Convergence de vue accrue entre administrateurs et investisseurs

Voici un rapport de recherche de PwC qui tend à démontrer que les administrateurs et les investisseurs partagent les mêmes points de vue sur les plusieurs priorités, dont les suivantes :

(1) la planification stratégique,

(2) la gestion du risque et

(3) la planification de la succession.

Une belle lecture du temps des Fêtes!

What’s important to directors and investors? Depends on whose shoes you’re in !

There is considerable alignment between directors’ and investors’ views on the important issues directors should be focusing on in the coming year, according to the report. Both groups include strategic planning, risk management, and succession planning as top priorities. Ninety-five percent of investors say strategic planning is the “most or a very important” area for director focus while nearly eight of 10 directors say they want to spend more time in that area going forward.

In the area of IT, more than three-quarters of investors believe directors should be at least “moderately” focused on new business models enabled by IT, but only 45% of directors say they are very or moderately engaged in doing so.

For director Mike Monahan, deciding on how to provide oversight of new IT-enabled business models versus major IT project implementations is not black and white.

“They are both important, and the relative importance depends a great deal on the core mission and market characteristics of the company,” said Monahan, audit committee chair for CMS Energy.

He points to a development at a large public gas and electric utility where he sits on the board. “We are in the process of installing a so-called smart energy system whereby the company will provide meters with the capability of providing significant value to customers by enabling them to better manage their energy consumption,” he said. “The communication regime with the customer is important, but the IT-based development and installation project is more important. Without an effective application there would be no smart energy system.”

Other key findings from the PwC comparison of the director and investor surveys include:

Compensation

Directors and investors both believe that compensation consultants are “very influential” over board decisions on executive compensation (41% and 37%, respectively). And, each group had similar views on the influence of institutional shareholders, rating them “very influential” at 22% and 18%, respectively. However, by a margin of 38 percentage points investors are more likely than directors to believe that CEO pressure has a “very influential” effect on board decisions about compensation.

At least 70% of directors and investors indicate that some type of action was taken by their company in response to say on pay voting results. But investors believe that directors should reconsider their companies’ executive compensation plan at relatively lower levels of negative voting.

Regulatory and enforcement

Forty-seven percent of investors and 64% of directors say recent legislative, regulatory and enforcement initiatives have increased investor protections “not very much” or “not at all,” with very few (2% and 4%, respectively) indicating that they have helped “very much.” At the same time, one-third of directors and almost one in five investors think the costs to companies of such increased activities have “very much” exceeded the potential benefits. Eighty percent of investors and three-fourths of directors also conclude these initiatives have increased public trust in the corporate sector “not very much” or “not at all.”

Board composition, structure and performance

Twenty-eight percent of directors say the ability of boards to provide effective oversight has increased in the last 12 months, compared to 19% of investors. Similarly, 33% of directors say that board effectiveness in overseeing risk has increased compared to 27% of investors.

Nineteen percent of investors indicate the board should reconsider re-nomination of a director if he/she receives between 11% and 15% negative shareholder voting, compared to only 8% of directors who would use the same benchmark.

The report also compares CEO viewpoints alongside directors and investors regarding company strategy and risk management. It showed that all three parties believe customers and clients have the most significant influence on company strategy. As for the greatest impediment to growth, directors and investors said it is “uncertain or volatile economic growth” (91%) while CEOs said it is government response to “fiscal deficit and debt burden” (93%).

Réflexions capitales pour les Boards en 2014 – The Harvard Law School (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Appointment of independent directors necessary for improved corporate governance – The Economic Times (csuitementor.wordpress.com)

NACD Issues Perspective on Executive Compensation Definitions to Help Corporate Boards Communicate Link Between Pay and Performance (virtual-strategy.com)

Le comité de gouvernance du C.A. | Élément clé d’une solide stratégie (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Histoire récente de l’essor des investisseurs activistes | Conditions favorables et avenir prévisible ?

Ce matin, je vous convie à une lecture révélatrice des facteurs qui contribuent aux changements de fond observés dans la gouvernance des grandes sociétés cotées, lesquels sont provoqués par les interventions croissantes des grands investisseurs activistes.

Cet article de quatre pages, publié par John J. Madden de la firme Shearman & Sterling, et paru sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, présente les raisons de l’intensification de l’influence des investisseurs dans la stratégie et la direction des entreprises, donc de la gouvernance, un domaine du ressort du conseil d’administration, représentants des actionnaires … et des parties prenantes.

English: Study on alternative investments by i... — English: Study on alternative investments by institutional investors. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Après avoir expliqué l’évolution récente dans le monde de la gouvernance, l’auteur brosse un tableau plutôt convainquant des facteurs d’accélération de l’influence des activistes eu égard aux orientations stratégiques.

Les raisons qui expliquent ces changements peuvent être résumées de la manière suivante :

Un changement d’attitude des grands investisseurs, représentant maintenant 66 % du capital des grandes corporations, qui conduit à des intérêts de plus en plus centrés sur l’accroissement de la valeur ajoutée pour les actionnaires;
Un nombre accru de campagnes (+ de 50 %) initiées par des activistes lesquelles se traduisent par des victoires de plus en plus éclatantes;
Un retour sur l’investissement élevé (13 % entre 2009 et 2012) accompagné par des méthodes analytiques plus sophistiquées et plus crédibles (livres blancs);
Un accroissement du capital disponible notamment par l’apport de plus en plus grand des investisseurs institutionnels (fonds de pension, compagnies d’assurance, fonds commun de placement, caisses de retraite, etc.);
Un affaiblissement dans les moyens de défense des C.A. et une meilleure communication entre les actionnaires;
Un intérêt de plus en plus marqué des C.A. et de la direction par un engagement avec les investisseurs activistes.

À l’avenir, les activistes vont intensifier leurs efforts pour exiger des changements organisationnels significatifs (accroissement des dividendes, réorganisation des unités d’affaires, modification des règles de gouvernance, présence sur les conseils, séparation des rôles de PCD et PCA, alignement de la rémunération des dirigeants avec la performance, etc.).

Ci-dessous, un extrait des passages les plus significatifs. Bonne lecture !

The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism

One of the signal developments in 2012 was the emerging growth of the form of shareholder activism that is focused on the actual business and operations of public companies. We noted that “one of the most important trendline features of

2012 has been the increasing amount of strategic or operational activism. That is, shareholders pressuring boards not on classic governance subjects but on the actual strategic direction or management of the business of the corporation.”… Several of these reform initiatives of the past decade continue to be actively pursued. More recently, however, the most significant development in the activism sphere has been in strategically-focused or operationally-focused activism led largely by hedge funds.

The 2013 Acceleration of “Operational” Activism

Some of this operational activism in the past few years was largely short-term return focused (for example, pressing to lever up balance sheets to pay extraordinary dividends or repurchase shares), arguably at the potential risk of longer-term corporate prosperity, or simply sought to force corporate dispositions; and certainly there continues to be activism with that focus. But there has also emerged another category of activism, principally led by hedge funds, that brings a sophisticated analytical approach to critically examining corporate strategy and capital management and that has been able to attract the support of mainstream institutional investors, industry analysts and other market participants. And this growing support has now positioned these activists to make substantial investments in even the largest public companies. Notable recent examples include ValueAct’s $2.2 billion investment in Microsoft (0.8%), Third Point’s $1.4 billion investment in Sony (7%), Pershing Square’s $2 billion investment in Procter & Gamble (1%) and its $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals (9.8%), Relational Investor’s $600 million investment in PepsiCo (under 1%), and Trian Fund Management’s investments of $1.2 billion in DuPont (2.2%) and of more than $1 billion in each of PepsiCo and Mondelez. Interestingly, these investors often embark on these initiatives to influence corporate direction and decision-making with relatively small stakes when measured against the company’s total outstanding equity—as in Microsoft, P&G, DuPont and PepsiCo, for example; as well as in Greenlight Capital’s 1.3 million share investment in Apple, Carl Icahn’s 5.4% stake in Transocean, and Elliot Management’s 4.5% stake in Hess Corp.

In many cases, these activists target companies with strong underlying businesses that they believe can be restructured or better managed to improve shareholder value. Their focus is generally on companies with underperforming share prices (often over extended periods of time) and on those where business strategies have failed to create value or where boards are seen as poor stewards of capital.

Reasons for the Current Expansion of Operational Activism

Evolving Attitudes of Institutional Investors.

… Taken together, these developments have tended to test the level of confidence institutional investors have in the ability of some boards to act in a timely and decisive fashion to adjust corporate direction, or address challenging issues, when necessary in the highly competitive, complex and global markets in which businesses operate. And they suggest a greater willingness of investors to listen to credible external sources with new ideas that are intelligently and professionally presented.

Tangible evidence of this evolution includes the setting up by several leading institutional investors such as BlackRock, CalSTRS and T. Rowe Price of their own internal teams to assess governance practices and corporate strategies to find ways to improve corporate performance. As the head of BlackRock’s Corporate Governance and Responsible Investor team recently commented, “We can have very productive and credible conversations with managements and boards about a range of issues—governance, performance and strategy.”

Increasing Activist Campaigns Generally; More Challenger Success. The increasing number of activist campaigns challenging incumbent boards—and the increasing success by challengers—creates an encouraging market environment for operational activism. According to ISS, the resurgence of contested board elections, which began in 2012, continued into the 2013 proxy season. Proxy contests to replace some or all incumbent directors went from 9 in the first half of 2009 to 19 in the first half of 2012 and 24 in the first half of 2013. And the dissident win rate has increased significantly, from 43% in 2012 to 70% in 2013. Additionally, in July 2013, Citigroup reported that the number of $1 billion + activist campaigns was expected to reach over 90 for 2013, about 50% more than in 2012.

Attractive Investment Returns; Increasing Sophistication and Credibility. While this form of activism has certainly shown mixed results in recent periods (Pershing Square’s substantial losses in both J.C. Penney and Target have been among the most well-publicized examples of failed initiatives), the overall recent returns have been strong. Accordingly to Hedge Fund Research in Chicago, activist hedge funds were up 9.6% for the first half of 2013, and they returned an average of nearly 13% between 2009 and 2012.

In many instances, these activists develop sophisticated and detailed business and strategic analyses—which are presented in “white papers” that are provided to boards and managements and often broadly disseminated—that enhance their credibility and help secure the support, it not of management, of other institutional shareholders.

Increasing Investment Capital Available; Greater Mainstream Institutional Support. The increasing ability of activist hedge funds to raise new money not only bolsters their firepower, but also operates to further solidify the support they garner from the mainstream institutional investor community (a principal source of their investment base). According to Hedge Fund Research, total assets under management by activist hedge funds has doubled in the past four years to $84 billion today. And through August this year their 2013 inflows reached $4.7 billion, the highest inflows since 2006. Particularly noteworthy in this regard, Pershing Square’s recent $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals was funded in part with capital raised for a standalone fund dedicated specifically to Air Products, without disclosing the target’s name to investors.

