« Il ne se passe pas un jour sans que l’actualité ne fasse état d’un scandale d’ordre éthique au sein d’une organisation. À ce jour, ce qu’on peut tirer comme enseignement de la commission Charbonneau, c’est que nul n’est épargné. En effet, cette réalité touche autant les entreprises privées que publiques, voire les partis politiques.
English: ethics’s triangle Français : Triangle de l’éthique (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
À contrecœur diront certains, ces organisations ont mis l’éthique à leur ordre du jour et elles se sont empressées de communiquer leurs initiatives afin de contrer la montée du cynisme à leur égard. Malgré ces efforts, le cynisme prend de l’ampleur au Québec. En effet, selon une enquête menée en juin dernier par l’Institut de la confiance dans les organisations, 83% des Québécois estiment que le climat de confiance s’est détérioré au Québec ».
Voici un article du Blogue Learn, Unlearn, Relearn, animé par CS Shilpi Thapar, sur comment se préparer à occuper un poste d’administrateurs de sociétés. Quelles questions se poser avant la nomination …, et après avoir obtenu le poste convoité. C’est un « checklist » très utile.
In today’s corporate world, role of companies have become complex and to achieve a sustainable growth is becoming huge challenge for the companies. So, companies need efficient people with different perspectives to constitute board to achieve their long term goals. Every company should be headed by an effective board which is collectively responsible for the long-term success of the company.
When you decide to move into governance and board role, you need to prepare well. Joining the Board is not an easy task. It requires a significant amount of work and preparation before accepting the invitation to join a board as director. It is a prestigious position and takes your career to next level but it is equally demanding and carries lot of accountability, responsibility and risk of spoiling yours and company reputation if something goes wrong. So be very selective in choosing your board seat as risk is higher now a days.
So here is some food for thought if you are planning to become a board director:
Voici un court article publié par Monish Chatrath sur le site de moneycontrol.com qui présente une perspective équilibrée des pratiques de gouvernance à l’échelle internationale. C’est un texte qui décrit clairement les besoins d’une saine gouvernance et qui montre comment celle-ci peut s’appliquer dans des contextes culturels différents.
La nécessité d’une bonne gouvernance est universelle et sa réalisation est étroitement liée à la compétitivité des organisations. J’ai choisi de vous livrer de larges extraits de cet article. Bonne lecture.
Good governance is characterised by a firm commitment and adoption of ethical practices by an organisation across its entire value chain, in all of its dealings with a wide group of stakeholders, encompassing employees, customers, vendors, regulators and shareholders (including minority shareholders). To achieve this, certain checks and practices need to be whole-heartedly embraced. Trust and integrity play an essential role in economic life and for the sake of future prosperity, boards and management need to ensure that these attributes are adequately recognised.
The subject of corporate governance leapt to limelight from relative obscurity after a string of collapses of high profile companies at the start of this century, when events at a Houston-based energy giant and at a global telecom behemoth in Mississippi, shocked the business world with both the scale and age of their unethical and illegal operations. Worse, they seemed to indicate only the tip of a dangerous iceberg. While corporate practices in the USA came under the scanner, it appeared that the problem was far more widespread.
Relatively similar issues at a large and reputed food group in Europe, at a multinational newspaper group in Canada and at an Indian technology major, revealed significant and deep-rooted problems, which inexplicably creep in at times and places where they are least expected. Subsequently, the need for the identification and adoption of good tenets for governance have been reinforced from time to time and efforts to this end have gathered further momentum with every new disclosure of a corporate scandal.
The board has a key role in setting the ethical tone of a company. High ethical standards are in the long term interests of the company as a means to make it credible and trustworthy, not only in day-to-day operations but also with respect to longer term commitments. While codes of conduct and whistle blower policies are important, what is more important is the manner in which they are communicated and practiced. In this context, it is vital for board members and senior management to lead by example. Similarly, the concept of having independent directors is sound in theory, but more important is the process underlying the selection of independent directors. The selection process itself need to be rigorous, transparent, objective and aligned with the organisation’s needs.
Although, having tight financial controls is essential for market confidence, cultural and operational risks can just as effectively damage a business if left unchecked. This is where we get to see many divergent views across the globe; the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in USA insists on management and auditor assertion on the financial control environment, whereas the combined code of corporate governance in the UK (the UK Code) maintains a focus on the wider control environment, but without the requirement for positive assertion. The French have introduced the Loi de Sécurité Financière (LSF) which moves towards directors acknowledging their responsibility for having maintained a strong control environment. Ireland and Germany, among others, also have similar frameworks. In India, listed companies are required to comply with the revised corporate governance requirements under Clause 49, which envisages mandatory risk assessments, certification of financial controls by Chief Executive officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial officers (CFOs) and a larger role for independent directors.
To sum up, a fair and effective corporate governance framework must evolve in the light of changing circumstances of business over time and the framework of the company should be tailored accordingly to deal with those circumstances. A poorly conceived governance system on the other hand, can wreak havoc on an economy by misallocating resources or failing to check opportunistic behaviour. The question that often arises is whether corporate governance operates the same way in every economy. It may be argued that cross-national patterns of corporate governance are either converging or will converge on either the Anglo-Saxon shareholder-centered model found in the USA and the UK, or a hybrid between the shareholder and stakeholder models typically found in Japan and Germany. The fact remains that, irrespective of the model adopted, the corporate governance and competitive strategy of organizations are inextricably interrelated.
To ensure that your board is continually reviewing and enhancing its governance processes, this checklist will provide a good starting point.
