Quels sont les grands enjeux de gouvernance ? | Six thèmes chauds ! *

En rappel, vous trouverez, ci-joint, une excellente publication de la NACD (National Association of Corporate Directors) qui présente les grands défis et les enjeux qui attendent les administrateurs de sociétés au cours des prochaines années.

Ce document est un recueil de textes publiés par les partenaires de la NACD : Heidrick & Struggles International, Inc., KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute, Marsh & McLennan Companies, NASDAQ OMX, Pearl Meyer & Partners et Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP.

Vous y trouverez un ensemble d’articles très pertinents sur les sujets de l’heure en gouvernance. J’ai déjà publié un billet sur ce sujet le 23 juin 2013, en référence à cette publication.

Chaque année, la NACD se livre à cet exercice et publie un document très prisé !

Voici comment les firmes expertes se sont répartis les thèmes les plus « hot » en gouvernance. Bonne lecture.

: Boardroom, Tremont Grand (Photo credit: Joel Abroad)

(1) What to Do When an Activist Investor Comes Calling par Heidrick & Struggle

(2) KPMG’s Audit Committee Priorities for 2013 par KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute

(3) Board Risk Checkup—Are You Ready for the Challenges Ahead ? par Marsh & McLennan Companies

(4) Boardroom Discussions par NASDAQ OMX

(5) Paying Executives for Driving Long-Term Success par Pearl Meyer & Partners

(6) What Boards Should Focus on in 2013 par Weil, Gotshal and Manges, LLP

NACD Insights and Analysis – Governance Challenges: 2013 and Beyond

Today, directors are operating in a new environment. Shareholders, regulators, and stakeholders have greater influence on the boardroom than ever before. In addition, risks and crisis situations are occurring with greater frequency and amplitude. Directors have a responsibility to ensure their companies are prepared for these challenges—present and future.This compendium provides insights and practical guidance from the nation’s leading boardroom experts—the National Association of Corporate Directors’ (NACD’s) strategic content partners—each recognized as a thought leader in their respective fields of corporate governance.

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Article relié :

La réputation de l’entreprise : un actif intangible à protéger *

Vous trouverez, ci-joint, la dernière version du Rapport Bourgogne, publié par CIRANO, un centre de recherche multidisciplinaire qui a pour mission l’accélération du transfert des savoirs entre le monde de la recherche et celui de la pratique.

L’étude réalisée par Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin, professeure agrégée à l’École Polytechnique de Montréal et vice-présidente au CIRANO et Serban Teodoresco, Président de Preventa Inc., présentent, en une page, les principales conclusions tirées d’une analyse documentaire des recherches menées au cours des 12 dernières années et les résultats d’une étude exploratoire de 80 grandes sociétés au Québec. À lire.

La réputation de l’entreprise : un actif intangible à protéger

« La réputation de l’entreprise est de plus en plus définie comme l’actif stratégique le plus important sur le plan de la création de valeur. L’intérêt des scientifiques à l’égard du concept de réputation de l’entreprise a contribué à quintupler le nombre d’articles et d’études évalués par des pairs au cours de la dernière décennie (Barnett et al., 2006). Pourtant, aucune définition n’est généralement acceptée.

English: Reputation management graphic that breaks down the elements of reputation management and how they fit together. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Nous proposons une définition de la réputation de l’entreprise fondée sur des sources universitaires et des travaux d’experts : La réputation de l’entreprise est un actif incorporel acquis avec le temps et représente la valeur et la confiance accordées à l’organisation par les parties prenantes.

C’est un élément-clé qui favorise l’atteinte d’objectifs stratégiques, dont la création de valeur, la croissance rentable et l’avantage concurrentiel durable. Notre sondage, mené au Québec, montre que seulement la moitié des sociétés interrogées reconnaissent l’importance de la réputation. Aucune ne semble gérer la réputation de façon proactive… Le présent ouvrage propose un plan d’action à l’intention des sociétés désireuses d’effectuer la transition entre la gestion réactive et la gestion proactive de la réputation ».

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Quelles sont les qualités d’un président de conseil d’administration (PCA) exceptionnel ? *

Voici un rapport de recherche publié par la firme Alvarez & Marsal, sur les qualités d’un bon président de conseil d’administration (PCA).

L’étude présente les résultats des entrevues menées auprès de 22 PCA des plus grandes sociétés publiques britanniques qui ont œuvrés avec plus de 120 PCA dans leurs carrières.

Cette lecture, vraiment fascinante, montre clairement les qualités des PCA qui sont considérées comme exceptionnelles par leurs pairs. Ci-dessous, un bref extrait du rapport.

What makes an exceptional Chairman ?

« Our research has identified the key attributes displayed by exceptional chairmen in challenging times. Although most difficult to maintain during periods of duress, these characteristics are displayed throughout a chairman’s tenure and across all aspects of their management of the business. We have also compared these attributes with the guidance for chairmen provided by the Higgs Report and the more recent guidance note published by the Financial Reporting Council. This emphasises that ‘good boards are created by good chairmen’ and the importance of the chairman demonstrating ‘ethical leadership.’ In its detail, the guidance provides lists detailing the chairman’s role, rather than the qualities which come out of our research.

Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 1987-2006 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Firstly, and most importantly, an exceptional chairman understands the business, its culture, people and processes. This understanding encompasses recognising and embodying the values of the business as much as having knowledge of the business operations and the marketplace. An exceptional chairman also understands the wider industry and prepares the company for all eventualities, from further market disruption to opportunities to improve competitiveness. This is based on their deep knowledge of the company and sector. Extensive knowledge of a sector or type of sector (e.g. heavy manufacturing) is as important as the chairman’s ability to apply his or her accumulated experiences into effecting transformational change and preparing the business for future challenges.

Secondly, exceptional chairmen never consider themselves a one-person success. They create strong teams that have real influence on the company’s direction by building an effective board of non-execs and establishing a complementary working relationship with the CEO and their team. They implement change through the CEO, but are ready and able to step in at the right time to provide air cover to alleviate pressure. In short, they provide strong active leadership of the board.

Not afraid to take tough decisions in adversity, this type of chairman has an infectious enthusiasm and commitment to change which has a ripple effect, creating a ‘can-do’ attitude throughout the company. With internal stakeholders on board, the chairman uses strong communication skills to engage shareholders and other external stakeholders with change ».

L’article présente 8 aspects qui caractérisent les présidents de conseil qui ont du succès. Lisez la suite dans cet excellent rapport.

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Un guide essentiel pour comprendre et enseigner la gouvernance | Version française *

Plusieurs administrateurs et formateurs me demandent de leur proposer un document de vulgarisation sur le sujet de la gouvernance. J’ai déjà diffusé sur mon blogue un guide à l’intention des journalistes spécialisés dans le domaine de la gouvernance des sociétés à travers le monde.

Il a été publié par le Global Corporate Governance Forum et International Finance Corporation (un organisme de la World Bank) en étroite coopération avec International Center for Journalists.

Je n’ai encore rien vu de plus complet et de plus pertinent sur la meilleure manière d’appréhender les multiples problématiques reliées à la gouvernance des entreprises mondiales. La direction de Global Corporate Governance Forum m’a fait parvenir le document en français le 14 février.

Qui dirige l’entreprise : Guide pratique de médiatisation du gouvernement d’entreprise – document en français

Ce guide est un outil pédagogique indispensable pour acquérir une solide compréhension des diverses facettes de la gouvernance des sociétés. Les auteurs ont multiplié les exemples de problèmes d’éthiques et de conflits d’intérêts liés à la conduite des entreprises mondiales. On apprend aux journalistes économiques – et à toutes les personnes préoccupées par la saine gouvernance – à raffiner les investigations et à diffuser les résultats des analyses effectuées.

Je vous recommande fortement de lire le document, mais aussi de le conserver en lieu sûr car il est fort probable que vous aurez l’occasion de vous en servir.

Vous trouverez ci-dessous quelques extraits de l’introduction à la version anglaise de l’ouvrage que j’avais publiée antérieurement.

Who’s Running the Company ? A Guide to Reporting on Corporate Governance

À propos du Guide

« This Guide is designed for reporters and editors who already have some experience covering business and finance. The goal is to help journalists develop stories that examine how a company is governed, and spot events that may have serious consequences for the company’s survival, shareholders and stakeholders. Topics include the media’s role as a watchdog, how the board of directors functions, what constitutes good practice, what financial reports reveal, what role shareholders play and how to track down and use information shedding light on a company’s inner workings. Journalists will learn how to recognize “red flags,” or warning signs, that indicate whether a company may be violating laws and rules. Tips on reporting and writing guide reporters in developing clear, balanced, fair and convincing stories.

