L’activisme des investisseurs peut être vu comme un catalyseur

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un compte rendu, rédigé par Elizabeth Mullen dans le magazine du NACD (National Association of Corporate Directors), et résultant d’une table ronde portant sur le phénomène des investisseurs activistes.

On notera que plusieurs experts, dans certaines circonstances, considèrent les activistes comme des agents de changement. Voici quelques extraits très intéressants :

Activism Should Be Seen as a Catalyst, Not Operational Weakness

Directors must take care to balance their business acumen against shareholders’ opinions, new governance developments, proxy advisory firms’ recommendations, and management’s strategy.

While it is widely accepted that directors’ primary duty is to protect shareholder interests, directors must take care to balance their business acumen against shareholders’ opinions, new governance developments, proxy advisory firms’ recommendations, and management’s strategy, participants said in a recent National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) roundtable, presented in partnership with AIG and WilmerHale.

Ellen B. Richstone (left), Jeffrey Rudman, and Steve Maggiacomo

“Shareholder activist” and “shareholder activism” are umbrella terms that encompass a range of groups, interests, and modes of action, so boards’ responses naturally will vary depending on their particular situations. Some companies may face the Icahns and Ackmans of the world, who purchase ownership stakes in companies with the hope of gaining board seats and strategic control; or institutional investors like CalPERS, which are vocal in their opinions of the companies in which they invest; and retail investors with less influence but important opinions of their own.

“Fidelity is more likely to be at your feet while Icahn is more likely to be at your throat,” said WilmerHale’s Jeffrey Rudman. Even the types of shareholder activism can vary, said Martin M. Coyne II, ranging from Harvard Business School’s Shareholder Rights Project, to derivative suits following an M&A event, to family-owned companies facing strategic differences, to private companies with initial investors who are highly involved in strategic planning, to highly influential proxy firms.

While all these voices deserve to be heard, Coyne advised boards to remain focused on an end goal, rather than trying to satisfy all parties involved. “When that topic becomes omnipresent and goes from a discussion topic that should be discussed by the board and decided upon—and you start making bad business decisions to satisfy—what it does is take away from succession planning discussions, strategy discussions, operational discussions. It distracts the board and becomes an operational weakness,” he said.

The opinions of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Glass, Lewis & Co., and other proxy advisors should be considered guidelines, not scripture; ensuring a solid reasoning process behind decisions is more important, participants said. Their influence can be a “good wake-up call,” said Shaun B. Higgins, to reevaluate governance practices, such as joint CEO-chair roles or certain types of compensation plans that proxy firms often campaign against. Bringing up these opinions is a jumping-off point for boards to ensure their policies are sound and defensible, and communicate those justifications to shareholders.

“What they bring is awareness to boards that there are certain issues of concern to the public that they have to address thoroughly,” said James J. Morris. “If the board can have a good rationale of why they want it that way, they’re going to be okay.”…

… Boards today must also consider investors’ and stakeholders’ interests beyond the bottom line, particularly when it comes to environmental concerns. Higgins noted that today’s reports and disclosures are more extensive than ever: “If you told me back in 2000 we were going to put corporate social responsibility in the annual report I would have said, ‘Are you kidding me?’ It wasn’t even on our radar screen.”

Participants à la table ronde :

Martin M. Coyne II, Director, Akamai Technologies, RockTech

Peter T. Francis, Director, Dover Corp., Stanford Graduate School of Business

Shaun B. Higgins, Director, Aryzta AG, Carmine Labriola

Scott Hunter, FCA, Director, Allied World Assurance Company Holdings

James G. Jones, CFA, Founder/Portfolio Manager Sterling Investment Advisors; Director, CFA Institute

Jerry L. Levens, Director, Hancock Holding Co.

Steve Maggiacomo, SVP Financial Lines, AIG

James J. Morris, Principal, 2 Ventures; Director, Esterline Technologies, JURA Corp., LORD Corp.

Craig W. Nunez, Chairman and CEO, Bocage Group; Director, Goodwill Industries of Houston, Medical Bridges

Steve Pannucci, Professional Liability Underwriting Manager, AIG

Donald K. Peterson, Director, Sanford C. Bernstein Fund, TIAA-CREF

Ellen B. Richstone, Director, ERI, OpEx Engine, NACD New England

Andrea Robinson, Partner, WilmerHale

Jeffrey Rudman, Partner, WilmerHale

Carole J. Shapazian, Director, Baxter International

Richard Szafranski, Director, Corporate Office Properties Trust, Cleared Solutions

Histoire récente de l’essor des investisseurs activistes | Conditions favorables et avenir prévisible ?

Ce matin, je vous convie à une lecture révélatrice des facteurs qui contribuent aux changements de fond observés dans la gouvernance des grandes sociétés cotées, lesquels sont provoqués par les interventions croissantes des grands investisseurs activistes.

Cet article de quatre pages, publié par John J. Madden de la firme Shearman & Sterling, et paru sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, présente les raisons de l’intensification de l’influence des investisseurs dans la stratégie et la direction des entreprises, donc de la gouvernance, un domaine du ressort du conseil d’administration, représentants des actionnaires … et des parties prenantes.

English: Study on alternative investments by i... — English: Study on alternative investments by institutional investors. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Après avoir expliqué l’évolution récente dans le monde de la gouvernance, l’auteur brosse un tableau plutôt convainquant des facteurs d’accélération de l’influence des activistes eu égard aux orientations stratégiques.

Les raisons qui expliquent ces changements peuvent être résumées de la manière suivante :

Un changement d’attitude des grands investisseurs, représentant maintenant 66 % du capital des grandes corporations, qui conduit à des intérêts de plus en plus centrés sur l’accroissement de la valeur ajoutée pour les actionnaires;
Un nombre accru de campagnes (+ de 50 %) initiées par des activistes lesquelles se traduisent par des victoires de plus en plus éclatantes;
Un retour sur l’investissement élevé (13 % entre 2009 et 2012) accompagné par des méthodes analytiques plus sophistiquées et plus crédibles (livres blancs);
Un accroissement du capital disponible notamment par l’apport de plus en plus grand des investisseurs institutionnels (fonds de pension, compagnies d’assurance, fonds commun de placement, caisses de retraite, etc.);
Un affaiblissement dans les moyens de défense des C.A. et une meilleure communication entre les actionnaires;
Un intérêt de plus en plus marqué des C.A. et de la direction par un engagement avec les investisseurs activistes.

À l’avenir, les activistes vont intensifier leurs efforts pour exiger des changements organisationnels significatifs (accroissement des dividendes, réorganisation des unités d’affaires, modification des règles de gouvernance, présence sur les conseils, séparation des rôles de PCD et PCA, alignement de la rémunération des dirigeants avec la performance, etc.).

Ci-dessous, un extrait des passages les plus significatifs. Bonne lecture !

The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism

One of the signal developments in 2012 was the emerging growth of the form of shareholder activism that is focused on the actual business and operations of public companies. We noted that “one of the most important trendline features of

2012 has been the increasing amount of strategic or operational activism. That is, shareholders pressuring boards not on classic governance subjects but on the actual strategic direction or management of the business of the corporation.”… Several of these reform initiatives of the past decade continue to be actively pursued. More recently, however, the most significant development in the activism sphere has been in strategically-focused or operationally-focused activism led largely by hedge funds.

The 2013 Acceleration of “Operational” Activism

Some of this operational activism in the past few years was largely short-term return focused (for example, pressing to lever up balance sheets to pay extraordinary dividends or repurchase shares), arguably at the potential risk of longer-term corporate prosperity, or simply sought to force corporate dispositions; and certainly there continues to be activism with that focus. But there has also emerged another category of activism, principally led by hedge funds, that brings a sophisticated analytical approach to critically examining corporate strategy and capital management and that has been able to attract the support of mainstream institutional investors, industry analysts and other market participants. And this growing support has now positioned these activists to make substantial investments in even the largest public companies. Notable recent examples include ValueAct’s $2.2 billion investment in Microsoft (0.8%), Third Point’s $1.4 billion investment in Sony (7%), Pershing Square’s $2 billion investment in Procter & Gamble (1%) and its $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals (9.8%), Relational Investor’s $600 million investment in PepsiCo (under 1%), and Trian Fund Management’s investments of $1.2 billion in DuPont (2.2%) and of more than $1 billion in each of PepsiCo and Mondelez. Interestingly, these investors often embark on these initiatives to influence corporate direction and decision-making with relatively small stakes when measured against the company’s total outstanding equity—as in Microsoft, P&G, DuPont and PepsiCo, for example; as well as in Greenlight Capital’s 1.3 million share investment in Apple, Carl Icahn’s 5.4% stake in Transocean, and Elliot Management’s 4.5% stake in Hess Corp.

In many cases, these activists target companies with strong underlying businesses that they believe can be restructured or better managed to improve shareholder value. Their focus is generally on companies with underperforming share prices (often over extended periods of time) and on those where business strategies have failed to create value or where boards are seen as poor stewards of capital.

Reasons for the Current Expansion of Operational Activism

Evolving Attitudes of Institutional Investors.

… Taken together, these developments have tended to test the level of confidence institutional investors have in the ability of some boards to act in a timely and decisive fashion to adjust corporate direction, or address challenging issues, when necessary in the highly competitive, complex and global markets in which businesses operate. And they suggest a greater willingness of investors to listen to credible external sources with new ideas that are intelligently and professionally presented.

Tangible evidence of this evolution includes the setting up by several leading institutional investors such as BlackRock, CalSTRS and T. Rowe Price of their own internal teams to assess governance practices and corporate strategies to find ways to improve corporate performance. As the head of BlackRock’s Corporate Governance and Responsible Investor team recently commented, “We can have very productive and credible conversations with managements and boards about a range of issues—governance, performance and strategy.”

Increasing Activist Campaigns Generally; More Challenger Success. The increasing number of activist campaigns challenging incumbent boards—and the increasing success by challengers—creates an encouraging market environment for operational activism. According to ISS, the resurgence of contested board elections, which began in 2012, continued into the 2013 proxy season. Proxy contests to replace some or all incumbent directors went from 9 in the first half of 2009 to 19 in the first half of 2012 and 24 in the first half of 2013. And the dissident win rate has increased significantly, from 43% in 2012 to 70% in 2013. Additionally, in July 2013, Citigroup reported that the number of $1 billion + activist campaigns was expected to reach over 90 for 2013, about 50% more than in 2012.

Attractive Investment Returns; Increasing Sophistication and Credibility. While this form of activism has certainly shown mixed results in recent periods (Pershing Square’s substantial losses in both J.C. Penney and Target have been among the most well-publicized examples of failed initiatives), the overall recent returns have been strong. Accordingly to Hedge Fund Research in Chicago, activist hedge funds were up 9.6% for the first half of 2013, and they returned an average of nearly 13% between 2009 and 2012.

