Catégorie : Gestion des talents

L’ancienneté du PCD (CEO) nuit-elle à la performance ?


La longueur de l’exercice du mandat d’un président et chef de direction (PCD) nuit-elle à la performance ? Il semble bien que oui selon l’étude de Xueming Luo, Vamsi K. Kanuri et Michelle Andrews, publiée dans HBR The Magazine.

Les implications pour les C.A. sont discutées dans l’article. Et vous, qu’en pensez-vous?

Long CEO Tenure Can Hurt Performance

It’s a familiar cycle: A CEO takes office, begins gaining knowledge and experience, and is soon launching initiatives that boost the bottom line. Fast-forward a decade, and the same executive is risk-averse and slow to adapt to change—and the company’s performance is on the decline. The pattern is so common that many refer to the “seasons” of a CEO’s tenure, analogous to the seasons of the year.

New research examines the causes of this cycle and shows that it’s more nuanced than that. We found that CEO tenure affects performance through its impact on two groups of stakeholders—employees and customers—and has different effects on each. The longer a CEO serves, the more the firm-employee dynamic improves. But an extended term strengthens customer ties only for a time, after which the relationship weakens and the company’s performance diminishes, no matter how united and committed the workforce is.

We studied 356 U.S. companies from 2000 to 2010. We measured CEO tenure and calculated the strength of the firm-employee relationship each year (by assessing such things as retirement benefits and layoffs) and the strength of the firm-customer relationship (by assessing such things as product quality and safety). We then measured the magnitude and volatility of stock returns. All this allowed us to arrive at an optimal tenure length: 4.8 years.

The underlying reasons for the pattern, we believe, have to do with how CEOs learn. Previous research has shown that different learning styles prevail at different stages of the CEO life cycle. Early on, when new executives are getting up to speed, they seek information in diverse ways, turning to both external and internal company sources. This deepens their relationships with customers and employees alike.

But as CEOs accumulate knowledge and become entrenched, they rely more on their internal networks for information, growing less attuned to market conditions. And, because they have more invested in the firm, they favor avoiding losses over pursuing gains. Their attachment to the status quo makes them less responsive to vacillating consumer preferences.

These findings have several implications for organizations. Boards should be watchful for changes in the firm-customer relationship. They should be aware that long-tenured CEOs may be skilled at employee relations but less adept at responding to the marketplace; these leaders may be great motivators but weak strategists, unifying workers around a failing course of action, for example. Finally, boards should structure incentive plans to draw heavily on consumer and market metrics in the late stages of their top executives’ terms. This will motivate CEOs to maintain strong customer relationships and to continue gathering vital market information firsthand.

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*Xueming Luo is a professor at the University of Texas at Arlington and a distinguished honorary professor at Fudan University, in China. Vamsi K. Kanuri and Michelle Andrews are PhD candidates.

Article sur la promotion à l’interne :

CEO Succession–Promote from Within (sophisticatedfinance.typepad.com)

Suggestions en vue de renforcer la gouvernance des OBNL


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un article publié par Dr Eugene Fram sur son blogue Nonprofit Management. L’auteur énonce plusieurs propositions susceptibles d’améliorer la gouvernance des entreprises, plus particulièrement des OBNL.

Ces suggestions sont issues des 40 recommandations que Richard Leblanc a récemment publiées à propos des entreprises cotées en bourse. (Voir mon billet du 12 juillet 2013 à ce sujet : Renforcement des règles de gouvernance | Une proposition de Richard Leblanc).

Voici donc les onze suggestions retenues par Eugene Fram qui s’adressent aux OBNL. Bonne lecture.

11 Ways to a Stronger Nonprofit Board

1. Reduce the size of the board

2. Limit director over-boarding

3. Increase the directors’ knowledge of the nonprofit’s field(s) of operations

English: Carol Chyau and Marie So, co-founders...
English: Carol Chyau and Marie So, co-founders of Ventures in Development, a nonprofit organization that promotes social enterprise in Greater China. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

4. Enable directors to have access to information and to managers reporting to the CEO

5. Select directors who can contribute directly to the organization’s mission

6. Hold management accountable

7. Control management’s influence on director selection

8. Address conflicts of interest fully

9. Match management’s compensation with contributions to achieving mission, corporate performance and risk management

10. Stay on message when communicating organizational outcomes

11. Understand the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of replacing elected directors

Articles d’intérêt sur la gestion des OBNL :

Evaluate your nonprofit from a funder’s perspective (fundraisinggoodtimes.com)

Non Profit Board of Directors Checklist (jasteriou.wordpress.com)

Getting the Nonprofit Board Recruiting Process « Right » (powerofoneconsulting.wordpress.com)

Nonprofits need to balance finance and mission (utsandiego.com)

Why Nonprofit Board Prospects Say No (hardysmithconsulting.wordpress.com)

What every nonprofit board needs to know (miamiherald.com)

La gestion de la succession du PCD (CEO) par le C.A. | Les nombreux éléments à considérer


Voici un article sur les nombreux éléments à considérer dans le cas du remplacement d’un président et chef de direction (PCD). Les conseils d’administration ne sont pas souvent confrontés à ce genre de décision; mais c’est sûrement l’une des plus importantes décisions qu’ils auront à prendre.

L’auteur présente une sorte de check list de tout ce dont il faut se préoccuper dans les cas de changements de PCD. Cet article, publié par Brian V. Breheny, et paru dans HLS on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, est l’un des plus opérationnels qu’il m’ait été donné de lire. Il sera sûrement d’une grande utilité pour les membres de conseils appelés à vivre cette période critique de la vie des organisations. Je vous recommande d’en tenir compte lors du remplacement d’un PCD.

Notez que l’auteur prend pour acquis que le C.A. a déjà préparé un plan de relève du PCD. Cependant, si ce n’est pas le cas, l’article vous incitera sûrement à concevoir un tel plan ! Bonne lecture.

The Landscape of CEO Succession Issues

A board’s decision as to whether, when and how to terminate the employment of a CEO and hire a successor is among the most critical decisions facing the board of any company—large or small, public or private, established or start-up. In most cases, however, a CEO termination is a rare event and one with respect to which—as would be expected—the board, the company’s general counsel and its human resources professionals may have little or no experience. In addition, the situation is further complicated by contractual, regulatory and personal factors.

Contracts
Contracts (Photo credit: NobMouse)

This post describes the substantive and procedural considerations that boards will want to take into account when there is a change of CEO. In it, we assume that the board has made the business decision relating to CEO succession and is focused on strategy, implementation and minimizing potentially costly and/or embarrassing oversights and errors. Many but not all of the same considerations apply in respect of executive officers other than the CEO, and some additional considerations may apply to such other officers; in any event, their relative significance likely will differ from the case of the CEO.

Articles reliés au sujet :

Communication Practices in CEO Succession (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

The Landscape of CEO Succession Issues (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Les aspects éthiques de la gouvernance d’entreprise | Un rapport qui prend en compte la réalité européenne (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

The best solutions for governance problems can only come from well-informed corporate shareholders and stakeholders (venitism.blogspot.com)

Propositions des actionnaires américains lors des assemblées annuelles | Tendances observées


Laura J. Finn responsable du blogue Trending in Governance, l’un des blogues en gouvernance du NYSE, nous présente les résultats d’une recherche effectuée sur le site proxymonitor.org qui inventorie l’ensemble des propositions des actionnaires pour les prochaines assemblées annuelles. L’auteure identifie cinq catégories de proposition susceptibles de recevoir un appui significatif des actionnaires :

1. Limiter le nombre de mandats des administrateurs

2. S’incorporer au Delaware

3. Adopter une politique sur la diversité du conseil

4. Limiter la durée des mandats des administrateurs

5. Planifier la succession du PCD

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les détails concernant ces propositions. Cette tendance générale est-elle également observée au Canada ? Bonne lecture.

