Comportements néfastes liés au narcissisme de certains PCD (CEO) *


Il est indéniable qu’un PCD (CEO) doit avoir une personnalité marquante, un caractère fort et un leadership manifeste. Ces caractéristiques tant recherchées chez les premiers dirigeants peuvent, dans certains cas, s’accompagner de traits de personnalité dysfonctionnels tels que le narcissisme.

C’est ce que Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic soutien dans son article publié sur le blogue du HuffPost du 2 janvier 2014. Il cite deux études qui confirment que le comportement narcissique de certains dirigeants (1) peut avoir des effets néfastes sur le moral des employés, (2) éloigner les employés potentiels talentueux et (3) contribuer à un déficit de valeurs d’intégrité à l’échelle de toute l’organisation.

L’auteur avance que les membres des conseils d’administration, notamment ceux qui constituent les comités de Ressources humaines, doivent être conscients des conséquences potentiellement dommageables des leaders flamboyants et « charismatiques ». En fait, les études montrent que les vertus d’humilité, plutôt que les traits d’arrogance, sont de bien meilleures prédicteurs du succès d’une organisation.

P1030704La première étude citée montre que les organisations dirigées par des PCD prétentieux et tout-puissants ont tendances à avoir de moins bons résultats, tout en étant plus sujettes à des fraudes.

La seconde étude indique que les valeurs d’humilité incarnées par un leader ont des conséquences positives sur l’engagement des employés.

Voici en quelques paragraphes les conclusions de ces deux études. Bonne lecture.

In the first study, Antoinette Rijsenbilt and Harry Commandeur assessed the narcissism levels of 953 CEOs from a wide range of industries, as well as examining objective performance indicators of their companies during their tenure. Unsurprisingly, organizations led by arrogant, self-centered, and entitled CEOs tended to perform worse, and their CEOs were significantly more likely to be convicted for corporate fraud (e.g., fake financial reports, rigged accounts, insider trading, etc.). Interestingly, the detrimental effects of narcissism appear to be exacerbated when CEOs are charismatic, which is consistent with the idea that charisma is toxic because it increases employees’ blind trust and irrational confidence in the leader. If you hire a charismatic leader, be prepared to put up with a narcissist.

In the second study, Bradley Owens and colleagues examined the effects of leader humility on employee morale and turnover. Their results showed that « in contrast to rousing employees through charismatic, energetic, and idealistic leadership approaches (…) a ‘quieter’ leadership approach, with listening, being transparent about limitations, and appreciating follower strengths and contributions [is the most] effective way to engage employees. » This suggests that narcissistic CEOs may be good at attracting talent, but they are probably better at repelling it. Prospective job candidates, especially high potentials, should therefore think twice before being seduced by the meteoric career opportunities outlined by charismatic executives. Greed is not only contagious, but competitive and jealous, too…

                             

If we can educate organizations, in particular board members, on the virtues of humility and the destructive consequences of narcissistic and charismatic leadership, we may see a smaller proportion of entitled, arrogant, and fraudulent CEOs — to everyone’s benefit. Instead of worshiping and celebrating the flamboyant habits of corporate bosses, let us revisit the wise words of Peter Drucker, who knew a thing or two about management:

The leaders who work most effectively, it seems to me, never say ‘I’. And that’s not because they have trained themselves not to say ‘I’. They don’t think ‘I’. They think ‘we’; they think ‘team’. They understand their job to be to make the team function. They accept responsibility and don’t sidestep it, but ‘we’ gets the credit.

 

* En reprise

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Document de référence sur les bonnes pratiques de constitution d’un Board | The Directors Toolkit *


Voici un document australien de KPMG, très bien conçu, qui répond clairement aux questions que tous les administrateurs de sociétés se posent dans le cours de leurs mandats.

Même si la publication est dédiée à l’auditoire australien de KPMG, je crois que la réalité règlementaire nord-américaine est trop semblable pour se priver d’un bon « kit » d’outils qui peut aider à constituer un Board efficace. C’est un formidable document électronique de 130 pages, donc long à télécharger. Voyez la table des matières ci-dessous.

J’ai demandé à KPMG de me procurer une version française du même document mais il ne semble pas en exister. Bonne lecture en ce début d’été 2014.

The Directors Toolkit

Our business environment provides an ever-changing spectrum of risks and opportunities. The role of the director continues to be shaped by a multitude of forces including economic uncertainty, larger and more complex organisations, the increasing pace of technological innovation and digitisation along with a more rigorous regulatory environment.

At the same time there is more onus on directors to operate transparently and be more accountable for their actions and decisions.

To support directors in their challenging role KPMG has created The Directors’ Toolkit. This guide, in a user-friendly electronic format, empowers directors to more effectively discharge their duties and responsibilities while improving board performance and decision-making.

Key topics :

The Directors' Toolkit cover

Duties and responsibilities of a director

Oversight of strategy and governance

Managing shareholder and stakeholder expectations

Structuring an effective board and sub-committees

Enabling key executive appointments

Managing productive meetings

Better practice terms of reference, charters and agendas

Establishing new boar

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* En reprise

Article relié :

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Les dix (10) plus importantes activités pour une gouvernance efficace *


Vous trouverez ci-dessous un checklist qui vous sera utile pour effectuer une révision de vos processus de gouvernance.

Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Top Ten Steps to Improving Corporate Governance :

1.      Recognise that good governance is not just about compliance

Boards need to balance conformance (i.e. compliance with legislation, regulation and codes of practice) with performance aspects of the board’s work (i.e. improving the performance of the organisation through strategy formulation and policy making). As a part of this process, a board needs to elaborate its position and understanding of the major functions it performs as opposed to those performed by management. These specifics will vary from board to board. Knowing the role of the board and who does what in relation to governance goes a long way towards maintaining a good relationship between the board and management.

2.      Clarify the board’s role in strategy

It is generally accepted today that the board has a significant role to play in the formulation and adoption of the organisation’s strategic direction. The extent of the board’s contribution to strategy will range from approval at one end to development at the other. Each board must determine what role is appropriate for it to undertake and clarify this understanding with management.

3.      Monitor organisational performance

Monitoring organisational performance is an essential board function and ensuring legal compliance is a major aspect of the board’s monitoring role. It ensures that corporate decision making is consistent with the strategy of the organisation and with owners’ expectations. This is best done by identifying the organisation’s key performance drivers and establishing appropriate measures for determining success. As a board, the directors should establish an agreed format for the reports they monitor to ensure that all matters that should be reported are in fact reported.

4.      Understand that the board employs the CEO

In most cases, one of the major functions of the board is to appoint, review, work through, and replace (when necessary), the CEO. The board/CEO relationship is crucial to effective corporate governance because it is the link between the board’s role in determining the organisation’s strategic direction and management’s role in achieving corporate objectives.

5.      Recognise that the governance of risk is a board responsibility

Establishing a sound system of risk oversight and management and internal control is another fundamental role of the board. Effective risk management supports better decision making because it develops a deeper insight into the risk-reward trade-offs that all organisations face.

6.      Ensure the directors have the information they need

Better information means better decisions. Regular board papers will provide directors with information that the CEO or management team has decided they need. But directors do not all have the same informational requirements, since they differ in their knowledge, skills, and experience. Briefings, presentations, site visits, individual director development programs, and so on can all provide directors with additional information. Above all, directors need to be able to find answers to the questions they have, so an access to independent professional advice policy is recommended.

7.      Build and maintain an effective governance infrastructure

Since the board is ultimately responsible for all the actions and decisions of an organisation, it will need to have in place specific policies to guide organisational behaviour. To ensure that the line of responsibility between board and management is clearly delineated, it is particularly important for the board to develop policies in relation to delegations. Also, under this topic are processes and procedures. Poor internal processes and procedures can lead to inadequate access to information, poor communication and uninformed decision making, resulting in a high level of dissatisfaction among directors. Enhancements to board meeting processes, meeting agendas, board papers and the board’s committee structure can often make the difference between a mediocre board and a high performing board.

8.      Appoint a competent chairperson

Research has shown that board structure and formal governance regulations are less important in preventing governance breaches and corporate wrongdoing than the culture and trust created by the chairperson. As the “leader” of the board, the chairperson should demonstrate strong and acknowledged leadership ability, the ability to establish a sound relationship with the CEO, and have the capacity to conduct meetings and lead group decision-making processes.

9.      Build a skills-based board

What is important for a board is that it has a good understanding of what skills it has and those skills it requires. Where possible, a board should seek to ensure that its members represent an appropriate balance between directors with experience and knowledge of the organisation and directors with specialist expertise or fresh perspective. Directors should also be considered on the additional qualities they possess, their “behavioural competencies”, as these qualities will influence the relationships around the boardroom table, between the board and management, and between directors and key stakeholders.

10.     Evaluate board and director performance and pursue opportunities for improvement

Boards must be aware of their own strengths and weaknesses, if they are to govern effectively. Board effectiveness can only be gauged if the board regularly assesses its own performance and that of individual directors. Improvements to come from a board and director evaluation can include areas as diverse as board processes, director skills, competencies and motivation, or even boardroom relationships. It is critical that any agreed actions that come out of an evaluation are implemented and monitored. Boards should consider addressing weaknesses uncovered in board evaluations through director development programs and enhancing their governance processes.

Voir le site www.effectivegovernance.com.au

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* En reprise

 

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Obtenir un siège sur le C.A. d’une grande entreprise | Difficile … même pour une gestionnaire expérimentée ! *


L’article de J.T. O’Donnell est très direct et, possiblement, assez juste ! Personne ne me fera dire qu’obtenir un siège sur le C.A. d’une grande entreprise cotée en bourse est une chose facile … même pour une personne expérimentée qui possède déjà un poste de haute direction ! Non, c’est une avenue qui demande beaucoup, beaucoup de temps, de volonté et de stratégies !

