Organiser des réunions de C.A. d’OBNL productives *


Aujourd’hui, j’ai retenu un court article paru sur le site de Tom Okarma, un site qui se consacre à l’amélioration de la gouvernance des OBNL et au renforcement de l’efficacité des réunions de conseils d’administration. Voici donc 7 conseils vraiment très pertinents à l’intention de tous les C.A.

Que vous soyez le président du conseil, le chef de la direction ou un administrateur, vous bénéficierez des recommandations de cet expert que je pourrais résumer succinctement de la manière suivante, en y ajoutant certains suggestions personnelles :

L’ordre du jour (OJ) doit être établi par le PCD et le PCA, après avoir incité les membres du C.A. à faire des suggestions;

On devrait toujours indiquer le temps que l’on souhaite consacrer à un item de l’OJ;

Un « binder » complet doit être envoyé aux membres du C.A. dix jours avant la réunion;

Le président doit présupposer que les administrateurs ont lu la documentation et qu’ils sont bien préparés pour la réunion;

Utiliser un « agenda d’approbation « , une sorte de « template » du compte rendu, avec tous les attendus. Cet outil permet également de regrouper plusieurs items de nature routinière afin de les voter en bloc;

La plupart des sujets complexes doivent d’abord être étudiés en comité (surtout si le C.A. compte plus de 14 personnes);

Une personne expérimentée doit prendre des notes et rendre compte des décisions dans le PV;

S’assurer d’avoir un tableau de bord du suivi des actions et des décisions, avec le nom d’une personne responsable pour chaque point.

Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Que pensez-vous de ces conseils ?

 

You shouldn’t be bored at a board meeting | Board meeting dos and don’ts

 

Tired of ineffective board meetings and directors that show up unprepared? Have you had it with board members that sit around at meetings like so many potted plants? Maybe you have trouble just getting enough directors to show up to have a quorum!

First Meeting
First Meeting (Photo credit: lhl)

I don’t like wasting time at unproductive meetings and I’m sure you don’t either. And I really have a problem with meetings that have a “feel good” element to them but nothing is ever decided. You know, group hugs all around but no tangible results. You just keep rehashing tough topics over and over again.Instead, how would you like to tap into your board’s collective expertise more often and derive significantly more value from each director? Well, there is a way.I can just about guarantee you will experience productive meetings by doing a few things before the meeting is called to order. Here are some tips if you feel board and committee meetings are becoming a waste of time…

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La dématérialisation du conseil d’administration | Une nécessité ! *


Cette semaine, nous avons demandé à Amanda Biggs, gestionnaire web et rédactrice en gouvernance, d’agir à titre d’auteure invitée. Son billet présente le basculement dans l’ère du numérique comme incontournable pour les entreprises et leurs instances dirigeantes.

Dématérialiser et digitaliser sont des termes que l’on retrouve à l’ordre du jour de nombreux conseils d’administration depuis quelques années.

Voici donc l’article en question, reproduit ici avec la permission de l’auteur. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture.

La dématérialisation du conseil d’administration, un « must »

par Amanda Biggs

De quoi parle-t-on ?

La dématérialisation concerne l’ensemble des actions menées pour remplacer au sein d’une organisation les supports matériels d’information, de communication et de gestion par des fichiers et outils informatiques. C’est un processus propulsé par la révolution des technologies et qui s’inscrit dans une politique globale de zéro papier et d’acteurs interconnectés.

Où se déroule la digitalisation ?

Des échanges par courriel aux factures électroniques, il n’y a aucun métier qui échappe aux apports des nouvelles technologies de communication. Le conseil d’administration, garant de la bonne gouvernance au quotidien de l’organisation, doit donner le ton au sommet « the tone at the top ». Les administrateurs montrent l’exemple et se doivent d’embrasser les technologies pour leurs bénéfices mais également pour comprendre leur importance dans les activités et l’économie actuelle.

Efficacité, sécurité, responsabilité et leadership.

L’ère du digital et de l’interconnexion a bouleversé les structures traditionnelles de l’information et de la communication. Elle a aussi été source de nouveaux défis pour les conseils d’administration. En effet, une récente étude par Reuters confirme une augmentation de la taille des conseils, de la quantité de mandats détenus ainsi que le nombre de membres résidant dans des pays différents. De plus, avec l’accumulation et la démultiplication d’informations apportées par les nouvelles technologies, on assiste à un accroissement de l’épaisseur des pochettes d’informations des réunions des conseils. La gestion des réunions et d’une communication sécurisée entre membres deviennent ainsi de véritables challenges, complexes et couteux si des procédures papier sont maintenues.

ipad
ipad (Photo credit: Sean MacEntee)

Pour répondre à ces nouveaux défis et accompagner la transition digitale des conseils d’administration, des spécialistes comme Leadingboards, Idside, Diligentboard ont développé des logiciels sous le nom de « board portals » qu’on appelle en français des « conseils-sans-papier ».Les administrateurs ont tout intérêt à adopter un tel outil informatique afin d’organiser et sécuriser leur information, la consulter au besoin et simultanément ainsi qu’accéder aux archives pour pratiquer une prise de décision éclairée.

Sachant que l’intelligence économique est une arme à part entière dans un contexte d’économie globalisée, les risques pesant sur les administrateurs sont démultipliés. On note que les documents papiers comportent un risque élevé de perte, d’oubli ou de vol. Pour éviter cela, de nombreux administrateurs utilisent désormais des courriels privés pour échanger, faisant naitre de nouveaux risques sous-estimés : ces comptes peuvent être piratés, les courriels interceptés ou stockés sous le « US Patriot Act ». Si les données sensibles des conseils ne sont pas hautement sécurisées, cela peut mettre en péril toute l’activité de la société ainsi que les intérêts des parties prenantes. C’est pourquoi les board portals offrent plusieurs niveaux de sécurité afin de garantir la confidentialité des échanges.

Pour terminer, on note une popularité croissante des appareils mobiles auprès des administrateurs grâce à leur mobilité bien entendu mais aussi pour les nombreuses fonctionnalités intuitives proposées. Pour rendre l’expérience digitale la plus agréable possible, certains conseils-sans-papiers disposent d’applications iPad dédiées. Ces applications permettent aux membres d’accéder aux informations de leur conseil en tout temps mais également de prendre des notes et de communiquer entre eux pour une gouvernance améliorée et exemplaire.

Il y a bel et bien des outils aux fonctionnalités avancées pour aider et faciliter le rôle des administrateurs tout en réduisant les risques. Un conseil d’administration 2.0 permet de répondre aux nouveaux enjeux économiques efficacement tout en participant aux objectifs d’un développement durable.

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Quelques idées à explorer en 2014 pour accroître la performance du C.A. d’une OBNL *


Voici un court billet de Tom Okarma, président fondateur de Vantage Point | For NonProfit, exposant certaines idées pour accroître l’efficacité de C.A. d’OBNL.

Ci-dessous, un extrait de son billet ainsi que quelques liens utiles pour améliorer la performance des « Boards ». Bonne lecture !

 

No More Nonprofit Board Problems in 2014 !

 

Here are a few ideas to help ministry and nonprofit leaders work more closely (and pleasurably) with their boards. Who knows, maybe everyone will actually start enjoying board meetings!

Nonprofit_Expo_01
Nonprofit_Expo_01 (Photo credit: shawncalhoun)

Reconnect regularly with each director, one-to-one if possible, to tap into their wisdom, learn their perspective, and gain valuable confidential input

Invest to improve on your strengths through seminars, workshops, or conferences…like CLA 2014 

Identify existing nonprofit board best practices and install the top two that you feel add the most value to your organization

When meeting with key external stakeholders, ask how they think the organization is performing

Be more available to your staff, volunteers, and key community partners

Become a director on another nonprofit or ministry board and gain valuable perspective of just what that is like

Review your calendar monthly and the organization’s budget to determine if you are allocating time and treasure in line with the year’s goals

Conduct periodic board update (they hate “training”) sessions

For a few other easy and effective ideas on how to improve board relations and effectiveness in 2014, read :

(du site de Vantage Point | For NonProfit)

 

Electrify Your Sleepy Directors

Board Presidents that Don’t Bore

Board Meetings The Don’t Bore

Maximize Your Board’s Performance in 2014

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Quelles sont les qualités d’un président de conseil d’administration (PCA) exceptionnel ? *


Voici un rapport de recherche publié par la firme Alvarez & Marsal, sur les qualités d’un bon président de conseil d’administration (PCA).

L’étude présente les résultats des entrevues menées auprès de 22 PCA des plus grandes sociétés publiques britanniques qui ont œuvrés avec plus de 120 PCA dans leurs carrières.

Cette lecture, vraiment fascinante, montre clairement les qualités des PCA qui sont considérées comme exceptionnelles par leurs pairs. Ci-dessous, un bref extrait du rapport.

What makes an exceptional Chairman ?

« Our research has identified the key attributes displayed by exceptional chairmen in challenging times. Although most difficult to maintain during periods of duress, these characteristics are displayed throughout a chairman’s tenure and across all aspects of their management of the business. We have also compared these attributes with the guidance for chairmen provided by the Higgs Report and the more recent guidance note published by the Financial Reporting Council. This emphasises that ‘good boards are created by good chairmen’ and the importance of the chairman demonstrating ‘ethical leadership.’ In its detail, the guidance provides lists detailing the chairman’s role, rather than the qualities which come out of our research.

Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Gover...
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 1987-2006 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Firstly, and most importantly, an exceptional chairman understands the business, its culture, people and processes. This understanding encompasses recognising and embodying the values of the business as much as having knowledge of the business operations and the marketplace. An exceptional chairman also understands the wider industry and prepares the company for all eventualities, from further market disruption to opportunities to improve competitiveness. This is based on their deep knowledge of the company and sector. Extensive knowledge of a sector or type of sector (e.g. heavy manufacturing) is as important as the chairman’s ability to apply his or her accumulated experiences into effecting transformational change and preparing the business for future challenges.

Secondly, exceptional chairmen never consider themselves a one-person success. They create strong teams that have real influence on the company’s direction by building an effective board of non-execs and establishing a complementary working relationship with the CEO and their team. They implement change through the CEO, but are ready and able to step in at the right time to provide air cover to alleviate pressure. In short, they provide strong active leadership of the board.

Not afraid to take tough decisions in adversity, this type of chairman has an infectious enthusiasm and commitment to change which has a ripple effect, creating a ‘can-do’ attitude throughout the company. With internal stakeholders on board, the chairman uses strong communication skills to engage shareholders and other external stakeholders with change ».

L’article présente 8 aspects qui caractérisent les présidents de conseil qui ont du succès. Lisez la suite dans cet excellent rapport.

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Pourquoi séparer les fonctions de président du conseil (PCA) et de président et chef de la direction (PDG) ? *


Très bonnes réflexions d’Yvan Allaire sur le dogme de la séparation des rôles entre PCA et PDG. À lire sur le blogue Les Affaires .com.

