Voici le compte rendu d’une conférence donnée par Luis A. Aguilar, commissaire de la SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) qui décrit le rôle des investisseurs institutionnels et leur influence sur le contrôle des grandes sociétés publiques.
L’article est intéressant parce qu’il énonce deux problématiques cruciales eu regard à la règlementation visant les investisseurs institutionnels. (1) l’importance de la divulgation d’informations fiables aux investisseurs, (2) le besoin des investisseurs d’être entendus sur les considérations de gouvernance, notamment sur la rémunération de la haute direction.
L’article reflète la réalité américaine mais je crois que les avis de M. Aguilar sont aussi valables pour les grandes corporations canadiennes. Voici un extrait du compte rendu qui brosse un tableau éloquent des changements majeurs du rôle et de l’influence des investisseurs institutionnels survenus au cours des 60 dernières années : de 7 % de la capitalisation boursière en 1950 à 67 % en 2010 !
The topic of your conference recognizes the important role played by institutional investors and the great influence they exert in our capital markets. The role and influence of institutional investors has grown over time. For example, the proportion of U.S. public equities managed by institutions has risen steadily over the past six decades, from about 7 or 8% of market capitalization in 1950, to about 67 % in 2010. The shift has come as more American families participate in the capital markets through pooled-investment vehicles, such as mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs).
Institutional investor ownership is an even more significant factor in the largest corporations: In 2009, institutional investors owned in the aggregate 73% of the outstanding equity in the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations.
The New York Stock Exchange, the world’s largest stock exchange by market capitalization (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The growth in the proportion of assets managed by institutional investors has been accompanied by a dramatic growth in the market capitalization of U.S. listed companies. For example, in 1950, the combined market value of all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was about $94 billion. By 2012, however, the domestic market capitalization of the NYSE was more than $14 trillion, an increase of nearly1,500%. This growth is even more impressive if you add the $4.5 trillion in market capitalization on the NASDAQ market, which did not exist until 1971. The bottom line is, that as a whole, institutional investors own a larger share of a larger market.Of course, institutional investors are not all the same. They come in many different forms and with many different characteristics. Among other things, institutional investors have different organizational and governance structures, and are subject to different regulatory requirements. The universe of institutional investors includes mutual funds and ETFs regulated by the SEC, as well as pension funds, insurance companies, and a wide variety of hedge funds and managed accounts, many of which are unregulated.
And, of course, institutional investors don’t all buy or sell the same asset classes at the same time. To the contrary, they have a wide variety of distinct goals, strategies, and timeframes for their investments. As a result, their interaction with, and impact on, the market occurs in many different ways.
The growth in assets managed by institutions has also affected, and been affected by, the significant changes in market structure and trading technologies over the past few decades, including the development of the national market system, the proliferation of trading venues – including both dark pools and electronic trading platforms – and the advent of algorithmic and high-speed trading. These changes – largely driven by the trading of institutional investors – have resulted in huge increases in trading volumes. For example, in 1990, the average daily volume on the NYSE was 162 million shares. Today, just 23 years later, that average daily volume is approximately 2.6 billion shares – an increase of about 1,600%.
Simply stated, institutional investors are dominant market players, but it is difficult to fit them into any particular category. This poses a challenge for regulators, who must take into account all the many different ways institutional investors operate, and interact, with the capital markets.
It is clear, however, that professionally-managed institutions can help ensure that our capital markets function as engines for economic growth. Institutional investors are known to improve price discovery, increase allocative efficiency, and promote management accountability. They aggregate the capital that businesses need to grow, and provide trading markets with liquidity – the lifeblood of our capital markets.
In doing all this, institutional investors – like all investors – depend on the assurance of a level playing field, access to complete and reliable information, and the ability to exercise their rights as shareowners. That is why fair and intelligent regulation is necessary for the proper functioning of our capital markets.
Autres articles qui pourraient aussi vous intéresser :
Il y a une multitude de C.A. qui, à l’origine, ont été structurés sur la base de la plus grande représentation possible de membres de leurs organisations. Évidemment, dans ces cas, aucun administrateur n’est réellement indépendant et plusieurs sont mal placés pour participer à des décisions qui peuvent avoir une incidence sur les intérêts de leur groupe de référence. Dans ces cas, les administrateurs sont souvent en conflit d’intérêt car ils croient représenter un groupe particulier.
En réalité, plusieurs ne comprennent pas, ou ne veulent pas comprendre, qu’ils doivent agir en fonction des « meilleurs intérêts de l’entité » sur laquelle il siège. On leur dit qu’ils doivent être indépendants d’esprit… Plusieurs administrateurs ne respectent pas la confidentialité des informations présentées à l’assemblée. Certains s’empressent de tout rapporter aux organisations qu’ils représentent (sic).
Liverpool Chamber of Commerce (Photo credit: americaspower)
Voici un cas qui intéressera sûrement tous les membres de conseils d’administration d’associations bénévoles, surtout celles qui sont constituées de représentants de différents secteurs industriels. Même si le cas origine du blogue australien de Julie Garland McLellan, celui-ci s’applique très bien à la situation de plusieurs entreprises à vocation associative. Le cas et son analyse sont en anglais.
Qu’en pensez-vous ? Qu’auriez-vous fait à la place d’Ursula ? Quelle analyse d’expert vous semble la plus appropriée dans notre contexte ?
« This month our real life case study focuses on the complex conflicts of interest affecting association boards where the directors are representatives of industry participants ».
Que pensent vraiment les PCD de leur C.A. ? Les auteurs Jeffrey Sonnenfeld*, Melanie Kusin* et Elise Walton* ont procédé à des entrevues en profondeur avec une douzaine de PCD (CEO) expérimentés et ils ont publiés la synthèse de leurs résultats dans Harvard Business Review (HBR). Essentiellement, les chercheurs voulaient savoir comment les C.A. peuvent avoir une influence positive et devenir un atout stratégique. Ils ont résumé leur enquête en faisant ressortir 5 conseils à l’intention des conseils d’administration. Voici un extrait de cet article très intéressant. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus !
Over the past several years, in the wake of corporate missteps that have taken a toll on shareholders and communities alike, we’ve heard plenty about how boards of directors should have been more responsible stewards. Corporate watchdogs, investors and analysts, members of the media, regulators, and pundits have proposed guidelines and new practices. But one voice has been notably missing from this chorus—and it belongs to the constituency that knows boards and their failings best. It’s the voice of the CEO.
Harkness Tower, situated in the Memorial Quadrangle at Yale (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
There are reasons for this silence from the chief executive camp. Few CEOs volunteer their views publicly; they know they’d risk looking presumptuous and becoming a target. They realize it would be foolhardy to draw attention to their own governance dysfunctions or seem to reveal boardroom confidences. Meanwhile, people who do make it their business to speak out on governance haven’t made much effort to elicit CEOs’ views. Extreme cases of CEO misconduct have created skepticism about whether CEOs can help fix faulty governance—a dangerous overreaction. Many observers, having seen grandiose, greedy, and corrupt CEOs protected by inattentive or complicit directors, consider excessive CEO influence on boards to be part of the problem. Others may lack the access to CEOs and the level of trust needed for frank conversations. Whatever the reasons, the omission is unfortunate. Not only do CEOs have enormous experience to draw on, but their views are the ones boards are most likely to heed.
