Aujourd’hui, je présente plusieurs points de vue se rapportant aux effets négatifs, à long terme, des agissements des investisseurs activistes. Depuis un an, j’ai fait plusieurs interventions sur ce thème dans le but de mieux informer les partisans de la « bonne gouvernance » de la situation qui prévaut dans ce domaine. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un billet que j’ai publié le 28 septembre 2013 et qui fait l’inventaire de ces publications.
Mon objectif n’est pas de susciter la controverse à ce sujet parmi les administrateurs de sociétés; je suis néanmoins très sensible aux voix, de plus en plus nombreuses, qui s’élèvent et qui concluent aux effets pervers des fonds activistes. J’espère donc qu’avec toutes les informations « scientifiques » et de nature « pratique », les lecteurs de ce blogue pourront se forger une opinion éclairée.
À cet égard, j’ai demandé à Yvan Allaire, président exécutif du conseil de l’IGOPP, de vous exposer succinctement sa position sur cette épineuse question*.
Un important et acrimonieux débat fait rage présentement aux États-Unis sur un sujet d’une grande importance pour la situation canadienne. D’une part, un groupe d’universitaires, dont le leader est le professeur Bebchuk de la faculté de droit de Harvard, soutient, études empiriques à l’appui, qu’il est faux d’imputer des mobiles de profitabilité à court terme aux «fonds activistes», que ceux-ci contribuent à une amélioration sensible et durable de la performance des entreprises ciblées, qu’en aucune façon leurs prescriptions et agissements ne suscitent-ils des comportements de maximisation de la valeur du titre à court terme, mais dont les effets à long terme seraient nocifs pour l’entreprise.
English: This statue is also known as « Statue of Three Lies » Lie # 1 : This is not John Harvard’s face; no picture or statue of John Harvard survived. Lie # 2 : John Harvard was not founder of Harvard University; it was founded two years prior to being renamed Harvard in 1638. Lie # 3 : The inscription says that Harvard was founded in 1638; in fact, it was founded two years earlier. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Évidemment, cette thèse est contestée et réfutée par un groupe réunissant des avocats, des universitaires, des juristes et surtout des dirigeants d’entreprise. Le célèbre avocat Martin Lipton, initiateur de la défense dite «poison pill» en est le porte-parole le plus véhément et assidu.
Vous trouverez au lien suivant un texte de Lipton qui réunit un nombre d’études aux conclusions divergentes de celles de Bebchuk ainsi que des témoignages de personnes ayant une longue expérience pratique de ces phénomènes.
Le sujet est important pour le Canada, car tant pour le Groupe de travail sur la protection des entreprises québécoisesque dans le cadre des consultations des commissions des valeurs mobilièressur l’à-propos de donner plus de pouvoir aux conseils en situation de tentative «hostile» de prise de contrôle, les opposants à toute intervention ou changement s’abreuvent abondamment à la fontaine de Bebchuk et al.
* Pour ceux qui veulent pousser davantage leurs réflexions sur les enjeux se rapportant aux conséquences néfastes des interventions des actionnaires activistes et « hedge funds », il me fera plaisir de vous faire parvenir les documents suivants :
(1) Hedge funds as “Activist Shareholders”: Passing Phenomenon or Grave-Diggers of Public Corporations ? Allaire et Firsirotu, 2007 .
(2) Activist Hedge Funds are good for you ! Allaire, 2013.
Je vous invite à lire cet article de Vincent Ryan paru dans Capital Markets du site CFO. On y décrit un changement significatif dans l’influence que peuvent exercer les actionnaires des grandes sociétés cotées en se rapprochant des positions des activistes, lesquels ont un solide parcours (Track Record). Voici un extrait de ce court article.
Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus !
Management and the board of directors may assume that a company’s institutional shareholders will be their allies in a fight against an activist investor. They shouldn’t.
Shareholder activists continue to take on boards of directors and management, especially at large companies. Of the 137 financial or board-seat activist campaigns announced as of August 12, nearly 30 percent involved companies with a market capitalization of more than $1 billion at the time the campaign was initiated, according to SharkRepellent.net, up from 20 percent in 2012.
While companies may just be more vulnerable to activist campaigns, experts say a key driver is that institutional shareholders are more often embracing these much-maligned investors instead of siding with the company against them.
“There is real change in how activists are perceived by the investing public,” says Alexander Khutorsky, managing director of The Valence Group, a specialist investment bank. In the past, if an institutional investor didn’t like a company’s performance or its management team, it “voted with its feet” and sold the shares. But now many investors are “more open to outsider influence,” says Khutorsky. “They’re willing to concede that a company could be made better through activism, so they are sticking around and voting for changes.”