Rien à rajouter à ce billet de l’expert en gouvernance qui , comme moi, cherche des réponses à plusieurs théories sur la gouvernance.

Plus de recherches dans le domaine de la gouvernance serait grandement indiquées… Le CAS et la FSA de l’Université Laval mettront sur pied un programme de recherche dont le but est de répondre à ce type de questionnement.

 

Pourquoi séparer les fonctions de président du conseil (PCA) et de président et chef de la direction (PDG) ?

« Parmi les dogmes de la bonne gouvernance, la séparation des rôles du PCA et du PDG vient au deuxième rang immédiatement derrière « l’indépendance absolue et inviolable » de la majorité des administrateurs. …

Yvan Allaire - World Economic Forum Annual Mee...
Yvan Allaire – World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2010 Davos (Photo credit: World Economic Forum)

Bien que les études empiriques aient grande difficulté à démontrer de façon irréfutable la valeur de ces deux dogmes, ceux-ci sont, semble-t-il, incontournables. Dans le cas de la séparation des rôles, le sujet a pris une certaine importance récemment chez Research in Motion ainsi que chez Air Transat. Le compromis d’un administrateur en chef (lead director) pour compenser pour le fait que le PCA et le PDG soit la même personne ne satisfait plus; le dogme demande que le président du conseil soit indépendant de la direction ».

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L’utilisation des huis clos lors des sessions de C.A. *


Voici un article intéressant de Matthew Scott sur le site de Corporate Secretary qui aborde un sujet qui préoccupe beaucoup de hauts dirigeants : le huis clos lors des sessions du conseil d’administration ou de certains comités. L’auteur explique très bien la nature et la nécessité de cette activité à inscrire à l’ordre du jour du conseil.

Compte tenu de la « réticence » de plusieurs hauts dirigeants à la tenue de cette activité, il est généralement reconnu que cet item devrait toujours être présent à l’ordre du jour afin d’éliminer certaines susceptibilités.

Le huis clos est un temps privilégié que les administrateurs indépendants se donnent pour se questionner sur l’efficacité du conseil et la possibilité d’améliorer la dynamique interne; mais c’est surtout une occasion pour les membres de discuter librement, sans la présence des gestionnaires, de sujets délicats tels que la planification de la relève, la performance des dirigeants, la rémunération globale de la direction, les poursuites légales, les situations de conflits d’intérêts, les arrangements confidentiels, etc. On ne rédige généralement pas de procès-verbal à la suite de cette activité, sauf lorsque les membres croient qu’une résolution doit absolument apparaître au P.V.

La mise en place d’une période de huis clos est une pratique relativement récente, depuis que les conseils d’administration ont réaffirmé leur souveraineté sur la gouvernance des entreprises. Cette activité est maintenant considérée comme une pratique exemplaire de gouvernance et presque toutes les sociétés l’ont adoptée.

Notons que le rôle du président du conseil, en tant que premier responsable de l’établissement de l’agenda, est primordial à cet égard. C’est lui qui doit informer le PCD de la position des membres indépendants à la suite du huis clos, un exercice qui demande du tact !

Je vous invite à lire l’article ci-dessous. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Are you using in-camera meetings ?

More companies are encouraging candid exchange among independent directors without management present

As corporate boards face more complex and difficult decisions, they may want to consider increasing the use of in-camera meetings to get more ‘realistic’ opinions from directors before moving forward with corporate strategy.

In-camera meetings, as they are called in Canada – or executive sessions, as they are referred to in the US – are special meetings where independent directors or committees of the board convene separately from management to have candid, off-the-record discussions about matters that are important to the company.

English: SOS Meetings Logo
English: SOS Meetings Logo (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The term ‘In camera’ derives from Latin and refers to ‘in a chamber’ which is a legal term meaning ‘in private.’ During these meetings, independent board members are free to challenge each other and speak their mind freely because minutes are generally not taken. Such meetings could be held to discuss and clarify the board’s position on issues that may produce opposing views between management and the board or to deal with issues that could involve conflicts of interest with management, such as CEO compensation.

‘In-camera meetings allow directors to talk about their view of matters without management present,’ says Jo-Anne Archibald, president of DSA Corporate Services. ‘They can talk about anything related to the company and they don’t have to worry about it being written down anywhere.’

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La gouvernance dans tous ses états | Huit (8) articles parus dans Lesaffaires.com


Voici une série de huit articles, publiés le 31 mars 2014 par les experts du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) dans le volet Dossier de l’édition Les Affaires.com

Découvrez comment les entreprises et les administrateurs doivent s’adapter afin de tirer profit des meilleures pratiques.

  1. Une bonne gouvernance, c’est aussi pour les PME
  2. Les défis de la gouvernance à l’ère du numérique
  3. La montée de l’activisme des actionnaires en six questions
  4. Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller
  5. Gouvernance : huit principes à respecter
  6. Conseils d’administration : la diversité, mode d’emploi
  7. Les administrateurs doivent-ils développer leurs compétences ?
  8. Vous souhaitez occuper un poste sur un conseil d’administration ?

Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture !

La gouvernance dans tous ses états | Huit articles parus dans Lesaffaires.com

 

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Une bonne gouvernance, c’est aussi pour les PME

Une entrevue avec M. Réjean Dancause, président et directeur général du Groupe Dancause et Associés inc.

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Les défis de la gouvernance à l’ère du numérique

Une entrevue avec M. Gilles Bernier, directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés

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La montée de l’activisme des actionnaires en six questions

Une entrevue avec M. Jean Bédard, titulaire de la Chaire de recherche en gouvernance de sociétés, Université Laval

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Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

Une entrevue avec M. Jacques Grisé, auteur du blogue jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

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Gouvernance : huit principes à respecter

Une entrevue avec M. Richard Drouin, avocat-conseil, McCarthy Tétrault

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Conseils d’administration : la diversité, mode d’emploi

Une entrevue avec Mme Nicolle Forget, administratrice de sociétés

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Les administrateurs doivent-ils développer leurs compétences?

Une entrevue avec Mme Louise Champoux-Paillé, administratrice de sociétés et présidente du …

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Vous souhaitez occuper un poste sur un conseil d’administration ?

Une entrevue avec M. Richard Joly, président de Leaders et Cie

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La bonne gouvernance selon Munger, vice-président du C.A. de Berkshire *


Aujourd’hui, je vous propose une très intéressante lecture publiée par David F. Larcker et Brian Tayan, de la  Stanford Graduate School of Business qui porte sur la conception que se fait Charles Munger de la bonne gouvernance des sociétés.

Les auteurs nous proposent de répondre à trois questions relatives à la position de Munger, vice-président du conseil de Berkshire :

1. Le système de gouvernance basé sur la confiance avancé par Munger pourrait-il s’appliquer à différents types d’organisations ?

2. Quelles pratiques de gouvernance sont-elles nécessaires et quelles pratiques sont-elles superflues ?

3. Comment s’assurer que la culture organisationnelle survivra à un processus de succession du PCD ?

À la suite de la lecture de l’article ci-dessous, quelles seraient vos réponses à ces questions.

Voici un résumé de la pensée de Munger, suivi d’un court extrait. Bonne lecture !

Charlie Munger

Berkshire Hathaway Vice Chairman Charlie Munger is well known as the partner of CEO Warren Buffett and also for his advocacy of “multi-disciplinary thinking” — the application of fundamental concepts from across various academic disciplines to solve complex real-world problems. One problem that Munger has addressed over the years is the optimal system of corporate governance.
 
Munger advocates that corporate governance systems become more simple, rather than more complex, and rely on trust rather than compliance to instill ethical behavior in employees and executives. He advocates giving more power to a highly capable and ethical CEO, and taking several steps to improve the culture of the organization to reduce the risk of self-interested behavior.

Corporate Governance According to Charles T. Munger

How should an organization be structured to encourage ethical behavior among organizational participants and motivate decision-making in the best interest of shareholders? His solution is unconventional by the standards of governance today and somewhat at odds with regulatory guidelines. However, the insights that Munger provides represent a contrast to current “best practices” and suggest the potential for alternative solutions to improve corporate performance and executive behavior.

Trust-Based Governance

The need for a governance system is based on the premise that individuals working in a firm are selfinterested and therefore willing to take actions to further their own interest at the expense of the organization’s interests. To discourage this tendency, companies implement a series of carrots (incentives) and sticks (controls). The incentives might be monetary, such as performance-based compensation that aligns the financial interest of executives with shareholders. Or they might be or cultural, such as organizational norms that encourage certain behaviors. The controls include policies and procédures to limit malfeasance and oversight mechanisms to review executive decisions.

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Définir l’intégrité au sein du conseil d’administration | Deloitte *


Quel est le rôle du conseil d’administration en matière d’intégrité ? Un récent document du Centre de la gouvernance d’entreprise de Deloitte montre comment l’intégrité constitue l’une des grandes responsabilités du C.A., comment on peut l’évaluer au niveau de l’organisation et, surtout, quel modèle les administrateurs peuvent adopter afin d’assumer leur fonction de surveillance de l’intégrité.

Ce court article sera sûrement d’une grande utilité aux membres des conseils. Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus !

Définir l’intégrité au sein du conseil d’administration | Deloitte

« Un conseil d’administration efficace se soucie de l’intégrité tant au sein du conseil qu’à l’extérieur de celui-ci. Il donne l’exemple. Le conseil aide le chef de la direction à donner le ton en matière d’éthique au sein de l’organisation. De plus, il favorise et surveille le respect des lois, des règlements et des politiques propres à l’organisation. L’intégrité au sein du conseil d’administration est fondée sur des facteurs comme les valeurs organisationnelles, le besoin de respecter les responsabilités fiduciaires du conseil ainsi qu’une volonté de rendre des comptes.

English: The Deloitte Centre in Auckland City,...
English: The Deloitte Centre in Auckland City, New Zealand. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

L’engagement envers une performance empreinte d’intégrité est largement reconnu comme étant un attribut indispensable d’une organisation. Toutefois, bon nombre de personnes et d’organisations éprouvent des difficultés à mettre cet idéal en pratique. Les structures et les pratiques de gouvernance des conseils doivent favoriser une culture d’intégrité dans l’entreprise en plus de promouvoir la responsabilité d’entreprise ainsi que les responsabilités environnementales et sociales. Le conseil d’administration doit aider à forger des relations de confiance à long terme avec les actionnaires, les clients, les autorités de réglementation et les employés.

Le rôle du conseil dans le maintien de l’intégrité consiste à travailler avec le chef de la direction pour donner le ton, comprendre les exigences en matière de conformité et fixer les attentes à l’égard de la haute direction qui sont ensuite transmises à l’ensemble de l’organisation. De plus, le conseil demande aux membres de la haute direction de rendre des comptes sur les résultats par rapport aux attentes fixées ».

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Quelle est la valeur ajoutée d’un « conseil aviseur » efficace ? *


Ce texte publié par Barry Reiter, et paru dans Ivey Business Journal, explique très bien en quoi consiste un « conseil aviseur » pour une PME en développement. En quoi les entreprises trouvent-elles avantage à se doter d’une telle structure et, surtout, quels sont les étapes concrètes de sa création ainsi que les conditions d’un bon fonctionnement.