Three recurring features in the Guide help reporters apply “lessons learned” to their own “beats,” or coverage areas:

– Reporter’s Notebook: Advise from successful business journalists

– Story Toolbox: How and where to find the story ideas

– What Do You Know? Applying the Guide’s lessons

Each chapter helps journalists acquire the knowledge and skills needed to recognize potential stories in the companies they cover, dig out the essential facts, interpret their findings and write clear, compelling stories:

What corporate governance is, and how it can lead to stories. (Chapter 1, What’s good governance, and why should journalists care?)
How understanding the role that the board and its committees play can lead to stories that competitors miss. (Chapter 2, The all-important board of directors)
Shareholders are not only the ultimate stakeholders in public companies, but they often are an excellent source for story ideas. (Chapter 3, All about shareholders)
Understanding how companies are structured helps journalists figure out how the board and management interact and why family-owned and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), may not always operate in the best interests of shareholders and the public. (Chapter 4, Inside family-owned and state-owned enterprises)
Regulatory disclosures can be a rich source of exclusive stories for journalists who know where to look and how to interpret what they see. (Chapter 5, Toeing the line: regulations and disclosure)
Reading financial statements and annual reports — especially the fine print — often leads to journalistic scoops. (Chapter 6, Finding the story behind the numbers)
Developing sources is a key element for reporters covering companies. So is dealing with resistance and pressure from company executives and public relations directors. (Chapter 7, Writing and reporting tips)

Each chapter ends with a section on Sources, which lists background resources pertinent to that chapter’s topics. At the end of the Guide, a Selected Resources section provides useful websites and recommended reading on corporate governance. The Glossary defines terminology used in covering companies and corporate governance ».

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Le rôle de l’audit interne dans l’identification des risques émergents *

Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un document de la firme Thomson Reuters (White Paper) très intéressant sur le rôle de l’audit interne dans l’identification des risques émergents.

EYE ON THE HORIZON : INTERNAL AUDIT’S ROLE IN IDENTIFYING EMERGING RISKS

Key elements of emerging risks

Reinsurance company Swiss Re defines emerging risks as “newly developing or changing risks which are difficult to quantify and which may have a major impact on the organisation.” This identifies their key elements.

Emerging risks may be entirely new, such as those posed by social media or technological innovation. Or they may come from existing risks that evolve or escalate – for example, the way counterparty credit risk or liquidity risk sky-rocketed during the 2008 financial crisis.

Newly developing risks lack precedent or history, and their precise form may not be immediately clear, which makes them difficult to measure or model. Changing risks are at least familiar in their shape and nature, although the rate of transformation and intensity can make them hard to quantify.

The final key element of emerging risks is their potential impact. New or changing risks can be as menacing as those the organisation deals with on a daily basis, and sometimes even more so. To give just one example, the way in which the music business failed to address the implications of digital downloads allowed a complete outsider, the computer company Apple, to step in and define and dominate the new market.

Emerging risks also threaten through their apparent remoteness or their obscurity. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld distinguished between things we know we do not know (‘known unknowns’), and things we do not know we do not know (‘unknown unknowns’). In the first category are risks whose shape might be familiar, but where we do not necessarily understand all of their elements – causes, potential impact, probability or timing. Unknown unknowns are events that are so out of left field or seemingly farfetchedthat it takes great insight or a leap of the imagination to even articulate them. These include the ‘black swan’ events highlighted by the investor-philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb, where the human tendency is to dismiss them as improbable beforehand, then rationalise them after they occur. The 9/11 terrorist attack, or the financial crash of 2008, or the invention of the internet show that not only do black swan events happen, but they do so more frequently than is generally recognised, and they have an historically significant impact (and not always negative).

Many emerging risks are characterised by their global nature, their scale or their longer-term horizon – climate change is an example that displays all of these elements. In other cases, it is less the individual events themselves, some of which may be relatively moderate or manageable on their own, as the conflation of circumstances that creates a ‘perfect storm’.

Vous pouvez aussi consulter l’enquête de Thomson Reuters Accelus Survey on Internal Audit dont nous avons parlé dans notre billet du 7 juin.

New duties on horizon for internal auditors

“The clear message from the survey is that internal audit functions need to stop thinking about themselves as compliance specialists and start taking on a much larger, more strategic role within the organization,” Ernst & Young LLP internal audit leader Brian Schwartz said in a news release. “IA is increasingly being asked by senior management and the board to provide broader business insights and better anticipate traditional and emerging risks, even as they maintain their focus on non-negotiable compliance activities.”

New risks

As strategic opportunities emerge, internal auditors also are adjusting to new compliance duties, according to the survey. Globalization has resulted in increased revenue from emerging markets for many companies, so new regulatory, cultural, tax, and talent risks are emerging.

Thomson Reuters Messenger (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Internal audit will play a more prominent role in evaluating these risks, according to the survey report. Although slightly more than one-fourth (27%) of respondents are heavily involved in identifying, assessing, and monitoring emerging risks now, 54% expect to be heavily involved in the next two years.

The biggest primary risks that respondents said their organizations are tracking are:

Economic stability (54%).

Cybersecurity (52%).

Major shifts in technology (48%).

Strategic transactions in global locations (44%).

Data privacy regulations (39%).

Survey respondents said the skills most often found to be lacking in internal audit functions are:

Data analytics;

Business strategy;

Deep industry experience;

Risk management; and

Fraud prevention and detection.

“As corporate leaders demand a greater measure of strategy and insight from their internal audit functions, CAEs will need to move quickly to close competency gaps and ensure that they have the right people in the right place, at the right time.” Schwartz said. “If they fail to meet organizational expectations, they risk being left behind or consigned to more transactional compliance activities.”

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Keeping Internal Auditors Up to the Challenge (forbes.com)

Internal Audit Has To STOP Focusing On Internal Controls (business2community.com)

Changement important dans la relation auditeur externe/interne | Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Useful Internal Auditing in 4 Easy Steps (isocertificationaustralia.com)

Thomson Reuters Develops Accelus Governance, Risk and Compliance Platform (risk-technology.typepad.com)

Le rôle du C.A. dans la gestion des risques *

La gestion des risques est une activité-clé qui doit être orchestrée par la direction de l’entreprise. Mais quel doit être le rôle du conseil d’administration en matière de surveillance de l’exécution de cette tâche essentielle ?

Quel est effectivement l’étendu du rôle du conseil dans les grandes sociétés publiques américaines. C’est ce que le document du Conference Board, présenté ici, décrit avec moult détails et d’une manière exceptionnellement bien illustrée.

Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de ce texte qui traite des aspects suivants :

Responsabilité pour l’établissement des stratégies

Fréquence des révisions des stratégies

Réunion spéciale de planification stratégique

Adoption d’une approche standardisée telle qu’ERM (Enterprise Risk Management)

Responsabilité pour la surveillance des risques

Fréquence des comptes rendus de la direction au C.A. en matière de risque

Le responsable en chef de la gestion des risques (CRO)

Le comité des risques de l’entreprise

Risk in the Boardroom

Any business is exposed to risks that can threaten its ability to execute its strategy. For this reason, strategy and risk oversight are inherently connected. Today, more than ever, the board of directors is expected to thoroughly assess key business risks and ensure that the enterprise is equipped to mitigate them. This Directors Notes discusses the current corporate practices on risk oversight by directors of U.S. public companies. Findings detail where the board assigns these responsibilities, whether it avails itself of dedicated reporting lines from senior management on risk issues, and the degree to which it adopts a standardized framework on enterprise risk management (ERM).

ERM – Enterprise Risk Management (Photo credit: Orange Steeler)

Given the correlation between risk and strategy, data on the frequency and forms of strategic reviews is also presented. The findings are from the most recent edition of the Board Practices Survey, which The Conference Board conducts annually in collaboration with NASDAQ OMX and NYSE Euronext (see “The Board Practices Survey” on p. 5). The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that financial institutions strengthen their risk oversight by establishing a dedicated risk committee of the board of directors.

In addition, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules require all public companies to disclose the extent of their board’s role in overseeing the organization’s risk exposure, including how the board administers its risk oversight function and how the leadership structure accommodates such a role.

Finally, in October 2009, the SEC reversed a policy under which shareholder proposals relating to the evaluation of risk could be excluded from a company’s proxy materials as related to the company’s ordinary day-to-day business activities. Collectively, these developments are a nod in the direction of addressing the risk oversight failures that played so prominently in the 2008 financial crisis. Most important, they are expected to increase scrutiny of risk management programs and their endorsement and close supervision by senior leaders of corporations.

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Histoire récente de l’essor des investisseurs activistes | Conditions favorables et avenir prévisible ? *

Ce matin, je vous convie à une lecture révélatrice des facteurs qui contribuent aux changements de fond observés dans la gouvernance des grandes sociétés cotées, lesquels sont provoqués par les interventions croissantes des grands investisseurs activistes.

Cet article de quatre pages, publié par John J. Madden de la firme Shearman & Sterling, et paru sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, présente les raisons de l’intensification de l’influence des investisseurs dans la stratégie et la direction des entreprises, donc de la gouvernance, un domaine du ressort du conseil d’administration, représentants des actionnaires … et des parties prenantes.

English: Study on alternative investments by i... — English: Study on alternative investments by institutional investors. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Après avoir expliqué l’évolution récente dans le monde de la gouvernance, l’auteur brosse un tableau plutôt convainquant des facteurs d’accélération de l’influence des activistes eu égard aux orientations stratégiques.

Les raisons qui expliquent ces changements peuvent être résumées de la manière suivante :

Un changement d’attitude des grands investisseurs, représentant maintenant 66 % du capital des grandes corporations, qui conduit à des intérêts de plus en plus centrés sur l’accroissement de la valeur ajoutée pour les actionnaires;
Un nombre accru de campagnes (+ de 50 %) initiées par des activistes lesquelles se traduisent par des victoires de plus en plus éclatantes;
Un retour sur l’investissement élevé (13 % entre 2009 et 2012) accompagné par des méthodes analytiques plus sophistiquées et plus crédibles (livres blancs);
Un accroissement du capital disponible notamment par l’apport de plus en plus grand des investisseurs institutionnels (fonds de pension, compagnies d’assurance, fonds commun de placement, caisses de retraite, etc.);
Un affaiblissement dans les moyens de défense des C.A. et une meilleure communication entre les actionnaires;
Un intérêt de plus en plus marqué des C.A. et de la direction par un engagement avec les investisseurs activistes.