In many instances, these activists develop sophisticated and detailed business and strategic analyses—which are presented in “white papers” that are provided to boards and managements and often broadly disseminated—that enhance their credibility and help secure the support, it not of management, of other institutional shareholders.

Increasing Investment Capital Available; Greater Mainstream Institutional Support. The increasing ability of activist hedge funds to raise new money not only bolsters their firepower, but also operates to further solidify the support they garner from the mainstream institutional investor community (a principal source of their investment base). According to Hedge Fund Research, total assets under management by activist hedge funds has doubled in the past four years to $84 billion today. And through August this year their 2013 inflows reached $4.7 billion, the highest inflows since 2006. Particularly noteworthy in this regard, Pershing Square’s recent $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals was funded in part with capital raised for a standalone fund dedicated specifically to Air Products, without disclosing the target’s name to investors.

In addition to making capital available, mainstream institutions are demonstrating greater support for these activists more generally. In a particularly interesting vote earlier this year, at the May annual meeting of Timken Co., 53% of the shareholders voting supported the non-binding shareholder proposal to split the company in two, which had been submitted jointly by Relational Investors (holding a 6.9% stake) and pension fund CalSTRS (holding 0.4%). To build shareholder support for their proposal, Relational and CalSTRS reached out to investors both in person and through the internet. Relational ran a website (unlocktimken . com) including detailed presentations and supportive analyst reports. They also secured the support of ISS and Glass Lewis. Four months after the vote, in September, Timken announced that it had decided to spin off its steel-making business.

The Timken case is but one example of the leading and influential proxy advisory firms to institutional investors increasingly supporting activists. Their activist support has been particularly noticeable in the context of activists seeking board representation in nominating a minority of directors to boards.

These changes suggest a developing blurring of the lines between activists and mainstream institutions. And it may be somewhat reminiscent of the evolution of unsolicited takeovers, which were largely shunned by the established business and financial communities in the early 1980s, although once utilized by a few blue-chip companies they soon became a widely accepted acquisition technique.

Weakened Board-Controlled Defenses; Increasing Communication Among Shareholders. The largely successful efforts over the past decade by certain pension funds and other shareholder-oriented organizations to press for declassifying boards, redeeming poison pills and adopting majority voting in director elections have diminished the defenses available to boards in resisting change of control initiatives and other activist challenges. Annual board elections and the availability of “withhold” voting in the majority voting context increases director vulnerability to investor pressure.

And shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders and their representative organizations, are better organized today for taking action in particular situations. The increasing and more sophisticated forms of communication among shareholders—including through the use of social media—is part of the broader trend towards greater dialogue between mainstream institutions and their activist counterparts. In his recent op-ed article in The Wall Street Journal, Carl Icahn said he would use social media to make more shareholders aware of their rights and how to protect them, writing that he had set up a Twitter account for that purpose (with over 80,000 followers so far) and that he was establishing a forum called the Shareholders Square Table to further these aims.

Corporate Boards and Managements More Inclined to Engage with Activists. The several developments referenced above have together contributed to the greater willingness today of boards and managements to engage in dialogue with activists who take investments in their companies, and to try to avoid actual proxy contests.

One need only look at the recent DuPont and Microsoft situations to have a sense of this evolution toward engagement and dialogue. After Trian surfaced with its investment in DuPont, the company’s spokesperson said in August 2013: “We are aware of Trian’s investment and, as always, we routinely engage with our shareholders and welcome constructive input. We will evaluate any ideas Trian may have in the context of our ongoing initiatives to build a higher value, higher growth company for our shareholders.” Also in August, Microsoft announced its agreement with ValueAct to allow the activist to meet regularly with the company’s management and selected directors and give the activist a board seat next year; thereby avoiding a potential proxy contest for board representation by ValueAct. Soon thereafter, on September 17, Microsoft announced that it would raise its quarterly dividend by 22% and renew its $40 billion share buyback program; with the company’s CFO commenting that this reflected Microsoft’s continued commitment to returning cash to its shareholders.

What to Expect Ahead

The confluence of the factors identified above has accelerated the recent expansion of operational activism, and there is no reason in the current market environment to expect that this form of activism will abate in the near term. In fact, the likelihood is that it will continue to expand… Looking ahead, we fully expect to see continuing efforts to press for the structural governance reforms that have been pursued over the past several years. Campaigns to separate the Chair and CEO roles at selected companies will likely continue to draw attention as they did most prominently this year at JPMorgan Chase. And executive compensation will remain an important subject of investor attention, and of shareholder proposals, at many companies where there is perceived to be a lack of alignment between pay and performance. We can also expect that the further development of operational activism, and seeing how boards respond to it, will be a central feature of the governance landscape in the year ahead.

Finding Value in Shareholder Activism (clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu)

The Corporate Social Responsibility Report and Effective Stakeholder Engagement (venitism.blogspot.com)

The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Shareholder activism on the rise in Canada (business.financialpost.com)

Dealing With Activist Hedge Funds (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

American Activist Investors Get Ready To Invade Europe (forbes.com)

Activist Investors Help Companies, Not Workers – Bloomberg (bloomberg.com)

The Separation of Ownership from Ownership (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Réflexions capitales pour les Boards en 2014 – The Harvard Law School (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance by Paul Rose, Bernard S. Sharfman (togovern.wordpress.com)

Références en gouvernance pour les administrateurs et les directeurs généraux d’OBNL

Dans cet article paru sur mon blogue l’an dernier, je soulignais que de plus en plus d’administrateurs d’organisations à but non lucratif (OBNL) sont intéressés à en savoir davantage sur les règles de gouvernance et sur les modes de fonctionnement de ces types d’organisations.

Chez les professionnels de la gestion ainsi que chez les membres d’ordres professionnels, rares sont ceux qui ne sont pas membres de conseils d’administration d’OBNL. Il existe plusieurs entreprises québécoises qui s’intéressent aux OBNL, mais il y en a une qui se consacre en priorité à la formation des membres de ces organisations avec beaucoup de succès et qui a publié des volumes qui sont devenus, au fil des ans, des références auprès des administrateurs et des directeurs généraux d’organismes à but non lucratif.

Je vous invite à consulter le lien ci-dessous pour en connaître davantage portant sur la formation et sur les publications la gouvernance de ce type d’organisation très répandu.

La gouvernance et le C.A. (OSBL)

“Quand vous acceptez un poste d’administrateur, savez-vous à quoi vous vous engagez ? Est-ce que les associations et les organismes sans but lucratif ont des règles de bonne gouvernance ? Est-ce que la reddition de compte se fait de façon responsable ? Face au déficit d’imputabilité dans notre société, les associations et autres organismes sans but lucratif, tant privés que publics, ont peu de pratiques de performance leur permettant d’assurer leur crédibilité et d’inspirer confiance”.

Série Gouvernance – Guides pratiques

Les Guides pratiques pour une Gouvernance Stratégique ® se veulent des publications qui abordent des aspects sensibles de la gestion d’OSBL et pour lesquelles on retrouve moins facilement des réponses. La série comprendra, au fil des années, une dizaine de titres.

Message aux abonnés du blogue ainsi qu’aux membres du groupe « Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance » de LinkedIn

Chers membres et abonnés,

Voici, au 26 décembre 2013, certaines informations concernant notre blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé ainsi qu’un message de notre groupe de discussion LinkedIn Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance.

1. Le blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé

Depuis le début de la parution du blogue, le 19 juillet, j’ai publié 820 billets en gouvernance et suscité l’intérêt d’environ 75 000 personnes. Le blogue a eu trois fois plus de visiteurs dans la dernière année. Beaucoup d’abonnés au blogue se servent de l’outil de recherche (situé au bas de la page) afin d’obtenir des informations pertinentes et d’actualité sur leurs questionnements en gouvernance. À ce stade-ci, mon objectif est d’avoir plus de 50 000 visiteurs pour l’année 2014.

Le référencement se fait principalement par LinkedIn (43 %) et par des engins de recherche tels que Google (43 %); le reste (14 %) se réparti entre plusieurs autres réseaux sociaux.

Le partage des billets se fait par l’intermédiaire de LinkedIn (40 %), Twitter (29 %), Facebook (22 %) et Tumblr (9 %).

Le site est fréquenté par des visiteurs provenant :

du Canada (59 %)
de la France (20 %) (incluant Suisse et Belgique)
du Magreb (4 %) (Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie)
d’autres pays de diverses provenance (17 %).

J’en profite pour remercier à nouveau tous les lecteurs qui, par leurs votes, ont exprimé leur appréciation du blogue lors du concours organisé par Made In Blog (MiB) à l’échelle canadienne. Notre blogue a obtenu la deuxième position parmi les soixante-cinq (65) blogues de la catégorie Business/marketing/médias sociaux, le seul candidat finaliste dans le domaine de la gouvernance. Nous sommes honorés de cette marque de reconnaissance.

Blog Image

Rappelons que ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets, « posts », est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revues, des blogues et sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.

Chaque jour, je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernance dans le monde francophone, en fournissant aux lecteurs une mine de renseignements récents (les billets quotidiens) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes

2. Le groupe de discussion sur LinkedIn | Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance

Notre groupe de discussion sur LinkedIn, Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance, sous l’égide du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), a connu une croissance remarquable au cours des dernières années, passant de 372 membres, au 1er septembre 2012, à 858 membres au 26 décembre 2013.

Notre objectif est de demeurer le groupe francophone de référence en gouvernance le plus actif et le plus influent en 2014 sur LinkedIn.

Au cours de cette période, nous avons réussi à maintenir un haut niveau de respect dans nos échanges, et à provoquer de saines discussions sur des thèmes relatifs à la gouvernance de tous les types d’entreprises évoluant dans des environnements règlementaires différents (USA, CANADA, UK, UE).

En tant qu’administrateur et contributeur principal de ce groupe, je vous remercie vivement de vos contributions à l’avancement des connaissances dans le domaine de la gouvernance.

Au nom du CAS, et en mon nom personnel, je vous souhaite un excellent temps des Fêtes et une année 2014 à la hauteur de vos aspirations.

Merci encore de votre présence soutenue au blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé ainsi qu’au groupe de discussion Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance du CAS.

8 Ways to Track Your Social Media Performance (financialsocialmedia.com)

LinkedIn: The 25 Hottest Skills That Got People Hired in 2013 (alexfreelancer.wordpress.com)

Un exercice de remue-méninge pour repenser les règles de « bonne gouvernance »

Aujourd’hui, veille de Noel, je vous présente les sommaires des Think-tank produit par Board Intelligence, une firme spécialisée dans les informations sur les conseils d’administration. Celle-ci a tenu une série de débats sur la réinvention des règles de gouvernance en demandant aux panels de se prononcer sur la question suivante :

“If you could rip up the rule book, what would good governance look like ?”

Voici les résumés des résultats les plus remarquables présentés dans FT.com. Bonne lecture et Joyeux Noel !

Think-tank searches for good governance

Stressing the importance of company boards can weaken the sense of accountability among management and staff, according to participants in a recent debate.