A note from SharkRepellent.net highlights “an increased willingness by mainstream mutual funds and other institutional investors to side with activists, which is absolutely essential [for a hedge fund] to effect changes with a small ownership stake, as they often do when targeting larger companies.”
The goals of activists often align with investors: returning excess balance-sheet cash to shareholders, selling underperforming or noncore business units or even ousting an ineffective board of directors.
“As much as management may feel they are being attacked, their shareholders will not necessarily share that view,” Khutorsky says.
In addition, activist investors have a “good track record” of creating value, at least in the nominal sense, says Khutorsky. “The stock [often] goes up so they can show very straightforward returns; they’re not necessarily creating long-term value, but they have credibility in helping shareholders realize near-term value,” he says.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, une présentation Power Point que Richard Leblanc a livrée à la conférence annuelle de la Canadian Society of Corporate Secretaries, le 21 août 2013 à Halifax, NS.
Cette présentation aborde tous les points chauds dans le domaine de la rémunération des hauts dirigeants. Richard a eu la générosité de mettre cette présentation en ligne via le groupe de discussion Boards & Advisors. Il s’agit d’une mine d’information pour toute personne intéressée par l’influence de la gouvernance sur les rémunérations des dirigeants.
President Barack Obama and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announce new limits on executive compensation. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Si vous êtes intéressés par certains aspects plus spécifiques de ces questions, je suis assuré qu’il se fera un plaisir de vous donner de plus amples informations. Voici un résumé des 10 thèmes abordés dans cette présentation. Bonne lecture.
1. Red flags and best practices;
2. Shareholder engagement and activism;
3. Changes to executive compensation;
4. Compensation of oversight functions (Canada, FSB);
5. Internal pay equity (coming in August);
6. Independent director compensation: Case;
7. Incorporating LT NF metrics into compensation: Case;
Cet article, rédigé par Ted Kaufman, de Forbes expose une problématique de gouvernance déterminante et décisoire, une problématique à laquelle chaque administrateur est confronté. Dans la gestion d’une corporation publique (cotée en bourse), quelle importance un administrateur doit-il accorder à l’avis et au vote des actionnaires ?
Il est crucial, pour chaque administrateur, d’avoir une vision claire à ce sujet car son comportement sur le Conseil sera influencé, en grande partie, par la conception qu’il se fait de son rôle de fiduciaire. L’auteur adopte une position très campée, tranchante et … mordante à ce sujet : l’hégémonie et la primauté des actionnaires !
Encore une fois, il est difficile de trancher car on peut toujours répondre que ça dépend ! Mais, à mon avis, chaque administrateur a un point de vue sur la question, une prise de position qui façonne son système de valeur.
Attention cependant … La position de l’auteur doit être analysée en tenant compte de l’environnement légal américain. La thèse de Kaufman est que les actionnaires n’ont à peu près pas d’influence sur ce que le management ou le conseil fait ! Les actionnaires, selon lui, sont les véritables propriétaires et ils sont souverains. Les visiteurs du blogue sont-il d’accord avec cette position ? À vous de décider ! Que pensez-vous de la position de l’auteur ?
À qui les administrateurs d’une société publique doivent-ils allégeance : aux actionnaires, aux investisseurs dominants, aux parties prenantes, au management … ?
Ma réponse est que bien qu’ils soient élus par l’actionnariat, ils doivent exercer leur rôle de fiduciaire dans les MEILLEURS INTÉRÊTS DE LA SOCIÉTÉ, en prenant en compte la position des parties prenantes. C’est la réponse canadienne.
I can’t recall the venue, but it had to be in the late 1950s or early 1960’s, long before the major shareholders in our major corporations were mutual funds, pension funds, and other institutional investors. The speaker was from an organization called Americans for the Competitive Enterprise System (ACES). His topic was corporate democracy.
English: Sen. Ted Kaufman addresses engineering graduates at the University of Delaware. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
What he said stayed with me. Democracy, he said, was not only the way our political system worked but also how we ran our corporations. The people who owned common stock voted for a board of directors who in turn elected a chairman and hired a president to run the company. The board met regularly with the president and other hired managers to make sure the company was being run to maximize the economic return for the stockholders.
It sounds almost quaint, doesn’t it?
Corporate governance today has nothing to do with socialism or democracy. What is now clear is that many of our major corporations are operated as dictatorships by their managements, and stockholders have virtually no say in how they are run.