À l’avenir, les activistes vont intensifier leurs efforts pour exiger des changements organisationnels significatifs (accroissement des dividendes, réorganisation des unités d’affaires, modification des règles de gouvernance, présence sur les conseils, séparation des rôles de PCD et PCA, alignement de la rémunération des dirigeants avec la performance, etc.).

Ci-dessous, un extrait des passages les plus significatifs. Bonne lecture !

The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism

One of the signal developments in 2012 was the emerging growth of the form of shareholder activism that is focused on the actual business and operations of public companies. We noted that “one of the most important trendline features of

2012 has been the increasing amount of strategic or operational activism. That is, shareholders pressuring boards not on classic governance subjects but on the actual strategic direction or management of the business of the corporation.”… Several of these reform initiatives of the past decade continue to be actively pursued. More recently, however, the most significant development in the activism sphere has been in strategically-focused or operationally-focused activism led largely by hedge funds.

The 2013 Acceleration of “Operational” Activism

Some of this operational activism in the past few years was largely short-term return focused (for example, pressing to lever up balance sheets to pay extraordinary dividends or repurchase shares), arguably at the potential risk of longer-term corporate prosperity, or simply sought to force corporate dispositions; and certainly there continues to be activism with that focus. But there has also emerged another category of activism, principally led by hedge funds, that brings a sophisticated analytical approach to critically examining corporate strategy and capital management and that has been able to attract the support of mainstream institutional investors, industry analysts and other market participants. And this growing support has now positioned these activists to make substantial investments in even the largest public companies. Notable recent examples include ValueAct’s $2.2 billion investment in Microsoft (0.8%), Third Point’s $1.4 billion investment in Sony (7%), Pershing Square’s $2 billion investment in Procter & Gamble (1%) and its $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals (9.8%), Relational Investor’s $600 million investment in PepsiCo (under 1%), and Trian Fund Management’s investments of $1.2 billion in DuPont (2.2%) and of more than $1 billion in each of PepsiCo and Mondelez. Interestingly, these investors often embark on these initiatives to influence corporate direction and decision-making with relatively small stakes when measured against the company’s total outstanding equity—as in Microsoft, P&G, DuPont and PepsiCo, for example; as well as in Greenlight Capital’s 1.3 million share investment in Apple, Carl Icahn’s 5.4% stake in Transocean, and Elliot Management’s 4.5% stake in Hess Corp.

In many cases, these activists target companies with strong underlying businesses that they believe can be restructured or better managed to improve shareholder value. Their focus is generally on companies with underperforming share prices (often over extended periods of time) and on those where business strategies have failed to create value or where boards are seen as poor stewards of capital.

Reasons for the Current Expansion of Operational Activism

Evolving Attitudes of Institutional Investors.

… Taken together, these developments have tended to test the level of confidence institutional investors have in the ability of some boards to act in a timely and decisive fashion to adjust corporate direction, or address challenging issues, when necessary in the highly competitive, complex and global markets in which businesses operate. And they suggest a greater willingness of investors to listen to credible external sources with new ideas that are intelligently and professionally presented.

Tangible evidence of this evolution includes the setting up by several leading institutional investors such as BlackRock, CalSTRS and T. Rowe Price of their own internal teams to assess governance practices and corporate strategies to find ways to improve corporate performance. As the head of BlackRock’s Corporate Governance and Responsible Investor team recently commented, “We can have very productive and credible conversations with managements and boards about a range of issues—governance, performance and strategy.”

Increasing Activist Campaigns Generally; More Challenger Success. The increasing number of activist campaigns challenging incumbent boards—and the increasing success by challengers—creates an encouraging market environment for operational activism. According to ISS, the resurgence of contested board elections, which began in 2012, continued into the 2013 proxy season. Proxy contests to replace some or all incumbent directors went from 9 in the first half of 2009 to 19 in the first half of 2012 and 24 in the first half of 2013. And the dissident win rate has increased significantly, from 43% in 2012 to 70% in 2013. Additionally, in July 2013, Citigroup reported that the number of $1 billion + activist campaigns was expected to reach over 90 for 2013, about 50% more than in 2012.

Attractive Investment Returns; Increasing Sophistication and Credibility. While this form of activism has certainly shown mixed results in recent periods (Pershing Square’s substantial losses in both J.C. Penney and Target have been among the most well-publicized examples of failed initiatives), the overall recent returns have been strong. Accordingly to Hedge Fund Research in Chicago, activist hedge funds were up 9.6% for the first half of 2013, and they returned an average of nearly 13% between 2009 and 2012.

In many instances, these activists develop sophisticated and detailed business and strategic analyses—which are presented in “white papers” that are provided to boards and managements and often broadly disseminated—that enhance their credibility and help secure the support, it not of management, of other institutional shareholders.

Increasing Investment Capital Available; Greater Mainstream Institutional Support. The increasing ability of activist hedge funds to raise new money not only bolsters their firepower, but also operates to further solidify the support they garner from the mainstream institutional investor community (a principal source of their investment base). According to Hedge Fund Research, total assets under management by activist hedge funds has doubled in the past four years to $84 billion today. And through August this year their 2013 inflows reached $4.7 billion, the highest inflows since 2006. Particularly noteworthy in this regard, Pershing Square’s recent $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals was funded in part with capital raised for a standalone fund dedicated specifically to Air Products, without disclosing the target’s name to investors.

In addition to making capital available, mainstream institutions are demonstrating greater support for these activists more generally. In a particularly interesting vote earlier this year, at the May annual meeting of Timken Co., 53% of the shareholders voting supported the non-binding shareholder proposal to split the company in two, which had been submitted jointly by Relational Investors (holding a 6.9% stake) and pension fund CalSTRS (holding 0.4%). To build shareholder support for their proposal, Relational and CalSTRS reached out to investors both in person and through the internet. Relational ran a website (unlocktimken . com) including detailed presentations and supportive analyst reports. They also secured the support of ISS and Glass Lewis. Four months after the vote, in September, Timken announced that it had decided to spin off its steel-making business.

The Timken case is but one example of the leading and influential proxy advisory firms to institutional investors increasingly supporting activists. Their activist support has been particularly noticeable in the context of activists seeking board representation in nominating a minority of directors to boards.

These changes suggest a developing blurring of the lines between activists and mainstream institutions. And it may be somewhat reminiscent of the evolution of unsolicited takeovers, which were largely shunned by the established business and financial communities in the early 1980s, although once utilized by a few blue-chip companies they soon became a widely accepted acquisition technique.

Weakened Board-Controlled Defenses; Increasing Communication Among Shareholders. The largely successful efforts over the past decade by certain pension funds and other shareholder-oriented organizations to press for declassifying boards, redeeming poison pills and adopting majority voting in director elections have diminished the defenses available to boards in resisting change of control initiatives and other activist challenges. Annual board elections and the availability of “withhold” voting in the majority voting context increases director vulnerability to investor pressure.

And shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders and their representative organizations, are better organized today for taking action in particular situations. The increasing and more sophisticated forms of communication among shareholders—including through the use of social media—is part of the broader trend towards greater dialogue between mainstream institutions and their activist counterparts. In his recent op-ed article in The Wall Street Journal, Carl Icahn said he would use social media to make more shareholders aware of their rights and how to protect them, writing that he had set up a Twitter account for that purpose (with over 80,000 followers so far) and that he was establishing a forum called the Shareholders Square Table to further these aims.

Corporate Boards and Managements More Inclined to Engage with Activists. The several developments referenced above have together contributed to the greater willingness today of boards and managements to engage in dialogue with activists who take investments in their companies, and to try to avoid actual proxy contests.

One need only look at the recent DuPont and Microsoft situations to have a sense of this evolution toward engagement and dialogue. After Trian surfaced with its investment in DuPont, the company’s spokesperson said in August 2013: “We are aware of Trian’s investment and, as always, we routinely engage with our shareholders and welcome constructive input. We will evaluate any ideas Trian may have in the context of our ongoing initiatives to build a higher value, higher growth company for our shareholders.” Also in August, Microsoft announced its agreement with ValueAct to allow the activist to meet regularly with the company’s management and selected directors and give the activist a board seat next year; thereby avoiding a potential proxy contest for board representation by ValueAct. Soon thereafter, on September 17, Microsoft announced that it would raise its quarterly dividend by 22% and renew its $40 billion share buyback program; with the company’s CFO commenting that this reflected Microsoft’s continued commitment to returning cash to its shareholders.

What to Expect Ahead

The confluence of the factors identified above has accelerated the recent expansion of operational activism, and there is no reason in the current market environment to expect that this form of activism will abate in the near term. In fact, the likelihood is that it will continue to expand… Looking ahead, we fully expect to see continuing efforts to press for the structural governance reforms that have been pursued over the past several years. Campaigns to separate the Chair and CEO roles at selected companies will likely continue to draw attention as they did most prominently this year at JPMorgan Chase. And executive compensation will remain an important subject of investor attention, and of shareholder proposals, at many companies where there is perceived to be a lack of alignment between pay and performance. We can also expect that the further development of operational activism, and seeing how boards respond to it, will be a central feature of the governance landscape in the year ahead.