Cet article couvre vraiment tous les angles de l’établissement d’un « comité aviseur » et il répond aux questions que les entrepreneurs et les dirigeants d’entreprises en développement se posent eu égard à la valeur ajoutée d’un tel comité.

Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont appréciés.

THE ROLE AND VALUE OF AN EFFECTIVE ADVISORY BOARD

An effective advisory board, properly composed and structured, can provide non-binding but informed guidance and serve as a tremendous ally in the quest for superior corporate governance. This author, a lawyer with significant experience on boards of directors, offers a helpful blueprint for establishing an effective advisory board.

PM Harper participates in a question and answe...
PM Harper participates in a question and answer session with the Ivey Business School (Photo credit: pmwebphotos)

Nobody can build a great business alone, and whether it’s a start up or an established industry leader, having access to high-quality advice can enhance an organization’s odds of success. Entities seeking advice can obtain it from a board of directors, consultants or networks of one sort or another. Increasingly, attention is being given to advisory boards. This article discusses the role of these boards, how they should be structured and organized, and their value to an enterprise.

Why have an advisory board ?

Enterprises considering setting up an advisory board must answer a key question: “Why are we establishing an advisory board and what do we want out of it?” The enterprise may be seeking assistance with anything from marketing to managing human resources to influencing the direction of regulators. Thinking carefully about an advisory board’s purpose will ensure that it will be structured to maximize its contribution to an organization’s success.

Commitment of Management/Leadership

An enterprise that wants to have an effective advisory board must spend time determining the mandate of that board, recruiting members, addressing compensation issues, organizing for and orchestrating effective meetings, paying for the services of advisory board members and dealing with the other matters noted above. The commitment must come from an appropriate point in the enterprise. If the advisory board is set up primarily to advise the CEO, the CEO’s involvement must be obvious and constant. If an advisory board is set up to assist in science or marketing, an appropriate individual, one who is willing to lend his or her name to the recruiting effort and to spend the time required to address the other issues, must be identified from that group. An advisory board that senses that there is an absence of commitment (whether by virtue of poorly organized meetings, frequently cancelled meetings, a leader who cancels his or her own attendance at the last minute, advice that is not transmitted or is ignored) will quickly become ineffective, as members will not prepare for meetings, not attend meetings or will not apply the degree of rigour required to provide their best advice.

 

Un autre document très intéressant est le suivant : 9 Tips for Creating an Advisory Board

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Énoncés de principes de bonne gouvernance 2012 | Business Roundtable *


Voici un document publié par l’organisation américaire Business Roundtable qui est la plus importante association de PCD (CEO) aux É.U. et qui regroupe les plus grandes sociétés avec un total de $6 trillion en revenus annuels et plus de 12 million d’employés. Ce document présente le point de vue des hauts dirigeants de ces sociétés sur les pratiques de bonne gouvernance. Le rapport est représentatif de ce que les membres pensent que devraient être les pratiques exemplaires en matière de gouvernance. C’est une lecture vraiment très pertinente.

English: Corporate Governance

Principles of Corporate Governance – 2012

« Business Roundtable supports the following guiding principles:

First, the paramount duty of the board of directors of a public corporation is to select a chief executive officer and to oversee the CEO and senior management in the competent and ethical operation of the corporation on a day-to-day basis.

Second, it is the responsibility of management, under the oversight of the board, to operate the corporation in an effective and ethical manner to produce long-term value for shareholders. The board of directors, the CEO and senior management should set a “tone at the top” that establishes a culture of legal compliance and integrity. Directors and management should never put personal interests ahead of or in conflict with the interests of the corporation.

Third, it is the responsibility of management, under the oversight of the board, to develop and implement the corporation’s strategic plans, and to identify, evaluate and manage the risks inherent in the corporation’s strategy. The board of directors should understand the corporation’s strategic plans, the associated risks, and the steps that management is taking to monitor and manage those risks. The board and senior management should agree on the appropriate risk profile for the corporation, and they should be comfortable that the strategic plans are consistent with that risk profile.

Fourth, it is the responsibility of management, under the oversight of the audit committee and the board, to produce financial statements that fairly present the financial condition and results of operations of the corporation and to make the timely disclosures investors need to assess the financial and business soundness and risks of the corporation.

Fifth, it is the responsibility of the board, through its audit committee, to engage an independent accounting firm to audit the financial statements prepared by management and issue an opinion that those statements are fairly stated in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, as well as to oversee the corporation’s relationship with the outside auditor.

Sixth, it is the responsibility of the board, through its corporate governance committee, to play a leadership role in shaping the corporate governance of the corporation and the composition and leadership of the board. The corporate governance committee should regularly assess the backgrounds, skills and experience of the board and its members and engage in succession planning for the board.

Seventh, it is the responsibility of the board, through its compensation committee, to adopt and oversee the implementation of compensation policies, establish goals for performance-based compensation, and determine the compensation of the CEO and senior management. Compensation policies and goals should be aligned with the corporation’s long-term strategy, and they should create incentives to innovate and produce long-term value for shareholders without excessive risk. These policies and the resulting compensation should be communicated clearly to shareholders.

Eighth, it is the responsibility of the corporation to engage with longterm shareholders in a meaningful way on issues and concerns that are of widespread interest to long-term shareholders, with appropriate involvement from the board of directors and management.

Ninth, it is the responsibility of the corporation to deal with its employees, customers, suppliers and other constituencies in a fair and equitable manner and to exemplify the highest standards of corporate citizenship.

These responsibilities and others are critical to the functioning of the modern public corporation and the integrity of the public markets. No law or regulation can be a substitute for the voluntary adherence to these principles by corporate directors and management in a manner that fits the needs of their individual corporations ».

___________________________

* En reprise

Articles reliés au sujet :

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Suggestions en vue de renforcer la gouvernance des OBNL *


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un article publié par Dr Eugene Fram sur son blogue Nonprofit Management. L’auteur énonce plusieurs propositions susceptibles d’améliorer la gouvernance des entreprises, plus particulièrement des OBNL.

Ces suggestions sont issues des 40 recommandations que Richard Leblanc a récemment publiées à propos des entreprises cotées en bourse. (Voir mon billet du 12 juillet 2013 à ce sujet : Renforcement des règles de gouvernance | Une proposition de Richard Leblanc).

Voici donc les onze suggestions retenues par Eugene Fram qui s’adressent aux OBNL. Bonne lecture.

11 Ways to a Stronger Nonprofit Board

1. Reduce the size of the board

2. Limit director over-boarding

3. Increase the directors’ knowledge of the nonprofit’s field(s) of operations

English: Carol Chyau and Marie So, co-founders...
English: Carol Chyau and Marie So, co-founders of Ventures in Development, a nonprofit organization that promotes social enterprise in Greater China. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

4. Enable directors to have access to information and to managers reporting to the CEO

5. Select directors who can contribute directly to the organization’s mission

6. Hold management accountable

7. Control management’s influence on director selection

8. Address conflicts of interest fully

9. Match management’s compensation with contributions to achieving mission, corporate performance and risk management

10. Stay on message when communicating organizational outcomes

11. Understand the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of replacing elected directors

_______________________________

* En reprise

Evaluate your nonprofit from a funder’s perspective (fundraisinggoodtimes.com)

Non Profit Board of Directors Checklist (jasteriou.wordpress.com)

Getting the Nonprofit Board Recruiting Process « Right » (powerofoneconsulting.wordpress.com)

Nonprofits need to balance finance and mission (utsandiego.com)

Why Nonprofit Board Prospects Say No (hardysmithconsulting.wordpress.com)

What every nonprofit board needs to know (miamiherald.com)

Histoire récente de l’essor des investisseurs activistes | Conditions favorables et avenir prévisible ? *


Ce matin, je vous convie à une lecture révélatrice des facteurs qui contribuent aux changements de fond observés dans la gouvernance des grandes sociétés cotées, lesquels sont provoqués par les interventions croissantes des grands investisseurs activistes.

Cet article de quatre pages, publié par John J. Madden de la firme Shearman & Sterling, et paru sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, présente les raisons de l’intensification de l’influence des investisseurs dans la stratégie et la direction des entreprises, donc de la gouvernance, un domaine du ressort du conseil d’administration, représentants des actionnaires … et des parties prenantes.

English: Study on alternative investments by i...
English: Study on alternative investments by institutional investors. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Après avoir expliqué l’évolution récente dans le monde de la gouvernance, l’auteur brosse un tableau plutôt convainquant des facteurs d’accélération de l’influence des activistes eu égard aux orientations stratégiques.

Les raisons qui expliquent ces changements peuvent être résumées de la manière suivante :

  1. Un changement d’attitude des grands investisseurs, représentant maintenant 66 % du capital des grandes corporations, qui conduit à des intérêts de plus en plus centrés sur l’accroissement de la valeur ajoutée pour les actionnaires;
  2. Un nombre accru de campagnes (+ de 50 %) initiées par des activistes lesquelles se traduisent par des victoires de plus en plus éclatantes;
  3. Un retour sur l’investissement élevé (13 % entre 2009 et 2012) accompagné par des méthodes analytiques plus sophistiquées et plus crédibles (livres blancs);
  4. Un accroissement du capital disponible notamment par l’apport de plus en plus grand des investisseurs institutionnels (fonds de pension, compagnies d’assurance, fonds commun de placement, caisses de retraite, etc.);
  5. Un affaiblissement dans les moyens de défense des C.A. et une meilleure communication entre les actionnaires;
  6. Un intérêt de plus en plus marqué des C.A. et de la direction par un engagement avec les investisseurs activistes.

 

À l’avenir, les activistes vont intensifier leurs efforts pour exiger des changements organisationnels significatifs (accroissement des dividendes, réorganisation des unités d’affaires, modification des règles de gouvernance, présence sur les conseils, séparation des rôles de PCD et PCA, alignement de la rémunération des dirigeants avec la performance, etc.).

Ci-dessous, un extrait des passages les plus significatifs. Bonne lecture !

The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism

One of the signal developments in 2012 was the emerging growth of the form of shareholder activism that is focused on the actual business and operations of public companies. We noted that “one of the most important trendline features of

2012 has been the increasing amount of strategic or operational activism. That is, shareholders pressuring boards not on classic governance subjects but on the actual strategic direction or management of the business of the corporation.”… Several of these reform initiatives of the past decade continue to be actively pursued. More recently, however, the most significant development in the activism sphere has been in strategically-focused or operationally-focused activism led largely by hedge funds.