They agreed there is a strong case for saying an organisation lives or dies by the actions and inactions of its management team, rather than the board, and that employees were a better indicator of how a company is run than scrutiny of the board.

An alternative boardroom model was suggested, drawing on the way some executive committees operate, where the chief executive seeks consultation rather than consensus. Perhaps the chairman could have a similar function.

Chairmen of the Bored (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

This might also reflect the reality of the near-impossible task faced by non-executive directors. One participant said: “A non-executive is on a hiding to nothing – and to do the job properly, they need smaller portfolios and better pay. When things go wrong, they can expect to be tried in the court of public opinion.”

It was argued that this is becoming such a trend that many talented candidates are no longer willing to take on the role. “I wouldn’t take a non-executive role in a big and complex global bank. The mismatch between what you are accountable for and your ability to affect it is enormous,” one commented.

“To do the job of the non-exec properly you have to get out of the boardroom and into the organisation. You have to experience the business for yourself and not just take management’s word for it.”

There were also complaints about the amount of time required to do the job of the non-executive: “It’s not 12 days a year at £1,500 per day – it’s at least 30 days. Given the opportunity cost of what an accomplished person could be doing with their time, and given the risk you carry as a non-executive, why do it?”

If we don’t go so far as to rip up the governance rule book, at least we should make it shorter, they agreed. Rules will always have unintended consequences and breed perverse outcomes – and fear of falling foul of the rules can
lead boards to document as little as possible to maintain “plausible deniability”.

At a subsequent debate it was proposed there should be a register to name and shame – and praise – the performance of non-executives. At present, shareholders’ opinion of a non-executive and their decision on re-electing them is based on gut feeling. A public register would be helpful in forming a judgment, listing statistics about the number of boards the non-executive is on, the time they allocate to each and notable events that took place on their watch

There are chairmen with such large portfolios they could not possibly allocate sufficient time to each board, they argued. A public register would make this much more transparent.

Débats entre cinq présidents de conseils et un PCD

The five chairmen and chief executives attending a recent think-tank discussion accepted that even improved boards cannot prevent all corporate crises and expressed concern at this overly “defensive” role. They argued that “stopping bad things happening” must be tempered by helping “good things happen”.

The participants agreed that non-executives must have the confidence to challenge the chairman and chief executive. One said: “Having sat on the board of my employer as an executive, I have come to the conclusion that it is a hopeless role. When the chief executive is sitting opposite, it is fairly obvious how you’re supposed to respond to the question ‘what do you think?’

“Board meetings are not a good use of time. We don’t question why we’re doing what we’re doing.”

The group concluded that “small is beautiful: small boards, small briefing packs, small agenda, and small rule book”.

At a subsequent dinner, also attended by chairmen and chief executives, a call was made for boards to be more realistic about their limitations and to be more discerning about where they focus their efforts

For example, boards attempt to scrutinise specific investment decisions when the information they can absorb and the time available for discussion mean substantive challenge or insights are unlikely.

On the other hand, it was pointed out that boards are also held liable for the detail as well as the big picture. Even so, attempting to meet these conflicting responsibilities by “clogging up the board agenda with too many matters to explore properly” cannot be the answer, they agreed.

The participants argued that the governance rule book is ineffective and that boards should instead be subject to an annual review of their effectiveness.

A need for “better memories, rather than better rules or regulations”, was stressed and the recommendation that non-executives should stand down after nine years was criticised for institutionalising the short-term memory of the boardroom.

One said: “When our bank repeated its mistakes from the early 1990s, it wasn’t the bank that suffered from amnesia – it was just the board.”

The chairmen and chief executives concluded that UK business suffers from a short-term “sell-out” culture. It was argued that in the US, business leaders who are successful will strive to be yet more successful and in Germany, successful businesses are nurtured for the next generation. But in the UK, business people aspire to have just enough to “retire to the Old Rectory”. One said: “We lack the ambition – or greed – of the Americans and we don’t feel the duty of the Germans. We need to raise the level of ambition – and sense of duty.”

Débats entre présidents de conseils

Boards are failing at strategy and becoming increasingly focused on costs, according to a think-tank debate attended by chairmen. One said: “We need the conversation in the boardroom to be two levels ‘higher’. Many of our largest companies are sitting on cash and they need to get back to strategy and invest in the future – or there won’t be one.”

It was suggested that advisory boards, unfettered by concerns of liability and governance, might be better at tackling strategy – and might attract creative people who would otherwise be put off joining boards by the burden of governance.

The chairmen also asked whether more of a board’s work could be handled by committees, as they can be more focused and effective.

They also questioned whether age and experience should continue to take precedence over training and education when appointing board members. One view was that boardroom skills are becoming more specialised and need to be learned.

Regulators came under fire from the chairmen. They were accused of not understanding the businesses they are regulating and of treating non-executives as executives.

The meeting also referred to the spread of regulation from the financial services sector. One said: “We have a two-tier corporate world: financial services and the rest. But what starts as regulation of financial services bleeds through to the rest.”

The participants warned that because boards are out of touch with society, there is a danger of a backlash and the emergence of an “anti-business” movement.

The relationship between society and business was also raised at a subsequent debate. One view was that the future of the corporation depends on it being redesigned and finance returned to its proper, subservient role of supporting the wider economy.

All businesses should demonstrate public benefit – just as charities have to show a public benefit in return for charitable status, businesses should do the same, perhaps in return for limited liability status.

Another view was that voluntary sector leaders should be encouraged to join corporate boards, because of their specific skills, including in reputation and risk management.

Participants went on to call for younger, more vibrant boards. “You should see the faces of the future – not just the past,” said one. The concern that young executives are too busy to join boards was rejected and some chairmen were blamed for claiming to support diversity of age but then not allowing their executives to join someone else’s board.

It was also argued that businesses and boards need permission to fail. “What business or person can achieve great things without the possibility of failure?” one asked.

Vous pouvez lire les résultats des dix autres débats en vous référant à l’article en référence.

How to measure a post-2015 MDG on good governance (post2015.org)

Liens étroits entre les PCD (CEO) et les administrateurs des comités d’audit

Voici un article choc publié par Dena Aubin et diffusé par l’agence Reuters le 10 décembre 2013. Il est ici question d’une recherche universitaire menée par deux professeurs de l’Université de Tilburg aux Pays-Bas qui montre que 40 % des administrateurs responsables de la supervision des affaires financières entretiennent des liens sociaux très étroits avec la haute direction de l’entreprise, laissant une impression de non-indépendance et de possibilité de conflit d’intérêt entre des personnes qui ont des liens d’amitié et d’affinité.

De là à penser que ces administrateurs seront plus susceptibles d’adopter des positions plus favorables à la direction, il n’y a qu’un pas à franchir. Et les chercheurs n’ont pas hésité à pousser leur investigation dans ce sens.

L’étude montre que ces situations de « proximité » peuvent donner lieu à de plus faibles contrôles financiers, notamment à des manipulations comptables, suivies de tentatives d’étouffer la vérité.

Ce sont des études comme celle-ci qui amène les autorités règlementaires à resserrer les critères d’indépendance des membres des comités d’audit.

Bonne lecture; vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Clubby ties between U.S. CEOs and board audit committees: study

NEW YORK (Reuters) – Almost 40 percent of U.S. corporate directors with responsibility for monitoring the profit-and-loss ledger have social ties to the chief executive, a study says, making them look more like lapdogs than watchdogs.

Conducted by two accounting professors at Tilburg University in The Netherlands, the study reinforces long-held perceptions of a clubby culture on U.S. corporate boards, where members seldom challenge the executives they are meant to police.

The study looked at about 2,000 U.S. companies and their board audit committees, which are responsible for overseeing outside auditors and making sure financial reports are accurate. It found that personal friends of senior managers were often appointed to these committees, making the directors more likely to go along with the company’s reporting practices.

Where that was the case, earnings manipulation was more frequent and problems such as weak financial controls were covered up, the study found.

Tilburg University (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Regulations put in place over a decade ago after accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom required audit committees to be made up only of independent directors. That meant they were never employed by the company or a firm doing business with it.

Even so, audit committee members often have long-standing social ties to executives, belonging to the same elite clubs or charity boards, the study found.

« Although such firms appear to have independent audit committees, in reality these committees offer little to no monitoring at all, » the study found.

The study, by accounting professors Liesbeth Bruynseels and Eddy Cardinaels, researched social ties with BoardEx, a business intelligence service. It appears in the January 2014 issue of the American Accounting Association’s Accounting Review.

The professors suggested that legislators consider requiring more disclosure about social connections between audit committees and CEOs, given the committees’ importance.

Charles Elson, director of the Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance in Newark, Delaware, said it would be difficult for regulators to define social ties.

« Is it one lunch a week, is it two lunches? Inevitably, social ties will develop when you’re on a board – you have to see that person on a regular basis, » he said.

The United States made a major push to improve audit committees’ effectiveness with the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which tightened membership requirements.

More recently, regulators in Europe and the United Kingdom have been trying to get audit committees to be more rigorous in choosing outside auditors and monitoring them.

Clubby ties between U.S. CEOs and board audit committees-study (xe.com)

Le comité de gouvernance du C.A. | Élément clé d’une solide stratégie (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

US audit watchdog reviving controversial plan to require firms to disclose names of people who work on audits – @Reuters (reuters.com)

Business Basics – Corporate Audits (business2community.com)

Auditors told to up their game by Financial Reporting Council (theguardian.com)

Le point sur la gouvernance au Canada | Rapport de Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg

Le rapport annuel de Davies est toujours très attendu car il brosse un tableau très complet de l’évolution de la gouvernance au Canada. De plus, c’est un document publié en français.

Je vous invite donc à en prendre connaissance en lisant le court résumé ci-dessous et, si vous voulez en savoir plus sur les thèmes abordés, vous pouvez télécharger le document sur le site de l’entreprise.

Cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous. Bonne lecture !

Le point sur la gouvernance au Canada | Rapport de Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg

Rapport de Davies sur la gouvernance 2013

Depuis la diversité au sein des conseils jusqu’aux risques liés aux marchés émergents, en passant par l’activisme actionnarial, cette troisième édition du Rapport de Davies sur la gouvernance, notre compte rendu annuel, analyse l’actualité sur de nombreuses questions d’intérêt pour les conseils d’administration et les observateurs du paysage de la gouvernance au Canada.