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* En reprise

Finding Value in Shareholder Activism (clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu)

The Corporate Social Responsibility Report and Effective Stakeholder Engagement (venitism.blogspot.com)

The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Shareholder activism on the rise in Canada (business.financialpost.com)

Dealing With Activist Hedge Funds (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

American Activist Investors Get Ready To Invade Europe (forbes.com)

Activist Investors Help Companies, Not Workers – Bloomberg (bloomberg.com)

The Separation of Ownership from Ownership (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Réflexions capitales pour les Boards en 2014 – The Harvard Law School (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance by Paul Rose, Bernard S. Sharfman (togovern.wordpress.com)

Échafauder le « Board » du futur | McKinsey

Un récent document de McKinsey met en exergue l’importance pour les conseils d’administration de consacrer une partie significative de leur temps à des activités de vision stratégique à long terme plutôt que de rester le nez collé sur les rapports trimestriels, les budgets et la conformité.

L’étude estime qu’environ 70 % du temps du « Board » est investi dans de telles activités qui, même si elles sont essentielles, ne sont pas au cœur de ce que les conseils d’administration devraient faire, c’est-à-dire s’occuper de stratégies et prévoir du temps pour scruter l’avenir (les compétiteurs, le marché, les opportunités, les risques, l’évolution des valeurs sociétales, la mondialisation de l’économie, etc.).

Ce virement de bord doit s’effectuer en remaniant l’ordre du jour des conseils de manière à redresser la balance des responsabilités, c’est-à-dire en consacrant plus de temps à l’avenir ! Voici un extrait de l’excellent document de McKinsey qui montre comment les conseils peuvent répartir leur temps entre des activités de nature traditionnelles et des activités de représentation du futur.

Le tableau 1, présenté dans cet extrait, donne une bonne idée de la façon dont les présidents de conseils doivent envisager l’allocation du temps entre les réunions régulières du conseil :

(1) les activités qui relèvent de la surveillance, du contrôle et du rôle de fiduciaire;

(2) les activités qui concernent la formation de la vision du futur.

Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de cette approche de McKinsey qui, selon moi, marque une coupure dans la façon de concevoir les rôles et les responsabilités des membres du conseil.

Quelle est votre idée là-dessus ? Bonne lecture !

Building a forward-looking board | McKinsey

Debate over the role of company boards invariably intensifies when things go wrong on a grand scale, as has happened in recent years. Many of the companies whose corpses litter the industrial and financial landscape were undermined by negligent, overoptimistic, or ill-informed boards prior to the financial crisis and the ensuing deep recession. Not surprisingly, there’s been a renewed focus on improved corporate governance: better structures, more rigorous checks and balances, and greater independence by nonexecutives, for example.

McKinsey & Company competitiveness report (Photo credit: mars_discovery_district)

Governance arguably suffers most, though, when boards spend too much time looking in the rear-view mirror and not enough scanning the road ahead. We have experienced this reality all too often in our work with companies over several decades. It has also come through loud and clear during recent conversations with 25 chairmen of large public and privately held companies in Europe and Asia. Today’s board agendas, indeed, are surprisingly similar to those of a century ago, when the second Industrial Revolution was at its peak. Directors still spend the bulk of their time on quarterly reports, audit reviews, budgets, and compliance—70 percent is not atypical—instead of on matters crucial to the future prosperity and direction of the business.

The alternative is to develop a dynamic board agenda that explicitly highlights these forward-looking activities and ensures that they get sufficient time over a 12-month period. The exhibit illustrates how boards could devote more of their time to the strategic and forward-looking aspects of the agenda. This article discusses ways to achieve the right balance.

How forward-looking boards should spend their time

Document de consultation de l’OCDE sur la révision des principes de gouvernance |2014

Voici le document de consultation de l’OCDE sur la révision des principes de gouvernance |2014, présenté à Paris le 17 mars 2014. Ce document est en version anglaise seulement. Après la révision, l’OCDE produira des versions dans toutes les langues !

Celui-ci explicite les objectifs de politiques publiques en gouvernance, explore le nouveau paysage qui commande des changements en gouvernance et suggère sept (7) domaines susceptibles d’engendrer des changements importants au document Principe de gouvernance de 2004 (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance).

Je vous invite à participer à cette consultation si vous croyez utile de le faire. Ci-dessous, une introduction, suivie des 7 développements qui influeront sur la nouvelle version des principes de gouvernance de l’OCDE.

The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance is a public policy instrument intended to assist governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, regulatory and institutional framework for corporate governance. As formulated in the mandate that was given to the OECD Corporate Governance Committee in 2010, the objective is to contribute to « economic efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability ». In practice, this objective is achieved by formulating principles for policies that give market participants sound economic incentives to perform their respective roles within a framework of checks and balances where transparency, supervision and effective enforcement provides confidence in market practices and institutions.

English: The logo of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

While the Principles may inspire voluntary initiatives and influence practices in individual companies, the Principles do not aspire to include a shopping list of what individual market participants, such as shareholders, boards, managers and other stakeholders, from their unique perspectives, may consider good business judgment or sound commercial practices. What works in one company or for one investor may not necessarily be generally applicable as public policy or of systemic economic importance to society.

In order to be relevant and effective, the legal and regulatory framework must be shaped with respect to the economic reality in which it will be implemented. This is true also for the recommendations made in the Principles. And since they were last revised in 2004, the world has experienced a number of important events and structural developments in both the financial and corporate sectors. This obviously includes the financial crisis. But equally important for the review of the Principles are the far reaching changes in corporate ownership and investment practices. In some respects, these changes have come to challenge conventional wisdom and the relevance of current corporate governance standards. Several of these developments have been documented and analysed by the Corporate Governance Committee and the Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables and some of the background reports that have been written to support the review are annexed to this note for reference.

Seven main events and developments of importance to the review of the Principles can be identified:

The financial crisis.

The financial crisis revealed severe shortcomings in corporate governance. When most needed, existing standards failed to provide the checks and balances that companies need in order to cultivate sound business practices. Corporate governance weaknesses in remuneration, risk management, board practices and the exercise of shareholder rights played an important role in the development of the financial crisis and such weaknesses extended not only to the financial sector, but to companies more generally. The lessons from the financial crisis are discussed in the Committee’s report « Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Conclusions and Emerging Good Practices to Enhance Implementation of the Principles » (2010).

Developments in institutional ownership, investment strategies and trading techniques.

Since the Principles were revised in 2004, assets under management by institutional investors have increased considerably. We have also seen a surge in new types of institutional investors, investment vehicles and trading techniques. Taken together, these developments have affected the character and quality of ownership engagement. Many of the largest institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds use indexing as the prime investment strategy. A special, and increasingly popular, version of indexing is the use of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), which increased by more than 1000 percent between 2004 and 2011. A common characteristic of these investment practices is that they motivate investors to pay little or no attention to the fundamentals of individual companies, since the composition of the index is pre-defined and adjustments in the portfolio is not by active choice but rather a result of the index weighting. The same effect results from the surge in so-called high frequency trading where the investment strategy and ultra-short holding periods do not motivate any corporate specific analysis or ownership engagement. A fourth development that has attracted a lot of interest and debate is co-location of brokers, data vendors and other participants’ computer capacity within the stock exchanges’ data centres. This has raised concerns about confidence in a level playing field among different categories of investors with respect to market information. These developments and their implications for the economic incentives for ownership engagement among institutional investors are further discussed in « Institutional Investors as Owners – Who Are They and What Do They Do? » (2013).

Developments in the investment chain and the use of service providers.

The real world of ownership characterised by institutional (or intermediary) investors is a very different reality than the model textbook world of company law and economics, which assumes a strict and uncompromised alignment of interest between the performance of the company and the income of the ultimate shareholder. Instead of a straight line from « from profit to pocket », which is assumed in theory, we have an extended and sometimes very complex investment chain where different actors may have different incentives. The implications for the quality of ownership engagement are discussed in the background report « Institutional Investors as Owners – Who Are They and What Do They Do? » (2013). Among other aspects, the report highlights the possible implications of cross-investments between different institutional investors and the extensive use of proxy advisers, which is sometimes argued to impose a box ticking culture of « one-size-fits-all ». The last couple of decades have also seen an increase in outsourcing of asset management to external asset managers who may also be charged with carrying out the ownership functions. The complexity of the investment chain is also influenced by changes in stock market structures, trading practices and investment strategies. One example is the increased use of dark pools and off-exchange trading platforms that has increased concerns about the quality of the price discovery process and equal access to market information, which is so essential for efficient allocation of capital.

Developments in shareholder rights and participation.

Since the last review of the Principles, shareholder rights in many countries have been strengthened and there is a general trend to empower the shareholder meeting in the corporate decision-making process, particularly with respect to board nomination and remuneration policies. Technological advancements have also contributed to facilitating shareholder participation in the shareholder meetings. As documented in the report « Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today’s Equity Markets » (2013), several studies illustrate a relatively high level of participation in shareholder meetings in most OECD countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States that have predominantly dispersed ownership at corporate level. Today, the discussion on shareholder participation is mainly focused on the actual quality of shareholder monitoring and engagement, with the exception of issues related to shareholder co-operation. In some countries, particularly in emerging market economies, it is also argued that ownership engagement is impeded by difficulties with respect to placing items on the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting; the rules for convening shareholders’ meetings; limited access to relevant documentation and restrictions on share ownership by institutional investors.

