Sommaire de l’enquête de PwC sur la gouvernance des entreprises auprès des administrateurs


La gouvernance des entreprises a beaucoup évolué au cours des vingt dernières années. Aujourd’hui, les investisseurs institutionnels détiennent 70 % des actions des corporations publiques.

L’auteure indique que l’un des seuls moyens pour les actionnaires investisseurs d’améliorer la performance des entreprises est d’agir sur la gouvernance des entreprises, en exerçant différentes pressions auprès du management et des administrateurs (« direct engagement ») et en faisant connaître leur avis via le vote par procuration.

Un sommaire de l’étude publié par Paula Loop*, directrice du Centre de la gouvernance de PricewaterhouseCoopers, nous donne un bon aperçu des principaux changements observés lors de l’enquête auprès de 886 administrateurs de grandes corporations américaines.

Voici les points saillants de l’étude :

  1. Director discontent with peers hits a high-water mark
  2. Boards are taking more action on performance assessments
  3. Independent chairs are more likely to have the difficult conversations
  4. Key issues are not being prioritized in many boardrooms
  5. Male and female directors see strategy very differently
  6. Executive pay plans are effective—except where they’re not
  7. Seeing returns on shareholder engagement
  8. The gender divide is real on questions of board diversity
  9. Challenging management is a challenge

 

Voir le résumé de l’enquête ci-dessous.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont appréciés.

 

Insights from PwC’s 2017 Annual Corporate Directors Survey

 

 

« Against the backdrop of a new administration in Washington and growing social divisiveness, US public company directors are faced with great expectations from investors and the public. Perhaps now more than ever, public companies are being asked to take the lead in addressing some of society’s most difficult problems. From seeking action on climate change to advancing diversity, stakeholder expectations are increasing and many companies are responding.

In part, this responsiveness is driven by changes in who owns public companies today. Institutional investors now own 70% of US public company stock, much of which is held in index funds. [1] Many of these passive investors believe that seeking improvements in corporate governance is one of the only levers they have to improve company performance. And these shareholders are exerting their influence with management teams and the board through their governance policies, direct engagement and proxy voting.

But boards and shareholders don’t always agree, and the corporate governance environment itself is not immune to divisiveness. In fact, our research shows that directors are clearly out of step with investor priorities in some critical areas.

One of these areas is environmental issues. During the 2017 proxy season, a handful of shareholder proposals on environmental issues, like climate change, gained majority shareholder support. This is the first time we have seen these types of proposals pass, and they did so with the help of some of the largest institutional investors like BlackRock, Vanguard and Fidelity. For their part, some of the largest US companies declared their continuing commitment to take action fighting climate change, even as the US announced its withdrawal from the Paris climate accord.

About the survey

 

For over a decade, PwC’s Annual Corporate Directors Survey has gauged the views of public company directors from across the United States on a variety of corporate governance matters. In the summer of 2017, 886 directors participated in our survey. The respondents represent a cross-section of companies from over a dozen industries,

75% of which have annual revenues of more than $1 billion. Eighty-four percent of the respondents were men, and 16% were women. Their board tenure varied, but 60% have served on their board for five or more years.

 

But despite increased shareholder interest in environmental risk, there appears to be a disconnect when it comes to the views in many boardrooms. A majority of directors tell us that their boards don’t need sustainability expertise. A surprising number also say their company’s strategy isn’t being influenced by climate change or resource scarcity, and that they don’t think environmental concerns will impact their current strategy. Companies and investors may be driving the agenda, but rather than leading the way in this area, many directors are being carried along.

Gender diversity on boards has also become a clear priority for institutional investors in 2017. Shareholders like State Street Global Advisors and BlackRock recently adopted new diversity policies or guidance on board diversity. Indeed, State Street even voted against directors at hundreds of companies that it believed had not made sufficient strides in diversifying their boards. Yet despite the increased focus from institutional investors, fewer of the new board seats in 2016 went to women than in the prior year. [2] And gender parity is still a long way off, with only 25% of boards in the S&P 500 having more than two female directors. [3] Even so, about half of female directors tell us that their board is already sufficiently diverse. Which leads to the question—are female directors sufficiently championing the cause of gender diversity?

Investors are also putting the spotlight on social issues like income inequality and employee retirement security, asking companies to help develop shared economic security. But again, directors tell us that income inequality considerations should not play a part in company strategy.

PwC’s 2017 Annual Corporate Directors Survey examines the areas where directors and investors are aligned and moving forward together, as well as the ways in which they are out of sync.

While boards have made real improvements in some areas, there is clearly more work to be done. Among our key observations:

 

Director discontent with peers hits a high-water mark

 

With greater expectations of boards, directors are upping their game and are seeking to add value. More than ever, directors—particularly those who are less tenured—are also noticing that not all of their fellow directors are doing the same. Almost half of directors (46%) believe that one or more of their fellow board members should be replaced. One-fifth of directors say that two or more directors on their board should be replaced.

 

Boards are taking more action on performance assessments

 

Investors have been pushing boards to not just conduct board performance assessments, but to do something with the results. This year, more than twothirds (68%) say that their board has taken some action in response to their last board assessment—an increase of 19 percentage points over last year.

 

Independent chairs are more likely to have the difficult conversations

 

Directors on boards with non-executive chairs are more than twice as likely to say that their board decided not to re-nominate a director, or provided counsel to a director, as a result of the board’s assessment process.

 

Key issues are not being prioritized in many boardrooms

 

While investors are talking about the impact of environmental and social issues on the bottom line, the conversations are not necessarily filtering up to the boardroom. A significant percentage of directors say that income inequality (51%), immigration (49%) and climate change (40%) should not be taken into account—at all—in company strategy.

 

Male and female directors see strategy very differently

 

Female directors are more likely to think that social issues should play a part in company strategy formation. And they are much more likely to think that issues like environmental concerns and social instability will force the company to change its strategy in the next three years.

 

Executive pay plans are effective—except where they’re not

 

Directors are confident that incentive plans promote long-term shareholder value. But 70% at least somewhat agree that executives in general are overpaid, and 66% say that executive compensation exacerbates income inequality. Meanwhile, executive pay continues to go up, not down. [4]

 

Seeing returns on shareholder engagement

 

In just the past year, directors have come around to a much more positive view of shareholder engagement. They are much more likely now to think that direct engagement impacts proxy voting (77% as compared to 59% in 2016). And the vast majority now say that the right representatives are present (85%) and investors are well prepared for meetings (84%)—12 and 21 percentage point increases over last year, respectively.

 

The gender divide is real on questions of board diversity

 

Male and female directors have a significant difference of opinion about the impact of board diversity on company performance. Nearly five out of six female directors (82%) believe that diversity enhances company performance, while only just over half of men agree (54%).

 

Challenging management is a challenge

 

Strategy oversight is one of the board’s core responsibilities. Investors want to know that directors are heavily involved in evaluating, challenging and monitoring the company’s strategy, and calling for a change of course when needed. Yet only 60% of directors say their board strongly challenges management assumptions on strategy as part of their oversight role.

As we analyzed the results of this year’s survey, we also looked behind the numbers at how demographic differences such as gender and length of tenure on the board affected directors’ views. Read on for our full analysis of the survey results and areas where those differences were notable. And for the results of every question in the survey, please refer to the Appendix of the complete publication.

The complete publication is available here.

Endnotes

1Institutional investors owned an average of 70% of the outstanding shares of US public companies as of June 30, 2017. PwC + Broadridge, ProxyPulse 2017 Proxy Season Review, September 2017. Forty-two percent of all US stock fund assets as of June 30, 2017 were held through index funds. Investment Company Institute.(go back)

2 The percentage of women in new board appointments at Fortune 500 companies declined two percentage points to 27.3% in 2016. Fortune, “The Share of Women Appointed to Fortune 500 Declined Last Year,” June 19, 2017.(go back)

3Spencer Stuart, 2016 Spencer Stuart Board Index, November 2016.(go back)

4See Willis Towers Watson Executive Pay Bulletin, May 9, 2017.(go back) »

_____________________________________

*Paula Loop is Leader of the Governance Insights Center at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a publication from the PwC Governance Insights Center.

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 26 octobre 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 26 octobre 2017.

Cette semaine, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « harvard law school forum on corporate governance »

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « harvard law school forum on corporate governance »

 

 

  1. Securities Cases to Watch this Term at the Supreme Cour
  2. Director Networks, Turnover, and Appointments
  3. Protecting Shareholder Ownership and Governance Rights
  4. 2017 Relative TSR Prevalence and Design of S&P 500 Companies
  5. Busy Directors: Strategic Interaction and Monitoring Synergies
  6. Where’s the Board? Questions for Equifax
  7. Building a Better Board Book
  8. The Rise of Investor-Centric Activism Defense Strategy
  9. Environmental and Social Proposals in the 2017 Proxy Season
  10. Activism’s New Paradigm

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 19 octobre 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 19 octobre 2017.

Cette semaine, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « harvard law school forum on corporate governance »

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « harvard law school forum on corporate governance »

 

 

  1. Do Clawback Adoptions Influence Capital Investments?
  2. Cross-Border Reincorporations in the European Union: The Case for Comprehensive Harmonisation
  3. Proxy Season Legal Update
  4. Capable Boards and Value Creation
  5. Pay Ratio: The Time Has Come
  6. Proposed Overhaul of Disclosure and Shareholder Proposal Rules
  7. Novel Defensive Tactics Against Activist Shareholders
  8. Rejection of the Universal Proxy Card
  9. The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Board Refreshment Trends at S&P 1500 Firms
  10. Fiduciary Principles and Delaware Corporation Law

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 12 octobre 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 12 octobre 2017.

Cette semaine, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « harvard law school forum on corporate governance »

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « harvard law school forum on corporate governance »

 

 

 

  1. 2017 Proxy Season Review: Compensation
  2. P&G Proxy Fight: Trian Pushes to Reevaluate Executives’ Incentive Compensation Goals
  3. S&P 500 CEO Compensation Increase Trends
  4. Ambiguity and the Corporation: Group Disagreement and Underinvestment
  5. The Yates Memo: Looking for “Individual Accountability” in All the Wrong Places
  6. Preventing the Next Data Breach
  7. 2017-2018 ISS Global Policy Survey
  8. Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes
  9. So You Want to Buy a Stake in a Private Equity Manager?
  10. Fiduciary Principles and Delaware Corporation Law

« Benchmark » global en matière de politique de gouvernance | ISS


Subodh Mishra, Directeur exécutif à Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) a publié le résultat des études de ISS visant à établir un « benchmark » global en matière de politique de gouvernance.

Voici les cinq domaines de recherche :

  1. One-Share One-Vote Principle
  2. Gender Diversity on Boards
  3. Share Issuance and Buyback Proposals
  4. Virtual/Hybrid Meetings
  5. Pay Ratio Between Senior Executives and Employees

L’étude présente les résultats sous forme de tableaux assez explicites.

 

Bonne lecture !

 

2017-2018 ISS Global Policy Survey

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « ISS annual global benchmark policy »

 

A key part of ISS’ annual global benchmark policy formulation process is a survey which is open to institutional investors, corporate executives, board members and any other interested constituencies. For the 2017-2018 policy cycle, the survey was in two parts: (1) a short, high-level Governance Principles Survey covering a limited number of topical corporate governance areas and (2) a longer, more detailed supplemental survey allowing respondents to drill down into a wider set of key issues at market and regional levels. This document summarizes the findings of the Governance Principles Survey, which closed on August 31. The supplemental survey will remain open until October 6, 2017, at 5 PM (ET).

The response to the Governance Principles Survey was strong. In total, ISS received 602 responses to the survey, from a total of 571 different organizations. Responses were received from 121 institutional investors, representing 116 organizations, including 103 asset managers and 18 asset owners. An additional 10 responses were received from organizations that represent or provide services to institutional investors; these results were aggregated with the investor responses, bringing the total investor responses to 131. Two investors provided responses to ISS after the survey’s deadline, which were not aggregated in the results. For purposes of this report, survey results are based on 129 “investor” responses.

Responses were also received from 382 corporate issuers, several of whom submitted multiple responses. Additional non-investor survey responses were received from 46 consultants/advisors to companies; 28 corporate directors; and 13 organizations that represent or provide services to issuers. Responses from these corporate constituents were aggregated with the issuer responses, bringing the total “non-investor” responses to 469.

As in past years, the largest number of respondents—more than 400 in all—were from organizations based in the United States, with 51 from groups based in Canada, and 84 from groups based in Europe and/or the U.K. Responses were also received from organizations in, but not limited to, Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, India, Brazil, Russia and Bermuda. Many respondents have a focus that goes beyond their own home country.

Primary Market of Focus Investor Non-Investor
Global (most or all of the below) 49% 19%
U.S. 28% 62%
Continental Europe 7% 4%
Asia-Pacific 5% 3%
U.K. 4% 2%
Canada 3% 6%
Developing/emerging markets generally 2% 0%
Other (includes Australia, Switzerland, or combination of two other markets) 2% 1%
Latin America 0% 1%

The breakdown of investors by the size of their assets owned or assets under management was as follows:

Asset Size % of Investor Respondents
Under $100 million 2%
$100 million–$500 million 9%
$500 million–$1 billion 4%
$1 billion–$10 billion 19%
$10 billion–$100 billion 26%
Over $100 billion 35%
Not applicable 6%

Some of the respondents answered every survey question; others skipped one or more questions. Throughout this report, response rates are calculated as percentages of the valid responses received on each particular question from investors and from non-investor respondents, excluding blank responses. Survey participants who filled out the “Respondent Information” but did not answer any of the policy questions were excluded from the analysis and are not part of the breakdown of respondents above.

Key Findings

One-Share One-Vote Principle

The global debate over shareholders’ voting rights and multi-class share schemes has exploded in recent years thanks to a series of high-profile share issuances that deviated from one-share, one-vote. The recent initial public offering of Snap Inc. in the U.S., which offered only non-voting shares to the public, raised the stakes.