We recently tapped our networks to bring CEOs’ opinions to light. We talked to dozens of well-regarded veteran chief executives, focusing on people with no particular reason to resent boards—we didn’t want bitterness or self-justification to color the findings. We wanted to know: What keeps a board from being as effective as it could be? Is it really the cartoon millstone around the CEO’s neck, or does it have a positive influence on the enterprise? What can a board do to become a true strategic asset?
We were surprised by the candor of the responses—even given our comfortable relationships with the CEOs and our assurances that quotes would not be attributed without express permission. Clearly, CEOs believe it is important to address problems and opportunities they’re uniquely positioned to observe. They know that their strategic visions and personal legacies can be undone by bad governance, and they have plenty to say on the subject. We’ve distilled their comments into five overarching pieces of advice for boards.
Don’t Shun Risk or See It in Personal Terms
Do the Homework, and Stay Consistently Plugged In
Bring Character and Credentials, Not Celebrity, to the Table
Constructively Challenge Strategy
Make Succession Transitions Less Awkward, Not More So
« Every board is different. If you serve on one, some of these comments may strike close to home; others may not. As we listened to CEOs and reviewed our transcripts looking for patterns, we identified three important takeaways.
First, contrary to what some critics believe, CEOs do not want to keep their boards in the dark or to chip away at directors’ power. They recognize that they and their shareholders will get more value if the partnership at the top is strong. Great CEOs know that if governance isn’t working, it’s everyone’s job to figure out why and to fix it.
Second, most boards aren’t working as well as they should—and it’s not clear that any of the systemic reforms that have been proposed will remedy matters. Although governed by bylaws and legal responsibilities, interactions between CEOs and directors are still personal, and improving them often requires the sorts of honest, direct, and sometimes awkward conversations that serve to ease tensions in any personal relationship. When strong relationships are in place, it becomes easier for CEOs to speak candidly about problems—for example, if the board isn’t adding enough value to decision making, or if individual directors are unconstructive or overly skeptical. For their part, directors should be clear about what they want—whether it’s less protocol and fewer dog and pony shows or more transparency, communication, and receptivity to constructive criticism.
Third, the best leadership partnerships are forged where there is mutual respect, energetic commitment to the future success of the enterprise, and strong bonds of trust. A great board does not adopt an adversarial, “show me” posture toward management and its plans. Nor does it see its power as consisting mainly of checks and balances on the CEO’s agenda. Great boards support smart entrepreneurial risk taking with prudent oversight, wise counsel, and encouragement ».
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Jeffrey Sonnenfeld*, is the senior associate dean for executive programs and the Lester Crown Professor at Yale University’s School of Management, is the founding CEO of Yale’s Chief Executive Leadership Institute. Melanie Kusin* is the vice chairman of Korn/Ferry International’s CEO practice. Elise Walton*, is a former Yale–Korn/Ferry senior research fellow, consults on corporate governance and executive leadership.
Voici un cas qui intéressera sûrement tous les membres de conseils d’administration de sociétés d’État. Même si le cas origine du blogue australien de Julie Garland McLellan, je crois que ce cas en gouvernance s’applique très bien à la situation des sociétés d’État québécoises en réorganisation, même si la nouvelle loi sur la modernisation des sociétés propose des façons de faire différentes.
Qu’en pensez-vous ? Qu’auriez-vous fait à la place de Tom ? Quelle analyse vous semble la plus appropriée dans notre contexte ?
« This month our real life case study focuses on the, often frustrating, role of boards in government sector organisations and how to respond when the priorities of government don’t provide quite the level of support and responsiveness that directors might wish for ».
This photo shows the École nationale d’administration (ÉNA) and MAMCS buildings in the Petite France neighbourghood of Strasbourg, as seen from the ponts couverts bridge. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Article relié au sujet du choix des administrateurs de sociétés :
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un excellent article publié par Jennifer Brown et paru dans Canadian Lawer Magazine. Voilà un texte qui présente une vue assez équilibrée sur la nécessité ou non d’une réglementation accrue en général, mais dans ce cas-ci, concernant l’industrie des firmes de conseils en procurations (« proxy advisory industry »). Cet article discute de la grande diversité des arguments présentés à la Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA). Il y a du pour et du contre ! Et vous, quel est votre point de vue dans ce débat ?
When the Canadian Securities Administrators issued a call last summer for comment on the potential regulation of the proxy advisory industry, it was inundated with responses from general counsel, their companies, law firms, and others who seemed to have been waiting in the shadows for a chance to vent. The input received from reporting issuers, directors, and the investor relations people that work for Canadian companies shows the idea obviously hit a nerve with many Canadian public companies of all sizes, says Tuzyk. “Given the volume of comments advocating some form of action from all these issuers in response to the comment period — there are very few issues of new proposed rules that so many issuers have commented on like this — I would be very surprised if they did nothing.”…
English: proxy networks logo (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The question of whether the proxy advisory industry should be regulated has been a polarizing issue for some time now. Depending on who you ask, there are strong opinions on both sides. Institutional shareholders are closely aligned with the proxy firms; law firms make their bread and butter from corporate management, while issuers and academics have concerns about many aspects of the process. The CSA, which acts on behalf of the provincial securities regulators in Canada, invited input from all parties — issuers, institutional investors, proxy advisers, and other market players — on concerns over the activities of proxy advisory firms. The concerns range from a perceived lack of transparency in how they operate to conflicts of interest and inaccuracy of their work.
The activities of proxy advisory firms are unregulated in Canada. The call for consultation follows similar steps by regulators in the United States and Europe, as the perceived power of proxy firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. and Glass, Lewis & Co., which provide proxy voting advice and other services, has been debated in recent years. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission embarked upon a similar exercise in 2010, but it has not resulted in any changes to date.
Some feel companies like ISS and Glass Lewis wield too much power and have too much influence. Insiders point to issuers who have been quoted in the press making comments along the lines of, “The proxy advisory firm is my number one shareholder because they control 50 per cent of my vote.”
That sounds good as a headline but it’s not really true, says Brad Allen, of Branav Shareholder Advisory Services Inc. “People continue to reinforce this image that proxy firms have all this power. They do have influence but their primary influence is their ability to communicate to a broad range of shareholders that hold an equity interest.”
As one of many companies that submitted a written response to regulators last fall, Magna International Inc. indicated its key concerns included potential conflicts of interest, lack of transparency, and potential inaccuracies as well as limited opportunity for issuer engagement. It also has concerns about the extent to which institutional investors in Canada rely on proxy advisers’ recommendations. “Our comments were directed to say, there has to be a level playing field so the issuers know exactly what is the basis on which we are being assessed,” says Bassem Shakeel, Magna’s vice president and secretary. “Right now that is one of the biggest problems; there just isn’t enough transparency around the detail — the basis on which some parts of the analysis is being completed and/or overly broad subjective discretion which can be used to override voting guidelines.”
Others argue the proxy companies aren’t as powerful as the issuers make them out to be. “My view is these proxy advisory firms don’t necessarily have as much influence as many people say they do because a lot of times when we speak to institutional investors, who are clients, they are proud to say, ‘Yes we receive the information but we’re not robots and we do spend some time on how we’re going to vote,’” says Jonathan Feldman, a partner at Goodmans LLP. “They say, ‘If we disagree with what the proxy advisers are suggesting, we won’t just follow them blindly.’”
The issues of conflict of interest, transparency, and lack of qualitative assessment of governance quality and predictive validity on shareholder value are all reasons why the proxy firms should be regulated, says Richard Leblanc, an associate professor of law, governance, and ethics at York University. “If I asked my students to pay me to help them with their score, it’s a conflict,” he says.