Developments in corporate characteristics and business models.

Investments in fixed assets, such as machinery and buildings, have for decades been seen as the main source of capital formation. A recent OECD study1, however, shows that business investment in intangible assets has been increasing faster than investments in fixed assets for a number of years in many OECD countries and already accounts for more than half of the total business investment in some countries. The result is an increased dependence on human capital and intangible assets for innovation and value creation at firm level. At the same time, there has been significant number of acquisitions by some large established companies in more intangible-asset-intensive industries, partly through their venture units. Together with the decrease in the number of new listings in advanced stock markets, these developments have raised concerns about the ability of growth companies to develop and expand as independent companies. One preliminary indicator is the decrease in the share of young companies as percentage of the total number of companies in the US by 16% over the last decade. Another important development in terms of corporate characteristics and business models is the creation and surge of alternative corporate structures, mainly in the form of partnerships. This includes publicly traded partnerships (PTPs) and master limited partnerships (MSPs) that trade on securities exchanges.

Developments in corporate ownership.

Traditionally, the international corporate governance debate has focused on situations with dispersed ownership where the conflict is a zero sum game between dispersed owners on the one hand and incumbent management on the other hand. This « agency » approach has its merits but it also has important weaknesses. One important weakness is that most listed companies around the world are not characterized by dispersed ownership. Rather, they have a controlling or dominant owner. This is particularly true in emerging markets. But controlling owners are also common in most advanced economies, including the US and continental Europe. It has been argued that the focus on dispersed ownership is of limited help when addressing corporate governance issues in companies that have a controlling owner. The presence of controlling owners is generally assumed to provide strong incentives for informed ownership engagement and to overcome the fundamental agency problem between shareholders and managers. There are also arguments that the incentives for controlling owners to assume the costs for this ownership engagement are weakened by restrictions on the possibilities of controlling owners to exercise their rights and be properly compensated for their efforts to monitor. Some of these are discussed in the background paper « The Law and Economics of Controlling Owners in Corporate Governance » (2013). At the same time, there are concerns that controlling owners in a weak regulatory framework may take advantage of minority shareholders through abusive related party transactions. This is discussed in the report « Related Party Transactions and Minority Shareholder Rights » (2012).

Developments in the functioning of public stock markets.

Corporate governance policies are focused on companies that are traded on the public stock market. To understand the functioning and structure of public stock markets is therefore essential for getting the corporate governance rules right. And today, stock markets look very different from what they did when the OECD Principles were first established. The developments are well documented in the background reports « Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today’s Equity Markets » (2013) and « Making Stock markets Work to Support Economic Growth » (2013), which address issues such as market fragmentation, increased use of dark pools, changes in « tick-size », high-frequency trading and co-location. The reports also show that during the last decade, some of the leading stock markets in the world have lost as much as half of their listed companies and that the average size of companies that find their way to the stock market has increased. At the same time, stock exchanges in emerging markets, notably in Asia, have increased the number of listed companies significantly. Between 2008 and 2012 a majority of all new listings in the world were in emerging markets. Since the free float (the portion of outstanding shares regularly available for public trading) is relatively small in these markets, one consequence of this development is an increase in the number of publicly traded companies that have a controlling owner. Another important development is the occurrence of cross-listings and secondary listings, which raises issues related to the standards and procedures for recognizing of corporate governance standards in primary listing venues and the allocation of supervisory obligations between listing stock exchanges. We have also seen a development where stock exchanges have demutualised and become listed companies on themselves; so called self-listing. At the same time, there has been a certain degree of consolidation through mergers of regulated exchanges both at national and international level, which was coupled with the emergence of new venues for trading; such as alternative trading venues and dark pools.

2014 Review of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

First released in May 1999 and last revised in 2004, the OECD Corporate Governance Committee has launched a further review of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. The review process starts in 2014 with the objective of conclusion within one year.

The OECD Principles are one of the 12 key standards for international financial stability of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and form the basis for the corporate governance component of the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes of the World Bank Group.

The rationale for the review is to ensure the continuing high quality, relevance and usefulness of the Principles taking into account recent developments in the corporate sector and capital markets. The outcome should provide policy makers, regulators and other rule-making bodies with a sound benchmark for establishing an effective corporate governance framework.

The basis for the review will be the 2004 version of the Principles, which embrace the shared understanding that a high level of transparency, accountability, board oversight, and respect for the rights of shareholders and role of key stakeholders is part of the foundation of a well-functioning corporate governance system. These core values should be maintained and, as appropriate, be strengthened to reflect experiences since 2004.

As the Principles are a global standard also adopted by the FSB, all FSB member jurisdictions are invited to participate in the review as Associates and have the same decision-making rights as OECD members.

The review will benefit from consultations with stakeholders, including the business sector, investors, professional groups at national and international levels, trade unions, civil society organisations and other international standard setting bodies.

Peer reviews – In response to the corporate governance challenges that came into focus in the wake of the financial crisis, the Corporate Governance Committee launched a thematic review process designed to facilitate the effective implementation of the OECD Principles and to assist market participants and policy makers to respond to emerging corporate governance risks. These peer reviews will provide valuable background support to the review.

OECD Forecasts During and After the Financial Crisis: A Post Mortem

Formations spécialisées en gouvernance | Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS)

Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) de l’Université Laval offrira, en mai prochain, trois formations spécialisées de haut niveau :

(1) Gouvernance des services financiers

(2) Gouvernance des régimes de retraite

(3) Gouvernance des PME

Sur une formule de deux jours intensifs, chaque formation est animée par des experts chevronnés et est adaptée aux besoins des administrateurs, cadres et dirigeants. Les trois formations se tiendront à Montréal, au Centre de conférences Le 1000.

Gouvernance des services financiers

La formation Gouvernance des services financiers aura lieu les 6 et 7 mai 2014. Elle est destinée aux administrateurs, cadres et hauts dirigeants du secteur des services financiers qui œuvrent dans le domaine bancaire, les assurances, les valeurs mobilières et les organismes d’encadrement légal et corporatif. Cette formation vise à favoriser la mise en place de saines pratiques de gouvernance afin de préserver la confiance du grand public, des consommateurs et des investisseurs. Pour connaître les détails de la formation Gouvernance des services financiers

Gouvernance des régimes de retraite

La formation Gouvernance des régimes de retraite aura lieu les 13 et 14 mai 2014. Elle s’adresse aux membres de comités de retraite, aux administrateurs et gestionnaires de fonds de régime de retraite. Cette formation vise à améliorer les connaissances et compétences en gouvernance, à préciser les rôles et responsabilités qui incombent aux administrateurs et gestionnaires d’un régime de retraite, puis à développer un sens critique pour un meilleur processus décisionnel. Pour connaître les détails de la formation Gouvernance des régimes de retraite

Gouvernance des PME

La formation Gouvernance des PME aura lieu les 27 et 28 mai 2014. Elle est destinée aux chefs d’entreprise, hauts dirigeants, investisseurs et administrateurs appelés à siéger sur les conseils d’administration ou comités consultatifs de PME. Cette formation propose de réfléchir aux pratiques de gouvernance les mieux adaptées et les plus efficaces pour l’entreprise de type PME et permet de revoir les grandes orientations et identifier des moyens concrets pour en optimiser la gouvernance. Pour connaître les détails de la formation Gouvernance des PME

______________________________________________

Ces formations comptent pour un crédit de 15 heures de formation continue requise pour les détenteurs du titre IAS.A. de l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés ainsi que les ASC du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés. De plus, elles sont reconnues par les ordres et organismes professionnels suivants : Association des MBA du Québec, Barreau du Québec, Chambre de la sécurité financière, Institut québécois des planificateurs financiers, Ordre des ADMA du Québec, Ordre des CPA du Québec, Ordre des CRHA.

__________________________

* À propos du CAS

Créé en 2005 grâce à un partenariat entre l’Autorité des marchés financiers, la Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, le ministère du Conseil exécutif du Québec et la Faculté des sciences de l’administration de l’Université Laval, le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés se positionne comme leader de la formation des administrateurs et représente le seul programme de certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés au Québec. Il contribue au développement et à la promotion de la bonne gouvernance de sociétés en offrant des formations reconnues et à la fine pointe des meilleures pratiques. À ce jour, le CAS a diplômé 624 ASC. Il est possible de consulter leur profil en visitant le www.BanqueAdministrateurs.com.

PLANIFICATION D’AUDIT INTERNE BASÉE SUR LES RISQUES

Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un document de la firme Thomson Reuters (White paper) qui aborde les écueils que n’ont pas su toujours éviter les responsables d’audit interne lors du déploiement de leur processus de planification annuelle/triennale fondé sur les risques.

Votre planification prend-t-elle vraiment en compte les objectifs stratégiques de votre organisation ainsi que les risques qui pourraient prévenir leur réalisation…
Votre planification prend-t-elle vraiment en compte les travaux réalisés par les autres fonctions d’assurance de votre organisation (Gestion des risques, Conformité, Finance, etc..)…
Votre planification prend-t-elle vraiment en compte les préoccupations des dirigeants….