The 2013 Acceleration of “Operational” Activism

Some of this operational activism in the past few years was largely short-term return focused (for example, pressing to lever up balance sheets to pay extraordinary dividends or repurchase shares), arguably at the potential risk of longer-term corporate prosperity, or simply sought to force corporate dispositions; and certainly there continues to be activism with that focus. But there has also emerged another category of activism, principally led by hedge funds, that brings a sophisticated analytical approach to critically examining corporate strategy and capital management and that has been able to attract the support of mainstream institutional investors, industry analysts and other market participants. And this growing support has now positioned these activists to make substantial investments in even the largest public companies. Notable recent examples include ValueAct’s $2.2 billion investment in Microsoft (0.8%), Third Point’s $1.4 billion investment in Sony (7%), Pershing Square’s $2 billion investment in Procter & Gamble (1%) and its $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals (9.8%), Relational Investor’s $600 million investment in PepsiCo (under 1%), and Trian Fund Management’s investments of $1.2 billion in DuPont (2.2%) and of more than $1 billion in each of PepsiCo and Mondelez. Interestingly, these investors often embark on these initiatives to influence corporate direction and decision-making with relatively small stakes when measured against the company’s total outstanding equity—as in Microsoft, P&G, DuPont and PepsiCo, for example; as well as in Greenlight Capital’s 1.3 million share investment in Apple, Carl Icahn’s 5.4% stake in Transocean, and Elliot Management’s 4.5% stake in Hess Corp.

In many cases, these activists target companies with strong underlying businesses that they believe can be restructured or better managed to improve shareholder value. Their focus is generally on companies with underperforming share prices (often over extended periods of time) and on those where business strategies have failed to create value or where boards are seen as poor stewards of capital.

Reasons for the Current Expansion of Operational Activism

Evolving Attitudes of Institutional Investors.

… Taken together, these developments have tended to test the level of confidence institutional investors have in the ability of some boards to act in a timely and decisive fashion to adjust corporate direction, or address challenging issues, when necessary in the highly competitive, complex and global markets in which businesses operate. And they suggest a greater willingness of investors to listen to credible external sources with new ideas that are intelligently and professionally presented.

Tangible evidence of this evolution includes the setting up by several leading institutional investors such as BlackRock, CalSTRS and T. Rowe Price of their own internal teams to assess governance practices and corporate strategies to find ways to improve corporate performance. As the head of BlackRock’s Corporate Governance and Responsible Investor team recently commented, “We can have very productive and credible conversations with managements and boards about a range of issues—governance, performance and strategy.”

Increasing Activist Campaigns Generally; More Challenger Success. The increasing number of activist campaigns challenging incumbent boards—and the increasing success by challengers—creates an encouraging market environment for operational activism. According to ISS, the resurgence of contested board elections, which began in 2012, continued into the 2013 proxy season. Proxy contests to replace some or all incumbent directors went from 9 in the first half of 2009 to 19 in the first half of 2012 and 24 in the first half of 2013. And the dissident win rate has increased significantly, from 43% in 2012 to 70% in 2013.  Additionally, in July 2013, Citigroup reported that the number of $1 billion + activist campaigns was expected to reach over 90 for 2013, about 50% more than in 2012.

Attractive Investment Returns; Increasing Sophistication and Credibility. While this form of activism has certainly shown mixed results in recent periods (Pershing Square’s substantial losses in both J.C. Penney and Target have been among the most well-publicized examples of failed initiatives), the overall recent returns have been strong. Accordingly to Hedge Fund Research in Chicago, activist hedge funds were up 9.6% for the first half of 2013, and they returned an average of nearly 13% between 2009 and 2012.

In many instances, these activists develop sophisticated and detailed business and strategic analyses—which are presented in “white papers” that are provided to boards and managements and often broadly disseminated—that enhance their credibility and help secure the support, it not of management, of other institutional shareholders.

Increasing Investment Capital Available; Greater Mainstream Institutional Support. The increasing ability of activist hedge funds to raise new money not only bolsters their firepower, but also operates to further solidify the support they garner from the mainstream institutional investor community (a principal source of their investment base). According to Hedge Fund Research, total assets under management by activist hedge funds has doubled in the past four years to $84 billion today. And through August this year their 2013 inflows reached $4.7 billion, the highest inflows since 2006.  Particularly noteworthy in this regard, Pershing Square’s recent $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals was funded in part with capital raised for a standalone fund dedicated specifically to Air Products, without disclosing the target’s name to investors.

In addition to making capital available, mainstream institutions are demonstrating greater support for these activists more generally. In a particularly interesting vote earlier this year, at the May annual meeting of Timken Co., 53% of the shareholders voting supported the non-binding shareholder proposal to split the company in two, which had been submitted jointly by Relational Investors (holding a 6.9% stake) and pension fund CalSTRS (holding 0.4%). To build shareholder support for their proposal, Relational and CalSTRS reached out to investors both in person and through the internet. Relational ran a website (unlocktimken . com) including detailed presentations and supportive analyst reports. They also secured the support of ISS and Glass Lewis. Four months after the vote, in September, Timken announced that it had decided to spin off its steel-making business.

The Timken case is but one example of the leading and influential proxy advisory firms to institutional investors increasingly supporting activists. Their activist support has been particularly noticeable in the context of activists seeking board representation in nominating a minority of directors to boards.

These changes suggest a developing blurring of the lines between activists and mainstream institutions. And it may be somewhat reminiscent of the evolution of unsolicited takeovers, which were largely shunned by the established business and financial communities in the early 1980s, although once utilized by a few blue-chip companies they soon became a widely accepted acquisition technique.

Weakened Board-Controlled Defenses; Increasing Communication Among Shareholders. The largely successful efforts over the past decade by certain pension funds and other shareholder-oriented organizations to press for declassifying boards, redeeming poison pills and adopting majority voting in director elections have diminished the defenses available to boards in resisting change of control initiatives and other activist challenges. Annual board elections and the availability of “withhold” voting in the majority voting context increases director vulnerability to investor pressure.

And shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders and their representative organizations, are better organized today for taking action in particular situations. The increasing and more sophisticated forms of communication among shareholders—including through the use of social media—is part of the broader trend towards greater dialogue between mainstream institutions and their activist counterparts. In his recent op-ed article in The Wall Street Journal, Carl Icahn said he would use social media to make more shareholders aware of their rights and how to protect them, writing that he had set up a Twitter account for that purpose (with over 80,000 followers so far) and that he was establishing a forum called the Shareholders Square Table to further these aims.

Corporate Boards and Managements More Inclined to Engage with Activists. The several developments referenced above have together contributed to the greater willingness today of boards and managements to engage in dialogue with activists who take investments in their companies, and to try to avoid actual proxy contests.

One need only look at the recent DuPont and Microsoft situations to have a sense of this evolution toward engagement and dialogue. After Trian surfaced with its investment in DuPont, the company’s spokesperson said in August 2013: “We are aware of Trian’s investment and, as always, we routinely engage with our shareholders and welcome constructive input. We will evaluate any ideas Trian may have in the context of our ongoing initiatives to build a higher value, higher growth company for our shareholders.” Also in August, Microsoft announced its agreement with ValueAct to allow the activist to meet regularly with the company’s management and selected directors and give the activist a board seat next year; thereby avoiding a potential proxy contest for board representation by ValueAct. Soon thereafter, on September 17, Microsoft announced that it would raise its quarterly dividend by 22% and renew its $40 billion share buyback program; with the company’s CFO commenting that this reflected Microsoft’s continued commitment to returning cash to its shareholders.

What to Expect Ahead

The confluence of the factors identified above has accelerated the recent expansion of operational activism, and there is no reason in the current market environment to expect that this form of activism will abate in the near term. In fact, the likelihood is that it will continue to expand… Looking ahead, we fully expect to see continuing efforts to press for the structural governance reforms that have been pursued over the past several years. Campaigns to separate the Chair and CEO roles at selected companies will likely continue to draw attention as they did most prominently this year at JPMorgan Chase. And executive compensation will remain an important subject of investor attention, and of shareholder proposals, at many companies where there is perceived to be a lack of alignment between pay and performance. We can also expect that the further development of operational activism, and seeing how boards respond to it, will be a central feature of the governance landscape in the year ahead.

___________________________________________

* En reprise

Finding Value in Shareholder Activism (clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu)

The Corporate Social Responsibility Report and Effective Stakeholder Engagement (venitism.blogspot.com)

The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Shareholder activism on the rise in Canada (business.financialpost.com)

Dealing With Activist Hedge Funds (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

American Activist Investors Get Ready To Invade Europe (forbes.com)

Activist Investors Help Companies, Not Workers – Bloomberg (bloomberg.com)

The Separation of Ownership from Ownership (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Réflexions capitales pour les Boards en 2014 – The Harvard Law School (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance by Paul Rose, Bernard S. Sharfman (togovern.wordpress.com)

Résultats de l’enquête portant sur « La gouvernance à l’ère du numérique » **


Les résultats d’une grande enquête ont été dévoilés en primeur aux 125 participants présents au Séminaire Gouvernance Express 2014 tenu le mercredi 19 mars au Sheraton Montréal sous le thème «La gouvernance de sociétés à l’ère du numérique».

Nature de l’enquête

Devant les enjeux associés à la transformation numérique des organisations, le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) a lancé, en février dernier, une enquête afin de recueillir des données sur l’impact du numérique dans la gouvernance des sociétés et les effets sur le rôle et les responsabilités des administrateurs.

Méthodologie

Ce sondage a été administré par la firme BIP de Montréal auprès des diplômés de trois collèges de formation en gouvernance de sociétés soit le Directors College (Ontario), l’Institut Français des administrateurs (France) et le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (Québec). Au total, 319 personnes ont participé à cette enquête, ce qui correspond à un taux de réponse de 20 %. Le questionnaire Web a été élaboré par un comité de travail dirigé par M. René Leclerc, diplômé du CAS, suite à une analyse des études récentes sur ce sujet et à une série d’entrevues effectuées par Expansion Stratégies auprès de dix leaders d’influence et administrateurs de sociétés*.

Le questionnaire regroupait des questions sur sept volets :

  1. le niveau de participation du répondant à des conseils d’administration,
  2. le profil de l’organisation dans laquelle le répondant est le plus impliqué à titre d’administrateur de sociétés,
  3. le degré d’utilisation des technologies numériques au sein du C.A. de cette organisation,
  4. le pourquoi du numérique dans cette organisation,
  5. l’implication du C.A. dans la prise de décisions en matière de numérique dans cette organisation,
  6. la perception du répondant, à titre d’administrateur, face au numérique et finalement,
  7. le profil technologique du répondant.

Sommaire des résultats de l’enquête

Plusieurs résultats très intéressants émanent de ce sondage. D’entrée de jeu, il est important de mentionner que la taille de l’organisation dans laquelle l’administrateur est le plus impliqué est une variable nettement plus significative que le genre ou le pays d’origine lorsque vient le temps de caractériser les perceptions et les comportements des répondants face au numérique.

The Price Building, in the old city of Quebec ...
The Price Building, in the old city of Quebec City. The building is the head office of the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec and the official residence of the Premier of Québec (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Ainsi, il ressort que, parmi les répondants qui agissent à titre d’administrateur au sein d’un C.A. faisant usage de technologies numériques (ou qui l’ont été récemment), 46 % d’entre eux fonctionnent sans papier. Il va sans dire que le taux d’utilisation des plateformes spécialisées par les conseils d’administration a beaucoup augmenté depuis l’arrivée des tablettes.