He says ISS and Glass Lewis use a “mechanistic, quantitative, and volume-based” approach to their business and don’t measure things that are important to the quality of corporate governance and to shareholder performance — essentially what happens inside the boardroom. “The assumption is what they are measuring matters but often what they’re not measuring might matter more,” such as individual people and the qualities and skills of directors, says Leblanc. “As a qualitative researcher I’m seeing this volume-based model that is conflicted because of the consulting stream to improve your governance score. Their input variables are basically a proxy circular. That does not capture corporate governance.”
Voici un article scientifique publié dans Social Science Research Network (SSRN)par Bill Francis (1), Iftekhar Hasan (2) et Qiang Wu (3) sur un sujet très pertinent pour la gouvernance des sociétés : L’utilité de la présence de professeurs d’université sur les C.A. des entreprises publiques.
L’article montre que la présence de professeurs sur les conseils d’administration est positivement associée à une meilleure performance des entreprises. Les professeurs-administrateurs, plus particulièrement ceux qui ont une formation en administration, jouent un rôle très important de conseillers auprès de l’entreprise. Leur influence sur la performance des entreprises semble déterminante dans plusieurs domaines relatifs à la bonne gouvernance.
« Directors from academia served on the boards of more than one third of S&P 1,500 firms over the 1998-2006 period. This paper investigates the effects of academic directors on corporate governance and firm performance. We find that companies with directors from academia are associated with higher performance. In addition, we find that professors without administrative jobs drive the positive relation between academic directors and firm performance. We also show that professors’ educational backgrounds affect the identified relationship. For example, academic directors with business-related degrees have the most positive impacts on firm performance among all the academic fields considered in our regressions.
Furthermore, we show that academic directors play an important governance role through their monitoring and advising functions. Specifically, we find that the presence of academic directors is associated with higher acquisition performance, higher number of patents, higher stock price informativeness, lower discretionary accruals, lower CEO compensation, and higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Overall, our results provide supportive evidence that academic directors are effective monitors and valuable advisors, and that firms benefit from academic directors ».
Si vous souhaitez avoir plus d’information sur les objectifs, la méthodologie ou les résultats de l’étude, je vous invite à lire l’article au complet.
Peter F. Drucker and Masatoshi Ito Graduate School of Management (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
« This paper empirically investigates whether the presence of academic directors affects firm performance and corporate governance. Based on the independence theory, expertise theory, and diversity theory, we hypothesize that academic directors can improve board efficacy and subsequent firm performance because of their monitoring abilities and advising abilities. The key result is in line with our hypothesis. We find that the presence of directors from academia in the boardroom is associated with higher firm performance. The positive association holds after controlling for firm- and other governance-specific characteristics, and considering endogeneity issues, such as omitted variable bias, self-selection bias and causality issue. By comparing the differences in the attendance behavior and committee assignments of academic directors and other outside directors, we find that academic directors perform better than other outside directors in the boardroom.
We further examine the monitoring and advising roles of academic directors in details. We find that firms with academic directors have higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, lower cash-based CEO compensation, more patent numbers, higher acquisition performance, higher stock price informativeness, and are less likely to manage their earnings. The results provide several channels through which academic directors affect firm value positively.
We also find evidence that academic directors with administrative jobs do not improve firm performance as much as academic directors without administrative jobs. Additional analysis finds that academic directors with administrative jobs have more severe board-meeting attendance problems. Furthermore, we find that academic directors’ areas of study have different impacts on firm performance ».
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(1) Lally School of Management and Technology, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Découvrez le numéro 48 de la lettre de liaison mensuelle adressée aux adhérents de l’IFA. Cette publication électronique mensuelle au format pdf téléchargeable via le site internet a pour objectif de faciliter l’accès aux informations-clés sur les activités de l’IFA pour tous les adhérents : l’agenda des prochains évènements et séminaires, les activités en région, les actualités de la gouvernance, les dernières publications et les principaux services disponibles.
Dans ce numéro, Laurence Dors (Anthenor Partners) et Caroline de La Marnierre (Capitalcom), co-signataires de cet éditorial, tentent de répondre à une question posée par le MONDE ECONOMIE du 18 février 2013 : Comment contrôler les salaires des dirigeants ?
J’ai reproduit ci-dessous le texte paru dans la section « actualités de la gouvernance » de la lettre de l’IFA. Bonne lecture.
Le sujet du moment : Les patrons coûtent-ils trop cher ?
« Voici une question que se pose un grand nombre de nos concitoyens dans un contexte économique et social particulièrement tourmenté, mais la vraie question n’est–elle pas ailleurs : existe-t-il des critères objectifs, équitables et lisibles – à la fois pour l’entreprise et ses parties prenantes : actionnaires, salariés, partenaires et clients– susceptibles d’asseoir la rémunération d’un dirigeant de manière juste, efficace et consensuelle?
C’est tout l’enjeu du vote – consultatif ou non – de la rémunération globale des dirigeants par les actionnaires de l’entreprise en Assemblée Générale débattu sous l’appellation anglo-saxonne de Say on Pay. Alors que ce projet de loi fait couler beaucoup d’encre en France, le Say on Pay est déjà en vigueur dans 17 pays au plan mondial.
L’agitation autour des rémunérations de certains patrons du CAC 40 dans un contexte où la crise fait reculer les résultats, stagner les salaires et progresser le chômage, a naturellement joué un rôle essentiel dans l’instauration d’une dynamique en faveur du Say on Pay. Mais elle a également faussé le débat, car le Say on Pay ne saurait être un outil de modération des rémunérations des dirigeants, comme en témoignent les tendances inverses observées concrètement dans les pays où il est en vigueur.
Les détracteurs du Say on Pay objectent que ce vote reviendrait à dessaisir le Conseil d’Administration d’une large partie de ses responsabilités et prérogatives. Mais cet argument ne tient pas puisque le Conseil d’Administration aura toujours pour mission de délibérer sur les niveaux, les modalités et les critères de performance des dirigeants.
En revanche, la perspective d’un tel vote va nécessairement changer la dynamique de décision au sein du Conseil d’Administration : là où les questions de rémunération faisaient souvent l’objet de débats feutrés réservés – dans la pratique – à un cercle restreint autour du Président et du Comité des Rémunérations, le Say on Pay va obliger la collégialité du Conseil à en assumer pleinement les enjeux.
En outre, et peut-être est-ce là une opportunité que nous apporte cette disposition, le Say on Pay se révélera probablement un puissant levier d’alignement de la rémunération des dirigeants avec les intérêts de l’entreprise et de ses parties prenantes, et donc avec le projet de l’entreprise sur le moyen/long terme. En obligeant le Conseil d’Administration à investir du temps et de l’énergie sur la détermination de niveaux de rémunération lisibles, équitables et objectifs, le Say on Pay va inéluctablement favoriser une prise en compte accrue du temps long, dont le Conseil d’Administration est garant. La performance ne s’établissant de manière incontestable que dans la durée, l’étalement dans le temps du versement de certaines composantes de la rémunération va s’en trouver renforcé. Pour frustrantes qu’elles soient pour les intéressés qui porteront un risque accru, les tendances préexistantes au paiement partiel en actions – ou équivalent actions – vont apparaitre d’autant plus séduisantes aux Conseils d’Administration qu’elles diminuent le numéraire versé l’année « N », et donc l’irritabilité des actionnaires et des parties prenantes en période de crise.