Dans le premier chapitre, Administrateurs et conseils d’administration, nous faisons le point sur l’évolution de la composition des conseils d’administration au Canada, les appels à la diversité au sein de ces conseils et des équipes de direction ainsi que les idées proposées par les autorités de réglementation et les investisseurs à cet égard. Dans le chapitre intitulé Rémunération des membres de la haute direction et des administrateurs, nous faisons état de la popularité grandissante du vote consultatif sur la rémunération de la haute direction et proposons des mesures que peuvent prendre les conseils d’administration pour éviter d’être pris de court par le résultat d’un tel vote. Dans le chapitre intitulé Questions relatives au vote des actionnaires, nous nous intéressons aux nouveautés concernant la question de l’intégrité du vote des actionnaires au Canada, les initiatives de réglementation des agences de conseil en vote et la pratique du vote à la majorité parmi les émetteurs. Dans le chapitre intitulé Initiatives des actionnaires, nous mettons en lumière les tendances et les questions d’actualité comme l’« achat de votes », la rémunération offerte aux administrateurs par les dissidents et le « vote vide » ainsi que les règlements de préavis. Dans le chapitre intitulé Surveillance des risques : les activités sur les marchés émergents, nous examinons comment les émetteurs gèrent les risques associés à leurs activités sur les marchés émergents ainsi que les nouveautés importantes touchant la législation et la mise en application de la loi en matière de lutte contre la corruption. Enfin, dans le chapitre intitulé Régimes de droits : gouvernance et changement de contrôle, nous analysons les deux cadres de réglementation des régimes de droits en situation de prise de contrôle proposés cette année par les autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières.

Pour consulter le sommaire, cliquez ici. Pour lire le document complet, cliquez ici.

La réforme européenne de la pratique de l’audit

Vous trouverez ci-dessous un condensé de l’entente intervenue par les institutions européennes concernant la réforme de l’audit. Ce résumé nous est transmis par ecoDa- The European Confederation of Directors’ Associations, dont le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) est l’un des membres affiliés.

Cette entente fait suite au billet du 12 décembre, (Une réglementation pour accroître l’indépendance des firmes d’audit) où on annonçait certaines modifications sur la table à dessin des autorités réglementaires des É.U. et de l’union européenne.

Voici donc un bref résumé suivi d’une présentation sommaire des principaux changements convenus. À la suite de cet article d’ecoDa, vous trouverez le point de vue de Julia Irvine présenté dans Economia. Bonne lecture !

Yesterday, the European institutions managed to get a provisional agreement in trilogue on the reform of the audit sector. With the agreement, audit firms will be required to rotate every 10 years. Public interest entities will only be able to extend the audit tenure once, upon tender. Under this measure, joint audit will also be encouraged. To avoid the risk of self-review, several non-audit services are prohibited under a strict ‘black list’, including stringent limits on tax advice and on services linked to the financial and investment strategy of the audit client. In addition, a cap on the provision of non-audit services is introduced.

Audit reform

1. A clarified societal role for auditors

Increased audit quality : In order to reduce the ‘expectation gap’ between what is expected from auditors and what they are bound to deliver, the new rules will require auditors to produce more detailed and informative audit reports, with a required focus on relevant information to investors.

Enhanced transparency : Strict transparency requirements will be introduced for auditors with stronger reporting obligations vis-à-vis supervisors. Increased communication between auditors and the audit committee of an audited entity is requested.

Better accountability : The work of auditors will be closely supervised by audit committees, whose competences are strengthened. In addition, the package introduces the possibility for 5% of the shareholders of the company to initiate actions to dismiss the auditors. A set of administrative sanctions that can be applied by the competent authorities is also foreseen for breaches of the new rules.

2. A strong independence regime

Mandatory rotation of audit firms : Audit firms will be required to rotate after an engagement period of 10 years. After maximum 10 years, the period can be extended by up to 10 additional years if tenders are carried out, and by up to 14 additional years in case of joint audit, i.e. if the company being audited appoints more than one audit firm to carry out its audit. A calibrated transitional period taking into account the duration of the audit engagement is foreseen to avoid a cliff effect following the entry into force of the new rules.

Prohibition of certain non-audit services : Audit firms will be strictly prohibited from providing non-audit services to their audit clients, including stringent limits on tax advice and services linked to the financial and investment strategy of the audit client. This aims to limit risk of conflicts of interest, when auditors are involved in decisions impacting the management of a company. This will also substantially limit the ‘self-review’ risks for auditors.

Cap on the provision of non-audit services: To reduce the risks of conflicts of interest, the new rules will introduce a cap of 70% on the fees generated for non-audit services others than those prohibited based on a three-year average at the group level.

3. A more dynamic and competitive EU audit market

A Single Market for statutory audit : The new rules will provide a level playing field for auditors at EU level through enhanced cross-border mobility and the harmonisation of International Standards on Auditing (ISAs).

More choice : In order to promote competition, the new rules prohibit restrictive ‘Big Four only’ third party clauses imposed on companies. Incentives for joint audit and tendering will be introduced, and a proportionate application of the rules will be applied to avoid extra burden for small and mid-tier audit firms. Tools to monitor the concentration of the audit market will be reinforced.

Enhanced supervision of the audit sector : Cooperation between national supervisors will be enhanced at EU level, with a specific role devoted to the European Markets and Securities Authority (ESMA) with regard to international cooperation on audit oversight.

Voici également le point de vue de Julia Irvine présenté dans Economia.

EU bodies compromise on audit reform

Listed companies will have to tender their audit every 10 years and rotate auditors every 20 years after trilogue agreement was reached this morning on a package of audit reform measures

Certain non-audit services – such as some tax and corporate finance advice – which impact on an audit client’s financial and investment strategy, will be banned, and shareholders will find it easier to initiate action to get the auditors dismissed.

The measures, which were agreed between the European Parliament and the Lithuanian EU presidency, still have to be approved later this week by COREPER, the committee of permanent representatives of the member states. The European Parliament will then have to formally adopt the text next year.

Negotiations over audit reform reached stalemate earlier this month and led to the decision by British MEP and lead rapporteur Sajjad Karim to cancel scheduled trilogue discussions “because of a lack of will by some parties to compromise”. The major sticking points were mandatory rotation of auditors and non-audit services.

However, the breakthrough came today, thanks to “constructive efforts from all sides to find a way forward”, Karim said, adding that the compromise on a 20-year timespan for rotation was workable and a “considerable improvement on the commission’s original proposal”.

The agreed measures ensure that auditors will be key contributors to economic and financial stability through increased audit quality, stronger independence requirements and more open and dynamic EU audit market.

Other measures under the agreement include extending companies that have joint auditors can extend the 20 years to 24 and a four-year transitional period to avoid every company going out to tender at the same time.

Auditors will be prohibited from providing certain non-audit services to audit clients, including “stringent limits” on tax advice and services. The measures also include a 70% cap on fees from all other non-audit services, based on a three-year average at group level.

Big Four only clauses are banned and incentives for joint audit and tendering (as yet unspecified) are to be introduced. It is also intended that the rules will be applied proportionately to avoid extra burdens on small and mid-tier audit firms.

Auditors will have to provide more detailed and informative audit reports, focusing on relevant information for investors, they will be bound by strict transparency requirements in their communications with supervisors and will generally be required to talk more often to a client’s audit committee.

Shareholders will be able to start action to dismiss the auditors, provided 5% of them collaborate.

Finally, the package of measures will ensure a level playing field for auditors throughout the European Union through enhanced cross-border mobility and harmonisation of international auditing standards.

EU commissioner Michel Barnier hailed the outline agreement as “the first step towards increasing audit quality and re-establishing investor confidence in financial information, an essential ingredient for investment and economic growth in Europe”.

Auditors, he said, played an important societal role by providing stakeholders with an accurate reflection of the veracity of companies’ financial statements. “However, a number of banks were given clean bills of health despite huge losses from 2007 onwards. In relation to the real economy, inspection reports from the member states revealed lack of professional scepticism by auditors, misstatements and a lack of fresh thinking in the audits of major companies because of the average long-lasting relationship between the auditor and their clients.

“Taken all together, the agreed measures ensure that auditors will be key contributors to economic and financial stability through increased audit quality, stronger independence requirements and more open and dynamic EU audit markets.”

Karim added, “The European Parliament is optimistic that the proposal can be approved by a majority of member states and MEPs, considering it is a balanced compromise that will go a long way towards restoring confidence in the audit market.”

Initial reaction from the profession to the news was cautious. ICAEW chief executive Michael Izza said that after three years of debate and hard work, there was now hope that the follow-up work might be achieved before the EU elections on 22 May next year.

“Focus now needs to move to the transition and practical implications,” he said. “It is important not to underestimate the considerable practical impact the reform package will have, not only on the auditing profession but also on companies across the EU.

“It will take time for everybody involved – the profession, business, regulators – to work through the details and get to grips with all the changes.”

EU agrees rules to overhaul auditing firms (irishtimes.com)

EU in preliminary deal on audit reform (irishtimes.com)

US audit watchdog reviving controversial plan to require firms to disclose names of people who work on audits – @Reuters (reuters.com)

Les PDG d’OBNL doivent-ils (ou doivent-elles) être membres de leurs C.A. ?

Quels sont les pratiques exemplaires de gouvernance eu égard à l’appartenance des PDG (DG/CEO) aux conseils d’administration de leurs organisations, plus particulièrement des OBNL ?

C’est l’une des recherches les plus effectuées sur Google avec plus de cinq millions de références reliées à ce sujet… On note également des discussions très animées sur les groupes de discussion LinkedIn, tels que Non-Profit Management Professionals.

C’est un sujet très populaire et, comme vous vous en doutez, les avis diffèrent largement en fonction du (1) type d’organisation, (1) de son histoire, (3) de sa mission et (4) des obligations règlementaires.

Dans certaines organisations à but non lucratif, le ou la PDG siège au conseil d’administration mais, à mon avis, ce n’est pas le cas pour la plupart des associations de bénévoles, des fondations et des entreprises philanthropiques. Une recherche rapide montre que les PDG ne siègent pas sur des entreprises telles que la Croix Rouge canadienne, le Festival d’été de Québec, Centraide du grand Montréal, le Club Musical, l’OSQ, Musique de chambre à Sainte-Pétronille, l’Ordre des administrateurs agréés du Québec, pour n’en nommer que quelques-unes.

Généralement, si la législation ou la réglementation l’autorise, c’est au conseil d’administration de décider si le ou la PDG a le statut de membre du C.A., avec plein droit de vote, ou sans droit de vote. On observe que certaines législations américaines (la Californie, notamment) ne permettent pas aux PDG de voter à titre de membres du conseil. Au Québec, c’est le cas du CLD de Québec, par exemple.

Dans les sociétés d’état québécoises, les PDG sont nommé(e)s par le gouvernement sur recommandation du C.A.; les PDG siègent habituellement de plein droit sur les conseils d’administration. Dans le monde municipal, les DG ne sont pas membres des conseils municipaux, des MRC et des CRÉ.

Comme on le constate, un tour d’horizon rapide indique qu’il y a plusieurs possibilités : (1) le ou la PDG est membre à part entière du C.A., (2) le ou la PDG est membre du C.A., mais sans droit de vote, (3) le ou la PDG n’est pas membre du C.A. Dans presque tous les cas cependant, les PDG assistent aux réunions du conseil à titre de personnes ressource, même sans être membres du C.A.