In addition to making capital available, mainstream institutions are demonstrating greater support for these activists more generally. In a particularly interesting vote earlier this year, at the May annual meeting of Timken Co., 53% of the shareholders voting supported the non-binding shareholder proposal to split the company in two, which had been submitted jointly by Relational Investors (holding a 6.9% stake) and pension fund CalSTRS (holding 0.4%). To build shareholder support for their proposal, Relational and CalSTRS reached out to investors both in person and through the internet. Relational ran a website (unlocktimken . com) including detailed presentations and supportive analyst reports. They also secured the support of ISS and Glass Lewis. Four months after the vote, in September, Timken announced that it had decided to spin off its steel-making business.

The Timken case is but one example of the leading and influential proxy advisory firms to institutional investors increasingly supporting activists. Their activist support has been particularly noticeable in the context of activists seeking board representation in nominating a minority of directors to boards.

These changes suggest a developing blurring of the lines between activists and mainstream institutions. And it may be somewhat reminiscent of the evolution of unsolicited takeovers, which were largely shunned by the established business and financial communities in the early 1980s, although once utilized by a few blue-chip companies they soon became a widely accepted acquisition technique.

Weakened Board-Controlled Defenses; Increasing Communication Among Shareholders. The largely successful efforts over the past decade by certain pension funds and other shareholder-oriented organizations to press for declassifying boards, redeeming poison pills and adopting majority voting in director elections have diminished the defenses available to boards in resisting change of control initiatives and other activist challenges. Annual board elections and the availability of “withhold” voting in the majority voting context increases director vulnerability to investor pressure.

And shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders and their representative organizations, are better organized today for taking action in particular situations. The increasing and more sophisticated forms of communication among shareholders—including through the use of social media—is part of the broader trend towards greater dialogue between mainstream institutions and their activist counterparts. In his recent op-ed article in The Wall Street Journal, Carl Icahn said he would use social media to make more shareholders aware of their rights and how to protect them, writing that he had set up a Twitter account for that purpose (with over 80,000 followers so far) and that he was establishing a forum called the Shareholders Square Table to further these aims.

Corporate Boards and Managements More Inclined to Engage with Activists. The several developments referenced above have together contributed to the greater willingness today of boards and managements to engage in dialogue with activists who take investments in their companies, and to try to avoid actual proxy contests.

One need only look at the recent DuPont and Microsoft situations to have a sense of this evolution toward engagement and dialogue. After Trian surfaced with its investment in DuPont, the company’s spokesperson said in August 2013: “We are aware of Trian’s investment and, as always, we routinely engage with our shareholders and welcome constructive input. We will evaluate any ideas Trian may have in the context of our ongoing initiatives to build a higher value, higher growth company for our shareholders.” Also in August, Microsoft announced its agreement with ValueAct to allow the activist to meet regularly with the company’s management and selected directors and give the activist a board seat next year; thereby avoiding a potential proxy contest for board representation by ValueAct. Soon thereafter, on September 17, Microsoft announced that it would raise its quarterly dividend by 22% and renew its $40 billion share buyback program; with the company’s CFO commenting that this reflected Microsoft’s continued commitment to returning cash to its shareholders.

What to Expect Ahead

The confluence of the factors identified above has accelerated the recent expansion of operational activism, and there is no reason in the current market environment to expect that this form of activism will abate in the near term. In fact, the likelihood is that it will continue to expand… Looking ahead, we fully expect to see continuing efforts to press for the structural governance reforms that have been pursued over the past several years. Campaigns to separate the Chair and CEO roles at selected companies will likely continue to draw attention as they did most prominently this year at JPMorgan Chase. And executive compensation will remain an important subject of investor attention, and of shareholder proposals, at many companies where there is perceived to be a lack of alignment between pay and performance. We can also expect that the further development of operational activism, and seeing how boards respond to it, will be a central feature of the governance landscape in the year ahead.

Finding Value in Shareholder Activism (clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu)

The Corporate Social Responsibility Report and Effective Stakeholder Engagement (venitism.blogspot.com)

The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Shareholder activism on the rise in Canada (business.financialpost.com)

Dealing With Activist Hedge Funds (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

American Activist Investors Get Ready To Invade Europe (forbes.com)

Activist Investors Help Companies, Not Workers – Bloomberg (bloomberg.com)

The Separation of Ownership from Ownership (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Réflexions capitales pour les Boards en 2014 – The Harvard Law School (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance by Paul Rose, Bernard S. Sharfman (togovern.wordpress.com)

Document de KPMG sur les bonnes pratiques de constitution d’un Board | The Directors Toolkit

Voici un document australien de KPMG, très bien conçu, qui répond clairement aux questions que tous les administrateurs de sociétés se posent dans le cours de leurs mandats.

Même si la publication est dédiée à l’auditoire australien de KPMG, je crois que la réalité règlementaire nord-américaine est trop semblable pour se priver d’un bon « kit » d’outils qui peut aider à constituer un Board efficace. C’est un formidable document électronique de 130 pages, donc long à télécharger. Voyez la table des matières ci-dessous.

J’ai demandé à KPMG de me procurer une version française du même document mais il ne semble pas en exister. Bonne lecture en cette fin d’année 2013 et Joyeuses Fêtes à tous et à toutes.

The Directors Toolkit

Our business environment provides an ever-changing spectrum of risks and opportunities. The role of the director continues to be shaped by a multitude of forces including economic uncertainty, larger and more complex organisations, the increasing pace of technological innovation and digitisation along with a more rigorous regulatory environment.

At the same time there is more onus on directors to operate transparently and be more accountable for their actions and decisions.

To support directors in their challenging role KPMG has created The Directors’ Toolkit. This guide, in a user-friendly electronic format, empowers directors to more effectively discharge their duties and responsibilities while improving board performance and decision-making.

Key topics :

Duties and responsibilities of a director

Oversight of strategy and governance

Managing shareholder and stakeholder expectations

Structuring an effective board and sub-committees

Enabling key executive appointments

Managing productive meetings

Better practice terms of reference, charters and agendas

Establishing new boar

Article relié :

Le comité de gouvernance du C.A. | Élément clé d’une solide stratégie (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Message aux abonnés du blogue ainsi qu’aux membres du groupe « Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance » de LinkedIn

Chers membres et abonnés,

Voici, au 26 décembre 2013, certaines informations concernant notre blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé ainsi qu’un message de notre groupe de discussion LinkedIn Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance.

1. Le blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé

Depuis le début de la parution du blogue, le 19 juillet, j’ai publié 820 billets en gouvernance et suscité l’intérêt d’environ 75 000 personnes. Le blogue a eu trois fois plus de visiteurs dans la dernière année. Beaucoup d’abonnés au blogue se servent de l’outil de recherche (situé au bas de la page) afin d’obtenir des informations pertinentes et d’actualité sur leurs questionnements en gouvernance. À ce stade-ci, mon objectif est d’avoir plus de 50 000 visiteurs pour l’année 2014.

Le référencement se fait principalement par LinkedIn (43 %) et par des engins de recherche tels que Google (43 %); le reste (14 %) se réparti entre plusieurs autres réseaux sociaux.

Le partage des billets se fait par l’intermédiaire de LinkedIn (40 %), Twitter (29 %), Facebook (22 %) et Tumblr (9 %).

Le site est fréquenté par des visiteurs provenant :

du Canada (59 %)
de la France (20 %) (incluant Suisse et Belgique)
du Magreb (4 %) (Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie)
d’autres pays de diverses provenance (17 %).

J’en profite pour remercier à nouveau tous les lecteurs qui, par leurs votes, ont exprimé leur appréciation du blogue lors du concours organisé par Made In Blog (MiB) à l’échelle canadienne. Notre blogue a obtenu la deuxième position parmi les soixante-cinq (65) blogues de la catégorie Business/marketing/médias sociaux, le seul candidat finaliste dans le domaine de la gouvernance. Nous sommes honorés de cette marque de reconnaissance.

Blog Image

Rappelons que ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets, « posts », est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revues, des blogues et sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.

Chaque jour, je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernance dans le monde francophone, en fournissant aux lecteurs une mine de renseignements récents (les billets quotidiens) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes

2. Le groupe de discussion sur LinkedIn | Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance

Notre groupe de discussion sur LinkedIn, Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance, sous l’égide du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), a connu une croissance remarquable au cours des dernières années, passant de 372 membres, au 1er septembre 2012, à 858 membres au 26 décembre 2013.

Notre objectif est de demeurer le groupe francophone de référence en gouvernance le plus actif et le plus influent en 2014 sur LinkedIn.

Au cours de cette période, nous avons réussi à maintenir un haut niveau de respect dans nos échanges, et à provoquer de saines discussions sur des thèmes relatifs à la gouvernance de tous les types d’entreprises évoluant dans des environnements règlementaires différents (USA, CANADA, UK, UE).

En tant qu’administrateur et contributeur principal de ce groupe, je vous remercie vivement de vos contributions à l’avancement des connaissances dans le domaine de la gouvernance.

Au nom du CAS, et en mon nom personnel, je vous souhaite un excellent temps des Fêtes et une année 2014 à la hauteur de vos aspirations.

Merci encore de votre présence soutenue au blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé ainsi qu’au groupe de discussion Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance du CAS.

8 Ways to Track Your Social Media Performance (financialsocialmedia.com)

LinkedIn: The 25 Hottest Skills That Got People Hired in 2013 (alexfreelancer.wordpress.com)

Un exercice de remue-méninge pour repenser les règles de « bonne gouvernance »

Aujourd’hui, veille de Noel, je vous présente les sommaires des Think-tank produit par Board Intelligence, une firme spécialisée dans les informations sur les conseils d’administration. Celle-ci a tenu une série de débats sur la réinvention des règles de gouvernance en demandant aux panels de se prononcer sur la question suivante :

“If you could rip up the rule book, what would good governance look like ?”

Voici les résumés des résultats les plus remarquables présentés dans FT.com. Bonne lecture et Joyeux Noel !

Think-tank searches for good governance

Stressing the importance of company boards can weaken the sense of accountability among management and staff, according to participants in a recent debate.

They agreed there is a strong case for saying an organisation lives or dies by the actions and inactions of its management team, rather than the board, and that employees were a better indicator of how a company is run than scrutiny of the board.

An alternative boardroom model was suggested, drawing on the way some executive committees operate, where the chief executive seeks consultation rather than consensus. Perhaps the chairman could have a similar function.

Chairmen of the Bored (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

This might also reflect the reality of the near-impossible task faced by non-executive directors. One participant said: “A non-executive is on a hiding to nothing – and to do the job properly, they need smaller portfolios and better pay. When things go wrong, they can expect to be tried in the court of public opinion.”

It was argued that this is becoming such a trend that many talented candidates are no longer willing to take on the role. “I wouldn’t take a non-executive role in a big and complex global bank. The mismatch between what you are accountable for and your ability to affect it is enormous,” one commented.

“To do the job of the non-exec properly you have to get out of the boardroom and into the organisation. You have to experience the business for yourself and not just take management’s word for it.”