Cinq tendances dans les propositions des actionnaires aux É.U. 

(Five Coming Trends in Shareholder Proposals)

Every year shareholders file proposals that garner barely any votes cast in favor by their fellow shareholders. Nevertheless, I like to keep an eye on the “off-beat” corporate governance proposals that are filed each year to see if there may be a coming trend. Here are five such proposals that may gain traction in coming proxy seasons:
1- Curb Excessive Directorships – filed by Kenneth Steiner at three companies this year: AIG, Bank of America, and Exxon Mobil. None of the proposals received more than 6% of votes cast in favor,  but Steiner raised the point that overextended directors may be bad for corporate governance. In the case of AIG, he noted that GMI Ratings, formerly Corporate Library, has rated the company a “high governance risk” since 2007. In all three proposals he asked his fellow shareholders to vote in favor of his proposal “to protect shareholder value.” Apparently, the other shareholders don’t see directors serving on 3 or more boards as problematic.

Network diagram showing corporate interlocks w...

2- Re-incorporate in Delaware – filed by Gerald Armstrong at Chesapeake Energy Corp. This proposal is particularly interesting. After years of shareholders voting in the majority on a number of proposals, like declassifying the board and enacting majority voting, and the company not heeding shareholders’ votes, Armstrong filed this proposal to re-incorporate in the state of Delaware because the state “is known for fairness and integrity.”  Currently, Chesapeake is incorporated in Oklahoma and Armstrong believes the company worked with state legislature to create a law that “all corporations incorporated in Oklahoma with more than 1,000 shareholders be required to have a classified board of directors with three-year terms for each director.” Chesapeake opposed the proposal and the majority of shareholders sided with the company. This energy company is not Delaware-bound, at least for now.

3- Adopt Policy on Board Diversity – filed by NYC Pension Funds at Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold. Currently, the company has no women or minorities on its board, so the purpose of the proposal is four-fold: to include women and minority candidates in the pool of board candidates, expand director searches to include “nominees from both non-executive corporate positions and non-traditional environments such government, academia, and non-profit organizations,” review board composition periodically to find and fill knowledge gaps, and report on the process to shareholders. The company stated in its opposition that it “believes that this proposal would not improve its ability to select the most suitable and qualified candidates for membership on the board and would impose unnecessary administrative burdens and costs.” The shareholders will vote on this proposal next week, July 16. Stay tuned.

4- Director Term Limits – filed by Dennis Rocheleau at General Electric. He argued that term limits “apply to the President of the United States and are in effect for directors at a number of Fortune 500 firms” and believes that GE “need[s] a better board and the sooner the better.” GE argued that term limits would “prevent qualified, experienced and effect directors from serving on the board” and further explained the company believes the proposal was motivated by Rocheleau’s desire to remove specific directors. Shareholders sided with GE, giving a vote of confidence to the company’s nomination and evaluation process.

5- CEO Succession Planning – filed by Laborers’ District Council & Contractors of Ohio at Google. A dozen similar proposals have been filed at Fortune 250 companies in the past three years, though none have received majority support. Google opposed the proposal, stating: “The Leadership Development and Compensation Committee reviews at least annually and recommends to the full board of directors plans for the development, retention, and replacement of executive officers, including the Chief Executive Officer.” At this time, the majority of shareholders feel confident in the board’s ability to handle succession planning without a formal policy.

Article relié

Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2013 Proxy Season (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Renforcement des règles de gouvernance | Une proposition de Richard Leblanc


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un billet publié par Richard Leblanc* sur son blogue Governance Gateway. Il s’agit d’une proposition de changement à trois niveaux :

(1) Renforcement du rôle du C.A. en matière de création de valeur;

(2) Imputabilité de la direction envers le C.A.;

(3) Imputabilité du C.A. envers les actionnaires.

L’auteur nous demande de faire des suggestions dans le but de peaufiner un cas qu’il est en voie de réaliser. Des suggestions concernant cette liste ?

Proposals to Strengthen a Board’s Role in Value Creation, Management Accountability to the Board, and Board Accountability to Shareholders

I.    Increase Board Engagement, Expertise and Incentives to Focus on Value Creation

Reduce the size of the Board.

Increase the frequency of Board meetings.

Limit Director overboardedness.

Limit Chair of the Board overboardedness.

Increase Director work time.

Increase the Board Chair’s role in the value creation process.

Statue of John Harvard, founder of Harvard Uni...
Statue of John Harvard, founder of Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the college yard. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Focus the majority of Board time on value creation and company performance.

Increase Director roles and responsibilities relative to value creation.

Increase Director compensation, and match incentive compensation to long-term value creation and individual performance.

Enable Director access to information and reporting Management.

Enable Director and Board access to expertise to inform value creation as needed.

Require active investing in the Company by Directors.

Select Directors who can contribute directly to value creation.

Revise the Board’s committee structure to address value creation.

Hold Management to account.

Disclose individual Director areas of expertise directly related to value creation.

Increase Board engagement focused on value creation.

Establish and fund an independent Office of the Chairman.

Limit Board homogeneity and groupthink.

II.   Increase Director Independence from Management and Management Accountability to the Board

Increase objective Director and advisory independence.

Limit Director interlocks.

Limit over-tenured Directors.

Limit potential Management capture and social relatedness of Directors.

Decrease undue Management influence on Director selection.

Decrease undue Management influence on Board Chair selection.

Increase objective independence of governance assurance providers.

Limit management control of board protocols.

Address fully perceived conflicts of interest.

Establish independent oversight functions reporting directly to Committees of the Board to support compliance oversight.

Match Management compensation with longer-term value creation, corporate performance and risk management.

III.   Increase Director Accountability to Shareholders

The Board Chair and Committee Chairs shall communicate face-to-face and visit regularly with major Shareholders.

Communicate the value creation plan to Shareholders.

Implement integrated, longer-term reporting focused on sustained value creation that includes non-financial performance and investment.

Implement independent and transparent Director performance reviews with Shareholder input linked to re-nomination.

Each Director, each year, shall receive a majority of Shareholder votes cast to continue serving as a Director.

Make it easier for Shareholders to propose and replace Directors.

Limit any undue Management influence on Board – Shareholder communication.

Limit Shareholder barriers to the governance process that can be reasonably seen to promote Board or Management entrenchment.

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* Richard W. Leblanc, Associate Professor, Law, Governance & Ethics, Faculty of Liberal Arts & Professional Studies, of the Bar of Ontario; Summer Faculty 2013 (MGMT S-5018 Corporate Governance) at Harvard University; Faculty at the Directors College; and Research Fellow and Advisory Board Member, Institute for Excellence in Corporate Governance, University of Texas at Dallas, Naveen Jindal School of Management.

Les critères d’évaluation du rôle d’administrateur de sociétés


Voici un excellent article publié par Jeffrey Gandz, Mary Crossan, Gerard Seijts et Mark Reno* dans la revue Ivey Business Journal. Les auteurs insistent sur trois critères d’évaluation du rôle d’administrateur de sociétés : (1) compétences, (2) engagement et (3) caractère. Bien que ces trois critères soient déterminants dans l’exercice du rôle d’administrateur, la dimension la plus difficile à appréhender est le leadership qui se manifeste par le « caractère » d’un administrateur.