ISS solicited respondents’ views on multi-class capital structures that carry unequal voting rights.

Among investors, a large minority (43 percent) indicated that they considered unequal voting rights are never appropriate for a public company in any circumstances. An equal proportion of investors (43 percent) said unequal voting rights structures may be appropriate in the limited circumstances of newly-public companies if they are subject to automatic sunset requirements or at firms more broadly if the capital structure is put up for periodic reapproval by the holders of the low-vote shares. Only five percent of investor respondents agreed with the opinion that companies should be allowed to choose whatever capital structure they see fit.

Among non-investors, 50 percent responded that companies should be allowed to choose whatever capital structure they see fit, while 27 percent responded that a multi-class structure may be appropriate at a newly public company if subject to an automatic sunset provision or more broadly if reapproved on a periodic basis by the low-vote

shareholders. Only 11 percent responded that multi-class structures with unequal voting rights are never appropriate for a public company in any circumstances.

Among investors, one respondent commented that “where the existence of multiple share classes creates a ‘controlling entity’ as a minimum the board must be able to demonstrate how it can operate independently of that entity.” Several non-investor respondents indicated that companies should be allowed to choose their own corporate structure given that shareholders can choose not to invest in the issuer’s shares if they dislike the structure.

Gender Diversity on Boards

The global focus on increasing gender diversity in corporate boardrooms has grown in recent years. ISS asked respondents if they would consider it problematic if there are zero female directors on a public company board. More than two-thirds (69 percent) of investor respondents said “yes.” The lion’s share of these respondents (43 percent) said that the absence of women directors could indicate problems in the board recruitment process, while 26 percent of investor respondents said that although a lack of female directors would be problematic, their concerns may be mitigated if there is a disclosed policy/approach that describes the considerations taken into account by the board or the nominating committee to increase gender diversity on the board. Fewer than one in ten (8 percent) of investor respondents agreed with the statement that directors are best suited to determine the board composition and that a lack of women directors is not necessarily problematic.

Slightly less than one-quarter (23 percent) of the investor respondents indicated that they may find the lack of female directors on a board to be problematic based on a case-by-case analysis. Among the factors cited by investor respondents in making such a case-by-case determination were: the appropriateness of the existing directors based on their experience and skill sets; whether the board is composed of people who are capable of representing shareholders; company size; and turn-around situations.

Of the investor respondents who indicated that the lack of female directors on a public board is or could be problematic, the highest number cited engagement with the board and/or management as the most appropriate response. The second most popular response was to consider supporting a shareholder proposal aimed at increasing diversity. The investor respondents’ third-highest favored action was supporting a shareholder-nominated candidate.

A majority (54 percent) of the non-investor respondents answered “yes” when asked if the absence of a single woman director on a board is problematic, although more than half of these respondents said their concerns might be mitigated by a company’s disclosed policy or approach. Only around one of every five (19 percent) of non-investor respondents said that a lack of diversity was not a concern given that sitting directors are best suited to determine board composition. Of those non-investor respondents who indicated that the absence of female directors on the board may be problematic based on a case-by-case determination, comments often mirrored those of the investor respondents with respect to taking directors’ experience and skill sets into consideration. Other non-investor commenters expressed concern about adopting “quotas,” or a one-size-fits-all policy applicable to all industries and all types of companies.

Like the investor respondents, non-investors’ most commonly preferred investor action in response to a lack of gender diversity was engagement with the board and management. Unlike the investor respondents, however, the non-investors favored votes against members of the nominating committee rather than support for a shareholder nominee to the board.

Share Issuance and Buyback Proposals

Cross-market companies (i.e. incorporated in one country, listed in one or more others) can create unique corporate governance challenges given differences in legal requirements, listing standards and market norms. Voting on share issuances and buybacks at cross-market companies can be particularly complex given significant market-specific differences in shareholders’ rights to approve or ratify such capital allocation issues.

ISS asked survey respondents to provide their views on share issuances and buybacks as a general matter.

Among the investor respondents, 13 percent indicated that both share issuances and buybacks are matters for the board to decide. Forty-four percent of the investor respondents said that both share issuances and buybacks should generally be voted upon by shareholders. More than one-quarter (27 percent) of the investor respondents indicated their preference for shareholder votes on share issuances, but they favored leaving share buybacks to the board’s discretion. Combining these results, more than seven out of ten of the investor respondents favored votes on share issuances while less than half of them called for votes on buybacks.

Among non-investor respondents, a significant majority (61 percent) supported the view that both share issuances and buybacks are matters for the board to decide.

As a follow-up question, respondents were asked to provide their views specifically on share issuance and buyback proposals at U.S.-listed, but non-U.S.-incorporated companies.

Investors’ responses were split. More than one-third (36 percent) of the investors agreed that since the proposals are on the ballot due to the laws of the market of incorporation, the company should follow the customary practices of that market. At the other end of the spectrum, 26 percent of the respondents indicated that as long as the company follows customary U.S. capital market practices, the proposal should be treated as routine, so as not to disadvantage a cross-market firm vis-à-vis its US-domiciled peers. One-quarter of the investors supported a hybrid approach that is less restrictive than many European markets’ best practices but that protects shareholders from excessive dilution in situations not covered by NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules.

On the other hand, a majority of the non-investor respondents (55 percent) supported the view that as long as the company follows customary U.S. capital market practices, the proposal should be treated as routine, so as not to disadvantage a cross-market firm vis-à-vis its U.S.-domiciled peers.

Virtual/Hybrid Meetings

In the U.S., UK and some other markets worldwide, companies are permitted to use electronic means of communication to facilitate the participation of shareholders at general meetings. While there are benefits to allowing shareholders to participate remotely, some investors have raised concerns that replacing physical meetings with virtual-only meetings may hinder meaningful exchanges between board members and shareholders.

Survey respondents were asked to provide their view on the use of remote means of communication for facilitating shareholder participation at general meetings, i.e., “hybrid” or “virtual-only” shareholder meetings.

About one out of every five (19 percent) of the investors said that they would generally consider the practice of holding either “virtual-only” or “hybrid” shareholder meetings to be acceptable, without reservation. At the opposite extreme, 8 percent of the investors did not support either “hybrid” or “virtual-only” meetings. More than one-third (36 percent) of the investor respondents indicated that they generally consider the practice of holding “hybrid” shareholder meetings to be acceptable, but not “virtual-only” shareholder meetings. Another 32 percent of the investor respondents indicated that the practice of holding “hybrid” shareholder meetings is acceptable, and that they would also be comfortable with “virtual-only” shareholder meetings if they provided the same shareholder rights as a physical meeting.

Among non-investor respondents, a plurality (42 percent) indicated that “virtual-only” or “hybrid” shareholder meetings are acceptable without reservation. However, among the majority of non-investor respondents who did not support that view, 22 percent indicated that, generally, the practice of holding “hybrid” meetings is acceptable, and they would also be comfortable with “virtual-only” meetings if they provided the same shareholder rights as a physical meeting, while 15 percent did not support the practice of holding either “hybrid” or “virtual” meetings.

Pay Ratio Between Senior Executives and Employees

Barring some last minute legislative roadblock, U.S. issuers will be required to disclose the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of the median company employee in their proxy statements for the 2018 season. Similar pay ratio information will also be required of UK companies from 2018. In anticipation of these new disclosures, ISS asked respondents how they intend to analyze data on pay ratios.

Somewhat surprisingly, only 16 percent indicated that they are not planning to make use of this new information. Nearly three-quarters of the investor respondents indicated that they intend to either compare the ratios across companies/industry sectors, or assess year-on-year changes in the ratio at an individual company or use both of these methodologies. Of the 12 percent of investors who selected “other” as their response, some of them indicated a wait-and-see approach while other comments indicated uncertainty or concerns regarding the usefulness of the pay ratio data.

Among non-investor respondents, a plurality (44 percent) expressed doubt about the usefulness of such pay ratio data. Many of them expressed skepticism that the data would be meaningful, with one non-investor respondent commenting: “For a company having a widespread international exposure, the pay ratio is considered irrelevant.” Other commenters cited a variety of factors that would complicate peer comparisons, including demographic and geographic disparities and the use of part-time or contract workers. Notably, however, 21 percent of the non-investor respondents indicated that they intend both to compare the ratios across companies/industry sectors and assess year-on-year changes in the ratio at an individual company.

Respondents were also asked how shareholders should use disclosed data on pay ratios. Among investor respondents, the most frequent response was to use it as one data point in determining votes on compensation-related resolutions, followed by using it as background material for engagement with the company. Among non-investor respondents, the most frequent response was that the information as disclosed will not be meaningful to shareholders.

Appendix: Detailed Survey Responses

Survey results are based on 129 investor responses (primarily asset managers and asset owners) and 469 responses from non-investors (primarily companies and their advisers), reflecting more than one response from some organizations.

For questions that allowed multiple answers, rankings are based on the number of responses for each answer choice. Percentages for other questions may not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

1. One-Share, One-Vote Principle

The “one-share, one-vote principle”—the idea that long-term shareholder value is best protected by a capital structure in which voting power corresponds to each shareholder’s ownership stake and at-risk capital commitment—is increasingly under attack as some companies have sought to access public capital markets while insulating themselves and their management teams from perceived short-term pressures through differential voting rights. The recent IPO of Snap Inc. in the U.S. pushed the envelope by offering shares to the public with no voting rights at all. A number of other companies, such as Alphabet, Facebook and Blue Apron, utilize capital structures where public shareholders may only purchase low or zero voting rights shares. As stock markets increasingly find themselves in global competition for high-profile listings (e.g. Alibaba Group Holding, Saudi Aramco), they may feel pressure to relax or eliminate long-standing rules designed to protect investors. Short-term demand for a “hot” stock can potentially make it appear as if shareholders, as a group, do not place a high priority on voting rights. Some investors who purchase shares in an IPO may not prioritize good corporate governance and shareholder rights if they do not plan to hold their shares for the long term. Meanwhile, long-term shareholders who may normally prioritize good governance may nevertheless be forced to buy shares of companies with substandard shareholder rights as soon as those firms are included in a major stock index.

Which of the following represents your organization’s view of multi-class capital structures with unequal voting rights?

Investor Non-Investor
Companies should be allowed to choose whatever capital structure they see fit. 5% 50%
They are never appropriate for a public company in any circumstances. 43% 11%
They may be appropriate for certain newly-public companies, but should be subject to an automatic sunset provision based on time elapsed since the IPO. 18% 9%
They may be appropriate for certain newly-public companies, but should be subject to an automatic sunset provision based on the market capitalization of the company. 7% 5%
They may be appropriate for certain public companies, but should be subject to periodic reapproval by the holders of the low-vote shares. 18% 13%
Other 9% 12%

2. Gender Diversity on Boards

The focus on gender diversity in corporate boardrooms has increased in numerous markets in recent years. Many of these markets have implemented enhanced disclosure requirements, best practice recommendations or regulatory quotas to drive increased female representation on public company boards. Despite this heightened attention, there have been varying levels of progress amongst companies in increasing the number of female directors on boards and some institutional investors continue to express frustration with a perceived lack of progress in boosting gender diversity in certain markets or industry sectors.

Does your organization consider it to be problematic if there are zero female directors on a public company board?

Investor Non-Investor
Yes, the absence of at least one female director may indicate problems in the board recruitment process. 43% 25%
Yes, but concerns may be mitigated if there is a disclosed policy/approach that describes the considerations taken into account by the board or the nominating committee to increase gender diversity on the board. 26% 29%
No, directors are best-suited to determining the composition of the board. 8% 19%
Maybe, but the level of concern is based on a case-by-case determination (e.g., it depends on the country; type of company; industry sector or other factors) (Please specify below) 23% 27%

If your organization answered “Yes” or “Maybe” to the preceding question, what actions do you consider may be appropriate for shareholders to take at a company that lacks any gender diversity on the board, and/or has not disclosed a policy on the issue? (Check all that apply)

Investors’ Rank Non-Investors’ Rank
Engage with the board and/or management 1 (92) 1 (312)
Consider supporting a shareholder proposal aimed at increasing diversity 2 (83) 2 (82)
Consider supporting a shareholder-nominated candidate to the board 3 (60) 5 (39)
Consider voting against all members of the nominating/governance committee 5 (45) 4 (46)
Consider voting against the chair of the nominating/governance committee 4 (53) 3 (50)
Consider voting against the chair of the board or lead director 6 (42) 6 (35)
Consider voting against the Report & Accounts (in markets where this is an option) reflecting poor disclosure of gender diversity 7 (18) 8 (4)
Other 8 (3) 7 (21)

*Rankings are based on number of responses for each answer choice.

3. Share Issuance and Buyback Proposals

Rules regarding shareholder approval of share issuances and buybacks vary by market. US listing rules do not require shareholder approval for share repurchases, and only require shareholder approval for share issuances in excess of 20 percent of issued capital where such issuances are private placements at a price below book value or market value, or where the issuances will result in a change of control or are in connection with an acquisition. Any other share issuances, up to the number of shares authorized in the charter, do not require a shareholder vote. By contrast, many European markets in principle require shareholder approval of all share issuances and share buybacks, but allow companies to seek approval for annual mandates covering share issuances during the coming year, up to a specified percentage of issued capital, or share buybacks during the coming year.

These differing approaches to shareholder approval of share issuances and buybacks create challenges at cross-market companies. US-listed companies incorporated in markets such as the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands may, for example, be required by the laws of their country of legal domicile to seek shareholder approval for share issuances or share repurchases that would not otherwise be required under the rules of their stock market listing. In such a situation, ISS currently evaluates such proposals under the policy of the country of incorporation. However, such policies are generally aligned with local listing rules or codes of best practice, which may not strictly apply to companies not listed in those markets. Also under consideration however is that companies that are incorporated in markets requiring shareholder votes on issuances and repurchases often have a relatively large number of authorized but unissued shares, compared to their US-domiciled counterparts, and therefore the potential for dilution is correspondingly greater. Moreover, regulations and best practice codes, particularly in the UK and Ireland, distinguish between share issuances with and without preemptive rights, while preemptive rights have all but disappeared from the US market.