Que pensent vraiment les PCD de leur C.A. ? Les auteurs Jeffrey Sonnenfeld*, Melanie Kusin* et Elise Walton* ont procédé à des entrevues en profondeur avec une douzaine de PCD (CEO) expérimentés et ils ont publiés la synthèse de leurs résultats dans Harvard Business Review (HBR). Essentiellement, les chercheurs voulaient savoir comment les C.A. peuvent avoir une influence positive et devenir un atout stratégique. Ils ont résumé leur enquête en faisant ressortir 5 conseils à l’intention des conseils d’administration. Voici un extrait de cet article très intéressant. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus !
Over the past several years, in the wake of corporate missteps that have taken a toll on shareholders and communities alike, we’ve heard plenty about how boards of directors should have been more responsible stewards. Corporate watchdogs, investors and analysts, members of the media, regulators, and pundits have proposed guidelines and new practices. But one voice has been notably missing from this chorus—and it belongs to the constituency that knows boards and their failings best. It’s the voice of the CEO.
Harkness Tower, situated in the Memorial Quadrangle at Yale (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
There are reasons for this silence from the chief executive camp. Few CEOs volunteer their views publicly; they know they’d risk looking presumptuous and becoming a target. They realize it would be foolhardy to draw attention to their own governance dysfunctions or seem to reveal boardroom confidences. Meanwhile, people who do make it their business to speak out on governance haven’t made much effort to elicit CEOs’ views. Extreme cases of CEO misconduct have created skepticism about whether CEOs can help fix faulty governance—a dangerous overreaction. Many observers, having seen grandiose, greedy, and corrupt CEOs protected by inattentive or complicit directors, consider excessive CEO influence on boards to be part of the problem. Others may lack the access to CEOs and the level of trust needed for frank conversations. Whatever the reasons, the omission is unfortunate. Not only do CEOs have enormous experience to draw on, but their views are the ones boards are most likely to heed.
We recently tapped our networks to bring CEOs’ opinions to light. We talked to dozens of well-regarded veteran chief executives, focusing on people with no particular reason to resent boards—we didn’t want bitterness or self-justification to color the findings. We wanted to know: What keeps a board from being as effective as it could be? Is it really the cartoon millstone around the CEO’s neck, or does it have a positive influence on the enterprise? What can a board do to become a true strategic asset?
We were surprised by the candor of the responses—even given our comfortable relationships with the CEOs and our assurances that quotes would not be attributed without express permission. Clearly, CEOs believe it is important to address problems and opportunities they’re uniquely positioned to observe. They know that their strategic visions and personal legacies can be undone by bad governance, and they have plenty to say on the subject. We’ve distilled their comments into five overarching pieces of advice for boards.
Don’t Shun Risk or See It in Personal Terms
Do the Homework, and Stay Consistently Plugged In
Bring Character and Credentials, Not Celebrity, to the Table
Constructively Challenge Strategy
Make Succession Transitions Less Awkward, Not More So
« Every board is different. If you serve on one, some of these comments may strike close to home; others may not. As we listened to CEOs and reviewed our transcripts looking for patterns, we identified three important takeaways.
First, contrary to what some critics believe, CEOs do not want to keep their boards in the dark or to chip away at directors’ power. They recognize that they and their shareholders will get more value if the partnership at the top is strong. Great CEOs know that if governance isn’t working, it’s everyone’s job to figure out why and to fix it.
Second, most boards aren’t working as well as they should—and it’s not clear that any of the systemic reforms that have been proposed will remedy matters. Although governed by bylaws and legal responsibilities, interactions between CEOs and directors are still personal, and improving them often requires the sorts of honest, direct, and sometimes awkward conversations that serve to ease tensions in any personal relationship. When strong relationships are in place, it becomes easier for CEOs to speak candidly about problems—for example, if the board isn’t adding enough value to decision making, or if individual directors are unconstructive or overly skeptical. For their part, directors should be clear about what they want—whether it’s less protocol and fewer dog and pony shows or more transparency, communication, and receptivity to constructive criticism.
Third, the best leadership partnerships are forged where there is mutual respect, energetic commitment to the future success of the enterprise, and strong bonds of trust. A great board does not adopt an adversarial, “show me” posture toward management and its plans. Nor does it see its power as consisting mainly of checks and balances on the CEO’s agenda. Great boards support smart entrepreneurial risk taking with prudent oversight, wise counsel, and encouragement ».
____________________________________
Jeffrey Sonnenfeld*, is the senior associate dean for executive programs and the Lester Crown Professor at Yale University’s School of Management, is the founding CEO of Yale’s Chief Executive Leadership Institute. Melanie Kusin* is the vice chairman of Korn/Ferry International’s CEO practice. Elise Walton*, is a former Yale–Korn/Ferry senior research fellow, consults on corporate governance and executive leadership.
