Étiquette : composition

Comment les principaux intéressés peuvent-ils évaluer la qualité d’un conseil d’administration ?


Que peut faire un actionnaire ou un investisseur pour évaluer la compétence d’un conseil d’administration et se former une opinion sur l’efficacité de son rôle de fiduciaire ?

Voici un article, publié par la rédaction d’Investopedia, qui présente un checklist en cinq points, simple mais fort utile, pour mieux savoir quoi regarder dans la documentation publique.

Bien sûr, votre évaluation ne sera pas nécessairement concluante mais je suis assuré que si vous portez une attention spéciale aux 5 éléments présentés ci-dessous, vous aurez une bien meilleure appréciation des qualités du conseil et de ses administrateurs.

Quels autres facteurs considérez-vous dans l’évaluation des compétences d’un Board ? Bonne lecture !

Evaluating The Board Of Directors

You can learn a lot from looking at the disclosures made about a company’s board of directors in its annual report, but it takes time and knowledge to pick up clues on the level of quality of a company’s governance as reflected in its board’s composition and responsibilities. (For related reading, see An Investor’s Checklist To Financial Footnotes and Footnotes: Early Warning Signs For Investors.)

Tulips

In theory, the board is responsible to the shareholders and is supposed to govern a company’s management. But in many instances, the board has become a servant of the chief executive officer (CEO), who is typically also the chairman of the board. The role of the board of directors has increasingly come under scrutiny in light of corporate scandals such as those at Enron, WorldCom and HealthSouth, in which the board of directors failed to act in investors’ best interests. Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 made corporations more accountable, investors should still pay attention to what a corporation’s board of directors is up to. Here we’ll show you what the board of directors can tell you about how a company is being run.

The Checklist
According to an October 27, 2003, Wall Street Journal article, a checklist was developed by the Corporate Library to help investors evaluate the objectivity and effectiveness of a board. According to this checklist, investors should examine:

1. Size of the Board
There is no universal agreement on the optimum size of a board of directors. A large number of members represents a challenge in terms of using them effectively and/or having any kind of meaningful individual participation. According to the Corporate Library’s study, the average board size is 9.2 members, and most boards range from 3 to 31 members. Some analysts think the ideal size is seven.

In addition, there are two critical board committees that must be made up of independent members:

  1. The compensation committee
  2. The audit committee

The minimum number for each committee is three. This means that a minimum of six board members is needed so that no one is on more than one committee. Having members doing double duty may compromise the important wall between audit and compensation, which helps avoid any conflicts of interest. Members serving on a number of other boards may not devote adequate time to their responsibilities.

The seventh member is the chairperson of the board. It’s the responsibility of the chairperson to make sure the board is functioning properly and the CEO is fulfilling his or her duty and following the directives of the board. A conflict of interest is created if the CEO is also the chairperson of the board.

To staff any additional committees, such as nominating or governance, additional people may be necessary. However, having more than nine members may make the board too big to function effectively. (For background reading, see The Basics Of Corporate Structure.)

2. The Degree of Independence: Insiders and Outsiders
A key attribute of an effective board is that it is comprised of a majority of independent outsiders. While not necessarily true, a board with a majority of insiders is often viewed as being stacked with sycophants, especially in cases where the CEO is also the chairman of the board.

An outsider is someone who has never worked at the company, is not related to any of the key employees and has never worked for a major supplier, customer or service provider, such as lawyers, accountants, consultants, investment bankers, etc. While this definition of independent outsiders is clear, you’d be surprised at the number of times it is misapplied. Too often, the « outsider » label is given to the retired CEO or a relative when that person is actually an insider with conflicts of interest.The Wall Street Journal article found that independent outsiders made up 66% of all boards and 72% of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) boards. The larger the number of outside board members the better. This makes the board more independent and allows it to provide a higher level of corporate governance to shareholders, particularly if the position of chairman of the board is separated from the CEO and is held by an outsider.

3. Committees
There are four important board committees: executive, audit, compensation and nominating. There may be more committees depending on corporate philosophy, which is determined by an ethics committee and special circumstances relating to a particular company’s line of business. Let’s take a closer look at the four main committees:

  1. The Executive Committee
    The executive committee, is made up of a small number of board members that are readily accessible and easily convened, to decide on matters subject to board consideration but must be decided on expeditiously, such as a quarterly meeting. Executive committee proceedings are always reported to and reviewed by the full board. Just as with the full board, investors should prefer that independent directors make up the majority of an executive committee.
  2. The Audit Committee
    The audit committee works with the auditors to make sure that the books are correct and that there are no conflicts of interest between the auditors and the other consulting firms employed by the company. Ideally, the chair of the audit committee is a Certified Public Accountant (CPA). Often, a CPA is not on the audit committee, let alone on the board. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) requires that the audit committee include a financial expert, but this qualification is typically met by a retired banker, even though that person’s ability to catch fraud may be questionable. The audit committee should meet at least four times a year in order to review the most recent audit. An additional meeting should be held if there are other issues that need to be addressed
  3. The Compensation Committee.
    The compensation committee is responsible for setting the pay of top executives. It seems obvious that the CEO or other people with conflicts of interest should not be on this committee, but you’d be surprised at the number of companies that allow just that. It is important to check if the members of the compensation board are also on the compensation committees of other firms because of the potential conflict of interest. The compensation committee should meet at least twice a year. Having only one meeting may be a sign that the committee meets just to approve a pay package that was created by the CEO or a consultant without much debate. (To learn more, read Evaluating Executive Compensation.)
  4. The Nominating Committee
    This committee is responsible for nominating people to the board. The nomination process should aim to bring on people with independence and a skill set currently lacking on the board.M

4. Other Commitments and Time Constraints
The number of boards and committees a board member is on is a key consideration when judging the effectiveness of a member.

The following chart from the survey shows the time commitments of board members of the 1,700 largest U.S. public companies according the the study’s 2003 data. This indicates that the majority of board members sit on no more than three boards. What this data does not specify is the number of committees to which these people belong.

You’ll often find that independent board members serve on both the audit and compensation committees and are also on three or more other boards. You have to wonder how much time a board member can devote to a company’s business if the person is on multiple boards. This situation also raises questions about the supply of independent outside directors. Are these people pulling double duty because there’s a lack of qualified outsiders?

5. Related Transactions
Companies must disclose any transactions with executives and directors in a financial note entitled « Related Transactions. » This discloses actions or relationships that cause conflicts of interest, such as doing business with a director’s company or having relatives of the CEO receiving professional fees from the company.

The Bottom Line
The composition and performance of a board of directors says a lot about its responsibilities to a company’s shareholders. A board loses credibility if its objectivity and independence are compromised by material shortcomings in this checklist. Investors are poorly served by substandard governance practices.

Clarifications au sujet des deux principaux systèmes de gouvernance | One Tier vs Two Tier


Ici, en Amérique du Nord, on entend quelquefois parler des distinctions entre le modèle de gouvernance européen et le modèle de gouvernance à l’américaine. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, une brève synthèse des particularités des modèles de gouvernance européens eu égard à la distinction one tier/two tier systèmes de gouvernance.

Cette conclusions est basée sur une recherche de type « Benchmarking » conduite par ecoDa* (The European Confederation of Directors Associations) auprès de ses membres des Instituts de gouvernance européens ainsi qu’auprès d’autres membres non-européens, tel que le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS).

À la suite de l’extrait présentant les grandes lignes de ces modèles de gouvernance, vous trouverez un portrait plus précis des principales différences entre les deux systèmes, dont les deux plus représentatifs (UK, One Tier; Allemagne, Two Tier).

Bonne lecture !

 

Although the European Union tries to undermine the differences, the corporate law and corporate governance is highly diversified throughout Europe, embedded in a long history of specific societal and economic approaches towards the organisation of the business world, aligning governance with these quite different societal priorities.IMG_20140520_212116

In the two tier system, supervisory board members control the strategy but don’t define it. In the two tier system, there is also a clear cut between management and control responsibilities. In the one tier system, the board governs the company e. g. controls the direction, defines the strategic options and can address any issues related to the performance of the company.

People advocating for the two tier model always point out that having distance between management and oversight creates independence that makes sense. People defending the one-tier system consider that having executives and non-executives on the same board provides a better flow of information and helps to overcome problems that boards can face in understanding what is going on in the company. The one-tier system would also enable the non-executive to see how executive operate together as a team. The non-executive would be more involved in forward-looking of the strategy. As a downside effect of the one tier system, it is difficult for non-executives to draw distinction between monitoring and oversight.

The one tier system is often seen as an English model while the two-tier system is more of a German style. But the reality is more complex than that over the different countries in the European Union. The Nordic Corporate Governance (CG) model is quite unique with a strictly hierarchical governance structure and a direct chain of command among the general meeting, the board and the CEO. The Italian CG model is also special with the distinction between the managing body (sole administrator or, in the collective form of a board of directors) and the controlling organ (so called “board of statutory auditors”)

 

One-tier board system Two-tier board system 
Organisation
A single board. A supervisory body and a management body.
Composition
Mixed, executive and non-executive directors may serve on the board. Separate, executive and non-executive directors serve on separate boards (i.e., a supervisory board composed exclusively of non-executive directors and a management board composed exclusively of executive directors).
Organisation
Unitary Binary
Committees
Mandatory or recommended Supervisory and advisory committees(Mandatory) oversight and advisory committees such as the audit committee, the remuneration committee and the nomination (appointments) committee, composed of a majority of non-executive directors, one or more of whom must be independent.Supervisory committee

Optional committee entrusted with supervising the company, composed of both executive and non-executive directors.

Usually differs slightly from a true supervisory board (as found in the two-tier system) in terms of powers, composition and role.

 

Mostly found in countries which present characteristics of a one-tier system while incorporating certain features of a two-tier system.

 

 OptionalHistorically not required but oversight and advisory committees are increasingly important in the two-tier system as well.
Roles
Board of directors Managerial roleDirection and executive actsDecision-taking, management and oversightPerformance enhancement

Supervisory role

Accountability

Strategic and financial oversight

 

 Management board Managerial roleDirection and executive actsDecision-taking and managementPerformance enhancement

Service and strategic role

 

Supervisory board

 

Supervisory role

Accountability

Decision-taking and oversight

Monitoring role

Strategic and financial oversight

 

 
CEO duality
Allowed.The same person can serve as both CEO and chair of the board of directors (although this is generally not recommended by corporate governance practices). 

 

 Restricted.No CEO duality (although the CEO can sometimes be a member or attend meetings of the supervisory board.)
Executive directors
Appointed by the general meeting of shareholders, based on a proposal by the board or appointments committee (if any).A director may be appointed by the board of directors when the term of office of another director comes to an end, in order to prevent the board from being paralyzed, for example if the board no longer has a sufficient number of members as required by law or the articles (co-optation procedure).The appointment of a co-opted director must be confirmed at the first general meeting of shareholders following his or her appointment.  Appointed by the supervisory board or the general meeting of shareholders, based on a proposal by the board or the appointments committee (if there is one).
Non-Executive (supervisory directors)
Idem. Appointed by the general meeting of shareholders or, based on a proposal by the supervisory board or the appointments committee (if there is one).
Conflicts perspective
Negatively associated with the separation of decision-management and decision-oversight roles due to its composition (a majority of executive directors) and unitary structure.Diffusion of tasks and responsibilities weakens the non-executive directors’ ability to oversee the implementation of decisions, especially where executive and non-executive directors face the same potential legal liability.Higher risk of conflicts of interest between management and shareholders. 

To avoid conflicts of interest, it is often recommended that the one-tier board be composed of a majority of non-executive directors, due to   (i)

their experience and knowledge, (ii) their contacts, which may enhance management’s ability to secure external resources, and (iii) their independence from the CEO.

 

In companies which have achieved a certain level of development, risks of conflicts of interest are often reduced through the creation of committees allowing these functions to be segregated. In addition, legal provisions aimed at preventing and resolving conflict of interest exist in most jurisdictions.