Ainsi que l’auteure le mentionne, en plus de l’expérience, la bonne …, il faut beaucoup de chance car vous n’êtes pas le seul, ou la seule, à vouloir accéder aux postes de commandes (sur les C.A.). Vous devez avoir un solide réseau de contacts professionnels et faire connaître votre disponibilité, ce que plusieurs refusent de faire parce qu’ils ou elles ont peur de l’échec.

De plus, vous devez avoir les « bonnes connections », le bon profil LinkedIn, la bonne réputation sur les réseaux sociaux, le bon parcours d’emploi dans les grandes organisations, le bon mentor, le bon timing, la bonne formation académique et, de plus en plus, la bonne formation en gouvernance de sociétés.

Si vous êtes intéressés par un poste sur un C.A. prestigieux (à votre retraite, par exemple) préparez-vous en conséquence en utilisant une démarche structurée et en le laissant savoir dans votre milieu, auprès des firmes de recrutement, sur les réseaux sociaux et auprès d’administrateurs chevronnés. Même si vous êtes le fils ou la fille du propriétaire, ce ne sera pas « une marche dans le parc ».

Je vous invite à lire ce bref article qui vous expliquera quelques barrières à l’entrée… Et n’oubliez pas de lire les commentaires à la fin !

Voici un bref extrait de l’article :

 

Board Seats: Elusive Carrots? (4 Reasons Why)

In the last several weeks, I’ve had three separate conversations with smart, proven C-suite members – all men in their late 50s/early 60s. They’re all credentialed and have previous board experience. Each has been aggressively seeking executive board positions over the last 18 months. Not one of them has been successful. Their only solace? Colleagues trying to do the same are failing too.

LinkedIn One Percent Most Viewed Profiles Email
LinkedIn One Percent Most Viewed Profiles Email (Photo credit: DavidErickson)

As it turns out, more than a few executive Baby Boomers are looking to grab coveted roles on corporate boards. And, why not? Getting paid five-figures to attend quarterly meetings and do some business strategy work seems like a great deal. However, based on my discussions with industry professionals over the last 10 months, for even the most proven executives, it might be easier to win the lottery than to land a board seat. There’s clearly a supply and demand issue – too many senior, white, male executives for too few board positions. Plus, to add insult to injury, according to Jack Welch, some of the executives getting those board seats aren’t very effective.

If you’re an executive who had a board seat(s) in mind for the next phase of your career, here are some things to ponder…

 

 

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* En reprise

Une formation en gouvernance pour les nouveaux administrateurs | Un prérequis ? *


La formation en gouvernance est de plus en plus un préalable à l’exercice du rôle d’administrateur de sociétés. L’article retenu montre que l’apprentissage sur le tas est en voie de disparition dans les conseils d’administration de grandes sociétés. La formation préparatoire peut prendre différentes formes : training sur mesure, coaching, séminaires, etc.

Cependant, il semble de plus en plus évident que les programme de formation en gouvernance (tels que IoD, C.dir., ASC, IAS) menant à une certification reconnue, constituent la voie à suivre dans le futur.

L’article de Hannah Prevett, paru dans le Sunday Times, montre que les formations organisées sont de meilleurs endroits pour un apprentissage de qualité que les tables de conseils d’administration… Bonne lecture !

Diplômés ASC du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés 2012

A head start for novices

The received wisdom is that new directors learn on the job. If they are not  equipped with the necessary skills when they accept their first board  appointment, they will need to be quick on the uptake.

Not any more: the tidal wave of new governance requirements means it is not  good enough to acquire expertise over time. And, as a result, many  prospective boardroom stars are seeking training to help them do the job  they’re paid to do from day one. When Alan Kay learnt he was to join the executive board of Costain in 2003, he  immediately began considering how to prepare for his new role at the  engineering and construction group.

“A lot of people haven’t really thought about how to prepare for a board role.  [They think] it’s something that happens naturally: you get on the board and  then you think, I’m going to learn on the job,” said Kay, who is Costain’s  technical and operations director. “But once you’re appointed, becoming  competent and learning as you go takes several months, which is not ideal.”

He researched training options for new board members and came across the  Institute of Directors’ accredited programmes, including the certificate and  diploma in company direction. The IoD fills 6,000 places on such courses annually with representatives of  both large and small organisations — not all of them young guns, as Roger  Barker, head of corporate governance at the IoD, explained.

“The directors of large organisations were reluctant to undertake any form of  formalised director training. These were typically seasoned former  executives, with extensive experience of serving on boards as chief  executives or chief financial officers. It has been difficult to persuade  such individuals that director training is relevant to them,” said Barker.

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Les critères d’évaluation du rôle d’administrateur de sociétés **


Voici un excellent article publié par Jeffrey Gandz, Mary Crossan, Gerard Seijts et Mark Reno* dans la revue Ivey Business Journal. Les auteurs insistent sur trois critères d’évaluation du rôle d’administrateur de sociétés : (1) compétences, (2) engagement et (3) caractère.

Bien que ces trois critères soient déterminants dans l’exercice du rôle d’administrateur, la dimension la plus difficile à appréhender est le leadership qui se manifeste par le « caractère » d’un administrateur.

Les auteurs décrivent 11 caractéristiques-clés dont il faut tenir compte dans le recrutement, la sélection, l’évaluation et la rotation des administrateurs.

Je vous invite donc à lire cet article. En voici un extrait. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

« When it comes to selecting and assessing CEOs, other C-suite level executives or board members, the most important criteria for boards to consider are competencies, commitment and character. This article focuses on the most difficult of these criteria to assess – leadership character – and suggests the eleven key dimensions of character that directors should consider in their governance roles ».

Leadership character and corporate governance

Competencies, commitment and character

Competencies matter. They define what a person is capable of doing; in our assessments of leaders we look for intellect as well as organizational, business, people and strategic competencies. Commitment is critical. It reflects the extent to which individuals aspire to the hard work of leadership, how engaged they are in the role, and how prepared they are to make the sacrifices necessary to succeed. But above all, character counts. It determines how leaders perceive and analyze the contexts in which they operate. Character determines how they use the competencies they have. It shapes the decisions they make, and how these decisions are implemented and evaluated.

Seasonal Reflection on Ivey Business building
Seasonal Reflection on Ivey Business building (Photo credit: Marc Foster)

Focus on character

Our research has focused on leadership character because it’s the least understood of these three criteria and the most difficult to talk about. Character is foundational for effective decision-making. It influences what information executives seek out and consider, how they interpret it, how they report the information, how they implement board directives, and many other facets of governance.

Within a board, directors require open, robust, and critical but respectful discussions with other directors who have integrity, as well as a willingness to collaborate and the courage to dissent. They must also take the long view while focusing on the shorter-range results, and exercise excellent judgment. All of these behaviors hinge on character.

Our research team at Ivey was made very conscious of the role of character in business leadership and governance when we conducted exploratory and qualitative research on the causes of the 2008 financial meltdown and the subsequent recession. In focus groups and conference-based discussions, where we met with over 300 business leaders on three continents, participants identified character weaknesses or defects as being at the epicenter of the build-up in financial-system leverage over the preceding decade, and the ensuing meltdown. Additionally, the participants identified leadership character strengths as key factors that distinguished the companies that survived or even prospered during the meltdown from those that failed or were badly damaged.

Participants in this research project identified issues with character in both leadership and governance. Among them were:

Overconfidence bordering on arrogance that led to reckless or excessive risk-taking behaviors

Lack of transparency and in some cases lack of integrity

Sheer inattention to critical issues

Lack of accountability for the huge risks associated with astronomical individual rewards

Intemperate and injudicious decision-making

A lack of respect for individuals that actually got in the way of effective team functioning

Hyper-competitiveness among leaders of major financial institutions

Irresponsibility toward shareholders and the societies within which these organizations operated.

These character elements and many others were identified as root or contributory causes of the excessive buildup of leverage in financial markets and the subsequent meltdown. But the comments from the business leaders in our research also raise important questions about leadership character. Among them:

What is character? It’s a term that we use quite often: “He’s a bad character”; “A person of good character”; “A character reference.” But what do we really mean by leadership “character”?

Why is it so difficult to talk about someone’s character? Why do we find it difficult to assess someone’s character with the same degree of comfort we seem to have in assessing their competencies and commitment?

Can character be learned, developed, shaped and molded, or is it something that must be present from birth – or at least from childhood or adolescence? Can it change? What, if anything, can leaders do to help develop good character among their followers and a culture of good character in their organizations?

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** En reprise

Strategic Leaders-Challenges, Organizational Abilities & Individual Characteristics (workplacepsychology.net)

How to Succeed As a Leader! (ejims05.wordpress.com)

Character & Leadership (colleensharen.wordpress.com)

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L’utilisation des huis clos lors des sessions de C.A. *


Voici un article intéressant de Matthew Scott sur le site de Corporate Secretary qui aborde un sujet qui préoccupe beaucoup de hauts dirigeants : le huis clos lors des sessions du conseil d’administration ou de certains comités. L’auteur explique très bien la nature et la nécessité de cette activité à inscrire à l’ordre du jour du conseil.

Compte tenu de la « réticence » de plusieurs hauts dirigeants à la tenue de cette activité, il est généralement reconnu que cet item devrait toujours être présent à l’ordre du jour afin d’éliminer certaines susceptibilités.

Le huis clos est un temps privilégié que les administrateurs indépendants se donnent pour se questionner sur l’efficacité du conseil et la possibilité d’améliorer la dynamique interne; mais c’est surtout une occasion pour les membres de discuter librement, sans la présence des gestionnaires, de sujets délicats tels que la planification de la relève, la performance des dirigeants, la rémunération globale de la direction, les poursuites légales, les situations de conflits d’intérêts, les arrangements confidentiels, etc. On ne rédige généralement pas de procès-verbal à la suite de cette activité, sauf lorsque les membres croient qu’une résolution doit absolument apparaître au P.V.