Afin de bien départager les rôles complémentaires exercés par les membres du conseil et les membres de la direction et éviter les conflits qui pourraient naître dans certaines zones d’intérêt, notamment dans le domaine lié aux rémunérations, il m’apparaît être une bonne pratique de gouvernance de ne pas accorder un statut de membre du conseil d’administration à un ou une PDG.

Pour les organisations qui vivent avec une situation particulière, il serait souhaitable que le C.A., par l’intermédiaire du ou de la PCA, mette en œuvre une stratégie de changement (à plus ou moins long terme) pour revoir cet aspect de leur gouvernance.

L’article ci-dessous publié par Eugene Fram, Professeur émérite au Saunders College of Business du Rochester Institute of Technology, explique un peu la situation. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Voici un extrait de l’article :

Should a Nonprofit CEO Be a Voting Member of the Board of Directors ?

Here are the issues as I see them:

State Legislation: Most nonprofit charters are issued by states, and it appears that the vast majority of American nonprofits are governed by these regulations. California does not permit the CEO to be a voting member. Until a recent change, New York did allow the CEO to become a board member. The motivations behind the legislation center on preventing a CEO developing conflicts-of interest, especially as they relate to salary decisions. Also, there is a feeling among some nonprofit directors that the board must be the « boss. » This attitude can even go as far as one nonprofit board member’s comment: « We tell the CEO exactly what to do. »

Français : Sainte Prétonille, Île d’Orléans, province de Québec, Canada (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

It appears that the restriction is considered a « best practice. » Some nonprofits move around it by naming the CEO an ex-official member of the board, a member without a vote. However, there is a « better practice, » available where permitted by legislation.

Developing An Even Better Practice in a Nonprofit

Start At The Top: Allow the CEO to hold the title of President/CEO and allow the senior volunteer to become board chair. This signals to staff and public that the board has full faith in the CEO as a professional manager. In addition, the change absolves the senior volunteer of potential financial liability, not unlike the volunteer who unwittingly received a $200,000 bill from the IRS because it appeared he had strong control of a bankrupt nonprofit’s finances and operations.

Ask The CEO: Make certain the CEO is willing and able to accept full responsibility for operations. Not all CEOs, designated as Executive Directors, want the increased responsibilities attached to such a title and to become a board member. These managers only feel comfortable with having the board micromanage operations and often openly discuss their reservations.

The CEO Becomes A Communications Nexus: Under the CEO’s guidance, board-staff contact takes place on task forces, strategic planning projects, at board orientations and at organization celebrations. It openly discourages the staff making « end runs » to board members, not a small problem in community-focused nonprofits

Brand Image: As a board director, the CEO can be more active in fund development. The board position and the title can easily help the CEO to build the organization’s public brand image through the clear public perceptions of the board’s choice to lead the organization. This provides leverage to make greater use of the board-CEO relationship required to develop funds. It can allow the CEO to be the spokesperson for the organization’s mission.

Peer Not Powerhouse: Probably descending from early religious nonprofits, its personnel may be seen by part of the public as not being « worldly. » They must be over-viewed by a group of laypersons that encounters the real world daily. The CEO, as a voting member and a team peer, takes on increasing importance to reducing these attitudes. As long as the CEO works successfully as a peer not a powerhouse, there should be substantial benefits to the organization.

Once Again! Should a Nonprofit CEO Be a Voting Member of the Board of Directors? (huffingtonpost.com)

Nonprofit Board Chair and CEO (nonprofitboardcrisis.typepad.com)

Le comité de gouvernance du C.A. | Élément clé d’une solide stratégie (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Say On Pay : Comparaisons internationales et bonnes pratiques

Aujourd’hui, on fait le point sur le Say on Pay en France. Le numéro de décembre 2013 du Bulletin de l’IFA présente, à la une, un bon compte rendu du rapport de la Commission Internationale de l’IFA. Bonne lecture !

Say On Pay : Comparaisons internationales et bonnes pratiques

La Commission Internationale de l’IFA publie aujourd’hui le rapport de son groupe de travail sur « Say on Pay : Comparaisons internationales et bonnes pratiques » en versions française et anglaise, disponibles dès à présent sur le site de l’IFA.

La Commission Européenne a inscrit le SOP dans son « Action plan : European company law and corporate governance ». En France, le SOP, sous forme d’un vote annuel consultatif de l’Assemblée Générale sur les rémunérations versées aux dirigeants mandataires sociaux, a constitué l’une des principales innovations du nouveau code Afep-Medef publié en Juin 2013.

European Commission (Photo credit: tiseb)

Au moment où les grandes entreprises françaises vont se doter d’un tel système, le rapport apporte une valeur ajoutée pratique avec :

• une vision synthétique et comparée des modalités opérationnelles de mise en application du Say On Pay dans une vingtaine de pays de cultures diverses et de maturités différentes sur ce sujet : cette comparaison internationale a été réalisée avec l’appui des réseaux d’Ecoda (The European Confederation of Directors Associations) et de la CCI Paris Ile-de-France (Chambre de commerce et d’industrie de région Paris Ile-de-France),

• une dizaine de bonnes pratiques identifiées comme permettant un fonctionnement efficient du SOP, à partir d’interviews, essentiellement auprès des membres du Club IFA des présidents de comités des rémunérations, complétées par des échanges avec quelques institutions de place, notamment l’Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF).

Des conseils d’administration défaillants ? Crise de gouvernance …

Très bon questionnement d’Yvan Allaire, président exécutif du conseil, IGOPP dans le Devoir. Voici l’introduction de l’article :

Des conseils d’administration défaillants ? | Crise de gouvernance dans le secteur public

« De toute évidence, nous vivons une crise de gouvernance dans les institutions et organismes de l’État québécois. Selon des problématiques qui leur sont propres, le Fonds de solidarité, le CHUM, le CUSM, Tourisme Montréal, les universités ont subi de vives critiques pour une gouvernance jugée déficiente, et cette liste n’est ni exhaustive ni achevée.

Comment expliquer ce phénomène, au terme de dix ans d’ergotage sur la gouvernance dans le secteur public ? Les raisons sont trop nombreuses pour en traiter convenablement dans un court texte, mais voici une piste :

La lenteur ou l’incapacité des gouvernements à imposer aux multiples organismes, institutions et entreprises de l’État québécois les mêmes règles et principes de gouvernance auxquels sont soumises depuis 2006 les sociétés d’État.

Rappelons les principales obligations de gouvernance que la loi 53 adoptée en 2006 impose à quelque 23 sociétés ou organismes »

Également, il est très intéressant de lire le billet de Gaétan Frigon dans la Presse qui vient à la défense de M. Parisien.

«Monsieur Montréal»

«Monsieur Montréal»

« En exigeant que Jacques Parisien quitte son poste de Président du conseil d’administration de la Société des célébrations du 375^e anniversaire de Montréal, c’est toute la communauté d’affaires de Montréal que monsieur le maire a insultée en lui envoyant un message lourd de conséquences. D’ailleurs, avant d’aborder la «saga Tourisme Montréal», qui a mené à cette demande de démission, voyons voir qui est Jacques Parisien.

On ne compte plus les millions de dollars recueillis par Jacques Parisien dans des collectes de fonds pour toutes sortes de causes. Dans le milieu, on l’appelle «Monsieur Montréal» tellement il aime cette ville. Il est de tous les combats quand vient le temps de la soutenir, d’en faire la promotion et d’aider ceux qui y vivent ».

Que pensez-vous des arguments invoqués pour défendre le président d’un conseil d’administration ?

Le comité de gouvernance du C.A. | Élément clé d’une solide stratégie (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Les particularités de la gouvernance des entreprises de haute technologie

Voici un billet de David A. Bell, associé de la firme Fenwick & West LLP qui a récemment été publié sur le blogue du Harvard Law School. Ce texte est un résumé de la publication Corporate Governance Practices and Trends: A Comparison of Large Public Companies and Silicon Valley Companies (2013) dont le texte complet est disponible ici.

Depuis 2003, Fenwick fait l’inventaire des pratiques de gouvernance issues des corporations du Standard & Poor’s 100 Index (S&P 100) qui sont pertinentes pour les entreprises de haute technologie cotées de la Silicon Valley 150 Index (SV 150). Vous trouverez dans le document ci-joint des données comparatives, souvent étonnantes et très significatives, entre les deux groupes sur les thèmes suivants :

Composition du conseil d’administration;
Nombre d’administrateurs exécutifs sur le conseil;
Diversité du membership, notamment la proportion de femmes;
La taille et le nombre de réunions du C.A. et de ses comités statutaires;
Les pratiques du « majority voting » et du « board classification »;
L’utilisation de la structure du vote à classes multiples;
Les directives concernant l’actionnariat des administrateurs;
La fréquence ainsi que le nombre de propositions des actionnaires activistes.

Je vous invite à lire cet extrait, puis si vous souhaitez en savoir plus, lisez aussi le résumé du HLS. Enfin, si l’étude détaillée vous intéresse vous pouvez vous procurer le rapport complet ici.

Corporate Governance at Silicon Valley Companies 2013

In each case, comparative data is presented for the S&P 100 companies and for the high technology and life science companies included in the SV 150, as well as trend information over the history of the survey. In a number of instances we also present data showing comparison of the top 15, top 50, middle 50 and bottom 50 companies of the SV 150 (in terms of revenue), illustrating the impact of scale on the relevant governance practices.

Significant Findings

Governance practices and trends (or perceived trends) among the largest companies are generally presented as normative for all public companies. However, it is also somewhat axiomatic that corporate governance practices should be tailored to suit the circumstances of the individual company involved. Among the significant differences between the corporate governance practices of the SV 150 high technology and life science companies and the uniformly large public companies of the S&P 100 are:

English: Apple’s headquarters at Infinite Loop in Cupertino, California, USA. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The number of executive officers tends to be substantially lower in the SV 150 than in the S&P 100 (in the 2013 proxy season, average of 6.5 compared to 11.2). In both groups there has been a long-term, slow but steady decline in the average number of executive officers per company, as well as a narrowing in the range of the number of executive officers in each group.

While there has been a general downward trend in both groups, the SV 150 companies continue to be substantially less likely to have a combined board chair/CEO than S&P 100 companies (in the 2013 proxy season, 37% compared to 72%). Where there is a separate chair, they are also substantially more likely to be a non-insider at SV 150 companies (in the 2013 proxy season, 69% compared to 21%). Lead directors are substantially more common among S&P 100 companies (in the 2013 proxy season, 85% compared to 44%).

The S&P 100 companies tend to have larger boards than SV 150 companies (average of 12.0 compared to average of 8.1 in the 2013 proxy season), and tend toward larger primary committees (audit, compensation and nominating). They are also substantially more likely to have other standing committees (83% of S&P 100 companies do, compared to 23% of SV 150 companies in the 2013 proxy season).