  		•  Positively associated with the separation of decision-management and decision-oversight roles, due to the composition of the supervisory board (independent directors) which ensures independence and its binary structure.No diffusion of tasks and responsibilities. 

    Lower risk of conflicts of interest between management and shareholders.

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     
    (Dis)advantages
    AdvantagesSpirit of partnership and mutual respect between directors, which allows greater interaction amongst all board members.Non-executive directors have more contact with the company itself and are more involved in the decision-making process. Non-executive directors have direct access to information.

     

    Decision-making process is faster.

     

    A lighter administrative burden as only a single management body needs to hold meetings and only a single set of minutes need be drawn up.

     

    Board meetings take place more regularly.

     

    Disadvantages

    A single body is entrusted with both managing and supervising the company’s operations.

     

    More difficult to guarantee the independence of board members and there is a greater risk of non-executive directors aligning too much with executive directors.

     

    More liability for non-executive directors.

     

     

    		 Advantages Clear distinction between the supervisory and management functions within the company.Clear distinctions of liabilities between the members of the supervisory and management bodies.Supervisory board members are more independent.

     

    Clear separation of the roles of chairman and CEO.

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Disadvantages

    It is more difficult for directors to build relationships of trust, thereby potentially undermining communication between the two boards.

     

    Supervisory board members only receive limited information (from the management board) and at a later stage (decreased involvement). There is a heightened risk of the supervisory board not discovering shortcomings or discovering them too late.

     

    Decision-making process is delayed due to less frequent supervisory board meetings.

     

    Non-executive directors face several challenges which appear to be typical of the two-tier board model, such as difficulties (i) building relationships of trust, thereby potentially undermining communication and flows of information between the two boards, and (ii) fully understanding and ratifying strategic initiatives by the management board, thereby frustrating the decision-making processes.

     

    _______________________________________________

    ecoDa (The European Confederation of Directors Associations) is a not-for-profit association based in Brussels, which acts as the « European voice of directors » and represents around 60,000 board directors from across the European Union (EU) member states. The organisation acts as a forum for debate and public advocacy by influencing the public policy debate at EU level and by promoting appropriate director training, professional development and boardroom best practice.

    Les risques de gouvernance associés à l’OPA d’Alibaba


    , professeur de droit, d’économique et de finance, et directeur des programmes sur la gouvernance corporative à la Harvard law School vient de publier un article très important dans le New York Times.

    L’auteur met les investisseurs en garde contre de réels risques de gouvernance liés à l’offre publique d’achat (OPA) de l’entreprise chinoise Alibaba.

    Je crois qu’il est utile de mieux comprendre les enjeux de gouvernance avant d’investir dans cette immense OPA.

    Bonne lecture !

     

    Wall Street is eagerly watching what is expected to be one of the largest initial public offering in history: the offering of the Chinese Internet retailer Alibaba at the end of this week. Investors have been described by the media as “salivating” and “flooding underwriters with orders.” It is important for investors, however, to keep their eyes open to the serious governance risks accompanying an Alibaba investment.

    Several factors combine to create such risks. For one, insiders have a permanent lock on control of the company but hold only a small minority of the equity capital. Then, there are many ways to divert value to affiliated entities, but there are weak mechanisms to prevent this. Consequently, public investors should worry that, over time, a significant amount of the value created by Alibaba would not be shared with them.

    In Alibaba, control is going to be locked forever in the hands of a group of insiders known as the Alibaba Partnership. These are all managers in the Alibaba Group or related companies. The Partnership will have the exclusive right to nominate candidates for a majority of the board seats. Furthermore, if the Partnership fails to obtain shareholder approval for its candidates, it will be entitled “in its sole discretion and without the need for any additional shareholder approval” to appoint directors unilaterally, thus ensuring that its chosen directors always have a majority of board seats.

    Alibaba is scheduled to become a publicly traded company later this week.

    Many public companies around the world, especially in emerging economies, have a large shareholder with a lock on control. Such controlling shareholders, however, often own a substantial portion of the equity capital that provides them with beneficial incentives. In the case of Alibaba, investors need to worry about the relatively small stake held by the members of the controlling Alibaba Partnership.

    After the I.P.O., Alibaba’s executive chairman, Jack Ma, is expected to hold 7.8 percent of the shares and all the directors and executive officers will hold together 13.1 percent. Over time, insiders may well cash out some of their current holding, but Alibaba’s governance structure would ensure that directors chosen by the Alibaba Partnership will forever control the board, regardless of the size of the stake held by the Partnership’s members.

    With an absolute lock on control and a limited fraction of the equity capital, the Alibaba insiders will have substantial incentives to divert value from Alibaba to other entities in which they own a substantial percentage of the equity. This can be done by placing future profitable opportunities in such entities, or making deals with such entities on terms that favor them at the expense of Alibaba.

    Alibaba’s prospectus discloses information about various past “related party transactions,” and these disclosures reflect the significance and risks to public investors of such transactions. For example, in 2010, Alibaba divested its control and ownership of Alipay, which does all of the financial processing for Alibaba, and Alipay is now fully controlled and substantially owned by Alibaba’s executive chairman.

    Public investors should worry not only about whether the Alibaba’s divesting of Alipay benefited Mr. Ma at the expense of Alibaba, but also about the terms of the future transactions between Alibaba and Alipay. Because Alibaba relies on Alipay “to conduct substantially all of the payment processing” in its marketplace, these terms are important for Alibaba’s future success.

    Mr. Ma owns a larger fraction of Alipay’s equity capital than of Alibaba’s, so he would economically benefit from terms that would disfavor Alibaba. Indeed, given the circumstances, the I.P.O. prospectus acknowledges that Mr. Ma may act to resolve Alibaba-Alipay conflicts not in Alibaba’s favor.

    The prospectus seeks to allay investor concerns, however, by indicating that Mr. Ma intends to reduce his stake in in Alipay within three to five years, including by having shares in Alipay granted to Alibaba employees. But stating such an intention does not represent an irreversible legal commitment. Furthermore, transfers of Alipay ownership stakes from Mr. Ma to other members of the Alibaba Partnership would still leave the Partnership’s aggregate interest to be decidedly on the side of Alipay rather than Alibaba.

    Given the significant related party transactions that have already taken place, and the prospect of such transactions in the future, Alibaba tried to placate investors by putting in a “new related party transaction policy.” But this new policy hardly provides investors with solid protection. Unlike charter and bylaw provisions, corporate policies are generally not binding. Furthermore, Alibaba’s policy explicitly allows the board, where the nominees of Alibaba partnership will always have a majority, to approve any exceptions to the policy that the board chooses.

    Of course, the Alibaba partners might elect not to take advantage of the opportunities for diversion provided to them by Alibaba’s structure. And, even if the partners do use such opportunities, the future business success of Alibaba might be large enough to make up for the costs of diversions and leave public investors with good returns on their investment.

    Before jumping in, however, investors rushing to participate in the Alibaba I.P.O. must recognize the substantial governance risks that they would be taking. Alibaba’s structure does not provide adequate protections to public investors.

    __________________________________________

    Article relié :

    Alibaba Raises the Fund-Raising Target for Its I.P.O. to $21.8 Billion (Sept. 15, 2014)

    Toute la lumière sur les attentes envers les C.A. | L’état de situation selon Lipton


    Aujourd’hui, je veux vous faire partager le point de vue de Martin Lipton*, expert dans les questions de fusion et d’acquisition ainsi que dans les affaires se rapportant à la gouvernance des entreprises, sur les enjeux des C.A.. L’auteur met l’accent sur les pratiques exemplaires en gouvernance et sur les comportements attendus des conseils d’administration.

    Ce texte, paru sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance,résume très bien les devoirs et les responsabilités des administrateurs de sociétés de nos jours et renforce la nécessité, pour les conseils d’administration, de gérer les situations d’offres hostiles.

    Bonne lecture ! Êtes-vous d’accord avec les attentes énoncées ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

    The Spotlight on Boards

     

    The ever evolving challenges facing corporate boards prompts an updated snapshot of what is expected from the board of directors of a major public company—not just the legal rules, but also the aspirational “best practices” that have come to have almost as much influence on board and company behavior.

    Boards are expected to:

    Establish the appropriate “Tone at the Top” to actively cultivate a corporate culture that gives high priority to ethical standards, principles of fair dealing, professionalism, integrity, full compliance with legal requirements and ethically sound strategic goals.IMG_20140523_112914

    Choose the CEO, monitor his or her performance and have a succession plan in case the CEO becomes unavailable or fails to meet performance expectations.

    Maintain a close relationship with the CEO and work with management to encourage entrepreneurship, appropriate risk taking, and investment to promote the long-term success of the company (despite the constant pressures for short-term performance) and to navigate the dramatic changes in domestic and world-wide economic, social and political conditions. Approve the company’s annual operating plan and long-term strategy, monitor performance and provide advice to management as a strategic partner.

    Develop an understanding of shareholder perspectives on the company and foster long-term relationships with shareholders, as well as deal with the requests of shareholders for meetings to discuss governance and the business portfolio and operating strategy. Evaluate the demands of corporate governance activists, make changes that the board believes will improve governance and resist changes that the board believes will not be constructive. Work with management and advisors to review the company’s business and strategy, with a view toward minimizing vulnerability to attacks by activist hedge funds.

    Organize the business, and maintain the collegiality, of the board and its committees so that each of the increasingly time-consuming matters that the board and board committees are expected to oversee receives the appropriate attention of the directors.

    Plan for and deal with crises, especially crises where the tenure of the CEO is in question, where there has been a major disaster or a risk management crisis, or where hard-earned reputation is threatened by a product failure or a socio-political issue. Many crises are handled less than optimally because management and the board have not been proactive in planning to deal with crises, and because the board cedes control to outside counsel and consultants.

    Determine executive compensation to achieve the delicate balance of enabling the company to recruit, retain and incentivize the most talented executives, while also avoiding media and populist criticism of “excessive” compensation and taking into account the implications of the “say-on-pay” vote.

    Face the challenge of recruiting and retaining highly qualified directors who are willing to shoulder the escalating work load and time commitment required for board service, while at the same time facing pressure from shareholders and governance advocates to embrace “board refreshment”, including issues of age, length of service, independence, gender and diversity. Provide compensation for directors that fairly reflects the significantly increased time and energy that they must now spend in serving as board and board committee members. Evaluate the board’s performance, and the performance of the board committees and each director.

    Determine the company’s reasonable risk appetite (financial, safety, cyber, political, reputation, etc.), oversee the implementation by management of state-of-the-art standards for managing risk, monitor the management of those risks within the parameters of the company’s risk appetite and seek to ensure that necessary steps are taken to foster a culture of risk-aware and risk-adjusted decision-making throughout the organization.

    Oversee the implementation by management of state-of-the-art standards for compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, monitor compliance and respond appropriately to “red flags.”

    Take center stage whenever there is a proposed transaction that creates a real or perceived conflict between the interests of stockholders and those of management, including takeovers and attacks by activist hedge funds focused on the CEO.

    Recognize that shareholder litigation against the company and its directors is part of modern corporate life and should not deter the board from approving a significant acquisition or other material transaction, or rejecting a merger proposal or a hostile takeover bid, all of which is within the business judgment of the board.

    Set high standards of social responsibility for the company, including human rights, and monitor performance and compliance with those standards.

    Oversee relations with government, community and other constituents.

    Review corporate governance guidelines and committee charters and tailor them to promote effective board functioning.

    To meet these expectations, it will be necessary for major public companies

    (1) to have a sufficient number of directors to staff the requisite standing and special committees and to meet expectations for diversity;

    (2) to have directors who have knowledge of, and experience with, the company’s businesses, even if this results in the board having more than one director who is not “independent”;

    (3) to have directors who are able to devote sufficient time to preparing for and attending board and committee meetings;

    (4) to provide the directors with regular tutorials by internal and external experts as part of expanded director education; and

    (5) to maintain a truly collegial relationship among and between the company’s senior executives and the members of the board that enhances the board’s role both as strategic partner and as monitor.