D’autres résultats percutants : 72 % des répondants actifs au sein d’un C.A. confirment que leur conseil n’a aucun membre possédant une expertise numérique et 56 % affirment que ce conseil s’implique dans les décisions numériques au moins une fois par année. De plus, 59 % de ces répondants affirment que les technologies numériques sont très importantes afin de permettre à leur organisation d`être plus productive, tandis que seulement 27 % de ceux-ci affirment qu’elles sont très importantes pour se démarquer de la concurrence. On remarque aussi que 88 % des répondants se disent personnellement actifs sur LinkedIn tandis que seulement 8 % affirment initier des discussions sur Facebook. Enfin, seulement 49 % des répondants qui sont actifs sur un C.A. affirment que leur conseil se soucie activement de la réputation de l’organisation sur les médiaux sociaux.

Globalement, le sondage montre très clairement que les administrateurs sont devant un paradoxe des temps modernes : ils manient aisément les outils numériques, mais ne se semblent pas se sentir aussi à l’aise envers les stratégies liées au virage numérique qu’envers celles liées aux enjeux habituels de gouvernance. De ce fait, le leadership du virage numérique et bon nombre de décisions qui s’y rattachent sont pris par la direction générale des organisations. Si on veut que les conseils d’administration augmentent leur pouvoir décisionnel ou s’arriment à cette nouvelle réalité, il y aurait lieu de sensibiliser et de former les administrateurs et d’intégrer de nouveaux administrateurs experts dans le numérique, conscients des enjeux qui y sont justement rattachés.

En accord avec les études récentes, le groupe de travail suggère les pistes d’action suivantes aux membres de conseils d’administration :

Prévoir que la concurrence, pour attirer des membres avec expérience numérique, va s’intensifier rapidement;

Bâtir une équipe numérique au CA qui est diversifiée;

N’attendez pas une crise numérique pour adapter le CA;

Effectuer des revues périodiques des enjeux technologiques;

Implanter des revues du portefeuille TI en appui au modèle d’affaires de l’organisation.

________________________________________________

*Le groupe de travail du CAS était formé des personnes suivantes :

Gilles Bernier, ASC, Directeur des programmes, Collège des administrateurs de sociétés

Alain Bolduc, ASC, administrateur de sociétés

Patrick Courtemanche, Vice-Président-Opérations, BIP

Jacques Grysole, Président, Expansion Stratégies, inc.

Lucie Leclerc, Présidente Directrice Générale, BIP

René Leclerc, ASC, Administrateur de sociétés

Dominique Maheux, Conseillère BIP et propriétaire de DataSapiens

À propos du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés

Créé en 2005 grâce à un partenariat entre l’Autorité des marchés financiers, la Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, le ministère du Conseil exécutif du Québec et la Faculté des sciences de l’administration de l’Université Laval, le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés se positionne comme leader de la formation des administrateurs et représente le seul programme de certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés au Québec. Il contribue au développement et à la promotion de la bonne gouvernance de sociétés en offrant des formations reconnues et à la fine pointe des meilleures pratiques. À ce jour, le CAS a diplômé 590 ASC. Il est possible de consulter leur profil en visitant le www.BanqueAdministrateurs.com.

À propos de BIP

Le Bureau d’Intervieweurs Professionnels (BIP) figure parmi les plus importantes firmes de sondage au Québec. Fondé en 1976 et acquis en 1988 par la présidente actuelle, BIP et son équipe de 150 employés sondent près de 250 000 personnes et organisations au Québec, au Canada et ailleurs dans le monde. L’entreprise offre un service sur mesure ou complet de collecte (téléphonique, en ligne, via son panel, etc.), de traitement de données et d’analyse de recherche, tant pour la clientèle du secteur public que privé. Reconnu pour son savoir-faire dans les mandats complexes et variés, BIP offre une expertise unique et personnalisée. Sa réputation d’excellence depuis plus de 25 ans est fondée sur le respect, la rigueur et le résultat.

À propos d’Expansion Stratégies

Expansion Stratégies inc. est un bureau-conseil fondé en 1997 par Jacques Grysole, MBA. Sa mission est d’aider au développement à court et long terme de ses clients. Une analyse rigoureuse et précise, des plans stratégiques minutieusement préparés, des indicateurs réalistes de performance et un suivi méthodique sont au cœur de cette approche innovante. Expansion Stratégies inc. contribue au succès d’entreprises privées et publiques au Québec et œuvre dans plus de trente pays auprès d’organismes de développement économique et de grandes organisations de développement international. http://www.expansionstrategies.ca

______________________

** En reprise

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Dix leçons tirées d’une multitude d’entrevues avec des PCD de PME **


Quelles leçons peut-on tirer des entrevues avec les PCD (CEO) d’entreprises de petites capitalisations. C’est ce que nous présente Adam J. Epstein*, un spécialiste de « hedge fund » qui investit des centaines de millions de dollars dans les petites entreprises. L’article a été publié dans mc2MicroCap par Ian Cassel.

J’ai trouvé les conseils très pertinents pour les personnes intéressées à connaître la réalité des évaluations d’entreprises par des investisseurs privés. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

10 Lessons Learned from Interviewing Hundreds of MicroCap CEOs

1)    Preparation – there is no reason to waste your time and someone else’s by sitting down with a CEO to discuss their company without preparing – really preparing.  To me, “really preparing” doesn’t mean looking at Yahoo Finance for a few minutes in the taxi on the way to the meeting, or flipping through the company’s PowerPoint on your phone.  That kind of preparation is akin to walking up a few flights of stairs with some grocery bags to get ready for climbing Mt. Rainier.  To be really prepared for a first meeting means reading/skimming the most recent 10K, the most recent 10Q, the most recent proxy filing, the management presentation, any previous management presentations (more on this later), a recent sell-side company or industry report, and an Internet search of the management team’s backgrounds (with particular emphasis on any prior SEC, NASD, or other state/federal legal problems).  It’s hard to overemphasize how many would-be micro-cap investing disasters can be headed off at the pass by reading what’s said, and not said, and then having the opportunity to ask the CEO directly about what you’ve found.

Stream Near Mt Rainier

2)    Non-Starters – for better or worse, the micro-cap world is home to some “colorful” management teams.  After all of the time served in this regard, absolutely nothing surprises me anymore.  I have found CEOs who were simultaneously running 3 companies, CEOs who were banned from running a public company by the SEC, management presentations that were largely plagiarized, CEOs who shouted profanities in response to basic questions about their “skin in the game,” and CEOs who not only didn’t understand Reg. FD, but clearly didn’t even know it existed.  When in doubt, it’s much better not to invest at all than to make a bad investment; fortunately there are always thousands of other companies to consider.

3)    Company .PPT – these presentations speak volumes about what kind of company you are dealing with if you’re paying attention: a) my colleagues and I came up with a golden rule during my institutional investing tenure, namely that the length of a .ppt presentation is, more often than not, inversely proportional to the quality of the micro-cap company being presented (i.e., any micro-cap company that can’t be adequately presented in less than 20 slides is a problem, and 15 is even better); b) if the slides are too complex to understand on a standalone basis then either the company has a problem or you’re about to invest in something you don’t sufficiently understand – neither is good; c) NEO bios, market information, service/product/IP, strategy, financials, and use of proceeds should all receive equal billing (when buying a house, would you go and visit a house with an online profile that only features pictures of the front yard and the garage?); d) .ppt formatting and spelling/syntax problems are akin to showing up at an important job interview with giant pieces of spinach in your teeth; e) when reviewing use of proceeds (for a prospective financing) or milestones, look up prior investor presentations to see how well they did with prior promises – history often repeats itself; f) treat forward looking projections for what they typically are – fanciful at best, and violations of Reg. FD at worst; and g) micro-cap companies that flaunt celebrities as directors, partners, or investors should be approached cautiously.

4)    NEO Bios – as Ian Cassel often points out quite rightly in my opinion, micro-cap investing is an exercise in wagering on jockeys more than horses.  One of the principal ways prospective investors have to assess jockeys is the manner in which professional backgrounds are set forth; i.e., management bios.  Like a company .ppt, bios of named executive officers speak volumes about the people being described. Here are some things to look out for: a) bios that don’t contain specific company names (at least for a 10 year historic period) typically don’t for a reason, and it’s unlikely to be positive (e.g., “Mr. Smith has held senior management roles with several large technology companies”); b) it’s a good idea to compare SEC bios with bios you might find for the same people on other websites (remember the “three company CEO” referred to earlier?); c) bios that don’t contain any educational references or only highlight executive programs at Harvard, Wharton, Stanford, etc.; d) company websites that don’t have any management/director bios (surprising how many there are); and e) CEOs and CFOs who have never held those jobs before in a public company (to be clear, lots of micro-cap NEOs are “first-timers,” but it’s something you should at least factor into the risk profile of the investment).

5)    Management Conduct – just as management bios speak volumes, so does their conduct at in person one-on-one meetings.  More specifically: a) organized, professional corporate leaders rarely look disheveled or have bad hygiene; b) service providers chosen by companies also represent the company, so the previous observation applies to bankers/lawyers as well; c) CEOs who are overly chatty about non-business issues might not be keen to talk about their companies; d) if a CEO seems glued to their .ppt presentation (i.e., essentially just reading you the slides), tell them to close their laptops and just talk about the company with no visual aids – you will learn an awful lot about them in the ensuing 5 minutes; e) be on the lookout for NEOs or service providers cutting each other off, disagreeing with each other, or talking over one another;  f) when asking questions of the CEO or CFO watch their body language – moving around in their seats, running hands through their hair, perspiration, and less eye contact are nonverbal signs of duress (it’s one of the reasons why in-person meetings with management are always preferable to phone calls); g) if there are more than one NEOs in attendance, are they listening to each other (it’s rarely a great sign when other execs are looking at their phones during meetings); h) is the CEO providing careful, thoughtful answers or are they shooting from the hip – loose lips virtually always sink ships; i) did the CEO answer any questions with “I don’t know” – even great CEOs can’t possibly know the answer to every question about their companies; and j) something partially tongue-in-cheek just to think about – we know from everyday life that when someone starts a sentence with “with all due respect” what inevitably  follows is, well, something disrespectful, and when a CEO repeatedly says “to be honest” what inevitably follows is….

6)    Service Providers – micro-cap service providers (bankers, lawyers, auditors, IR firms, etc.) can run the gamut from highly professional to so bad that they can actually jeopardize companies with their advice.  While it certainly can take a while to learn “the good, the bad, and the ugly” in the micro-cap ecosystem, you can learn a lot about the CEO by asking him/her to take a few minutes to explain why the company’s service providers are the best choices for the shareholders.  It perhaps goes without saying that if a CEO can’t speak artfully, and convincingly in this regard, then buyer beware.