Female directors are substantially more common among S&P 100 companies whether measured in terms of average number of female directors (in the 2013 proxy season, 2.4 compared to 0.8) or in terms of average percentage of each board that are women (in the 2013 proxy season, 19.9% compared to 9.1%). While female board membership peaked among SV 150 companies in the 2008 proxy season (average of 12.3% compared to 17.2% for the S&P 100), the overall trend is clearly upward in both groups (compared to averages of 10.9% in the S&P 100 and 2.1% in the SV 150 in the 1996 proxy season). From the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons, the percentage of companies with no women directors declined from 11% to 2% in the S&P 100 and 82% to 43% in the SV 150.

SV 150 companies continue to have more insiders as a percentage of the full board, while S&P 100 companies continue to have more insider directors measured in absolute numbers (while there has been and longer term downward trend in insiders, both groups have held essentially steady over the past five proxy seasons).

While there is a clear trend toward adoption of some form of majority voting in both groups, the rate of adoption is substantially higher among S&P 100 companies (92% compared to 44% of SV 150 companies in the 2013 proxy season), although it declined 5% from the 2011 proxy season (compared to a 7% increase for the SV 150).

Stock ownership guidelines for executive officers are substantially more common among S&P 100 companies (in the 2013 proxy season, 95% compared to 53%), although that is a substantial increase for both groups over the course of the survey (compared to 58% for the S&P 100 and 8% for the SV 150 in 2004), including a 9% increase in the SV 150 over the last year. Similar trends hold for stock ownership guidelines covering board members (although the S&P 100 percentage is about 20% lower for directors over the period of the survey).

While classified boards used to be similarly common among both groups (about 44% for S&P 100 and 47% for SV 150 in 2004), there has been a marked long-term decline in the rate of their use among S&P 100 companies but not among SV 150 companies (11% for S&P 100 compared to 45% for SV 150 in the 2013 proxy season). Our data shows that within the SV 150, the rate of adoption fairly closely tracks with the size of company (measured by revenue).

Stockholder activism, measured in the form of proposals included in the proxy statements of companies, continues to be substantially lower among the high technology and life science companies in the SV 150 than among S&P 100 companies (whether measured in terms of frequency of inclusion of any such proposals or in terms of number of proposals). However, over the last two proxy seasons, the largest companies in the SV 150 have closed the gap and are now comparable to the S&P 100 in terms of frequency of having a least one such proposal.

Corporate Governance at Silicon Valley (venitism.blogspot.com)

Réflexions capitales pour les Boards en 2014 – The Harvard Law School (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

2013 Annual Corporate Governance Review (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Le recrutement de PCD (CEO) sur les C.A. a de plus en plus la cote

Il semble que les conseils d’administration dotés de personnes ayant une solide expérience des affaires, notamment à titre de PCD (CEO), mènent à des entreprises plus fortes et plus profitables. Tel est le constat que l’on peut faire à la suite de la lecture de l’article de Tom Groenfeldt, contributeur au magazine Forbes.

L’enquête menée par JamesDruryPartners auprès des cinq cent (500) plus grandes entreprises américaines montre que celles-ci se tournent davantage vers des PCD (CEO) en exercice ou retraités pour siéger sur les conseils d’administration, après avoir expérimenté diverses configurations de C.A. Les résultats peuvent être consultés sur le site de JamesDruryPartners.

L’article explique pourquoi il en est ainsi et décrit, en détail, les principaux changements dans la composition des C.A., en insistant sur la croissance des charges et responsabilités des membres de conseils. Par exemple, en 1990, les CEO siégeaient sur 2,2 conseils d’administration et 51 % participaient à quatre conseils ou plus. Aujourd’hui, ceux-ci siègent sur 1,2 conseil et seulement le quart (25%) participent à quatre conseils.

La recrudescence de cet engouement pour le recrutement de CEO, comme administrateurs, laisse peu de place aux femmes sur les conseils puisque la population de femmes CEO est encore très faible. L’étude montre que la recherche de CFO est également très faible en regard de la popularité des CEO.

Better Corporate Boards Usually Lead To Higher Profits

The report notes that “A fundamental premise of our report is that we value business experience more highly than non-business experience in measuring governance capacity. Our research shows that the more accomplished a director is in business achievement, the more likely that director is to engage the CEO, management team, and other directors in rigorous discussion regarding critical business issues.”

The report also includes ways to improve ranking, and shows the companies that have had the greatest increases in their scores and the greatest declines. It is a detailed look at boards and has some excellent discussion of what makes for strong governance capacity. Boards can increase their capacity by enlarging its board if it is too small and upgrading its boardroom talent by adding directors of more substantive business accomplishment, particularly if active and retired CEOs are under-represented on the board.

Articles reliés :

Vous vous préparez à occuper un poste d’administrateur d’une entreprise ? (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Better Corporate Boards Usually Lead To Higher Profits (blogs.sap.com)

Is Nonprofit Board Service Worth It? Reflections from a One-Time Skeptic (exceptionalboards.com)

Ten Essential Tips for Board Members Hiring a CEO (venitism.blogspot.com)

Qu’est-ce qu’une « contestation » pour le contrôle d’une entreprise ?

On assiste à de plus en plus de « contestations » de la part d’actionnaires activistes pour l’obtention du contrôle des entreprises cotées.

Qu’est-ce qu’une campagne de contestation (proxy contest) ? Quelles formes ces contestations prennent-elles ? Quels raisons incitent certains actionnaires activistes à aller de l’avant avec leurs propositions de changement ? Que peuvent faire les conseils d’administration pour se préparer à une attaque éventuelle et pour se protéger efficacement ?

Le document, préparé conjointement par Corporate Board Member du NYSE et Kroll, un leader mondial dans le conseil en gouvernance, répond très bien à ces questions. Voici un court extrait d’un article où Bob Brenner, associé de Kroll, répond aux questions. Bonne lecture.

Proxy Contests and Corporate Control

In general, the term corporate contest refers to several different situations in which a shareholder(s) or other corporate entity tries to force a change of control in a company. The two most common situations where we get involved are proxy fights and takeover attempts.

Proxy fights generally arise in two types of situations. In the first, an existing shareholder(s) seeks board representation to change corporate behavior or governance because the shareholder is unhappy with the company’s performance and the unwillingness of the board of directors to alter course or change the status quo. Typically, such a contest begins after quiet, protracted negotiation between the board/management and a prominent shareholder, during which the shareholder expresses ideas for change or displeasure with policy or direction and is rebuffed.

The second type of proxy fight, which we describe as “opportunistic,” does not start with an existing investment or position. Instead, it is marked by a rapid accumulation of stock by a new shareholder. The shareholder, or group of shareholders, acquires the stock on the premise that the board and/or management is failing to maximize the company’s assets. If the new shareholder can pressure the company to change policy, management, or board composition, fine. If not, they are prepared to force the issue.

“Activist” investors have had great success in these types of corporate contests. Typically, they target companies that have seen a decrease in share price over time. The well-funded activist investor claims to be ready, able, and more than willing to roll up its sleeves and implement change.

Historically, outright unsolicited or hostile takeover bids have formed a large part of the corporate contest world. In the case of a takeover bid, one corporate entity offers to buy another, frequently a competitor or an entity with a good synergistic fit. In far fewer instances, an activist shareholder may desire to purchase the outstanding shares of an entity from existing shareholders in order to obtain control of that entity so that it may effectuate immediate change. These types of contests are rarely launched by activist funds as these efforts require large amounts of capital to be sunk into one investment, a tactic that hedge funds generally try to avoid. True hostile takeover bids have declined in recent years.

Proxy Contests on the Rise – Activists Emboldened by Success (levick.com)

Statistiques sur les « Proxy Contests » (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Career Consequences of Proxy Contests (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Investor hints at proxy fight with Bob Evans because of ‘board’s apathetic posture’ (bizjournals.com)

Board Members Versus Hedge Fund Activists (venitism.blogspot.com)

Boards Should Minimize the Role of Proxy Advisors (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Le processus d’engagement du C.A. avec les actionnaires |Tendances globales

En tant qu’administrateurs de sociétés, nous sommes de plus en plus confrontés aux demandes de réunions spéciales avec les actionnaires. Que devons-nous faire ? Comment accueillir ces demandes ? Quelle position devons-nous adopter à cet égard ? Qui doit initier les démarches ? Quelles sont les expériences vécues par les organisations à ce sujet ?

L’article qui suit vous mettra à jour sur la nature du processus d’engagement du C.A. avec les actionnaires, sur les bénéfices potentiels à s’engager dans cette activité, sur les pratiques à l’échelle mondiale et sur les manières de faire.

Cet article a été publié par James Kim et Jason D. Schloetzer dans la série Director Notes du Conference Board; vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait d’un billet paru récemment sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum.

Je vous invite à lire cet article au complet car vous y découvrirez d’excellents arguments à aller de l’avant (tout en étant très vigilant) ainsi que plusieurs exemples d’entreprises qui se sont sérieusement engagées dans cette voie.

Global Trends in Board-Shareholder Engagement

There has been a rapid increase in shareholder requests for special meetings with the board. This report discusses the potential benefits and complexities of the board-shareholder engagement process, reviews global trends in engagement practices, provides insights into engagement activities at U.S. companies, and highlights developments in the use of technology to facilitate engagement. It also provides perspectives from institutional investors on the design of an effective engagement process.

The annual general meeting is the main channel of communication between a company’s board and its shareholders. Among other important meeting activities, shareholders have the opportunity to hear executives and directors discuss recent performance and outline the company’s long-term strategy.

Intel Board of Directors (Photo credit: IntelFreePress)

Since 2007, there has been an increase in shareholder requests for special meetings with the board. A recent study of board-shareholder engagement activities shows that 87 percent of security issuers, 70 percent of asset managers, and 62 percent of asset owners reported at least one engagement in the previous year. Moreover, the level of engagement is increasing rapidly, with 50 percent of issuers, 64 percent of asset managers, and 53 percent of asset owners reporting that they were engaging more. Only 6 percent of issuers and almost no investors reported a decrease in engagement. Shareholders, particularly institutional investors, believe that annual meetings are too infrequent and do not provide sufficient content to address their concerns.

The increase in engagement parallels a wave of shareholder activism that emerged in the mid-2000s. Proxy advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), have helped to foster a new environment for board-shareholder engagement. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 14a-21(a), adopted in 2011 to implement provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), requires public companies to include a “say-on-pay” vote in their proxy statements at least once every three years. The advisory vote has provided shareholders more voice in executive compensation. Annual meetings are now preceded by an increased level of engagement activity as more shareholders express their desire to influence corporate policies.

More generally, there is a common view in the current governance environment that directors should respond to shareholder questions regarding executive compensation, corporate strategy, financial performance, campaign financing, environmental and social issues, and corporate governance matters. Not surprisingly, say on pay and the appointment of an independent board chairman remain the primary focus of board-shareholder engagement activity in 2013.

En terminant retenez cet autre extrait de l’article qui présente un résumé du processus d’engagement entre actionnaires et conseil d’administration :

« Several representatives of prominent institutional investors at the June conference shared their perspectives regarding an effective board-shareholder engagement process.