La mise en place d’une période de huis clos est une pratique relativement récente, depuis que les conseils d’administration ont réaffirmé leur souveraineté sur la gouvernance des entreprises. Cette activité est maintenant considérée comme une pratique exemplaire de gouvernance et presque toutes les sociétés l’ont adoptée.

Notons que le rôle du président du conseil, en tant que premier responsable de l’établissement de l’agenda, est primordial à cet égard. C’est lui qui doit informer le PCD de la position des membres indépendants à la suite du huis clos, un exercice qui demande du tact !

Je vous invite à lire l’article ci-dessous. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Are you using in-camera meetings ?

More companies are encouraging candid exchange among independent directors without management present

As corporate boards face more complex and difficult decisions, they may want to consider increasing the use of in-camera meetings to get more ‘realistic’ opinions from directors before moving forward with corporate strategy.

In-camera meetings, as they are called in Canada – or executive sessions, as they are referred to in the US – are special meetings where independent directors or committees of the board convene separately from management to have candid, off-the-record discussions about matters that are important to the company.

English: SOS Meetings Logo
English: SOS Meetings Logo (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The term ‘In camera’ derives from Latin and refers to ‘in a chamber’ which is a legal term meaning ‘in private.’ During these meetings, independent board members are free to challenge each other and speak their mind freely because minutes are generally not taken. Such meetings could be held to discuss and clarify the board’s position on issues that may produce opposing views between management and the board or to deal with issues that could involve conflicts of interest with management, such as CEO compensation.

‘In-camera meetings allow directors to talk about their view of matters without management present,’ says Jo-Anne Archibald, president of DSA Corporate Services. ‘They can talk about anything related to the company and they don’t have to worry about it being written down anywhere.’

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* En reprise

La bonne gouvernance selon Munger, vice-président du C.A. de Berkshire *


Aujourd’hui, je vous propose une très intéressante lecture publiée par David F. Larcker et Brian Tayan, de la  Stanford Graduate School of Business qui porte sur la conception que se fait Charles Munger de la bonne gouvernance des sociétés.

Les auteurs nous proposent de répondre à trois questions relatives à la position de Munger, vice-président du conseil de Berkshire :

1. Le système de gouvernance basé sur la confiance avancé par Munger pourrait-il s’appliquer à différents types d’organisations ?

2. Quelles pratiques de gouvernance sont-elles nécessaires et quelles pratiques sont-elles superflues ?

3. Comment s’assurer que la culture organisationnelle survivra à un processus de succession du PCD ?

À la suite de la lecture de l’article ci-dessous, quelles seraient vos réponses à ces questions.

Voici un résumé de la pensée de Munger, suivi d’un court extrait. Bonne lecture !

Charlie Munger

Berkshire Hathaway Vice Chairman Charlie Munger is well known as the partner of CEO Warren Buffett and also for his advocacy of “multi-disciplinary thinking” — the application of fundamental concepts from across various academic disciplines to solve complex real-world problems. One problem that Munger has addressed over the years is the optimal system of corporate governance.
 
Munger advocates that corporate governance systems become more simple, rather than more complex, and rely on trust rather than compliance to instill ethical behavior in employees and executives. He advocates giving more power to a highly capable and ethical CEO, and taking several steps to improve the culture of the organization to reduce the risk of self-interested behavior.

Corporate Governance According to Charles T. Munger

How should an organization be structured to encourage ethical behavior among organizational participants and motivate decision-making in the best interest of shareholders? His solution is unconventional by the standards of governance today and somewhat at odds with regulatory guidelines. However, the insights that Munger provides represent a contrast to current “best practices” and suggest the potential for alternative solutions to improve corporate performance and executive behavior.

Trust-Based Governance

The need for a governance system is based on the premise that individuals working in a firm are selfinterested and therefore willing to take actions to further their own interest at the expense of the organization’s interests. To discourage this tendency, companies implement a series of carrots (incentives) and sticks (controls). The incentives might be monetary, such as performance-based compensation that aligns the financial interest of executives with shareholders. Or they might be or cultural, such as organizational norms that encourage certain behaviors. The controls include policies and procédures to limit malfeasance and oversight mechanisms to review executive decisions.

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Douze (12) tendances à surveiller en gouvernance | Jacques Grisé


Vous trouverez ci-dessous un article publié dans Lesaffaires.com le 31 mars 2014.

Dans cet entrevue, le journaliste me demande de faire une synthèse des tendances les plus significatives en gouvernance de sociétés. Bonne lecture !

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

sans-titre

Une entrevue avec M. Jacques Grisé, auteur du blogue jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

Si la gouvernance des entreprises a fait beaucoup de chemin depuis quelques années, son évolution se poursuit. Afin d’imaginer la direction qu’elle prendra au cours des prochaines années, nous avons consulté l’expert Jacques Grisé, ancien directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, de l’Université Laval. Toujours affilié au Collège, M. Grisé publie depuis plusieurs années le blogue www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com, un site incontournable pour rester à l’affût des bonnes pratiques et tendances en gouvernance.

Voici les 12 tendances dont il faut suivre l’évolution, selon Jacques Grisé :

1. Les conseils d’administration réaffirmeront leur autorité.

« Auparavant, la gouvernance était une affaire qui concernait davantage le management », explique M. Grisé. La professionnalisation de la fonction d’administrateur amène une modification et un élargissement du rôle et des responsabilités des conseils. Les CA sont de plus en plus sollicités et questionnés au sujet de leurs décisions et de l’entreprise.

2. La formation des administrateurs prendra de l’importance.

À l’avenir, on exigera toujours plus des administrateurs. C’est pourquoi la formation est essentielle et devient même une exigence pour certains organismes. De plus, la formation continue se généralise ; elle devient plus formelle.

3. L’affirmation du droit des actionnaires et celle du rôle du conseil s’imposeront.

Le débat autour du droit des actionnaires par rapport à celui des conseils d’administration devra mener à une compréhension de ces droits conflictuels. Aujourd’hui, les conseils doivent tenir compte des parties prenantes en tout temps.

4. La montée des investisseurs activistes se poursuivra.

L’arrivée de l’activisme apporte une nouvelle dimension au travail des administrateurs. Les investisseurs activistes s’adressent directement aux actionnaires, ce qui mine l’autorité des conseils d’administration. Est-ce bon ou mauvais ? La vision à court terme des activistes peut être néfaste, mais toutes leurs actions ne sont pas négatives, notamment parce qu’ils s’intéressent souvent à des entreprises qui ont besoin d’un redressement sous une forme ou une autre. Pour bien des gens, les fonds activistes sont une façon d’améliorer la gouvernance. Le débat demeure ouvert.

5. La recherche de compétences clés deviendra la norme.

De plus en plus, les organisations chercheront à augmenter la qualité de leur conseil en recrutant des administrateurs aux expertises précises, qui sont des atouts dans certains domaines ou secteurs névralgiques.

6. Les règles de bonne gouvernance vont s’étendre à plus d’entreprises.

Les grands principes de la gouvernance sont les mêmes, peu importe le type d’organisation, de la PME à la société ouverte (ou cotée), en passant par les sociétés d’État, les organismes à but non lucratif et les entreprises familiales.

7. Le rôle du président du conseil sera davantage valorisé.

La tendance veut que deux personnes distinctes occupent les postes de président du conseil et de PDG, au lieu qu’une seule personne cumule les deux, comme c’est encore trop souvent le cas. Un bon conseil a besoin d’un solide leader, indépendant du PDG.

8. La diversité deviendra incontournable.

Même s’il y a un plus grand nombre de femmes au sein des conseils, le déficit est encore énorme. Pourtant, certaines études montrent que les entreprises qui font une place aux femmes au sein de leur conseil sont plus rentables. Et la diversité doit s’étendre à d’autres origines culturelles, à des gens de tous âges et d’horizons divers.

9. Le rôle stratégique du conseil dans l’entreprise s’imposera.

Le temps où les CA ne faisaient qu’approuver les orientations stratégiques définies par la direction est révolu. Désormais, l’élaboration du plan stratégique de l’entreprise doit se faire en collaboration avec le conseil, en profitant de son expertise.

10. La réglementation continuera de se raffermir.

Le resserrement des règles qui encadrent la gouvernance ne fait que commencer. Selon Jacques Grisé, il faut s’attendre à ce que les autorités réglementaires exercent une surveillance accrue partout dans le monde, y compris au Québec, avec l’Autorité des marchés financiers. En conséquence, les conseils doivent se plier aux règles, notamment en ce qui concerne la rémunération et la divulgation. Les responsabilités des comités au sein du conseil prendront de l’importance. Les conseils doivent mettre en place des politiques claires en ce qui concerne la gouvernance.

11. La composition des conseils d’administration s’adaptera aux nouvelles exigences et se transformera.

Les CA seront plus petits, ce qui réduira le rôle prépondérant du comité exécutif, en donnant plus de pouvoir à tous les administrateurs. Ceux-ci seront mieux choisis et formés, plus indépendants, mieux rémunérés et plus redevables de leur gestion aux diverses parties prenantes. Les administrateurs auront davantage de responsabilités et seront plus engagés dans les comités aux fonctions plus stratégiques. Leur responsabilité légale s’élargira en même temps que leurs tâches gagnent en importance. Il faudra donc des membres plus engagés, un conseil plus diversifié, dirigé par un leader plus fort.

12. L’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration deviendra la norme.

La tendance est déjà bien ancrée aux États-Unis, où les entreprises engagent souvent des firmes externes pour mener cette évaluation. Certaines choisissent l’autoévaluation. Dans tous les cas, le processus est ouvert et si les résultats restent confidentiels, ils contribuent à l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’administration.