    ________________________________________________

    * Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy

    Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) | Septembre 2014


    Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, le Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) du mois de septembre 2014.

    Seul programme de certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés offert au Québec, il s’adresse aux administrateurs siégeant à un conseil d’administration et disposant d’une expérience pertinente.

    Les administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC) sont regroupés dans la Banque des ASC, un outil de recherche en ligne mis au point par le Collège, afin de faciliter le recrutement d’administrateurs sur les conseils d’administration.

    Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) | Septembre 2014

    _______________________

     

    RAPPORT D’ACTIVITÉ 2013-2014

     

    Rapport d'activité 2013-2014 du CASC’est avec plaisir que le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés vous présente son Rapport d’activité 2013-2014.

    Vous y trouverez un bilan positif de cette neuvième année, marquée par de nombreuses actions visant à diversifier notre offre de formation, à affirmer notre statut de leader de la formation des administrateurs et à promouvoir l’excellence en gouvernance au Québec.

    Consultez le rapport pour tous les détails [+]

     

     

    Banques des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés

     

    Le Collège est fier de mettre en ligne une nouvelle présentation de la Banque des Administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC). La Banque des ASC est maintenant intégrée au site Web du Collège et propose un nouvel outil de recherche bonifié, ainsi qu’un design plus ergonomique.

    Plusieurs nouveautés ont été apportées à l’outil de recherche dans le but d’optimiser la recherche d’ASC selon les requêtes des recruteurs d’administrateurs.

    Consultez cette nouvelle Banque des ASC [+]

     

    DÉVOILEMENT DE LA 3E SÉRIE DE CAPSULES D’EXPERTS EN GOUVERNANCE

     

    3e série de capsules d'experts : les médias sociaux, par Sylvain LafranceLe CAS est heureux de vous dévoiler sa 3e série de capsules d’experts, formée de huit entrevues vidéos. Pendant 3 minutes, un expert du Collège partage une réflexion et se prononce sur un sujet d’actualité lié à la gouvernance.

    Une capsule sera dévoilée chaque semaine par bulletin électronique. À surveiller !

    Cette semaine : Les médias sociaux, par Sylvain Lafrance [+]

     Les programmes de formation du CAS

     

    Gouvernance des PME | 5 et 6 novembre 2014, à Québec

    Certification – Module 1 : Les rôles et responsabilités des administrateurs |  12, 13 et 14 février 2015, à Québec, et 26, 27 et 28 mars 2015, à Montréal

     

    Les événements en gouvernance auxquels le CAS est associé

     

    Inscription au programme « Réseau jeunes administrateurs » pour la cohorte d’automne | 8 septembre 2014, à Montréal

    Congrès national de l’IAS sur la gouvernance transformationnelle et Gala des Fellows | 18 septembre 2014, à Montréal

    Assemblée générale annuelle du Cercle des ASC et conférence « Un CA peut-il être trop avant-gardiste » par Mme Anne Darche, ASC | 23 septembre 2014, à Québec

    Conférence Prestige de l’Ordre des CPA du Québec, « Leadership éthique au 21e siècle » par Mme Cynthia Cooper | 1er octobre 2014, à Montréal

    Conférence Femmes Leaders par Les Affaires | 15 octobre 2014, à Québec

    Programme de l’ecoDa « New Governance Challenges for Board Members in Europe » | 21 et 22 octobre 2014, à Bruxelles

    NOMINATIONS ASC

     

    Serge Bouchard, ASC | Conseil régional de l’environnement du Centre-du-Québec

    Marlène Deveaux, ASC | CLD Saguenay

    Sylvie Tremblay, ASC | Chambre des notaires du Québec

    Richard Audet, ASC | Inforoute Santé du Canada

    Marc Duchesne, ASC | Nicorp inc.

    Vincent Dagnault, ASC | Signes d’Espoir

    Annick Mongeau, ASC | Groupe TVA inc.

    Jean-François Thuot, ASC | Société canadienne des directeurs d’association, section du Québec

    Sylvain Beaudry, ASC | Institut québécois de planification financière

    Lyne Laverdure, ASC | PharmaBio Développement

    Louise Dostie, ASC | Caisse de l’Administration et des Services publics

    Pauline D’Amboise, ASC | Solidarité rurale du Québec

    Jean-Paul Gagné, ASC | Metix inc.

    Denis Arcand, ASC | Caisse Desjardins Brossard

    Josée De La Durantaye, ASC | Ordre des comptables professionnels agréés du Québec

    Michel Verreault, ASC | Chambre des notaires du Québec

    Michel Sanschagrin, ASC | Fondation des Violons du Roy et Club musical de Québec

    Carl Viel, ASC | Palais Montcalm

    Luc Séguin, ASC | Hydrocarbures Anticosti

    Anne Darche, ASC     | Groupe Germain Hospitalité et Groupe St-Hubert

     

    DISTINCTIONS ASC et formateurs

     

    Marie Lavigne, ASC | Chevalière de l’Ordre national du Québec

    Claude Béland, formateur au CAS | Grand officier de l’Ordre national du Québec

    Maurice Gosselin, ASC     | Prix du ministre accordé par le ministère de l’Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche et de la Science

    Boîte à outils pour administrateurs

     

    Nouvelle référence mensuelle en gouvernance : Rémunération des administrateurs et gouvernance : enjeux et défis, par l’IGOPP.

    La capsule d’expert du mois – NOUVEAUTÉ : Les médias sociaux, par Sylvain Lafrance.

    Top 5 des billets les plus consultés cet été (juin, juillet et août) du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé.

     

    Bonne lecture !

    ____________________________________________

    Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS)

    Faculté des sciences de l’administration Pavillon Palasis-Prince

    2325, rue de la Terrasse, Université Laval Québec (Québec) G1V 0A6

    418 656-2630; 418 656-2624

    info@cas.ulaval.ca

     

    Contribution des administrateurs externes à la vision des entreprises


    Michael Evans, l’auteur de ce court article publié dans Forbes, montre les nombreux avantages des entreprises (jeunes, petites, familiales, entrepreneuriales …) à recruter un ou quelques administrateurs externes au conseil d’administration.

    Les administrateurs externes doivent être judicieusement choisis afin de compter sur leurs expériences du domaine d’affaires ainsi que sur leurs capacités à exposer plus de perspective et de vision.

    L’auteur présente également les quatre rôles fondamentaux que les administrateurs externes peuvent contribuer à clarifier.

    Voici un extrait de la première partie de l’article. Bonne lecture !

    Outside Board Members Bring Needed Experience And Perspective To Your Company

     

    Middle-market companies often operate as small fiefdoms under the control of the king, or to use a business term, the CEO. Very few mid-sized companies have a formal board of directors and for those that do have boards, CEOs tend to populate them with family, friends, and internal management. The theory is that board members do not know the business of the company, cost too much, and often do not provide value. In some cases, those conclusions are often true. But in many cases, the establishment of an effective board and the inclusion of outside board members have saved many a company from ruin.

    It is estimated that less than 5 percent of middle-market companies have an established board or advisory board, the primary reason for such a low percentage is that small- and middle-market businesses believe they are smart enough not to need a board, think it is too expensive, or believe it would constrain their decision-making abilities.

    female outside board member

    With the demands on CEOs — including ongoing regulatory changes, pressure from family and other founders, the rise of new competitors and business models, and the need to transform businesses at an ever-quickening pace — it may be time for you to get some help and add an outside director to your board.

    Outside directors bring outside experience and perspective to the board. They keep a watchful eye on the inside directors and on the way the organization is run, and provide guidance as to risk management and good corporate governance practices. Outside directors are often useful in handling disputes between inside directors, or between shareholders and the board.

    Enquête 2014 sur le leadership du conseil d’administration | Korn Ferry


    Ce billet publié par Robert E. Hallagan et Dennis Carey, vice-présidents de Korn Ferry, présente une partie d’une étude conduite par l’Institut Korn Ferry portant sur le leadership du C.A.

    On constatera que la séparation des fonctions de président du conseil et de président et chef de la direction s’effectue lentement chez nos voisins du sud ! En effet, bien que tous les experts de la gouvernance reconnaissent le bien fondé d’avoir un président du conseil indépendant, on note un certain progrès à cet égard mais il y a encore loin de la coupe aux lèvres, surtout dans les grandes entreprises cotées aux ÉU.

    Voici un aperçu de l’introduction de cette étude. Je vous invite à lire le document complet pour avoir une meilleure idée des résultats de l’enquête. Bonne lecture !

    Survey of Board Leadership 2014

    This is our second annual report on board leadership.

    The numbers and trends are interesting but the subtleties and substance behind them are extremely valuable as the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) and Korn Ferry continue their study of high-performing boards. The thoughtful selection and performance of board leaders is one of two pillars of leadership that drive long-term shareholder value—the other being the CEO of the company.IMG_00000694

    There is universal agreement that each board must have an independent leader but how each company has achieved this takes many shapes.

    In this year’s report, we see continued evidence of a slow and deliberate trend toward separation of the roles, higher in mid-cap companies than the large-cap S&P 500. Key catalysts included activism, and a transition of CEO leadership that prompted the board to elect to separate the roles.

    …

    There is universal agreement that each board must have an independent leader but how each company has achieved this takes many shapes.

    In our first report we stated our commitment to remaining an honest broker of facts in the performance debate. Many proponents of separation claim it will enhance long-term shareholder value, yet no study to date has rendered conclusive evidence in either direction. We have now isolated companies that have made the change, documented their performance before and after, and will soon be comfortable debating the results. While we clearly understand the danger in relying solely on numbers and acknowledge that there are many potential ways to slice the data, we believe our attempt to get at the “facts” will generate engaged, healthy debate among our members and clients. We look forward to a rich dialogue at NACD conferences to come.

    Methodology and approach

    This study examined changes to and trends in board leadership structure for 900 US companies, namely the constituents of Standard & Poor’s Large Cap 500 Index (S&P 500) and the Mid-Cap Index (the S&P 400) as of December 31, 2012. Companies are added to the S&P 500 if they have unadjusted market capitalization of $4.6 billion or more, and to the S&P 400 if they have unadjusted market capitalization of between $1.2 billion and $5.1 billion. The S&P 500 Index represents a barometer of the state of the largest publicly traded US corporations, and the majority of the research and analysis in this study focuses on this group. To expand the scope beyond large-cap companies, and thus broaden the findings of the research, the constituents of the S&P 400 were also examined in detail.

    For each company, we looked at the type of board leadership structure in place at the time of its proxy filing for each year between 2008 and 2012. This report focuses primarily on the leadership structure in place as of year-end 2012, and examines each company’s overall leadership approach as it pertains to the roles of chairman, CEO, and lead director (if at all). Proxy filings, annual reports, and the corporate governance section of company websites comprise the source documents for these determinations. Please note that numbers shown in this report reflect actual statistics and not data projected from a random sampling of companies.

    In addition, each company that had a change in its leadership structure since January 1, 2003 (by replacing either the CEO or chairman) was investigated to understand the reason for the change, and additional details—such as tenure, age, education, committee responsibilities—were sought for the incoming chairman. Company and outside press reports and news articles were used to determine the reason for an executive’s departure, and executive biographical and company data were culled from secondary sources, including Reuters, Businessweek, MarketWatch, and Morningstar.

    The trend to separate roles continues to move steadily forward.