There were also complaints about the amount of time required to do the job of the non-executive: “It’s not 12 days a year at £1,500 per day – it’s at least 30 days. Given the opportunity cost of what an accomplished person could be doing with their time, and given the risk you carry as a non-executive, why do it?”

If we don’t go so far as to rip up the governance rule book, at least we should make it shorter, they agreed. Rules will always have unintended consequences and breed perverse outcomes – and fear of falling foul of the rules can
lead boards to document as little as possible to maintain “plausible deniability”.

At a subsequent debate it was proposed there should be a register to name and shame – and praise – the performance of non-executives. At present, shareholders’ opinion of a non-executive and their decision on re-electing them is based on gut feeling. A public register would be helpful in forming a judgment, listing statistics about the number of boards the non-executive is on, the time they allocate to each and notable events that took place on their watch

There are chairmen with such large portfolios they could not possibly allocate sufficient time to each board, they argued. A public register would make this much more transparent.

Débats entre cinq présidents de conseils et un PCD

The five chairmen and chief executives attending a recent think-tank discussion accepted that even improved boards cannot prevent all corporate crises and expressed concern at this overly “defensive” role. They argued that “stopping bad things happening” must be tempered by helping “good things happen”.

The participants agreed that non-executives must have the confidence to challenge the chairman and chief executive. One said: “Having sat on the board of my employer as an executive, I have come to the conclusion that it is a hopeless role. When the chief executive is sitting opposite, it is fairly obvious how you’re supposed to respond to the question ‘what do you think?’

“Board meetings are not a good use of time. We don’t question why we’re doing what we’re doing.”

The group concluded that “small is beautiful: small boards, small briefing packs, small agenda, and small rule book”.

At a subsequent dinner, also attended by chairmen and chief executives, a call was made for boards to be more realistic about their limitations and to be more discerning about where they focus their efforts

For example, boards attempt to scrutinise specific investment decisions when the information they can absorb and the time available for discussion mean substantive challenge or insights are unlikely.

On the other hand, it was pointed out that boards are also held liable for the detail as well as the big picture. Even so, attempting to meet these conflicting responsibilities by “clogging up the board agenda with too many matters to explore properly” cannot be the answer, they agreed.

The participants argued that the governance rule book is ineffective and that boards should instead be subject to an annual review of their effectiveness.

A need for “better memories, rather than better rules or regulations”, was stressed and the recommendation that non-executives should stand down after nine years was criticised for institutionalising the short-term memory of the boardroom.

One said: “When our bank repeated its mistakes from the early 1990s, it wasn’t the bank that suffered from amnesia – it was just the board.”

The chairmen and chief executives concluded that UK business suffers from a short-term “sell-out” culture. It was argued that in the US, business leaders who are successful will strive to be yet more successful and in Germany, successful businesses are nurtured for the next generation. But in the UK, business people aspire to have just enough to “retire to the Old Rectory”. One said: “We lack the ambition – or greed – of the Americans and we don’t feel the duty of the Germans. We need to raise the level of ambition – and sense of duty.”

Débats entre présidents de conseils

Boards are failing at strategy and becoming increasingly focused on costs, according to a think-tank debate attended by chairmen. One said: “We need the conversation in the boardroom to be two levels ‘higher’. Many of our largest companies are sitting on cash and they need to get back to strategy and invest in the future – or there won’t be one.”

It was suggested that advisory boards, unfettered by concerns of liability and governance, might be better at tackling strategy – and might attract creative people who would otherwise be put off joining boards by the burden of governance.

The chairmen also asked whether more of a board’s work could be handled by committees, as they can be more focused and effective.

They also questioned whether age and experience should continue to take precedence over training and education when appointing board members. One view was that boardroom skills are becoming more specialised and need to be learned.

Regulators came under fire from the chairmen. They were accused of not understanding the businesses they are regulating and of treating non-executives as executives.

The meeting also referred to the spread of regulation from the financial services sector. One said: “We have a two-tier corporate world: financial services and the rest. But what starts as regulation of financial services bleeds through to the rest.”

The participants warned that because boards are out of touch with society, there is a danger of a backlash and the emergence of an “anti-business” movement.

The relationship between society and business was also raised at a subsequent debate. One view was that the future of the corporation depends on it being redesigned and finance returned to its proper, subservient role of supporting the wider economy.

All businesses should demonstrate public benefit – just as charities have to show a public benefit in return for charitable status, businesses should do the same, perhaps in return for limited liability status.

Another view was that voluntary sector leaders should be encouraged to join corporate boards, because of their specific skills, including in reputation and risk management.

Participants went on to call for younger, more vibrant boards. “You should see the faces of the future – not just the past,” said one. The concern that young executives are too busy to join boards was rejected and some chairmen were blamed for claiming to support diversity of age but then not allowing their executives to join someone else’s board.

It was also argued that businesses and boards need permission to fail. “What business or person can achieve great things without the possibility of failure?” one asked.

Vous pouvez lire les résultats des dix autres débats en vous référant à l’article en référence.

How to measure a post-2015 MDG on good governance (post2015.org)

Liens étroits entre les PCD (CEO) et les administrateurs des comités d’audit

Voici un article choc publié par Dena Aubin et diffusé par l’agence Reuters le 10 décembre 2013. Il est ici question d’une recherche universitaire menée par deux professeurs de l’Université de Tilburg aux Pays-Bas qui montre que 40 % des administrateurs responsables de la supervision des affaires financières entretiennent des liens sociaux très étroits avec la haute direction de l’entreprise, laissant une impression de non-indépendance et de possibilité de conflit d’intérêt entre des personnes qui ont des liens d’amitié et d’affinité.

De là à penser que ces administrateurs seront plus susceptibles d’adopter des positions plus favorables à la direction, il n’y a qu’un pas à franchir. Et les chercheurs n’ont pas hésité à pousser leur investigation dans ce sens.

L’étude montre que ces situations de « proximité » peuvent donner lieu à de plus faibles contrôles financiers, notamment à des manipulations comptables, suivies de tentatives d’étouffer la vérité.

Ce sont des études comme celle-ci qui amène les autorités règlementaires à resserrer les critères d’indépendance des membres des comités d’audit.

Bonne lecture; vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Clubby ties between U.S. CEOs and board audit committees: study

NEW YORK (Reuters) – Almost 40 percent of U.S. corporate directors with responsibility for monitoring the profit-and-loss ledger have social ties to the chief executive, a study says, making them look more like lapdogs than watchdogs.

Conducted by two accounting professors at Tilburg University in The Netherlands, the study reinforces long-held perceptions of a clubby culture on U.S. corporate boards, where members seldom challenge the executives they are meant to police.

The study looked at about 2,000 U.S. companies and their board audit committees, which are responsible for overseeing outside auditors and making sure financial reports are accurate. It found that personal friends of senior managers were often appointed to these committees, making the directors more likely to go along with the company’s reporting practices.

Where that was the case, earnings manipulation was more frequent and problems such as weak financial controls were covered up, the study found.

Tilburg University (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Regulations put in place over a decade ago after accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom required audit committees to be made up only of independent directors. That meant they were never employed by the company or a firm doing business with it.

Even so, audit committee members often have long-standing social ties to executives, belonging to the same elite clubs or charity boards, the study found.

« Although such firms appear to have independent audit committees, in reality these committees offer little to no monitoring at all, » the study found.

The study, by accounting professors Liesbeth Bruynseels and Eddy Cardinaels, researched social ties with BoardEx, a business intelligence service. It appears in the January 2014 issue of the American Accounting Association’s Accounting Review.

The professors suggested that legislators consider requiring more disclosure about social connections between audit committees and CEOs, given the committees’ importance.

Charles Elson, director of the Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance in Newark, Delaware, said it would be difficult for regulators to define social ties.

« Is it one lunch a week, is it two lunches? Inevitably, social ties will develop when you’re on a board – you have to see that person on a regular basis, » he said.

The United States made a major push to improve audit committees’ effectiveness with the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which tightened membership requirements.

More recently, regulators in Europe and the United Kingdom have been trying to get audit committees to be more rigorous in choosing outside auditors and monitoring them.

Clubby ties between U.S. CEOs and board audit committees-study (xe.com)

Le comité de gouvernance du C.A. | Élément clé d’une solide stratégie (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

US audit watchdog reviving controversial plan to require firms to disclose names of people who work on audits – @Reuters (reuters.com)

Business Basics – Corporate Audits (business2community.com)

Auditors told to up their game by Financial Reporting Council (theguardian.com)

Le point sur la gouvernance au Canada | Rapport de Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg

Le rapport annuel de Davies est toujours très attendu car il brosse un tableau très complet de l’évolution de la gouvernance au Canada. De plus, c’est un document publié en français.

Je vous invite donc à en prendre connaissance en lisant le court résumé ci-dessous et, si vous voulez en savoir plus sur les thèmes abordés, vous pouvez télécharger le document sur le site de l’entreprise.

Cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous. Bonne lecture !

Le point sur la gouvernance au Canada | Rapport de Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg

Rapport de Davies sur la gouvernance 2013

Depuis la diversité au sein des conseils jusqu’aux risques liés aux marchés émergents, en passant par l’activisme actionnarial, cette troisième édition du Rapport de Davies sur la gouvernance, notre compte rendu annuel, analyse l’actualité sur de nombreuses questions d’intérêt pour les conseils d’administration et les observateurs du paysage de la gouvernance au Canada.

Dans le premier chapitre, Administrateurs et conseils d’administration, nous faisons le point sur l’évolution de la composition des conseils d’administration au Canada, les appels à la diversité au sein de ces conseils et des équipes de direction ainsi que les idées proposées par les autorités de réglementation et les investisseurs à cet égard. Dans le chapitre intitulé Rémunération des membres de la haute direction et des administrateurs, nous faisons état de la popularité grandissante du vote consultatif sur la rémunération de la haute direction et proposons des mesures que peuvent prendre les conseils d’administration pour éviter d’être pris de court par le résultat d’un tel vote. Dans le chapitre intitulé Questions relatives au vote des actionnaires, nous nous intéressons aux nouveautés concernant la question de l’intégrité du vote des actionnaires au Canada, les initiatives de réglementation des agences de conseil en vote et la pratique du vote à la majorité parmi les émetteurs. Dans le chapitre intitulé Initiatives des actionnaires, nous mettons en lumière les tendances et les questions d’actualité comme l’« achat de votes », la rémunération offerte aux administrateurs par les dissidents et le « vote vide » ainsi que les règlements de préavis. Dans le chapitre intitulé Surveillance des risques : les activités sur les marchés émergents, nous examinons comment les émetteurs gèrent les risques associés à leurs activités sur les marchés émergents ainsi que les nouveautés importantes touchant la législation et la mise en application de la loi en matière de lutte contre la corruption. Enfin, dans le chapitre intitulé Régimes de droits : gouvernance et changement de contrôle, nous analysons les deux cadres de réglementation des régimes de droits en situation de prise de contrôle proposés cette année par les autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières.