Vous désirez en savoir plus sur les bonnes pratiques de gouvernance ? Visitez le site du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés et suivez le blogue de Jacques Grisé.


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Suggestions en vue de renforcer la gouvernance des OBNL *


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un article publié par Dr Eugene Fram sur son blogue Nonprofit Management. L’auteur énonce plusieurs propositions susceptibles d’améliorer la gouvernance des entreprises, plus particulièrement des OBNL.

Ces suggestions sont issues des 40 recommandations que Richard Leblanc a récemment publiées à propos des entreprises cotées en bourse. (Voir mon billet du 12 juillet 2013 à ce sujet : Renforcement des règles de gouvernance | Une proposition de Richard Leblanc).

Voici donc les onze suggestions retenues par Eugene Fram qui s’adressent aux OBNL. Bonne lecture.

11 Ways to a Stronger Nonprofit Board

1. Reduce the size of the board

2. Limit director over-boarding

3. Increase the directors’ knowledge of the nonprofit’s field(s) of operations

English: Carol Chyau and Marie So, co-founders...
English: Carol Chyau and Marie So, co-founders of Ventures in Development, a nonprofit organization that promotes social enterprise in Greater China. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

4. Enable directors to have access to information and to managers reporting to the CEO

5. Select directors who can contribute directly to the organization’s mission

6. Hold management accountable

7. Control management’s influence on director selection

8. Address conflicts of interest fully

9. Match management’s compensation with contributions to achieving mission, corporate performance and risk management

10. Stay on message when communicating organizational outcomes

11. Understand the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of replacing elected directors

_______________________________

* En reprise

Evaluate your nonprofit from a funder’s perspective (fundraisinggoodtimes.com)

Non Profit Board of Directors Checklist (jasteriou.wordpress.com)

Getting the Nonprofit Board Recruiting Process « Right » (powerofoneconsulting.wordpress.com)

Nonprofits need to balance finance and mission (utsandiego.com)

Why Nonprofit Board Prospects Say No (hardysmithconsulting.wordpress.com)

What every nonprofit board needs to know (miamiherald.com)

Échafauder le « Board » du futur | McKinsey


Un récent document de McKinsey met en exergue l’importance pour les conseils d’administration de consacrer une partie significative de leur temps à des activités de vision stratégique à long terme plutôt que de rester le nez collé sur les rapports trimestriels, les budgets et la conformité.

L’étude estime qu’environ 70 % du temps du « Board » est investi dans de telles activités qui, même si elles sont essentielles, ne sont pas au cœur de ce que les conseils d’administration devraient faire, c’est-à-dire s’occuper de stratégies et prévoir du temps pour scruter l’avenir (les compétiteurs, le marché, les opportunités, les risques, l’évolution des valeurs sociétales, la mondialisation de l’économie, etc.).

Ce virement de bord doit s’effectuer en remaniant l’ordre du jour des conseils de manière à redresser la balance des responsabilités, c’est-à-dire en consacrant plus de temps à l’avenir ! Voici un extrait de l’excellent document de McKinsey qui montre comment les conseils peuvent répartir leur temps entre des activités de nature traditionnelles et des activités de représentation du futur.

Le tableau 1, présenté dans cet extrait, donne une bonne idée de la façon dont les présidents de conseils doivent envisager l’allocation du temps entre les réunions régulières du conseil :

(1) les activités qui relèvent de la surveillance, du contrôle et du rôle de fiduciaire;

(2) les activités qui concernent la formation de la vision du futur.

Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de cette approche de McKinsey qui, selon moi, marque une coupure dans la façon de concevoir les rôles et les responsabilités des membres du conseil.

Quelle est votre idée là-dessus ? Bonne lecture !

Building a forward-looking board | McKinsey

 

Debate over the role of company boards invariably intensifies when things go wrong on a grand scale, as has happened in recent years. Many of the companies whose corpses litter the industrial and financial landscape were undermined by negligent, overoptimistic, or ill-informed boards prior to the financial crisis and the ensuing deep recession. Not surprisingly, there’s been a renewed focus on improved corporate governance: better structures, more rigorous checks and balances, and greater independence by nonexecutives, for example.

McKinsey & Company competitiveness report
McKinsey & Company competitiveness report (Photo credit: mars_discovery_district)

Governance arguably suffers most, though, when boards spend too much time looking in the rear-view mirror and not enough scanning the road ahead. We have experienced this reality all too often in our work with companies over several decades. It has also come through loud and clear during recent conversations with 25 chairmen of large public and privately held companies in Europe and Asia. Today’s board agendas, indeed, are surprisingly similar to those of a century ago, when the second Industrial Revolution was at its peak. Directors still spend the bulk of their time on quarterly reports, audit reviews, budgets, and compliance—70 percent is not atypical—instead of on matters crucial to the future prosperity and direction of the business.

The alternative is to develop a dynamic board agenda that explicitly highlights these forward-looking activities and ensures that they get sufficient time over a 12-month period. The exhibit illustrates how boards could devote more of their time to the strategic and forward-looking aspects of the agenda. This article discusses ways to achieve the right balance.

How forward-looking boards should spend their time

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Comment échapper aux mythes trompeurs de la rémunération des PCD ?


Voici un texte de , professeur à Southwestern Law School, qui se questionne sérieusement sur le processus de rémunération des CEO (PCD), plus particulièrement sur les indicateurs utilisés pour en établir la valeur.

Dans son livre à paraître bientôt, « Indispensable and other myths : The empirical truth about CEO pay », il avance qu’il faut échapper à l’envie d’utiliser l’approche de la comparaison (Benchmark) avec les pairs pour fixer les rémunérations des PCD, et à l’idée de relier trop étroitement leurs rémunérations avec la capitalisation boursière de l’entreprise.

Selon lui, il n’y a pas de marché pour les talents des PCD et ceux-ci ont peu de possibilités de trouver un poste similaire dans une autre entreprise. Pourquoi alors entretenir le mythe de leur situation monopolistique, toute puissante ?

L’auteur présente une vision assez révolutionnaire de la manière de concevoir la rétribution des présidents et chefs de direction (PCD).

Je reproduis ci-dessous le billet paru sur son site Indispensable and other myths. Quel est votre point de vue sur le sujet ?

Quels sont les critères les plus raisonnables pour établir la rémunération des hauts dirigeants ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus !

Escaping the Conformity Trap

Pearl Meyer & Partners has just released their contribution to the NACD’s new Governance Challenges 2014 and Beyond report, “Escaping the Conformity Trap: Aligning Executive Pay Programs with Business and Leadership Objectives.” I love the overall theme, which is that companies should not default to cookie-cutter measures of executive performance just because their peer companies do. The report also indicates that companies shouldn’t defer to peers on the amount of pay, though this point is less prominent. I make a similar — though more sweeping — argument in my forthcoming book, Indispensable and Other Myths: Why the CEO Pay Experiment Failed, and How to Fix It. (The book should be out around the end of May.)

Office Politics: A Rise to the Top
Office Politics: A Rise to the Top (Photo credit: Alex E. Proimos)

Unfortunately, while there’s a lot in the Pearl Meyer report that is laudable, there’s also a fair amount of rehashing of typical errors. On page 18 (the report starts on p. 17 for some reason), the report describes the growth in CEO pay of 12% from 2009-2012 in Fortune 100 firms as “comparatively conservative.” This is technically true, if by “comparatively conservative” Pearl Meyer means that there have been much steeper rises in executive pay. But the rationale seems to be different. The report points out that the market capitalization of Fortune 100 firms increased by 50% over this same period, and credits external scrutiny of CEO pay and a desire to remain within peers’ norms for restraining CEO pay.

The clear implication here is that CEO pay should rise in proportion to the company’s stock price. (The report says this more explicitly on page 19 when it says total shareholder return is often a good performance metric.) As I point out in Indispensable, this is a dangerous fallacy. CEOs do not control their companies’ stock price. They can influence price (especially in the short term), but careful empirical studies have repeatedly demonstrated that executives’ actions account for only a small percentage of share price movement. The external environment broadly — and in the industry more particularly — drive the bulk of share price movement. So why should companies peg CEO pay to the growth in share price that for the most part is independent of their actions? This sort of rhetorical move is particularly disappointing in a report whose laudable aims seems to be to move companies in precisely the opposite direction, away from easy, off-the-shelf measures like share price that fail to capture what companies should really care about.
The report also backtracks when it comes to using comparable companies to set the amount of CEO pay. Despite having at least hinted that this is a poor strategy elsewhere in the report, it states (on p. 18):

Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with providing executives with pay opportunities that reflect market norms for comparable positions in similarly sized and oriented companies.  With well-designed long-term performance metrics and goals, establishing pay opportunities  at market median will help ensure that actual, realizable pay is appropriately positioned based on relative performance outcomes.

But there absolutely is something wrong with this. As Charles Elson and Craig Ferrere have recently demonstrated, there is no market for CEO talent. Since CEOs have little ability to move to another company, why should a company care what its competitors are paying their own CEOs? Why not try to get a bargain by paying less, if the CEO can’t get a comparable job elsewhere? Scholars have advanced plenty of rationales (which I explore in the book but don’t have room to delve into here), but none of them work very well.

Although I’m disappointed that the report does not go nearly far enough, I was heartened that a major compensation consultant is at least beginning to question the conventional wisdom. It’s a small step, but at least it’s in the right direction.

 

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Commentaire de l’IAS-ICD à l’attention de la CVMO | Amendements proposés aux pratiques de divulgation en matière de gouvernance


Voici un communiqué de l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés (IAS-ICD) qui fait état de sa position auprès de la Commission des valeurs mobilières de l’Ontario (CVMO), en réponse à la sollicitation de commentaires sur des amendements proposés aux pratiques de divulgation en matière de gouvernance (Formulaire 58-101F1 et Règlement 58-101).