Voici un aperçu de la table des matières du document. Bonne lecture et bonne réflexion.

PLANIFICATION D’AUDIT INTERNE BASÉE SUR LES RISQUES

A TYPICAL INTERNAL AUDIT SCENARIO

REVIEW STANDARD INTERNAL AUDIT PROCEDURES

LISTEN TO MANAGEMENT: THE REAL OPPORTUNITY

LAY THE FOUNDATIONS: THE IMPORTANCE OF A ROBUST METHODOLOGY

KNOW YOUR COMPANY’S RISK APPETITE

PLAN FOR SUCCESS

UNDERSTAND THE BUSINESS AND ITS CULTURE

As the COSO Internal Control – Integrated Framework (2013) states, « risk assessment involves a dynamic and iterative process for identifying and assessing risks to the achievement of objectives ». Yet many in-house internal audit functions look at the annual internal audit risk assessment process as a check-the-box activity, required mainly to be in compliance with the IIA professional practices framework.

Typically, a three or five-year review cycle for the entire organization is already in place, and the annual internal audit risk assessment barely scratches the surface: It is merely used to justify minor modifications in the risk-based internal audit plan. Yet the internal audit risk assessment presents an often missed opportunity for internal auditors to understand their organization’s evolving objectives and implement a more dynamic risk-based approach to the internal audit process. Let’s take a look at a typical scenario played out every day and see if we, as uninvolved by-standers, can audit the process and see it if falls short in any way.

In advance of this year’s risk assessment, the internal audit department reviewed and revised their risk assessment process and the various preparation materials for management participants. The preparation materials included a list of key management participants with their preferred contact method, a list of internal audit risk assessment questions, an announcement letter explaining the importance of the annual risk assessment process, and a presentation that provided examples of beneficial insight received from the previous year’s risk assessment.

During the risk assessment, the internal audit staff rigorously captures each management remarks in an effort to record each detail, be it quantitative or qualitative. As the « scribe, » the internal audit staff is responsible for note taking, while the internal audit director asks management a series of questions from the annual list of internal audit risk assessment queries. The internal audit director conducts the interview in a way that illustrates both their tremendous understanding of the business and their ability to not get bogged down in the details. The individual representing management, on the other hand, usually provides general responses highlighting a few generic risks inherent in their business, but not enough for one to actually audit. One of those general responses was around an increase in the organization’s credit risk exposure.

Les priorités et les questionnements en TI | Survey 2014 de Provitivi

The Future of Information Technology (Photo credit: MDGovpics)

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les résultats d’un sondage très poussé effectué par la firme PROTIVITI qui présente les priorités 2014 dans le domaine des technologies de l’information.

Ce document expose une liste assez exhaustive de thèmes à considérer sur diverses problématiques IT. On y commente les principaux résultats du sondage et on fait état des questions-clés susceptibles d’intéresser les administrateurs et les dirigeants.

À l’instar de Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, je vous encourage à lire ce document récent et très pertinent pour les organisations aux prises avec diverses problématiques liées au champ IT.

IT Priorities 2014 | Protiviti Survey

La transformation de l’audit interne par l’utilisation de la pensée critique | KPMG

Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un document de la firme KPMG qui présente le concept de pensée critique (critical thinking) adapté à l’audit interne. Ce document présente également une pyramide des différents niveaux de maturité de l’audit interne, laquelle culmine avec la pensée critique, puis la création de valeur.

Ce document propose trois ajustements au cycle d’audit interne pour bien refléter une approche intégrant la pensée critique.

À l’instar de Denis Lefort, je vous encourage à lire ce document très intéressant lequel saura peut-être vous inspirer !

Transforming Internal Audit Through Critical Thinking

In an uncertain and challenging economy, organizations are seeking an approach to internal audit that goes beyond reviewing past activities. Instead, they want internal audits that are insightful, forward looking, and go beyond preserving value to creating value on a departmental, divisional, or organization-wide level.

To meet these expectations, internal audit leaders must strive to migrate to more advanced stages of maturity that evolve basic auditing processes and skills towards an approach to create value and insight to an organization. Many internal audit functions establish goals to achieve higher value; however, they fall short in one of two ways:

The skill sets and competencies of the team are not sufficiently cross-functional or developed in each team member to deliver the expected value

The internal audit approach is not redesigned to facilitate a new approach in planning, execution, and reporting of results.

This is where the critical thinking approach comes into play. Critical thinking is defined as an open-minded approach to analyzing a situation or task for the development of supportable conclusions and conveying the assessed results in a logical manner. The application of this concept in internal audit is where value can be unleashed within an organization. Applying critical thought to internal audit is more than just a planning exercise, but one in which every element of your process is challenged. This step-by-step exercise of identifying existing or new interdependencies, inputs, relationships, and opportunities in each phase of the audit can create new information for eager business leaders about how to approach risks and improvement opportunities from a new angle.

Critical thinking can help shift the purpose of internal audit to create value and expand or develop the positive perception of the department across the organization. The full maturity, when successfully implemented, goes a level beyond operational auditing and should result in opening more doors for internal audit to sit on steering committees, task forces, and other strategic initiatives. Critical thinking as a core approach for internal audit establishes a strategic partner within the business, focused on achieving balance between risk management and business performance.

Six sujets cruciaux à l’agenda des C.A. britanniques en 2014

Le document ci-dessous expose, de manière infographique, les défis et les occasions de changement qui se présentent aux conseils d’administration des sociétés britanniques. Le leadership du Royaume-Uni en matière d’établissement de règles de gouvernance est assez reconnu dans l’univers des pays anglo-saxons (dont les É.U, le Canada, le R.U, l’Australie …).

Le sondage commandité par l’ICSA (Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators), le Financial Times et le CSS (Company Secretarial Services) présente des résultats très encourageants sur les tendances à surveiller au cours des prochaines années.

Ainsi, on constate les résultats suivants :

80 % des répondants croient que les conditions économiques iront en s’améliorant en 2014 (vs 48 % en 2013)

51 % considère leurs C.A. comme plus diversifiés en termes de genre (vs 32 % 3n 2013)

Les perceptions, en ce qui a trait à la suffisance du pipeline de talents féminins, sont en progression (25 % par rapport à 4 % en 2013)

La confiance dans l’atteinte des cibles prévues par les autorités est de 57 %

76 % des entreprises sont conscientes des cyber-risques liés aux nouvelles technologies de l’information

Les entreprises ont l’intention de modifier significativement plusieurs aspects de la rémunération des hauts dirigeants

37 % des entreprises voient les actionnaires activistes comme ayant un impact positif sur la croissance à long terme (vs 47 % qui croient que l’activisme ne favorise pas la croissance à long terme)

87 % des entreprises ont un plan d’engagement avec les investisseurs (comparativement à 60 % en 2013)

53 % des entreprises sont en faveur de ne pas imposer de limite à la durée des mandats des administrateurs (comparativement à 32 % qui croient que l’on devrait imposer une limite de 6 ou 9 ans).

Si vous souhaitez avoir plus de détail sur ce court compte rendu, je vous invite à suivre le lien ci-dessous. Bonne lecture !

Six hot topics for Boards in 2014

2014 brings many fresh challenges and opportunities to the boardroom. Recent surveys of the views of company secretaries by ICSA, the Financial Times and Company Secretarial Services (CSS) highlighted six hot topics that are set to feature highly on boardroom agendas over the coming year.

Gouverner et gérer sont-ils deux systèmes de pensée différents ?

Peter Tunjic* avance que les actes de gouvernance, de la part d’un conseil d’administration, et les actes de direction, au sens de management, correspondent à deux systèmes de pensée fondamentalement différents.

Dans son article, l’auteur présente une matrice que vous trouverez peut-être utile de considérer. Je vous invite à lire l’article pour plus de détails.

Governing and Directing : Are They Different ?

A recent survey of CEO attitudes to their boards by respected commentator Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and his colleagues, shouldn’t surprise anyone: ‘CEOs complain that boards often lack the intestinal fortitude for the level of risk taking that healthy growth requires.

“Board members are supposed to bring long-term prudence to a company”, as one CEO says, but this often translates to protecting the status quo and suppressing the bold thinking about reinvention that enterprises need when strategic contexts shift.’ Consensus is emerging that public company boards are too focused on compliance and are ignoring their role as creators of enduring value for the firms they direct. But it’s not for lack of will on their part.

The board’s role in strategy is considered the biggest issue for 67 per cent of respondents to the 2012 Spencer Stuart US Board Index want to spend more time on strategy. Despite this, according to Heidrick & Struggles, 84 per cent of directors of the top 2,000 largest publicly traded companies in the US thought ‘they are now spending more time on monitoring and less on strategy. Consequently, only one-third of respondents to a 2013 McKinsey & Company report say they have a complete understanding of current strategy. If directors have their eyes on value creation why is it that their feet are still pointing in a different direction? It’s because the system is not designed to create value. Best practice in corporate governance produces too many ‘governors’ focused on protecting value and not enough directors focused on creating it.

Public companies have become over governed and under directed because corporate governance regulation and education is designed to ensure the ‘correct’ board structure, process and composition rather than ensure ‘imagination, creativity, or ethical behavior in guiding the destinies of corporate enterprises’

This paper argues that in order to create enduring value, public company directors must go beyond governing and governance and must also embrace ‘directing’ and ‘directorship’. I propose that governance and directorship are two distinct systems of thought and action in the boardroom.