Pour consulter le sommaire, cliquez ici. Pour lire le document complet, cliquez ici.

La réforme européenne de la pratique de l’audit

Vous trouverez ci-dessous un condensé de l’entente intervenue par les institutions européennes concernant la réforme de l’audit. Ce résumé nous est transmis par ecoDa- The European Confederation of Directors’ Associations, dont le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) est l’un des membres affiliés.

Cette entente fait suite au billet du 12 décembre, (Une réglementation pour accroître l’indépendance des firmes d’audit) où on annonçait certaines modifications sur la table à dessin des autorités réglementaires des É.U. et de l’union européenne.

Voici donc un bref résumé suivi d’une présentation sommaire des principaux changements convenus. À la suite de cet article d’ecoDa, vous trouverez le point de vue de Julia Irvine présenté dans Economia. Bonne lecture !

Yesterday, the European institutions managed to get a provisional agreement in trilogue on the reform of the audit sector. With the agreement, audit firms will be required to rotate every 10 years. Public interest entities will only be able to extend the audit tenure once, upon tender. Under this measure, joint audit will also be encouraged. To avoid the risk of self-review, several non-audit services are prohibited under a strict ‘black list’, including stringent limits on tax advice and on services linked to the financial and investment strategy of the audit client. In addition, a cap on the provision of non-audit services is introduced.

Audit reform

1. A clarified societal role for auditors

Increased audit quality : In order to reduce the ‘expectation gap’ between what is expected from auditors and what they are bound to deliver, the new rules will require auditors to produce more detailed and informative audit reports, with a required focus on relevant information to investors.

Enhanced transparency : Strict transparency requirements will be introduced for auditors with stronger reporting obligations vis-à-vis supervisors. Increased communication between auditors and the audit committee of an audited entity is requested.

Better accountability : The work of auditors will be closely supervised by audit committees, whose competences are strengthened. In addition, the package introduces the possibility for 5% of the shareholders of the company to initiate actions to dismiss the auditors. A set of administrative sanctions that can be applied by the competent authorities is also foreseen for breaches of the new rules.

2. A strong independence regime

Mandatory rotation of audit firms : Audit firms will be required to rotate after an engagement period of 10 years. After maximum 10 years, the period can be extended by up to 10 additional years if tenders are carried out, and by up to 14 additional years in case of joint audit, i.e. if the company being audited appoints more than one audit firm to carry out its audit. A calibrated transitional period taking into account the duration of the audit engagement is foreseen to avoid a cliff effect following the entry into force of the new rules.

Prohibition of certain non-audit services : Audit firms will be strictly prohibited from providing non-audit services to their audit clients, including stringent limits on tax advice and services linked to the financial and investment strategy of the audit client. This aims to limit risk of conflicts of interest, when auditors are involved in decisions impacting the management of a company. This will also substantially limit the ‘self-review’ risks for auditors.

Cap on the provision of non-audit services: To reduce the risks of conflicts of interest, the new rules will introduce a cap of 70% on the fees generated for non-audit services others than those prohibited based on a three-year average at the group level.

3. A more dynamic and competitive EU audit market

A Single Market for statutory audit : The new rules will provide a level playing field for auditors at EU level through enhanced cross-border mobility and the harmonisation of International Standards on Auditing (ISAs).

More choice : In order to promote competition, the new rules prohibit restrictive ‘Big Four only’ third party clauses imposed on companies. Incentives for joint audit and tendering will be introduced, and a proportionate application of the rules will be applied to avoid extra burden for small and mid-tier audit firms. Tools to monitor the concentration of the audit market will be reinforced.

Enhanced supervision of the audit sector : Cooperation between national supervisors will be enhanced at EU level, with a specific role devoted to the European Markets and Securities Authority (ESMA) with regard to international cooperation on audit oversight.

Voici également le point de vue de Julia Irvine présenté dans Economia.

EU bodies compromise on audit reform

Listed companies will have to tender their audit every 10 years and rotate auditors every 20 years after trilogue agreement was reached this morning on a package of audit reform measures

Certain non-audit services – such as some tax and corporate finance advice – which impact on an audit client’s financial and investment strategy, will be banned, and shareholders will find it easier to initiate action to get the auditors dismissed.

The measures, which were agreed between the European Parliament and the Lithuanian EU presidency, still have to be approved later this week by COREPER, the committee of permanent representatives of the member states. The European Parliament will then have to formally adopt the text next year.

Negotiations over audit reform reached stalemate earlier this month and led to the decision by British MEP and lead rapporteur Sajjad Karim to cancel scheduled trilogue discussions “because of a lack of will by some parties to compromise”. The major sticking points were mandatory rotation of auditors and non-audit services.

However, the breakthrough came today, thanks to “constructive efforts from all sides to find a way forward”, Karim said, adding that the compromise on a 20-year timespan for rotation was workable and a “considerable improvement on the commission’s original proposal”.

The agreed measures ensure that auditors will be key contributors to economic and financial stability through increased audit quality, stronger independence requirements and more open and dynamic EU audit market.

Other measures under the agreement include extending companies that have joint auditors can extend the 20 years to 24 and a four-year transitional period to avoid every company going out to tender at the same time.

Auditors will be prohibited from providing certain non-audit services to audit clients, including “stringent limits” on tax advice and services. The measures also include a 70% cap on fees from all other non-audit services, based on a three-year average at group level.

Big Four only clauses are banned and incentives for joint audit and tendering (as yet unspecified) are to be introduced. It is also intended that the rules will be applied proportionately to avoid extra burdens on small and mid-tier audit firms.

Auditors will have to provide more detailed and informative audit reports, focusing on relevant information for investors, they will be bound by strict transparency requirements in their communications with supervisors and will generally be required to talk more often to a client’s audit committee.

Shareholders will be able to start action to dismiss the auditors, provided 5% of them collaborate.

Finally, the package of measures will ensure a level playing field for auditors throughout the European Union through enhanced cross-border mobility and harmonisation of international auditing standards.

EU commissioner Michel Barnier hailed the outline agreement as “the first step towards increasing audit quality and re-establishing investor confidence in financial information, an essential ingredient for investment and economic growth in Europe”.

Auditors, he said, played an important societal role by providing stakeholders with an accurate reflection of the veracity of companies’ financial statements. “However, a number of banks were given clean bills of health despite huge losses from 2007 onwards. In relation to the real economy, inspection reports from the member states revealed lack of professional scepticism by auditors, misstatements and a lack of fresh thinking in the audits of major companies because of the average long-lasting relationship between the auditor and their clients.

“Taken all together, the agreed measures ensure that auditors will be key contributors to economic and financial stability through increased audit quality, stronger independence requirements and more open and dynamic EU audit markets.”

Karim added, “The European Parliament is optimistic that the proposal can be approved by a majority of member states and MEPs, considering it is a balanced compromise that will go a long way towards restoring confidence in the audit market.”

Initial reaction from the profession to the news was cautious. ICAEW chief executive Michael Izza said that after three years of debate and hard work, there was now hope that the follow-up work might be achieved before the EU elections on 22 May next year.

“Focus now needs to move to the transition and practical implications,” he said. “It is important not to underestimate the considerable practical impact the reform package will have, not only on the auditing profession but also on companies across the EU.

“It will take time for everybody involved – the profession, business, regulators – to work through the details and get to grips with all the changes.”

EU agrees rules to overhaul auditing firms (irishtimes.com)

EU in preliminary deal on audit reform (irishtimes.com)

US audit watchdog reviving controversial plan to require firms to disclose names of people who work on audits – @Reuters (reuters.com)

Le rôle de l’audit interne dans l’identification des risques émergents

Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un document de la firme Thomson Reuters (White Paper) très intéressant sur le rôle de l’audit interne dans l’identification des risques émergents.

C’est un rôle très stimulant pour les administrateurs et les gestionnaires prêts à relever les défis. Voici un extrait du document. Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

EYE ON THE HORIZON : INTERNAL AUDIT’S ROLE IN IDENTIFYING EMERGING RISKS

Key elements of emerging risks

Reinsurance company Swiss Re defines emerging risks as “newly developing or changing risks which are difficult to quantify and which may have a major impact on the organisation.” This identifies their key elements.

Emerging risks may be entirely new, such as those posed by social media or technological innovation. Or they may come from existing risks that evolve or escalate – for example, the way counterparty credit risk or liquidity risk sky-rocketed during the 2008 financial crisis.

Newly developing risks lack precedent or history, and their precise form may not be immediately clear, which makes them difficult to measure or model. Changing risks are at least familiar in their shape and nature, although the rate of transformation and intensity can make them hard to quantify.

The final key element of emerging risks is their potential impact. New or changing risks can be as menacing as those the organisation deals with on a daily basis, and sometimes even more so. To give just one example, the way in which the music business failed to address the implications of digital downloads allowed a complete outsider, the computer company Apple, to step in and define and dominate the new market.

Emerging risks also threaten through their apparent remoteness or their obscurity. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld distinguished between things we know we do not know (‘known unknowns’), and things we do not know we do not know (‘unknown unknowns’). In the first category are risks whose shape might be familiar, but where we do not necessarily understand all of their elements – causes, potential impact, probability or timing. Unknown unknowns are events that are so out of left field or seemingly farfetchedthat it takes great insight or a leap of the imagination to even articulate them. These include the ‘black swan’ events highlighted by the investor-philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb, where the human tendency is to dismiss them as improbable beforehand, then rationalise them after they occur. The 9/11 terrorist attack, or the financial crash of 2008, or the invention of the internet show that not only do black swan events happen, but they do so more frequently than is generally recognised, and they have an historically significant impact (and not always negative).

Many emerging risks are characterised by their global nature, their scale or their longer-term horizon – climate change is an example that displays all of these elements. In other cases, it is less the individual events themselves, some of which may be relatively moderate or manageable on their own, as the conflation of circumstances that creates a ‘perfect storm’.

Vous pouvez aussi consulter l’enquête de Thomson Reuters Accelus Survey on Internal Audit dont nous avons parlé dans notre billet du 7 juin.

New duties on horizon for internal auditors

“The clear message from the survey is that internal audit functions need to stop thinking about themselves as compliance specialists and start taking on a much larger, more strategic role within the organization,” Ernst & Young LLP internal audit leader Brian Schwartz said in a news release. “IA is increasingly being asked by senior management and the board to provide broader business insights and better anticipate traditional and emerging risks, even as they maintain their focus on non-negotiable compliance activities.”

New risks

As strategic opportunities emerge, internal auditors also are adjusting to new compliance duties, according to the survey. Globalization has resulted in increased revenue from emerging markets for many companies, so new regulatory, cultural, tax, and talent risks are emerging.

Thomson Reuters Messenger (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Internal audit will play a more prominent role in evaluating these risks, according to the survey report. Although slightly more than one-fourth (27%) of respondents are heavily involved in identifying, assessing, and monitoring emerging risks now, 54% expect to be heavily involved in the next two years.

The biggest primary risks that respondents said their organizations are tracking are:

Economic stability (54%).

Cybersecurity (52%).