Les auteurs décrivent 11 caractéristiques-clés dont il faut tenir compte dans le recrutement, la sélection, l’évaluation et la rotation des administrateurs.

Je vous invite donc à lire cet article. En voici un extrait. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

« When it comes to selecting and assessing CEOs, other C-suite level executives or board members, the most important criteria for boards to consider are competencies, commitment and character. This article focuses on the most difficult of these criteria to assess – leadership character – and suggests the eleven key dimensions of character that directors should consider in their governance roles ».

Leadership character and corporate governance

Competencies, commitment and character

Competencies matter. They define what a person is capable of doing; in our assessments of leaders we look for intellect as well as organizational, business, people and strategic competencies. Commitment is critical. It reflects the extent to which individuals aspire to the hard work of leadership, how engaged they are in the role, and how prepared they are to make the sacrifices necessary to succeed. But above all, character counts. It determines how leaders perceive and analyze the contexts in which they operate. Character determines how they use the competencies they have. It shapes the decisions they make, and how these decisions are implemented and evaluated.

Seasonal Reflection on Ivey Business building
Seasonal Reflection on Ivey Business building (Photo credit: Marc Foster)

Focus on character

Our research has focused on leadership character because it’s the least understood of these three criteria and the most difficult to talk about. Character is foundational for effective decision-making. It influences what information executives seek out and consider, how they interpret it, how they report the information, how they implement board directives, and many other facets of governance.

Within a board, directors require open, robust, and critical but respectful discussions with other directors who have integrity, as well as a willingness to collaborate and the courage to dissent. They must also take the long view while focusing on the shorter-range results, and exercise excellent judgment. All of these behaviors hinge on character.

Our research team at Ivey was made very conscious of the role of character in business leadership and governance when we conducted exploratory and qualitative research on the causes of the 2008 financial meltdown and the subsequent recession. In focus groups and conference-based discussions, where we met with over 300 business leaders on three continents, participants identified character weaknesses or defects as being at the epicenter of the build-up in financial-system leverage over the preceding decade, and the ensuing meltdown. Additionally, the participants identified leadership character strengths as key factors that distinguished the companies that survived or even prospered during the meltdown from those that failed or were badly damaged.

Participants in this research project identified issues with character in both leadership and governance. Among them were:

Overconfidence bordering on arrogance that led to reckless or excessive risk-taking behaviors

Lack of transparency and in some cases lack of integrity

Sheer inattention to critical issues

Lack of accountability for the huge risks associated with astronomical individual rewards

Intemperate and injudicious decision-making

A lack of respect for individuals that actually got in the way of effective team functioning

Hyper-competitiveness among leaders of major financial institutions

Irresponsibility toward shareholders and the societies within which these organizations operated.

These character elements and many others were identified as root or contributory causes of the excessive buildup of leverage in financial markets and the subsequent meltdown. But the comments from the business leaders in our research also raise important questions about leadership character. Among them:

What is character? It’s a term that we use quite often: “He’s a bad character”; “A person of good character”; “A character reference.” But what do we really mean by leadership “character”?

Why is it so difficult to talk about someone’s character? Why do we find it difficult to assess someone’s character with the same degree of comfort we seem to have in assessing their competencies and commitment?

Can character be learned, developed, shaped and molded, or is it something that must be present from birth – or at least from childhood or adolescence? Can it change? What, if anything, can leaders do to help develop good character among their followers and a culture of good character in their organizations?

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Articles reliés :

Strategic Leaders-Challenges, Organizational Abilities & Individual Characteristics (workplacepsychology.net)

How to Succeed As a Leader! (ejims05.wordpress.com)

Character & Leadership (colleensharen.wordpress.com)

Entrevue avec Robert Monks, actionnaire activiste


Je vous invite à visionner la vidéo de ReutersVideo dans laquelle Lucy Marcus discute ouvertement et candidement avec Robert Monks, actionnaire activiste avéré et conseiller en gouvernance de sociétés, à propos des réformes entreprises au Royaume-Uni, en comparaison avec les É.U.

boardroom
boardroom (Photo credit: The_Warfield)

M. Monks donne son avis sur les comportements des administrateurs de demain et montre comment ceux-ci peuvent se préparer et surmonter une  situation de crise.

Vous serez probablement aussi intéressés à plusieurs autres vidéos de la série In the Boardroom présentée sur YouTube. Bon visionnement !

Article d’intérêt :

Men seen as impediments to shaking up boardrooms (business.financialpost.com)

Une formation en gouvernance pour les nouveaux administrateurs | Un prérequis ?


La formation en gouvernance est de plus en plus un préalable à l’exercice du rôle d’administrateur de sociétés. L’article retenu montre que l’apprentissage sur le tas est en voie de disparition dans les conseils d’administration de grandes sociétés. La formation préparatoire peut prendre différentes formes : training sur mesure, coaching, séminaires, etc.

Cependant, il semble de plus en plus évident que les programme de formation en gouvernance (tels que IoD, C.dir., ASC, IAS) menant à une certification reconnue, constituent la voie à suivre dans le futur. L’article de Hannah Prevett, paru dans le Sunday Times, montre que les formations organisées sont de meilleurs endroits pour un apprentissage de qualité que les tables de conseils d’administration… Bonne lecture.

Diplômés ASC du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés 2012

A head start for novices

The received wisdom is that new directors learn on the job. If they are not  equipped with the necessary skills when they accept their first board  appointment, they will need to be quick on the uptake.

Not any more: the tidal wave of new governance requirements means it is not  good enough to acquire expertise over time. And, as a result, many  prospective boardroom stars are seeking training to help them do the job  they’re paid to do from day one. When Alan Kay learnt he was to join the executive board of Costain in 2003, he  immediately began considering how to prepare for his new role at the  engineering and construction group.

“A lot of people haven’t really thought about how to prepare for a board role.  [They think] it’s something that happens naturally: you get on the board and  then you think, I’m going to learn on the job,” said Kay, who is Costain’s  technical and operations director. “But once you’re appointed, becoming  competent and learning as you go takes several months, which is not ideal.”

He researched training options for new board members and came across the  Institute of Directors’ accredited programmes, including the certificate and  diploma in company direction. The IoD fills 6,000 places on such courses annually with representatives of  both large and small organisations — not all of them young guns, as Roger  Barker, head of corporate governance at the IoD, explained.

“The directors of large organisations were reluctant to undertake any form of  formalised director training. These were typically seasoned former  executives, with extensive experience of serving on boards as chief  executives or chief financial officers. It has been difficult to persuade  such individuals that director training is relevant to them,” said Barker.

Articles d’intérêt reliés au thème de la formation en gouvernance

Nonprofit board development is a process when done right (donordreams.wordpress.com)

L’évolution de la « Hawkamah » (Gouvernance en arabe) dans les pays en développement (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

A head start for novices (david-doughty.com)

L’établissement d’une juste rémunération du PCD | Responsabilité absolue du C.A.


Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture de l’article d’Adam Davidson, publié dans le New York Times du 29 mai 2013. L’auteur présente une excellente analyse des facteurs qui influencent la rémunération du PCD et montre comment le conseil d’administration doit jouer un rôle capital dans l’établissement d’une rémunération juste et efficace.