    Though board composition is not likely to be an area marked by rapid, significant change, the slow and steady trend to separate chairman and CEO roles continued in 2012. By the end of 2012, 56% of S&P 500 chairmen also held the position of CEO. This marks a significant departure from 2009, when 63% of all chairmen also held the company’s highest executive office. The change comes almost equally from increases in non-executive chairmen and chairmen who have some past affiliation with the company; additional analysis in this report will examine what types of companies are likely to favor the different approaches.

    fig1Click image to enlarge

    While it is reasonable to expect this gradual trend to continue, particularly as activist shareholders keep pushing for separation, some large companies, including IBM, Disney, and Urban Outfitters, are moving in the opposite direction and are recombining roles. In the case of IBM and Disney, the recombinations are part of longterm succession, though IBM Chairman-CEO Ginny Rometty added the Chairman role just 10 months after becoming CEO—faster than many expected. In the case of Urban Outfitters, founder Richard Hayne reclaimed the CEO role after his successor had difficulty maintaining the main brand’s appeal to young people. Our continued perspective is that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to board leadership and that careful analysis and trusted advisors should be leveraged to find the appropriate structure for each organization.

    In our opinion, chairmen must meet several criteria to qualify as truly “non-executive” or independent. They must not currently hold an executive role (CEO or other), must not be former executives, and must not be founders or family members of founders. From time to time, companies may characterize these types of chairmen as “non-executive” in the language of their proxy reports or even in the chairman’s title, but our analysis re-characterizes them per the criteria above. The idea of an independent chairman is that he or she can bring an impartial and objective perspective to the board, and our experience finds that founders, family members of founders, and former executives tend not to possess that objectivity. This particular debate on nomenclature is a classic case of saying it doesn’t make it so. Being independent in title is not necessarily a reflection of reality. An analysis of the types of chairmen found in the S&P 500 in 2012 is described in Figure 2.

    The trend toward separation of the chairman and CEO has been more pronounced over time within the mid-cap companies in the S&P 400 than it has been in the S&P 500. Separation rates in both groups rose by two points in 2012, to 44% in the S&P 500 and 55% in the S&P 400.

    ….

    Le point de vue sans équivoque de l’activiste Carl Icahn


    Depuis quelques années, on parle souvent d’activistes, d’actionnaires activistes, d’investisseurs activistes ou de Hedge Funds pour qualifier la philosophie de ceux qui veulent assainir la gouvernance des entreprises et redonner une place prépondérante aux « actionnaires-propriétaires » !

    Pour ceux qui sont intéressés à connaître le point de vue et les arguments d’un actionnaire activiste célèbre, je vous invite à lire l’article écrit par Carl Icahn le 22 août sur son site Shareholders’ Square Table (SST).

    Vous aurez ainsi une très bonne idée de cette nouvelle approche à la gouvernance qui fait rage depuis quelque temps.

    Je vous invite aussi à lire l’article de Icahn qui s’insurge contre la position de Warren Buffet de ne pas intervenir dans la décision de la rémunération globale « excessive » à Coke, suivi de la réponse de Buffet.

    My article from Barron’s on Warren Buffett’s abstention from a vote on Coke’s executive-pay plan

    À vous de vous former une opinion sur ce sujet ! Bonne lecture !

    The Bottom Line | Carl Icahn

    Among other things, I’m known to be a “reductionist.”  In my line of work you must be good at pinpointing what to focus on – that is, the major underlying truths and problems in a situation.  I then become obsessive about solving or fixing whatever they may be. This combination is what perhaps has lead to my success over the years and is why I’ve chosen to be so outspoken about shareholder activism, corporate governance issues, and the current economic state of America. IMG00570-20100828-2239

    Currently, I believe that the facts “reduce” to one indisputable truth which is that we must change our system of selecting CEOs in order to stay competitive and get us out of an extremely dangerous financial situation.  With exceptions, I believe that too many companies in this country are terribly run and there’s no system in place to hold the CEOs and Boards of these inadequately managed companies accountable. There are numerous challenges we are facing today whether it be monetary policy, unemployment, income inequality, the list can go on and on… but the thing we have to remember is there is something we can do about it: Shareholders, the true owners of our companies, can demand that mediocre CEOs are held accountable and make it clear that they will be replaced if they are failing.

    I am convinced by our record that this will make our corporations much more productive and profitable and will go a long way in helping to solve our unemployment problems and the other issues now ailing our economy.

    …….

    Pourquoi nommer un administrateur indépendant comme président du conseil


    Plusieurs se questionnent sur les raisons qui expliquent l’importance de choisir un administrateur indépendant comme président du conseil, même dans les entreprises dont le fondateur possède le contrôle.

    Le court article de  paru dans itbusiness le 25 août 2014 montre les avantages réels à se doter d’une gouvernance exemplaire.

    Voici, selon l’auteur,  neuf points à considérer dans le choix de cette option. Bonne lecture !

    1. Increased share price on acquisition
    2. Investor due diligence is smoother
    3. Greater interest in follow-on investment rounds
    4. Increased transparency through supplying shareholder information
    5. Increased accountability of management
    6. Stronger risk and crisis management policies
    7. Stronger customer acquisition process resulted from customers’ appreciation that the company is stronger than its individual executives.
    8. Competitors take notice of the seriousness of your company’s approach
    9. Creates environment for innovative change

    The use of a non-executive chairperson for a private corporation, including early and growth stage companies, allows the company to start acting as if the company is structured for success and is serious about its responsibilities to shareholders, customers, and staff.

    9 reasons to name a non-executive chairperson to your board

    It is natural for entrepreneurs and founders to want to control the destiny of their company. Facebook and Mark Zuckerberg are often cited as examples of why a founder should stay in control.

    In this example, Zuckerberg owned less than 30 per cent of Facebook; however, he maintained a controlling vote through multiple voting rights. These voting rights enabled him to singlehandedly buy Instagram for over $1 billion without board approval.IMG_00000884

    Some entrepreneurial observers may say that this is a good thing. Others who have been schooled in corporate governance would suggest too much power rested in one shareholder’s hands, and one who holds less than 50 per cent of the equity of the company. This example of a lack of corporate governance points a founder in the direction of how a private company and its strategic direction should be directed and controlled, while maintaining the vision the founders had when they formed the company.

    When a company accepts equity investment from outside shareholders, the shareholders have an expectation that their rights will be protected by the board of directors. For a growth stage company, these many responsibilities become burdensome. I agree with most founders that their primary responsibility is to drive product development and acquire profitable customers. A founder who is both comfortable with and understands the alignment of the vision and strategic direction should be comfortable handing off some of the leadership responsibilities that guide the company.

    Best practices of corporate governance for a public company separate the role of CEO of the company and the chairperson of the board of directors, often referred to as the non-executive chairperson or lead director. Under this structure, the CEO manages the affairs of the company under the direction of the board, and the governance structure or board of directors and its members are managed by the non-executive chairperson. Many founders are concerned with a loss of control in this structure; however, they need not be. With a strong selection process that was developed from a skills matrix, and a desire to have open and regular communication between the two roles, the company should be positioned for success.

    ….

    Les C.A de petites tailles performent mieux !


    Selon une étude du The Wall Street Journal publié par Joann S. Lublin, les entreprises qui comptent moins d’administrateurs ont de meilleurs résultats que les entreprises de plus grandes tailles.

    Bien qu’il n’y ait pas nécessairement de relation de type cause à effet, il semble assez clair que la tendance est à la diminution de nombre d’administrateurs sur les conseils d’administration des entreprises publiques américaines. Pourquoi en est-il ainsi ?

    Il y a de nombreuses raisons dont l’article du WSJ, ci-dessous, traite. Essentiellement, les membres de conseils de petites tailles :

    1. sont plus engagés dans les affaires de l’entité
    2. sont plus portés à aller en profondeur dans l’analyse stratégique
    3. entretiennent des relations plus fréquentes et plus harmonieuses avec la direction
    4. ont plus de possibilités de communiquer entre eux
    5. exercent une surveillance plus étroite des activités de la direction
    6. sont plus décisifs, cohésif et impliqués.

    Les entreprises du domaine financier ont traditionnellement des conseils de plus grandes tailles mais, encore là, les plus petits conseils ont de meilleurs résultats.

    La réduction de la taille se fait cependant très lentement mais la tendance est résolument à la baisse. Il ne faut cependant pas compter sur la haute direction pour insister sur la diminution de la taille des C.A. car il semblerait que plusieurs PCD s’accommodent très bien d’un C.A. plus imposant !

    Il faut cependant réaliser que la réduction du nombre d’administrateurs peut constituer un obstacle à la diversité si l’on ne prend pas en compte cette importante variable. Également, il faut noter que le C.A. doit avoir un président du conseil expérimenté, possédant un fort leadership. Un conseil de petite taille, présidé par une personne inepte, aura des résultats à l’avenant !

    Voici deux autres documents, partagés par Richard Leblanc sur son groupe de discussion LinkedIn Boards and Advisors, qui pourraient vous intéresser :

    « Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors« : http://people.stern.nyu.edu/eofek/PhD/papers/Y_Higher_JFE.pdf

    « Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms« : http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1403&context=facpub

    Je vous convie donc à la lecture de l’article du WSJ dont voici un extrait de l’article. Bonne lecture !

    Smaller Boards Get Bigger Returns

    Size counts, especially for boards of the biggest U.S. businesses.

    Companies with fewer board members reap considerably greater rewards for their investors, according to a new study by governance researchers GMI Ratings prepared for The Wall Street Journal. Small boards at major corporations foster deeper debates and more nimble decision-making, directors, recruiters and researchers said. Take Apple Inc. In the spring when BlackRock founding partner Sue Wagner was up for a seat on the board of the technology giant, she met nearly every director within just a few weeks. Such screening processes typically take months.

    But Apple directors move fast because there only are eight of them. After her speedy vetting, Ms. Wagner joined Apple’s board in July. She couldn’t be reached for comment.

    Smaller boards at major corporations have more nimble decision-making processes, directors, recruiters and academic researchers say. Eric Palma

    Among companies with a market capitalization of at least $10 billion, typically those with the smallest boards produced substantially better shareholder returns over a three-year period between the spring of 2011 and 2014 when compared with companies with the biggest boards, the GMI analysis of nearly 400 companies showed.

    Companies with small boards outperformed their peers by 8.5 percentage points, while those with large boards underperformed peers by 10.85 percentage points. The smallest board averaged 9.5 members, compared with 14 for the biggest. The average size was 11.2 directors for all companies studied, GMI said.

    « There’s more effective oversight of management with a smaller board, » said Jay Millen, head of the board and CEO practice for recruiters DHR International. « There’s no room for dead wood. »

    Many companies are thinning their board ranks to improve effectiveness, Mr. Millen said. He recently helped a consumer-products business shrink its 10-person board to seven, while bringing on more directors with emerging-markets expertise.

    GMI’s results, replicated across 10 industry sectors such as energy, retail, financial services and health care, could have significant implications for corporate governance.

    Small boards are more likely to dismiss CEOs for poor performance—a threat that declines significantly as boards grow in numbers, said David Yermack, a finance professor at New York University’s business school who has studied the issue.

    It’s tough to pinpoint precisely why board size affects corporate performance, but smaller boards at large-cap companies like Apple and Netflix Inc. appear to be decisive, cohesive and hands-on. Such boards typically have informal meetings and few committees. Apple directors, known for their loyalty to founder Steve Jobs, have forged close ties with CEO Tim Cook, according to a person familiar with the company. Mr. Cook frequently confers with individual directors between board meetings « to weigh the pros and cons of an issue, » an outreach effort that occurs quickly thanks to the board’s slim size, this person said.

    Mr. Cook took this approach while mulling whether to recruit Angela Ahrendts, then CEO of luxury-goods company Burberry Group PLC for Apple’s long vacant position of retail chief. Private chats with board members helped him « test the thought » of recruiting her, the person said. She started in April.

    Ms. Wagner, Apple’s newest director, replaced a retiring one. The board wants no more than 10 members to keep its flexibility intact, according to the person familiar with the company, adding that even « eye contact and candor change » with more than 10 directors.

    Apple returns outperformed technology sector peers by about 37 cumulative percentage points during the three years tracked by GMI. An Apple spokeswoman declined to comment.

    Netflix, with seven directors, demonstrated equally strong returns, outperforming sector peers by about 32 percentage points. Board members of the big video-streaming service debate extensively before approving important management moves, said Jay Hoag, its lead independent director.