Proactively reach out to your largest 15 to 20 institutional investors. Large institutional investors, particularly value investors with a longer-term investment horizon, are more likely to confront companies on specific issues than index/fund investors.
Offer to schedule a 30-minute phone call with each institutional investor to discuss the company’s executive compensation plan as well as any corporate governance concerns.
Be certain that at least the lead independent director and a knowledgeable person from the investor relations, human resources, and legal departments are on the call and have authority to answer shareholder questions. If your company has experienced poor say-on-pay votes in recent years, the compensation committee chairman should also participate. It is generally preferable that the CEO and the company’s compensation consultant do not participate, particularly when the main topic of discussion will be executive compensation.
An effective agenda for a 30-minute call is as follows: devote the first five minutes to summarizing the overall business activities of the company (investor relations), five minutes to explaining how the performance measures included in executive compensation plans are linked to corporate strategy (human resources, compensation committee chairman, lead independent director), and five minutes summarizing outstanding shareholder proposals (general counsel). The remaining 15 minutes should be devoted to two-way discussion between the company and the shareholder.
If the company has faced specific concerns about its compensation design in prior years, the compensation committee should make an effort to improve its Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) disclosure. A clearly written CD&A—particularly the Executive Summary—can reduce the need for separate meetings and one-on-one conversations about compensation. Directors should write the CD&A with its major shareholders in mind. The CFA Institute’s CD&A Template offers ideas for boards on how to organize the CD&A disclosure. The template is currently used by a number of companies, including Pfizer, American Express Company, General Electric, and Morningstar ».

Oracle’s executive pay deals under fire from investors (theguardian.com)

The (Advisory) Ties That Bind Executive Pay (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Global Trends in Board-Shareholder Engagement (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Sérieux rapprochement entre les actionnaires activistes et les actionnaires institutionnels (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Oracle executive pay deal again rejected by shareholders (theguardian.com)

Proxy Contests on the Rise – Activists Emboldened by Success (levick.com)

Statistiques sur les « Proxy Contests » (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Board Members Versus Hedge Fund Activists (venitism.blogspot.com)

La présidence du comité d’audit ?

Je reproduis, ci-dessous, un article du blogue de Norman Marks sur les questions qu’un candidat devrait se poser avant d’accepter le poste de président du comité d’audit.

L’auteur a recueilli les points de vue personnel et professionnel des praticiens de longue date dans le domaine de la gouvernance, plus précisément dans les fonctions d’audit et de gestion des risques. Bonne lecture.

If I was Chair of the Audit Committee

If I was asked to join a board and serve as the chair of the audit committee (which I am qualified to do), I would apply the lessons from what seems like a lifetime of working with audit committees. In most cases, the chair was excellent and I would hope to be as effective as they were.

After what I would assume would be a thorough and detailed orientation to the organization and its challenges by such key people as the CEO, CFO and her direct reports, General Counsel, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Accounting Officer, Chief Strategy Officer, Chief Information Officer, Chief Audit Executive, Chief Risk Officer, head of Investor Relations, Chief Information Security Officer, Chief Compliance Officer, Chairman of the Board or Lead Independent Director, lead external audit partner, and outside counsel (and others, depending on the organization), I would turn my attention to the following:

Do I now have a fair understanding of how the organization creates value, its strategies, and the risks to those strategies?

Do I have a sufficient understanding of the organization’s business model, including its primary products, organization and key executives, business operations, partners, customers and suppliers, etc.?

How strong is the management team? Are there any individuals whose performance I need to pay attention to, perhaps asking more detailed questions when they provide information?

Who else is on the audit committee and do we collectively have the insight, experience, and understanding necessary to be effective? Where are the gaps and how will they be addressed?

What are the primary financial reporting risks and how well are they addressed? What areas merit, if any, special attention by the audit committee? Who should I look to for assurance they are being managed satisfactorily? Who owns the compliance program (if any) on controls over financial reporting, and how strong is the assessment team?

What are the other significant financial and other risks (for which risk management oversight has been delegated by the full board) that merit special attention? Who should I look to for assurance they are being managed satisfactorily?

How strong is the external audit team and how well do they work with management and the internal audit team? What are their primary concerns? Is their fee structure sufficient or excessive? Is their independence jeopardized by the services they provide beyond the financial statement audit (even if permitted by their standards)?

How strong is the internal audit team and does the CAE have the respect of the management team and the external auditor? Are they sufficiently resourced? Are they free from undue management influence (for example, is the CAE hoping for promotion to a position in management, does he have free access to the audit committee, and is his compensation set by management or the audit committee)? What are their primary concerns? Do they provide a formal periodic opinion on the adequacy of the organization’s processes for governance and management of risk, as well as the related controls? How do they determine what to audit?

Who owns and sets the agenda for the audit committee? Is there sufficient time and are there enough meetings to satisfy our oversight obligations?

Do the right people attend the audit committee meetings, such as the general counsel, CFO, CAE, CRO, CCO, chief accounting officer, and the external audit partner?

How does the approval process work for the periodic and annual filings with the regulator (e.g., the SEC)?

How are allegations of inappropriate conduct managed? Who owns the compliance hotline, who decides what will be investigated and how, and at what point is the audit committee involved? Is there assurance that allegations will be objectively investigated without retaliation?

What concerns do the other members of the audit committee have? Does the former chair of the committee have any advice?

Is the Audit Committee Really the Secret Sauce for Cyber Security? (tripwire.com)

The responses to the questions raised at Audit Committee Meeting SCC from Mr Nigel Behan of UNITE. (unitesomersetcounty.wordpress.com)

UK wants Big Four to compete for audit work (fcpablog.com)

The difference between internal audit and external audit, by a firm consulting (iareportg5.wordpress.com)

La référence en matière de gouvernance corporative | Les enseignements de Gilles Paquet

Il est rare, dans ce blogue, que je fasse ouvertement la promotion d’un ouvrage sur la gouvernance des sociétés; mais lorsqu’il s’agit d’une œuvre synthèse de la gouvernance corporative telle que vue par le professeur Gilles Paquet*, pionnier, bâtisseur, penseur, défricheur, éclaireur et leader-précurseur des notions de gouvernance dans toutes les catégories d’entreprises, je crois que je rends un grand service aux partisans de la saine gouvernance, notamment à toute la communauté des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC) qui ont bénéficiés des enseignements du professeur Paquet.

Je vous présente donc, en primeur, le dernier volume de Gilles Paquet qui paraîtra le 22 novembre 2013. Comme l’extrait ci-dessous l’indique, il est le résultat des nombreuses présentations de l’auteur dans le cadre du programme en gouvernance du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, au cours des huit dernières années.

Voici donc un court résumé du volume tel que rédigé par l’auteur. Je joins également en annexe la table des matières du livre que vous pourrez vous procurer en allant sur son site :

http://www.gouvernance.ca/index.php?page=pubs&lang=ce

Le professeur Paquet a également conçu une capsule vidéo très populaire pour le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés : https://www.cas.ulaval.ca/cms/site/college/cas-gouvernance/outils-gouvernance/capsules-experts

Ce petit livre reprend en gros le contenu de la conférence d’ouverture livrée dans le programme de certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés de l’Université Laval au cours des dernières années. Gouvernance corporative connote ici la coordination efficace et dynamique de l’organisation quand pouvoir, ressources et information sont vastement distribués entre plusieurs mains – dans le privé, le public, le communautaire, etc.

La Partie I présente la philosophie générale de la gouvernance corporative telle qu’elle se définit depuis les années 1970, montre ses pathologies, et explore la philosophie de rechange qui commence à s’imposer.

La Partie II expose les principes généraux qui aident à définir et à fonder l’architecture d’une bonne gouvernance corporative, et examine certaines façons de corriger les vices de structures existants.

La Partie III se penche sur l’ingénierie de la gouvernance corporative, et évalue les radoubs possibles à court terme et la refondation envisageable à plus long terme pour éliminer ou contenir les effets toxiques des pathologies de gouvernance observées.

La Partie IV fait le pont entre les considérations plus générales des premières parties et le travail pratique sur le terrain de ceux qui doivent improviser pour construire une gouvernance corporative satisfaisante sur mesure, en réfléchissant sur le meccano de la gouvernance corporative, et en montrant toute l’importance de la dimension éthique dans le renouvellement de la gouvernance corporative dans tous les secteurs.

De quoi préparer les esprits à aborder de manière critique la gouvernance corporative, et engendrer un changement d’attitude quant à ce qu’on peut faire pratiquement pour assurer une meilleure gouvernance.

Gilles Paquet

____________________________________________

*Gilles Paquet est professeur émérite à l’École de gestion Telfer, et directeur de recherches au Centre d’études en gouvernance de l’Université d’Ottawa. Économiste, historien, journaliste, il a publié plusieurs ouvrages, et de nombreux textes scientifiques et travaux de vulgarisation. Pour plus de renseignements, visitez son site web au http://www.gouvernance.ca.

Gouvernance corporative: Une entrée en matières

Table des matières

Préambule

On construit sur les cendres de deux mythes

Un détour obligé par trois recadrages

Ampleur de la tâche

Le volume à vol d’oiseau

Invitation au voyage

Un contexte qui change

Perspective gouvernance

Problématique gouvernance

Annexe : la Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec

PARTIE I : Philosophie de la gouvernance corporative

Chapitre 1 : Dérive de la gouvernance corporative

Deux paradigmes

Pourquoi le modèle européo-japonais est-il

le moins insatisfaisant?

Quelques illustrations

La situation au Canada : mise en contexte

À la recherche d’un troisième paradigme

Pertinence pour les secteurs public et communautaire

Radiographie du conseil d’administration

Conclusion

Chapitre 2 : Pathologies de gouvernance

Certaines causes majeures

D’un détour obligé par un processus de transition

Conclusion

PARTIE II : Architecture de la gouvernance corporative

Chapitre 3 : Principes, mécanismes et stratagèmes

Attitude design

Éléments de grammaire du design

Conclusion

Chapitre 4 : Par quatre chemins

Sources de difficultés

Quatre avenues plus ou moins subversives

Conclusion

PARTIE III : Ingénierie de la gouvernance corporative

Chapitre 5 : Technologies, bricolage et radoubs dans l’immédiat

Modus operandi

Radoubs

Les propositions Allaire-Firsirotu

Conclusion

Chapitre 6 : Repères pour la refondation à plus long terme

Deux avenues

Libération des servitudes

Invitation à une conversation avec les prototypes

Et le sens de l’honneur dans tout cela?