Major shifts in technology (48%).

Strategic transactions in global locations (44%).

Data privacy regulations (39%).

Survey respondents said the skills most often found to be lacking in internal audit functions are:

Data analytics;

Business strategy;

Deep industry experience;

Risk management; and

Fraud prevention and detection.

“As corporate leaders demand a greater measure of strategy and insight from their internal audit functions, CAEs will need to move quickly to close competency gaps and ensure that they have the right people in the right place, at the right time.” Schwartz said. “If they fail to meet organizational expectations, they risk being left behind or consigned to more transactional compliance activities.”

Keeping Internal Auditors Up to the Challenge (forbes.com)

Internal Audit Has To STOP Focusing On Internal Controls (business2community.com)

Changement important dans la relation auditeur externe/interne | Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Useful Internal Auditing in 4 Easy Steps (isocertificationaustralia.com)

Thomson Reuters Develops Accelus Governance, Risk and Compliance Platform (risk-technology.typepad.com)

Les défis des C.A. d’entreprises de petites capitalisations eu égard à l’achat de services juridiques

Aujourd’hui, je propose aux administrateurs de sociétés une lecture très utile pour mieux appréhender les défis reliés à l’utilisation de services juridiques dans le cas d’entreprises de petite capitalisation.

Cet article, publié par Adam J. Epstein* dans NACD Directorship, présente clairement les options qui s’offrent aux administrateurs de ces entreprises lorsque vient le temps de décider d’une stratégie gagnante pour l’achat de services juridiques.

Les conseils de l’auteur sont notamment très précieux pour aider l’entreprise à embaucher le bon type de firme et pour décider de la forme que prendra le paiement des honoraires.

Je vous invite donc à lire ce court article; en voici un court extrait. Bonne lecture !

A Small-Cap Conundrum: Purchasing Legal Services Without In-House Counsel

Because so many small-cap companies— particularly those with market capitalizations below $500 million—operate without in-house counsel, and because many officers and directors lack legal backgrounds, there is a constant risk of either hiring the wrong attorneys or paying too much for legal services. And since few small-cap companies can afford either, directors should consider the following insights into common circumstances involving legal services.

Current Environment The law firm business model is in the midst of a historic transformation. After decades of hypergrowth and profitability, the law industry post-financial crisis is in many cases a shadow of its former self. Put differently, when it comes to purchasing legal services, it’s become a buyer’s market.

English: Law Firm Logo (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

For small-cap companies already saddled with comparatively crippling costs of “being public,” the evolution of the marketplace for legal services is unreservedly positive. But even in the face of a buyer’s market, many small-cap companies aren’t benefitting as much as they should.

For example, one of the most dramatic changes to the law firm model is an inexorable shift away from hourly billing to flat fees. According to The Wall Street Journal, the frequency of use of flat fee structures has nearly doubled at large law firms in the last several years. At a high level, this is beneficial to purchasers of legal services, because hourly fee billing can be susceptible to conflicts of interest (i.e., lawyers might be tempted to take more time to complete tasks because they are getting paid by the hour). But just because a company is paying a flat fee for a particular service doesn’t necessarily mean the company is getting a better deal. Especially when it comes to clients with less legal acumen, law firms still do their best to construct flat fees that aren’t demonstrably different than historic hourly fees when all is said and done. Accordingly, management needs to confirm that any flat fees agreed upon are, in fact, more advantageous to the company and its shareholders.

Notwithstanding the positive developments in the legal services marketplace for small-cap companies, there are three circumstances in particular that are always deserving of added director scrutiny.

__________________________________

*Adam J. Epstein is lead director of OCZ Technology Group, an NACD Board Leadership Fellow, and advises smallcap boards through his firm, Third Creek Advisors. This article is excerpted, in part, from his book, The Perfect Corporate Board: A Handbook for Mastering the Unique Challenges of Small-Cap Companies (McGraw-Hill, 2012).

Another Innovative Juxtaposition Emerges From a US Legal Market in Distress (slaw.ca)

Ten years later: A look back and ahead, a decade after the ABA Commission on Billable Hours Report (Part 1 of 3) (adverselling.typepad.com)

Innovation and the Legal Profession: A Twitter Chat (slaw.ca)

Top 10 des billets en gouvernance sur mon blogue | Novembre 2013

Voici une liste des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue au cours du mois de novembre 2013. Cette liste constitue, en quelque sorte, un sondage de l’intérêt manifesté par des dizaines de milliers de personnes sur différents thèmes de la gouvernance des sociétés.

On y retrouve des points de vue très bien étayés sur des sujets d’actualité tels que : des conseils pour une bonne préparation aux réunions du conseil, des guides de gouvernance à l’intention des OBNL, une documentation sur les fondements de la gouvernance, une présentation des principes de gouvernance universels, le pouls de l’audit interne, la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégiaux, le conseil d’administration sans papier sécurisé.

En terme géographique, près du quart (25 %) des visiteurs sont d’origine française ou proviennent de dizaines de pays francophones, et 58 % sont d’origine canadienne. Ceux-ci trouvent leur voie sur le site principalement via LinkedIn (43 %), via les engins de recherche (43 %) ou via d’autres réseaux sociaux (14 %), tels que Facebook, Twitter ou Tumblr.

Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus et ils sont grandement appréciés; je réponds toujours à ceux-ci. Bonne lecture !

Les dix (10) plus importantes activités pour une gouvernance efficace

Les grands enjeux de la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégiaux

La référence en matière de gouvernance corporative | Les enseignements de Gilles Paquet

La dématérialisation du conseil d’administration | Une nécessité !

Cinq (5) principes simples et universels de saine gouvernance ?

Un document précieux à l’intention des C.A. d’OBNL (revisité)*

Guides de gouvernance à l’intention des OBNL : Questions et réponses

Mener ou suivre : Questions à l’intention des conseils d’administration d’OBNL | Deloitte

Comment bien se préparer à une réunion du conseil d’administration ? (revisité)

Le pouls de l’audit interne en 2013 | Rapport de l’Institut des auditeurs internes (IAI)

Vous vous préparez à occuper un poste d’administrateur d’une entreprise ? (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Le comité de gouvernance du C.A. | Élément clé d’une solide stratégie (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Comment motiver certains de vos administrateurs d’OBNL ? (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Qu’est-ce qu’une « contestation » pour le contrôle d’une entreprise ?

On assiste à de plus en plus de « contestations » de la part d’actionnaires activistes pour l’obtention du contrôle des entreprises cotées.

Qu’est-ce qu’une campagne de contestation (proxy contest) ? Quelles formes ces contestations prennent-elles ? Quels raisons incitent certains actionnaires activistes à aller de l’avant avec leurs propositions de changement ? Que peuvent faire les conseils d’administration pour se préparer à une attaque éventuelle et pour se protéger efficacement ?

Le document, préparé conjointement par Corporate Board Member du NYSE et Kroll, un leader mondial dans le conseil en gouvernance, répond très bien à ces questions. Voici un court extrait d’un article où Bob Brenner, associé de Kroll, répond aux questions. Bonne lecture.

Proxy Contests and Corporate Control

In general, the term corporate contest refers to several different situations in which a shareholder(s) or other corporate entity tries to force a change of control in a company. The two most common situations where we get involved are proxy fights and takeover attempts.

Proxy fights generally arise in two types of situations. In the first, an existing shareholder(s) seeks board representation to change corporate behavior or governance because the shareholder is unhappy with the company’s performance and the unwillingness of the board of directors to alter course or change the status quo. Typically, such a contest begins after quiet, protracted negotiation between the board/management and a prominent shareholder, during which the shareholder expresses ideas for change or displeasure with policy or direction and is rebuffed.

The second type of proxy fight, which we describe as “opportunistic,” does not start with an existing investment or position. Instead, it is marked by a rapid accumulation of stock by a new shareholder. The shareholder, or group of shareholders, acquires the stock on the premise that the board and/or management is failing to maximize the company’s assets. If the new shareholder can pressure the company to change policy, management, or board composition, fine. If not, they are prepared to force the issue.

“Activist” investors have had great success in these types of corporate contests. Typically, they target companies that have seen a decrease in share price over time. The well-funded activist investor claims to be ready, able, and more than willing to roll up its sleeves and implement change.

Historically, outright unsolicited or hostile takeover bids have formed a large part of the corporate contest world. In the case of a takeover bid, one corporate entity offers to buy another, frequently a competitor or an entity with a good synergistic fit. In far fewer instances, an activist shareholder may desire to purchase the outstanding shares of an entity from existing shareholders in order to obtain control of that entity so that it may effectuate immediate change. These types of contests are rarely launched by activist funds as these efforts require large amounts of capital to be sunk into one investment, a tactic that hedge funds generally try to avoid. True hostile takeover bids have declined in recent years.

Proxy Contests on the Rise – Activists Emboldened by Success (levick.com)

Statistiques sur les « Proxy Contests » (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Career Consequences of Proxy Contests (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Investor hints at proxy fight with Bob Evans because of ‘board’s apathetic posture’ (bizjournals.com)

Board Members Versus Hedge Fund Activists (venitism.blogspot.com)

Boards Should Minimize the Role of Proxy Advisors (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Le processus d’engagement du C.A. avec les actionnaires |Tendances globales

En tant qu’administrateurs de sociétés, nous sommes de plus en plus confrontés aux demandes de réunions spéciales avec les actionnaires. Que devons-nous faire ? Comment accueillir ces demandes ? Quelle position devons-nous adopter à cet égard ? Qui doit initier les démarches ? Quelles sont les expériences vécues par les organisations à ce sujet ?

L’article qui suit vous mettra à jour sur la nature du processus d’engagement du C.A. avec les actionnaires, sur les bénéfices potentiels à s’engager dans cette activité, sur les pratiques à l’échelle mondiale et sur les manières de faire.

Cet article a été publié par James Kim et Jason D. Schloetzer dans la série Director Notes du Conference Board; vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait d’un billet paru récemment sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum.

Je vous invite à lire cet article au complet car vous y découvrirez d’excellents arguments à aller de l’avant (tout en étant très vigilant) ainsi que plusieurs exemples d’entreprises qui se sont sérieusement engagées dans cette voie.

Global Trends in Board-Shareholder Engagement

There has been a rapid increase in shareholder requests for special meetings with the board. This report discusses the potential benefits and complexities of the board-shareholder engagement process, reviews global trends in engagement practices, provides insights into engagement activities at U.S. companies, and highlights developments in the use of technology to facilitate engagement. It also provides perspectives from institutional investors on the design of an effective engagement process.

The annual general meeting is the main channel of communication between a company’s board and its shareholders. Among other important meeting activities, shareholders have the opportunity to hear executives and directors discuss recent performance and outline the company’s long-term strategy.