    « We get in-depth, » he said. « That’s easier with a small group. »

    Netflix directors spent about nine months discussing a proposed price increase, with some pushing back hard on executives about the need for an increase, Mr. Hoag said. Netflix increased prices this spring for new U.S. customers of the company’s streaming video plan, its first price bump since 2011.

    A board twice as big wouldn’t have time for « diving deeper into the business on things that matter, » Mr. Hoag said.

    ….

    Laxisme et passivité au conseil d’administration | La situation en G-B


    Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, l’extrait d’un article très pertinent publié par Dina Medland , laquelle couvre le domaine de la gouvernance dans Forbes, qui fait état d’une entrevue conduite avec le professeur de Gouvernance Andrew Kakabadse, de la Henley Business School de Grande-Bretagne.

    L’article met le doigt sur le conservatisme (et le traditionalisme) crasse des administrateurs qui siègent sur les conseils d’administration en Grande-Bretagne. L’attitude de non-intervention de plusieurs administrateurs conduit à un sérieux manque d’innovation dans la gouvernance des entreprises anglaises (UK).

    Trouve-t-on le même laxisme et la même résistance aux changements dans nos organisations nord-américaines ?

    Personnellement, je ne crois pas que ce soit à la même échelle mais les conseils d’administration souffrent beaucoup du manque de questionnement de leurs membres. Il y a, ici aussi, trop de passivité eu égard aux questions d’orientation de l’entreprise ainsi qu’aux actions de la direction.

    Je vous invite donc à lire ce court article et à partager votre point de vue sur le sujet. Bonne lecture !

    There Is A Crying Need For Innovation In Boardrooms

    Andrew Kakabadse has built a reputation for sharp, insightful commentary on the boardrooms of publicly listed companies. Professor of Governance and Leadership at Henley Business School since last summer, he has spoken out before now on the declining worth of non-executive directors.

    In an interview with me in April 2013, he suggested many non-executive directors in the UK’s boardrooms were ‘of little or no value to the business.’ Particularly scathing about the UK, he said : “We have a culture where we don’t ask questions.”

    Dina Medland
    Dina Medland, Contributrice pour Forbes

    We also have a boardroom culture in the UK where we believe that “if it has worked fine for hundreds of years, why change it?” It is part and parcel, it seems of a national love of ritual – at which we clearly excel. The world’s love for very British celebrations -often involving members of the Royal family, horses, logistical feats of military planning and discipline and split-second timing- bears testimony to that. But the flip side of that seems to be that innovation is both rare, and resisted.

    It is worth noting, therefore, that ICSA, the professional body for company secretaries – who are required for listed companies in the UK – chose Professor Kakabadse to undertake a piece of research on The Company Secretary, with a view to finding a way to progress the value of the role. (Note: for transparency, the software arm of ICSA which provides technology solutions for the boardroom is the commercial sponsor of my blog Board Talk but has no editorial control on input).

    “On average, UK boards consist of 9 to 11 members, if whom the majority are over the age of 50. Fewer than half of these board members had had a job description and the chairman is very likely to be white, male and over the age of 60. Barriers to diversity remain firmly set throughout most boardrooms in the country” says the report.

    It says the management and governance realities of boards indicate “animosity, a lack of intimacy with strategy, and poor communication” when it comes to top team strategy. Board and executive relations are “non-cohesive” when it comes to “shaping/negotiation of strategy, open interaction and trust.” Board members are described as “out of touch” – with “reality, markets and employees, unclear member role and contribution, productivity of meetings, engagement with the executive.”

    ……

    Quelques mythes persistants à propos de la culture de gouvernance


    Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un article tout à fait pertinent et intéressant, paru sur le site de INC.COM et publié par le .

    Voici onze (11) affirmations, ou mythes, à propos de la culture organisationnel et comment les administrateurs de sociétés peuvent tirer profit de ces enseignements.

    Bonne lecture !

    « Culture is a manifestation of your company’s values, and it impacts everything from talent recruiting to innovation. Unfortunately, some founders and CEOs, especially at early-stage startups, confuse culture with perks or, worse, believe that defining a company’s culture is a task best left up to someone else. Eleven founders from the Young Entrepreneur Council (YEC) call out the most persistent culture myths–and what you can do to overcome them »

    11 Stubborn Myths About Company Culture

    1. Perks = Culture

    « Many startup founders mistakenly think that fun perks automatically make for a good culture. Don’t get me wrong–happy hours, Ping-Pong tables and catered lunches are great, but they’re not going to keep employees happy unless you work to create a fundamental culture of respect. It’s a lot easier to provide perks than it is to make sure that employees feel motivated and valued. » —Jared Feldman, Mashwork

    2. Culture Doesn’t Start With You

    « Most CEOs don’t realize that they are defining the culture by how they are behaving. Snap at people often? Anger will become part of your culture. Undermine your staff? Bureaucracy will invade your culture. Pretend everything is always amazing? You’ll create a culture full of fakes. If you want a culture that is always evolving and becoming more beautiful, invest in doing so yourself. » —Corey Blake, Round Table Companies

    3. Employee Feedback Isn’t Important

    « Some CEOs do not treat employee feedback as if it was as important as their own thoughts, because they are not viewed as equals. Though it is clear a CEO’s role is more expansive then other positions, the culture of a company can be negatively affected if people’s ideas and thoughts are suppressed. Each employee has a unique view of the organization, and the culture of sharing views is important to the company’s success. » —Phil Chen, Systems WatchIMG_00001932

    4. Remote Work Doesn’t Impact Culture

    « I’ve worked for several companies remotely for years, and none of them have worked out long term. You always have things going on, and you are never as productive as when you’re together in a group. Working with others next to you is the best way for your company culture to grow. If you have to work remotely, find a way to get to the office at least twice a week to improve culture. » —John Rampton, Adogy

    5. Someone Else Owns It

    « They assume it’s someone else’s problem to deal with. HR doesn’t own culture. Employees don’t own culture. Everyone owns culture, and senior leaders have an enormous impact on how business gets done in the day-to-day. CEOs who don’t understand this are destined to live with whatever they get. CEOs who do understand their roles are better equipped to be intentional about the culture they create in ways that drive performance. »–Chris Cancialosi, GothamCulture

    6. Culture Doesn’t Need to Be Defined

    « Chris Wood of Paige Technologies says it best, ‘Organizations are really only a representation of the people in them; employers must be diligent about mapping culture.’ Products and services can be duplicated, but people can’t. Your people drive your culture and they are the one defining difference of a company. CEOs forget to understand and define the culture that they have in place early on. » —Jason Grill, JGrill Media | Sock 101

    7. Culture Is Just a Set of Values

    « We help many growing companies build culture, and the one thing most CEOs get wrong is forgetting to operationalize it. Culture isn’t just a set of core values on the wall–it’s a set of consistent behaviors. You have to be clear what those values look like in practice (we call them work rules) so current and future employees see culture in action and understand how works gets done in the company and align the company to them. » —Susan LaMotte, Exaqueo

    8. Culture Only Matters When You Reach X Size

    « Most CEOs think they don’t have to worry about company culture until their business meets certain profit or growth margins. In reality, company culture is affecting your bottom line regardless of your margins. I’ll say it again: Your company’s culture is inextricable from your company’s success. Focus on hiring the right people and offering them a place to thrive. With the wrong staff or an unmotivated staff, your company will go nowhere. » —Sean Kelly, HUMAN

    9. You Can’t Hire for Culture

    « You have to carefully select the type of people you add to your team if you’re going for a particular culture. For instance, if you’re a fashion company, you probably want to hire people that are actually passionate about fashion. It’s good to have people with different ideas, but generally they should have a shared common interest. With that shared interest, you can build a culture that your team members and customers can get behind. » —Andy Karuza, Brandbuddee

    10. Compensation Is the Only Motivator

    « Once they reach a certain salary, most non-sales employees could honestly care less about additional compensation. Employees work to feel needed, so remind them that they are your company. Recognize them, and make it public recognition. » —Justin Gray, LeadMD

    11. Culture Will Wait for You to Create It

    « The interesting thing about a company culture is that it will create itself if you don’t create it first. CEOs need to define and personify the company culture and instill it at every level of the organization. The best companies all have a culture based on their mission, and all employees know why they’re working so hard. When the opposite is true, the culture will create itself–and it may not be the culture you envisioned. » —Andrew Thomas, SkyBell Technologies, Inc.

    L’état des travaux de recherche relatifs à la contribution des investisseurs activistes


    Ainsi que mon billet du 19 août en faisait état, le débat est de plus en plus vif en ce qui regarde la contribution des « Hedge Funds » à l’amélioration de la performance à long terme des entreprises ciblées.

    Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un court billet de Martin Lipton, partenaire fondateur de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, paru sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, qui décrit la problématique et les principaux enjeux liés au comportement des investisseurs « activistes ».

    L’auteur accorde une grande place aux travaux d’Yvan Allaire et de François Dauphin de l’IGOPP (Institut sur la Gouvernance d’Organisations Privées et Publiques) qui pourfendent l’approche économétrique de la recherche phare de Bebchuk-Brav-Jiang.

    Le résumé ci-dessous relate les principaux jalons relatifs à cette saga !

    The post puts forward criticism of an empirical study by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang on the long-term effects of hedge fund activism; this study is available here, and its results are summarized in a Forum post and in a Wall Street Journal op-ed article. As did an earlier post by Mr. Lipton available here, this post relies on the work of Yvan Allaire and François Dauphin that is available here. A reply by Professors Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang to this earlier memo and to the Allaire-Dauphin work is available here. Additional posts discussing the Bebchuk-Brav-Jiang study, including additional critiques by Wachtell Lipton and responses to them by Professors Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, are available on the Forum here.

     

    The Long-Term Consequences of Hedge Fund Activism

    The experience of the overwhelming majority of corporate managers, and their advisors, is that attacks by activist hedge funds are followed by declines in long-term future performance. Indeed, activist hedge fund attacks, and the efforts to avoid becoming the target of an attack, result in increased leverage, decreased investment in CAPEX and R&D and employee layoffs and poor employee morale.IMG_00002145

    Several law school professors who have long embraced shareholder-centric corporate governance are promoting a statistical study that they claim establishes that activist hedge fund attacks on corporations do not damage the future operating performance of the targets, but that this statistical study irrefutably establishes that on average the long-term operating performance of the targets is actually improved.

    In two recent papers, Professor Yvan Allaire, Executive Chair of the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations, has demonstrated that the statistics these professors rely on to support their theories are not irrefutable and do not disprove the real world experience that activist hedge fund interventions are followed by declines in long-term operating performance. The papers by Professor Allaire speak for themselves:

    “Activist” hedge funds: creators of lasting wealth? What do the empirical studies really say?

    Hedge Fund Activism and their Long-Term Consequences; Unanswered Questions to Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang

    Les « Hedge Funds » contribuent-ils à assurer la croissance à long terme des entreprises ciblées ?


    Voici un article publié par IEDP (International Executive Development Programs) et paru sur le site http://www.iedp.com

    Comme vous le constaterez, l’auteur fait l’éloge des effets positifs de l’activisme des actionnaires qui, contrairement à ce que plusieurs croient, ajoutent de la valeur aux organisations en opérant un assainissement de la gouvernance.

    Je sais que les points de vue concernant cette forme d’activisme sont très partagés mais les auteurs clament que les prétentions des anti-activistes ne sont pas fondées scientifiquement.

    En effet, les recherches montrent que les activités des « hedges funds » contribuent à améliorer la valeur ajoutée à long terme des entreprises ciblées.

    La lecture de cet article vous donnera un bon résumé des positions en faveur de l’approche empirique. Votre idée est-elle faite à ce sujet ?

     

    Do Hedge Funds Create Sustainable Company Growth ?