Voici un extrait de l’article. Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

C.E.O.’s Don’t Need to Earn Less. They Need to Sweat More

« Most C.E.O.’s used to be able to handle their pay negotiations in private, but the Dodd-Frank reforms, which were passed in 2010, now give shareholders the right to vote on executive compensation. This has helped usher in a so-called “say on pay” revolution, which tries to stop executives from making more money when their companies don’t do that well. In Switzerland, a recent nationwide referendum, passed 2 to 1, gave shareholders the right to restrict the pay for the heads of Swiss companies. The European Union is likely to vote on a similar measure by the end of the year.

Economically speaking, this is more than a little odd. Shareholders should be motivated to pay their C.E.O.’s according to their success. But doing so involves a tricky dance known to game theorists as the principal-agent problem: how does an employer (the principal) motivate a worker (the agent) to pursue the principal’s interest? This principal-agent problem is everywhere. (Do you pay a contractor per day of work or per project? Do you pay salespeople by the hour or on commission?) It becomes particularly thorny when the agent knows a lot more about his job than the principal.

Boards and chief executives don’t often suffer from Costanza-like ineptitude, but they are harder to rein in. They are often rewarded when they don’t succeed but are not usually penalized enough when they do a lackluster job. Lucian Bebchuk, a professor at Harvard Law School and perhaps the leading academic voice for corporate reform, told me that the problem isn’t (just) greed. It’s the boards of directors. The directors are supposed to represent the stockholders’ interests, he says, but most public firms, where C.E.O.’s can have considerable influence over board appointments, neuter those interests. They are structured so that a board tends to side with its chief.

Excessive C.E.O. pay, Bebchuk says, is a manifestation of a deeper problem. A bad C.E.O. pay package can cost shareholders millions; a corporation that is being poorly overseen by its board can cost billions. “Shareholder rights in the U.S. are still quite weak relative to what they are in other advanced economies,” he explained. His solution is to pass laws that make it easier for shareholders to vote out boardmembers who fail to discipline underperforming chief executives. This, he argues, will motivate them to push back against executives that do an underwhelming job. At the very least, all the attention would keep boardmembers and C.E.O.’s on their toes. And a multitude of better-run companies would result in billions, perhaps trillions, of wealth returned to the economy ».

Articles reliés :

Principal Agent Problems in Government (sympathyandbureaucracy.com)

Remuneration Programs: A Principal Agent Theory perspective of CEO Remuneration Programs (projectsparadise.com)

Évaluation de la performance du PCD (CEO) | Survey 2013 de Stanford


Une étude conduite par le Center for Leadership Development and Research de la Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance, et The Miles Group montre que les administrateurs évaluent piètrement la performance de leur PCD (CEO) sur les dimensions de la gestion des talents et de leur capacité (ou leur volonté) à créer les conditions favorables à l’engagement de leur conseil.

L’on s’en doute, les priorités sont toujours accordées aux performances financières. Ce n’est pas surprenant !  Seulement 5 % de la note finale est attribuée aux activités relatives au développement des talents et à la planification de la relève… Si l’on croit vraiment que ce sont deux activités stratégiques clés, il faut leur accorder une part plus substantielle de l’évaluation. Sinon, on lance le message que ce que l’on mesure est ce qui importe !

Voici un sommaire des points saillants de l’étude. Pour obtenir plus de détails sur les résultats de l’étude, je vous invite à consulter le site de Stanford. Bonne lecture.

2013 CEO Performance Evaluation Survey

Boards rate CEOs high in decision-making, low in talent development
 
More than 160 CEOs and directors of North American public and private companies were polled in the 2013 Survey on CEO Performance Evaluations, which studied how CEOs themselves and directors rate both chief executive performance as well as the performance evaluation process. When directors were asked to rank the top weaknesses of their CEO, “mentoring skills” and “board engagement” tied for the #1 spot. “This signals that directors are clearly concerned about their CEO’s ability to mentor top talent,” says Stephen Miles, founder and chief executive of The Miles Group. “Focusing on drivers such as developing the next generation of leadership is essential to planning beyond the next quarter and avoiding the short-term thinking that inhibits growth.”

2013 CEO Performance Evaluation Survey

Little weight given to customer service, workplace safety, and innovation in CEO evaluations.

While accounting, operating, and stock price metrics are assigned high value by boards, other factors generally hold little worth when boards rate their CEOs. “Seeming important things such as product service and quality, customer service, workplace safety, and even innovation are used in less than 5% of evaluations,” says Professor Larcker.

CEOs and boards believe the evaluation process is balanced.

Eighty-three percent (83%) of directors and 64% of CEOs believe that the CEO evaluation process is a balanced approach between financial performance and nonfinancial metrics, such as strategy development and employee and customer satisfaction. “Unfortunately, the truth of the matter is that the CEO evaluation process is not that balanced,” says Professor Larcker. “Amid growing calls for integrating reporting and corporate social responsibility, companies are still behind the times when it comes to developing reliable and valid measures of nonfinancial performance metrics.”

CEOs failing to engage boards.

“Board relationships and engagement” tied with “mentoring and development skills” as the #1 weakness in CEOs. “This serious disconnect between management and the boardroom has multiple negative ramifications,” says Mr. Miles. “Board engagement is absolutely vital to the function of the CEO – and to the health of a company. How can the board understand what’s going on in the company if the CEO is not engaging?”

Directors lukewarm when comparing their CEOs against peer group.

Forty-one percent (41%) of directors believe that their CEO is in the top 20% of his or her peers, while 17% believe that their CEO is below the 60th percentile. “For almost half of directors to say that their CEO is just ‘in the top 20 percent’ is not exactly a ringing endorsement,” says Mr. Miles. “The board hires the CEO – they should believe that they have the individual in that job who is absolutely the best, or can quickly become the best. The fact that nearly 20% of directors feel that their CEO ranks below the top 40% means that a lot of CEOs should be preparing their resumes.”

Disconnect in how CEOs and directors regard the evaluation process.

Sixty-three percent (63%) of CEOs versus 83% of directors believe that the CEO performance process is effective in their companies. “Nearly a third of CEOs don’t think that their evaluation is effective,” says Professor Larcker. “The success of an organization is dependent on open and honest dialogue between the CEO and the board. It is difficult to see how that can happen without a rigorous evaluation process.”

10% of companies say they have never evaluated their CEO.

“Given their fiduciary duties, it’s strange that any company would not evaluate its CEO,” says Professor Larcker. “The CEO performance evaluation should feed all sorts of board decisions, including goal setting, corporate performance measurement, compensation structure, and succession planning. Without an evaluation of the CEO, how can the board claim to be monitoring a corporation?”

CEOs highly likely to agree with the results of their performance evaluation.

Only 12% of CEOs believe that they are rated too high or too low overall, and almost half (49%) do not disagree with any area of their performance evaluation. “Shareholders have to wonder at the objectivity of the evaluation process,” says Professor Larcker. “It’s hard to believe that boards are pushing CEOs on their evaluations if they pretty much agree with their evaluation.”

Only two-thirds of CEOs believe that their own performance evaluation is a meaningful exercise.

“Even though a high percentage of directors and CEOs think that the CEO evaluation process is meaningful, this number really should be 100%,” says Mr. Miles. “Every board has the power to meaningfully evaluate the CEO – whether doing it themselves, or bringing in someone to do it, or some combination thereof.”

Directors unlenient on violations of ethics but more forgiving of CEOs with legal or regulatory violations that occur on their watch.