7)    Corporate Governance – spans the full continuum in micro-cap companies from top-notch to nothing more than a mirage.  One way to quickly ferret out which flavor of governance you’re dealing with is to ask a CEO to succinctly set forth the company’s strategy (i.e., goals, risks, opportunities, customers, etc.), and subsequently ask the CEO to describe how each seated director assists with the fundamental elements of achieving that strategy.  Though oversimplified, material disconnects in this regard are very likely to illustrate some governance challenges.  Also, ask the CEO how each of the directors came to the company; if all of the directors were brought to the company by the CEO, it’s fair to ask the CEO how confident an investor should be that the board is suitably independent to monitor the CEOs performance (one of the principal roles of all boards).

8)    Public Company IQ – easily one of the biggest problems with investing in the micro-cap arena is the conspicuous lack of (relevant, successful) capital markets and corporate finance experience in boardrooms and C-suites.  As alluded to earlier, it’s a fact of life that a large percentage of micro-cap officers and directors lack appreciable tenures in shepherding small public companies (to be clear, this doesn’t mean they aren’t smart, successful, and sophisticated, it just means they haven’t had lots of experience in small public companies).  Unlike larger public companies, small public companies can execute relatively well, and still toil in obscurity creating little or no value for shareholders.   It’s a good idea to evaluate the same when meeting with management, because companies with low “public company IQs” are more likely to underperform all else being equal.  Be on the lookout for CEOs who: a) can’t articulate a sensible strategy for maintaining or increasing trading volume; b) seem to regularly undertake financings that are more dilutive than similarly situated peer companies; c) frequently authorize the issuance of press releases that don’t appear to contain material information; d) blame some or all of their capital markets challenges on short-seller/market-making conspiracy theories; and e) can’t name the company’s largest 5 shareholders, their approximate holdings, and the last time he/she spoke to each.

9)    Follow-Up – CEOs who promise to follow-up after meetings with clarified answers, customer references, or more information but don’t are tacitly underscoring for you that they are either disorganized, disingenuous, don’t care about investors or all three.  The opposite is also not good; for example, if the company’s internal or external IR professionals subsequently convey information that seems inappropriate (from a Reg. FD standpoint) – it probably is.

10) Cautionary Note – Bernard Madoff undoubtedly would have passed these tests and a lot more with flying colors.  Sometimes the “bad guys” are really smart and charming and you’re going to either lose most of your money or get defrauded, or both. It’s happened to me, and it’s maddening and humbling at the same time.  Hence, the apt phrase: high risk, high return.

It’s easy, in my experience anyway, to get so skeptical about micro-cap companies that it can be paralyzing.  But, just when you’re about to throw in the towel, along comes a compelling growth prospect run by management with as much integrity and skill as the day is long, and it serves as a poignant reminder of everything that’s great about investing in small public companies.

Like most “best-of” lists, this isn’t intended to be exhaustive by any stretch of the imagination.  In addition to making money and promoting US jobs/innovation, one of the best parts of investing in small public companies in my opinion is continuing to hone the craft, and learn from other investors and their experiences.  Accordingly, add/subtract per your own experiences, and happy hunting.

_________________________________________

*Adam J. Epstein advises small-cap boards through his firm, Third Creek Advisors, LLC, is a National Association of Corporate Directors Board Leadership Fellow, and the author of The Perfect Corporate Board: A Handbook for Mastering the Unique Challenges of Small-Cap Companies, (McGraw Hill, 2012).  He was co-founder and principal of Enable Capital Management, LLC.

** En reprise

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Les dirigeants d’entreprises privées font-ils de bons administrateurs d’OBNL ?


Est-ce que les hauts dirigeants, reconnus pour leurs habiletés de gestionnaires, font de bons administrateurs d’organisations à buts non lucratifs (OBNL) ?

La thèse de William G. Bowen* (1994) est à l’effet que beaucoup de représentants du monde des affaires, siégeant sur des conseils d’administration d’OBNL, le font pour une multitude de raisons n’ayant pas toujours de relations avec les intérêts de l’organisation, mais servent plutôt à faire avancer leurs intérêts personnels !

Eugene H. Fram**, expert en gouvernance des OBNL et auteur du billet publié sur le blogue Nonprofit Management, croit qu’il faut peindre un portrait plus nuancé en 2014. Selon lui, les comités de gouvernance et de mise en nomination ne devraient cependant jamais prendre pour acquis que l’efficacité d’un gestionnaire dans une entreprise privée sera garante d’une valeur ajoutée pour l’OBNL.

Les perceptions de ceux-ci sont trop souvent à l’effet que les OBNL sont plus permissives, moins exigeantes, moins sérieuses …  La réalité est tout autre et les dirigeants devraient y penser à deux fois avant de s’engager sur un C.A. d’OBNL ! Plusieurs témoigneront que les réunions de ces conseils sont très souvent complexes, sensitives, moins structurées et, souvent, éprouvantes pour des « gestionnaires chevronnés »…

On a ici un beau sujet d’étude (de recherche) car le modèle d’affaires des OBNL suppose toujours une contribution remarquable des gens d’affaires !

Pensez-vous que la situation a beaucoup évoluée depuis l’affirmation de Bowen, il y a 20 ans ? La gouvernance des OBNL a-t-elle changée au point de modifier les perceptions des gens d’affaires ?

Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Bonne lecture !

 

Do Today’s Business Leaders Make Effective Nonprofit Directors?

The names of the new board nominees have been announced. They include several outstanding recruits from the business community. Will these new formidable directors perform well in the nonprofit environment? William G. Bowen, a veteran director in both the for-profit and nonprofit environments, raised the following questions about such beginnings in a 1994 article:* Is it true that well-regarded representatives of the business world are often surprisingly ineffective as members of nonprofit boards? Do they seem to have checked their analytical skills and their “toughness” at the door? If this is true in some considerable number of cases, what is the explanation?

An example of the U.S. Nonprofit Organization ...
An example of the U.S. Nonprofit Organization postage meter marking made with a Pitney Bowes mailstream system. Letter. 2007. Русский: Пример штампа франкировальной машины системы Pitney Bowes, имеющего тариф « Nonprofit Organization » (США, 2007). Письмо. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Are Bowen’s observations about directors’ questionable motivations for accepting director positions still applicable in the 21st century? He noted that some nonprofit directors accept board positions because they are dedicated to the organization’s mission, vision and values. But he also hypothesized that business leaders are sometimes motivated to join nonprofit boards for a variety of other reasons. They may regard board membership as a “vacation from the bottom line … or the enjoyment of a membership in a new ‘club’.” Also they perhaps join nonprofit boards to “soften” community perceptions that, as tough bottom-line executives, they also may care as much about human issues as they care about shareholder returns. (It would probably be costly or impossible to obtain objective data of this observation.) Press reports through the years, since 1994, have indicated that such attitudes still hold leadership sway in nonprofit organizations. (See: Nonprofit Board Crisis.com)

In today’s nonprofit environment, there may remain senior business leaders or groups who are less serious about the responsibilities incumbent upon board members, as noted by Bowen. If this is the situation, a high level of board permissiveness, allowed by business-oriented directors and others, is still causing a level of board dysfunction business leaders would never allow on their own boards.

____________________________________

21st Century Reflections on Bowen’s Observations

Since Bowen’s 1994 observations, there have been some improvements. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has driven some of the changes in audit committee’s procedures, overviews of internal controls, whistle-blower requirement, CEO’s & CFOs signatures attesting to financial statement accuracy, etc. Although not required by law, some larger nonprofits have adhered to all the provisions of the Act. I also feel business leaders now think more deeply about joining a nonprofit board, especially after the Penn State scandal and the reputation embarrassment the board encountered.

But do these changes indicate substantial change reducing the permissiveness in the nonprofit environment Bowen described? Anecdotally, here is a typical comment that I continue to hear, this one from the board chair large nonprofit with 300 employees. “We don’t expect the same standards of management performance that the business organization has.”

However, I am optimistic about the future. As nonprofit boards select more professional type CEO’s to lead their organizations, whether they are hired internally or externally, more change will take place. Hopefully, if boards want to retain these people, this movement should place some subtle pressures on board nomination committees to seek more candidates whose motivation is to focus on mission, vision and values, along with balanced budgets. A new breed should readily understand that this focus has the same meaning to nonprofit stakeholders, as a profit focus does to business stakeholders.

_____________________________________________

* William G. Bowen (1994), “When a Business Leader Joins a Nonprofit Board,” Harvard Business Review, September-October. Bowen currently is president emeritus of the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and former president of Princeton University in Princeton. He has served as an outside director for a wide variety of for-profit and nonprofit organizations.

**Eugene H. Fram PRACTITIONER AND PROFESSOR OF MARKETING AND MANAGEMENT, AUTHOR & CONSULTANT. ALSO SIGNIFICANT EXPERTISE WITH BUSINESS & NONPROFIT BOARDS OF DIRECTORS.

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Échafauder le « Board » du futur | McKinsey


Un récent document de McKinsey met en exergue l’importance pour les conseils d’administration de consacrer une partie significative de leur temps à des activités de vision stratégique à long terme plutôt que de rester le nez collé sur les rapports trimestriels, les budgets et la conformité.

L’étude estime qu’environ 70 % du temps du « Board » est investi dans de telles activités qui, même si elles sont essentielles, ne sont pas au cœur de ce que les conseils d’administration devraient faire, c’est-à-dire s’occuper de stratégies et prévoir du temps pour scruter l’avenir (les compétiteurs, le marché, les opportunités, les risques, l’évolution des valeurs sociétales, la mondialisation de l’économie, etc.).

Ce virement de bord doit s’effectuer en remaniant l’ordre du jour des conseils de manière à redresser la balance des responsabilités, c’est-à-dire en consacrant plus de temps à l’avenir ! Voici un extrait de l’excellent document de McKinsey qui montre comment les conseils peuvent répartir leur temps entre des activités de nature traditionnelles et des activités de représentation du futur.

Le tableau 1, présenté dans cet extrait, donne une bonne idée de la façon dont les présidents de conseils doivent envisager l’allocation du temps entre les réunions régulières du conseil :

(1) les activités qui relèvent de la surveillance, du contrôle et du rôle de fiduciaire;

(2) les activités qui concernent la formation de la vision du futur.

Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de cette approche de McKinsey qui, selon moi, marque une coupure dans la façon de concevoir les rôles et les responsabilités des membres du conseil.

Quelle est votre idée là-dessus ? Bonne lecture !

Building a forward-looking board | McKinsey

 

Debate over the role of company boards invariably intensifies when things go wrong on a grand scale, as has happened in recent years. Many of the companies whose corpses litter the industrial and financial landscape were undermined by negligent, overoptimistic, or ill-informed boards prior to the financial crisis and the ensuing deep recession. Not surprisingly, there’s been a renewed focus on improved corporate governance: better structures, more rigorous checks and balances, and greater independence by nonexecutives, for example.