Pour être alignée avec le projet d’entreprise, la rémunération des dirigeants devra également être acceptable au plan social, ce qui impliquera que les Comités de rémunérations s’extraient du champ du financier quasi confidentiel pour aborder ce sujet – particulièrement complexe – de façon élargie, c’est-à-dire en y intégrant plus largement la dimension sociale/environnementale de l’entreprise. Concrètement, cela veut dire que l’évaluation des dirigeants prendrait davantage en considération des paramètres comme l’évolution annuelle de la masse salariale du Groupe, les écarts de salaire, les flux nets d’emploi, les plans de restructuration éventuels, en plus des habituels critères sociaux, et également : l’évolution des émissions de gaz à effet de serre, de l’efficacité énergétique, de la consommation d’eau et de la préservation des ressources, etc…
Le débat au sein du Conseil d’Administration sur la rémunération des dirigeants va ainsi conduire à plus de co-construction du projet d’entreprise, à plus d’exigence dans le suivi et la prévention des risques, et à un champ de débats plus large autour de l’intérêt social de l’entreprise, qui s’inscrit dans le temps.
Loin d’une prise de gage sur les patrons, et beaucoup plus qu’un simple ajustement technique, le Say on Pay est donc surtout un levier de rénovation de la gouvernance de l’entreprise, susceptible de changer l’ambiance des Conseils d’Administration et de dynamiser l’interaction entre la Direction Générale et l’organe de contrôle.
Pour autant, le Say on Pay va-t-il clore la polémique sur les rémunérations excessives ? On peut en douter, mais il peut apporter de l’objectivation sereine. Le rodage ira-t-il sans heurt ? Là aussi, ce sera un art d’exécution avec d’inévitables tentations démagogiques ici et là. Que l’on procède par voie de code de place ou par voie législative, il faudra un temps d’adaptation, et c’est pour cela que dans sa grande sagesse, le législateur et le gouvernement semblent avoir abandonné la piste d’une mise en oeuvre obligatoire dès les Assemblées Générales 2013. Comme toute réforme de fond, celle-là doit s’élaborer dans le consensus, sans préjugé et sans fantasme.
Il est fondamental que le Say on Pay soit perçu par les dirigeants et les membres du Conseil comme une opportunité de progrès, tant en interne à travers un dialogue social enrichi, que dans la relation globale de l’entreprise avec son environnement et l’opinion publique. Rechercher les critères d’une rémunération « juste » revient clairement à centrer le débat non plus exclusivement sur la personne du dirigeant, mais sur les intérêts de l’entreprise et de ses parties prenantes ».
« Sam is an experienced manager and has worked for over twenty years in his industry. He has also sat on two not-for-profit boards and enjoys the governance role. Now he has an opportunity to buy an equity stake in a small business that has a product and service for which market demand is growing.
The business has not been growing quickly due to flat market conditions and revenue has not increased substantially as a consequence. The current owners are a husband and wife team and are tired; they have run the business for many years and want to retire.
The proposal is that Sam should purchase 40% of the company and take a seat on the board. The existing owners would retain 30% equity each and a shareholder’s agreement would stipulate that board decisions would require a 70% majority to be agreed. The current board has three members consisting of the owners and an ‘independent’ chairman who is the lawyer and a long-standing friend of the owners. The proposal is that he should remain as “he adds a lot of value and sees things we would miss”.
Sam intends not to work in the company but to be merely a shareholder and director. He has ideas for improving the growth and increasing the value of the company but wants to retain his full time employment in a larger corporation as a security measure. His employer is happy for him to take on a board seat and there is no direct competition between the two companies so Sam would have no conflict of interest; however, Sam’s boss, who is a friend and mentor to Sam, is uneasy and has suggested that Sam could find himself outmanoeuvred in the boardroom and overcharged for his equity. Sam is appreciative of the counsel but believes the shareholder agreement protects his interests. He would like to discuss board dynamics with the current owners but they seem not to be interested as they say the Chairman handles all the compliance and they just run the business so there is nothing to worry about ».
Quels conseil donneriez-vous à Sam ? Esquissez une réponse avant de consulter les avis des experts sur le sujet ci-dessous !
Doug’s Answer
Owning part of an SME is much more than an equity purchase and a board position. High level strategic and governance oversight is not enough; it takes a more ‘hands-on’ involvement.
The owners have realised they have had enough. Under the current proposal there is little in the way of resolving the typical SME succession dilemma; specifically:
Who has the skill and energy to ultimately take control and drive the business?
How to extract full value for the business which substantially funds retirement?
The board risks stalemate and conflict in decisions with a Chair aligned with current owners. Not a good outcome for the business, Sam or the current owners.
For this to be a win / win for everyone, an agreed succession plan should be part of Sam’s due diligence process along the following lines:
Sam’s intentions, post current-owners succession, should be clarified and agreed
The appointment of an independent chair and an independent director experienced in the same industry should be agreed
Untapped management talent existing within the business and a skilling, education and promotion program outlined
Recruitment program for management where gaps are identified
Current owners agree to an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) where appropriate
Key client and supplier relationships transition to the wider management team.
Sam should further protect his minority interests by holding pre-emptive rights to purchase the remaining shares should they be on offer, notwithstanding the ESOP mentioned above.
By clarifying all the stakeholders’ intentions and aspirations, the business presents a unified front with management, the board and shareholders “singing from the same songbook”.
Doug Jardine provides consulting services to owner operated businesses and boards and is based in Sydney.
Julie’s Answer
There is more to a board than compliance. Managers accustomed to running things as they see fit whilst relying on a lawyer to put together a semblance of compliance at board level are not going to make good board colleagues. Sam has some good ideas but unless they are also in the shareholder agreement (with dates and budgets) they will likely never get implemented.
Already the board is set for deadlock whenever the existing directors disagree with Sam. The 70% required for decision-making is a nonsense as Sam will find he either has to conform to the wishes of a husband and wife team or try to split them. They might as well stipulate 100% consensus as that is all that will work in the circumstances. It is also a pretty good way to run a board.
I usually hate quasi-equity as it tends to complicate matters but Sam could look into having a preference share which is repayable as debt and converts to equity only when the strategy reaches certain milestones.
What he most needs to do is sit down with the current owners and talk, long, hard and deep, about what this company is really supposed to achieve. It looks as if it has always been supposed to provide a certain lifestyle and income for the owners. But what about the future? What do they now want the company to be?
If they can agree on a vision and set aside enough of Sam’s investment to fund the new actions that must be taken to achieve the vision, then they may be able to grow the company to a stage where a profitable exit is achievable. If they can’t agree on exactly what the vision is and how they will work to achieve it – Now – In detail – Sam should not invest.
Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia.
Simon’s Answer
Sam takes an equity share to help grow the company (future nest egg). The owners (husband and wife) want to retire and secure as much money as possible from the asset sale (nest egg right now). Neither party wants any ongoing operational involvement – what is this deal really about? Are the owners serious in selling or grabbing equity dollars?
The 70% rule subjugates Sam’s rights and restricts the potential for business improvements but also terrifyingly entrenches the owners’ current policies, practices and procedures. A resolution to change anything requires the support of Sam, the Chairman (even if he/she places director duties ahead of friendship) and one of the owners – good luck with that.
There needs to be far more discussion by all parties about the fundamentals of this deal before it proceeds any further.
Sam is a minority shareholder with a Shareholders’ Agreement (SA) that lacks rigour, inclusion of, and agreement on, significant matters. The SA affords Sam no rights protection, no restriction on changes in each owner’s equity or share ownership, no restraint of trade restriction on the owners once retired and no provisions for breaking deadlocks e.g. mediation which will be inevitable given the 70% rule.