“A significant minority of directors – 27 percent – say that unexpected litigation against the company would have no impact on their CEO’s performance evaluation,” says Professor Larcker, while « approximately a quarter of directors (24%) say that unexpected regulatory problems would also have no impact. » By contrast, all directors (100%) say that their CEO’s performance evaluation would be negatively impacted by ethical violations or a lack of transparency with the board.

Statistiques et constats sur le processus de succession des PCD (CEO)


Ce billet présente le résumé d’une étude, produite par le Conference Board et récemment publiée sur le site de Harvard Law School Forun on Corporate Governance and Financial Régulation, laquelle fait état de la planification de la relève des PCD (CEO). L’étude intitulée CEO Succession Practices (2013 Edition) analyse les cas de rotation des PCD dans les entreprises du S&P 500. Le rapport présente les résultats en quatre sections :

Les tendances en matière de planification de la relève de 2000 à 2012 ainsi que la relation entre la performance des entreprises et le départ ou l’arrivée d’un PCD;

Les pratiques en matière de succession du PCD en 2012 : les responsabilités du conseil, le rôle du PCD démissionnaire au conseil et la nature de la divulgation aux actionnaires;

Une analyse des particularités de plusieurs cas célèbres de succession de PCD en 2012;

Divers exemples montrant comment l’activisme des actionnaires a une influence grandissante sur le processus de la planification de la relève en 2012.

Vous pouvez vous procurer une copie complète de l’étude en vous adressant à matteo.tonello@conference-board.org.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les principaux constats dégagés par la recherche. Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont appréciés.

Statistics on CEO Succession in the S&P 500

Despite steady average CEO succession rates, dismissals hit a 10-year high in 2012.

In 2012, 53 CEOs in the S&P 500 left their post. The rate of CEO succession in calendar year 2012 was 10.9 percent, consistent with the average number of annual succession announcements from 2000 through 2011. The rate of CEO dismissals varies widely across the 2000–2012 period, ranging from 40.0 percent in 2002 to 13.2 percent in 2005 (on average, 24.5 percent for the period). In 2012, 31.4 percent of all successions were non-voluntary departures, the highest rate recorded since 2003.

Companies in the services industries experienced higher than average CEO succession rates.

The rate of CEO succession had significant variation across industry groups during 2012. The services industry had a succession rate of 18.0 percent in 2012, higher than its 13-year average of 16.2 percent. By contrast, the extraction industry, which includes mining, petroleum products, and natural gas companies, had a succession rate of only 5.6 percent during 2012, lower than its 13-year average of 9.5 percent.

English: Corporate Governance
English: Corporate Governance (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Companies increasingly look outside to hire their CEOs.

In 2012, 27.1 percent of S&P 500 companies that faced a CEO succession hired an outsider for the top job. While the rate confirms a trend recorded since the 1970s, it is much higher than the 19 percent reported in 2011. This finding may suggest that there is a need to continue to strengthen companies’ leadership development practices. The heated pay-for-performance debate of the last few years has induced boards of directors to increase the rigor of the CEO selection process: the growing percentage of outsiders chosen as new CEOs may show that directors don’t always like what they find within the companies’ ranks. Moreover, a number of companies that underwent a succession event in 2012 selected a director from their own board as the new CEOs. The director-turned-CEO succession model provides companies with a chief executive who is familiar with corporate strategy and key stakeholders, thereby reducing leadership transition risk.

CEO departure may offer opportunity to reconsider board leadership model.

Only 18.8 percent of successions in 2012 involved the immediate joint appointment of an individual as CEO and chairman of the board of directors. Based on succession announcements, one-third of departing CEOs remained as board chairman for at least a brief transition period, typically until the next shareholder meeting, while several departing CEOs retained significant influence with the company as board chairman. In some cases (Iron Mountain), the succession was used as an opportunity to reconsider the board leadership structure and adopt a CEO/board chairman separation model. Alternatively, the boards of Altria Group, Boston Scientific, CA Inc., and Murphy Oil retained the expertise of the departing CEO via a consulting contract rather than a position on the board.

Formal succession process is credited for the choice of new CEO, except when the CEO is hired from outside.

Perhaps surprisingly, only 22.9 percent of succession announcements among S&P 500 companies in 2012 explicitly stated that the incoming CEO was identified through the board’s succession planning process. This is noticeably lower than the 32.4 percent of successions that referred to the succession planning process in 2011. There appears to be a link between inside promotion to the CEO position and the succession planning process—31.6 percent of announcements that mention the board’s role in the succession planning process involve an insider appointment as incoming CEO, whereas no successions that involve an outside hire reference succession planning.

Mantatory CEO retirement policies remain seldom used.

Mandatory CEO retirement policies based on age are an infrequent element of CEO succession plans. Only 11.8 percent of manufacturing companies and 8 percent of nonfinancial services companies adopt an age-based mandatory retirement policy for CEOs; the number is lower in the financial industry. The highest level of policy adoption (19.4 percent) is reported by manufacturing and nonfinancial companies with annual revenue of $20 billion or greater.

Articles reliés :

Le développement de la relève pour des postes de haute direction

Le rôle du C.A. et du PCD (CEO) dans la planification de la succession du premier dirigeant

Mieux planifier la relève du PCD (CEO)  |  Une approche systématique pour en garantir le succès ?

La planification de la relève : Une activité primordiale pour tous les C.A.

Planification de la relève du PCD et gestion des talents

More Companies Looking Outside for their Next CEO (sys-con.com)

The 2012 Chief Executive Study: Time for New CEOs – Just Released (barebrilliance.wordpress.com)

Wal-Mart CEO Succession and Replacement Plan Identified (247wallst.com)

Succession Planning (lawprofessors.typepad.com)

Obtenir un siège sur le C.A. d’une grande entreprise | Difficile … même pour une gestionnaire expérimentée !


L’article de J.T. O’Donnell est très direct et, possiblement, assez juste ! Personne ne me fera dire qu’obtenir un siège sur le C.A. d’une grande entreprise cotée en bourse est une chose facile … même pour une personne expérimentée qui possède déjà un poste de haute direction ! Non, c’est une avenue qui demande beaucoup, beaucoup de temps, de volonté et de stratégies !

Ainsi que l’auteure le mentionne, en plus de l’expérience, la bonne …, il faut beaucoup de chance car vous n’êtes pas le seul, ou la seule, à vouloir accéder aux postes de commandes (sur les C.A.). Vous devez avoir un solide réseau de contacts professionnels et faire connaître votre disponibilité, ce que plusieurs refusent de faire parce qu’ils ou elles ont peur de l’échec.

De plus, vous devez avoir les « bonnes connections », le bon profil LinkedIn, la bonne réputation sur les réseaux sociaux, le bon parcours d’emploi dans les grandes organisations, le bon mentor, le bon timing, la bonne formation académique et, de plus en plus, la bonne formation en gouvernance de sociétés.

Si vous êtes intéressés par un poste sur un C.A. prestigieux (à votre retraite, par exemple) préparez-vous en conséquence en utilisant une démarche structurée et en le laissant savoir dans votre milieu, auprès des firmes de recrutement, sur les réseaux sociaux et auprès d’administrateurs chevronnés. Même si vous êtes le fils ou la fille du propriétaire, ce ne sera pas « une marche dans le parc ».

Je vous invite à lire ce bref article qui vous expliquera quelques barrières à l’entrée… Et n’oubliez pas de lire les commentaires à la fin !