     

    Hedge funds get a bad press but are they really a negative force? Looking at their public face, on the one hand we see so the called ‘vulture’ funds that this month forced Argentina into a $1.5bn default, on the other hand we recall that the UK’s largest private charitable donation, £466 million, was made by hedge fund wizard Chris Cooper-Hohn. Looking beyond the headlines the key question is, do hedge funds improve corporate performance and generate sustainable economic growth or not?

    Researchers at Columbia Business School, Duke Fuqua School of Business and Harvard Law School looked at this most important question and discovered that despite much hype to the contrary  the long-term effect of hedge funds and ‘activists shareholders’ is largely positive. They tested the conventional wisdom that interventions by activist shareholders, and in particular activist hedge funds, have an adverse effect on the long-term interests of companies and their shareholders and found it was not supported by the data.

    Their detractors have long argued that hedge funds force corporations to sacrifice long-term profits and competitiveness in order to reap quick short-term benefits. The immediate spike that comes after interventions from these activist shareholders, they argue, inevitably leads to long-term declines in operating performance and shareholder value.

    Three researchers, Lucian Bebchuk of Harvard Law School, Alon Brav of Duke Fuqua School of Business, and Wei Jiang of Columbia Business School argue that opponents of shareholder activism have no empirical basis for their assertions. In contrast, their own empirical research reveals that both short-term and long-term improvements in performance follow in the wake of shareholder interventions. Neither the company nor its long-term shareholders are adversely affected by hedge fund activism.

    Their paper published in July 2013 reports on about 2,000 interventions by activist hedge funds during the period 1994-2007, examining a long time window of five years following the interventions. It found no evidence that interventions are followed by declines in operating performance in the long term. In fact, contrary to popular belief, activist interventions are followed by improved operating performance during the five-year period following these interventions. Furthermore the researchers discovered that improvements in long-term performance, were also evident when the intervention were in the two most controversial areas – first, interventions that lower or constrain long-term investments by enhancing leverage, beefing up shareholder pay-outs, or reducing investments and, second, adversarial interventions employing hostile tactics.

    There was also no evidence that initial positive share price spikes accompanying activist interventions failed to appreciate their long-term costs and therefore tend to be followed by negative abnormal returns in the long term; the data is consistent with the initial spike reflecting correctly the intervention’s long-term consequences.

    ‘Pumping-and-dumping’ (i.e. when the exit of an activist is followed by long-term negative returns) is much sited by critics. But no evidence was found of this. Another complaint, that activist interventions during the years preceding the financial crisis rendered companies more vulnerable, was also debunked, as targeted companies were no more adversely affected by the crisis than others.

    In light of the recent events in Argentina it is salutary to recall this important research. The positive aspect of activist hedge fund activity that it reveals should be born in mind when considering the ongoing policy debates on corporate governance, corporate law, and capital markets regulation. Business leaders, policy makers and institutional investors should reject the anti-hedge fund claims often used by detractors as a basis for limiting the rights and involvement of shareholders, and should support expanding rather than limiting the rights and involvement of shareholders. Boards and their executives should carefully monitor these debates in order to prepare for corporate governance’s evolving policy environment.

    Reconsidération des indicateurs de mesure d’un « bon » conseil d’administration


    Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un excellent article de Knud B. Jensen, paru dans le numéro Juillet-Août 2014, du Ivey Business Journal, section Governance.

    L’auteur a fait une analyse attentive des études établissant une relation entre l’efficacité des « Boards » et les résultats financiers de l’entreprise. Sa conclusion ne surprendra pas les experts de la gouvernance car on sait depuis un certain temps que la plupart des études sont de nature analytique et que les relations étudiées sont associatives, donc de l’ordre des corrélations statistiques.

    Mais, même les résultats dits scientifiques (empiriques), n’apportent pas une réponse claire aux relations causales entre l’efficacité des conseils d’administration et les résultats attendus, à court et long terme … Pourquoi ?

    L’auteur suggère qu’un modèle de gouvernance ne peut être utilisé à toutes les sauces, parce que les organisations évoluent dans des contextes (certains diront univers) éminemment différents !

    L’analyse fine de l’efficacité des C.A. montre que les variables contextuelles devraient avoir une place de choix dans l’évaluation de l’efficacité de la gouvernance.

    La gouvernance est une discipline organisationnelle et son analyse devrait reposer sur les « théories organisationnelles, tels que le design, la culture, la personnalité et le leadership du PDG (CEO), ainsi que sur les compétences « contextuelles » des administrateurs ». C’est plus complexe et plus difficile que de faire des analyses statistiques … ce qui n’empêche pas de poursuivre dans la voie de la recherche scientifique.

    Voici un extrait de cet article. Je vous invite cependant à le lire au complet afin de bien saisir toutes les nuances.

    Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont grandement appréciés.

    Reconceptualizing the board and its metrics 

    « The key to rating boards is understanding context. Most researchers and public policies assume a similar board system across industries. This assumption allows law makers and researchers to ignore inter-company board differences. Nevertheless, board functions and effectiveness must reflect the context in which an organization finds itself. After all, board processes and functions are clearly dependent on context (growth or the lack of it, competition, strategy or the lack of it, etc.). For example, after it became very clear that the functioning of the board of directors at Canadian Pacific was no longer suitable to drive company growth, an activist shareholder pushed for new directors and a reorganized board. This led to a dramatic increase in cost ratios, profit and share price. It changed the function of the board. Other illustrations where context called for a change of the board include BlackBerry (formerly RIM) and Barrick Gold….

    When it comes to an effective governance model, one size does not fit all.  Context is paramount. Context is both endogenous and exogenous. Endogenous variables include complexity, asset base, competitive advantage, capital structure, quality of management, and board culture and leadership.  Exogenous variables include industry structures, position in growth cycle, competitive force, macroeconomics (interest rate, commodity pricing), world supply and growth, political changes, and unforeseen events (earthquakes, tsunamis, etc.). These variables are key inputs for company performance and determine whether earnings are above or below average. Simply put, companies may need a different type of board to fit with different sets of endogenous and exogenous variables.

    Boards and management typically have different mandates, not to mention a different social architecture to carry them out. It is generally agreed that the CEO and the management teams run the firm, while the board approves strategy, selects the CEO and determines the incentives, sets risk management, and approves major investments and changes to the capital structure.  But as discussed in Boards that Lead (2014) by Ram Charan, Dennis Casey and Michael Useen, directors must also lead the corporation on the most crucial issues. As a result, the ideal level of board involvement remains a grey area and is rarely defined. Setting boundaries when there are overlapping responsibilities is difficult. Nevertheless, how the functional relationships between the board and management work is probably far more important than board features to the growth, and sometimes survival, of the organization.

    In Back to the Drawing Board (2004), Colin Carter and Jay Lorsch suggest the reason so little has resulted from the various reforms aimed at improving governance is the focus on visible variables, or what others have labeled structural issues, instead of a focus on process or inside board behavior. In other words, features have trumped functions.

    The increase in complexity may be another issue. Keep in mind that directors don’t spend a lot of time together, which is a barrier to good behavior and process and makes it difficult for boards to function as a dynamic team. According to a 2013 McKinsey survey of over 700 corporate board members, directors spend an average of 22 days per year on company issues and two thirds do not think they have a complete understanding of the firm’s strategy. Clearly, there are severe limitations on boards, which have more to do than time available, especially with their limited number of board meetings packed with presentations from management.

    Boards should be viewed as an organizational system, with context part of any performance judgment. This view has more merit in distinguishing between effective and ineffective boards than the structural view. Human resource metrics may hold more promise and be more important than the structural indices currently used to distinguish between effective and ineffective boards. »

    ________________________________________________________

    L’évaluation des conseils d’administration et des administrateurs | Sept étapes à considérer


    Cet article rédigé par Geoffrey KIEL, James BECK et Jacques GRISÉ (1) et paru dans les Documents de travail de la Faculté des sciences de l’administration en 2008 est toujours d’actualité. Il présente un guide pratique des questions clés que les conseils d’administration doivent prendre en considération lorsqu’ils planifient une évaluation.

    On met l’accent sur l’utilité d’avoir des évaluations bien menées ainsi que sur les sept étapes à suivre pour des évaluations efficaces d’un conseil d’administration et des administrateurs. Bonne lecture.

    SEPT ÉTAPES À SUIVRE POUR DES ÉVALUATIONS EFFICACES D’UN CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION ET DES ADMINISTRATEURS

     

    Lorsqu’une crise se produit au sein d’une société, comme celles qu’ont connues Nortel et Hollinger International, les intervenants, les médias, les organismes de réglementation et la collectivité se tournent vers le conseil d’administration pour trouver des réponses. Étant donné que ce dernier est le chef décisionnel ultime de la société, il est responsable des actions et du rendement de la société.

    Le défi actuel que doivent relever les conseils d’administration consiste à accroître la valeur des organisations qu’ils gouvernent. Grâce à l’évaluation du rendement, les conseils d’administration peuvent s’assurer qu’ils ont les connaissances, les compétences et la capacité de relever ce défi.

    Plusieurs guides et normes de pratiques exemplaires reconnaissent cette notion. Ainsi, la Commission des valeurs mobilières de l’Ontario indique dans les lignes directrices sur la gouvernance des sociétés (NP 58-201) que « le conseil d’administration, ses comités et chacun de ses administrateurs devraient faire l’objet régulièrement d’une évaluation à l’égard de leur efficacité et de leur contribution ».

    L’évaluation du conseil d’administration est trop souvent perçue comme un mal nécessaire – un processus mécanique consistant à cocher des points sur une liste qui, en bout de ligne, a peu de valeur réelle pour le conseil d’administration si ce n’est pour satisfaire aux exigences en matière de conformité. Toutefois… un processus efficace d’évaluation du conseil d’administration peut donner lieu à une transformation.

    Une publication du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), sous forme de questions et réponses sur la gouvernance, a été conçue à l’intention des administrateurs nommés par le gouvernement du Québec comme membre d’un conseil d’administration d’une société d’État ou d’un organisme gouvernemental. Celle-ci vise à répondre aux questions les plus courantes qu’un administrateur nouvellement nommé peut légitimement se poser en matière de gouvernance. On y indique qu’ « une évaluation faite à intervalles périodiques est essentielle pour assurer le maintien d’une gouvernance efficace » (2).

    Penguins

    Cet article offrira une approche pratique en matière d’évaluations efficaces des conseils d’administration et des administrateurs en appliquant un cadre comportant sept étapes qui pose les questions clés que tous les conseils d’administration devraient prendre en considération lorsqu’ils planifient une évaluation. Même les conseils d’administration efficaces peuvent tirer profit d’une évaluation bien menée.

    Comme nous l’avons résumé dans le tableau 1, une évaluation menée adéquatement peut contribuer considérablement à des améliorations du rendement à trois niveaux : organisation, conseil d’administration et administrateur. Selon Lawler et Finegold « les conseils qui évaluent leurs membres et qui s’évaluent ont tendance à être plus efficaces que ceux qui ne le font pas ». Toutefois, il faut souligner que ces avantages ne sont possibles qu’au moyen d’une évaluation du conseil d’administration menée de manière appropriée; si l’évaluation n’est pas faite correctement, cela peut causer de la méfiance parmi les membres du conseil d’administration et entre le conseil lui-même et la direction.

    Une publication de l’École d’administration publique du Québec (ENAP), produite en collaboration avec le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), présente une section traitant de l’évaluation de la performance du conseil d’administration (3).

