lever for understanding the various factors that may have led to reprehensible conduct within the company. Based on the investigations that will be completed over the coming months, VW’s management will be in a position to identify more precisely the nature of these organizational failings and to propose ways to minimize the risk of future violations. During 2016, VW’s management will also announce the objectives and stratégies it intends to pursue over the next few years.

Les entreprises sont-elles sujettes à trop de règles de conformité ?


Voici un article de Sean J. Griffith, professeur de droit à la Fordham Law School, paru sur le forum du Harvard Law School qui montre toute l’importance que revêt aujourd’hui la gouvernance de « conformité ».

Bien entendu, le rôle des autorités réglementaires, ainsi que les nombreuses législations affectant la gouvernance des entreprises, sont des facteurs contribuant à l’accroissement du fardeau de la conformité.

On peut difficilement imaginer que les pressions à la conformité iront en diminuant. Les entreprises s’adaptent donc aux nouvelles exigences en créant de nouveaux départements dirigés par des chefs de la conformité (Chief Compliance Officer). L’article analyse les effets positifs et négatifs de ce virage.

En ce qui me concerne, je pense que l’on doit faire de grands efforts pour simplifier la gestion de conformité, car il me semble que celle-ci prend une place beaucoup trop importante.

Bonne lecture !

Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance

 

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Much of what scholars and practitioners think of as core corporate governance—the oversight and control of internal corporate affairs— is now being subsumed by “compliance.” Although compliance with law and regulation is not a new idea, the establishment of an autonomous department within firms to detect and deter violations of law and policy is. American corporations are at the dawn of a new era: the era of compliance.

Over the past decade, compliance has blossomed into a thriving industry, and the compliance department has emerged, in many firms, as the co-equal of the legal department. Compliance is commonly headed by a Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) with a staff, in large firms, of hundreds or thousands. Moreover, although the CCO reports to the board, compliance is not wholly subordinate to the board. Boards cannot neglect the compliance function or choose not to install and maintain the function on par with industry peers. Furthermore, once compliance officers generate information through monitoring and surveillance, it is beyond a reasonable board’s authority to stop them. Compliance is thus under the board, but its authority comes from somewhere else.

Unlike other governance structures, the origins of compliance are exogenous to the firm. The impetus for compliance does not come from a traditional corporate constituency. It does not come from shareholders, managers, employees, creditors, or customers. It comes from the government. Compliance is a de facto government mandate imposed upon firms by means of ex ante incentives, ex post enforcement tactics, and formal signaling efforts. Moreover, in imposing compliance on firms, the government is not simply making rules that firms must follow, as it does when it passes new laws and regulations, nor is it adjusting its traditional tools—the amount of enforcement and the size of sanctions—to assure compliance with existing law and regulation. Instead, through compliance, the government dictates how firms must comply, imposing specific governance structures expressly designed to change how the firm conducts its business.

At the level of theory, the contemporary compliance function subverts the notion that corporate governance arrangements both are and ought to be the product of a bargain between shareholders and managers. Compliance rewrites Ronald Coase’s famous passage on the internal organization of firms. Compliance officers come into an organization not necessarily (or not entirely) at the behest of an “entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production,” but rather pursuant to the directive of a government enforcer. Seen through the prism of compliance, the corporation no longer resembles a nexus of contracts but rather a real entity, subject to punishment and rehabilitation at the pleasure of a sovereign. Compliance thus rejects mainstream accounts of the firm in favor of a much older theoretical account.

Moreover, because government interventions in compliance come not through the traditional levers of state corporate or federal securities law, but rather through prosecutions and regulatory enforcement actions, a different set of interests and incentives are at play. Compliance questions arise over what purpose or purposes the firm should serve and revives the “other constituencies” debate. Compliance also raises the question whether the authorities pressing for corporate reforms have the right incentives and the right information to do so. If they do not, the development of compliance may merely result in the imposition of inefficient governance structures on firms.