Dans cette lettre, l’IAS salue la CVMO et la Province de l’Ontario pour leurs initiatives visant à favoriser la diversité des genres et enjoint la CVMO à travailler en collaboration avec les Autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières afin d’élaborer une initiative nationale sur la diversité des genres.

L’IAS souligne également qu’il s’est fait depuis longtemps, lors de consultations auprès du gouvernement et des autorités réglementaires, un promoteur du régime « se conformer ou s’expliquer ». La lettre comprend également les suggestions suivantes pour améliorer la diversité des genres au sein des conseils d’administration :

  1. Les émetteurs devraient divulguer des cibles concernant la représentation des femmes au conseil et la manière dont ils entendent mesurer leur progrès au fil du temps. S’il n’y a pas de cibles, on devrait pouvoir exiger de l’émetteur qu’il divulgue comment il entend s’y prendre pour favoriser la diversité.
  2. De nouvelles exigences devraient être instaurées au même moment pour tous les émetteurs non émergents, sans égard à leur capitalisation boursière ou à leur indice de société.
  3. La question des limites de mandat a une portée beaucoup plus large et complexe que son seul rapport à la diversité et devrait donc être envisagée dans le cadre d’une consultation distincte. L’IAS favorise l’amélioration continue des conseils d’administration, mais ne croit pas que le renouvellement des conseils se résume simplement à une question de compte.
  4. Les exigences proposées de divulgation du nombre et de la proportion de femmes parmi les cadres dirigeants des filiales de l’émetteur ne sont pas nécessaires, seraient trop lourdes et ne devraient donc pas figurer parmi les amendements.

Veuillez cliquer ici pour lire l’intégralité de la lettre de commentaires. Les membres peuvent transmettre leur rétroaction sur cette prise de position de politique et d’autres initiatives à l’adresse de courriel comments@icd.ca.

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Document de consultation de l’OCDE sur la révision des principes de gouvernance |2014


Voici le document de consultation de l’OCDE sur la révision des principes de gouvernance |2014, présenté à Paris le 17 mars 2014. Ce document est en version anglaise seulement. Après la révision, l’OCDE produira des versions dans toutes les langues !

Celui-ci explicite les objectifs de politiques publiques en gouvernance, explore le  nouveau paysage qui commande des changements en gouvernance et suggère sept (7) domaines susceptibles d’engendrer des changements importants au document Principe de gouvernance de 2004 (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance).

Je vous invite à participer à cette consultation si vous croyez utile de le faire. Ci-dessous, une introduction, suivie des 7 développements qui influeront sur la nouvelle version des principes de gouvernance de l’OCDE.

The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance is a public policy instrument intended to assist governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, regulatory and institutional framework for corporate governance. As formulated in the mandate that was given to the OECD Corporate Governance Committee in 2010, the objective is to contribute to « economic efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability ». In practice, this objective is achieved by formulating principles for policies that give market participants sound economic incentives to perform their respective roles within a framework of checks and balances where transparency, supervision and effective enforcement provides confidence in market practices and institutions.

English: The logo of the Organisation for Econ...
English: The logo of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

While the Principles may inspire voluntary initiatives and influence practices in individual companies, the Principles do not aspire to include a shopping list of what individual market participants, such as shareholders, boards, managers and other stakeholders, from their unique perspectives, may consider good business judgment or sound commercial practices. What works in one company or for one investor may not necessarily be generally applicable as public policy or of systemic economic importance to society.

In order to be relevant and effective, the legal and regulatory framework must be shaped with respect to the economic reality in which it will be implemented. This is true also for the recommendations made in the Principles. And since they were last revised in 2004, the world has experienced a number of important events and structural developments in both the financial and corporate sectors. This obviously includes the financial crisis. But equally important for the review of the Principles are the far reaching changes in corporate ownership and investment practices. In some respects, these changes have come to challenge conventional wisdom and the relevance of current corporate governance standards. Several of these developments have been documented and analysed by the Corporate Governance Committee and the Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables and some of the background reports that have been written to support the review are annexed to this note for reference.

Seven main events and developments of importance to the review of the Principles can be identified:

The financial crisis.

The financial crisis revealed severe shortcomings in corporate governance. When most needed, existing standards failed to provide the checks and balances that companies need in order to cultivate sound business practices. Corporate governance weaknesses in remuneration, risk management, board practices and the exercise of shareholder rights played an important role in the development of the financial crisis and such weaknesses extended not only to the financial sector, but to companies more generally. The lessons from the financial crisis are discussed in the Committee’s report « Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Conclusions and Emerging Good Practices to Enhance Implementation of the Principles » (2010).

Developments in institutional ownership, investment strategies and trading techniques.

Since the Principles were revised in 2004, assets under management by institutional investors have increased considerably. We have also seen a surge in new types of institutional investors, investment vehicles and trading techniques. Taken together, these developments have affected the character and quality of ownership engagement. Many of the largest institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds use indexing as the prime investment strategy. A special, and increasingly popular, version of indexing is the use of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), which increased by more than 1000 percent between 2004 and 2011. A common characteristic of these investment practices is that they motivate investors to pay little or no attention to the fundamentals of individual companies, since the composition of the index is pre-defined and adjustments in the portfolio is not by active choice but rather a result of the index weighting. The same effect results from the surge in so-called high frequency trading where the investment strategy and ultra-short holding periods do not motivate any corporate specific analysis or ownership engagement. A fourth development that has attracted a lot of interest and debate is co-location of brokers, data vendors and other participants’ computer capacity within the stock exchanges’ data centres. This has raised concerns about confidence in a level playing field among different categories of investors with respect to market information. These developments and their implications for the economic incentives for ownership engagement among institutional investors are further discussed in « Institutional Investors as Owners – Who Are They and What Do They Do? » (2013).

Developments in the investment chain and the use of service providers.

The real world of ownership characterised by institutional (or intermediary) investors is a very different reality than the model textbook world of company law and economics, which assumes a strict and uncompromised alignment of interest between the performance of the company and the income of the ultimate shareholder. Instead of a straight line from « from profit to pocket », which is assumed in theory, we have an extended and sometimes very complex investment chain where different actors may have different incentives. The implications for the quality of ownership engagement are discussed in the background report « Institutional Investors as Owners – Who Are They and What Do They Do? » (2013). Among other aspects, the report highlights the possible implications of cross-investments between different institutional investors and the extensive use of proxy advisers, which is sometimes argued to impose a box ticking culture of « one-size-fits-all ». The last couple of decades have also seen an increase in outsourcing of asset management to external asset managers who may also be charged with carrying out the ownership functions. The complexity of the investment chain is also influenced by changes in stock market structures, trading practices and investment strategies. One example is the increased use of dark pools and off-exchange trading platforms that has increased concerns about the quality of the price discovery process and equal access to market information, which is so essential for efficient allocation of capital.

Developments in shareholder rights and participation.

Since the last review of the Principles, shareholder rights in many countries have been strengthened and there is a general trend to empower the shareholder meeting in the corporate decision-making process, particularly with respect to board nomination and remuneration policies. Technological advancements have also contributed to facilitating shareholder participation in the shareholder meetings. As documented in the report « Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today’s Equity Markets » (2013), several studies illustrate a relatively high level of participation in shareholder meetings in most OECD countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States that have predominantly dispersed ownership at corporate level. Today, the discussion on shareholder participation is mainly focused on the actual quality of shareholder monitoring and engagement, with the exception of issues related to shareholder co-operation. In some countries, particularly in emerging market economies, it is also argued that ownership engagement is impeded by difficulties with respect to placing items on the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting; the rules for convening shareholders’ meetings; limited access to relevant documentation and restrictions on share ownership by institutional investors.

Developments in corporate characteristics and business models.

Investments in fixed assets, such as machinery and buildings, have for decades been seen as the main source of capital formation. A recent OECD study1, however, shows that business investment in intangible assets has been increasing faster than investments in fixed assets for a number of years in many OECD countries and already accounts for more than half of the total business investment in some countries. The result is an increased dependence on human capital and intangible assets for innovation and value creation at firm level. At the same time, there has been significant number of acquisitions by some large established companies in more intangible-asset-intensive industries, partly through their venture units. Together with the decrease in the number of new listings in advanced stock markets, these developments have raised concerns about the ability of growth companies to develop and expand as independent companies. One preliminary indicator is the decrease in the share of young companies as percentage of the total number of companies in the US by 16% over the last decade. Another important development in terms of corporate characteristics and business models is the creation and surge of alternative corporate structures, mainly in the form of partnerships. This includes publicly traded partnerships (PTPs) and master limited partnerships (MSPs) that trade on securities exchanges.

Developments in corporate ownership.

Traditionally, the international corporate governance debate has focused on situations with dispersed ownership where the conflict is a zero sum game between dispersed owners on the one hand and incumbent management on the other hand. This « agency » approach has its merits but it also has important weaknesses. One important weakness is that most listed companies around the world are not characterized by dispersed ownership. Rather, they have a controlling or dominant owner. This is particularly true in emerging markets. But controlling owners are also common in most advanced economies, including the US and continental Europe. It has been argued that the focus on dispersed ownership is of limited help when addressing corporate governance issues in companies that have a controlling owner. The presence of controlling owners is generally assumed to provide strong incentives for informed ownership engagement and to overcome the fundamental agency problem between shareholders and managers. There are also arguments that the incentives for controlling owners to assume the costs for this ownership engagement are weakened by restrictions on the possibilities of controlling owners to exercise their rights and be properly compensated for their efforts to monitor. Some of these are discussed in the background paper « The Law and Economics of Controlling Owners in Corporate Governance » (2013). At the same time, there are concerns that controlling owners in a weak regulatory framework may take advantage of minority shareholders through abusive related party transactions. This is discussed in the report « Related Party Transactions and Minority Shareholder Rights » (2012).