    Selon les auteurs, « L’évaluation est une composante essentielle d’une saine gouvernance d’entreprise. Elle permet de jeter un regard sur la façon dont les décisions ont été prises et sur la manière d’exercer la gestion des activités de l’organisation et ce, dans une perspective d’amélioration continue… Il incombe au président du conseil d’instaurer une culture d’évaluation du rendement et de la performance. Pour ce faire, il doit veiller à la mise en place d’un processus d’évaluation clair, à l’élaboration de règles et d’outils pertinents, à la définition des responsabilités de chaque intervenant dans le processus d’évaluation, à la diffusion de l’information et à la mise en place des correctifs nécessaires ». Dans cette publication, on présente dix outils détaillés d’évaluations (questionnaires) qui concernent les groupes cibles suivants :

    1. l’évaluation du conseil

    2. l’évaluation du fonctionnement du conseil

    3. l’évaluation du président du conseil

    4. l’évaluation d’un membre de conseil

    5. l’évaluation du comité de gouvernance et d’éthique

    6. l’évaluation du comité de vérification

    7. l’évaluation du comité des ressources humaines

    8. l’évaluation du fonctionnement d’un comité

    9. l’évaluation d’un membre de comité

    10. l’évaluation du président d’un comité

    _______________________________________

    (1) Geoffrey Kiel, Ph.D., premier vice-chancelier délégué et doyen de l’École d’administration, University of Notre Dame, Australie, et président de la société Effective Governance Pty Ltd, James Beck, directeur général, Effective Governance Pty Ltd, Jacques Grisé, Ph.D., F.Adm.A., collaborateur spécial du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), Faculté des sciences de l’administration, Université Laval, Québec.

    (2) Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, Être un administrateur de sociétés d’état : 16 questions et réponses sur la gouvernance, Faculté des sciences de l’administration, Université Laval, 2007.

    (3) ENAP, Les devoirs et responsabilités d’un conseil d’administration, Guide de référence, Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec, 2007.

    Que faire quand la confiance entre le conseil et la direction est faible ? | Le cas d’une OBNL


    Voici un cas qui origine du blogue australien de Julie Garland McLellan et qui intéressera certainement tous les membres de conseils d’administration d’OBNL.  J’ai choisi de partager ce cas en gouvernance avec vous car je crois que celui-ci évoque trop souvent les situations vécues par certaines organisations à but non lucratif.

    Ce cas présente la situation réelle d’une entreprise dont les liens de confiance entre le C.A. et la direction se sont effrités.

    Qu’en pensez-vous ? Que feriez-vous à la place de Jake ? Quelle analyse vous semble la plus appropriée dans notre contexte ? Que pensez-vous des analyses effectuées par les trois experts ?

    « Boards operate best when each director trusts each other director to adhere to the jointly accepted governance processes and policies as well as the relevant laws and regulations. This month our real life case study considers what to do when that trust is lost. Consider: What would you advise a friend to do under these circumstances ? »

     

    Que faire quand la confiance est perdue ?

     

    « Jake is a club chairman. The former chairman resigned after a major disagreement with the rest of the board which arose because the former chairman signed a major contract. When the board discovered what had happened they were furious that a large decision had been made without involving them. The former chairman stormed from the meeting and resigned in writing the following morning.

    The Board then acted without a formal chair, directors took turns to chair the meetings, until the next election. During this time the board rewrote the by-laws which previously allowed the chairman to sign contracts after verification by the treasurer that doing so would not lead to insolvency. They adopted new by-laws that stated no director, including – for absence of doubt – the chairman and/or treasurer, could commit the club to any contract, expenditure or course of action unless approved in a duly constituted board meeting.P1110362

    Jake was not previously on the board and was elected unopposed after being invited by the treasurer to stand for election. He is a successful businessman but has no experience with consensual board decision-making. He has now discovered that the club is wallowing because recent decisions have not been made in a timely fashion. His fellow directors are numerous, factionated and indecisive. The CEO has low delegations and the constitution envisages that the chairman, CEO and treasurer should make decisions between meetings and use the board to ratify strategy, engage members and provide oversight. The amended by-laws prevent the constitution from working but don’t provide an alternative workable model.

    The board reacted with horror to a suggestion that they soften the new by-laws but don’t appear willing to improve their own performance so the club can operate under the new by-laws. Staff performance reviews and bonuses are soon to be agreed and Jake is fairly certain that his board will not make rational decisions or support the CEO’s recommendations. He knows that he needs to act decisively to avert disaster but doesn’t know where to start.

    How can Jake create an environment that allows for effective management of the club before this situation spirals out of control? »

    Séparation des fonctions de président du conseil et de chef de la direction : retour sur un grand classique !


    Voici le deuxième billet présenté par le professeur Ivan Tchotourian de la Faculté de droit de l’Université Laval, élaboré dans le cadre de son cours de maîtrise Gouvernance de l’entreprise.

    Dans le cadre d’un programme de recherche, il a été proposé aux étudiants non seulement de mener des travaux sur des sujets qui font l’actualité en gouvernance de l’entreprise, mais encore d’utiliser un format original permettant la diffusion des résultats. Le présent billet expose le résultat des recherches menées par Nadia Abida, Arnaud Grospeillet, Thomas Medjir et Nathalie Robitaille.

    Ce travail revient sur les arguments échangés concernant la dissociation des fonctions de président du conseil d’administration et de chef de la direction. Ce billet alimente la discussion en faisant une actualité comparative des normes et des éléments juridiques, et en présentant les dernières statistiques en ce domaine.

    Le papier initial des étudiants a été retravaillé par Nadia Abida afin qu’il correspondre au style du blogue . Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires et vos points de vue sont les bienvenus.

    « Je vous en souhaite bonne lecture et suis certain que vous prendrez autant de plaisir à le lire que j’ai pu en prendre à le corriger. Merci encore à Jacques de permettre la diffusion de ce travail et d’offrir ainsi la chance à des étudiants de contribuer aux riches discussions dont la gouvernance d’entreprise est l’objet ».  (Ivan Tchotourian)

     

    Séparation des fonctions de président du conseil et de chef de la direction : retour sur un grand classique

     

    Nadia Abida, Arnaud Grospeillet, Thomas Medjir, Nathalie Robitaille

    Anciens étudiants du cours DRT-6056 Gouvernance de l’entreprise

     

    La séparation entre les fonctions de président du conseil d’administration (CA) et du chef de la direction est l’un des facteurs incontournables de l’indépendance des administrateurs. Cette dernière est un indicateur de pratique de bonne gouvernance d’entreprise. Cependant, et malgré l’importance avérée de la séparation des deux fonctions, nombre d’entreprises continuent à en pratiquer le cumul. Les arguments foisonnent de part et d’autre, et ne s’accordent pas sur la nécessité de cette séparation.

    redaction-des-statuts-de-sa

    Un retour sur une proposition d’actionnaires de la banque JP Morgan démontre la nécessité de ne pas laisser ce sujet sans réflexions. Cette proposition en faveur d’une séparation des fonctions a été émise à la suite d’une divulgation par la société d’une perte s’élevant à 2 milliards de dollars… perte essuyée sous la responsabilité de son PDG actuel [1].

    Ce n’est un secret pour personne que cette société a un passif lourd avec des pertes colossales engendrées par des comportements critiquables sur lesquels la justice a apporté un éclairage. Les conséquences de cette gestion auraient-elles été identiques si une séparation des pouvoirs avait était mise en place entre une personne agissant et une personne surveillant ?

     

    Silence du droit et positions ambiguës

     

    Les textes législatifs (lois ou règlements) canadiens, américains ou européens apportent peu de pistes de solution à ce débat. La plupart se montrent en effet silencieux en ce domaine faisant preuve d’une retenue étonnamment rare lorsque la gouvernance d’entreprise est débattue. Dans ses lignes directrices [2], l’OCDE – ainsi que la Coalition canadienne pour une saine gestion des Entreprises dans ses principes de gouvernance d’entreprise [3] – atteste pourtant de l’importance du cloisonnement entre les deux fonctions.

    De ce cloisonnement résulte l’indépendance et l’objectivité nécessaires aux décisions prises par le conseil d’administration. Au Canada, le comité Saucier dans son rapport de 2001 et le rapport du Milstein center [4] ont mis en exergue l’importance d’une telle séparation. En comparaison, la France s’est montrée plus discrète et il n’a pas été question de trancher dans son Code de gouvernement d’entreprise des sociétés cotées (même dans sa version amendée de 2013) [5] : ce dernier ne privilégie ainsi ni la séparation ni le cumul des deux fonctions [6].

     

    Quelques chiffres révélateurs

     

    Les études contemporaines démontrent une nette tendance en faveur de la séparation des deux rôles. Le Canadian Spencer Stuart Board Index [7] estime qu’une majorité de 85 % des 100 plus grandes entreprises canadiennes cotées en bourse ont opté pour la dissociation entre les deux fonctions. Dans le même sens, le rapport Clarkson affiche que 84 % des entreprises inscrites à la bourse de Toronto ont procédé à ladite séparation [8]. Subsistent cependant encore de nos jours des entreprises canadiennes qui  permettent le cumul. L’entreprise Air Transat A.T. Inc en est la parfaite illustration : M. Jean-Marc Eustache est à la fois président du conseil et chef de la direction. A contrario, le fond de solidarité de la Fédération des travailleurs du Québec vient récemment de procéder à la séparation des deux fonctions. Aux États-Unis en 2013, 45 % des entreprises de l’indice S&P500 (au total 221 entreprises) dissocient les rôles de PDG et de président du conseil. Toutefois, les choses ne sont pas aussi simples qu’elles y paraissent : 27 % des entreprises de cet indice ont recombiné ces deux rôles [9]. Évoquons à ce titre le cas de Target Corp dont les actionnaires ont refusé la dissociation des deux fonctions [10].

     

    Il faut séparer les fonctions !

     

    Pendant longtemps, il a été d’usage au sein des grandes sociétés par actions, que le poste de président du conseil soit de l’apanage du chef de la direction. Selon les partisans du non cumul, fusionner ces deux fonctions revient néanmoins à réunir dans une seule main un trop grand pouvoir et des prérogatives totalement antagonistes, voir même contradictoires. En ce sens, Yvan Allaire [11] souligne qu’il est malsain pour le chef de la direction de présider aussi le conseil d’administration. Rappelons que le CA nomme, destitue, rémunère et procède à l’évaluation du chef de la direction. La séparation des deux fonctions trouve pleinement son sens ici puisqu’elle crée une contre mesure du pouvoir : le président du CA est chargé du contrôle permanent de la gestion, et le directeur général est en situation de subordination par rapport au CA.

    Sous ce contrôle, le directeur général ne peut être que plus diligent et prudent dans l’exercice de ses fonctions, puisqu’il doit en rendre compte au CA. Des idées et décisions confrontées et débattues sont de loin plus constructives que des décisions prises de manière unilatérale. N’y a-t-il pas plus d’esprit dans deux têtes que dans une comme le dit le proverbe ? De plus, les partisans du non cumul avancent d’autres arguments. Il en va ainsi de la rémunération de la direction. Le cumul des deux fonctions irait de pair avec la rémunération conséquente. Celui qui endosse les deux fonctions est enclin à prendre des risques qui peuvent mettre en péril les intérêts financiers de la société pour obtenir une performance et un rendement qui justifieraient une forte rémunération. Par ailleurs, le cumul peut entrainer une négligence des deux rôles au profit de l’un ou de l’autre. Aussi, le choix du non cumul s’impose lorsque l’implication de la majorité ou encore, de la totalité des actionnaires ou membres dans la gestion quotidienne de la société, est faible. Cette séparation permet en effet aux actionnaires ou aux membres d’exercer une surveillance adéquate de la direction et de la gestion quotidienne de ladite société [12].

     

    Attention à la séparation !

     

    Nonobstant les arguments cités plus haut, la séparation des deux fonctions ne représente pas nécessairement une meilleure gestion du conseil d’administration. Les partisans du cumul clament que non seulement l’endossement des deux fonctions par une seule personne unifie les ordres et réduit les couts de l’information, mais que c’est aussi un mécanisme d’incitation pour les nouveaux chefs en cas de transition. Cela se traduit par la facilité de remplacer une seule personne qui détient les deux pouvoirs, à la place de remplacer deux personnes. Par ailleurs, la séparation limiterait l’innovation et diluerait le pouvoir d’un leadership effectif [13] en augmentant la rivalité entre les deux responsables pouvant même aller jusqu’à semer la confusion.