The difference between the two lies primarily in their attitude to value. Governance concerns right structure and process. The focus is on protecting and preserving value through maintaining control and managing risk. In contrast, directorship involves bold choices that necessarily create risk.

Directing involves designing the ways in which value is created, making decision of consequence and inspiring CEO’s to lead their organisations into strength, resilience and endurance. The boundaries between the two might blur in the heat of a board meeting, but the differences in attitude, competencies and outcome are clear. Here are four tests to help you decide whether you stand on the question of value.

Governing for shareholder value versus directing for firm value

Measuring value versus creating value

Governing for transparency versus directing with discretion

Managing risk versus creating risk

…. The DLMA Matrix graphically represents the similarities and differences of each perspective as well as the inherent dilemma required to balance them all.

THE DLMA MATRIX ™

_______________________________

*Peter Tunjic is an independent corporate advocate and commercial lawyer based in Melbourne, Australia. He is the author of ondirectorship.com and has co-authored several learning programmes for the Australian Institute of Company Directors. He consults on creating value in the boardroom and improving board/manager relations.

Articles d’intérêt :

Le rôle de l’audit interne dans l’identification des risques émergents

EYE ON THE HORIZON : INTERNAL AUDIT’S ROLE IN IDENTIFYING EMERGING RISKS

Key elements of emerging risks

Reinsurance company Swiss Re defines emerging risks as “newly developing or changing risks which are difficult to quantify and which may have a major impact on the organisation.” This identifies their key elements.

Emerging risks may be entirely new, such as those posed by social media or technological innovation. Or they may come from existing risks that evolve or escalate – for example, the way counterparty credit risk or liquidity risk sky-rocketed during the 2008 financial crisis.

Newly developing risks lack precedent or history, and their precise form may not be immediately clear, which makes them difficult to measure or model. Changing risks are at least familiar in their shape and nature, although the rate of transformation and intensity can make them hard to quantify.

The final key element of emerging risks is their potential impact. New or changing risks can be as menacing as those the organisation deals with on a daily basis, and sometimes even more so. To give just one example, the way in which the music business failed to address the implications of digital downloads allowed a complete outsider, the computer company Apple, to step in and define and dominate the new market.

Emerging risks also threaten through their apparent remoteness or their obscurity. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld distinguished between things we know we do not know (‘known unknowns’), and things we do not know we do not know (‘unknown unknowns’). In the first category are risks whose shape might be familiar, but where we do not necessarily understand all of their elements – causes, potential impact, probability or timing. Unknown unknowns are events that are so out of left field or seemingly farfetchedthat it takes great insight or a leap of the imagination to even articulate them. These include the ‘black swan’ events highlighted by the investor-philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb, where the human tendency is to dismiss them as improbable beforehand, then rationalise them after they occur. The 9/11 terrorist attack, or the financial crash of 2008, or the invention of the internet show that not only do black swan events happen, but they do so more frequently than is generally recognised, and they have an historically significant impact (and not always negative).

Many emerging risks are characterised by their global nature, their scale or their longer-term horizon – climate change is an example that displays all of these elements. In other cases, it is less the individual events themselves, some of which may be relatively moderate or manageable on their own, as the conflation of circumstances that creates a ‘perfect storm’.

Vous pouvez aussi consulter l’enquête de Thomson Reuters Accelus Survey on Internal Audit dont nous avons parlé dans notre billet du 7 juin.

New duties on horizon for internal auditors

New risks

As strategic opportunities emerge, internal auditors also are adjusting to new compliance duties, according to the survey. Globalization has resulted in increased revenue from emerging markets for many companies, so new regulatory, cultural, tax, and talent risks are emerging.

Thomson Reuters Messenger (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Internal audit will play a more prominent role in evaluating these risks, according to the survey report. Although slightly more than one-fourth (27%) of respondents are heavily involved in identifying, assessing, and monitoring emerging risks now, 54% expect to be heavily involved in the next two years.

The biggest primary risks that respondents said their organizations are tracking are:

Economic stability (54%).

Cybersecurity (52%).

Major shifts in technology (48%).

Strategic transactions in global locations (44%).

Data privacy regulations (39%).

Survey respondents said the skills most often found to be lacking in internal audit functions are:

Data analytics;

Business strategy;

Deep industry experience;

Risk management; and

Fraud prevention and detection.

“As corporate leaders demand a greater measure of strategy and insight from their internal audit functions, CAEs will need to move quickly to close competency gaps and ensure that they have the right people in the right place, at the right time.” Schwartz said. “If they fail to meet organizational expectations, they risk being left behind or consigned to more transactional compliance activities.”

Keeping Internal Auditors Up to the Challenge (forbes.com)

Internal Audit Has To STOP Focusing On Internal Controls (business2community.com)

Changement important dans la relation auditeur externe/interne | Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Useful Internal Auditing in 4 Easy Steps (isocertificationaustralia.com)

Thomson Reuters Develops Accelus Governance, Risk and Compliance Platform (risk-technology.typepad.com)

Comité des C.A. sur la surveillance des risques

Ci-dessous, vous trouverez un billet, partagé par Denis Lefort, expert-conseil en gouvernance et en audit interne, qui vous incite à prendre connaissance du Bulletin de janvier 2014 du Conference Board intitulé « Risk Oversight: Evolving expectation for Board« .

Risk Oversight : Evolving Expectations for Boards

Présenté par Denis Lefort, CPA, CA, CIA, CRMA

Ce document, très intéressant, fait un retour en arrière sur les différentes analyses et recommandations effectuées par différents groupes dont, le NACD, la SEC, le SSG, Dodd-Frank, ICGN, FSB, FRC (les acronymes sont explicitées dans le document de 10 pages), dans la foulée des scandales financiers de 2008.

English: Contribution and prioritizing threats and risks to Risk Management Effectiveness (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Le document est très critique quant au rôle très actif que devraient jouer les conseils d’administration au niveau de la surveillance des risques. Il est aussi très critique des approches mises en œuvre par les fonctions Gestion des risques et audit interne. Enfin, des recommandations sont formulées pour ces trois instances.

Bien qu’au départ, le document ait ciblé les institutions financières, ses propos peuvent s’appliquer à un grand éventail d’organisations. C’est pourquoi je vous encourage tous à en prendre connaissance et à le partager avec vos dirigeants, membres de conseils, collègues et contacts professionnels. Voici un extrait. Bonne lecture !

The Risk Oversight Committee is responsible for :

a. determining where and when formal documented risk assessments should be completed, recognizing that additional risk management rigor and formality should be cost/benefit justified

b. ensuring that business units are identifying and reliably reporting the material risks to the key objectives identified in their annual strategic plans and core foundation objectives necessary for sustained success, including compliance with applicable laws and regulations

c. reviewing and assessing whether material risks being accepted across XYZ are consistent with the corporation’s risk appetite and tolerance

d. developing, implementing, and monitoring overall compliance with this policy

e. overseeing development, administration and periodic review of this policy for approval by the board of directors

f. reviewing and approving the annual external disclosures related to risk oversight processes required by securiti esregulators

g. reporting periodically to the CEO and the board on the corporation’s consolidated residual risk position

h. ensuring that an appropriate culture of risk-awareness exists throughout the organization

Business unit leaders are responsible for:

a. managing risks to their unit’s business objectives within the corporation’s risk appetite/tolerance

b. identifying in their business when they believe the benefits of formal risk assessment exceed the costs, or when requested to by the CEO or risk oversight committee

Risk management and assurance support services unit is responsible for :

a. providing risk assessment training, facilitation, and assessment services to senior management and business units upon request

b. annually preparing a consolidated report on XYZ’s most significant residual risks and related residual risk status, and a report on the current effectiveness and maturity of the Corporation’s risk management processes for review by the risk oversight committee, senior management, and the corporation’s board of directors

c. completing risk assessments of specific objectives that have not been formally assessed and reported on by business units when asked to by the risk oversight committee, senior management, or the board of directors; or if the risk management support services team leader believes that a formal risk assessment is warranted to provide a materially reliable risk status report to senior management and the board of directors

d. conducting independent quality assurance reviews on risk assessments completed by business units and providing feedback to enhance the quality and reliability of those assessments

e. participating in the drafting and review of the corporation’s annual disclosures in the Annual Reports and Proxy Statement related to risk management and oversight

Audit and Risk Management

Redefining The Role Of Internal Audit: Part Two (business2community.com)

Redefining The Role Of Internal Audit: Avoiding Redundancy (business2community.com)

Risk Based Internal Audit Planning (learnsigma.co.uk)

The difference between internal audit and external audit, by a firm consulting (iareportg5.wordpress.com)

Getting from Continuous Auditing to Continuous Risk Assessment (mjsnook.co)

The Internal Audit Activity’s Role in Governance, Risk, and Control (IIA Certified Internal Auditor – Part 1) (examcertifytraining.wordpress.com)

Préoccupations des C.A. eu égard à la cybersécurité ?

Voici un document du National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) qui aborde une question cruciale sur le rôle des conseils d’administration en matière de prévention et de réactions à la suite de problèmes de sécurité informatique.

computer security (Photo credit: justonlysteve)

Le document de 10 pages est disponible gratuitement sur le site du NACD si vous vous inscrivez. Je vous invite à prendre connaissance des principales questions qu’un administrateur devrait poser à la direction.