Voici un article très intéressant publié le 25 février 2013 par D. F. Larcker, A. L. McCall, et B. Tayan dans Stanford Closer Look Series. Les auteurs expliquent très clairement (1) la raison d’être des firmes qui procurent des conseils aux organisations qui détiennent des procurations (Proxy Advisory Firms), (2) le mode de fonctionnement d’entreprises telles que Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) et Glass Lewis & Co) et (3) certaines lacunes de leur processus d’analyse.
Que vous soyez d’accord ou non avec les conclusions de l’article, celui-ci vous aidera sûrement à mieux comprendre le modèle d’affaires des firmes qui font des recommandations de vote, notamment aux investisseurs institutionnels. Les auteurs expliquent aussi la méthodologie utilisée par ces firmes pour arriver aux recommandations de vote. On donne également des exemples précis de questions posées aux répondants et on montre comment certaines d’entre elles ont des problèmes de design (biais, généralisation, ambiguïtés, imprécisions, etc.).
Cet article nous aide à mieux saisir la complexité de ces firmes, et leur influence grandissante dans le monde de la gouvernance ! Voici un extrait de l’introduction de l’article. Vos commentaires sont appréciés.
« The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms Proxy advisory firms are independent, for-profit consulting companies that provide research and voting recommendations on corporate governance matters brought before investors at shareholder meetings. These matters include the election of the board of directors, approval of equity-based compensation programs, advisory approval of management compensation, and other management- and shareholder-sponsored initiatives regarding board structure, compensation design, and other governance policies and procedures.
There are many reasons why investors might choose to consult with third-party advisors when voting their position on these matters. Institutional investors are generally required by the Securities and Exchange Commission to vote all matters on the corporate proxy and disclose their votes to beneficial owners of their funds. Given the size and diversity of their holdings, it might be impractical for professional investors to have a thorough understanding of all items brought before them. Small investors, in particular, might not employ sufficient analytical staff to review all proposals in detail. For these reasons, reliable and valid third-party recommendations can contribute to a well-functioning market by improving information flow between issuers and investors leading to better decisions on compensation and corporate governance ».
L’audit interne prend de plus en plus d’importance au sein des organisations. Le Journal of Accountancy vient depublier les résultats d’une enquête portant sur l’évolution de la profession d’auditeur interne. Ce survey semi-annuel est mené par l’Institut des auditeurs internes (IIA ) auprès de 545 chefs de l’audit interne nord-américains. Cet article a été porté à mon attention par Denis Lefort, Expert-conseil | Gouvernance, Audit, Contrôle.
Vos commentaires sont toujours très appréciés. Bonne lecture à tous et toutes.
Dominique Pannier, Director of Internal Audit of the OECD (Photo credit: OECD)
« Companies are devoting more money and staff to internal audit. Half of companies are maintaining their internal audit budget, and 41% plan to increase their spending, according to The Pulse of the Profession, a twice-annual survey of North American audit executives by The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA). That’s the highest percentage of projected increases since the survey began in 2008. Also, the number of companies projected to shrink the internal audit budget (9%) is at a low point, beating the previous low of 14% from four years ago. Twenty-four percent of companies plan to increase staffing in the internal audit department, 71% plan to maintain staffing, and 5% plan to decrease staffing.
Vous pouvez lire la suite en suivant le lien suivant :
Voici un document très engagé de la firme Latham & Watkins sur la progression de l’activisme en gouvernance des sociétés. Comme vous le constaterez, la firme Lathan & Watkins présente un tableau assez sombre de l’avenir d’une gouvernance marquée par les recommandations de firmes procurant des avis « indépendants » telles que ISS et Glass Lewis. Selon cet article, l’activisme des actionnaires et des investisseurs institutionnels est alimenté par tout un courant de pensée (« alternate universe ») en gouvernance qui, toujours selon l’article, va à l’encontre de la création de valeur des entreprises américaines cotées en bourse.
Selon l’article, l’adoption de la législation Dodd-Frank qui oblige le vote annuel « Say on Pay » est une victoire pour les défenseurs de la saine gouvernance. Il semble que l’activisme comme mécanisme de régulation de la gouvernance est en forte progression même, si selon les auteurs, c’est une pure perte de temps, d’énergie et d’argent.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, quelques extraits de la lettre de la firme Latham & Watkins Corporate Governance Commentary. Pour simplifier la lecture j’ai enlevé les références aux citations que vous pourrez retrouver dans l’article original ci-joint. On y présente des arguments qui vont souvent à l’encontre des croyances populaires ! Le moins que l’on puisse dire, c’est que les auteurs n’y vont pas avec le dos de la cuillère ! Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont appréciés.