In light of these issues, ISS is currently reviewing its policies applicable to share issuances and buybacks at such cross-market companies.

As a general matter, which of the following best matches your organization’s views?

Investor Non-Investor
Share issuances and buybacks are matters for the board of directors to decide 13% 61%
Share issuances and buybacks should generally be voted upon by shareholders 44% 8%
Share issuances should be voted upon by shareholders, but share buybacks should be left to the board’s discretion 27% 14%
It depends on the market 13% 9%
Other 4% 9%

Which of the following best describes your organization’s view of share issuance and buyback proposals at US-listed, but non-US-incorporated companies?

Investor Non-Investor
As long as the company follows customary US capital market practices, the proposal should be treated as routine, so as not to disadvantage a cross-market firm vis-à-vis its US-domiciled peers. 26% 55%
As the proposals are on the ballot due to the laws of the market of incorporation, the company should follow the customary practices of that market. 36% 18%
A hybrid approach is called for, to protect shareholders from excessive dilution in situations not covered by NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules, while being less restrictive than European best practices. 25% 11%
Other (please specify) 14% 16%

4. Virtual/Hybrid Meetings

In the US, UK and some other markets worldwide, companies are permitted to use electronic means of communication to facilitate the participation of shareholders at general meetings. In some cases, companies may employ technological means to allow such participation as a supplement to the physical meeting (these are known as “hybrid meetings”), while in other cases the “virtual shareholder meeting” entirely supplants the physical meeting. In the UK, a number of companies have sought or are seeking shareholder approval to amend their articles of association in order to be able to hold hybrid or virtual-only shareholder meetings. In the US, companies have generally made the switch to a hybrid or virtual-only meeting without a shareholder vote, following changes in state laws on the matter.

Currently, the practice of holding virtual shareholder meetings is rare in the UK: only one company held a virtual meeting in 2016 and 2017. In the US, the practice is more widespread: over 160 companies held virtual-only meetings in the first half of 2017, and an additional 16 companies held hybrid meetings. Allowing shareholders to take part remotely can increase participation, and eliminating the physical meeting can reduce costs. However, some investors have raised concerns about the trend toward abandoning physical meetings, arguing that virtual-only meetings may hinder meaningful exchanges between management and shareholders, or allow management to avoid uncomfortable questions.

Please describe your organization’s view on the use of remote means of communication for facilitating shareholder participation at general meetings, i.e., “hybrid” or “virtual-only” shareholder meetings.

Investor Non-Investor
My organization generally considers the practice of holding “virtual-only” or “hybrid” shareholder meetings to be acceptable. 19% 42%
My organization generally considers the practice of holding “hybrid” shareholder meetings to be acceptable, but not “virtual-only” shareholder meetings. 36% 22%
My organization generally considers the practice of holding “hybrid” shareholder meetings to be acceptable, and would also be comfortable with “virtual-only” shareholder meetings if they provided the same shareholder rights as a physical meeting. 32% 22%
My organization does not support the practice of holding “hybrid” or “virtual” shareholder meetings. 8% 15%
Other 5% 12%

5. Pay Ratio Between Senior Executives and Employees

Beginning in 2018 (unless the rule is repealed prior to implementation), U.S. issuers will be required to report in their proxy statement the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of the median company employee. Similar rules have been proposed in the UK, where companies are already required to compare the year-on-year percentage change in compensation between the CEO and other employees (though long-term incentives are excluded). The EU Shareholder Rights Directive, which member states will have to incorporate into their local laws by 2019, requires disclosure of the annual change in each executive’s pay over five years, along with company performance and the change in average employee pay.

How does your organization intend to analyze data on pay ratios?

Investor Non-Investor
Compare the ratios across companies/industry sectors 6% 12%
Assess year-on-year changes in the ratio at an individual company 3% 8%
Both of the above 63% 21%
My organization is not planning to use this information 16% 44%
Other 12% 16%

In your organization’s view, how should shareholders use disclosed data on pay ratios? (Check all that apply)

Investors’ Rank Non-Investors’ Rank
As one data point in determining votes on compensation-related resolutions 1 (81) 3 (86)
As one data point in determining votes on directors 3 (49) 4 (29)
As background material for engagement with the company 2 (71) 2 (97)
As a risk factor to be weighed in making investment decisions 4 (46) 5 (28)
The information as disclosed will not be meaningful to shareholders 5 (16) 1 (248)
Other 6 (11) 4 (29)

*Rankings are based on number of responses for each answer choice.

 

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 5 octobre 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 5 octobre 2017.

Cette semaine, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

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  1. Long-Term Pay-For-Performance Alignment
  2. Activism and Board Diversity
  3. SEC (Limited) Guidance on Pay-Ratio Disclosure
  4. Corporate Governance: Stakeholders
  5. Finding Common Ground on Shareholder Proposals
  6. Improving SEC Regulations with Investor Ordering
  7. The Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Incentives
  8. CEO and Executive Compensation Practices: 2017 Edition
  9. Lessons from the ISS Report on the Trian/P&G Proxy Contest
  10. The Inner Workings of the Board: Evidence from Emerging Markets

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 28 septembre 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 28 septembre 2017.

Cette semaine, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

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  1. Forging Ahead with “Entire Fairness,” or Playing it Safer (Procedurally Speaking)
  2. Activism: The State of Play
  3. New Disclosure Requirements in Form ADV
  4. Merger Negotiations in the Shadow of Judicial Appraisal
  5. SEC’s Latest Guidance on Pay Ratio Rule
  6. Enjoying the Quiet Life: Corporate Decision-Making by Entrenched Managers
  7. Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
  8. CEOs and ISS’ Proxy Contest Framework
  9. The Evolution of the Private Equity Market and the Decline in IPOs
  10. Activism’s New Paradigm

L’activisme et les effets sur la diversité des CA


Comment se font les nominations d’administrateurs lorsqu’un fond activiste du type « hedge funds » intervient lors des élections aux assemblées générales annuelles ?

La recherche menée par David A. Katz* et Laura A. McIntosh*, de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, montrent clairement que les fonds activistes agressifs (hedge funds) proposent des candidats qui ne contribuent pas à la diversité du CA (en genre et en race) si l’on compare à la moyenne des entreprises du S&P 500.

Ainsi, durant la période 2011-2015, les femmes ne représentaient que 5 % des candidats nommés à des conseils par les hedge funds, comparativement à la nomination de 26 % de femmes aux CA des entreprises du S&P 500.

De plus, si l’on considère les entreprises ciblées par les hedge funds durant la même période, on constate que les CA 100 % masculins ont augmenté significativement, passant de 13 % à 17 %. Pour les autres entreprises du S&P 500, la proportion de CA 100 % masculin a considérablement diminué.

An August 2017 study investigated the reasons that hedge fund activists seemingly ignore the evidence for gender-diverse boards in their choices for director nominees and disproportionately target female chief executive officers. The authors suggest that hedge funds may be subconsciously biased against women leaders due to perceptions, cultural attitudes, and beliefs about the attributes of leaders in our society. Activists may tend to view female CEOs as weaker and may be more willing to second-guess and criticize the corporate strategic plans put forth by women leaders. Indeed, one academic study found that the persistent mention of a female CEO in media coverage leads to a 96 percent probability that her company will be targeted by activists.

L’article montre également que, contrairement aux fonds activistes agressifs, les investisseurs institutionnels et les gestionnaires d’actifs font une promotion sans précédent de la diversité des membres de CA. Plusieurs fonds de gestion d’actifs, tels que BlackRock, State Street Global Advisors et Vanguard, font un engagement public envers la promotion de la diversité sur les CA.

Les auteurs concluent à l’efficacité des actions de promotion de la diversité des CA dans la gouvernance des entreprises. Voici un résumé des conclusions en ce sens :

The concerted efforts of some of the largest and most influential investors and asset managers toward increasing board diversity are likely to be effective. Their support for shareholder proposals, their ongoing engagement with companies, and their consistent public advocacy for independent and diverse boards are powerful factors that will change the corporate governance landscape. Meanwhile, the advantages of diverse boards are becoming more widely understood and have been demonstrated through convincing evidence, making the business case for board diversity stronger than ever.

Enfin, il n’est pas superflu de rappeler la plus-value de la diversité comme le font les auteurs de l’entreprise Directorpoint dans leur billet The Benefits of Diversity in the Boardroom :

  1. A diverse boardroom provides a diversity of thought;
  2. A diverse boardroom helps address complex, corporate issues;
  3. A diverse boardroom is more representative of shareholders;
  4. A diverse boardroom increases revenues.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Activism and Board Diversity

 

 

Activism at public companies can reduce board diversity, or it can increase it, depending on the circumstances. In recent years, activist hedge funds have installed dissident nominees who collectively have trailed the S&P 1500 index significantly in terms of gender and racial diversity. In contrast, institutional shareholders and asset managers are promoting board diversity to an unprecedented extent, with concerted public efforts already producing results. Several institutional investor initiatives, announced earlier this year, and the New York Comptroller’s Boardroom Accountability Project 2.0, announced earlier this month, may be game-changing initiatives on the path to greater board diversity.

 

Hedge Fund Activism

 

Since the early 2000s, a number of studies have demonstrated that companies with women on their boards consistently experience a wide range of benefits, including higher average returns on equity, higher net income growth, lower stock volatility, and higher returns on invested capital. Whether because of improved group dynamics, a shift in risk management, increased ability to consider alternatives to current strategies, or a focus on governance generally, board gender diversity produces stronger boards. While the argument for gender diversity may have begun from notions of equality, experience has shown a compelling financial rationale.

With the evidence for board diversity very much in the public domain, the behavior of hedge fund activists seeking board representation has been somewhat puzzling. Hedge fund activism has been notably counterproductive in terms of gender diversity on public boards. A 2016 Bloomberg analysis of the years 2011 through 2015 found that women represented only five percent of the candidates successfully placed on boards by activist funds, a significant finding during a period in which women represented about 19 percent of S&P 500 directors and in which female candidates were nominated to fill 26 percent of open seats at S&P 500 companies. At companies targeted by hedge funds during the same years, the proportion of all-male boards increased from 13 percent to 17 percent, while in the S&P 1500 that proportion significantly declined.

An August 2017 study investigated the reasons that hedge fund activists seemingly ignore the evidence for gender-diverse boards in their choices for director nominees and disproportionately target female chief executive officers. The authors suggest that hedge funds may be subconsciously biased against women leaders due to perceptions, cultural attitudes, and beliefs about the attributes of leaders in our society. Activists may tend to view female CEOs as weaker and may be more willing to second-guess and criticize the corporate strategic plans put forth by women leaders. Indeed, one academic study found that the persistent mention of a female CEO in media coverage leads to a 96 percent probability that her company will be targeted by activists.

 

Boardroom Accountability 2.0

 

In marked contrast to hedge fund activists, significant institutional investors and asset managers are engaging in deliberate, proactive, and effective campaigns for increased diversity on public company boards. BlackRock, State Street Global Advisors, and Vanguard all have taken public steps this year to promote and advocate for greater board diversity. For example, State Street Global Advisors’ “preferred approach is to drive greater board diversity through an active dialogue and engagement with company and board leadership.” Using the carrot and stick approach, State Street notes that “[i]n the event that companies fail to take action to increase the number of women on their boards, despite our best efforts to actively engage with them, [State Street] will use [its] proxy voting power to effect change—voting against the Chair of the board’s nominating and/or governance committee if necessary.” BlackRock has noted that “over the coming year, we will engage companies to better understand their progress on improving gender balance in the boardroom.” Vanguard, in an open letter, noted that one of the four pillars it will use to evaluate a public company’s corporate governance is whether there is “[a] high-functioning, well-composed, independent, diverse, and experienced board with effective ongoing evaluation practices.”

Earlier this month, the New York City Comptroller and the New York City Pension Funds announced the “Boardroom Accountability Project 2.0,” a three-pronged initiative focusing on board diversity, director independence, and climate expertise. With regard to board diversity, the project calls for the boards of 151 U.S. companies to release “board matrix” disclosure indicating the race, gender, and skill sets of their board members, on the theory that standardized disclosure will increase transparency, accountability, and incentives for diversification. The project aims to combat a “persistent lack of diversity” on public company boards by encouraging boards to seek director candidates more broadly. The New York City Comptroller recently sent letters to the targeted companies asking them to provide the requested information.

The new project could well be successful as the NYC Comptroller’s original Boardroom Accountability Project. The goal of the original project was to make proxy access a standard feature of corporate governance. Since the 2014 launch of the initial project, proxy access has indeed become widespread, with over 400 U.S. companies (and over 60 percent of the S&P 500) having adopted some form of proxy access. Boardroom Accountability 2.0 is the sequel, in that nearly all of the targeted companies recently adopted proxy access, and the current project aims to empower shareholders to use this tool more effectively with the information contained in the proposed standardized matrix disclosure.

Even if companies choose not to directly respond to the information requested by the NYC Comptroller, the combination of the Boardroom Accountability Project 2.0 and institutional investors’ focus on the issue of diversity is likely to push public companies to reassess their approaches to board diversity generally and gender diversity specifically. We are already seeing changes in the way boards of directors are approaching director succession in response to these pressures. Public companies should consider using the opportunity presented by the Boardroom Accountability Project 2.0 to communicate their approaches to board diversity generally, and gender diversity specifically, to their larger institutional investors and engage in a dialogue that will present their approach in the best possible light.

The concerted efforts of some of the largest and most influential investors and asset managers toward increasing board diversity are likely to be effective. Their support for shareholder proposals, their ongoing engagement with companies, and their consistent public advocacy for independent and diverse boards are powerful factors that will change the corporate governance landscape. Meanwhile, the advantages of diverse boards are becoming more widely understood and have been demonstrated through convincing evidence, making the business case for board diversity stronger than ever.