There is no guarantee that the owners will be unified on either the quantum or timeframe for retirement and the SA needs to reconcile that fact. The owners (or one of them) could just sell the remaining 60% (30%) to another party or give the shareholding to their beneficiaries. What is the agreed owner exit strategy and succession plan? There is no first right of refusal (including terms) for Sam to buyout one or both owners.
What happens if one or both owners prematurely die/separate or become incapacitated? What happens if Sam dies or is incapacitated or simply wants to get out? These all need to be included in the SA with trigger events established, agreed timeframes and pre-calculated quantum.
Now is the time to construct a rigorous SA, if any party baulks now, better to establish that at the outset before the dollars are committed. If Sam acts in haste, he/she can repent at leisure.
Simon Pinnock is a professional and practising non-executive director and Board consultant. He is based in Melbourne, Australia.
Voici un article très intéressant publié le 25 février 2013 par D. F. Larcker, A. L. McCall, et B. Tayan dans Stanford Closer Look Series. Les auteurs expliquent très clairement (1) la raison d’être des firmes qui procurent des conseils aux organisations qui détiennent des procurations (Proxy Advisory Firms), (2) le mode de fonctionnement d’entreprises telles que Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) et Glass Lewis & Co) et (3) certaines lacunes de leur processus d’analyse.
Que vous soyez d’accord ou non avec les conclusions de l’article, celui-ci vous aidera sûrement à mieux comprendre le modèle d’affaires des firmes qui font des recommandations de vote, notamment aux investisseurs institutionnels. Les auteurs expliquent aussi la méthodologie utilisée par ces firmes pour arriver aux recommandations de vote. On donne également des exemples précis de questions posées aux répondants et on montre comment certaines d’entre elles ont des problèmes de design (biais, généralisation, ambiguïtés, imprécisions, etc.).
Cet article nous aide à mieux saisir la complexité de ces firmes, et leur influence grandissante dans le monde de la gouvernance ! Voici un extrait de l’introduction de l’article. Vos commentaires sont appréciés.
« The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms Proxy advisory firms are independent, for-profit consulting companies that provide research and voting recommendations on corporate governance matters brought before investors at shareholder meetings. These matters include the election of the board of directors, approval of equity-based compensation programs, advisory approval of management compensation, and other management- and shareholder-sponsored initiatives regarding board structure, compensation design, and other governance policies and procedures.
There are many reasons why investors might choose to consult with third-party advisors when voting their position on these matters. Institutional investors are generally required by the Securities and Exchange Commission to vote all matters on the corporate proxy and disclose their votes to beneficial owners of their funds. Given the size and diversity of their holdings, it might be impractical for professional investors to have a thorough understanding of all items brought before them. Small investors, in particular, might not employ sufficient analytical staff to review all proposals in detail. For these reasons, reliable and valid third-party recommendations can contribute to a well-functioning market by improving information flow between issuers and investors leading to better decisions on compensation and corporate governance ».
Voici le condensé d’un rapport sur les rémunérations des administrateurs de sociétés et sur les pratiques de gouvernance (aux É.U.), publié conjointement par le Conference Board, le NASDAQ OMX et le NYSE Euronext. Ce résumé a été transmis par Matteo Tonello du Conference Board et publié sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation.
This is « a benchmarking study with more than 150 corporate governance data points searchable by company size (measurable by revenue and asset value) and 20 industrial sectors. The report is based on a survey of public companies registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Stanford University’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance, the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI), the Shareholder Forum and Compliance Week also endorsed the survey by distributing it to their members and readers ».
Voici un extrait des points se rapportant à la rémunération des administrateurs. Pour de plus amples informations, je vous invite à lire l’article du HB Law School Forum ou à communiquer avec M. Tonello du Conference Board pour le rapport intégral de 2013.
Seal of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Directors are best compensated in the energy industry, but company size can make a huge difference. Computer services companies are the most generous with full value share awards, but equity-based compensation is widely used across industries and irrespective of company size.
Stock options are not as favored as they used to be, except by the smallest companies increasing skepticism on the effectiveness of stock options and stock appreciation rights as long-term incentives has led to their decline, especially in the last few years.
Additional cash retainer for board chairmen is seldom offered by larger companies, which are more likely to reward lead directors.
A corporate program financing the matching of personal charitable contributions is the most common among the director perquisites reported by companies.
While many nonexecutive directors have C-suite experience, former or current CFOs are less represented than expected in the board of financial services companies.
Dans son dernier billet, Richard Leblanc pose une question fondamentale en matière de gestion des risques par le comité d’audit : Devez-vous revoir en profondeur les responsabilités du comité d’audit afin de mieux circonscrire la surveillance des risques ?
Au cours de la dernière décennie, on a assisté à plusieurs échecs, directement reliés aux défaillances des mécanismes de gestion des risques, notamment le manque de contrôle interne et l’absence d’une fonction d’auditeur interne. Traditionnellement, c’est le comité d’audit qui se voit confier la tâche de superviser les risques auxquels font face les entreprises. Mais, comme l’article le montre, il y a une multitude de risques à considérer, et ceux-ci ne sont pas tous d’ordre financier ! De plus, aucune règlementation ne spécifie que c’est le comité d’audit qui doit exercer cette activité. Si bien qu’il est fort possible que le comité ne soit pas toujours le mieux qualifié pour jouer ce rôle.
Dans son article, Richard Leblanc, identifie douze questions qu’un C.A. doit se poser à cet égard. Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissances de l’article paru sur son blogue le 24 février 2013. Qu’en pensez-vous ? Pose-t-on de trop grandes exigences aux comités d’audit ?
« …Risk systems in many companies are immature. Look at BP, Wal-Mart, JP Morgan, HSBC, News of the World, Barclays, SNC Lavalin and MF Global. These are all risk management failures, which are turn are governance failures.
There is good reason for risk management failure. Proper risk management requires internal controls to mitigate risk. (Internal controls are processes and procedures such as segregation of duties, documentation, authorization, supervision, physical safeguards, IT security and prevention of management override.) No one likes to be controlled. Risk management is not intrinsically profit-making. Therefore there is an inherent aversion to risk management by management. This is why regulators now are targeting boards with greater risk governance obligations because only the board has the authority to control management. Recent bank governance guidelines in Canada require much stronger risk oversight by boards and audit committees. Recent Ontario Securities Commission guidelines offer advice to boards and audit committees with operations in emerging markets, coming out of the Sino-Forest debacle ».
“The Coalition has focussed on the importance of transparency and exemplary disclosure because this is the only window shareholders have into the boardroom. Shareholders have no choice but to assess the calibre of directors, the board and its governance regime based on the quality and clarity of its disclosure.”
Michael Wilson, Ex ambassadeur aux É.U et ex PCA de CCGG
L’objectif poursuivi par la publication de cet excellent document de la Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (CCGG) est de présenter des moyens et des exemples pour assurer une meilleure divulgation de l’information à propos des administrateurs, ceux-ci étant considérés comme le plus important maillon de la gouvernance.
« The single most important corporate governance requirement is the quality of directors. By quality we mean directors with the integrity, competencies, capabilities and motivation to carry out their fiduciary duties in the long term best interests of the corporation and all of its shareholders. The purpose of this document is to improve disclosure about directors. The Coalition believes that the most effective disclosure is: (1) easy to find, (2) easy to understand, (3) accurate and complete, (4) given in context so that the information has meaning ».