McKinsey & Company competitiveness report
McKinsey & Company competitiveness report (Photo credit: mars_discovery_district)

Governance arguably suffers most, though, when boards spend too much time looking in the rear-view mirror and not enough scanning the road ahead. We have experienced this reality all too often in our work with companies over several decades. It has also come through loud and clear during recent conversations with 25 chairmen of large public and privately held companies in Europe and Asia. Today’s board agendas, indeed, are surprisingly similar to those of a century ago, when the second Industrial Revolution was at its peak. Directors still spend the bulk of their time on quarterly reports, audit reviews, budgets, and compliance—70 percent is not atypical—instead of on matters crucial to the future prosperity and direction of the business.

The alternative is to develop a dynamic board agenda that explicitly highlights these forward-looking activities and ensures that they get sufficient time over a 12-month period. The exhibit illustrates how boards could devote more of their time to the strategic and forward-looking aspects of the agenda. This article discusses ways to achieve the right balance.

How forward-looking boards should spend their time

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Vent de changement dans les pratiques de vote des actionnaires !


Toute l’attention portée à la propriété et à la gouvernance des entreprises au cours des dernières années a menée à une réaffirmation du pouvoir du vote des actionnaires lors des assemblées annuelles des sociétés. Les actionnaires font entendre leurs voix de multiples manières auprès de la direction des entreprises et des conseils d’administration. La montée de l’actionnariat activiste est sûrement l’une des raisons de cette recrudescence.

La théorie de l’agence – qui veut que les actionnaires choisissent leurs agents/représentants (i.e. les administrateurs) et que ces derniers soient tenus responsables de la direction de l’organisation – semble mise à mal par les nouvelles intrusions des actionnaires dans la gestion de l’entreprise.

Les auteurs Paul H. Edelman et Randall S. Thomas, professeurs à Vanderbilt University, et Robert Thompson, professeur à Georgetown University Law Center, ont publié un document de recherche captivant portant sur le renouvellement des pratiques de votation dans une ère de « capitalisme intermédiaire ».

Quels sont les implications de ces changements pour la gouvernance des entreprises ? Assiste-t-on à un séisme dans le monde de la gouvernance ? Quelle sera la place des administrateurs dans la conduite des organisations si les actionnaires veulent faire la loi et exercer leur volonté en tout temps ?

Voici un résumé du document tel qu’il est présenté sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum. Vos commentaires sont bienvenus. Bonne lecture !

 

Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism

Shareholder voting, once given up for dead as a vestige or ritual of little practical importance, has come roaring back as a key part of American corporate governance. Where once voting was limited to uncontested annual election of directors, it is now common to see short slate proxy contests, board declassification proposals, and “Say on Pay” votes occurring at public companies. The surge in the importance of shareholder voting has caused increased conflict between shareholders and directors, a tension well-illustrated in recent high profile voting fights in takeovers (e.g. Dell) and in the growing role for Say on Pay votes. Yet, despite the obvious importance of shareholder voting, none of the existing corporate law theories coherently justify it.

Vote
Vote (Photo credit: Alan Cleaver)

Traditional theory about shareholder voting, rooted in concepts of residual ownership and a principal/agent relationship, does not easily fit with the long-standing legal structure of corporate law that generally cabins the shareholder role in corporate governance. Nor do those theories reflect recent fundamental changes as to who shareholders are and their incentives to vote (or not vote). Most shares today are owned by intermediaries, usually holding other people’s money within retirement plans and following business plans that gives the intermediaries little reason to vote those shares or with conflicts that may distort that vote. Yet three key developments have countered that reality and opened the way for voting’s new prominence. First, government regulations now require many institutions to vote their stock in the best interests of their beneficiaries. Second, subsequent market innovations led to the birth of third party voting advisors, including Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which help address the costs of voting and the collective action problems inherent in coordinated institutional shareholder action. And third, building on these developments, hedge funds have aggressively intervened in corporate governance at firms seen as undervalued, making frequent use of the ballot box to pressure targeted firms to create shareholder value, thereby giving institutional shareholders a good reason to care about voting. In a parallel way outside of the hedge fund space, institutional investors have made dramatically greater use of voting in Say on Pay proposals, Rule 14a-8 corporate governance proposals and majority vote requirements for the election of directors.

The newly invigorated shareholder voting is not without its critics though. Corporate management has voiced fears about the increase in shareholders’ voting power, as well as about third party voting advisors’ perceived conflicts of interest. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has asked for public comments on the possible undue influence of proxy advisors over shareholder voting. Even institutional investors have varying views on the topic. Can we trust the vote to today’s intermediaries and their advisors?

In our article, Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, we first develop our theory of shareholder voting. We argue that shareholders (and only shareholders) have been given the right to vote because they are the only corporate stakeholder whose return on their investment is tied directly to the company’s stock price; if stock price is positively correlated with the residual value of the firm, shareholders will want to maximize the firm’s residual value and vote accordingly. Thus, shareholder voting should lead to value maximizing decisions for the firm as a whole.

But that does not mean that shareholders should vote for everything. Economic theory and accepted principles of corporate law tell us that corporate officers exercise day to day managerial power at the public firm with boards of directors having broad monitoring authority over them. In this framework, shareholder voting is explained by its comparative value as a monitor. We would expect a shareholder vote to play a supplemental monitoring role if the issue being decided affects the company’s stock price, or long term value, and if the shareholder vote is likely to be superior, or complementary, to monitoring by the board or the market. This is particularly likely where the officers or directors of the company suffer from a conflict of interest, or may otherwise be seeking private benefits at the expense of the firm. Thus shareholder voting can play a negative role as a monitoring device by helping stop value-decreasing transactions.

Monitoring is not the only theoretical justification for shareholders voting. We posit two additional theories that provide positive reasons for corporate voting because they enhance decision-making beyond monitoring. Shareholder voting can provide: (1) a superior information aggregation device for private information held by shareholders when there is uncertainty about the correct decision; and (2) an efficient mechanism for aggregating heterogeneous preferences when the decision differentially affects shareholders.

We also explore whether contemporary shareholders have the characteristics that permit them to play the roles our theory contemplates. In particular, we examine the business plan that gives today’s intermediaries reasons not to vote or conflicts that can distort their vote. Similar attention is given to the regulatory and market changes that have grown up in response to this reality: government-required voting by intermediaries; third party proxy advisory firms to let this voting occur more efficiently; and hedge fund strategies to make voting pay, for themselves and for other intermediaries such as mutual funds and pension funds.

Finally, we use our theory to illuminate when shareholder voting is justified. We focus on the role of corporate voting where the issue is a high dollar, “big ticket” decision. We use hedge fund activism as an example of this scenario and show how it fits with each of the prongs of our voting theory. Here we see voting performing the monitoring role anticipated by our theory, but there is also an important role for aggregating heterogeneous preferences among shareholders as mutual funds decide whether to follow hedge fund initiatives. In addition, we make the less obvious case for shareholder voting where hedge funds drop out of the equation–on decisions that have a smaller effect on stock prices, or the company’s long term value, such as Say on Pay, majority voting proposals, and board declassification proposals.

In sum, this article presents a positive theory of corporate voting as it exists today. In doing so, it directly addresses the vast shifts in stock ownership that have created intermediary capitalism and the important role of government regulations and market participants in making corporate voting effective. At the same time, it preserves for corporate management the lion’s share of corporate decision making, subject to active shareholder monitoring using corporate voting in conflict situations that affect stock price.

The full paper is available for download here.

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Document de consultation de l’OCDE sur la révision des principes de gouvernance |2014


Voici le document de consultation de l’OCDE sur la révision des principes de gouvernance |2014, présenté à Paris le 17 mars 2014. Ce document est en version anglaise seulement. Après la révision, l’OCDE produira des versions dans toutes les langues !

Celui-ci explicite les objectifs de politiques publiques en gouvernance, explore le  nouveau paysage qui commande des changements en gouvernance et suggère sept (7) domaines susceptibles d’engendrer des changements importants au document Principe de gouvernance de 2004 (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance).

Je vous invite à participer à cette consultation si vous croyez utile de le faire. Ci-dessous, une introduction, suivie des 7 développements qui influeront sur la nouvelle version des principes de gouvernance de l’OCDE.

The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance is a public policy instrument intended to assist governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, regulatory and institutional framework for corporate governance. As formulated in the mandate that was given to the OECD Corporate Governance Committee in 2010, the objective is to contribute to « economic efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability ». In practice, this objective is achieved by formulating principles for policies that give market participants sound economic incentives to perform their respective roles within a framework of checks and balances where transparency, supervision and effective enforcement provides confidence in market practices and institutions.

English: The logo of the Organisation for Econ...
English: The logo of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

While the Principles may inspire voluntary initiatives and influence practices in individual companies, the Principles do not aspire to include a shopping list of what individual market participants, such as shareholders, boards, managers and other stakeholders, from their unique perspectives, may consider good business judgment or sound commercial practices. What works in one company or for one investor may not necessarily be generally applicable as public policy or of systemic economic importance to society.

In order to be relevant and effective, the legal and regulatory framework must be shaped with respect to the economic reality in which it will be implemented. This is true also for the recommendations made in the Principles. And since they were last revised in 2004, the world has experienced a number of important events and structural developments in both the financial and corporate sectors. This obviously includes the financial crisis. But equally important for the review of the Principles are the far reaching changes in corporate ownership and investment practices. In some respects, these changes have come to challenge conventional wisdom and the relevance of current corporate governance standards. Several of these developments have been documented and analysed by the Corporate Governance Committee and the Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables and some of the background reports that have been written to support the review are annexed to this note for reference.

Seven main events and developments of importance to the review of the Principles can be identified:

The financial crisis.

The financial crisis revealed severe shortcomings in corporate governance. When most needed, existing standards failed to provide the checks and balances that companies need in order to cultivate sound business practices. Corporate governance weaknesses in remuneration, risk management, board practices and the exercise of shareholder rights played an important role in the development of the financial crisis and such weaknesses extended not only to the financial sector, but to companies more generally. The lessons from the financial crisis are discussed in the Committee’s report « Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Conclusions and Emerging Good Practices to Enhance Implementation of the Principles » (2010).

Developments in institutional ownership, investment strategies and trading techniques.

Since the Principles were revised in 2004, assets under management by institutional investors have increased considerably. We have also seen a surge in new types of institutional investors, investment vehicles and trading techniques. Taken together, these developments have affected the character and quality of ownership engagement. Many of the largest institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds use indexing as the prime investment strategy. A special, and increasingly popular, version of indexing is the use of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), which increased by more than 1000 percent between 2004 and 2011. A common characteristic of these investment practices is that they motivate investors to pay little or no attention to the fundamentals of individual companies, since the composition of the index is pre-defined and adjustments in the portfolio is not by active choice but rather a result of the index weighting. The same effect results from the surge in so-called high frequency trading where the investment strategy and ultra-short holding periods do not motivate any corporate specific analysis or ownership engagement. A fourth development that has attracted a lot of interest and debate is co-location of brokers, data vendors and other participants’ computer capacity within the stock exchanges’ data centres. This has raised concerns about confidence in a level playing field among different categories of investors with respect to market information. These developments and their implications for the economic incentives for ownership engagement among institutional investors are further discussed in « Institutional Investors as Owners – Who Are They and What Do They Do? » (2013).