*David A. Katz is partner and Laura A. McIntosh is consulting attorney at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton publication by Mr. Katz and Ms. McIntosh which originally appeared in the New York Law Journal.

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 21 septembre 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 21 septembre 2017.

Cette semaine, j’ai relevé les dix principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

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  1. Equifax Data Breach: Preliminary Lessons for the Adoption and Implementation of Insider Trading Policies
  2. Better Directors or Distracted Directors? An International Analysis of Busy Boards
  3. Making Sure Your “Choice-of-Law” Clause Chooses All of the Laws of the Chosen Jurisdiction
  4. Investment Stewardship 2017 Annual Report
  5. Is There Hope for Change? The Evolution of Conceptions of “Good” Corporate Governance
  6. NYC Pension Funds Boardroom Accountability Project Version 2.0
  7. Reforms to UK Corporate Governance
  8. Sharing the Lead: Examining the Causes and Consequences of Lead Independent Director Appointment
  9. Vanguard’s Investor Stewardship
  10. Delaware Blockchain Initiative: Revitalizing European Companies’ Funding Efforts

Lettre ouverte du président des Fonds Vanguard à l’ensemble des administrateurs de compagnies publiques


F. William McNabb III is Chairman and CEO of Vanguard; Glenn Booraem is the head of Investment Stewardship and a principal at Vanguard. This post is based on an excerpt from a recent Vanguard publication by Mr. Booraem, and an open letter to directors of public companies worldwide by Mr. McNabb.

 

Cinq questions destinées au nouveau président de Vanguard

Investment Stewardship 2017 Annual Report

 

An open letter to directors of public companies worldwide

Thank you for your role in overseeing the Vanguard funds’ sizable investment in your company. We depend on you to represent our funds’ ownership interests on behalf of our more than 20 million investors worldwide. Our investors depend on Vanguard to be a responsible steward of their assets, and we promote principles of corporate governance that we believe will enhance the long-term value of their investments.

At Vanguard, a long-term perspective informs every aspect of our investment approach, from the way we manage our funds to the advice we give our investors. Our index funds are structurally long-term, holding their investments almost indefinitely. And our active equity managers—who invest nearly $500 billion on our clients’ behalf—are behaviorally long-term, with most holding their positions longer than peer averages. The typical dollar invested with Vanguard stays for more than ten years.

A long-term perspective also underpins our Investment Stewardship program. We believe that well-governed companies are more likely to perform well over the long run. To this end, we consider four pillars when we evaluate corporate governance practices:

  1. The board: A high-functioning, well-composed, independent, diverse, and experienced board with effective ongoing evaluation practices.
  2. Governance structures: Provisions and structures that empower shareholders and protect their rights.
  3. Appropriate compensation: Pay that incentivizes relative outperformance over the long term.
  4. Risk oversight: Effective, integrated, and ongoing oversight of relevant industry- and company-specific risks.

These pillars guide our proxy voting and engagement activity, and we hope that by sharing this framework with you, you’ll have a better perspective on our approach to stewardship.

I’d like to highlight a few key themes that are increasingly important in our stewardship efforts:

Good governance starts with a great board.

We believe that when a company has a great board of directors, good results are more likely to follow.

We view the board as one of a company’s most critical strategic assets. When the board contributes the right mix of skill, expertise, thought, tenure, and personal characteristics, sustainable economic value becomes much easier to achieve. A thoughtfully composed, diverse board more objectively oversees how management navigates challenges and opportunities critical to shareholders’ interests. And a company’s strategic needs for the future inform effectively planned evolution of the board.

Gender diversity is one element of board composition that we will continue to focus on over the coming years. We expect boards to focus on it as well, and their demonstration of meaningful progress over time will inform our engagement and voting going forward. There is compelling evidence that boards with a critical mass of women have outperformed those that are less diverse. Diverse boards also more effectively demonstrate governance best practices that we believe lead to long-term shareholder value. Our stance on this issue is therefore an economic imperative, not an ideological choice. This is among the reasons why we recently joined the 30% Club, a global organization that advocates for greater representation of women in boardrooms and leadership roles. The club’s mission to enhance opportunities for women from “schoolroom to boardroom” is one that we think bodes well for broadening the pipeline of great directors.

Directors are shareholders’ eyes and ears on risk.

Risk and opportunity shape every business. Shareholders rely on a strong board to oversee the strategy for realizing opportunities and mitigating risks. Thorough disclosure of relevant and material risks—a key board responsibility—enables share prices to fully reflect all significant known (and reasonably foreseeable) risks and opportunities. Given our extensive indexed investments, which rely on the price-setting mechanism of the market, that market efficiency is critical to Vanguard and our clients.

Climate risk is an example of a slowly developing and highly uncertain risk—the kind that tests the strength of a board’s oversight and risk governance. Our evolving position on climate risk (much like our stance on gender diversity) is based on the economic bottom line for Vanguard investors. As significant long-term owners of many companies in industries vulnerable to climate risk, Vanguard investors have substantial value at stake.

Although there is no one-size-fits-all approach, market solutions to climate risk and other evolving disclosure practices can be valuable when they reflect the shared priorities of issuers and investors. Our participation in the Investor Advisory Group to the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) reflects our belief that materiality-driven, sector-specific disclosures will better illuminate risks in a way that aids market efficiency and price discovery. We believe it is incumbent on all market participants—investors, boards, and management alike—to embrace the disclosure of sustainability risks that bear on a company’s long-term value creation prospects.

Engagement builds mutual understanding and a basis for progress.

Timely and substantive dialogue with companies is core to our investment stewardship approach. We see engagement as mutually beneficial: We convey Vanguard’s views and we hear companies’ perspectives, which adds context to our analysis.

Our funds’ votes on ballot measures—171,000 discrete items in the past year alone—are an outcome of this process, not the starting point. As we analyze ballot items, particularly controversial ones, we often invite direct and open-ended dialogue with the company. We seek management’s and the board’s perspectives on the issues at hand, and we evaluate them against our principles and leading practices. To understand the full picture, we often also engage with other investors, including activists and shareholder proponents. Our goal is that a fund’s ultimate voting decision does not come as a surprise. Our ability to make informed decisions depends on maintaining an ongoing exchange of ideas in a setting in which we can cover the intention and strategy behind the issues.

Yet our engagement activities are not solely focused on the ballot. Because our funds will hold most of their portfolio companies practically permanently, it’s important for us to build relationships with boards and management teams that transcend a transactional focus on any specific issue or vote. Engagement is a process, not an event, whose value only grows over time. A CEO we engaged with once said, “You can’t wait to build a relationship until you need it,” and that couldn’t be more true.

The opportunity to articulate our perspectives and understand a board’s thinking on a range of topics—anchored at the intersection of the firm’s strategy and its enabling governance practices—is a crucial part of our stewardship obligations. Although ballot items are reduced to a series of binary choices—yes or no, for or against—engagement beyond the ballot enables us to deal in nuance and in dialogue that drives meaningful progress over time.

There is a growing role for independent directors in engagement, both on issues over which they hold exclusive purview (such as CEO compensation and board composition/succession) and on deepening investors’ understanding of the alignment between a company’s strategy and governance practices. Our interest in engaging with directors is by no means intended to interfere with management’s ownership of the message on corporate strategy and performance. Rather, we believe it’s appropriate for directors to periodically hear directly from and be heard by the shareowners on whose behalf they serve.

* * *

Our focus on corporate governance and investment stewardship has been and will continue to be a deliberate manifestation of Vanguard’s core purpose: “To take a stand for all investors, to treat them fairly, and to give them the best chance for investment success.” Our four pillars and our increased focus on climate risk and gender diversity are not fleeting priorities for Vanguard. As essentially permanent owners of the companies you lead, we have a special obligation to be engaged stewards actively focused on the long term. Our Investment Stewardship team—available at InvestmentStewardship@vanguard.com—stands ready to engage with you and your leadership teams on matters of mutual importance to our respective stakeholders. Thank you for valuing our perspective and being our partner in stewardship.

Sincerely,

William McNabb III
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
The Vanguard Group, Inc.

* * *

Investment Stewardship 2017 Annual Report

Our values and beliefs

“To take a stand for all investors, to treat them fairly, and to give them the best chance for investment success.”

—Vanguard’s core purpose

Vanguard’s core values of focus, integrity, and stewardship are reflected every day in the way that we engage with our clients, our crew (what we call our employees), and our community. We view our Investment Stewardship program as a natural extension of these values and of Vanguard’s core purpose. Our clients depend on us to be good stewards of their assets, and we depend on corporate boards to prudently oversee the companies in which our funds invest. That is why we believe we have a unique mission to advocate for a world in which the actions and values of public companies and of investors are aligned to create value for Vanguard fund shareholders over the long term.

We believe well-governed companies will perform better over the long term.

Effective corporate governance is more than the collection of a company’s formal provisions and bylaws. A board of directors serves on behalf of all shareholders and is critical in establishing trust and transparency and ensuring the health of a company—and of the capital markets—over time. This board-centric view is the foundation of Vanguard’s approach to investment stewardship. It guides our discussions with company directors and management, as well as our voting of proxies on the funds’ behalf at shareholder meetings around the globe. Great governance starts with a board of directors that is capable of selecting the right management team, holding that team accountable through appropriate incentives, and overseeing relevant risks that are material to the business. We believe that effective corporate governance is an important ingredient for the long-term success of companies and their investors. And when portfolio companies perform well, so do our clients’ investments.

We value long-term progress over short-term gain.

Because our funds typically own the stock of companies for long periods (and, in the case of index funds, are structurally permanent holders of companies), our emphasis on investment outcomes over the long term is unwavering. That’s why we deliberately focus on enduring themes and topics that drive long-term value, rather than solely short-term results. We believe that companies and boards should similarly be focused on long-term shareholder value—both through the sustainability of their strategy and operations, and by managing the risks most material to their long-term success.

Our approach

Vanguard’s Investment Stewardship team comprises an experienced group of senior leaders and analysts who are responsible for representing Vanguard shareholders’ interests through industry advocacy, company engagement, and proxy voting on behalf of the Vanguard funds. The team also houses an internal research and communications function that is active in developing Vanguard’s views, policies, and ongoing approach to investment stewardship. Our data and technology group supports every aspect of our Investment Stewardship program.

We take a thoughtful and deliberate approach to investment stewardship.

Our team supports effective corporate governance practices in three ways:

Advocating for policies that we believe will enhance the sustainable, long-term value of our clients’ investments. We promote good corporate governance and responsible investment through thoughtful participation in industry events and discussions where we can expand our advocacy and enhance our understanding of investment issues.

Engaging with portfolio company executives and directors to share our corporate governance principles and learn about portfolio companies’ corporate governance practices. We characterize our approach as “quiet diplomacy focused on results”—providing constructive input that will, in our view, better position companies to deliver sustainable value over the long term for all investors.

Voting proxies at company shareholder meetings across each of our portfolios and around the globe. Because of our ongoing advocacy and engagement efforts, companies should be aware of our governance principles and positions by the time we cast our funds’ votes.

Our process is iterative and ongoing

Our four pillars

Board

Good governance begins with a great board of directors. Our primary interest is to ensure that the individuals who represent the interests of all shareholders are independent (both in mindset and freedom from conflicts), capable (across the range of relevant skills for the company and industry), and appropriately experienced (so as to bring valuable perspective to their roles). We also believe that diversity of thought, background, and experience, as well as of personal characteristics (such as gender, race, and age), meaningfully contributes to the board’s ability to serve as effective, engaged stewards of shareholders’ interests. If a company has a well-composed, high-functioning board, good results are more likely to follow.

Structure

We believe in the importance of governance structures that empower shareholders and ensure accountability of the board and management. We believe that shareholders should be able to hold directors accountable as needed through certain governance and bylaw provisions. Among these preferred provisions are that directors must stand for election by shareholders annually and must secure a majority of the votes in order to join or remain on the board. In instances where the board appears resistant to shareholder input, we also support the right of shareholders to call special meetings and to place director nominees on the company’s ballot.

Compensation

We believe that performance-linked compensation policies and practices are fundamental drivers of the sustainable, long-term value for a company’s investors. The board plays a central role in determining appropriate executive pay that incentivizes performance relative to peers and competitors. Providing effective disclosure of these practices, their alignment with company performance, and their outcomes is crucial to giving shareholders confidence in the link between incentives and rewards and the creation of value over the long term.

Risk

Boards are responsible for effective oversight and governance of the risks most relevant and material to each company in the context of its industry and region. We believe that boards should take a thorough, integrated, and thoughtful approach to identifying, understanding, quantifying, overseeing, and—where appropriate—disclosing risks that have the potential to affect shareholder value over the long term. Importantly, boards should communicate their approach to risk oversight to shareholders through their normal course of business.

By the numbers: Voting and engagement

Engagement and voting trends

2015 proxy season 2016 proxy season  2017 proxy season
Company engagements 685 817 954
Companies voted 10,560 11,564 12,974
Meetings voted 12,785 16,740 18,905
Proposals voted 124,230 157,506 171,385
Countries voted in* 70 70 68

* The number of countries can vary each year. In certain markets, some companies do not hold shareholder meetings annually.
Note: The annual proxy season is from July 1 to June 30.

Our voting

Proxy voting reflects our governance pillars worldwide.

Meetings voted by region

Note: Data pertains to voting activity from July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2017

Global voting activity

* Includes more than 26,000 proposals related to capitalization; 8,000 proposals related to mergers and acquisitions; 16,000 routine business proposals; and 1,000 other shareholder proposals.
Note: Data pertains to voting activity from July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2017.

Our engagement

We engage with companies of all sizes.

Market Capitalization % of 2017 proxy season engagements
Under $1 billion 19%
$1 billion–under $10 billion 44%
$10 billion–under $50 billion 24%
$50 billion and over 13%

Our engagement with portfolio companies has grown significantly over time.