Intel Board of Directors (Photo credit: IntelFreePress)

Since 2007, there has been an increase in shareholder requests for special meetings with the board. A recent study of board-shareholder engagement activities shows that 87 percent of security issuers, 70 percent of asset managers, and 62 percent of asset owners reported at least one engagement in the previous year. Moreover, the level of engagement is increasing rapidly, with 50 percent of issuers, 64 percent of asset managers, and 53 percent of asset owners reporting that they were engaging more. Only 6 percent of issuers and almost no investors reported a decrease in engagement. Shareholders, particularly institutional investors, believe that annual meetings are too infrequent and do not provide sufficient content to address their concerns.

The increase in engagement parallels a wave of shareholder activism that emerged in the mid-2000s. Proxy advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), have helped to foster a new environment for board-shareholder engagement. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 14a-21(a), adopted in 2011 to implement provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), requires public companies to include a “say-on-pay” vote in their proxy statements at least once every three years. The advisory vote has provided shareholders more voice in executive compensation. Annual meetings are now preceded by an increased level of engagement activity as more shareholders express their desire to influence corporate policies.

More generally, there is a common view in the current governance environment that directors should respond to shareholder questions regarding executive compensation, corporate strategy, financial performance, campaign financing, environmental and social issues, and corporate governance matters. Not surprisingly, say on pay and the appointment of an independent board chairman remain the primary focus of board-shareholder engagement activity in 2013.

En terminant retenez cet autre extrait de l’article qui présente un résumé du processus d’engagement entre actionnaires et conseil d’administration :

« Several representatives of prominent institutional investors at the June conference shared their perspectives regarding an effective board-shareholder engagement process.

Proactively reach out to your largest 15 to 20 institutional investors. Large institutional investors, particularly value investors with a longer-term investment horizon, are more likely to confront companies on specific issues than index/fund investors.
Offer to schedule a 30-minute phone call with each institutional investor to discuss the company’s executive compensation plan as well as any corporate governance concerns.
Be certain that at least the lead independent director and a knowledgeable person from the investor relations, human resources, and legal departments are on the call and have authority to answer shareholder questions. If your company has experienced poor say-on-pay votes in recent years, the compensation committee chairman should also participate. It is generally preferable that the CEO and the company’s compensation consultant do not participate, particularly when the main topic of discussion will be executive compensation.
An effective agenda for a 30-minute call is as follows: devote the first five minutes to summarizing the overall business activities of the company (investor relations), five minutes to explaining how the performance measures included in executive compensation plans are linked to corporate strategy (human resources, compensation committee chairman, lead independent director), and five minutes summarizing outstanding shareholder proposals (general counsel). The remaining 15 minutes should be devoted to two-way discussion between the company and the shareholder.
If the company has faced specific concerns about its compensation design in prior years, the compensation committee should make an effort to improve its Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) disclosure. A clearly written CD&A—particularly the Executive Summary—can reduce the need for separate meetings and one-on-one conversations about compensation. Directors should write the CD&A with its major shareholders in mind. The CFA Institute’s CD&A Template offers ideas for boards on how to organize the CD&A disclosure. The template is currently used by a number of companies, including Pfizer, American Express Company, General Electric, and Morningstar ».

Oracle’s executive pay deals under fire from investors (theguardian.com)

The (Advisory) Ties That Bind Executive Pay (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Global Trends in Board-Shareholder Engagement (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Sérieux rapprochement entre les actionnaires activistes et les actionnaires institutionnels (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Oracle executive pay deal again rejected by shareholders (theguardian.com)

Proxy Contests on the Rise – Activists Emboldened by Success (levick.com)

Statistiques sur les « Proxy Contests » (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Board Members Versus Hedge Fund Activists (venitism.blogspot.com)

Le pouls de l’audit interne en 2013 | Rapport de l’Institut des auditeurs internes (IAI)

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un rapport de l’Institut des auditeurs internes (IAI), partagé par Denis Lefort, expert-conseil /Gouvernance, Audit interne, Contrôle, sur les résultats du premier sondage de l’année 2013 concernant l’Amérique du nord, portant sur le pouls de la profession de l’audit interne (Pulse of the profession).

La fonction de l’audit interne au sein des entreprises est de plus en plus importante. Ce document comporte une foule de tableaux et d’illustrations qui seront, selon moi, très précieux pour évaluer l’essor de la profession. Je présente ici l’introduction au rapport suivi du sommaire des résultats et de la méthodologie.

Bonne lecture.

Defining Our Role In a Changing Landscape | The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)

The IIA’s Audit Executive Center conducts the North American Pulse of the Profession Survey to assess the state of the internal audit profession. This survey looks at trends and emerging issues in the internal audit profession within the United States, Canada, and the Caribbean. Last year, the survey results indicated the strongest Outlook for internal audit resources seen since the 2008 economic downturn. Continuing this trend, the 2013 survey suggests that the vast majority of the 428 CAEs and others in audit management roles who responded to this recent Pulse survey expect that their staff and budget resources will increase or stay the same in 2014.

With resource levels stabilizing close to pre-recession levels, the focus for internal audit seems to have settled into more diversified audit coverage than would have been seen a few years ago. The survey results indicate that audit departments are expecting a greater focus on compliance risks and less emphasis on Sarbanes-Oxley. At the same time, limited coverage of strategic business risks suggests a misalignment with the priorities of executive management and audit committees. “Historically, internal audit has witnessed that stakeholder expectations are a moving target,” states IIA President and CEO Richard Chambers. “Even if we are aligned today, those expectations may change tomorrow.” Chambers goes on to say that “at the end of the day, stakeholders expect us to be risk-based, and if we are not aligned with their priorities, then I think there is a risk that we will fail to meet their expectations.”

This year, as in previous years, The IIA focused a portion of the survey on emerging issues that affect the practice of internal auditing. This survey introduced two focus areas:

– 2014 Requirements of the U.S. Affordable Care Act and anticipated risks.

– Preparedness for COSO 2013 Internal Control–Integrated Framework implementation.

Responses pertaining to the U.S. Affordable Care Act suggest that a potential expectation gap is emerging related to internal audit’s ability to help stakeholders understand their associated risks. In contrast, survey results regarding COSO 2013 implementation indicate that internal audit departments that are implementing the revised framework by December 2014 foresee an easy transition.

SURVEY RESULTS AT-A-GLANCE

The IIA Audit Executive Center’s 2013 North American Pulse of the Profession Survey of 428 North American internal

audit professionals yielded the following overarching results:

1. The outlook for internal audit resources remains strong with steady increases in budget and staff levels and fewer decreases in some areas than in previous years.

2. One area of misalignment with stakeholder priorities appears to be strategic business risk.

3. Compliance risks are predicted to elicit greater audit coverage in 2014, pushing ahead of competing risk areas.

SURVEY DEMOGRAPHICS IN A NUTSHELL

The IIA Audit Executive Center’s 2013 North American Pulse of the Profession garnered responses from 428 CAEs and others in audit management roles within North American organizations, varying widely in type, size, and industry sector. Publicly traded organizations comprise the largest group of respondent organizations (38 percent). Privately held organizations and public sector entities also represent a significant portion of respondents — 27 percent and 23 percent, respectively. In addition, 14 percent of all respondents work in Fortune 500 companies.

The survey also shows a wide variation in staff size among respondent organizations, ranging from one person (11 percent) to more than 100 people (3 percent). The largest segment (38 percent) report staff sizes between two and five auditors. Participants represent more than 26 industries, with the highest representation from the financial services industry (22 percent). Other industries that participated at notable rates include insurance (8 percent), health services (8 percent), manufacturing (7 percent), and education (7 percent).

__________________________________

*The IIA’s Audit Executive Center is the essential resource to empower CAEs to be more successful. The Center’s suite of information, products, and services enables CAEs to respond to the unique challenges and emerging risks of the profession. For more information onthe Center, visit http://www.theiia.org/cae.

Redefining The Role Of Internal Audit: Part Two (business2community.com)

Redefining The Role Of Internal Audit: Avoiding Redundancy (business2community.com)

Risk Based Internal Audit Planning (learnsigma.co.uk)

The difference between internal audit and external audit, by a firm consulting (iareportg5.wordpress.com)

Getting from Continuous Auditing to Continuous Risk Assessment (mjsnook.co)

The Internal Audit Activity’s Role in Governance, Risk, and Control (IIA Certified Internal Auditor – Part 1) (examcertifytraining.wordpress.com)

La référence en matière de gouvernance corporative | Les enseignements de Gilles Paquet

Il est rare, dans ce blogue, que je fasse ouvertement la promotion d’un ouvrage sur la gouvernance des sociétés; mais lorsqu’il s’agit d’une œuvre synthèse de la gouvernance corporative telle que vue par le professeur Gilles Paquet*, pionnier, bâtisseur, penseur, défricheur, éclaireur et leader-précurseur des notions de gouvernance dans toutes les catégories d’entreprises, je crois que je rends un grand service aux partisans de la saine gouvernance, notamment à toute la communauté des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC) qui ont bénéficiés des enseignements du professeur Paquet.

Je vous présente donc, en primeur, le dernier volume de Gilles Paquet qui paraîtra le 22 novembre 2013. Comme l’extrait ci-dessous l’indique, il est le résultat des nombreuses présentations de l’auteur dans le cadre du programme en gouvernance du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, au cours des huit dernières années.

Voici donc un court résumé du volume tel que rédigé par l’auteur. Je joins également en annexe la table des matières du livre que vous pourrez vous procurer en allant sur son site :

http://www.gouvernance.ca/index.php?page=pubs&lang=ce

Le professeur Paquet a également conçu une capsule vidéo très populaire pour le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés : https://www.cas.ulaval.ca/cms/site/college/cas-gouvernance/outils-gouvernance/capsules-experts

Ce petit livre reprend en gros le contenu de la conférence d’ouverture livrée dans le programme de certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés de l’Université Laval au cours des dernières années. Gouvernance corporative connote ici la coordination efficace et dynamique de l’organisation quand pouvoir, ressources et information sont vastement distribués entre plusieurs mains – dans le privé, le public, le communautaire, etc.

La Partie I présente la philosophie générale de la gouvernance corporative telle qu’elle se définit depuis les années 1970, montre ses pathologies, et explore la philosophie de rechange qui commence à s’imposer.

La Partie II expose les principes généraux qui aident à définir et à fonder l’architecture d’une bonne gouvernance corporative, et examine certaines façons de corriger les vices de structures existants.

La Partie III se penche sur l’ingénierie de la gouvernance corporative, et évalue les radoubs possibles à court terme et la refondation envisageable à plus long terme pour éliminer ou contenir les effets toxiques des pathologies de gouvernance observées.

La Partie IV fait le pont entre les considérations plus générales des premières parties et le travail pratique sur le terrain de ceux qui doivent improviser pour construire une gouvernance corporative satisfaisante sur mesure, en réfléchissant sur le meccano de la gouvernance corporative, et en montrant toute l’importance de la dimension éthique dans le renouvellement de la gouvernance corporative dans tous les secteurs.

De quoi préparer les esprits à aborder de manière critique la gouvernance corporative, et engendrer un changement d’attitude quant à ce qu’on peut faire pratiquement pour assurer une meilleure gouvernance.