Network of Disclosure (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Ce document est divisé en cinq parties; voici un résumé de chacune d’elles :
« Section A – Shareholder voting includes the method of voting for directors preferred by the Coalition, as well as a discussion about majority voting along with a listing of those issuers who have adopted a majority voting policy for their director elections. In addition, there is a discussion on the results from our annual study on voting methods (how shareholders cast their ballots – slate voting or individual voting?) and the disclosure of the voting results.
Section B – Director information offers guidance to companies that want to adopt exemplary disclosure practices in their annual proxy circular. The “best practices” provided are examples of how some companies have chosen to communicate information to their shareholders. Companies are encouraged to either adopt or adapt these disclosure practices. In addition, disclosure practices judged to be innovative have been incorporated into their relevant disclosure sections.
Section C – Proxy circular layout provides examples of efforts made by issuers to enhance the readability of the proxy circular.
Section D – Innovations shows what some companies have done to improve their disclosure practices over and above what was communicated in last year’s document.
Section E – A guide to providing “best practice” disclosure is a checklist issuers can use to compare their current disclosure practices against the Coalition’s “best practices” when crafting their 2010 proxy ».
Voici un article d’actualité qui présente la problématique des rémunérations excessives des dirigeants en France (et en Suisse). L’année 2013 s’annonce assez importante pour la mise en oeuvre de moyens destinés à mettre un frein aux rémunérations jugées abusives par les actionnaires. Cet article partagé par Patrice Camus, directeur de projet en développement durable au Groupe Desjardins (Canada), a été publié sur la page de Novethic, une filiale de la Caisse des Dépôts française qui diffuse des communiqués sur le développement durable ainsi qu’un centre de recherche sur l’investissement socialement responsable (ISR) et sur la responsabilité sociale des entreprises (RSE).
Le « Say on Pay » et les indemnités de départ et de non concurrence devraient être au menu des AG du CAC 40 ce printemps. Le rapport sur la gouvernance, publié le 20 février, laisse augurer d’un futur projet de loi limitant fortement les possibilités de rémunération « excessives». En attendant, la question du lien entre ces rémunérations et la performance des entreprises est posée plus systématiquement par les actionnaires.
photograph of Novartis human resources building designed by Frank Gehry as part of the new campus built to replace the former Ciba-Geigy buildings in Basel, Switzerland (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Le patron de Novartis capitule
« … le cas le plus emblématique est celui de Daniel Vasella, le patron du groupe pharmaceutique Novartis, qui a soulevé un tollé en Suisse début février. Une émission de télévision a révélé le 5 février qu’il allait partir avec 72 millions de francs suisses (plus de 58 millions d’euros). La Fondation Ethos, qui défend le droit des actionnaires et qui a progressivement imposé un « Say on Pay » dans le pays, a aussitôt lancé une campagne pour demander l’annulation du contrat, en annonçant que dans le cas contraire elle poursuivait juridiquement le conseil d’administration de Novartis pour avoir manqué à sa mission de diligence en acceptant un tel système. Juste avant l’AG, qui se tient ce 22 février, Daniel Vasella et son conseil ont capitulé; le contrat a été annulé. Cette capitulation aurait été arrachée de haute lutte même si l’intéressé a déclaré dans un communiqué : « j’ai compris que nombreux sont ceux, en Suisse, qui jugent ce montant exagéré en dépit du fait que j’avais annoncé mon intention de le verser à des œuvres caritatives ». Le bénéfice de Novartis avait lui reculé de 7% en 2012… »
Voici un article publié par Robert C. Pozen*, paru HBR et reproduit dans LeadingCompany le 20 février 2013. L’article aborde un sujet d’actualité : le recrutement d’administrateurs professionnels (et indépendants). Pozen propose un modèle de conseil d’administration ayant une taille réduite et s’appuyant sur un engagement beaucoup plus important des membres.
Bien sûr, les recommandations sont valables pour les entreprises publiques cotées, mais elles peuvent aussi s’appliquer à plusieurs autres types d’organisations privées ou publiques de différentes tailles. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous un extrait de cet article. Celui-ci décrit le modèle proposé et présente plusieurs arguments qui militent en faveur d’un net changement dans la composition des C.A., répondant par la même occasion à certaines objections souvent évoquées.
« Boards are often too large to operate effectively as decision-making groups, with members relying on others to take the lead. Many of the financial institutions that had to be rescued from insolvency in 2008 had very large boards, and all had a substantial majority of independent directors. Citigroup, for example, had 18 directors, of whom 16 were independent. In groups this large, members engage in what psychologists call “social loafing”. They cease to take personal responsibility for the group’s actions and rely on others to take the lead. Large groups also inhibit consensus building, which is the way boards typically operate: the more members there are, the harder it is to reach agreement.
English: 500 Boylston St., Boston, MA 02116 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
I’ve been the president or chairman of two global financial firms, an independent director of several large industrial companies and a long-time scholar of corporate governance. During my career, I’ve seen several chronic deficiencies in corporate boards: boards are often too large to operate effectively as decision-making groups. Members frequently lack sufficient expertise in the relevant industry. And, most important, few members devote the time needed to fully understand the complexities of the company’s global operations.
I propose a model of professional directorship that directly responds to the three main factors behind ineffective decision-making. All boards would be limited to seven people. Management would be represented by the CEO – the other six directors would be independent. Most of the independent directors would be required to have extensive expertise in the company’s lines of business and they would spend at least two days a month on company business beyond the regular board meetings.
Groups of six or seven are the most effective at decision-making. They’re small enough for all members to take personal responsibility for the group’s actions and they can usually reach a consensus in a reasonably short time. The six independent directors called for in the new model are sufficient to populate the three key committees: audit, compensation and nominating. Three different directors would serve solely as chairs of each of those committees, and the other three directors would each serve on two of them ».
*Robert C Pozen is a senior lecturer of business administration at Harvard Business School and the chairman emeritus of MFS Investment Management, an investment company in Boston.
Aujourd’hui, j’ai choisi de partager avec vous le billet de Berl Nadler, associé de Davies, Ward, Phillips & Vineberg LLP, qui a été publié dans HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. Ce compte rendu reprend essentiellement le sommaire exécutif du rapport de Davies sur la gouvernance 2012 que l’on peut retrouver sur le site de l’entreprise (en anglais). On y aborde les sujets qui « deviendront d’actualité pour les conseils d’administration au Canada dans les mois et les années à venir ». Le rapport met l’accent sur la capacité accrue des actionnaires à dicter l’agenda et l’orientation des pratiques de gouvernance. Voici un bref résumé des thèmes abordés dans le rapport que je vous invite à lire au complet car on y présente la perspective canadienne.
« Dans la section intitulée Le pouvoir et l’influence des actionnaires canadiens, nous traitons de trois cas très différents où les actionnaires ont réussi à modifier la structure de gouvernance.
Dans Les conseils d’administration recherchent l’équité pour tous les actionnaires, nous examinons la façon dont TELUS s’est prise pour contrer le phénomène du vote vide ainsi que la tendance qu’ont les sociétés minières d’adopter un règlement obligeant l’actionnaire activiste à transmettre un avis préalable. Dans un cas comme dans l’autre, on constate que les conseils d’administration cherchent à se défendre contre des initiatives qui ne profiteraient pas à l’ensemble des actionnaires.
Dans Le mouvement de démocratie pour les actionnaires se poursuit, nous abordons la question de l’état actuel du vote majoritaire et celle du vote consultatif sur la rémunération. Dans L’importance accordée à l’intégrité du vote des actionnaires s’accentue, nous nous penchons sur les faits nouveaux touchant le système de vote par procuration au Canada, domaine important mais complexe.