Developments in the investment chain and the use of service providers.

The real world of ownership characterised by institutional (or intermediary) investors is a very different reality than the model textbook world of company law and economics, which assumes a strict and uncompromised alignment of interest between the performance of the company and the income of the ultimate shareholder. Instead of a straight line from « from profit to pocket », which is assumed in theory, we have an extended and sometimes very complex investment chain where different actors may have different incentives. The implications for the quality of ownership engagement are discussed in the background report « Institutional Investors as Owners – Who Are They and What Do They Do? » (2013). Among other aspects, the report highlights the possible implications of cross-investments between different institutional investors and the extensive use of proxy advisers, which is sometimes argued to impose a box ticking culture of « one-size-fits-all ». The last couple of decades have also seen an increase in outsourcing of asset management to external asset managers who may also be charged with carrying out the ownership functions. The complexity of the investment chain is also influenced by changes in stock market structures, trading practices and investment strategies. One example is the increased use of dark pools and off-exchange trading platforms that has increased concerns about the quality of the price discovery process and equal access to market information, which is so essential for efficient allocation of capital.

Developments in shareholder rights and participation.

Since the last review of the Principles, shareholder rights in many countries have been strengthened and there is a general trend to empower the shareholder meeting in the corporate decision-making process, particularly with respect to board nomination and remuneration policies. Technological advancements have also contributed to facilitating shareholder participation in the shareholder meetings. As documented in the report « Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today’s Equity Markets » (2013), several studies illustrate a relatively high level of participation in shareholder meetings in most OECD countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States that have predominantly dispersed ownership at corporate level. Today, the discussion on shareholder participation is mainly focused on the actual quality of shareholder monitoring and engagement, with the exception of issues related to shareholder co-operation. In some countries, particularly in emerging market economies, it is also argued that ownership engagement is impeded by difficulties with respect to placing items on the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting; the rules for convening shareholders’ meetings; limited access to relevant documentation and restrictions on share ownership by institutional investors.

Developments in corporate characteristics and business models.

Investments in fixed assets, such as machinery and buildings, have for decades been seen as the main source of capital formation. A recent OECD study1, however, shows that business investment in intangible assets has been increasing faster than investments in fixed assets for a number of years in many OECD countries and already accounts for more than half of the total business investment in some countries. The result is an increased dependence on human capital and intangible assets for innovation and value creation at firm level. At the same time, there has been significant number of acquisitions by some large established companies in more intangible-asset-intensive industries, partly through their venture units. Together with the decrease in the number of new listings in advanced stock markets, these developments have raised concerns about the ability of growth companies to develop and expand as independent companies. One preliminary indicator is the decrease in the share of young companies as percentage of the total number of companies in the US by 16% over the last decade. Another important development in terms of corporate characteristics and business models is the creation and surge of alternative corporate structures, mainly in the form of partnerships. This includes publicly traded partnerships (PTPs) and master limited partnerships (MSPs) that trade on securities exchanges.

Developments in corporate ownership.

Traditionally, the international corporate governance debate has focused on situations with dispersed ownership where the conflict is a zero sum game between dispersed owners on the one hand and incumbent management on the other hand. This « agency » approach has its merits but it also has important weaknesses. One important weakness is that most listed companies around the world are not characterized by dispersed ownership. Rather, they have a controlling or dominant owner. This is particularly true in emerging markets. But controlling owners are also common in most advanced economies, including the US and continental Europe. It has been argued that the focus on dispersed ownership is of limited help when addressing corporate governance issues in companies that have a controlling owner. The presence of controlling owners is generally assumed to provide strong incentives for informed ownership engagement and to overcome the fundamental agency problem between shareholders and managers. There are also arguments that the incentives for controlling owners to assume the costs for this ownership engagement are weakened by restrictions on the possibilities of controlling owners to exercise their rights and be properly compensated for their efforts to monitor. Some of these are discussed in the background paper « The Law and Economics of Controlling Owners in Corporate Governance » (2013). At the same time, there are concerns that controlling owners in a weak regulatory framework may take advantage of minority shareholders through abusive related party transactions. This is discussed in the report « Related Party Transactions and Minority Shareholder Rights » (2012).

Developments in the functioning of public stock markets.

Corporate governance policies are focused on companies that are traded on the public stock market. To understand the functioning and structure of public stock markets is therefore essential for getting the corporate governance rules right. And today, stock markets look very different from what they did when the OECD Principles were first established. The developments are well documented in the background reports « Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today’s Equity Markets » (2013) and « Making Stock markets Work to Support Economic Growth » (2013), which address issues such as market fragmentation, increased use of dark pools, changes in « tick-size », high-frequency trading and co-location. The reports also show that during the last decade, some of the leading stock markets in the world have lost as much as half of their listed companies and that the average size of companies that find their way to the stock market has increased. At the same time, stock exchanges in emerging markets, notably in Asia, have increased the number of listed companies significantly. Between 2008 and 2012 a majority of all new listings in the world were in emerging markets. Since the free float (the portion of outstanding shares regularly available for public trading) is relatively small in these markets, one consequence of this development is an increase in the number of publicly traded companies that have a controlling owner. Another important development is the occurrence of cross-listings and secondary listings, which raises issues related to the standards and procedures for recognizing of corporate governance standards in primary listing venues and the allocation of supervisory obligations between listing stock exchanges. We have also seen a development where stock exchanges have demutualised and become listed companies on themselves; so called self-listing. At the same time, there has been a certain degree of consolidation through mergers of regulated exchanges both at national and international level, which was coupled with the emergence of new venues for trading; such as alternative trading venues and dark pools.

2014 Review of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

First released in May 1999 and last revised in 2004, the OECD Corporate Governance Committee has launched a further review of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. The review process starts in 2014 with the objective of conclusion within one year.

 The OECD Principles are one of the 12 key standards for international financial stability of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and form the basis for the corporate governance component of the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes of the World Bank Group.

 The rationale for the review is to ensure the continuing high quality, relevance and usefulness of the Principles taking into account recent developments in the corporate sector and capital markets. The outcome should provide policy makers, regulators and other rule-making bodies with a sound benchmark for establishing an effective corporate governance framework.

 The basis for the review will be the 2004 version of the Principles, which embrace the shared understanding that a high level of transparency, accountability, board oversight, and respect for the rights of shareholders and role of key stakeholders is part of the foundation of a well-functioning corporate governance system. These core values should be maintained and, as appropriate, be strengthened to reflect experiences since 2004.

 As the Principles are a global standard also adopted by the FSB, all FSB member jurisdictions are invited to participate in the review as Associates and have the same decision-making rights as OECD members.

 The review will benefit from consultations with stakeholders, including the business sector, investors, professional groups at national and international levels, trade unions, civil society organisations and other international standard setting bodies.

Peer reviews – In response to the corporate governance challenges that came into focus in the wake of the financial crisis, the Corporate Governance Committee launched a thematic review process designed to facilitate the effective implementation of the OECD Principles and to assist market participants and policy makers to respond to emerging corporate governance risks. These peer reviews will provide valuable background support to the review.

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Placer les actionnaires-investisseurs au cœur du processus de nomination des administrateurs | Qu’en pensez-vous ?


Il est toujours intéressant de lire des articles qui font des propositions audacieuses sur la gouvernance des sociétés. En effet, c’est assez rare dans ce domaine qu’on se hasarde à présenter de nouvelles façons d’exercer la gouvernance.

Voici un article original et provocant publié par Emil Redding* dans CITYA.M.com qui suggère une nouvelle manière de nommer des administrateurs afin de tenir compte d’une plus grande diversité, mais aussi d’une plus grande volonté d’engagement des grands actionnaires-investisseurs dans la composition des comités de gouvernance et de mise en nomination !

Voici un extrait de l’article. Que pensez-vous de la proposition de l’auteure ?

Shareholders must be involved at an earlier stage of the process to have a real say over who is chosen. Instead of the Nominations Committee being made up of part of the current board, usually including the chair and often the chief executive, there should be a majority of “investor representatives” chosen by the body of shareholders. They would then have a vital say in who was put forward for final selection, and for “election” at the AGM.
 
Once the right non-executive directors (NEDs) are being appointed, they should be treated as more professional, held to account and rewarded accordingly. The recruitment of NEDs should become more formal and include psychometric testing. But the evaluation of NEDs also needs to become more in-depth. Pay should form an automatic part of board evaluations, and sector average pay levels should be published by the Financial Reporting Council to increase transparency.
 
By encouraging the owners of companies to take more responsibility, the UK corporate governance framework will be strengthened …

 

The boardroom debate needs to move beyond gender

WEAK and ineffectual boards are a risk to the health of their companies and to the whole UK economy. As the Flowers chairmanship of Co-op Bank showed, a board that does not contain the right mix of skills and experience will not be able to prevent mistakes from happening. We need financial and technical experts holding boardroom bosses to account. Yet the British corporate governance debate has been dominated by gender diversity. While it is vitally important that boards become more representative, this also skews attention away from where it should be – how to appoint directors with a diversity of skills and experience. So how can it be achieved? As my report today recommends, instead of executive search firms expanding shortlists to include more women, their attention should be on including people with different skills and experiences to those traditionally head-hunted. In the annual report, the skills and experiences of each board member should be emphasised, rather than their gender, so that focus shifts onto what that person brings to the monitoring and steering of the firm. Engaging shareholders is another necessary step. The 2012 Kay Review rightly identified lack of investor oversight as a crucial flaw, but the proposal to set up an Investor Forum, where shareholders meet to encourage collective engagement, and vague recommendations that investors be consulted over major appointments, will do little to improve the relationship between shareholders and the firms they own. Investors do have a say, by voting at the AGM. Yet the board typically puts forward the people they want, and shareholders unanimously waive the appointments through. Shareholders must be involved at an earlier stage of the process to have a real say over who is chosen. Instead of the Nominations Committee being made up of part of the current board, usually including the chair and often the chief executive, there should be a majority of “investor representatives” chosen by the body of shareholders. They would then have a vital say in who was put forward for final selection, and for “election” at the AGM. Once the right non-executive directors (NEDs) are being appointed, they should be treated as more professional, held to account and rewarded accordingly. The recruitment of NEDs should become more formal and include psychometric testing. But the evaluation of NEDs also needs to become more in-depth. Pay should form an automatic part of board evaluations, and sector average pay levels should be published by the Financial Reporting Council to increase transparency. By encouraging the owners of companies to take more responsibility, the UK corporate governance framework will be strengthened. This is the best insurance we can have against governance failures such as at Co-Op Bank.

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*Emily Redding is author of Policy Exchange’s report Board Rules: Improving Corporate Governance.
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