Number of engagements and assets represented

Note: Dollar figures represent the market value of Vanguard fund investments in companies with which we engaged as of June 30, 2017.

We engage on a range of topics aligned with our four pillars

Frequency of topics discussed during Vanguard engagements (%)

Note: Figures do not total 100%, as individual engagements often span multiple topics.

Boards in focus: Vanguard’s view on gender diversity

One of our most fundamental governance beliefs is that good governance begins with a great board of directors. We believe that diversity among directors—along dimensions such as gender, experience, race, background, age, and tenure—can strengthen a board’s range of perspectives and its capacity to make complex, fully considered decisions.

While we have long discussed board composition and diversity with portfolio companies, gender diversity has emerged as one dimension on which there is compelling support for positive effects on shareholder value. In recent years, a growing body of research has demonstrated that greater gender diversity on boards can lead to better company performance and governance.

Companies should be prepared to discuss—in both their public disclosures and their engagement with investors—their plans to incorporate appropriate diversity over time in their board composition. While we believe that board evolution is a process, not an event, the demonstration of meaningful progress over time will inform our engagement and voting going forward.

Boards in focus: Gender diversity

Engagement case studies

Gender diversity on boards was an important topic of engagement for us during the 12 months ended June 30, 2017. Below are summary examples of discussions we had on the subject.

High-impact engagement on gender diversity

Over several interactions with a U.S. industrial company, our team shared Vanguard’s perspective on board composition and evaluation. The company had undergone recent leadership transitions and was open to amending elements of its governance structure to align with best practices. We expressed particular support for meaningful gender diversity and expressed concern that the board previously had only one female director in its recent history.

Right after this year’s annual general meeting, the company announced it was adding four new directors with diverse experience, including two women. This outcome is the best-case scenario: The board welcomed shareholder input, we shared our view on best corporate governance practices, and the board ultimately incorporated our perspective into its board evolution process.

A denial of diversity’s value

A Canadian materials company that had consistently underperformed was governed by an entrenched, all-male board with seemingly nominal independence from the CEO. A 2017 shareholder resolution asked the company to adopt and publish a policy governing gender diversity on the board. Before voting, Vanguard engaged with the company to learn about its board evolution process, including its perspective on gender diversity. The engagement revealed that the company understood neither the value of gender diversity nor the importance of being responsive to shareholders’ concerns. Despite verbally endorsing gender diversity, the company resisted specifying a strategy or making a commitment to achieve it. The board, when seeking new members, relied solely on recommendations from current directors, a practice that can entrench the current board’s perspective and limit diversity. Our funds voted in support of the shareholder resolution, and we will continue to engage and hold the board accountable for meaningful progress over time.

Mixed results from an ongoing engagement

A U.S. consumer discretionary company had no women on its board, a problem magnified by its medium-term underperformance relative to peers, a classified board structure, and a lengthy average director tenure. We engaged with management twice between the 2016 and 2017 annual meetings to share our perspective on the importance of gender diversity and recommend that they make it a priority for future board evolution and director searches.

In its 2017 proxy, the company described board diversity as critical to the firm’s sustainable value and named gender as an element of diversity to be considered during the director search and nomination process. The company has since added a non-independent woman to the board. Although this move is directionally correct, it does not fully address our concerns; we will continue to encourage the company to add gender diversity to its ranks of independent directors.

Risk in focus: Vanguard’s view on climate risk

As the steward of long-term shareholder value for more than 20 million investors, Vanguard closely monitors how our portfolio companies identify, manage, and mitigate risks—including climate risk. Our approach to climate risk is evolving as the world’s and business community’s understanding of the topic matures.

This year, for the first time, our funds supported a number of climate-related shareholder resolutions opposed by company management. We are also discussing climate risk with company management and boards more than ever before. Our Investment Stewardship team is committed to engaging with a range of stakeholders to inform our perspective on these issues, and to share our thinking with the market, our portfolio companies, and our investors.

Risk in focus: Climate risk

A Q&A with Glenn Booraem, Vanguard’s Investment Stewardship Officer

Vanguard is an investment management company. Why should Vanguard fund investors be concerned about climate risk?

Mr. Booraem: Climate risk has the potential to be a significant long-term risk for companies in many industries. As stewards of our clients’ long-term investments, we must be finely attuned to this risk. We acknowledge that our clients’ views on climate risk span the ideological spectrum. But our position on climate risk is anchored in long-term economic value—not ideology. Regardless of one’s perspective on climate, there’s no doubt that changes in global regulation, energy consumption, and consumer preferences will have a significant economic impact on companies, particularly in the energy, industrial, and utilities sectors.

Why the shift in Vanguard’s assessment of climate risk, and why now?

Mr. Booraem: We’ve been discussing climate risk with portfolio companies for several years. It has been, and will remain, one of our engagement priorities for the foreseeable future. This past year, we engaged with more companies on this issue than ever before, and for the first time our funds supported two climate-related shareholder resolutions in cases where we believed that companies’ disclosure practices weren’t on par with emerging expectations in the market. As with other issues, our point of view has evolved as the topic has matured and, importantly, as its link to shareholder value has become more clear.

What is your top concern when you learn that a company in which a Vanguard portfolio invests does not have a rigorous strategy to evaluate and mitigate climate risk?

Mr. Booraem: Our concern is fundamentally that in the absence of clear disclosure and informed board oversight, the market lacks insight into the material risks of investing in that firm. It’s of paramount importance to us that the market is able to reflect risk and opportunity in stock prices, particularly for our index funds, which don’t get to select the stocks they own. When we’re not confident that companies have an appropriate level of board oversight or disclosure, we’re concerned that the market may not accurately reflect the value of the investment. Because we represent primarily long-term investors, this bias is particularly problematic when underweighting long-term risks inflates a company’s value.

Now that Vanguard has articulated a clear stance on climate risk, what can portfolio companies expect?

Mr. Booraem: First, companies should expect that we’re going to focus on their public disclosures, both about the risk itself and about their board’s and management’s oversight of that risk. Thorough disclosure is the foundation for the market’s understanding of the issue. Second, companies should expect that we’ll evaluate their disclosures in the context of both their leading peers and evolving market standards, such as those articulated by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB). Third, they should expect that we’ll listen to their perspective on these and other matters. And finally, they should see our funds’ proxy voting as an extension of our engagement. When we consider a shareholder resolution on climate risk, we give companies a fair hearing on the merits of the proposal and consider their past commitments and the strength of their governance structure.

Engagement case studies

In the 12 months ended June 30, 2017, the topic of climate risk disclosure grew in frequency and prominence in our engagements with companies, particularly those in the energy, industrial, and utilities sectors, where climate risk was addressed in nearly every conversation we had. Below are examples of our engagements on climate risk.

Two companies’ commitments to enhanced disclosure

Our team led similar engagements with two U.S. energy companies facing shareholder resolutions on climate risk. One resolution requested that the first company publish an annual report on climate risk impacts and strategy. At the second company, a resolution requested disclosure of the company’s strategy and targets for transitioning to a low- carbon economy. In both cases, when we engaged with the companies, their management teams committed to improving their climate risk disclosure. Given the companies’ demonstrated responsiveness to shareholder feedback and commitment to improving, our funds did not support either shareholder proposal. Our team will continue to track and evaluate the companies’ progress toward their commitments as we consider our votes in future years.

A vote against a risk and governance outlier For years we engaged with a U.S. energy company that lagged its peers on climate risk disclosure and board accessibility. This year, a shareholder proposal requesting that the company produce a climate risk assessment report demonstrated a compelling link between the requested disclosures and long-term shareholder value. Because the board serves on behalf of shareholders and plays a critical role in risk oversight, we believed it was appropriate to seek a direct dialogue with independent directors about climate risk. Management resisted connecting the independent directors with shareholders, making the company a significant industry outlier in good governance practice. Without the confidence that the board understood or represented our view that climate risk poses a material risk in the energy sector, our team viewed the climate risk and governance issues as intertwined. Ultimately, our funds voted for the shareholder proposal and withheld votes on relevant independent directors for failing to engage with shareholders.

A vote for greater climate risk disclosure

A shareholder proposal at a U.S. energy company asked for an annual report with climate risk disclosure, including scenario planning. Through extensive research and engagements with the company’s management, its independent directors, and other industry stakeholders, our team identified governance shortfalls and a clear connection to long-term shareholder value. The company lagged its peers in disclosure, risk planning, and board oversight and responsiveness to shareholder concerns. Crucially, although the company’s public filings identified climate risk as a material issue, it failed to articulate plans for mitigation or adaptation. A similar proposal last year garnered significant support, but the company made no meaningful changes in response. Engagement had limited effect, so our funds voted for the shareholder proposal.

* * *

This post was excerpted from a Vanguard report; the complete publication is available here.

Multiples mandats d’administrateurs sur des CA | Bénéfique ou inefficace ?


Est-ce que le fait qu’un administrateur siège à de multiples conseils le rend plus efficace dans ses fonctions de fiduciaire ? Y a-t-il une courbe d’apprentissage bénéfique pour les entreprises en question ?

Ou, est-ce que le fait de siéger à plusieurs conseils rend l’administrateur trop distrait, donc moins attentif et moins présent ?

Vous ne serez pas surpris d’apprendre que cela dépend des circonstances ! Cependant, le monde de la gouvernance (experts, firmes-conseils en votation, chercheurs) semble croire qu’il y a une limite maximale au nombre de conseils auxquels un administrateur peut contribuer positivement.

Pour Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), le maximum devrait être de cinq conseils. Ainsi, selon l’étude de Stephen P. Ferris et al*, le nombre de conseils auxquels les administrateurs des entreprises américaines siègent a diminué significativement, passant de cinq à trois sur une courte période. Ce nombre est en constante diminution depuis 10 ans.

L’auteur a entrepris une recherche à l’échelle internationale afin d’étudier les facteurs qui influencent l’efficacité des administrateurs eu égard au nombre de mandats multiples.

Les résultats montrent que le cumul des CA est un phénomène global. En effet, 70 % des entreprises échantillonnées ont des « busy boards ». Voici les quatre questions de recherche :

Examining the board appointments of a large set of international firms, in our recent paper, we develop four hypotheses regarding the nature of international boards and director busyness. First, we test whether busy boards are a global phenomenon. Second, we investigate the extent to which national cultures might explain the distribution of busy boards across countries. Related to this hypothesis, we examine more thoroughly the effect of existing corporate affiliations or desirable personal characteristics on gaining additional board seats. Our last hypothesis focuses on the extent to which busy directors affect firm value and whether their usefulness is conditional upon firm age.

Cet article ouvre une fenêtre sur les raisons susceptibles d’expliquer le comportement des administrateurs qui siègent à plusieurs conseils.

Bonne lecture !

 

Better Directors or Distracted Directors? An International Analysis of Busy Boards

 

 

 

The issue of multiple directorships on corporate boards has come under increasing scrutiny from both academicians and practitioners. There is conflicting evidence in the academic literature about the impact of multiple directorships on firm value and performance. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) report that busy directors require an excessively high level of compensation, which in turn, leads to poor firm performance. Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) find, however, no relation between the number of directorships held by a director and firm valuation as proxied by the market-to-book ratio. This evidence is disputed by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) who report that firms with busy boards exhibit lower market-to-book ratios, reduced profitability, and a weakened sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. More recently, Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan (2013) hypothesize that busy directors offer advantages for many firms, with such individuals providing significant advising abilities to younger firms. They argue that the positive benefits of busy boards extend to all but the most established firms.

The corporate world, however, appears to see busy directors as ineffective directors. Several practitioner organizations have adopted resolutions limiting the number of directorships held by directors. For instance, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) sought to place limits on multiple directorships in 2009. ISS ultimately adopted a policy beginning in 2017 that lowers limits on multiple directorships from six board seats to five. A 2012 survey by Spencer Stuart indicates that three-fourths of S&P 500 firms place restrictions on the number of directorships their directors can hold. Five years prior, in 2007, only 55% of the S&P 500 firms had such limitations. Over the period, 1999 to 2012, the average number of directorships held per director decreases from 5 to 3 for U.S. firms. This change is not only statistically significant, but also economically significant, representing as it does a 40% decrease. Although a similar reduction can be observed for non-U.S. firms, it is not as pronounced as that for U.S. firms.

The corporate finance documents conflicting evidence about the impact of multiple directorships on firm value and performance. It is important to note, however, that this literature is based on an analysis of either exclusively U.S. firms or a single country. For example, DiPietra et al. (2008) find that busy directors are associated with a higher market value of Italian firms. Andres et al. (2013), however, report that German firms with busy directors captured by their social network exhibit lower levels of firm performance. Both studies contend that busy directors are well connected through their social networks, but their findings are contradictory [1] Thus, the literature regarding the international effect of busy boards does not provided unambiguous insights or conclusions.

Yet there are important reasons to believe that both the incidence and effect of multiple directorships demonstrates meaningful international differences. The desirability and social acceptance of sitting on multiple boards can differ across countries due to cultural norms (Hostede, 1980: 1989; Schwartz, 1992). Ethical standards and their ability to influence managerial behaviors are likely to differ across borders. There will also be legal or regulatory differences regarding the ability of individuals to serve simultaneously on multiple boards. The supply of individuals sufficiently skilled and experienced to serve as directors varies across countries. Thus, the very feasibility of such appointments is likely to differ internationally. Finally, the power of the board to influence corporate activities, especially with respect to entrenched or family management is different across countries (Morck and Yeung, 2003; Hu and Kumar, 2004). All of these considerations make the desirability of directors with multiple appointments sensitive to country characteristics and institutions.

Examining the board appointments of a large set of international firms, in our recent paper, we develop four hypotheses regarding the nature of international boards and director busyness. First, we test whether busy boards are a global phenomenon. Second, we investigate the extent to which national cultures might explain the distribution of busy boards across countries. Related to this hypothesis, we examine more thoroughly the effect of existing corporate affiliations or desirable personal characteristics on gaining additional board seats. Our last hypothesis focuses on the extent to which busy directors affect firm value and whether their usefulness is conditional upon firm age.