« Corporate governance activism seems to be going from strength to strength, with Say on Pay providing new leverage and, as important, a new cause with great visceral appeal ».
English: Study on alternative investments by institutional investors. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
« Corporate governance activism’s fundamental structure as an alternate universe, essentially separate from the value creation function of its institutional investor clientele, has not changed and is not likely to do so in the future. The proxy advisory services, principally ISS and Glass Lewis, are a permanent part of the alternate universe of corporate governance and the crucial enablers of the universe’s key function — exercise of the share voting franchise ».
« Missing from most discussions of the alternate corporate governance universe are:
Recognition that the inhabitants of the parallel universe of corporate governance are not principals in their own right, but rather merely agents of the institutional investor industry, which in turn is an agent of the ultimate beneficial owners of the bulk of the equity securities of US companies.
Consideration of the large and growing agency costs imposed on the ultimate beneficial owners of public companies by the corporate governance universe, not only as a result of its own operation and growth, but also as a result of the significant expansion of the governance function at public companies needed to cope with the demands and distractions of corporate governance activism.
Most fundamentally, understanding that the foundation of the parallel universe of corporate governance activism — the precept that the shares of all portfolio companies be voted on all matters — is not imposed by the fiduciary duties of institutional investors. Rather, it is the product of a misreading of the legal requirements of fiduciary principles which, properly understood, require voting of shares by fiduciaries only if doing so creates more value than cost — a test that is clearly not met in most voting situations ».
« The obvious path of correction would be:
Recognition that there is no convincing empirical evidence that voting to advance so-called corporate governance best practices causes value creation.
Adherence by institutional investors to the cost benefit analysis that should be the basis for each voting decision, rather than simply voting all shares on all matters utilizing the cumbersome and costly machinery of corporate governance’s alternate universe.
Dismantling of the unnecessary and costly corporate governance universe that has developed at institutional investors and at portfolio companies, along with the enablers of that universe (including, in particular, the proxy advisory firms), thereby eliminating unnecessary agency costs from our public company governance structure ».
« Share voting decision makers at most institutional investors inhabit an alternate universe from investment decision makers.
Two incompatible economic and philosophical belief systems drive these alternate universes :
Investing professionals, overwhelmingly, are rationally apathetic about exercising the voting franchise embedded in stock ownership. Absent a readily observable and positive correlation between exercise of the corporate franchise and creation of shareholder value (as is the case in most M&A votes and proxy contests), investing professionals view the task of making voting decisions on each ballot item for each of their portfolio companies as not merely time consuming and distracting but, worse, economically wasteful.
On the other hand, notwithstanding the lack of a demonstrable connection between what is labeled good corporate governance and a positive increase in share valuation, corporate governance advocates continue to maintain that good corporate governance does, in the aggregate, enhance share values. Accordingly, in their view, voting on all ballot issues at each and every portfolio company in order to achieve better corporate governance is a value creator. Starting from this core ideology, corporate governance advocates have successfully persuaded many national politicians, most regulators of the securities and investment industries and virtually all of the financial press, that its so-called corporate governance best practices are an essential requirement for shareholder value creation and that professional investment managers, as a matter of their fiduciary duty to their customers, should be required to vote all portfolio shares on all ballot matters ».
Que veut-on dire par « agir dans l’intérêt public » lorsque l’on parle de gouvernance ? C’est un sujet vraiment complexe auquel il faut s’adresser par le biais d’un cadre conceptuel où les principales variables en jeu sont bien déchiffrées. Dans ce document de l’ICAEW (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales), on présente justement un cadre d’analyse précieux pour mieux comprendre l’intérêt public. Il est important de se questionner sur un certain nombre de variables significatives à cet égard; je les ai reproduites en français ci-dessous :
• La justification de la crédibilité à invoquer le concept d’intérêt public
• L’identification du sujet véritablement matière à intérêt public
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
• l’analyse des publics significatifs : Qui sont-ils ? Que veulent-ils ? Pourquoi le veulent-ils ? Comment cela affecte-t-il les besoins des autres parties prenantes ?
• La synthèse des situations potentiellement conflictuelles et des décisions en résultant
« In most societies there is a basic presumption that people should be able to go about their own business in their own interests. In the course of this they will interact with other people and influence and be influenced by their activities. However, there are further influences on people’s activities: when governments, regulators and others seek to intervene in the public interest ».