Voici un bref extrait de l’article :

Board Seats: Elusive Carrots? (4 Reasons Why)

In the last several weeks, I’ve had three separate conversations with smart, proven C-suite members – all men in their late 50s/early 60s. They’re all credentialed and have previous board experience. Each has been aggressively seeking executive board positions over the last 18 months. Not one of them has been successful. Their only solace? Colleagues trying to do the same are failing too.

LinkedIn One Percent Most Viewed Profiles Email
LinkedIn One Percent Most Viewed Profiles Email (Photo credit: DavidErickson)

As it turns out, more than a few executive Baby Boomers are looking to grab coveted roles on corporate boards. And, why not? Getting paid five-figures to attend quarterly meetings and do some business strategy work seems like a great deal. However, based on my discussions with industry professionals over the last 10 months, for even the most proven executives, it might be easier to win the lottery than to land a board seat. There’s clearly a supply and demand issue – too many senior, white, male executives for too few board positions. Plus, to add insult to injury, according to Jack Welch, some of the executives getting those board seats aren’t very effective.

If you’re an executive who had a board seat(s) in mind for the next phase of your career, here are some things to ponder…

Buffett soutien les doubles rôles de PCD et PCA de Dimon à JPMorgan !


WOW ! Solide prise de position de Warren Buffet en faveur du maintien de Jamie Dimon comme PCA et PCD de JPMorgan Chase, la plus grande banque américaine. L’article publié dans Bloomberg cette semaine, faisant état de la position de Buffet, montre que le fait de jouer les deux rôles, du moins aux É.U., n’est pas encore accepté comme une pratique exemplaire.

Qu’en pensez-vous ? Buffet peut certainement faire pencher la balance lors de l’assemblée des actionnaires du 21 mai…

Buffett Supports Dimon’s Dual Roles 100% at JPMorgan

Warren Buffett, who has said he personally owns shares of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), is backing the bank’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon as shareholders vote this month on whether to split his roles.

Warren Buffett and Jamie Dimon | Donald Bowers/Getty Images for Fortune

Warren Buffett and Jamie Dimon Warren Buffett, chairman of  Berkshire Hathaway Inc., said in November that Jamie Dimon, chief executive officer of JPMorgan Chase & Co., would be the best candidate to lead the U.S. Treasury Department in a financial crisis.

“I’m 100 percent for Jamie,” Buffett told Bloomberg Television’s Betty Liu yesterday in Omaha, Nebraska. “I couldn’t think of a better chairman.”

Calls for Dimon, 57, to relinquish the chairmanship have mounted since New York-based JPMorgan disclosed risk-control lapses on derivatives bets last year that fueled more than $6.2 billion of losses. In March, the company’s board urged investors to vote against naming a separate chairman at the May 21 meeting, saying that Dimon’s dual role remains the “most effective leadership model.”

Articles reliés au sujet :

JPMorgan Investors Should Oust Most of Board, Glass Lewis Says (bloomberg.com)

Warren Buffett’s Faith in Jamie Dimon (thestreet.com)

The Revolt Against Jamie Dimon (forbes.com)

Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (BRK.A)’s Warren Buffett May Be JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM)’s Jamie Dimon’s Last Fan (insidermonkey.com)

Quelles sont les raisons qui amènent un PCD à démissionner ?


Alexandra Wrage* s’est posée une question très pertinente : Quelles sont les raisons qui conduisent un PCD à démissionner ? Dans son article, paru sur le site de Corporate Counsel, l’auteur donne une foule de raisons pour lesquelles un PCD donne sa démission. Et, ce n’est qu’en de très rares occasions que celui-ci le fait « pour le bien de l’organisation » !

On le sait les PCD sont puissants (« forceful »), déterminés et affirmatifs. Ils ne sont généralement pas du genre à démissionner sans bonnes raisons ! Ils laissent leur position de chef et de pouvoir lorsqu’ils sentent qu’ils n’ont plus d’autres choix …

Cet article nous fait réfléchir sur l’importance du principe d’abnégation qui veut que l’intérêt de l’entreprise doit passer avant l’intérêt personnel. En ce qui me concerne, je crois que c’est ce principe qui doit guider les actions et les décisions d’un PCD qui, pour différentes raisons, ne peut plus assumer ses fonctions avec efficacité et intégrité. Ce n’est pas une décision facile … mais c’est, la plupart du temps, une sage décision. C’est alors que l’on comprend toute l’importance d’avoir un plan de relève … et une personne prête à combler le poste dans une situation de crise.

Why CEOs Resign

Mt. St. Helens (IGC'04)
Mt. St. Helens (IGC’04) (Photo credit: Ben Garney)

For any leader to ensure that his or her departure helps bring the organization “back into calmer waters” can be a final responsible act of leadership. If the negative event happened on your watch, that won’t change—but by taking yourself out of the story, by giving the next slate of leaders a fresh start and a chance to both do the right thing and be seen to do it, you can depart with dignity and hope that history will be kind.

________________________________

*Alexandra Wrage is the president of  TRACE, a nonprofit antibribery compliance organization offering practical tools and services to support the good governance efforts of multinational companies. She is a former member of the Independent Governance Committee (IGC) of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), football’s governing body. Prior to founding TRACE, Wrage was international counsel at Northrop Grumman.

Un exemple :

Yahoo chairman Fred Amoroso’s resignation will give Marissa Mayer more room to do her thing (venturebeat.com)

Mise à jour des compétences des membres du C.A.


Voici un plaidoyer en faveur de l’établissement d’un comité de gouvernance et de nomination par Alan. S. Gutterman. L’article est intéressant en ce qu’il procure d’excellentes justifications pour l’amélioration continue des membres du conseil. De plus, l’auteur présente une description des principaux devoirs et responsabilités des administrateurs qui sera utile à tout nouveau membre du conseil.

J’ajouterais que les programmes de formation en gouvernance telles que ceux du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) sont de plus en plus nécessaires de nos jours. Voici un aperçu du billet de M. Gutterman.

« The centerpiece of any such initiative is creating a permanent committee committed to working year-round on board development. This includes not only the traditional recruiting and selection but also mapping out a long-term strategy for the board’s composition and ensuring that active members are informed about “best practices” for being knowledgeable and effective (e.g., orientation, training and assessment) ».

Turn your board of directors into a key strategic asset

« One simple but often neglected step in board development is creating a description of the duties and responsibilities of directors. It’s like a job description and should be written in a manner that informs candidates about the types of behaviors that will be expected of them. Consider the following list as an example:

Intel Board of Directors
Intel Board of Directors (Photo credit: IntelFreePress)

Attend regular meetings of the company’s board of directors, which are held at least four times per year and which generally extend for about four to five hours.

Be accessible for personal contact with other board members and company officers between board meetings.

Participate on, and provide leadership to, at least one of the committees of the board. Prepare for active participation in board meetings and board decision making, including thorough review of materials distributed in advance.

Participate in orientation and training activities for new and continuing directors and proactively seek out other self-education opportunities on issues and problems that are being considered by the board.

Responsibly review and act upon recommendations of board committees brought to the entire board of directors for discussion and action.

Participate in the annual self-review process required of all board members.

Participate in the annual development and planning retreat for the entire board, which is usually held in January of each year.

Understand and comply with the terms and conditions of all policies, procedures and agreement applicable to board members in general and to you specifically, including fiduciary obligations imposed on board members under applicable laws.

In general, use your personal and professional skills, relationships, experiences and knowledge to advance the interests and prospects of the company.