Developments in the functioning of public stock markets.

Corporate governance policies are focused on companies that are traded on the public stock market. To understand the functioning and structure of public stock markets is therefore essential for getting the corporate governance rules right. And today, stock markets look very different from what they did when the OECD Principles were first established. The developments are well documented in the background reports « Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today’s Equity Markets » (2013) and « Making Stock markets Work to Support Economic Growth » (2013), which address issues such as market fragmentation, increased use of dark pools, changes in « tick-size », high-frequency trading and co-location. The reports also show that during the last decade, some of the leading stock markets in the world have lost as much as half of their listed companies and that the average size of companies that find their way to the stock market has increased. At the same time, stock exchanges in emerging markets, notably in Asia, have increased the number of listed companies significantly. Between 2008 and 2012 a majority of all new listings in the world were in emerging markets. Since the free float (the portion of outstanding shares regularly available for public trading) is relatively small in these markets, one consequence of this development is an increase in the number of publicly traded companies that have a controlling owner. Another important development is the occurrence of cross-listings and secondary listings, which raises issues related to the standards and procedures for recognizing of corporate governance standards in primary listing venues and the allocation of supervisory obligations between listing stock exchanges. We have also seen a development where stock exchanges have demutualised and become listed companies on themselves; so called self-listing. At the same time, there has been a certain degree of consolidation through mergers of regulated exchanges both at national and international level, which was coupled with the emergence of new venues for trading; such as alternative trading venues and dark pools.

2014 Review of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

First released in May 1999 and last revised in 2004, the OECD Corporate Governance Committee has launched a further review of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. The review process starts in 2014 with the objective of conclusion within one year.

 The OECD Principles are one of the 12 key standards for international financial stability of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and form the basis for the corporate governance component of the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes of the World Bank Group.

 The rationale for the review is to ensure the continuing high quality, relevance and usefulness of the Principles taking into account recent developments in the corporate sector and capital markets. The outcome should provide policy makers, regulators and other rule-making bodies with a sound benchmark for establishing an effective corporate governance framework.

 The basis for the review will be the 2004 version of the Principles, which embrace the shared understanding that a high level of transparency, accountability, board oversight, and respect for the rights of shareholders and role of key stakeholders is part of the foundation of a well-functioning corporate governance system. These core values should be maintained and, as appropriate, be strengthened to reflect experiences since 2004.

 As the Principles are a global standard also adopted by the FSB, all FSB member jurisdictions are invited to participate in the review as Associates and have the same decision-making rights as OECD members.

 The review will benefit from consultations with stakeholders, including the business sector, investors, professional groups at national and international levels, trade unions, civil society organisations and other international standard setting bodies.

Peer reviews – In response to the corporate governance challenges that came into focus in the wake of the financial crisis, the Corporate Governance Committee launched a thematic review process designed to facilitate the effective implementation of the OECD Principles and to assist market participants and policy makers to respond to emerging corporate governance risks. These peer reviews will provide valuable background support to the review.

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Dix (10) activités que les conseils d’administration devraient éviter de faire !


IMG_00001194

Voici le condensé d’un article publié par Deloitte en 2011 et que j’ai relayé à mes premiers abonnés au début de la création de mon blogue.

En revisitant mes billets, j’ai été en mesure de constater que plusieurs parutions étaient encore d’une grande pertinence. Ainsi, afin de revenir sur mes débuts comme blogueur, je vous présente un document de la firme Deloitte qui énumère dix (10) activités que les conseils d’administration doivent éviter de faire.

Les suggestions sont toujours aussi d’actualité. Bonne relecture !

Avoid presentation overload

Presentations should not dominate board meetings. If your board meetings consist of a scripted agenda packed with one presentation after another, there may not be sufficient time for substantive discussions. The majority of board meetings should be focused on candid dialogue about the critical strategic issues facing the company. The advance meeting materials should comprise information that provides the basis for the discussions held during the meeting. Management should feel confident that the board will read these pre-meeting materials, and the board must commit an adequate amount of time in advance of the meeting to do so.

Avoid understating the importance of compliance

There is no room for a culture of complacency when it comes to compliance with laws and regulations. As noted in the Deloitte publication

Avoid postponing the CEO succession discussion

CEO succession planning is one of the primary roles of the board. With the changing governance landscape and new and proposed regulations, the board has a full agenda these days. However, it is important to occasionally take a step back to ensure the board is addressing this important responsibility. During this time of rebuilding and prior to the implementation of new regulations, boards should assess where time is being spent and perhaps redirect focus on succession.

It is important to note that the succession planning process is continual and doesn’t end when a new CEO is selected. As the company evolves, its needs change, as do the skills required of the leadership team. The board needs to ensure that a leadership pipeline is developed and that its members have ample opportunity to connect with the next generation of leaders.

Avoid the trap of homogeneity

The topic of board composition and having the « right » people on the board continues to receive much attention. The SEC has proposed rules that would require more disclosure about director qualifications, including what makes each director qualified to participate on certain board committees. The shift to independent board members facilitated a move away from a « friends on the board » approach to a new mix. However, the board needs to assess whether this new mix translates into a positive and productive board dynamic. Boards should take a closer look at the expertise, experience and other qualities of each member to ensure the board that can provide the right expertise. Diversity of thought provides the perspectives needed to effectively address critical topics, which can contribute to greater productivity and ultimately a stronger board.

Avoid excessive short-term focus

Perpetual existence is one of the principal reasons for the initial development of a corporation. However, recent history offers many examples of modern corporate entities managing to reach short-term results at the expense of long-term prosperity. The board can demonstrate its leadership by being the voice of reason and openly discussing the sustainability of strategic initiatives. This can result in a well-governed company with a greater chance of achieving long-term, sustainable success.

Avoid approvals if you don’t understand the issue

Complex issues can have significant implications for the survival of an organization. It is up to directors to make sure that they understand issues that can alter the future of an enterprise before a vote is taken. This doesn’t require dissecting every detail, but it should consist of a thorough investigation and assessment of the risks and rewards of proposed transactions. If you don’t adequately understand the issue, ask for more education from management or external experts. It comes down to being able to ask the tough questions of management and probing further if things do not make sense. Consensus doesn’t mean going along with the crowd. True consensus results from a thorough debate and airing of the issues before the board, resulting in a more informed vote by directors.

Avoid discounting the value of experience

As a director, it is important to recognize the value that your experience can bring to the issues at hand. Good governance doesn’t mean checking all the right boxes. Rather, it is bringing together the diverse skills and experiences of each director to lead the company through challenges. Directors can provide greater insight by being ‘situationally aware’ when evaluating events and courses of action to take. Just as the captain of a ship needs to understand the various environmental factors that influence navigation, boards need to understand the external risks that may have an impact on the navigation of the company. Consider the context of the current issue, how it is similar to, or different from, previous experiences, what alternatives could be considered, and how outside forces may impede a successful outcome. Don’t discount the value of experience just because it was gained outside the boardroom.

Avoid stepping over the line into management’s role

A board that makes management decisions will find it difficult to hold the CEO accountable for the outcome. A director’s role is to oversee the efforts of management rather than stepping into management’s shoes. Directors must make a concentrated effort to ensure that they have clarity on management’s role, which is to operate the company. The distinction between the board and management is often blurred by directors who forget that they are not charged with running the day-to-day operations of an enterprise. This doesn’t prevent a director from getting into the details of an issue facing the company, but it does mean that directors should avoid stepping over the line.

Avoid ignoring shareholders

A company’s shareholders are among the most important and potentially vocal constituents of the enterprise. Concerns can sometimes be addressed by providing shareholders an audience with the board to air their concerns. Historically, compliance with the SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) rules has been perceived as a hindrance to directors engaging in shareholder dialogue and meetings. As outlined in the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance policy briefing.

Avoid a bias to risk aversion

With the recent focus on excessive risk-taking and its impact on the credit crisis, there is concern that companies and boards may become risk-averse.

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La petite histoire de l’évolution des rémunérations des hauts dirigeants


Voici un article de DEBORAH HARGREAVES sur la petite histoire de l’évolution des rémunérations des hauts dirigeants paru dans la section Opiniator du New York Times. L’expérience européenne est particulièrement instructive à cet égard.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de cet historique afin de mieux comprendre les restrictions qui seront éventuellement mises en place pour remédier aux excès en matière de rémunération des dirigeants (en relation avec les salaires moyens payés).

Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Bonne lecture !

Can We Close the Pay Gap ?

The issue of pay ratios has become the latest front in a worldwide debate about inequality and the widening gap between the top 1 percent and everyone else. In the United States, the financial reforms of the Dodd-Frank Act contained a provision that would force American companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation of their chief executive officer to the median compensation of their employees. Yet fierce criticism from the business sector has succeeded in delaying this measure for four years — and counting.

Now the European Commission in Brussels has weighed in, with a proposal currently under discussion that the European Union’s 10,000 listed companies reveal their pay ratios and allow shareholders to vote on whether they are appropriate. This has unleashed howls of protest against the European Union’s unpopular, unelected commissioners. Fund managers have called the plan weird, and business leaders have objected that shareholders don’t want such power.

Pay ratio proposals, in fact, have a venerable history. In his 1941 essay “The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius,” George Orwell advocated a limitation of incomes so that the best-paid would earn no more than 10 times the lowest-paid. But this was controversial territory, even for Orwell. A few paragraphs on, he retreated and wrote: “In practice it is impossible that earnings should be limited quite as rigidly as I have suggested.”