Quelle place doit occuper le VP-RH dans la haute direction d’une organisation (le sommet stratégique) ? Au-delà de toutes les considérations se rapportant à la rémunération, lesquelles sont par ailleurs fondamentales, quelle importance celui-ci doit-il accorder à la culture organisationnelle, et, surtout, quels efforts devraient être consentis à la mise en oeuvre d’un système sophistiqué de gestion des talents ? Comment le responsable de la gestion des ressources humaines (GRH) peut-il se positionner pour faire entendre sa voix auprès du conseil d’administration ?
L’importance qu’occupe le VP-RH dans l’entreprise ainsi que son influence auprès du Board dépend essentiellement de l’importance que le conseil d’administration accorde à toutes les facettes de la gestion des ressources humaines de l’entreprise. Le choix d’un Président et chef de la direction (PCD), attentif à ces aspects, est crucial à cet égard ! Cet article publié par Reza Ghazali dans TheStar.com montre que l’activité de la gestion des talents est très négligée et que le VP-RH n’a, trop souvent, pas la crédibilité requise pour mettre de l’avant cette priorité auprès du conseil. Pourquoi ? Comment corriger cette situation ?
NYC: American Intl Building and Manhattan Company Building (Photo credit: wallyg)
« How many times have you heard the common cry I want to grow and build this organisation but we simply just don’t have the right talent? The realisation that talent shortfalls can constrain growth, impede successful mergers, or derail a strategy has boards paying closer attention to talent topics than ever before. Recognising the competitive advantage a secure pipeline of engaged, diverse, and ready-to-lead talent provides, many corporate boards are extending their reach deep into human resources issues-leadership development, compensation, and succession planning reaching several levels below the chief executive officer.
There’s good reason. Talent scarcity is an obstacle that impacts virtually every large company and people issues have a direct impact on company performance. In the past, companies could bolster their advantage with a superior supply chain, strong product lines, or highly efficient facilities. Today, knowledge and the people who can leverage it are core differentiators. Having talent is not enough. Successful companies identify, attract, develop and retain the right talent effectively and consistently.
By understanding what is driving this change, the chief human resources officers (CHRO) can ensure that they are serving their board’s changing needs, and seize this opportunity to expand the influence of HR inside and outside their company-in some cases, by taking on board-level positions themselves. By that same token, CEOs had better ensure that their CHROs are board-capable and will represent the CEO and the company as a whole. As boards focus on helping to influence corporate strategy in more meaningful ways, the availability and quality of human capital join finance and operations as a risk factor. Boards are also considering whether their companies have the right people to support global growth. This ultimately falls on the shoulders of the CEO and his/her CHRO ».
On se questionne souvent sur l’efficacité des membres de conseils d’administration qui appartiennent aux mêmes réseaux sociaux et qui ont des liens étroits. La recherche de B. D. Nguyen de l’Université Cambridge (Judge Business School) est assez concluante à cet effet. Voici un extrait de l’article qui montre trois impacts négatifs du « Old Boys’ Network ».
There were three main findings. Firstly, close ties within a board can adversely affect company performance. While his study was not designed to explain why this is the case, Dr Nguyen believes opposing forces are at play: the positive effects of connectedness on information asymmetry as well as the board’s advisory role versus its willingness to be tough on a CEO when circumstances demand.
Secondly, social networks seem to impact board effectiveness in its role of hiring and firing CEOs, a key duty for the board to enable them to protect shareholder value. It appears well connected CEOs are less likely to be ousted for poor performance than non-connected CEOs. For the same poor performance, the connected CEO is almost three-times less likely to be fired.
Old Boys Network (Photo credit: marksdk)
The third key finding is that a connected CEO ousted for poor performance is much more likely to find a better job, more quickly, than an unconnected CEO.
Les aptitudes à la communication sont de plus en plus perçues comme essentielles à la réussite comme Président et chef de la direction (PCD) des sociétés, plus particulièrement celles reliées à maîtrise des communications publiques comme les vidéos corporatifs, les entrevues en direct, les vidéos publiées sur YouTube, les téléconférences par SKYPE, les discours de positionnement stratégique et l’utilisation des médias sociaux tels que Twitter, LinkedIn, Facebook, etc.
Cet article, publié dans International Business Times | ExpertNetwork, montre toute l’importance que les hauts dirigeants doivent consacrer à leurs activités de communications publiques en ces temps de besoins d’une plus grande transparence.