Dans Les défis de la supervision des opérations dans les marchés émergents, nous faisons le point sur les défis pressants qui se posent aux administrateurs et aux dirigeants des émetteurs qui exercent des activités dans les marchés émergents.
En dernier lieu, dans Les nouveaux critères, classements et lignes directrices en matière de gouvernance, nous nous intéressons aux nouveautés en matière de normes de gouvernance ».
Découvrez le numéro 47 de la lettre de liaison mensuelle adressée aux adhérents de l’IFA. Cette publication électronique mensuelle au format pdf téléchargeable via le site internet a pour objectif de faciliter l’accès aux informations-clés sur les activités de l’IFA pour tous les adhérents : l’agenda des prochains évènements et séminaires, les activités en région, les actualités de la gouvernance, les dernières publications et les principaux services disponibles.
Dans ce numéro, Andréa Bonhoure *, nous met à jour sur l’évolution du cadre de gouvernance en Europe et en France. J’ai reproduit ci-dessous les principales mesures annoncées telles qu’elles sont présentées à la une de la lettre de l’IFA. Bonne lecture.
Bruxelles dévoile ses ambitions sur la gouvernance
« Tandis que le gouvernement travaille sur un projet de texte instituant le say on pay, l’Europe n’est pas en reste. Mi-décembre, la direction du Marché Intérieur, pilotée par Michel Barnier, a publié son Plan d’action pour le droit européen des sociétés et la gouvernance d’entreprise. Le document, qui compte 19 pages, commence par souligner : « l’efficacité du cadre de la gouvernance d’entreprise est essentielle, car les sociétés bien gérées sont susceptibles d’être à la fois plus compétitives et plus viables à long terme ».
Bruxelles note ensuite que le cadre européen est fait de dispositions législatives et de mesures non contraignantes, les codes nationaux, appliqués sur la base comply or explain. L’ambition de la commission ne consiste pas à remettre en cause cet équilibre. Toutefois, sans surprise, elle relève des lacunes dans l’application des règles de gouvernance par les sociétés cotées. Dans le prolongement du Livre vert de 2011, elle propose donc un certain nombre de mesures destinées à améliorer la gouvernance. Pas de grande directive à attendre dans ce domaine, les modifications annoncées seront introduites dans des textes existants en cours de réexamen (directive comptable et directive sur les actionnaires) ou encore seront énoncées sous forme de recommandation.
Voici les principales mesures annoncées :
Conseils d’administration
Pour encourager les entreprises à développer la diversité au sein de leurs conseils, ce qui permet une critique objective et constructive des décisions de la direction, la Commission entend introduire dans la directive comptable des dispositions visant à renforcer les obligations déclaratives concernant cette politique de diversification.
Comply or explain
L’AMF le dit et le répète chaque année, les entreprises ne fournissent pas suffisamment d’explications lorsqu’elles écartent une disposition du code auquel elles se réfèrent. C’est aussi l’avis de Bruxelles. La Commission annonce la publication d’une recommandation pour améliorer le comply or explain.
Identification des actionnaires
Faut-il mettre en place un mécanisme européen d’identification des actionnaires ? La question, soulevée par le Livre vert de 2011 fait débat, certains estimant qu’il suffirait de demander aux émetteurs de prévoir un forum dédié aux actionnaires sur leur site, quand d’autres évoquent une baisse des seuils de notification. La Commission, sans avancer de solution, plaide en faveur d’une plus grande transparence et proposera une initiative sur ce sujet dont le contenu n’est pas encore arrêté.
Transparence et investisseurs professionnels
Une modification de la directive sur les actionnaires est annoncée sur la publicité des politiques en matière de vote et d’engagements des actionnaires, ainsi que des votes antérieurs des investisseurs institutionnels.
Rémunération des dirigeants
La Commission estime que les actionnaires ont un rôle crucial à jouer dans la gouvernance, tout en regrettant leur faible implication. Elle propose donc d’accroitre leurs pouvoirs sur le chapitre des rémunérations, notamment via l’introduction du say on pay dans la directive sur les actionnaires. Elle annonce également sa volonté de renforcer le contrôle des actionnaires sur les transactions avec les parties liées.
Toutes ces réformes et recommandations interviendront dès cette année. Le Plan d’action prévoit également des améliorations du droit des sociétés portant sur les opérations transfrontières, (transferts de sièges, fusions, scissions), les groupes de sociétés ou encore les formes juridiques adaptées aux PME. Affaire à suivre… »
Avez-vous déjà siégé sur des conseils d’administration avec des membres qui ne s’engagent pas vraiment et qui ne contribuent en rien à la valeur du groupe ? Si oui, vous n’êtes pas les seuls ! Cependant, en tant que membres de C.A., je crois que vous devez vous inquiéter si vous constatez certains comportements déficients tels ceux identifiés dans le billet de Jack and Suzy Welch, publié dans Bloomberg | BusinessWeek. Ces administrateurs sont souvent élus, années après années !Réfléchissons un peu; que pouvons-nous faire ?
L’article des Welch vous permettra d’identifier les cas problèmes afin de mieux évaluer la situation. Les auteurs nous rappellent que les C.A sont responsables de gérer leur efficacité ! « But imagine how much better it would be if nominating committees, usually just focused on vetting potential members, dealt with the hard cases right in front of them. After all, nothing can keep a board on its best behavior but itself ».
Voici quelques comportements dysfonctionnels d’administrateurs tels qu’identifiés par les auteurs :
Ceux qui ne font rien de rien (The Do-Nothing)
Ceux qui manquent de courage (The White Flag)
Ceux qui agissent à l’extérieur du C.A. en tentant de faire valoir leurs points de vue (The Cabalists)
Ceux qui font du micro-management (The Meddlers)
Ceux qui pontifient (The Pontificators)
Je vous invite à lire l’article pour plus de détails. Qu’en pensez-vous ? Que pouvez-vous faire ?
« I sit on a board with two members who, for the past year, have said and done little. Both were just reelected unanimously with the support of the nominating committee. What’s your take? — Anonymous, New York. So, two seat-warmers on your board were just reelected unanimously, you say? Doesn’t that mean you voted for them too? If so, don’t worry. You’re not the only director in history to endure an ineffective or otherwise dysfunctional peer. Not to slam boards; on the whole, they add real value. But boards frequently tolerate troublesome performance from one or two of their own. It’s simply too time-consuming or impolitic to eradicate. And that is why too many boards, in both the public and private sectors, don’t make the contribution they should. To be clear, we’re not talking about board behavior that is criminal. With a few famous exceptions, boards will remove anyone who breaks the law. No, we’re referring to boardroom behaviors that are perfectly legal but perfectly destructive as well ».
Plusieurs administrateurs et formateurs me demandent de leur proposer un document de vulgarisation sur le sujet de la gouvernance. J’ai déjà diffusé sur mon blogue un guide à l’intention des journalistes spécialisés dans le domaine de la gouvernance des sociétés à travers le monde. Il a été publié par le Global Corporate Governance Forum et International Finance Corporation (un organisme de la World Bank) en étroite coopération avec International Center for Journalists. Je n’ai encore rien vu de plus complet et de plus pertinent sur la meilleure manière d’appréhender les multiples problématiques reliées à la gouvernance des entreprises mondiales. La direction de Global Corporate Governance Forum m’a fait parvenir le document en français le 14 février.