A description of director duties and responsibilities is obviously important during the recruitment, interviewing and selection process; however, it also can be used as a guide in the development of orientation and training programs and creating of an assessment framework to evaluate how well directors are fulfilling their obligations ».

Articles d’intérêt :

Taking Board members onboard (cbglobalassociates.wordpress.com)

3 Ways to Find Your Perfect Board of Advisors (entrepreneur.com)

L’État de la profession de l’audit interne en 2013 | une étude de pwc


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un document fort intéressant, partagé par Denis Lefort*, qui dresse l’état de la situation de la profession de l’audit interne en 2013. Environ 1 100 CAE (Chief Audit Executive) et plus de 630 membres de haute direction, dans 60 pays, ont participés à cette étude annuelle de pwc. Ainsi, selon Denis Lefort, il « semble que la situation est plus préoccupante d’une année à l’autre. De plus, l’étude met en lumière des écarts de perception/satisfaction importants sur la valeur ajoutée de l’audit interne selon que cette perception soit celle du comité de vérification ou celle de la direction ».

Quel est l’état de la situation de votre propre fonction d’audit interne ?

2013 State of the Internal Audit Profession Study | pwc

Évoluer au rythme du changement : améliorer la performance de la fonction d’audit interne

La volatilité, la complexité, les perturbations économiques, les changements politiques et l’évolution de la réglementation qui caractérisent le contexte commercial actuel vont continuer et entraîner une prolifération des risques. Malheureusement, la fonction d’audit interne n’a pas évolué au rythme de ces changements et de nombreuses entreprises ont désormais de la difficulté à déterminer la stratégie d’audit interne à adopter et à tirer profit de leurs investissements dans l’audit interne.

PWC Building on 41st and Madison
PWC Building on 41st and Madison (Photo credit: Mark Morgan Trinidad A)

Notre neuvième rapport d’enquête annuel State of the Internal Audit Profession, présente les résultats d’un sondage réalisé auprès de 1 100 auditeurs en chef et 630 parties prenantes (notamment des dirigeants d’entreprises, des présidents de comité d’audit, d’autres membres de conseils et des cadres supérieurs des finances et de la gestion du risque) de 60 pays et de 18 secteurs d’activités différents.Les résultats de notre sondage et de 140 entrevues réalisées en personne indiquent qu’il y a un consensus clair sur le fait que l’audit interne doit améliorer sa performance et maximiser sa contribution. Dans le cas contraire, l’audit interne risque de perdre toute pertinence face à d’autres fonctions qui contribuent davantage à la gestion du risque de l’entreprise.

Notre enquête s’intéresse de plus près aux questions suivantes :

    1. les positions communes des parties prenantes concernant des sujets importants
    2. les capacités et la performance de l’audit interne
    3. la couverture des risques importants et émergents par la fonction d’audit interne
    4. les caractéristiques des organisations d’audit interne de premier plan

Cette étude indique également comment l’audit interne peut et doit améliorer la valeur qu’elle ajoute à l’entreprise, notamment les mesures qui devront être prises par les membres du conseil d’administration, la direction et les auditeurs en chef.

______________________________

Denis Lefort* , CPA, CA, CIA, CRMA, Expert-conseil | Gouvernance, Audit, Contrôle

Vous aimerez aussi :

The role of critical risks in internal audits (net-security.org)

PwC 2013 « State Of The Profession Survey » Finds Strong Needs Exist For Internal Audit To Deliver More Value To Organizations (darkreading.com)

Audit watchdog to criticize PwC: memo from firm (Reuters) (newsdaily.com)

Le CAS et le Cercle des ASC | Des agents de changement qui facilitent l’atteinte des objectifs de la « Table des partenaires influents »


Cette semaine, nous avons demandé à Louise Champoux-Paillé, C.Q., F.Adm.A., ASC, MBA, Présidente du Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés, d’agir à titre d’auteur invité sur le blogue. Louise montre comment les initiatives québécoises en matière de promotion de la diversité au sein des sociétés peuvent être facilitées par des agents de changements qui ont des expertises confirmées en gouvernance des sociétés. Il en est ainsi du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) et du Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC).

La mission du CAS est de contribuer au développement et à la promotion de la bonne gouvernance en offrant aux administrateurs de sociétés une formation de la plus haute qualité dans un environnement dynamique de partage du savoir, et une source d’information privilégiée à la fine pointe des meilleures pratiques.

World Economic Forum visits New York Stock Exc...
World Economic Forum visits New York Stock Exchange to mark International Women’s Day 2012 (Photo credit: World Economic Forum)

La mission du Cercle est de promouvoir la désignation Administrateur de sociétés certifié (ASC) auprès des entreprises publiques et privées, des organismes publics et parapublics et des OBNL, ainsi que favoriser la nomination de ses membres à des conseils d’administration.

L’article identifie certaines réalisations remarquables eu égard à la présence des femmes sur des conseils d’administration au Québec. Voici donc l’article en question, reproduit ici avec la permission de l’auteure. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture.

Le Collège et le Cercle : Des agents de changement pour atteindre les objectifs de la Table des partenaires influents

Par Louise Champoux-Paillé

Le 19 avril dernier,  les membres de la Table des partenaires influents, co-présidée par Madame Monique Jérôme-Forget et M. Guy St-Pierre dévoilaient leur stratégie d’action visant à accroître la présence des femmes au sein des conseils d’administration. Celle-ci comportait notamment la proposition que les sociétés cotées en Bourse, ayant leur siège social au Québec, prennent des engagements fermes afin de favoriser une meilleure représentation des femmes dans leur organisation. La Table propose les cibles suivantes : 20 % de représentation d’ici cinq ans (2018), 30 % d’ici dix ans (2023) et 40 % d’ici quinze ans (2028).

Les circonstances ont voulu que je sois appelée par Jacques Grisé à compléter, au cours de la même semaine, un bilan de situation pour la Conférence Européenne des associations d’administrateurs (EcoDa) en regard des actions canadiennes (mais surtout québécoises) pour la promotion de la diversité et de la présence des femmes au sein des conseils d’administration.

De manière générale, les principaux Collèges et associations membres de ce regroupement (Belgique, France, Finlande) ajoutent à leurs activités de formation en gouvernance, des initiatives de mentorat pour stimuler l’atteinte d’une présence féminine accrue. Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés et le Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés se comparent avantageusement à leurs homologues internationaux en ayant développé divers partenariats et ententes avec des regroupements du milieu afin d’organiser des activités de mentorat mais également des activités de sensibilisation, d’initiation à la gouvernance et d’encouragement de la relève pour les postes de direction au sein des entreprises québécoises, soit les femmes qui siégeront éventuellement à ces conseils d’administration. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un compte rendu des principales initiatives canadiennes et québécoises telles qu’elles ont été présentées dans le cadre de l’exercice de « benchmark » de EcoDa.

Cet engagement contribue sûrement à ce que les femmes constituent aujourd’hui 40 % des titulaires du titre d’Administrateur de sociétés certifié (ASC) et que les nominations à des postes des conseils d’administration aient été, au cours des deux dernières années, également réparties entre les deux genres. Notons qu’au cours des deux dernières années, il y a eu 153 nominations d’administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC) au sein des organisations publiques et privées.

La promotion d’une meilleure représentation féminine au sein des instances décisionnelles requiert un engagement de la part des entreprises mais également et surtout un travail constant de terrain pour accroître le vivier actuel et futur de femmes qui permettront d’atteindre les objectifs fixés par la Table des partenaires influents. Un défi de taille que nous poursuivrons avec vigueur.