We find that busy boards are a global phenomenon. Approximately 70% of our sample firms can be categorized as having busy boards. The incidence of busy boards is higher among firms in civil law countries than those headquartered in common law countries. We find that cultural factors help to explain the frequency with which board busyness is observed globally. Specifically, we find that cultures that are more tolerant of power inequalities and emphasize individual accomplishment have a higher incidence of busy boards. Firms headquartered in national cultures that focus more on masculinity and long-term orientation are associated with lower levels of busyness.

We also provide an analysis of what firm and personal factors account for individuals gaining multiple board seats. We find that the performance of the firms on whose boards an individual sits directly affects the number of directorships an individual holds. Further, we determine that directors serving on the boards of larger firms tend to hold more directorships. We discover that personal characteristics also matter, with status as a CEO or possession of an MBA helping an individual to gain additional board seats.

Our results also offer new insight into the ability of busy boards to provide value to their firms. We find that firms with busy boards exhibit lower market-to-book ratios and reduced profitability. Our empirical findings indicate that a one percentage increase in the number of busy independent directors on a board reduces the firm’s market-to-book ratio by 0.35, while its return on assets is about 34% lower.

When we stratify our firms by age, however, we find that the negative effect of board busyness on firm value reverses. Specifically, we determine that the benefits offered by busy directors are much more valuable to younger firms. This evidence is similar to that reported for U.S. IPO firms by Field, Lowry, Mkrtchyan (2013). We conclude that as firms mature, the demand for advising decreases while their demand for monitoring by directors increases. These results are consistent with the notion that busy directors most benefit young firms.

The complete paper is available for download here.

Note: This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. We thank seminar participants and discussants at the 2016 Financial Management Association and the 2017 Financial Management Association, Europe meetings.

______________________________________

Endnotes:

1While we follow the current finance literature to construct our board busyness measurements, we acknowledge that board busyness in social networks has gained importance. Sociologists apply mathematical concepts to assess network structures (see Scott, 2000 for an overview). These methods facilitate the assessment of interpersonal relationships and their application to financial data. For example, Barnea and Guedj (2009) generate measures that account for a director’s importance in a social network and find that in firms with more connected directors, the CEO’s remuneration is higher while CEO turnover is less sensitive to firm performance. Subrahmanyam (2008) develops a model that links the optimal number of board memberships to social costs and benefits.


*Stephen P. Ferris is Professor and Director of the Financial Research Institute at the University of Missouri’s Scheller College of Business. Narayanan Jayaraman is Professor of Finance at Georgia Institute of Technology’s Scheller College of Business. Min-Yu (Stella) Liao is Assistant Professor at the Illinois State University. This post is based on a recent paper by Professor Ferris, Professor Jayaraman, and Professor Liao.

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 14 septembre 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 14 septembre 2017.

Cette semaine, j’ai relevé les cinq principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « harvard law school forum on corporate governance »

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « harvard law school forum on corporate governance »

 

 

 

  1. Another Road Leading to Business Judgment Review—Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia
  2. The Effects of Hedge Fund Interventions on Strategic Firm Behavior
  3. UK Announces Corporate Governance Reforms
  4. How Should We Regulate Fintech?
  5. OCC Stakes Out a Lead Role in Establishing New Deregulatory Agenda

 

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 7 septembre 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 7 septembre 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets, tout en me limitant au Top 10.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « harvard law school forum on corporate governance »

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « harvard law school forum on corporate governance »

 

 

 

  1. Political Uncertainty and Firm Disclosure
  2. Corporate Governance—the New Paradigm
  3. NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulations Take Effect
  4. CFOs on Boards: Higher Pay, Lower Performance
  5. CSX Attracts New CEO and Stock Price Rises Sharply
  6. The Evolution and Current State of Director Compensation Plans
  7. Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value
  8. Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
  9. Divided Second Circuit Panel Overrules Prior Newman Insider Trading Decision
  10. Out of Sight Out of Mind: The Case for Improving Director Independence Disclosure

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 31 août 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 31 août 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets, tout en me limitant au Top 10.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « harvard law school forum on corporate governance »

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « harvard law school forum on corporate governance »

 

  1. SEC Staff Examines Impact of Regulation on Capital Formation and Market Liquidity
  2. ISS and the Removal of CEOs: A Call for an Enhanced Standard
  3. Far Beyond the Quarterly Call
  4. Federal Reserve Board Proposes Guidance Addressing Supervisory Expectations on Boards of Directors
  5. Proxy Access: Best Practices 2017
  6. 2017 Mid-Year Activism Update
  7. Controlling-Shareholder Related-Party Transactions Under Delaware Law
  8. NAIC Adopts Model Cybersecurity Law
  9. SEC Announces Results of Cybersecurity Examination Initiative
  10. Make-Whole Premiums and the Agency Costs of Debt

Deux événements récents qui auront un effet important sur la gouvernance


Corporate Governance—the New Paradigm

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 24 août 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 24 août 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets, tout en me limitant au Top 10.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « harvard law school forum on corporate governance »

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « harvard law school forum on corporate governance »

 

 

  1. Regulating Motivation: A New Perspective on the Volcker Rule
  2. Information Asymmetries Conceal Fraud and Systemic Risks in the U.S. Banking Industry
  3. Private Equity and Financial Fragility During the Crisis
  4. Activist Investors’ Approaches to Targeting Boards
  5. 2017 Securities and M&A Litigation Mid-Year Review
  6. Governance through Shame and Aspiration: Index Creation and Corporate Behavior in Japan
  7. ISS Releases Surveys for 2018 Policy Updates
  8. The Era of Private Ordering for Corporate Governance
  9. Delaware Court of Chancery Extends Business Judgment Rule
  10. Board Oversight of Long-Term Value Creation and Preservation

Cadre de référence pour évaluer la gouvernance des sociétés | Questionnaire de 100 items


Le Bureau de la vérification interne (BVI) de l’Université de Montréal (UdeM) a récemment développé un cadre de référence novateur pour l’évaluation de la gouvernance. La méthodologie, ainsi que le questionnaire qui en résulte, contribue, à mon avis, à l’avancement des connaissances dans le domaine de l’évaluation des caractéristiques et des pratiques de la gouvernance par les auditeurs internes.

Ayant eu l’occasion de collaborer à la conception de cet instrument de mesure de la gouvernance des sociétés, j’ai obtenu du BVI la permission de publier le résultat de cet exercice.

Cette version du cadre se veut « générique » et peut être utilisée pour l’évaluation de la gouvernance d’un projet, d’une activité, d’une unité ou d’une entité.

De ce fait, les termes, les intervenants ainsi que les structures attendues doivent être adaptés au contexte de l’évaluation. Il est à noter que ce cadre de référence correspond à une application optimale recherchée en matière de gouvernance. Certaines pratiques pourraient ne pas s’appliquer ou ne pas être retenues de façon consciente et transparente par l’organisation.

Le questionnaire se décline en dix thèmes, chacun comportant dix items :

 


 

Thème 1 — Structure et fonctionnement du Conseil

Thème 2 — Travail du président du Conseil

Thème 3 — Relation entre le Conseil et le directeur général (direction)

Thème 4 — Structure et travail des comités du Conseil

Thème 5 — Performance du Conseil et de ses comités

Thème 6 — Recrutement, rémunération et évaluation du rendement du directeur général

Thème 7 — Planification stratégique

Thème 8 — Performance et reddition de comptes

Thème 9 — Gestion des risques

Thème 10 — Éthique et culture organisationnelle

 


 

On retrouvera en Annexe une représentation graphique du cadre conceptuel qui permet d’illustrer les liens entre les thèmes à évaluer dans le présent référentiel.

L’évaluation s’effectue à l’aide d’un questionnaire de type Likert (document distinct du cadre de référence). L’échelle de Likert est une échelle de jugement par laquelle la personne interrogée exprime son degré d’accord ou de désaccord eu égard à une affirmation ou une question.

 

  1. Tout à fait d’accord
  2. D’accord
  3. Ni en désaccord ni d’accord
  4. Pas d’accord
  5. Pas du tout d’accord
  6. Ne s’applique pas (S.O.)

 

Une section commentaire est également incluse dans le questionnaire afin que les participants puissent exprimer des informations spécifiques à la question. L’audit interne doit réaliser son évaluation à l’aide de questionnaires ainsi que sur la base de la documentation qui lui sera fournie.

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « gouvernance d'entreprise conseil d'administration »

 

Thème 1 — Structure et fonctionnement du Conseil

(Questions destinées au président du comité de gouvernance [PCG] et/ou au président du Conseil [PC])

 

1.       Le Conseil compte-t-il une proportion suffisante de membres indépendants pour lui permettre d’interagir de manière constructive avec la direction ?
2.       La taille du Conseil vous semble-t-elle raisonnable compte tenu des objectifs et de la charge de travail actuel ? (dans une fourchette idéale de 9 à 13 membres, avec une moyenne d’environ 10 membres)
3.       La composition du Conseil est-elle guidée par une politique sur la diversité des membres ?
4.       Le Conseil a-t-il conçu un processus rigoureux de recrutement de ses membres, basé sur une matrice des compétences complémentaires ?
5.       Le président et les membres du comité responsable du recrutement (comité de gouvernance) ont-ils clairement exprimé aux candidats potentiels les attentes de l’organisation en matière de temps, d’engagement et de contributions reliés avec leurs compétences ?
6.       Les réunions sont-elles bien organisées et structurées ? (durée, PV, taux de présence, documentation pertinente et à temps, etc.)
7.       Les échanges portent-ils sur surtout sur des questions stratégiques, sans porter sur les activités courantes (qui sont davantage du ressort de l’équipe de direction) ?
8.       Les membres sont-ils à l’aise d’émettre des propos qui vont à contre-courant des idées dominantes ?
9.       Une séance à huis clos est-elle systématiquement prévue à la fin de chacune des réunions afin de permettre aux membres indépendants de discuter des sujets sensibles ?
10.    Les membres ont-ils accès à la planification des rencontres sur une période idéale de 18 mois en y incluant certains items ou sujets récurrents qui seront abordés lors des réunions du Conseil (plan de travail) ?

 

 

Thème 2 — Travail du président du Conseil 

(Questions destinées à un administrateur indépendant, au PC [auto-évaluation] et au président du comité de gouvernance [PCG])

 

1.       Le président s’assure-t-il de former un solide tandem avec le directeur général et de partager avec lui une vision commune de l’organisation ?
2.       Le président promeut-il de hauts standards d’efficacité et d’intégrité afin de donner le ton à l’ensemble de l’organisation ?
3.       Le président, de concert avec le directeur général, prépare-t-il adéquatement les réunions du Conseil ?
4.       Le président préside-t-il avec compétence et doigté les réunions du Conseil ?
5.       Le président s’assure-t-il que les échanges portent surtout sur des questions stratégiques et que les réunions du Conseil ne versent pas dans la micro gestion ?
6.       Le président s’investit-il pleinement dans la sélection des présidents et des membres des comités du Conseil ?
7.       Le président s’assure-t-il de l’existence d’une formation et d’une trousse d’accueil destinées aux nouveaux membres afin qu’ils soient opérationnels dans les plus brefs délais ?
8.       Le président s’assure-t-il de l’existence d’un processus d’évaluation du rendement du Conseil et de ses membres ?
9.       Le président prend-il la peine d’aborder les membres non performants pour les aider à trouver des solutions ?
10.    Le président s’assure-t-il que les membres comprennent bien leurs devoirs de fiduciaire, c’est-à-dire qu’ils doivent veiller aux meilleurs intérêts de l’organisation et non aux intérêts de la base dont ils sont issus ?

 

 

Thème 3 — Relation entre le Conseil et le directeur général (direction)

(Questions destinées au PC et au Directeur général [DG])

 

1.       Le président du Conseil et le directeur général ont-ils des rencontres régulières et statutaires pour faire le point entre les réunions du Conseil ?
2.       Le président du Conseil et le directeur général maintiennent-ils une communication franche et ouverte ? (équilibre entre une saine tension et des relations harmonieuses et efficaces)
3.       Le Conseil résiste-t-il à la tentation de faire de la micro gestion lors de ses réunions et s’en tient-il à assumer les responsabilités qui lui incombent ?
4.       Le Conseil agit-il de façon respectueuse à l’endroit du directeur général lors des réunions du Conseil et cherche-t-il à l’aider à réussir ?
5.       Le Conseil procède-t-il à une évaluation annuelle du rendement du directeur général (par le comité de GRH) basée sur des critères objectifs et mutuellement acceptés ?
6.       Les membres du Conseil s’abstiennent-ils de donner des ordres ou des directives aux employés qui relèvent de l’autorité du directeur général ?
7.       Le président comprend-il que le directeur général ne relève pas de lui, mais plutôt du Conseil, et agit-il en conséquence ?
8.       Le directeur général aide-t-il adéquatement le président dans la préparation des réunions du Conseil, fournit-il aux membres l’information dont ils ont besoin et répond-il à leurs questions de manière satisfaisante ?
9.       Le directeur général s’assure-t-il de ne pas embourber les réunions du Conseil de sujets qui relèvent de sa propre compétence ?
10.    Le directeur général accepte-t-il de se rallier aux décisions prises par le Conseil, même dans les cas où il a exprimé des réserves ?

 

 

Thème 4 — Structure et travail des comités du Conseil

 (Questions destinées au PC et au président d’un des comités)

 

1.       Existe-t-il, au sein de votre organisation, les comités du Conseil suivants :

·         Audit ?

·         Gouvernance ?

·         Ressources humaines ?

·         Gestion des risques ?

·         Sinon, a-t-on inclus les responsabilités de ces comités dans le mandat du Conseil ou d’une autre instance indépendante ?

·         Autres comités reliés à la recherche (ex. éthique, scientifique) ?