My article, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, recently published in the William & Mary Law Review, aims to provide a comprehensive account of the compliance function and the various ways in which it challenges corporate law orthodoxy. It launches compliance as a field of inquiry for scholars of corporate law and corporate governance by pairing a thorough descriptive account of the contemporary compliance function with a normative account of the ways in which compliance challenges settled theories of the firm and upsets the political economy of corporate governance.

Compliance begs foundational questions of what the firm is and who the author of corporate governance arrangements ought to be. There is a way out of these uncomfortable questions—by limiting the government’s ability to impose compliance reforms through enforcement or by mandating disclosure of firms’ compliance arrangements—but we may not want to set these issues aside so quickly. The fundamental goal of the Article is thus to start the scholarly conversation on compliance and corporate governance, to raise the issues and problems posed by the contemporary compliance function without necessarily solving them. The Article therefore seeks to provoke scholarly debate and provide a framework for prosecutors, policymakers, and scholars of corporate law and corporate governance to engage the question of compliance.

The full article is available here.

Les dix articles américains les plus marquants en gouvernance corporative en 2015


L’organisation Corporate Practice Commentator vient de publier la liste des meilleurs articles en gouvernance, plus précisément ceux qui concernent le marché des actions.

La sélection a été faite par les professeurs qui se spécialisent en droit corporatif. Cette année plus de 540 articles ont été analysés.

La liste inclut trois articles de la Faculté du Harvard Law School issus du programme en gouvernance corporative dont Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates et Jesse Fried font partie.

Voici la liste en ordre alphabétique.

Bonne recherche !

 

 Les dix articles américains les plus marquants en gouvernance corporative en 2015

 

 

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  1. Bartlett, Robert P. III. Do Institutional Investors Value the Rule 10b-5 Private Right of Action? Evidence from Investors’ Trading Behavior following Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 44 J. Legal Stud. 183-227 (2015).
  2. Bebchuk, Lucian, Alon Brav and Wei Jiang. The Long-term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism. 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1085-1155 (2015).
  3. Bratton, William W. and Michael L. Wachter. Bankers and Chancellors. 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1-84 (2014).
  4. Cain, Matthew D. and Steven Davidoff Solomon. A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation. 100 Iowa L. Rev. 465-500 (2015).
  5. Casey, Anthony J. The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and Creditors’ Selective Enforcement. 124 Yale L. J. 2680-2744 (2015).
  6. Coates, John C. IV. Cost-benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications. 124 Yale L .J. 882-1011 (2015).
  7. Edelman, Paul H., Randall S. Thomas and Robert B. Thompson. Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism. 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1359-1434 (2014).
  8. Fisch, Jill E., Sean J. Griffith and Steven Davidoff Solomon. Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform. 93 Tex. L. Rev. 557-624 (2015).
  9. Fried, Jesse M. The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-term Shareholders. 124 Yale L. J. 1554-1627 (2015).
  10. Judge, Kathryn. Intermediary Influence. 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 573-642 (2015).

Rencontre du droit, de l’administration et de la finance


Un grand colloque en gouvernance se tiendra le vendredi 1er avril 2016 au salon Hermès de la Faculté des sciences de l’administration (FSA) de l’Université Laval.

palasis-prince-FSA

Ce colloque, organisé conjointement par le Centre d’études en droit économique (Faculté de droit, ULaval) et la Chaire de recherche en gouvernance de sociétés (FSA, ULaval), est l’occasion de débattre de manière pluridisciplinaire sur les grands enjeux contemporains en gouvernance d’entreprise.

Les thématiques abordées concernent :

  1. la composition et la mission des conseils d’administration
  2. les devoirs des administrateurs relativement à l’information
  3. le contenu et la légitimité des pouvoirs des actionnaires
  4. l’activisme actionnarial
  5. l’opportunité de normes de divulgation ou impératives

Le colloque présente les perspectives et les points de vue d’intervenants provenant des milieux suivants : autorités réglementaires, organisations professionnelles, praticiens, administrateurs et chercheurs en gouvernance.