Several decades earlier, that Gilded Age titan John Pierpoint Morgan had endorsed a 20 to 1 ratio between the head of a company and its average worker. That same ratio was recommended in the 1970s by the American management guru Peter F. Drucker.

Yet look where we are now: In 2012, the compensation received by chief executives of companies in the S.&P. 500 index was 354 times that of rank-and-file staff.

Companies are sensitive about revealing the pay differential between the bosses and the work force partly because the gap has become so extreme. Business leaders argue that they have to offer high rewards in order to compete in a global talent pool for well-qualified executives.

After big corporations threatened to quit the country, voters in Switzerland last year rejected a referendum that would have restricted the pay gap to a ratio of 12 to 1. But the proposition still garnered 35 percent support amid a heated campaign.

The idea of a global talent pool for chief executives is, however, largely a myth. Not one of the chief executives heading up the 142 American companies in the Fortune Global 500 at the end of 2012, for example, was an external hire from overseas. There was a little movement within Europe, but over all, poaching of chief executives from abroad accounted for only 0.8 percent of C.E.O. appointments in the Fortune Global 500.

Business leaders also argue that senior managers need incentives to drive the business forward, so their compensation must be linked to the performance of the corporation, usually through the offer of big share awards for meeting certain targets. The argument that chief executive pay must be linked to the performance of the company has driven share awards ever higher — in Britain, as high as 700 percent of salary. But there is scant evidence to show a definite link between executive remuneration and a company’s success.

On the contrary, some economists say that the practice of rewarding chief executives for boosting the share price (and consequently their own compensation) makes them too short-term in their focus. The way they are paid is thus at odds with the long-term success of the company.

Moreover, the manner in which chief executives are rewarded means that it is in their interests to keep work-force wages low, in order to contain costs. This may help to explain why we have seen executive remuneration continue to rise sharply during and after the financial crisis, while work-force wages have stagnated, struggling to keep up with inflation.

Last year, the top 10 most highly paid chief executives in the United States took home more than $100 million each; most of these rewards came from shares or stock options. The survey of 2,259 American chief executives found that, on average, their remuneration had risen by 8.47 percent. At the same time, the average family income was $51,017 — little changed from the year before, and 9 percent less than its inflation-adjusted peak in 1999 of $56,080.

According to a report by the French academic Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez of the University of California, Berkeley, incomes for the top 1 percent in the United States grew by 31.4 percent from 2009 to 2012, but the bottom 99 percent saw their wages go up by only 0.4 percent during the same period. The economists conclude that the top 1 percent captured 95 percent of the income gains in the first two years of the recovery.

Widening pay gaps have added to concerns about inequality and economic instability. This is one reason regulators are struggling to find ways of making remuneration fairer or, failing that, enforcing disclosure that shows how unfair it is.

Brussels has tried to do this by introducing a law that comes into effect next year that will cap bankers’ bonuses. Europe’s highest-paid bankers will have their bonuses restricted to 100 percent of salary, or 200 percent with prior approval of shareholders. This is largely a British issue, since most of Europe’s best-paid bankers reside in Britain.

But the bank bonus rule has seen banks making big efforts to get around it by allocating monthly allowances to their top bankers and executives to make up for lost bonuses. Banks argue that without global action on bonuses, they risk losing their top performers to Wall Street or Hong Kong.

There is probably some truth in this since bankers specifically tend to be more mobile than corporate chief executives. There is, however, a counterargument that bankers will now be more attracted to working in the European Union since their pay will generally be just as high and far more predictable than an annual bonus.

The European Union bonus saga is helpful in illustrating the often perverse consequences of trying to impose laws and regulations to limit top remuneration. In a similar fashion, President Bill Clinton’s campaign pledge in 1991 to restrict top salaries to $1 million is often cited as the point at which chief executive pay started to skyrocket in America — precisely because companies introduced payments of stock options to circumvent the rule.

A regulatory crackdown on high pay ratios can also hurt the very people it is trying to help. The imposition of a maximum pay ratio, for example, might see companies outsourcing the work of their lowest-paid employees, purely to make their figures look better.

But business is not immune to the public debate about inequality and pay distribution. There is evidence that big pay gaps can undermine employee morale, leading to strikes, more sick days and higher staff turnover. And pressure on corporate leaders to address large pay disparities because it would help their business perform more effectively can be persuasive.

There is an outside chance that business will reform itself, as some business leaders bemoan the pay scandals for inflicting damage on their sector’s reputation. But expecting multimillionaires to take a voluntary pay cut is a long shot. It might be more effective to introduce structures that will tackle egregious pay awards before they are made.

In Germany, for example, the unusual system of a two-tier board structure for company governance has helped prevent top pay rising as fast as it has in other developed nations. A supervisory board, consisting half of shareholders and half of employees elected by the work force, has the ultimate power over executives and sets top pay.

In 2012, employee board members at Volkswagen forced through a 20 percent pay cut for the chief executive even though the company was making record profits. They felt the C.E.O.’s pay was too high, his bonus targets too easy and that work-force wages had been held down. This was widely seen in Germany as a response to the controversy over inequality after the financial crisis.

There is a growing chorus of voices in Britain arguing for the election of employees onto company boards or remuneration committees. This could become an important theme in the run-up to the next general election in 2015, given the way public debate has already focused on falling living standards.

Top chief executives worldwide often take home far more in one year than most people will earn in their entire lifetime. Yet the International Monetary Fund has recognized that reducing inequality leads to “faster and more durable growth.” It is important that we put pressure on businesses and policy makers to develop measures to stop pay gaps opening up even further, and to share the rewards of success more fairly — for everyone’s benefit.

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*Deborah Hargreaves is the director of the London-based campaign group the High Pay Centre.

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Sept incompréhensions à propos du processus de succession du PDG (PCD)


Voici un excellent article, publié par Heidi Schwartz* dans FacilityBlogsur un sujet très délicat mais vital pour tous les types d’organisations : Le processus de succession du PCD.

L’auteur présente les sept mythes les plus connus sur la problématique de la relève des présidents et chefs de la direction (PCD).

J’ai reproduit ci-dessous les points saillants de l’article. Bonne lecture !

The Seven Myths Of CEO Succession

 

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« With CEOs turning over at a rate of 10%-15% per year – from jumping to another firm to resigning due to poor health or poor performance, or just retiring – companies would be expected to be well-prepared for CEO succession. But governance experts from Stanford and The Miles Group have found a number of broad misunderstandings about CEO transitions and how ready the board is for this major change.

In their recent piece for the Stanford Closer Look Series, David Larcker and Brian Tayan of the Corporate Governance Research Initiative at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stephen Miles of The Miles Group name seven myths around CEO succession – myths shared by corporate boards as well as the larger business community.

“The selection of the CEO is the single most important decision a board of directors can make,” say the authors, but turmoil around these decisions at the top “have called into question the reliability of the process that companies use to identify and develop future leaders.”

« What are the seven myths around CEO succession?

Myth #1:

Companies know who the next CEO will be. “The longer the succession period from one CEO to the next, the worse the company will perform relative to its peers,” says Professor Larcker. “But, shockingly, nearly 40% of companies claim they have no viable internal candidate available to immediately fill the shoes of the CEO if he or she left tomorrow.”

Myth #2:

There is one best model for succession. “There are several different paths companies can take to naming a successor – including internal and external approaches,” says Mr. Miles. “One reason companies fall short at succession planning is that they often select the wrong model for their current situation. A company may need an external recruit to lead a turnaround, for instance, or may have the capability to groom multiple internal executives over a period of time to allow the most promising one to shine through. One size does not fit all.”

Myth #3:

The CEO should pick a successor. “Sitting CEOs have a vested interest in the current strategy of a company and its continuance, and they may have ‘favorites’ they want to see follow them,” says Professor Larcker. “Boards, however, must determine the future needs of the company, and what kind of successor will best match the direction the company is headed.”

Myth #4:

Succession is primarily a “risk management” issue. “While a failure to plan adequately certainly exposes an organization to downside risk, boards should understand that succession planning is primarily about *building* shareholder value,” says Mr. Miles. “Succession planning is as much success-oriented as it is risk-oriented.”

Myth #5:

Boards know how to evaluate CEO talent. “Our 2013 survey found that CEO performance evaluations place considerable weight on financial performance (such as accounting, operating, and stock price results) and not enough weight on the nonfinancial metrics (such as employee satisfaction, customer service, innovation, and talent development) that have proven correlation with the long-term success of organizations,” says Professor Larcker.

Myth #6:

Boards prefer internal candidates. “While, ultimately, three quarters of newly appointed CEOs are internal executives, external candidates still hold a strong appeal for boards – especially at the start of a search,” says Mr. Miles. “Often boards aren’t given enough exposure to internal candidates, and directors are often nervous about giving an ‘untested’ executive the full reins of a company. There is a still-prevalent bias against promoting the insider ‘junior executive’ to the top spot one day. So, while the ‘myth’ may end up mostly true in the end, there is often a long journey of getting the board to that decision.”

Myth #7:

Boards want a female or minority CEO. “The numbers speak for themselves,” says Professor Larcker. “‘Diversity’ ranks high on the list of attributes that board members formally look for in CEO candidates, and yet female and ethnic minorities continue to have low representation among actual CEOs. We continue to see that boards select CEOs with leadership styles they perceive to be similar to their own, and the fact is that boards today are still highly non-diverse when it comes to gender and ethnic backgrounds.”

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Heidi Schwartz* joined Group C Media in April 1989 as managing editor of Today’s Facility Manager (TFM) magazine (formerly Business Interiors) where she was subsequently promoted to editor/co-publisher of the monthly trade magazine for facility management professionals. In September 2012, she took over the newly created position of internet director for TFM’s parent company, Group C Media, where she is charged with developing content and creating online strategies for TFM and its sister publication, Business Facilities.