« The sooner an executive develops their ability to jump on camera to comfortably and confidently share their views, the more likely they are to be selected for high-profile positions and to be the spokesperson in moments of incredible visibility. Don’t make your first « live » video moment be one where you are unprepared to make a good impression. The likelihood of it being something critical (i.e. damage control, communications spin), is high, while your ability to knock it out of the park will be low. »
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, quelques conseils que les administrateurs de sociétés devraient suivre afin de s’assurer d’avoir un jugement robuste dans le cadre de la prise de décision. Cet article paru dans NACDDirectorship le 24 juin 2012 met l’accent sur le texte « Enhancing Board Oversight: Avoiding Judgment Traps and Biases », un document du COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission) dont les auteurs sont KPMG et les professeurs Steven M. Glover and Douglas F. Prawitt de Brigham Young University.
It used to be that exercising good judgment largely meant “using common sense.” But today, while common sense is still essential, exercising good judgment—consistently— in a business environment that is increasingly complex and dynamic, volatile and uncertain, and under high pressure requires a disciplined process. It also requires an understanding of common traps and biases that can undermine the judgments of even seasoned professionals and boards.
Voici quelques considérations importantes à connaître. Il faut lire l’article au complet lequel réfère au document du COSO.
A good judgment process followed consistently can help improve decision-making and oversight, but “traps and biases” can undermine the process.
Our “intuitive” judgment can betray us.
Beware of three particularly common judgment traps How you “frame” an issue largely determines how you see it (or don’t see it).
Beware of four common biases that can undermine good judgment (unwittingly).
Le point de vue de Pamela Jeffery, fondatrice du Canadian Board Diversity Council, dans le Financial Post, sur les effets positifs de la diversité. Il y a encore beaucoup de chemin à faire pour que le message passe clairement aux Boards des grandes sociétés cotées en bourse… mais plusieurs commencent à comprendre que la diversité est une importante valeur ajoutée dans l’efficacité des Boards.
Why in 2012, is the federal government trying to nudge corporate Canada into changing the makeup of its boardrooms to include more women?
The answer is simple: Inclusivity is good for business. Yet, while Canada enjoys an incredibly diverse, multicultural talent pool of men and women, nominating committees continue to seek out the usual candidates: Caucasian men. But the cost to opportunity of maintaining the status quo instead of seeking out the best and brightest in a much larger talent pool is too great. Recognizing this, the federal government’s Economic Action Plan 2012 created an advisory council of leaders from the private and public sectors to promote the participation of women on corporate boards.
Research shows that everybody wins when there are more perspectives around the table. The government understands this. Business has been slow to come…
Voici un excellent article de Peggy Klaus publié dans Harvard Business Review sur un sujet crucial : La communication du CEO avec les employés et les parties prenantes de l’organisation. À lire.
« Are you a CEO preparing to give a town hall state-of-the-union talk to your employees? Whether you’re a new CEO or one who’s been sitting in the chair for some time, keep reading.
An awful lot of planning, time and resources go into these town halls. They’re frequently big productions beamed via satellite to offices around the world. Employees take time away from their jobs to attend. Yet, incredibly, there is so much wasted opportunity. Take a look at your speech.
Have you spent time thinking about what’s in it for them? Do you know why you’re really giving it — aside from your Communications Director or head of HR telling you to that you’re supposed to update the troops and it’s another box you have to check off?
Have you asked yourself: What do you want your people to feel, think and do when you are done? (If you’ve left that part to the speechwriter, don’t.)
Have you addressed the elephant in the room? Bad press, layoffs, elimination of benefits, product recall, weak earnings, downgraded rating, takeovers, even widespread perceptions of you that might be less than flattering?
Employees are sick of pep talks that say nothing and do nothing but leave them guessing both about the state of the company and their Chief Executive. When it comes to their leaders, employees want and need a feeling of intimacy — the ability to see into them and to connect with them. They want to know who their leaders are — their background and experience and why they took this job. They want to understand their leaders’ style, their values, hot buttons, vulnerabilities, what keeps them up at night, what they plan on doing and what they expect from people. Yes, they want to be motivated and inspired but they can’t be either if you’re just a talking head ».
Très bon article paru dans Slate qui discute de l’influence de la globalisation des marchés sur la rémunération des CEO. Peu ou pas du tout d’effet … Voici un extrait de l’article :
The global war for talent is a popular justification for exorbitant chief executive pay. But with few exceptions, expatriate chiefs are a tiny minority at most major publicly traded corporations. It’s bad news for shareholders, especially in high-pay hubs, who could find better-value stewards overseas.