Ce guide est un outil pédagogique indispensable pour acquérir une solide compréhension des diverses facettes de la gouvernance des sociétés. Les auteurs ont multiplié les exemples de problèmes d’éthiques et de conflits d’intérêts liés à la conduite des entreprises mondiales. On apprend aux journalistes économiques – et à toutes les personnes préoccupées par la saine gouvernance – à raffiner les investigations et à diffuser les résultats des analyses effectuées. Je vous recommande fortement de lire le document, mais aussi de le conserver en lieu sûr car il est fort probable que vous aurez l’occasion de vous en servir.
Vous trouverez ci-dessous quelques extraits de l’introduction à l’ouvrage.
« This Guide is designed for reporters and editors who already have some experience covering business and finance. The goal is to help journalists develop stories that examine how a company is governed, and spot events that may have serious consequences for the company’s survival, shareholders and stakeholders. Topics include the media’s role as a watchdog, how the board of directors functions, what constitutes good practice, what financial reports reveal, what role shareholders play and how to track down and use information shedding light on a company’s inner workings. Journalists will learn how to recognize “red flags,” or warning signs, that indicate whether a company may be violating laws and rules. Tips on reporting and writing guide reporters in developing clear, balanced, fair and convincing stories.
Three recurring features in the Guide help reporters apply “lessons learned” to their own “beats,” or coverage areas:
– Reporter’s Notebook: Advise from successful business journalists
– Story Toolbox: How and where to find the story ideas
– What Do You Know? Applying the Guide’s lessons
Each chapter helps journalists acquire the knowledge and skills needed to recognize potential stories in the companies they cover, dig out the essential facts, interpret their findings and write clear, compelling stories:
What corporate governance is, and how it can lead to stories. (Chapter 1, What’s good governance, and why should journalists care?)
How understanding the role that the board and its committees play can lead to stories that competitors miss. (Chapter 2, The all-important board of directors)
Shareholders are not only the ultimate stakeholders in public companies, but they often are an excellent source for story ideas. (Chapter 3, All about shareholders)
Understanding how companies are structured helps journalists figure out how the board and management interact and why family-owned and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), may not always operate in the best interests of shareholders and the public. (Chapter 4, Inside family-owned and state-owned enterprises)
Regulatory disclosures can be a rich source of exclusive stories for journalists who know where to look and how to interpret what they see. (Chapter 5, Toeing the line: regulations and disclosure)
Reading financial statements and annual reports — especially the fine print — often leads to journalistic scoops. (Chapter 6, Finding the story behind the numbers)
Developing sources is a key element for reporters covering companies. So is dealing with resistance and pressure from company executives and public relations directors. (Chapter 7, Writing and reporting tips)
Each chapter ends with a section on Sources, which lists background resources pertinent to that chapter’s topics. At the end of the Guide, a Selected Resources section provides useful websites and recommended reading on corporate governance. The Glossary defines terminology used in covering companies and corporate governance ».
Voici une lecture très intéressante publiée dans McKinsey Quaterly par William George*, professeur à la Harvard Business School et membre des conseils suivants : ExxonMobil, Goldman Sachs et Mayo Clinic. L’article est basé sur l’expérience de l’auteur en tant que membre d’une grande variété de C.A.
M. George tente de montrer que l’on ne peut comprendre la gouvernance d’une entreprise et le comportement des membres du conseil qu’en considérant les rôles qui y sont exercés :
(1) administrateur indépendant;
(2) président du C.A. (PCA) et président et chef de la direction (PCD);
(3) uniquement PCD et
(4) uniquement PCA.
English: Inside a Harvard Business School classroom (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Selon le rôle occupé sur le C.A., l’auteur tire des conclusions sur le bon fonctionnement des mécanismes de gouvernance. Voici donc une lecture qui remet en question plusieurs principes de saine gouvernance (comme la séparation des rôles de PCD et PCA) en s’appuyant sur l’expérience de diverses positions au sein du conseil d’administration. Ainsi, l’efficacité du conseil dépend de la manière dont on comprend son rôle. L’auteur propose trois suggestions pour améliorer la gouvernance. Je vous invite à lire cet article. Quel est votre point de vue ?
Pour lire l’article au complet, vous devrez vous inscrire, mais c’est sûrement une belle occasion de recevoir les dernières communications de McKinsey. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait du document.
« Board governance is frequently discussed and often misunderstood. In this article, I offer an insider’s perspective on the topic. Over the years, I have had the privilege of serving on ten corporate boards, as well as being chairman and CEO of Medtronic, chairman only, and CEO only. I have also observed dozens of boards from outside the boardroom and engaged in numerous confidential conversations with members of these boards about the challenges they faced and how they handled them.
What I have learned from these experiences is that one’s perspective about a board’s governance is strongly influenced by the seat one holds—independent director, chair and CEO, CEO only, or chair only. That’s why it is essential to look at corporate governance through the eyes of each of these positions.
In surveying governance through the lens of different roles, I hope to address a problem in the prevailing dialogue: many of the governance experts exerting power over boards through shareholder proposals, media articles, and legislative actions have never participated in an executive session of a major board. It’s no surprise, therefore, that their proposals deal almost entirely with formal board processes and “check the box” criteria that generally have little to do with the substance of how boards operate.
I worry, in fact, that many of these proposals could weaken the performance of boards by burdening them with an excessive amount of ministerial details. That would be a shame, because corporate boards have made progress since the scandals of recent years, with a new generation of CEOs sharing with boards more openly, listening to them more closely, and working to achieve a healthier balance of power with independent directors ».
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* William George, a professor of management practice at the Harvard Business School, is a board member of ExxonMobil, Goldman Sachs, and the Mayo Clinic and previously served on the boards of Novartis AG and Target, among others. From 1991 to 2001, he was the CEO of Medtronic, whose board he chaired from 1996 to 2002. This article is an adaptation of a chapter George contributed to The Future of Boards: Meeting the Governance Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, edited by Jay W. Lorsch (Harvard Business School Publishing, July 2012).
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un document de consultation de l’IIA UK, partagé par Denis Lefort, CPA, CA, CIA, CRMA, concernant le rôle de l’audit interne dans le secteur financier. On y retrouvera plusieurs recommandation à l’intention de l’Institutdes auditeurs internes certifiés, dont quelques-unes controversées. Je vous invite à lire ce document.
The Rewarding Profession of Internal Audit / Corporate Management (Photo credit: danielleherner)
« In the course of our consultation, the Committee asked a range of questions around the role, scope and position of internal audit in the organisation’s governance and risk management frameworks. The responses received highlight the range of practice across the industry, with a varying degree of uniformity of practice and aspiration between organisations.
There was a general consensus around the importance of the independence of Internal Audit; both independence from Executive Management authority, from the Risk Management and Compliance functions, and from executive decision making responsibilities. There was also strong support for an unrestricted scope of Internal Audit, and for greater clarity and consistency of Internal Audit’s role in auditing areas such as strategy, culture, risk appetite and key corporate events.
Areas in which there was a greater divergence of response include the role and extent of Internal Audit involvement in challenging strategic decision making; whether there are circumstances in which it would be appropriate for Internal Audit to report to a Board Risk Committee rather than tothe Audit Committee, the nature of Internal Audit’s Executive reporting line and who this line should report into (e.g. CEO / CFO); and the appropriateness of the Chief Internal Auditor having the right to attend Executive Committee meetings. In these areas, the Committee has formed a view based on both the responses received and Committee discussion ».
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 