     

    Coûts et flexibilité du choix

     

    En dépit de la critique classique du cumul des fonctions, les deux types de structures sont potentiellement sources de bénéfices et de coûts, bénéfices et coûts que les entreprises vont peser dans leur choix de structure. Les coûts de la théorie de l’agence impliquent des arrangements institutionnels lorsqu’il y a séparation entre les fonctions de président et de chef de la direction [14]. Ces coûts sont occasionnés par exemple par la surveillance du CA sur le chef de la direction. Il devient plus cher de séparer les deux fonctions que de les unifier.

    Cependant, une antithèse présentée par Andrea Ovans [15] soutient qu’au contraire il est plus cher d’unifier les deux fonctions que de les séparer. Comment ? Simplement à travers la rémunération (salaire de base, primes, incitations, avantages, stock-options, et les prestations de retraite). L’imperméabilité entre les deux fonctions qui apparaît comme « la » solution en matière de bonne gouvernance pourrait ne pas l’être pour toutes les entreprises.

    Si le cumul des fonctions et les autres mécanismes de surveillance fonctionnement bien, pourquoi faudrait-il prévoir un changement ? De surcroit, le « one size fits all » n’est pas applicable en la matière. Devrait-on prévoir les mêmes règles en termes de séparation pour les grandes et petites entreprises ? Rien n’est moins sûr… Le cumul des fonctions apparaît plus adapté aux entreprises de petite taille : ceci est dû à la fluidité de communication entre les deux responsables et à la faiblesse de la quantité d’informations à traiter [16].

    [1] Investors seek to split JP Morgan CEO, Chairman http://www.wfaa.com/news/business/192146051.html, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 12 Juillet 2014.

    [2] http://www.oecd.org/fr/gouvernementdentreprise/ae/gouvernancedesentreprisespubliques/34803478.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 12 juillet 2014. Dans le même sens, voir l’instruction générale 85-201 et le rapport Cadbury en 1992.

    [3] CCGG : Principes de gouvernance d’entreprise pour la mise en place de conseils d’administration performants, http://www.ccgg.ca/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/Principes_de_gouvernance.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 12 juillet 2014

    [4] « Split CEO/Chair Roles: The Geteway to Good Governance? », http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/FacultyAndResearch/ResearchCentres/ClarksonCentreforBoardEffectiveness/CCBEpublications/SplitCEO.aspx, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 18 juillet 2014.

    [5] Code de gouvernement d’entreprise des sociétés cotées (révisé en juin 2013), http://www.medef.com/fileadmin/www.medef.fr/documents/AFEP-MEDEF/Code_de_gouvernement_d_entreprise_des_societes_cotees_juin_2013_FR.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 15 juillet 2014.

    [6] L’Union européenne ne s’est pas prononcée sur la séparation des deux fonctions. Voir à ce propos Richard Leblanc.

    [7] Canadian Spencer Stuart Board Index 2013, https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/Canadian-Board-Index-2013_27Jan2014.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 12 Juillet 2014 ; p. 19.

    [8] Public Submissions on Governance Issues, http://www.powercorporation.com/en/governance/public-submissions-governance-issues/may-12-2014-canada-business-corporations-act/#_ftn12, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 18 juillet 2014.

    [9] Spencer Stuart Board Index 2013 (US), https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/PDF%20Files/Research%20and%20Insight%20PDFs/SSBI13%20revised%2023DEC2013.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 25 juillet 2014.

    [10] Target shareholders narrowly reject splitting CEO, Chairman posts, http://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/news/2014/06/13/target-shareholders-narrowly-reject-splitting-ceo.html, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 18 juillet 2014.

    [11] Yvan Allaire, « Un « bon » président du CA ? », http://droit-des-affaires.blogspot.ca/2007/11/un-bon-prsident-du-ca.html, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 23 juillet 2014.

    [12] À ce propos, voir André Laurin, « La fonction de président de conseil d’administration », http://www.lavery.ca/upload/pdf/fr/DS_080203f.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 21 juillet 2014, p. 2.

    [13] Aiyesha Dey, Ellen Engel and Xiaohui Gloria Liu, « CEO and Board Chair Roles: to Split or not to Split? », December 16, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1412827, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 22 juillet 2014.

    [14] Idem.

    [15] Voir Coûts élevés associés à la combinaison des rôles du président du conseil et du président de la société : https://jacquesgrisegouvernance.com/2014/06/29/couts-eleves-associes-a-la-combinaison-des-roles-du-president-du-conseil-et-du-president-de-la-societe/, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 21 juillet 2014.

    [16] Aiyesha Dey, « What JPMorgan Shareholders Should Know About Splitting the CEO and Chair Roles », Research, http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/05/research-what-jpmorgan-shareho/, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 21 juillet 2014.

    Quel est le rôle du conseil dans une entreprise familiale ?


    La gestion des entreprises familiales est un sujet qui concerne un grand nombre d’organisations, souvent très petites mais qui ont néanmoins besoin d’une certaine configuration de gouvernance. L’article de Dan Ryan, président des pratiques réglementaires à PricewaterhouseCoopers, est basé sur une publication de PwC. 

    On y présente un modèle de gouvernance qui reflète l’évolution des entreprises familiales ainsi que les nombreux avantages à se doter des mécanismes de gouvernance appropriés.

    Également, l’article décrit les principales réticences des entrepreneurs et des fondateurs à aller de l’avant; l’auteur tente d’apporter des réponses concrètes aux préoccupations des propriétaires-dirigeants. Enfin, l’article aborde les attentes que les entreprises doivent avoir eu égard à la mise en place d’un conseil d’administration.

    Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de l’extrait ci-dessous et de poursuivre la lecture complète de l’article en cliquant sur le lien suivant :

    What Is a Board’s Role in a Family Business?

    Individual- and family-owned businesses are a vital part of our economy. If you or your family owns such a company you understand how important the company’s success is to your personal wealth and to future generations. If you’re a nonfamily executive at a family company, you also recognize that its profitability and resilience is vital to your job security and financial well-being.

    We see more family companies interested in corporate governance today than we did a decade ago, as shown in changes they’ve made to their boards. While some family companies have a board only to satisfy legal compliance requirements, more are moving toward the outer rings on the family business corporate governance model, below. Ultimately, owners will choose which level best suits the company’s needs and when changing circumstances mean the company’s governance should transition to another ring.

    Family Business Corporate Governance Model*

    pwc-wbrfb1

     

    Compliance board. While most states require companies incorporated in the state to have a board, the requirement may be as simple as a board of at least one person that meets at least once per year. A company may have only the founder on its board. In the early stages of a founder-led company, this type of board may well be the best fit for the company, since the founder is usually more focused on building the business than on governance.

    Insider board. Such a board often includes family members and members of senior management. This membership can better involve the family in the business, help with succession planning, and introduce additional perspectives to board discussions. The insider board may be created by the founder—who may no longer be the CEO—or by the next generation owner(s) of the company. That said, the founder/owner(s) retain decision-making authority.

    Inner circle board. In this type of board the founder/owner adds directors he or she knows well. These may include an accountant, lawyer, or other business professional that guided or influenced the company, or the founder’s close friends. These directors may bring skills or experience to the board that are otherwise missing and may be in a position to challenge the founder/owner(s) in a positive way. Such boards might create an audit committee or other committees. That said, the founder/owner(s)—who may or may not be the CEO—retains decision-making authority.

    Quasi-independent board. This level introduces outside/independent directors who have no employment or other tie to the company apart from their role as a director. (See the Family Business Corporate Governance Series module Building or renewing your board for a more complete discussion of independent/outside directors.) These directors introduce objectivity and accountability to the board and they expect their input to be respected. Board processes and policies will likely become more formalized with outside/independent directors on the board. The number of committees may increase. This outermost ring on the family business corporate governance model is most similar to governance at a public company.

    59% of CEOs and CFOs of 147 family-owned/owner-operated companies report having a “formal board of directors that acts on behalf of company owners to oversee the business and management,” per a PwC 2013 survey.

    We recognize that governance at any family company will be determined almost exclusively by what the founder (or family members who control the company) wants. You may have a compliance board or an inner circle board—and those may be entirely appropriate for where your company is at present. We’ve seen numerous family companies that benefited greatly from moving toward the outer rings in the governance model—especially when anticipating a generational transition.

    In this post, we’ll help you understand how to build an effective board for your family company, and how boards can assist with some of the particularly challenging issues family companies face. This first module discusses why you might want to evolve or change your governance model and what you could expect from a board if you do so.

    Each family company’s situation is unique and we can’t address every scenario. Our goal is to provide a framework of how corporate governance practices apply to family companies so you can decide what’s best for you.

    ___________________________________________

    * Some companies also have an Advisory Board to advise management (and directors). Advisory Board members don’t vote or have fiduciary responsibilities.

    …..

    Les investisseurs réclament plus d’engagement et d’ouverture de la part du conseil d’administration


     

     

    Les investisseurs et les actionnaires réclament avec de plus en plus d’insistance la possibilité d’engager des communications avec les administrateurs.

    L’article d’Andrew Ross Sorkin*  publié dans  DealBook Column du NYT rappelle les principaux arguments des actionnaires activistes et des investisseurs institutionnels qui militent en faveur de cette exigence ainsi que les raisons traditionnelles qui amènent les conseils d’administration à rester à l’écart de ces récentes demandes.

    Je crois, comme l’auteur, que les entreprises publiques doivent adopter des politiques qui encadrent clairement le processus d’engagement entre actionnaires/investisseurs et administrateurs de sociétés. Voici un extrait de cet article. Bonne lecture !

    Investors to Directors, ‘Can We Talk?’

    What if lawmakers never spoke to their constituents?

    Oddly enough, that’s exactly how corporate America operates. Shareholders vote for directors, but the directors rarely, if ever, communicate with them.

    Within the clubby world of directors, communicating with shareholders, big or small, is overtly frowned upon: “We endorse the principle that direct engagement involving directors should not be a routine method of engagement for most U.S. companies and for most investors,” according to the Conference Board Governance Center Task Force on Corporate/Investor Engagement.

    That’s why it was so unusual for the chairmen of at least 1,000 large United States public companies to receive a letter this month from a group of shareholders representing more than $10 trillion in assets with a demand: Talk to us. The letter, signed by representatives of some of the biggest investment groups, including BlackRock, Vanguard and Calstrs, insisted that boards open up.

    “Engagement between public company directors and their company’s shareholders is an idea whose time has come,” wrote the group, known as the Shareholder-Director Exchange. “We believe that U.S. public companies, in consultation with management, should consider formally adopting a policy providing for shareholder-director engagement.”

    P1120327

    What was uncommon about the letter was that it came not from activist investors like Carl C. Icahn or William A. Ackman, but from institutional investors that until recently had traditionally always supported whatever a company’s board recommended. Now, those investors want a dialogue.

    The reason boards have long shunned speaking with investors is multifaceted. Management — the chief executive, chief financial officer and so on — usually have meetings with the company’s biggest shareholders. Some directors avoid meetings. worried about speaking with one voice. Most don’t consider it their responsibility. Some are anxious about accidentally disclosing sensitive information. A memo to directors on this topic from the law firm Latham & Watkins was explicitly titled “Dangerous Talk?”

    Some chief executives are insecure and don’t want shareholders to get too close to their boards for fear they will have undue influence. After all, most directors rely directly on management and their presentations to understand what’s going on inside the company and what shareholders think.

    And then there is this: “Many top executives seem to think that board members cannot be trusted with such interactions,” according to Harvard Business Review. “Yet if directors cannot be trusted to meet with and listen to shareholders, how can they be expected to competently govern a corporation?”

    …..

    Vous pouvez également lire la lettre d’un investisseur institutionnel à l’intention du conseil d’administration, en particulier à l’attention du président du conseil, parue dans le Financial Times du 25 juillet 2014. Vous devrez vous inscrire pour consulter les pages du FT.

    Investors want direct access to the boardroom

    ________________________________________________

    *Andrew Ross Sorkin is the editor at large of DealBook.