« Multinationals are constantly in search of cheaper workers. The one exception appears to be the most expensive staff of all, in the boardroom. Particularly in the United States and Britain, boards have shown little desire to get the maximum bang for their buck by insisting companies cast wider recruitment nets. Anglo-American companies continue to tolerate steep rises in pay at the top that far exceed returns.
In 2010, compensation for the head honchos at American and British companies climbed 36 percent and 43 percent, respectively, dwarfing shareholder returns of around 15 percent, according to research firms GMI and Incomes Data Services. As recently as 1993, U.S. corporate bosses were paid some 130 times more than the average worker. Now they command about 350 times more, according to Duke University economist Dan Ariely.
A big plank of the defense has been globalization. Since the brightest CEOs can take their pick of posts across the globe, or so the argument goes, shareholders should not be surprised by astronomic remuneration – a point recently made by the Corporation of London’s policy chief. This oft-repeated excuse for overcharging shareholders is seldom backed up with evidence ».
Voici un article publié dans la section Innovations du Washington Post qui montre l’influence grandissante des médias sociaux sur la gouvernance des entreprises. L’auteur met en évidence la relation entre une plus grande utilisation des médias sociaux et la tendance des entreprises à accoder plus d’importance aux questions de développement durable et de responsabilités sociales.
While many of the world’s largest businesses are genuinely making their operations more socially responsible, and a growing number of political leaders are also getting on board, the banking and finance sector lags behind. The biggest risk posed to economic recovery is if that sector remains trapped in the old model that prioritizes irresponsible risk-taking to drive annual bonuses over genuine, long-term, sustainable profit and value-creation.
Wall Street should get on board because appealing to young people’s sense of social responsibility is also where competitive advantage lies. A 2010 report from Accenture found that the top 50 most sustainable companies (taken from a cross industry group of 275 companies from the Fortune Global 1,000) outperformed shareholder return of the bottom fifty by 16 percentage points over three years and by 38 percentage points over five years.
I believe the banking and finance sector will catch up. CSR has been taken out of the silo and put in the P&L statement thanks to the revolution in communications that has empowered ordinary people to sanction those who don’t behave the way they want them to. The most successful businesses of the next decade will be the most socially responsible. They will reap huge benefits from the power of social media, as employees, shareholders and consumers become passionate advocates for their brands and businesses. And the most talented young people will want to work for them.
Top Ten Issues For Boards in 2012 – The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation – A law and economics blog from the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance that gathers the latest…
Voici un résumé des énoncés concernant l’importance à accorder aux parties prenantes dans le nouveau code de gouvernance en Afrique du Sud. Ce sont des questions qui sont de plus en plus abordées dans les discussions sur le traitement à accorder aux parties prenantes, autres que les actionnaires:
The Principles underlying King III’s Chapter 8, Managing Stakeholder Relationships are stated to be the following:
8.1. The board should take account of the legitimate interests of stakeholders in its decisions.
8.2. The company should proactively manage the relationships with its stakeholders.
8.3. The company should identify mechanisms and processes that promote enhanced levels of constructive stakeholder engagement.
8.4. The board should strive to achieve the correct balance between its various stakeholder groupings, in order to advance the interests of the company.
8.5. Companies should ensure the equitable treatment of shareholders.
8.6. Transparent and effective communication is important for building and maintaining relationships.
8.7 The board should promote mutual respect between the company and its stakeholders.
Graham consulted to the national operations of a company that has grown over 20 years acquiring ‘non-family’ shareholders who account for 40% of the capital. The founder’s son owns 10% of the shares, heads an overseas division and is a director. The founder retains the remaining 50% and is a ‘passive’ investor.
Graham helped grow market share, revenue and profits. He was offered, and accepted, a board seat. Graham performed little due diligence as he knew the domestic operations well and they account for most of the activity.
Once on the board he discovered the overseas division is unprofitable and has been losing money for years. The salaries paid to staff in the division are above market rates. Market demographics and local regulations suggest the division will make losses even if costs are cut. Graham raised this at a board meeting and was told by the son of the founder that the long established strategy of ‘loss leadership’ for developing this market cannot be questioned or changed. The Chairman closed down the discussion asking for more information to allow informed discussion at the next meeting.
After the meeting the founder sent Graham an email stating that his son was exempt from board oversight and that he, as the major shareholder, was happy for the overseas division to operate at a loss. Discussions with senior staff alert Graham to the fact that the son does little other than attending occasional board meetings. The Chairman calls Graham and informs him that the major shareholder wants Graham to resign from the board. What should Graham do?
The goals of activists often align with investors: returning excess balance-sheet cash to shareholders, selling underperforming or noncore business units or even ousting an ineffective board of directors.
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 