Gilles Paquet

____________________________________________

*Gilles Paquet est professeur émérite à l’École de gestion Telfer, et directeur de recherches au Centre d’études en gouvernance de l’Université d’Ottawa. Économiste, historien, journaliste, il a publié plusieurs ouvrages, et de nombreux textes scientifiques et travaux de vulgarisation. Pour plus de renseignements, visitez son site web au http://www.gouvernance.ca.

Gouvernance corporative: Une entrée en matières

Table des matières

Préambule

On construit sur les cendres de deux mythes

Un détour obligé par trois recadrages

Ampleur de la tâche

Le volume à vol d’oiseau

Invitation au voyage

Un contexte qui change

Perspective gouvernance

Problématique gouvernance

Annexe : la Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec

PARTIE I : Philosophie de la gouvernance corporative

Chapitre 1 : Dérive de la gouvernance corporative

Deux paradigmes

Pourquoi le modèle européo-japonais est-il

le moins insatisfaisant?

Quelques illustrations

La situation au Canada : mise en contexte

À la recherche d’un troisième paradigme

Pertinence pour les secteurs public et communautaire

Radiographie du conseil d’administration

Conclusion

Chapitre 2 : Pathologies de gouvernance

Certaines causes majeures

D’un détour obligé par un processus de transition

Conclusion

PARTIE II : Architecture de la gouvernance corporative

Chapitre 3 : Principes, mécanismes et stratagèmes

Attitude design

Éléments de grammaire du design

Conclusion

Chapitre 4 : Par quatre chemins

Sources de difficultés

Quatre avenues plus ou moins subversives

Conclusion

PARTIE III : Ingénierie de la gouvernance corporative

Chapitre 5 : Technologies, bricolage et radoubs dans l’immédiat

Modus operandi

Radoubs

Les propositions Allaire-Firsirotu

Conclusion

Chapitre 6 : Repères pour la refondation à plus long terme

Deux avenues

Libération des servitudes

Invitation à une conversation avec les prototypes

Et le sens de l’honneur dans tout cela?

Il y a plus que l’honneur dans la culture publique commune

PARTIE IV : Meccano et éthique de la gouvernance corporative

Chapitre 7 : Préliminaires au travail sur le terrain

Simplification nécessaire dans cette entrée en matières

Quelques balises pour fixer les idées

La division du travail

Le conseil d’administration et la planification stratégique : perspective traditionnelle

Le conseil d’administration et la planification stratégique : perspective dynamique

La culture organisationnelle

Deux méta-principes : la subsidiarité active et le corridor éthique

Chapitre 8 : Ce que l’éthique n’est pas et ce qu’elle est

Ce que l’éthique n’est pas

Trois groupes de mots pour aider à vivre la contrainte éthique

Quelques constats et mises en garde

Apprentissage collectif et imagination morale

Conclusion

Conclusion : Quo vadis ?

Tendances lourdes

Travail au mésoscope

Attitude design

Effective Governance | Top Ten Steps to Improving Corporate Governance | Effective Governance (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Vous vous préparez à occuper un poste d’administrateur d’une entreprise ? (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Menaces à la gouvernance « traditionnelle » | Nouveaux moyens de défense !

Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un article exceptionnel écrit par DAVID GELLES du New York Times, sur les moyens de préparation et de défense des directions et des conseils d’administration face aux éventuelles attaques des investisseurs activistes.

Certaines entreprises, susceptibles d’être la cible de contestataires activistes très bien organisés, se sont adaptées en se préparant systématiquement aux attaques. Bien que les moyens de défenses traditionnels tels les « poison pills » et les « staggered boards » sont toujours utilisés pour contrer les attaques des activistes et les tentatives de « takeover », celles-ci sont de moins en moins efficaces devant les interventions accrues, et plus sophistiqués, des « Hedge Funds » et des autres groupes d’investisseurs activistes … opportunistes (souvent non sans fondement).

À chaque action, sa réaction ! Nous assistons à des batailles rangées entre protagonistes très bien préparés et très bien équipés. Les activistes ne réussissent pas toujours mais ils sont menaçants. Les firmes spécialisées dans les conseils légaux et stratégiques aux entreprises vulnérables sont de plus en plus sollicitées …

L’article explique les nouvelles problématiques de gouvernance qui font rage dans le milieu des grandes entreprises cotées et expose les nouvelles approches utilisées par ces dernières pour conserver leur autonomie et s’acquitter de leurs responsabilités fiduciaires envers tous les actionnaires.

La plupart des grandes entreprises ont changé leur approche face aux activistes. On ne se referme plus sur soi, on étudie les risques, on identifie les vulnérabilités, on engage une discussion avec les grands actionnaires-investisseurs (actifs et passifs) ainsi qu’avec la masse des petits actionnaires.

Voici un court extrait de l’article. Je vous invite à le lire attentivement. Également, je vous invite à prendre connaissance de l’article partagé par Louise Champoux-Paillé : When Facing Activist Investors, Fight Has Gone 24/7!

Vous serez ainsi à jour, et avisés, sur les grands défis qui attendent les administrateurs de demain !

Boardrooms Rethink Tactics to Defang Activist Investors

Executives and board members used to fear hostile bids above all else. In response, they devised defense mechanisms like poison pills and staggered boards to thwart attacks.

Today, hostile deals are on the wane, but a new threat has emerged that has put boardrooms on edge: activist investors.

“Companies now view the threat of shareholder activism similarly to how they viewed the threat of hostile takeovers in the 1980s,” said Gregg Feinstein, head of mergers and acquisitions at Houlihan Lokey.

Until recently, many companies responded to activists by simply refusing to meet with them and hoping they would go away.

When Daniel S. Loeb of Third Point Management took a stake in Yahoo in 2011, the company was initially dismissive. In an early phone call between Mr. Loeb and Yahoo, the company’s chairman, Roy Bostock, reportedly hung up on him. But a year and a half later, Mr. Loeb had forced out Yahoo’s chief executive and was on the board.

After a string of such debacles, and with activism today more established and prolific than ever before, that approach has fallen out of favor.

“The bunker mentality that had been advised in some quarters is fading as an approach,” said James C. Woolery, deputy chairman at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft. “Today you need real substantive preparation and real engagement.”

Vous vous préparez à occuper un poste d’administrateur d’une entreprise ? (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Boardrooms Rethink Tactics to Defang Activist Investors (dealbook.nytimes.com)

LIVE: Dan Loeb Is Giving A Rare Interview Right Now (businessinsider.com)

When Facing Activist Investors, Fight Has Gone 24/7 (dealbook.nytimes.com)

Sérieux rapprochement entre les actionnaires activistes et les actionnaires institutionnels (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Booming shareholder activism puts big business at risk (cnbc.com)

When Facing Activist Investors, Fight Has Gone 24/7!

Le tsunami des fonds activistes

Il y a beaucoup de turbulence dans le monde de la gouvernance depuis cinq ans, et c’est dans le nombre de campagnes menées par des actionnaires-investisseurs activistes que l’on peut le mieux observer ce phénomène.

L’article de Sam Jones, publié hier dans le Financial Times, montre que les campagnes de contestation des stratégies des directions d’entreprises et des décisions des conseils d’administration ont plus que doublées au cours des trois dernières années. Les interventions des activistes ont eues, en général, beaucoup de succès (rendements de 53 % VS 24 % pour le S&P 500 cette année) et elles ciblent des organisations de plus en plus grandes, dans des secteurs de plus en plus diversifiés, à l’échelle mondiale (Apple, Sony).

Très souvent, les fonds activistes visent des entreprises qui ont accumulé d’importantes réserves financières, dans le but de les contraindre à retourner une partie des surplus aux actionnaires (notamment, sous la forme de dividendes).

Bill Ackman prévoit que le mouvement s’étendra rapidement à l’Europe. On comprend que les C.A. soient de plus en plus préoccupés, eux qui sont, à juste titre, les représentants et fiduciaires de l’ensemble des actionnaires.

Les « hedge funds » sont intéressés par des rendements rapides au profit des actionnaires (les grands investisseurs, évidemment) tandis que les administrateurs envisagent le long terme, la pérennité de l’organisation et l’intérêt de tous les actionnaires (du moins ce sont les rôles qui leurs sont dévolus !).

Que pensez-vous de ces derniers développements et de leurs incidences sur les meilleures pratiques de gouvernances ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus ! Voici un extrait de l’article.

Shareholder campaigns double in three years

Where activists had previously focused on banks and financial services groups – criticising compensation and pushing for changes in corporate culture – now their targets are larger and far more diversified.

The research, conducted by Activist Insight and commissioned by law firm Linklaters, points to the growing engagement of institutional investors with companies in the wake of the financial crisis and the resurgence of more aggressive hedge-fund style corporate agitation.

Sérieux rapprochement entre les actionnaires activistes et les actionnaires institutionnels (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)
Statistiques sur les « Proxy Contests » (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)
Boardrooms Rethink Tactics to Defang Activist Investors (dealbook.nytimes.com)
Vous vous préparez à occuper un poste d’administrateur d’une entreprise ? (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

La gestion des risques dans un contexte plus incertain !

Voici le récent rapport annuel publié par la firme Accenture portant sur l’étude de la gestion des risques à l’échelle globale. L’étude a été effectuée auprès de 450 professionnels de la gestion des risques globaux.

Les résultats montrent que la gestion des risques devient de plus en plus intégrée dans la prise de décision notamment dans la budgétisation, les investissements et les stratégies corporatives. Les risques de nature légale sont considérés comme prédominants en ces temps incertains. Le rapport présente les résultats de manière très illustré.

J’ai reproduit, ci-dessous, les quatre conclusions que les auteurs tirent de cette étude internationale. Bonne lecture.

Risk management for an era of greater uncertainty

Conclusion: Four things to do differently

Since publication of the first Accenture Global Risk Management Study in 2009,it is clear that many organizations have made great strides in developing risk management functions, but others have been left behind.

Our 2013 Global Risk Management Study finds nearly all surveyed firms give higher priority to risk management now than they did two years ago. But there is still much room for improvement.

There appear to be large gaps between expectations of the risk management function’s role in meeting broader goals and its perceived performance— for every organizational goal we surveyed. In the following pages we have provided a wealth of data and many examples of how others are addressing the various challenges to more effectively manage risk in an era of greater uncertainty.

The Report lays out in more detail the current market pressures, shares insights on how firms are leveraging the risk management function to respond to these challenges and provides data and examples of what it can mean to be a high performance risk function.

However, to provide some “sign-posts” as you read through the information, we identified four of the more significant key actions which are evidently helping organizations reach their risk capability goals for 2015.

1. Treat risk as a “people game,” developing risk staff with business acumen.

If the risk management function is to play its elevated role more effectively, it increasingly will rely on risk staff with a deep understanding of the broader business.

2. Look ahead, as new types of risks are relentless, and develop capabilities that match tomorrow’s risks.

Risk capability plans should aim to be at least in concert with the organization’s business development plans, and often should be leading, rather than lagging.