Il y a plus que l’honneur dans la culture publique commune

PARTIE IV : Meccano et éthique de la gouvernance corporative

Chapitre 7 : Préliminaires au travail sur le terrain

Simplification nécessaire dans cette entrée en matières

Quelques balises pour fixer les idées

La division du travail

Le conseil d’administration et la planification stratégique : perspective traditionnelle

Le conseil d’administration et la planification stratégique : perspective dynamique

La culture organisationnelle

Deux méta-principes : la subsidiarité active et le corridor éthique

Chapitre 8 : Ce que l’éthique n’est pas et ce qu’elle est

Ce que l’éthique n’est pas

Trois groupes de mots pour aider à vivre la contrainte éthique

Quelques constats et mises en garde

Apprentissage collectif et imagination morale

Conclusion

Conclusion : Quo vadis ?

Tendances lourdes

Travail au mésoscope

Attitude design

Effective Governance | Top Ten Steps to Improving Corporate Governance | Effective Governance (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Vous vous préparez à occuper un poste d’administrateur d’une entreprise ? (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Les dix (10) plus importantes activités pour une gouvernance efficace

To ensure that your board is continually reviewing and enhancing its governance processes, this checklist will provide a good starting point.

Top Ten Steps to Improving Corporate Governance :

1.      Recognise that good governance is not just about compliance

Boards need to balance conformance (i.e. compliance with legislation, regulation and codes of practice) with performance aspects of the board’s work (i.e. improving the performance of the organisation through strategy formulation and policy making). As a part of this process, a board needs to elaborate its position and understanding of the major functions it performs as opposed to those performed by management. These specifics will vary from board to board. Knowing the role of the board and who does what in relation to governance goes a long way towards maintaining a good relationship between the board and management.

2.      Clarify the board’s role in strategy

It is generally accepted today that the board has a significant role to play in the formulation and adoption of the organisation’s strategic direction. The extent of the board’s contribution to strategy will range from approval at one end to development at the other. Each board must determine what role is appropriate for it to undertake and clarify this understanding with management.

3.      Monitor organisational performance

Monitoring organisational performance is an essential board function and ensuring legal compliance is a major aspect of the board’s monitoring role. It ensures that corporate decision making is consistent with the strategy of the organisation and with owners’ expectations. This is best done by identifying the organisation’s key performance drivers and establishing appropriate measures for determining success. As a board, the directors should establish an agreed format for the reports they monitor to ensure that all matters that should be reported are in fact reported.

4.      Understand that the board employs the CEO

In most cases, one of the major functions of the board is to appoint, review, work through, and replace (when necessary), the CEO. The board/CEO relationship is crucial to effective corporate governance because it is the link between the board’s role in determining the organisation’s strategic direction and management’s role in achieving corporate objectives.

5.      Recognise that the governance of risk is a board responsibility

Establishing a sound system of risk oversight and management and internal control is another fundamental role of the board. Effective risk management supports better decision making because it develops a deeper insight into the risk-reward trade-offs that all organisations face.

6.      Ensure the directors have the information they need

Better information means better decisions. Regular board papers will provide directors with information that the CEO or management team has decided they need. But directors do not all have the same informational requirements, since they differ in their knowledge, skills, and experience. Briefings, presentations, site visits, individual director development programs, and so on can all provide directors with additional information. Above all, directors need to be able to find answers to the questions they have, so an access to independent professional advice policy is recommended.

7.      Build and maintain an effective governance infrastructure

Since the board is ultimately responsible for all the actions and decisions of an organisation, it will need to have in place specific policies to guide organisational behaviour. To ensure that the line of responsibility between board and management is clearly delineated, it is particularly important for the board to develop policies in relation to delegations. Also, under this topic are processes and procedures. Poor internal processes and procedures can lead to inadequate access to information, poor communication and uninformed decision making, resulting in a high level of dissatisfaction among directors. Enhancements to board meeting processes, meeting agendas, board papers and the board’s committee structure can often make the difference between a mediocre board and a high performing board.

8.      Appoint a competent chairperson

Research has shown that board structure and formal governance regulations are less important in preventing governance breaches and corporate wrongdoing than the culture and trust created by the chairperson. As the “leader” of the board, the chairperson should demonstrate strong and acknowledged leadership ability, the ability to establish a sound relationship with the CEO, and have the capacity to conduct meetings and lead group decision-making processes.

9.      Build a skills-based board

What is important for a board is that it has a good understanding of what skills it has and those skills it requires. Where possible, a board should seek to ensure that its members represent an appropriate balance between directors with experience and knowledge of the organisation and directors with specialist expertise or fresh perspective. Directors should also be considered on the additional qualities they possess, their “behavioural competencies”, as these qualities will influence the relationships around the boardroom table, between the board and management, and between directors and key stakeholders.

10.     Evaluate board and director performance and pursue opportunities for improvement

Boards must be aware of their own strengths and weaknesses, if they are to govern effectively. Board effectiveness can only be gauged if the board regularly assesses its own performance and that of individual directors. Improvements to come from a board and director evaluation can include areas as diverse as board processes, director skills, competencies and motivation, or even boardroom relationships. It is critical that any agreed actions that come out of an evaluation are implemented and monitored. Boards should consider addressing weaknesses uncovered in board evaluations through director development programs and enhancing their governance processes.

See on www.effectivegovernance.com.au

Mener ou suivre : Questions à l’intention des conseils d’administration d’OBNL | Deloitte

Deloitte a publié ce premier numéro de Questions particulières pour les conseils d’administration d’organismes à but non lucratif (OBNL) afin d’analyser de plus près quelques-uns des principaux problèmes ou défis auxquels les administrateurs et leur organisation ont à faire face.

Voici une introduction au document en question. Cette publication, à l’intention des administrateurs d’OBNL, est complémentaire au document Il est temps de tirer parti de la nouvelle réalité du marché | Deloitte, partagé sur ce blogue le 29 octobre. Bonne lecture.

Mener ou suivre : Questions à l’intention des conseils d’administration d’OBNL

Les organismes à but non lucratif (OBNL) jouent un rôle important dans notre société, fournissant un large éventail de services dans divers secteurs d’activité. Même s’ils doivent faire face à des défis identiques ou semblables à ceux des organismes à but lucratif, les organismes à but non lucratif doivent résoudre des questions qui leur sont propres. Il arrive parfois qu’ils soient en concurrence directe avec des organismes à but lucratif, notamment au moment de recruter les meilleurs éléments ayant les capacités et l’expertise requises pour leur permettre de réaliser leur mission, aspect dont nous traitons dans la présente publication.

Deloitte logo. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Les autres sujets abordés dans la présente publication comprennent notamment les changements apportés à l’environnement réglementaire des organismes à but non lucratif découlant d’une nouvelle loi fédérale, à savoir la Loi canadienne sur les organisations à but non lucratif, de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels et les documents électroniques et des mesures législatives canadiennes contre les pourriels. Certains organismes à but non lucratif pourraient devoir revoir leur stratégie à la lumière de ces nouvelles règles, tandis que d’autres pourraient décider de le faire afin de tirer avantage des nouvelles technologies, dont les réseaux sociaux, afin de communiquer de manière plus efficace avec les parties prenantes et accroître le soutien de la collectivité.

La présente publication analyse ces questions et d’autres défis importants auxquels les organismes à but non lucratif et leurs administrateurs devront vraisemblablement faire face durant l’année à venir, tels qu’ils ont été définis par des professionnels de Deloitte qui travaillent auprès d’organismes à but non lucratif et qui sont souvent eux-mêmes administrateurs d’organismes à but non lucratif; des organismes ont recommandé leurs propres pratiques exemplaires qui, avec leur autorisation, ont été incluses dans cette publication.

Chaque article renferme des questions que les administrateurs pourraient poser pour explorer davantage ces enjeux avec leur propre conseil d’administration et les membres de la direction. En outre, les articles sont accompagnés d’outils et de ressources que les administrateurs peuvent utiliser pour obtenir une compréhension plus approfondie des questions abordées et améliorer l’efficacité du conseil dans le traitement de ces questions…

… Les conseils qui dirigent plutôt que d’être dirigés seront ceux qui auront adapté avec succès leurs stratégies en vue de transformer ces défis en occasions et qui tireront parti des exigences en matière de conformité pour mettre en œuvre des concepts novateurs.

Comment motiver certains de vos administrateurs d’OBNL ? (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Un argumentaire en faveur du choix d’administrateurs externes au C.A.* (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Le cas d’un nouveau président du conseil d’administration (PCA) d’une société d’État

Voici un cas qui intéressera sûrement tous les membres de conseils d’administration de sociétés d’État. Même si le cas en gouvernance origine du site australien de Julie Garland McLellan, je crois que celui-ci s’applique très bien à la situation des sociétés d’État québécoises.

Voici donc un cas original tiré d’une situation vécue dans une entreprise d’État. Comment un président du conseil (PCA – Chairman) et son conseil peuvent-ils arriver à gérer une situation critique créée par ses prédécesseurs, une situation qui a le potentiel de nuire à l’organisation et de discréditer le conseil et le gouvernement.

Qu’en pensez-vous ? Que feriez-vous à la place de Brian pour faire évoluer le conseil ?

Ce cas a été analysé par trois experts de la gouvernance (Voir les avis des experts dans le texte ci-dessous). Quelle analyse vous semble la plus appropriée dans notre contexte ?

Le cas du nouveau président du conseil d’administration (PCA) d’une société d’État

Brian is chairman of a government owned company. Succession has been ‘actively managed’ with directors rotating on and off the board. This has given access to new skills including marketing and modern media but has resulted in a board with relatively little corporate history. Brian is the longest serving member and has only been on the board for five years.

Walmart Chairman of the Board Discusses Making a Difference (Photo credit: Walmart Corporate)

Six years ago the company terminated the employment of the then CFO due to allegations of improper accounting which had resulted in revalued assets and a large profit being declared in the prior year triggering payment of bonuses to the then CFO and CEO.
The former CEO left shortly after receiving the bonus. The replacement CEO decided to investigate the accounting treatment. The investigation was conducted by the outsourced internal audit firm and concluded that the accounting treatment did not meet guidelines or even generally accepted accounting standards. The statutory auditors agreed. The asset revaluations were subsequently reversed which led to a large loss, no dividends or tax equivalent payments that year, and great embarrassment.

The former CFO was terminated and the matter referred to the police as a possible fraud. A new CFO was appointed. She is a pleasant and efficient person whom the board like and respect. She is considered a potential successor to the current CEO. The police decided not to pursue the fraud allegations as they believed these lacked sufficient evidence. The former CFO is suing for wrongful dismissal, the lawyers believe he may win, and the current CFO is worried because the union is calling for the former CFO to be reinstated.

The board is looking to Brian, who also chairs the remuneration committee, for guidance on what to do. The current CEO has offered his resignation but nobody wants to accept it. How can Brian help the board to move forward ?

Six raisons qui militent en faveur du choix d’administrateurs externes au C.A. (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

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Gouvernance corporative: Une entrée en matières

Table des matières

PARTIE I : Philosophie de la gouvernance corporative

PARTIE II : Architecture de la gouvernance corporative

PARTIE III : Ingénierie de la gouvernance corporative

PARTIE IV : Meccano et éthique de la gouvernance corporative

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