Louise Champoux-Paillé, C.Q., F.Adm.A., ASC, MBA

Présidente du Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés

________________________________________________

Initiatives to promote diversity in boardrooms on the part of CAS | Perspectives canadiennes et québécoises

Mentoring :

No quota for enrollment in our program (CAS). However, around 40% of our graduates are women. Intensive works with business community in order to promote women for enrollment in our program and create mentoring and networking activities. In Canada, only Québec has legislated gender parity for the boards of its Crown Corporations. The target was met on December 2011. A private Canadian Senator member’s bill was tabled in 2011 to create a mandatory rule requiring boards to have at least 40 % women or men within 6 years of the legislation. The proposed legislation never won the support of the Conservative government. Recently, both Québec and Canadian Government create advisory committees composed of proeminent business people to promote women on corporate boards.

Best practices/Recommendations :

The Canadian regulators encourage diversity of experiences, competencies, genders and origins on boards. A best practice recommended is to use a background and experience matrix to balance all the needs of the organization.

Networks :

Women’s well established associations see to create activities of networking-mentoring-sponsorship and conceive directories to promote women on  boards.

Other initiatives :

Shareholders proposals (MÉDAC mainly) for gender parity. In response, one bank, the National Bank of Canada, adopted in 2009 an orientation to have women nominees for half of all directorships that become vacant. Up to now, the objective was met.

Corporate Governance Model :

A mix of shareholder and stakeholder model. Main features : board members are elected by the shareholders; majority of directors are independent from the direction; Chair of the Board must preferably be independent; members of the audit committee members must be independents.

Nomination Process :

The authorities highly recommend that the members of the governance and nominating committee be independent. Usually, the nominating committee recommends as much candidates as there are seats to be filled. The nominating committee must disclose what steps are taken to identify new candidates for board nomination.

Average Board Structure :

Over the years, there has been a noticeable shift toward smaller boards. Average board size is actually 11 for big listed Canadian companies. A significant majority (85%) of companies separate the roles of board chair and CEO. International directors comprised about 22 % of all directorships in the listed companies, which translated to an average of 2 international directors per board. For the big companies, only 17 % of all directors are women. Generally, there are more boards with three or more women and fewer all-male boards. A big change in board composition for leading Canadian companies : the vast majority have three or more directors with relevant industry experience, compared to just over 10% in 1997.

Comment bâtir un C.A. d’OBNL performant ?


Voici une présentation de diapos très efficace préparée et partagée par Misha Charles, experte dans le domaine de la gouvernance organisationnelle. Sliseshares est une excellente façon de livrer votre message à vos réseaux. En voici un exemple.

Comment bâtir un C.A. d’OBNL performant ?

Régime de retraite pour les PME : les bons arguments


Voici un article paru ce matin dans le magazine Avantages qui fait ressortir plusieurs bons arguments en faveur de l’instauration d’un régime de retraite pour les PME*.

Régime de retraite pour les PME : les bons arguments

Plusieurs dirigeants de PME se montrent encore hésitants avant d’instaurer un régime de retraite pour leurs employés. Parmi les meilleurs arguments pour les convaincre, on peut mettre de l’avant le coût avantageux par rapport à une hausse de salaire, ainsi que le pouvoir d’attraction que cela représente pour des employés de qualité.

Une nouvelle activité offerte par la RRQ, « Les régimes de retraite pour les PME : Problématiques et solutions », met en valeur quelques-uns de ces arguments. La conférence était présentée le 9 avril dernier dans le cadre d’une journée de formation pour les conseillers organisée par la CSF – section de Laval.

« En raison de la rareté de la main-d’œuvre et de la concurrence provenant des grandes entreprises, le salaire et l’assurance collective ne sont plus des éléments suffisants pour attirer les bons employés dans les PME », a rappelé la conférencière Michèle Frenette, présidente de GRMF inc.

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*Deux formations en gouvernance pour deux secteurs spécialisés

Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés offrira, en mai prochain, deux formations spécialisées, sur une formule de deux jours intensifs, adaptées aux besoins des administrateurs et hauts gestionnaires de ces deux secteurs spécialisés.

Gouvernance des PME

La formation aura lieu les 8 et 9 mai 2013, à Québec. Les chefs d’entreprise, hauts dirigeants, investisseurs et administrateurs appelés à siéger sur les conseils d’administration ou comités consultatifs de PME sont invités à participer à cette formation haut de gamme visant à réfléchir aux pratiques de gouvernance les mieux adaptées et les plus efficaces pour ce type d’entreprise.

Gouvernance des régimes de retraite

La formation aura lieu les 15 et 16 mai 2013, à Montréal. Elle s’adresse aux administrateurs, mandataires et gestionnaires de régimes de retraite à cotisations ou prestations déterminées.

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Questionnaire de Leadership Montréal | À la recherche de relève au C.A.


Voici une excellente initiative de Leadership Montréal : un questionnaire destiné aux représentant(e)s d’organisations ayant des postes à combler dans les prochains mois au sein de leurs conseils d’administration.

Leadership Montréal favorise le contact entre des représentants de C.A. et des candidats talentueux souhaitant mettre leurs compétences au service d’organisations de la région de Montréal. Leadership Montréal et ses partenaires organiseront prochainement quelques événements qui réuniront candidat(e)s et représentant(e)s d’organisations. Le fait de compléter le questionnaire ne vous garantit pas une place lors des prochains événements. Toutefois, Leadership Montréal pourra diffuser les ouvertures de postes et vous appuyer dans la recherche de futurs administrateurs et administratrices ».

Questionnaire de Leadership Montréal | À la recherche de relève au C.A.

Vous aurez prochainement des postes à combler au sein de votre C. A. ou vous connaissez des gens souhaitant assurer la relève au sein de leur conseil d’administration ? Vous souhaitez rencontrer des candidats qui vous permettront d’enrichir et de diversifier la composition de votre conseil ? Cette invitation est pour vous !

Liberal leadership campaign launch. Oct 2, 2012.
Liberal leadership campaign launch. Oct 2, 2012. (Photo credit: Justin Trudeau)

Dans les prochaines semaines, Leadership Montréal et ses partenaires organisent deux événements qui réuniront une centaine de candidat(e)s talentueux aux profils variés et des représentant(e)s d’organisations à la recherche de membres de C. A. En participant à l’un de ces événements, vous pourrez rencontrer des candidat(e)s partageant un intérêt pour les questions de gouvernance et disposant d’une expertise utile et recherchée par les C. A. Leadership Montréal dispose d’un vaste réseau réunissant des professionnels et entrepreneurs intervenant dans des secteurs variés : droit, ingénierie, RH, finance, développement économique, développement durable, philanthropie, gestion, etc.

Leadership Montréal favorise la diversité au sein des lieux décisionnels. Vous pourrez ainsi rencontrer des jeunes de moins de 40 ans, des femmes, des personnes issues de l’immigration et des membres de minorités visibles à la recherche de défis au sein de nouveaux conseils d’administration. Plusieurs des candidat(e)s présents auront suivi une formation d’introduction à la gouvernance de sociétés offerte par le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés de l’Université Laval ou par les Jeunes administrateurs de l’Institut sur la gouvernance des organisations publiques et privées (IGOPP).

La participation aux événements est gratuite. Les représentants d’organisations intéressés doivent compléter un questionnaire dans lequel seront indiqués les détails quant aux postes à combler.

Article relié :

Pratiques exemplaires en matière de divulgation d’information concernant les administrateurs | CCGG (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)