3. Manage regulation through a transformational lens.

Many industries are being forced to rethink their business models, processes, reporting and data structures to better enable effective regulatory solutions. Seeking the opportunities to align these efforts with the business change agenda can lessen future complexity.

4. Focus on insight, not just data and analytics, and develop the “human element” of risk technology.

It is important not to miss the forest for the trees: technology, data, and analytics can only have value if their insights can be put into action.

Le « risque réputationnel » : Une priorité des Boards* (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

As Risk Management Gains Stature in the C-Suite, Accenture Finds Risk Managers Challenged by Skills Shortages and Insufficient Analytics Capabilities (fool.com)

Managing Risk or Creating It? The Real Message Behind the 2014 World Development Report (developmentintern.com)

The Risk of Risk Management (sixfoot4.wordpress.com)

Action is not optional: Risk Management Study (strategizingtaxrisks.com)

Sérieux rapprochement entre les actionnaires activistes et les actionnaires institutionnels

Je vous invite à lire cet article de Vincent Ryan paru dans Capital Markets du site CFO. On y décrit un changement significatif dans l’influence que peuvent exercer les actionnaires des grandes sociétés cotées en se rapprochant des positions des activistes, lesquels ont un solide parcours (Track Record). Voici un extrait de ce court article.

Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus !

Management and the board of directors may assume that a company’s institutional shareholders will be their allies in a fight against an activist investor. They shouldn’t.

Shareholders Getting Chummy with Activists

Shareholder activists continue to take on boards of directors and management, especially at large companies. Of the 137 financial or board-seat activist campaigns announced as of August 12, nearly 30 percent involved companies with a market capitalization of more than $1 billion at the time the campaign was initiated, according to SharkRepellent.net, up from 20 percent in 2012.

While companies may just be more vulnerable to activist campaigns, experts say a key driver is that institutional shareholders are more often embracing these much-maligned investors instead of siding with the company against them.

“There is real change in how activists are perceived by the investing public,” says Alexander Khutorsky, managing director of The Valence Group, a specialist investment bank. In the past, if an institutional investor didn’t like a company’s performance or its management team, it “voted with its feet” and sold the shares. But now many investors are “more open to outsider influence,” says Khutorsky. “They’re willing to concede that a company could be made better through activism, so they are sticking around and voting for changes.”

A note from SharkRepellent.net highlights “an increased willingness by mainstream mutual funds and other institutional investors to side with activists, which is absolutely essential [for a hedge fund] to effect changes with a small ownership stake, as they often do when targeting larger companies.”

The goals of activists often align with investors: returning excess balance-sheet cash to shareholders, selling underperforming or noncore business units or even ousting an ineffective board of directors.

“As much as management may feel they are being attacked, their shareholders will not necessarily share that view,” Khutorsky says.

In addition, activist investors have a “good track record” of creating value, at least in the nominal sense, says Khutorsky. “The stock [often] goes up so they can show very straightforward returns; they’re not necessarily creating long-term value, but they have credibility in helping shareholders realize near-term value,” he says.

Articles reliés au sujet des activistes :

Adjusting to Shareholder Activism as the New Normal (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

How You Can Profit from the Actions of Activist Investors (business2community.com)

What to Do When an Activist Comes Knocking (clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu)

The value of activist shareholders (lawprofessors.typepad.com)

How institutional investors have come to recognize the value of activist investing (valuewalk.com)

Marty Lipton: Shareholder Champion, Stakeholder Protector or Management Tool? (aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com)

Survey annuel de PwC sur la perception administrateurs de sociétés

Voici un extrait du récent rapport de PwC sur l’état de la gouvernance aux États-Unis. Le sommaire exécutif reproduit ci-dessous montre clairement l’évolution de la pensée des administrateurs en ce qui a trait aux thèmes suivants :

(1) Évaluation plus sévère de la performance des collègues administrateurs;

(2) Résistances quant au remplacement des collègues administrateurs;

(3) La « stimulation intellectuelle » est la principale motivation à siéger sur un conseil;

(4) Divergences d’opinions quant à la communication d’informations concernant la gouvernance, la rémunération de la direction et les nominations des administrateurs;

(5) Lacunes quant aux politiques de communications avec les parties prenantes;

(6) Peu d’administrateurs sont prêts à reconsidérer la rémunération des hauts dirigeants, même si les actionnaires questionnent la politique;

(7) Augmentation significative de la surveillance des risques par le C.A.;

(8) Différences de perception entre la direction et les administrateurs au sujet de l’influence de diverses parties prenantes sur les stratégies;

(9 Proactivité plus marquées des administrateurs en ce qui a trait aux risques de fraudes;

(10) Importance accrue accordée aux projets en TI, bien que toujours considérée comme insuffisante;

(11) Augmentation importante de l’utilisation de conseillers externes, notamment en TI;

(12) Une majorité d’administrateur (aux É-U) croit que les récentes initiatives règlementaires n’ont pas accrue la protection des investisseurs, mais elles ont contribué à accroitre significativement les coûts;

(13) L’influence des firmes de conseil spécialisées en gouvernance décline.

PwC’s 2013 Annual Corporate Directors Survey

We are witnessing unprecedented change in the corporate governance world: new perspectives on boardroom composition, higher levels of stakeholder engagement, more emphasis on emerging risks and strategies, and the increasing velocity of change in the digital world. These factors, coupled with calls for enhanced transparency around governance practices and reporting, the very active regulatory and lawmaking environment, and the enhanced power of proxy advisors, are all accelerating evolution, and in some cases creating a revolution, in the boardroom.

Nederlands: Vergaderruimte Boardroom Kromhout Kazerne Utrecht (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

In the summer of 2013, 934 public company directors responded to our 2013 Annual Corporate Directors Survey. Of those directors, 70% serve on the boards of companies with more than $1 billion in annual revenue. As a result, the survey’s findings reflect the practices and boardroom perspectives of many of today’s world-class companies. The focus of this year’s research not only reflects in-depth analysis of contemporary governance trends, but also emphasizes how boards are reacting to a rapidly evolving landscape.

These are the highlights:

Directors are even more critical of their fellow directors than last year: 35% now say someone on their board should be replaced (compared to only 31% in 2012). The top three reasons cited are diminished performance because of aging, a lack of required expertise, and poor preparation for meetings.

Replacing a fellow board member can be difficult; 48% cite impediments to doing so. The top inhibitor, cited nearly twice as often as any other factor, is that board leadership is uncomfortable addressing the issue.

Board service is not driven by money or ego. More than half of directors (54%) say that their primary motivation for sitting on a corporate board is intellectual stimulation, 22% see board service as a way to keep engaged, and 17% indicate they simply want to give something back. Remuneration is low on the list.

There is a dichotomy between directors who believe it’s appropriate to communicate about governance issues directly with shareholders and those who do not. Just over 30% say it’s « very appropriate » to communicate about corporate governance issues, and about a quarter say the same about executive compensation and director nominations. But the same or slightly more say director communication about these three areas is « not appropriate. »

Regarding communication with other stakeholders, nearly half of directors say their boards either have no policy or one that’s not useful. Considering the increasing frequency of stakeholder interactions, it’s not surprising that about one-quarter of those without such a policy believe there should be one.

Boards continue to take action in response to say on pay voting results (70%) but few actually reduced compensation (3%). Over one-half of directors say that it would take a negative shareholder vote of 30% or more to cause them to reconsider executive compensation.

The number of directors who believe there is a clear allocation of risk oversight responsibilities among the board and its committees (80%) improved over the prior year by 17 percentage points. Yet half of those who say that there is clarity reflected that it still could be improved.

CEOs and directors have different perspectives on who influences company strategy or what threatens their company’s growth prospects. As reported in PwC’s 16th Annual Global CEO Survey, CEOs see more influence by the media and supply chain partners, while directors believe investors have more clout. Directors are significantly more concerned about the government impairing growth prospects.

Ninety-four percent of directors say they receive information on competitor initiatives and strategy, but nearly a quarter of them wish it were better.

Three-quarters of directors said their boards took additional action to oversee fraud risks. Six of 10 held discussions regarding « tone at the top, » a 14 percentage-point increase from last year. Other actions included increased interactions with members of management below the executive level and having discussions about insider trading controls.

Directors reflected on the increasing importance of the IT revolution at their companies—15% call IT critical, up from 13% in 2012, and the amount of time directors spent overseeing IT increased correspondingly. Despite the fact that about one-third of boards spent more hours overseeing IT, 61% want to spend even more time considering related risks in the coming year, and 55% say the same about IT strategy.

There was a jump in the use of outside consultants to advise boards on IT strategy and risk: from 27% last year to 35% this year. Even more are thinking about it. While most of these were hired on a project-specific basis, the percentage of consultants engaged on a continuous basis doubled from last year.

Almost a third of directors believe their company’s strategy and IT risk mitigation is not adequately supported by a sufficient understanding of IT at the board level. And only about a quarter « very much » agree that the company provides them with adequate information for effective oversight.

The majority of directors have evolved their practices to be more engaged in overseeing traditional IT issues: the status of major IT implementations and the annual IT budget. These account for the highest levels of director engagement (80% and 63%, respectively). But directors say they are not sufficiently engaged in understanding the company’s level of cyber-security spend (24%) and competitors’ leverage of emerging technologies (22%).

Nearly two-thirds of directors (64%) believe recent regulatory and enforcement initiatives have not increased investor protections, and 77% don’t believe such actions have increased public trust in the corporate sector. In addition, 51% think these efforts have not enhanced transparency to stakeholders « very much » or at all.

Nearly three-fourths of directors feel that increased regulation and enforcement initiatives have added costs to companies that exceed the benefits, and 56% believe they have put excessive burdens on directors. Over a third (36%) responded that such initiatives have contributed to unreasonable expectations of director performance.

Despite their perceived increased influence, proxy advisory firms appear to be losing ground when it comes to their credibility with directors. Directors’ ratings of the firms’ independence, thoroughness of work, and quality of voting recommendations all declined in 2013.

A summary of selected insights reflecting the best of the boardroom is included in the first part of this report. The appendix includes other graphs and survey results.

Directors Survey: Boards Confront an Evolving Landscape (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Un argumentaire en faveur du choix d’administrateurs externes au C.A.* (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Corporate Governance Quick Read – The role of the board is to govern (togovern.wordpress.com)

Shareholders to fix salaries of board members of listed firms (elpais.com)

Taking a Fresh Look at Board Composition (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Breaking the Glass Ceiling: Women in the Boardroom (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Raising The Bar With A New Corporate Governance Index? (forbes.com)

Social Media and the Boardroom: Much Work Remains (billives.typepad.com)

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Gouvernance corporative: Une entrée en matières

Table des matières

PARTIE I : Philosophie de la gouvernance corporative

PARTIE II : Architecture de la gouvernance corporative

PARTIE III : Ingénierie de la gouvernance corporative

PARTIE IV : Meccano et éthique de la gouvernance corporative

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Management and the board of directors may assume that a company’s institutional shareholders will be their allies in a fight against an activist investor. They shouldn’t.

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