 

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Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller


Vous trouverez ci-dessous un article publié dans Lesaffaires.com le 31 mars 2014. Dans cet entrevue, le journaliste me demande de faire une synthèse des tendances les plus significatives en gouvernance de sociétés. Bonne lecture !

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

Une entrevue avec M. Jacques Grisé, auteur du blogue jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

Si la gouvernance des entreprises a fait beaucoup de chemin depuis quelques années, son évolution se poursuit. Afin d’imaginer la direction qu’elle prendra au cours des prochaines années, nous avons consulté l’expert Jacques Grisé, ancien directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, de l’Université Laval. Toujours affilié au Collège, M. Grisé publie depuis plusieurs années le blogue www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com, un site incontournable pour rester à l’affût des bonnes pratiques et tendances en gouvernance.

Voici les 12 tendances dont il faut suivre l’évolution, selon Jacques Grisé :

1. Les conseils d’administration réaffirmeront leur autorité.

« Auparavant, la gouvernance était une affaire qui concernait davantage le management », explique M. Grisé. La professionnalisation de la fonction d’administrateur amène une modification et un élargissement du rôle et des responsabilités des conseils. Les CA sont de plus en plus sollicités et questionnés au sujet de leurs décisions et de l’entreprise.

2. La formation des administrateurs prendra de l’importance.

À l’avenir, on exigera toujours plus des administrateurs. C’est pourquoi la formation est essentielle et devient même une exigence pour certains organismes. De plus, la formation continue se généralise ; elle devient plus formelle.

3. L’affirmation du droit des actionnaires et celle du rôle du conseil s’imposeront.

Le débat autour du droit des actionnaires par rapport à celui des conseils d’administration devra mener à une compréhension de ces droits conflictuels. Aujourd’hui, les conseils doivent tenir compte des parties prenantes en tout temps.

4. La montée des investisseurs activistes se poursuivra.

L’arrivée de l’activisme apporte une nouvelle dimension au travail des administrateurs. Les investisseurs activistes s’adressent directement aux actionnaires, ce qui mine l’autorité des conseils d’administration. Est-ce bon ou mauvais ? La vision à court terme des activistes peut être néfaste, mais toutes leurs actions ne sont pas négatives, notamment parce qu’ils s’intéressent souvent à des entreprises qui ont besoin d’un redressement sous une forme ou une autre. Pour bien des gens, les fonds activistes sont une façon d’améliorer la gouvernance. Le débat demeure ouvert.

5. La recherche de compétences clés deviendra la norme.

De plus en plus, les organisations chercheront à augmenter la qualité de leur conseil en recrutant des administrateurs aux expertises précises, qui sont des atouts dans certains domaines ou secteurs névralgiques.

6. Les règles de bonne gouvernance vont s’étendre à plus d’entreprises.

Les grands principes de la gouvernance sont les mêmes, peu importe le type d’organisation, de la PME à la société ouverte (ou cotée), en passant par les sociétés d’État, les organismes à but non lucratif et les entreprises familiales.

7. Le rôle du président du conseil sera davantage valorisé.

La tendance veut que deux personnes distinctes occupent les postes de président du conseil et de PDG, au lieu qu’une seule personne cumule les deux, comme c’est encore trop souvent le cas. Un bon conseil a besoin d’un solide leader, indépendant du PDG.

8. La diversité deviendra incontournable.

Même s’il y a un plus grand nombre de femmes au sein des conseils, le déficit est encore énorme. Pourtant, certaines études montrent que les entreprises qui font une place aux femmes au sein de leur conseil sont plus rentables. Et la diversité doit s’étendre à d’autres origines culturelles, à des gens de tous âges et d’horizons divers.

9. Le rôle stratégique du conseil dans l’entreprise s’imposera.

Le temps où les CA ne faisaient qu’approuver les orientations stratégiques définies par la direction est révolu. Désormais, l’élaboration du plan stratégique de l’entreprise doit se faire en collaboration avec le conseil, en profitant de son expertise.

10. La réglementation continuera de se raffermir.

Le resserrement des règles qui encadrent la gouvernance ne fait que commencer. Selon Jacques Grisé, il faut s’attendre à ce que les autorités réglementaires exercent une surveillance accrue partout dans le monde, y compris au Québec, avec l’Autorité des marchés financiers. En conséquence, les conseils doivent se plier aux règles, notamment en ce qui concerne la rémunération et la divulgation. Les responsabilités des comités au sein du conseil prendront de l’importance. Les conseils doivent mettre en place des politiques claires en ce qui concerne la gouvernance.

11. La composition des conseils d’administration s’adaptera aux nouvelles exigences et se transformera.

Les CA seront plus petits, ce qui réduira le rôle prépondérant du comité exécutif, en donnant plus de pouvoir à tous les administrateurs. Ceux-ci seront mieux choisis et formés, plus indépendants, mieux rémunérés et plus redevables de leur gestion aux diverses parties prenantes. Les administrateurs auront davantage de responsabilités et seront plus engagés dans les comités aux fonctions plus stratégiques. Leur responsabilité légale s’élargira en même temps que leurs tâches gagnent en importance. Il faudra donc des membres plus engagés, un conseil plus diversifié, dirigé par un leader plus fort.

12. L’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration deviendra la norme.

La tendance est déjà bien ancrée aux États-Unis, où les entreprises engagent souvent des firmes externes pour mener cette évaluation. Certaines choisissent l’autoévaluation. Dans tous les cas, le processus est ouvert et si les résultats restent confidentiels, ils contribuent à l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’administration.

Vous désirez en savoir plus sur les bonnes pratiques de gouvernance ? Visitez le site du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés et suivez le blogue de Jacques Grisé.

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La culture organisationnelle contribue-t-elle à la valeur des organisations ?


Qu’est-ce que la culture organisationnelle et comment celle-ci est-elle associée à la performance ? L’étude conduite par Luigi Guiso, professeur de finance à Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance; Paola Sapienza, professeur de finance à Northwestern University; and Luigi Zingales, professeur de finance à University of Chicago, tente de vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle la valeur de l’intégrité serait plus élevée dans les entreprises privées que dans les entreprises publiques (cotées).

L’étude tend à démontrer que l’accent mis sur la maximisation de la valeur aux actionnaires peut nuire à l’atteinte d’un haut niveau d’intégrité.

Voici un extrait de cette étude. Quel est votre point de vue sur l’importance d’une culture d’intégrité dans la performance des entreprises ?

The value of Corporate Culture

In our recent NBER working paper, The Value of Corporate Culture, we study which dimensions of corporate culture are related to a firm’s performance and why. Resigning from Goldman Sachs, vice president Greg Smith wrote in a very controversial New York Times op-ed: “Culture was always a vital part of Goldman Sachs’s success. It revolved around teamwork, integrity, a spirit of humility, and always doing right by our clients. The culture was the secret sauce that made this place great and allowed us to earn our clients’ trust for 143 years.” He then adds “I am sad to say that I look around today and see virtually no trace of the culture that made me love working for this firm for many years.” In his follow-up book, Greg Smith seems to blame the demise of Goldman Sachs’s culture to its transformation from a partnership to a publicly traded company.

English: Goldman Sachs Tower, Jersey City, New...
English: Goldman Sachs Tower, Jersey City, New Jersey (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

While highly disputed by the company, Greg Smith’s remarks raise several important questions. What constitutes a firm’s culture? How can we measure it? Does this culture—however defined and measured—impact a firm’s success? If so, why? And how can different governance structures enable or curtail the formation and preservation of a value-enhancing culture? In this paper we try to answer these questions.

Whether culture was Goldman’s secret sauce or not, Goldman certainly went out of the way to advertise it. The first page of its IPO prospectus was enumerating the “Business Principles,” including “Integrity and honesty are at the heart of our business.” Yet, in this regard Goldman is not unique. When we look at companies’ web pages, we find that 85% of the S&P 500 companies have a section (sometimes even two) dedicated to—what they call—“corporate culture,” i.e. principles and values that should inform the behavior of all firms’ employees.

If this is true, it might be value maximizing (at least in the short term) for publicly traded firms to underinvest in integrity capital. To test this hypothesis, we analyze whether ceteris paribus publicly traded firms in the GPTW dataset have a lower value of integrity (as measured by the survey responses) than privately held ones. We find this to be the case, even after controlling for industry, geography, size, and labor force composition. Public firms have an integrity value that is 0.21 standard deviations below similar firms that are private.

Not all firms see their integrity drop when they go public. Venture capital-backed firms do not seem to experience any drop. This different outcome might be the result of a longer horizon generated by the presence of a large shareholder or by a better organizational design made by professional founders.

To disentangle these hypotheses, we test whether the presence of a large shareholder or other corporate governance characteristics affect the level of integrity capital. We find that the only corporate governance characteristic that is statistically significant is the presence of large shareholder (at least 5% ownership share), yet it has a negative correlation with the level of integrity. Thus, it looks like a focus towards shareholders value maximization undermines the ability of a company to sustain a high level of integrity capital.

Vous pouvez télécharger le document complet ici.

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La gouvernance dans tous ses états | Première série d’articles


Voici les quatre premiers articles, d’une série de huit, publiés le 17 mars 2014 par les experts du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) dans le volet Dossier de l’édition Les Affaires.com

Découvrez comment les entreprises et les administrateurs doivent s’adapter afin de tirer profit des meilleures pratiques

La gouvernance dans tous ses états | Première série d’articles

Présenté par

CAS

Dossier à suivre

                   

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Gouvernance : huit principes à respecter
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Conseils d’administration : la diversité, mode d’emploi
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Les administrateurs doivent-ils développer leurs compétences?
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Vous souhaitez occuper un poste sur un conseil d’administration ?
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