Voici un extrait de l’article, notamment les questions concernant la planification d’une attaque à la sécurité, et d’autres questions concernant les mesures à prendre à la suite de ces problèmes.

Cybersecurity: Boardroom Implications

Ten Questions Directors Can Ask Management in Planning for a Breach

How will we know we have been hacked or breached, what makes us certain or how will we find out?
What are best practices for cybersecurity and where do our practices differ?
In management’s opinion, what is the biggest weakness in our IT systems? If we wanted to deal the most damage to the company, how would we go about it?
Does our external auditor indicate we have deficiencies in IT? If so, where?
Where do management and our IT team disagree on cybersecurity?
Were we told of cyber attacks that already occurred and how severe they were? For significant breaches, is the communication adequate as information is obtained regarding the nature and type of breach, the data impacted, and potential implications to the company and the response plan?
What part of our IT infrastructure can contribute to a significant deficiency or material weakness?
What do we consider our most valuable assets; how does our IT system interact with those assets; do we think there is adequate protection in place if someone wanted to get them or damage them; what would it take to feel comfortable that they were protected? Do we believe we can ever fully protect those assets? How should we monitor the status of their protection?
Are we investing enough so our corporate operating and network systems are not easy targets by a determined hacker?
Where can we generate more revenue and marginal profitability by making changes in IT?

Ten Questions Directors Can Ask Management Once a Breach Is Found

How did we learn about the breach? Were we notified by an outside agency or was the breach found internally?
What do we believe was stolen?
What has been affected by the breach?
Have any of our operations been compromised?
Is our crisis response plan in action, and is it working as planned?
Whom do we have to notify about this breach (materiality), whom should we notify, and is our legal team prepared for such notifications?
What steps is the response team taking to ensure that the breach is under control and the hacker no longer has access to the internal network?
Do we believe the hacker was an internal or external actor?
What were the weaknesses in our system that allowed it to occur (and why)?
What steps can we take to make sure this type of breach does not happen again,

Cinq (5) points que les comités d’audit doivent prendre en considération

Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance une publication de la firme Deloitte qui aborde cinq points que les comités d’audit doivent prendre en considération afin de réussir en période de changement et d’incertitude :

1 . Protéger la marque et la réputation

2. Renforcer la confiance des investisseurs

3. Rendre l’information financière plus pertinente pour les parties prenantes

4. Tirer parti de l’évolution technologique

5. Payer sa « juste part » d’impôts

Voici un extrait du document ci-dessous. Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Réussir en période de changement et d’incertitude : plans d’action à l’intention des comités d’audit

La plupart des entreprises prennent des mesures pour améliorer leur capacité de livrer concurrence à long terme, notamment en mettant en œuvre de nouvelles technologies, en créant des partenariats, en rationalisant leurs activités ou en explorant de nouveaux marchés, mais elles doivent aussi composer avec les changements découlant des percées technologiques, de l’entrée en vigueur de nouveaux textes réglementaires et des modifications des normes d’information financière.

Audit (Photo credit: LendingMemo)

Dans un tel contexte, les comités d’audit ont un rôle de plus en plus important à jouer, qui dépasse celui de la seule surveillance des rapports financiers et autres informations réglementaires que leur organisation doit fournir.

La présente publication aborde cinq points que le comité d’audit doit prendre en considération.

Protéger la marque et la réputation :

Aujourd’hui les entreprises sont de plus en plus jugées sur leur conduite. Respecter les lois ne suffit plus; on s’attend à ce que les entreprises se conforment à des normes plus élevées. Si elles ne peuvent entièrement contrôler la perception qu’on a de leur marque, elles peuvent prendre des mesures pour se protéger contre les atteintes à leur réputation et se doter d’un plan d’action qu’elles pourront mettre en œuvre rapidement advenant une controverse.

Renforcer la confiance des investisseurs :

Les responsabilités des comités d’audit se sont accrues considérablement au cours des dix dernières années. Aujourd’hui, les organismes de réglementation internationaux projettent d’imposer de nouvelles règles pour améliorer la qualité des audits. Un grand nombre d’entre elles auront des répercussions sur la manière dont les comités d’audit s’acquittent de leurs responsabilités et font rapport aux actionnaires.

Rendre l’information financière plus pertinente pour les parties prenantes :

Les normes comptables ont fait l’objet de nombreuses modifications qui ont rendu la comptabilité moins intuitive et plus détaillée. Plusieurs modifications avaient pour but de résoudre des problèmes financiers et, plus récemment, de dissiper de plus vastes préoccupations des parties prenantes, sur les plans social et environnemental, notamment. Les comités d’audit doivent jouer un rôle actif pour faciliter l’identification, la compréhension et l’adoption de nouvelles normes tout en veillant à ce que les informations que l’entreprise communique à ses parties prenantes soient pertinentes et utiles.

Tirer parti de l’évolution technologique :

Pratiquement toutes les activités reposent à présent sur la technologie ou sont assistées par la technologie, ce qui donne aux entreprises des occasions sans précédent de réaliser des économies d’échelle, de réinventer leurs modèles d’affaires ou d’améliorer leurs liens avec les parties prenantes. Les données numériques sont aujourd’hui une richesse extrêmement prisée, ce qui rend nécessaire la mise en place de processus de gouvernance semblables à ceux qui encadrent l’information financière pour garantir l’intégrité des données et des systèmes d’information.

Payer sa « juste part » d’impôts :

De nombreuses organisations ont été accusées, tant par des groupes d’activistes que par les médias, de ne pas payer leur « juste part » d’impôts. Dans un environnement où des mesures de planification fiscale innocentes et légitimes sur le plan commercial sont mal vues, les comités d’audit doivent s’assurer que les stratégies fiscales auxquelles l’organisation a recours sont bel et bien fondées en droit et comprendre comment ces stratégies peuvent être perçues par le public.

L’analyse de ces points vise à aider les comités d’audit à établir des plans d’action adaptés à leur entreprise et à sa situation tout en créant de la valeur pour les parties prenantes.

Chacune des rubriques de la présente publication propose des points à l’intention des comités d’audit afin de les y assister.

Le rôle de l’audit interne dans l’identification des risques émergents

Syllabus d’un cours sur la gouvernance des OBNL et des entreprises d’état

Ce matin, Richard Leblanc nous présente un « draft » de son nouveau syllabus de cours offert à l’Université York sur la gouvernance des OBNL et des entreprises/sociétés d’état.

Ce n’est pas qu’il n’y a pas de cours dans ce domaine – loin de là – mais je puis vous assurer qu’il n’y en pas de si complets … et de si exigeants.

Voyez par vous-même en suivant le lien ci-dessous pour vous rendre sur le groupe de discussion Boards & Advisors de LinkedIn et ouvrir le document présentant le syllabus.

Si vous êtes dans le domaine de la consultation, du coaching et de la formation en gouvernance, notamment des OBNL, les éléments de contenu de ce syllabus ainsi que les nombreuses références qu’il contient vous intéressera sûrement. Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Syllabus du cours « Governance of Government Enterprises and Not-for-Profit Organizations »

Voici les thèmes des sessions :

Introduction to Accountability Issues in Governmental and Not-for-Profit Organizations
Legal Framework, Structure, Rationale, Policies, Controls
Governance of State Owned Enterprises
Operation of the Board, Board and Committee Meetings, and Staff Relations
Development and Retirement of Directors
Fundraising and Donor Stewardship
Financial Oversight, Anti-Fraud, External Audit, and Internal Audit
Values, Mandate, Strategy and Prerogative
Risk, Internal Controls, and Assurance
Organizational Performance, CEO Succession, and Executive Compensation
Stakeholder Accountability of Crown Corporations and Other Public Entities: Government as Sole Shareholder, Taxpayors; Members, Donors, Funding Agencies, Beneficiaries, Volunteers, Staff, Partners, Sponsors, Community
Fraud, Corruption, Lack of Oversight, and Misbehavior Case Analysis: The Senate of Canada, The Quebec Corruption Inquiry, Ontario Power Generation, the Mayor of Toronto

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80 % des répondants croient que les conditions économiques iront en s’améliorant en 2014 (vs 48 % en 2013)

51 % considère leurs C.A. comme plus diversifiés en termes de genre (vs 32 % 3n 2013)

Les perceptions, en ce qui a trait à la suffisance du pipeline de talents féminins, sont en progression (25 % par rapport à 4 % en 2013)

La confiance dans l’atteinte des cibles prévues par les autorités est de 57 %

76 % des entreprises sont conscientes des cyber-risques liés aux nouvelles technologies de l’information

Les entreprises ont l’intention de modifier significativement plusieurs aspects de la rémunération des hauts dirigeants

37 % des entreprises voient les actionnaires activistes comme ayant un impact positif sur la croissance à long terme (vs 47 % qui croient que l’activisme ne favorise pas la croissance à long terme)

87 % des entreprises ont un plan d’engagement avec les investisseurs (comparativement à 60 % en 2013)

53 % des entreprises sont en faveur de ne pas imposer de limite à la durée des mandats des administrateurs (comparativement à 32 % qui croient que l’on devrait imposer une limite de 6 ou 9 ans).

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THE DLMA MATRIX ™

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