 

2.       Les recommandations des comités du Conseil aident-elles le Conseil à bien s’acquitter de son rôle ?
3.       Les comités du Conseil sont-ils actifs et présentent-ils régulièrement des rapports au Conseil ?
4.       Estimez-vous que les comités créent de la valeur pour votre organisation ?
5.       Les comités du Conseil s’abstiennent-ils de s’immiscer dans la sphère de responsabilité du directeur général ?
6.       À l’heure actuelle, la séparation des rôles et responsabilités respectifs du Conseil, des comités et de la direction est-elle officiellement documentée, généralement comprise et mise en pratique ?
7.       Les membres qui siègent à un comité opérationnel comprennent-ils qu’ils travaillent sous l’autorité du directeur général ?
8.       Le directeur général est-il invité à assister aux réunions des comités du Conseil ?
9.       Chacun des comités et des groupes de travail du Conseil dispose-t-il d’un mandat clair et formulé par écrit ?
10.    S’il existe un comité exécutif dans votre organisation, son existence est-elle prévue dans le règlement de régie interne et, si oui, son rôle est-il clairement défini ?

 

 

Thème 5 — Performance du Conseil et de ses comités 

(Questions destinées au PC et au président du comité de gouvernance [PCG])

 

1.       Est-ce que la rémunération des membres du Conseil a été déterminée par le comité de gouvernance ou avec l’aide d’un processus indépendant ? (Jetons de présence ?)
2.       Par quels processus s’assure-t-on que le Conseil consacre suffisamment de temps et d’attention aux tendances émergentes et à la prévision des besoins futurs de la collectivité qu’il sert ?
3.       Est-ce que l’on procède à l’évaluation de la performance du Conseil, des comités et de ses membres au moins annuellement ?
4.       Est-ce que la logique et la démarche d’évaluation ont été expliquées aux membres du Conseil, et ceux-ci ont-ils pu donner leur point de vue avant de procéder à l’évaluation ?
5.       A-t-on convenu préalablement de la façon dont les données seront gérées de manière à fournir une garantie sur la confidentialité de l’information recueillie ?
6.       Est-ce que le président de Conseil croit que le directeur général et la haute direction font une évaluation positive de l’apport des membres du Conseil ?
7.       L’évaluation du Conseil et de ses comités mène-t-elle à un plan d’action réaliste pour prendre les mesures nécessaires selon leur priorité ?
8.       L’évaluation du Conseil permet-elle de relever les lacunes en matière de compétences et d’expérience qui pourraient être comblées par l’ajout de nouveaux membres ?
9.       Est-ce que les membres sont évalués en fonction des compétences et connaissances qu’ils sont censés apporter au Conseil ?
10.    Les membres sont-ils informés par le président du Conseil de leurs résultats d’évaluation dans le but d’aboutir à des mesures de perfectionnement ?

 

 

Thème 6 — Recrutement, rémunération et évaluation du rendement du DG

(Questions destinées au PC, au DG [auto-évaluation] et au président du comité des RH)

 

1.       Existe-t-il une description du poste de directeur général ? Cette description a-t-elle servi au moment de l’embauche du titulaire du poste ?
2.       Un comité du Conseil (comité de GRH) ou un groupe de membres indépendants est-il responsable de l’évaluation du rendement du directeur général (basé sur des critères objectifs) ?
3.       Le président du Conseil s’est-il vu confier un rôle prépondérant au sein du comité responsable de l’évaluation du rendement du directeur général afin qu’il exerce le leadership que l’on attend de lui ?
4.       Le comité responsable de l’évaluation du rendement et le directeur général ont-ils convenu d’objectifs de performance sur lesquels ce dernier sera évalué ?
5.       Le rendement du directeur général est-il évalué au moins une fois l’an en fonction de ces objectifs ?
6.       Les objectifs de rendement du directeur général sont-ils liés au plan stratégique ?
7.       Le comité responsable de l’évaluation du rendement s’est-il entretenu avec le directeur général en cours d’année pour lui donner une rétroaction préliminaire ?
8.       La rémunération du directeur général est-elle équitable par rapport à l’ensemble des employés et a-t-elle fait l’objet d’une analyse comparative avec le marché des organisations afin d’assurer un certain degré de compétitivité ?
9.       Les hausses salariales du directeur général sont-elles uniquement accordées en fonction de l’évaluation de son rendement ?
10.    Est-ce que le Conseil consacre l’attention nécessaire à la succession du directeur général et dispose-t-il d’un processus robuste d’identification d’un nouveau premier dirigeant, tant pour les transitions planifiées que non planifiées ?

 

 

Thème 7 — Planification stratégique 

(Questions destinées au PC et au DG)

 

1.       Votre organisation possède-t-elle un plan stratégique incluant notamment :

·         le contexte dans lequel évoluent la société et les principaux enjeux auxquels elle fait face ?

·         les objectifs et les orientations stratégiques de la société ?

·         les résultats visés au terme de la période couverte par le plan ?

·         les indicateurs de performance utilisés pour mesurer l’atteinte des résultats ?

2.       Le plan stratégique porte-t-il sur une période cohérente avec la mission et l’environnement dans lequel il œuvre ?
3.       La mission, les valeurs et l’énoncé de vision de l’organisation ont-ils été déterminés et réévalués périodiquement ?
4.       Est-ce qu’il y a eu une analyse Forces/faiblesses et opportunités/menaces ?
5.       L’ensemble des parties prenantes de l’organisation a-t-il été consulté notamment au moyen de sondages et d’entrevues, et lors d’un atelier de planification stratégique ?
6.       Les membres ont-ils été engagés dans le processus, notamment par la création d’un comité ad hoc chargé de piloter l’exercice et par des rapports périodiques aux réunions du Conseil ?
7.       Le Conseil évalue-t-il la stratégie proposée, notamment les hypothèses clés, les principaux risques, les ressources nécessaires et les résultats cibles, et s’assure-t-il qu’il traite les questions primordiales telles que l’émergence de la concurrence et l’évolution des préférences des clients ?
8.       Le président du Conseil s’assure-t-il que le plan stratégique soit débattu lors de réunions spéciales et que le Conseil dispose de suffisamment de temps pour être efficace ?
9.       Le Conseil est-il satisfait des plans de la direction pour la mise en œuvre de la stratégie approuvée ?
10.    Le Conseil surveille-t-il la viabilité permanente de la stratégie, et est-elle ajustée, si nécessaire, pour répondre aux évolutions de l’environnement ?

 

 

Thème 8 — Performance et reddition de comptes

 (Questions destinées au Président du comité d’audit ou au PC, au DG et au secrétaire corporatif)

 

1.       S’assure-t-on que les indicateurs de performance utilisés par la direction et présentés au Conseil sont reliés à la stratégie de l’organisation et aux objectifs à atteindre ?
2.       S’assure-t-on que les indicateurs de la performance sont équilibrés entre indicateurs financiers et non financiers, qu’ils comprennent des indicateurs prévisionnels et permettent une comparaison des activités similaires ?
3.       A-t-on une assurance raisonnable de la fiabilité des indicateurs de performance qui sont soumis au Conseil ?
4.       Utilise-t-on des informations de sources externes afin de mieux évaluer la performance de l’organisation ?
5.       Le Conseil et les comités réexaminent-ils régulièrement la pertinence de l’information qu’il reçoit ?
6.       Le Conseil examine-t-il d’un œil critique les informations à fournir aux parties prenantes ?
7.       Le Conseil est-il satisfait du processus de communication de crise de la société et est-il à même de surveiller de près son efficacité si une crise survient ?
8.       Le Conseil est-il satisfait de son implication actuelle dans la communication avec les parties prenantes externes et comprend-il les évolutions susceptibles de l’inciter à modifier son degré de participation ?
9.       Est-ce que la direction transmet suffisamment d’information opérationnelle au Conseil afin que celui-ci puisse bien s’acquitter de ses responsabilités de surveillance ?
10.    Est-ce que le Conseil s’assure que les informations sont fournies aux parties prenantes telles que les organismes réglementaires, les organismes subventionnaires et les partenaires d’affaires ?

 

 

Thème 9 — Gestion des risques

 (Questions destinées au PC et au Président du comité de Gestion des risques ou au Président du comité d’audit)

 

1.       L’organisation a-t-elle une politique de gestion des risques et obtient-elle l’adhésion de l’ensemble des dirigeants et des employés ?
2.       L’organisation a-t-elle identifié et évalué les principaux risques susceptibles de menacer sa réputation, son intégrité, ses programmes et sa pérennité ainsi que les principaux mécanismes d’atténuation ?
3.       L’organisation a-t-elle un plan de gestion de la continuité advenant un sinistre ?
4.       Est-ce que les risques les plus élevés font l’objet de mandats d’audit interne afin de donner un niveau d’assurance suffisant aux membres du Conseil ?
5.       L’organisation se penche-t-elle occasionnellement sur les processus de contrôle des transactions, par exemple l’autorisation des dépenses, l’achat de biens et services, la vérification et l’approbation des factures et des frais de déplacement, l’émission des paiements, etc. ?
6.       Existe-t-il une délégation d’autorité documentée et comprise par tous les intervenants ?
7.       Le Conseil a-t-il convenu avec la direction de l’appétit pour le risque ? (le niveau de risque que l’organisation est prête à assumer)
8.       Le Conseil est-il informé en temps utile lors de la matérialisation d’un risque critique et s’assure-t-il que la direction les gère convenablement ?
9.       S’assure-t-on que la direction entretient une culture qui encourage l’identification et la gestion des risques ?
10.   Le Conseil s’est-il assuré que la direction a pris les mesures nécessaires pour se prémunir des risques émergents, notamment ceux reliés à la cybersécurité et aux cyberattaques ?

 

Thème 10 — Éthique et culture organisationnelle

 (Questions destinées au DG et au PC)

 

1.       Les politiques de votre organisation visant à favoriser l’éthique sont-elles bien connues et appliquées par ses employés, partenaires et bénévoles ?
2.       Le Conseil de votre organisation aborde-t-il régulièrement la question de l’éthique, notamment en recevant des rapports sur les plaintes, les dénonciations ?
3.       Le Conseil et l’équipe de direction de votre organisation participent-ils régulièrement à des activités de formation visant à parfaire leurs connaissances et leurs compétences en matière d’éthique ?
4.       S’assure-t-on que la direction générale est exemplaire et a développé une culture fondée sur des valeurs qui se déclinent dans l’ensemble de l’organisation ?
5.       S’assure-t-on que la direction prend au sérieux les manquements à l’éthique et les gère promptement et de façon cohérente ?
6.       S’assure-t-on que la direction a élaboré un code de conduite efficace auquel elle adhère, et veille à ce que tous les membres du personnel en comprennent la teneur, la pertinence et l’importance ?
7.       S’assure-t-on de l’existence de canaux de communication efficaces (ligne d’alerte téléphonique dédiée, assistance téléphonique, etc.) pour permettre aux membres du personnel et partenaires de signaler les problèmes ?
8.       Le Conseil reconnaît-il l’impact sur la réputation de l’organisation du comportement de ses principaux fournisseurs et autres partenaires ?
9.       Est-ce que le président du Conseil donne le ton au même titre que le DG au niveau des opérations sur la culture organisationnelle au nom de ses croyances, son attitude et ses valeurs ?
10.    Est-ce que l’organisation a la capacité d’intégrer des changements à même ses processus, outils ou comportements dans un délai raisonnable ?

 

 

 

Annexe

Présentation du schéma conceptuel

 

 

Thème (1) — Structure et fonctionnement du Conseil

Thème (2) — Travail du président du Conseil

Thème (3) — Relation entre le Conseil et le directeur général (direction)

Thème (4) — Structure et travail des comités du Conseil

Thème (5) — Performance du Conseil et de ses comités

Thème (6) — Recrutement, rémunération et évaluation du rendement du directeur général

Thème (7) — Planification stratégique

Thème (8) — Performance et reddition de comptes

Thème (9) — Gestion des risques

Thème (10) — Éthique et culture organisationnelle

 

 

Le processus de gestion des réunions d’un conseil d’administration | Deuxième partie


Plusieurs personnes me demandent de l’information sur le processus de gestion des réunions d’un conseil d’administration.

Souvent, les personnes intéressées souhaitent obtenir des documents pragmatiques et concrets.

Afin d’explorer plus à fond cette problématique, j’ai effectué une recherche documentaire assez exhaustive sur les bonnes pratiques eu égard aux réunions de conseils d’administration.

Cette recherche m’a amené à considérer quatre étapes incontournables dans la mise en place d’un processus efficace de gouvernance :

  1. la préparation de l’information et de la documentation pertinente ;
  2. la conduite de la réunion du conseil ;
  3. l’évaluation de la réunion ;
  4. les suivis apportés à la réunion.

Chacune de ces activités représente un niveau d’importance égal à mes yeux.

Mon premier billet, Le processus de gestion des réunions d’un conseil d’administration | Première partie, portait sur les étapes 1 et 2. J’ai rassemblé les informations les plus pertinentes sur le sujet.

Dans ce billet, j’aborderai les activités se rapportant aux deux autres thèmes : l’évaluation de la réunion et les suivis apportés à la réunion.

 

(3) L’évaluation de la réunion et de l’efficacité du conseil

 

L’évaluation de chaque réunion du conseil est à recommander. Il s’agit d’une activité menée par le président du conseil et elle peut se faire lors du huis clos. Cependant, il est essentiel que cette activité se fasse annuellement.

Tel que je l’ai publié sur mon blogue en gouvernance le 16 novembre 2016 (Comment procéder à l’évaluation du CA, des comités et des administrateurs | Un sujet d’actualité!), les conseils d’administration sont de plus en plus confrontés à l’exigence d’évaluer l’efficacité de leur fonctionnement par le biais d’une évaluation annuelle du CA, des comités et des administrateurs.