Voici le programme de la journée « Rencontre du droit, de l’administration et de la finance» préparé par les professeurs Jean Bédard et Ivan Tchotourian.

La présidence de la journée a été confiée à Nicolle Forget, administratrice de sociétés.

Horaire de la journée

DÉTAIL
8 h 30 Mot d’accueil

Eugénie Brouillet, doyenne et professeure, Faculté de droit, Université Laval

8 h 35 Mot de bienvenue

Jean Bédard, professeur et titulaire de la Chaire de recherche en gouvernance des sociétés, FSA ULaval

Ivan Tchotourian, professeur et codirecteur du CÉDÉ, Faculté de droit, Université Laval

8 h 40 Le point de vue du régulateur sur la gouvernance
9 h Le conseil d’administration en question

Ce panel abordera de nombreux questionnements actuels sur le conseil d’administration. Sa mission, sa composition (et notamment la parité hommes-femmes), le contrôle de la rémunération des dirigeants qui lui incombe, la place des valeurs éthiques, les pratiques les plus actuelles seront les sujets principaux qui seront discutés par les panélistes.

– Actualités juridiques et CA. : Olga Farman, avocate, Norton Rose Fulbright

– Parité et CA, bilan des initiatives juridiques : Sonia Struthers, avocate associée, McCarthyTetrault

– CA et parité, bilan 2014 des pratiques des entreprises : Jean Bédard, professeur et titulaire de la Chaire de recherche en gouvernance des sociétés, et Sophie Brière, professeure, FSA ULaval

10 h Période de questions
10 h 25 Pause-café
10 h 40 Devoirs des administrateurs et divulgation d’information

Dans le cadre de ce panel portant sur les devoirs des administrateurs, le risque communicationnel, la gestion des informations par le biais des médias sociaux, la divulgation extra-financière, la notion d’intérêt social feront l’objet d’une attention particulière.

– Médias sociaux et risque communicationnel : Vincent Bergeron, avocat et agent de marque, associé, Rodic, et Pierre Fournier-Simard, avocat et consultant, McKinsey Montréal

– Divulgation extra-financière des sociétés par actions, où en est-on ? : Michelle RODRIGUE, professeure, FSA, Université Laval

– Information et responsabilité des administrateurs en droit des valeurs mobilières, étude empirique 2008-2014 : Jean Bédard, professeur et titulaire de la Chaire de recherche en gouvernance des sociétés, FSA, Université Laval, Ivan Tchotourian, professeur et codirecteur du CÉDÉ, Faculté de droit, Université Laval

11 h 55 Période de questions
12 h 20 Repas
13 h 45 Point de vue de la CCGG
14 h Table ronde

Activisme actionnarial et droit de vote Animateur : Daniel ST-ONGE, conseiller en gouvernance

La table ronde analysera l’exercice du pouvoir des actionnaires et les visages contemporains de l’usage du droit de vote. Les sujets qui seront débattus sont les suivants : les conséquences de l’instauration du vote majoritaire, les stratégies de dialogue entre les actionnaires et la direction, la participation des actionnaires aux objectifs de l’entreprise, la place des agences en conseil de vote, le principe « 1 action = 1 voix ».

Stéphane Rousseau, professeur, Vice-doyen aux études supérieures et à la recherche, titulaire de la Chaire en gouvernance et droit des affaires, Faculté de droit, Université de Montréal

Daniel Thouin, président du Mouvement d’éducation et de défense des actionnaires (MÉDAC)

Julien Le Maux, professeur, HEC Montréal

15 h 15 Période de questions
15 h 45 Mot de clôture
16 h Verre de l’amitié

 

Toutes les informations concernant cet événement sont disponibles sur le site

http://www4.fsa.ulaval.ca/evenements/enjeux-contemporains-de-gouvernance-dentreprise/

 Bon colloque !