En fait, le NYSE exige depuis dix ans que les conseils procèdent à leur évaluation et que les résultats du processus soient divulgués aux actionnaires. Également, les investisseurs institutionnels et les activistes demandent de plus en plus d’informations au sujet du processus d’évaluation.

Les résultats de l’évaluation peuvent être divulgués de plusieurs façons, notamment dans les circulaires de procuration et sur le site de l’entreprise.

L’article publié par John Olson, associé fondateur de la firme Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, professeur invité à Georgetown Law Center, et paru sur le forum du Harvard Law School, présente certaines approches fréquemment utilisées pour l’évaluation du CA, des comités et des administrateurs.

On recommande de modifier les méthodes et les paramètres de l’évaluation à chaque trois ans afin d’éviter la routine susceptible de s’installer si les administrateurs remplissent les mêmes questionnaires, gérés par le président du conseil. De plus, l’objectif de l’évaluation est sujet à changement (par exemple, depuis une décennie, on accorde une grande place à la cybersécurité).

C’est au comité de gouvernance que revient la supervision du processus d’évaluation du conseil d’administration. L’article décrit quatre méthodes fréquemment utilisées.

(1) Les questionnaires gérés par le comité de gouvernance ou une personne externe

(2) les discussions entre administrateurs sur des sujets déterminés à l’avance

(3) les entretiens individuels avec les administrateurs sur des thèmes précis par le président du conseil, le président du comité de gouvernance ou un expert externe.

(4) L’évaluation des contributions de chaque administrateur par la méthode d’auto-évaluation et par l’évaluation des pairs.

Chaque approche a ses particularités et la clé est de varier les façons de faire périodiquement. On constate également que beaucoup de sociétés cotées utilisent les services de spécialistes pour les aider dans leurs démarches.

La quasi-totalité des entreprises du S&P 500 divulgue le processus d’évaluation utilisé pour améliorer leur efficacité. L’article présente deux manières de diffuser les résultats du processus d’évaluation.

(1) Structuré, c’est-à-dire un format qui précise — qui évalue quoi ; la fréquence de l’évaluation ; qui supervise les résultats ; comment le CA a-t-il agi eu égard aux résultats de l’opération d’évaluation ?

(2) Information axée sur les résultats — les grandes conclusions ; les facteurs positifs et les points à améliorer ; un plan d’action visant à corriger les lacunes observées.

Notons que la firme de services aux actionnaires ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services) utilise la qualité du processus d’évaluation pour évaluer la robustesse de la gouvernance des sociétés. L’article présente des recommandations très utiles pour toute personne intéressée par la mise en place d’un système d’évaluation du CA et par sa gestion.

Voici trois articles parus sur mon blogue qui abordent le sujet de l’évaluation :

L’évaluation des conseils d’administration et des administrateurs | Sept étapes à considérer

Quels sont les devoirs et les responsabilités d’un CA ?  (la section qui traite des questionnaires d’évaluation du rendement et de la performance du conseil)

Évaluation des membres de Conseils

Le texte de l’IGOPP, Performance et dynamique des conseils d’administration, est assez explicite sur le sujet de l’évaluation. On indique que celle-ci comporte plusieurs volets :

Une évaluation, sous forme de questionnaire, du fonctionnement du conseil et de ses comités; cette démarche est quasi-universelle;

Une évaluation nominative des membres du conseil par les pairs; cette forme d’évaluation gagne en fréquence, mais ne fait pas lunanimité chez nos participants; elle est même carrément rejetée par plusieurs parce que, selon eux, elle est susceptible de semer la zizanie au conseil;

Une auto-évaluation par les membres du conseil, laquelle est communiquée au président du conseil (PCA) et sert de base de discussion individuelle avec le PCA;

Une évaluation d’ensemble (anonyme et non nominative) des membres du conseil suivi d’une rencontre individuelle avec le ou la président(e) du conseil; cette démarche reçoit plus dappui;

De l’avis de nos informateurs, quelle que soit la démarche adoptée, la rencontre du PCA avec chaque membre individuellement est une démarche incontournable pour relever la qualité du conseil; le PCA doit être franc et ferme durant cette rencontre à propos de la contribution et de la préparation de chacun ainsi qu’à propos des aspects à améliorer, s’il y a lieu; cest le moment privilégié pour susciter des départs et ainsi renouveler et renforcer le conseil;

Une pratique, qui a du mérite, fut mentionnée : la direction (le PDG et ses subalternes immédiats) est invitée à évaluer le conseil dans son ensemble ainsi qu’à suggérer des enjeux qui devraient être considérés par le conseil au cours de la prochaine année;

L’évaluation doit aussi porter sur la façon dont le PCA s’acquitte de ses responsabilités; cette évaluation menée par le président du comité de gouvernance s’appuie habituellement sur les réponses des membres du conseil à un questionnaire préparé à cette fin.

 

 (4) Suivis apportés à la réunion

 

La direction doit être incitée à effectuer tous les suivis requis par le conseil d’administration et le CA doit l’accompagner dans la conception et la préparation de tableaux de suivis et de tableaux de bord.

Ces instruments sont essentiels au travail de supervision des administrateurs. On y retrouve généralement la date ou la résolution, la nature du suivi à effectuer, le ou les responsables de ces activités, l’échéance, les notes pertinentes au dossier.

Également, un tableau de bord doit être produit à chaque rencontre. On y retrouve des indicateurs liés à la performance de l’organisation ainsi que les principaux risques à mitiger.

Encore ici, c’est le président du conseil qui doit s’assurer que ces outils de suivis sont mis en place et utilisés à bon escient. Sans un suivi soutenu entre les rencontres du CA ou des comités, les administrateurs sont dans le brouillard.

Je vous invite également à prendre connaissance des deux documents synthèses suivants :

Assurer une efficacité supérieure du conseil d’administration

Règles et pratiques relatives aux réunions du conseil d’administration — UdeS

En terminant, il faut insister sur l’importance pour l’organisation de protéger la confidentialité et la sécurité des données par l’utilisation d’une plateforme permettant d’avoir accès aux contenus des réunions. Les firmes les plus connues pour offrir ces services sont idside et LeadingBoards.

Je suis assuré que les informations soumises dans ce rapport vous aideront à dégager une grille d’analyse pertinente pour l’évaluation de l’efficacité des conseils d’administration.

Comment votre entreprise se prépare-t-elle pour éviter d’être la cible d’investisseurs activistes ?


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un article de Jack « Rusty » O’Kelley III, directeur de la firme Russell Reynolds Associates, qui explique les diverses stratégies que les conseils d’administration peuvent mettre en place pour minimiser les attaques des actionnaires « activistes », lorsqu’ils ont choisi leur société comme cible de changement. L’article a été publié sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

Bien sûr, les entreprises doivent anticiper les gestes des activistes afin de se préparer à l’éventualité d’une demande de changement au CA.

L’auteur expose les approches couramment utilisées par les investisseurs activistes pour accroître le nombre d’administrateurs au conseil, ou pour demander le changement d’un ou deux administrateurs.

Quelles situations sont les plus favorables pour exiger des changements dans la composition du conseil d’administration ?

Les clients de la firme Russell Reynolds se posent deux questions à ce sujet :

– How do you know if an activist is going to seek to expand the board or target specific directors for replacement (and potentially escalate the situation to a proxy contest)?

– If an activist chooses a board member replacement strategy, how can you predict which directors an activist may target?

C’est certainement un article très utile pour les grandes entreprises cotées en bourse.

Mais, le jour viendra peut-être où votre entreprise sera la cible d’activistes !

Bonne lecture !

 

Activist Investors’ Approaches to Targeting Boards

 

Image associée
Les actionnaires activistes à l’assaut de l’Europe | L’Echo

 

Clients who are anticipating or early in the process of an activist situation, and a potential proxy contest, often ask us two questions:

  1. How do you know if an activist is going to seek to expand the board or target specific directors for replacement (and potentially escalate the situation to a proxy contest)?
  2. If an activist chooses a board member replacement strategy, how can you predict which directors an activist may target?

Based on our experience working with corporate boards defending against activists (as well as our broader board search and effectiveness expertise), we have gathered insights regarding how activists analyze and target boards of directors. In response to client requests, we have developed this guide to help our clients proactively think through defensive measures regarding board composition and governance issues.

Activists generally will utilize against individual directors all current and historical negative press, statistics, and data that is publicly available, whether or not it is accurate, comprehensive, or fair. Boards should be ready for this tactic and be ready to take back control of the narrative about the board.

Russell Reynolds only works on behalf of corporations and their existing board and management teams. We urge our clients to take a proactive, “clear-eyed” activist view of their board to understand how an activist may attack their board. We have prepared this overview based on our experience and on the insights of several activist defense lawyers, investment bankers, and proxy advisors with whom we have worked. Additionally, we have talked with activist investors who were willing to share their approaches.

Expansion vs. Replacement

Anticipating an activist’s approach to targeting board seats

Activists target a board to influence decision-making and increase value creation. While activists may take different approaches and specific tactics vary by activist and situation, key indicators can help identify their potential path.

Two of the most common activist approaches to maximizing influence on a board are either pressuring the company’s board to expand the number of board members or targeting specific incumbent directors to be replaced. Both may be done by way of a proxy contest or by using the threat of such a contest to pressure the target board into a settlement that places activist-backed directors on the board. There is no strict methodology for predicting which tactic an activist will pursue, and activists’ decisions are frequently determined by how companies react to the activists’ ideas.

We have identified some key indicators that determine if activists are likely to look to expand a board or target specific board members.

Expansion

Activists often seek to expand a board in less contentious activist situations

We have observed that the earlier a company is in the process of engaging with an activist, the more likely it is that the activist will encourage the board to expand its size by adding activist-backed directors. The longer and more public the process, the more likely it is that the activist will target specific incumbent directors and consider conducting a proxy fight.

Board expansion usually occurs in several situations based on several factors, which include:

The board has accepted the activist’s investment thesis and acknowledges the validity of its recommendations

The activist wants to monitor a situation or progress

There is specific insight or expertise the activist and board feel is missing based on business strategy

The board has classified terms (to get around limitations of a replacement strategy with staggered terms)

The first procedural step is for the board to look at its size in relation to its bylaws and peer benchmarks. As a general rule, relatively large boards make expansion less desirable. If the board is already at the maximum membership allowed by its bylaws, expansion is less attractive as the board may not want to change the bylaws to increase the number of directors. Board expansion will dilute the magnitude of activist influence (compared to replacement), but may face less resistance from the target board in a settlement.

For example, if an activist seeks to add 2 directors to a 10-member board, a board agreeing to expand the membership will net the activist 16% representation (2 of 12), as opposed to the 20% representation by replacing 2 sitting directors (2 of 10).

Board Expansion May Not Be the End of Activist Opposition

An activist and the board may agree to expand the board, but the activist may subsequently use their influence from their new board seats to later call for certain incumbent directors to step down in the following board election. Often, activists will look to break up groups of power on a board. They prefer to have at least two directors on a board to increase the number of voices and leadership for change. It is easier to dismiss one voice rather than two voices on an issue. Should the activist-backed directors seek to replace other directors likely targets could include:

Directors with the poorest history of value creation

The longest-tenured directors who approved the strategy to which the activist objected

The chairman or the director(s) who led the campaign against the activist

Activists usually do not target the CEO unless they create a “CEO referendum” evidenced by strong, public complaints about value creation (e.g., Arconic). Once an activist joins the board, the average CEO tenure is 15 months

Replacement

Activists often seek to replace board members in more contentious and drawn-out situations

Activists will spend the time and effort needed to win these contests to drive adoption of their perspective around major strategic/value creation issues when the financial returns will reward it. The director replacement strategy has the benefit (for the activist) of increasing the magnitude of the activist’s influence on a board (compared to expanding the board).

Under U.S. securities law, activists may and usually identify, by name, the incumbent directors that they are targeting for replacement when submitting a proxy filing. Replacing directors sends the clearest message of an activist’s desire to drive change in strategic direction to enhance value creation.

Activists usually go down this path the greater the disagreement between a company and an activist on strategies for value creation, and the less willing management is to implement the activist’s ideas. We see a greater chance that an activist will seek to replace directors to demonstrate the need for dramatic change when:

There are visible public disagreements about strategic or operational issues and value creation

Increasingly public and “tougher” the language

Situations where the board is too large and cannot be expanded

Activists often are looking for directors who can provide specific insight or expertise about an industry and can act as change agents.

Identifying Incumbent Directors Activists May Target

Anticipating an activist’s approach to targeting board seats

Activists have become very sophisticated in how they determine which directors to target in connection with a proxy contest. Activists will try to create the narrative around the full board and/or each director to advance the story that suits their goals. Activists will use time frames and benchmarks around total shareholder return and share price appreciation that paints management and board members in the worst possible light. While boards and directors may claim this is unfair or misleading (not taking into account the full facts or context), activists have the advantage of being on the offensive and using “facts” in a manner that benefits them. Activists look at a series of “filters” for each director. The record of value creation and relevance of each director’s skill set are critical. Unfortunately, a director with a great track record of value creation and with highly relevant skills can be targeted if there are publicly available stories that raise questions about that director’s judgment or integrity.

Russell Reynolds recommends that boards conduct a proactive board and director activism defense review. To help prepare and defend against an activist targeting a board and individual directors, RRA uses five filters to analyze each incumbent director and identify those most likely to be targeted by an activist investor.

Our proactive board composition and performance audit review includes:

 

Summary

Scrutiny of public company boards from activists, institutional investors, and the media shows no signs of abating. Publically and, what was once privately available information, continues to increase. New databases from ISS, Glass Lewis, Bloomberg, S&P and other information service providers increase the ability of activists and others to analyze multiple aspects of a board and individual directors’ performance, background, and governance standards. Boards need to prepare and be “clear-eyed” and objective in foreseeing the risks they may face should an activist or institutional investor initiate a review of the board.

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 10 août 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 10 août 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets, tout en me limitant au Top 10.

Bonne lecture !

 

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