Top Ten Steps to Improving Corporate Governance :
1. Recognise that good governance is not just about compliance
Boards need to balance conformance (i.e. compliance with legislation, regulation and codes of practice) with performance aspects of the board’s work (i.e. improving the performance of the organisation through strategy formulation and policy making). As a part of this process, a board needs to elaborate its position and understanding of the major functions it performs as opposed to those performed by management. These specifics will vary from board to board. Knowing the role of the board and who does what in relation to governance goes a long way towards maintaining a good relationship between the board and management.
2. Clarify the board’s role in strategy
It is generally accepted today that the board has a significant role to play in the formulation and adoption of the organisation’s strategic direction. The extent of the board’s contribution to strategy will range from approval at one end to development at the other. Each board must determine what role is appropriate for it to undertake and clarify this understanding with management.
3. Monitor organisational performance
Monitoring organisational performance is an essential board function and ensuring legal compliance is a major aspect of the board’s monitoring role. It ensures that corporate decision making is consistent with the strategy of the organisation and with owners’ expectations. This is best done by identifying the organisation’s key performance drivers and establishing appropriate measures for determining success. As a board, the directors should establish an agreed format for the reports they monitor to ensure that all matters that should be reported are in fact reported.
4. Understand that the board employs the CEO
In most cases, one of the major functions of the board is to appoint, review, work through, and replace (when necessary), the CEO. The board/CEO relationship is crucial to effective corporate governance because it is the link between the board’s role in determining the organisation’s strategic direction and management’s role in achieving corporate objectives.
5. Recognise that the governance of risk is a board responsibility
Establishing a sound system of risk oversight and management and internal control is another fundamental role of the board. Effective risk management supports better decision making because it develops a deeper insight into the risk-reward trade-offs that all organisations face.
6. Ensure the directors have the information they need
Better information means better decisions. Regular board papers will provide directors with information that the CEO or management team has decided they need. But directors do not all have the same informational requirements, since they differ in their knowledge, skills, and experience. Briefings, presentations, site visits, individual director development programs, and so on can all provide directors with additional information. Above all, directors need to be able to find answers to the questions they have, so an access to independent professional advice policy is recommended.
7. Build and maintain an effective governance infrastructure
Since the board is ultimately responsible for all the actions and decisions of an organisation, it will need to have in place specific policies to guide organisational behaviour. To ensure that the line of responsibility between board and management is clearly delineated, it is particularly important for the board to develop policies in relation to delegations. Also, under this topic are processes and procedures. Poor internal processes and procedures can lead to inadequate access to information, poor communication and uninformed decision making, resulting in a high level of dissatisfaction among directors. Enhancements to board meeting processes, meeting agendas, board papers and the board’s committee structure can often make the difference between a mediocre board and a high performing board.
8. Appoint a competent chairperson
Research has shown that board structure and formal governance regulations are less important in preventing governance breaches and corporate wrongdoing than the culture and trust created by the chairperson. As the “leader” of the board, the chairperson should demonstrate strong and acknowledged leadership ability, the ability to establish a sound relationship with the CEO, and have the capacity to conduct meetings and lead group decision-making processes.
9. Build a skills-based board
What is important for a board is that it has a good understanding of what skills it has and those skills it requires. Where possible, a board should seek to ensure that its members represent an appropriate balance between directors with experience and knowledge of the organisation and directors with specialist expertise or fresh perspective. Directors should also be considered on the additional qualities they possess, their “behavioural competencies”, as these qualities will influence the relationships around the boardroom table, between the board and management, and between directors and key stakeholders.
10. Evaluate board and director performance and pursue opportunities for improvement
Boards must be aware of their own strengths and weaknesses, if they are to govern effectively. Board effectiveness can only be gauged if the board regularly assesses its own performance and that of individual directors. Improvements to come from a board and director evaluation can include areas as diverse as board processes, director skills, competencies and motivation, or even boardroom relationships. It is critical that any agreed actions that come out of an evaluation are implemented and monitored. Boards should consider addressing weaknesses uncovered in board evaluations through director development programs and enhancing their governance processes.
Ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets, « posts », est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revues, des blogues et sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.
Chaque jour, je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernance dans le monde francophone, en fournissant aux lecteurs une mine de renseignements récents (les billets quotidiens) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes.
Deloitte a publié ce premier numéro de Questions particulières pour les conseils d’administration d’organismes à but non lucratif (OBNL) afin d’analyser de plus près quelques-uns des principaux problèmes ou défis auxquels les administrateurs et leur organisation ont à faire face.
Les organismes à but non lucratif (OBNL) jouent un rôle important dans notre société, fournissant un large éventail de services dans divers secteurs d’activité. Même s’ils doivent faire face à des défis identiques ou semblables à ceux des organismes à but lucratif, les organismes à but non lucratif doivent résoudre des questions qui leur sont propres. Il arrive parfois qu’ils soient en concurrence directe avec des organismes à but lucratif, notamment au moment de recruter les meilleurs éléments ayant les capacités et l’expertise requises pour leur permettre de réaliser leur mission, aspect dont nous traitons dans la présente publication.
Deloitte logo. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Les autres sujets abordés dans la présente publication comprennent notamment les changements apportés à l’environnement réglementaire des organismes à but non lucratif découlant d’une nouvelle loi fédérale, à savoir la Loi canadienne sur les organisations à but non lucratif, de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels et les documents électroniques et des mesures législatives canadiennes contre les pourriels. Certains organismes à but non lucratif pourraient devoir revoir leur stratégie à la lumière de ces nouvelles règles, tandis que d’autres pourraient décider de le faire afin de tirer avantage des nouvelles technologies, dont les réseaux sociaux, afin de communiquer de manière plus efficace avec les parties prenantes et accroître le soutien de la collectivité.
La présente publication analyse ces questions et d’autres défis importants auxquels les organismes à but non lucratif et leurs administrateurs devront vraisemblablement faire face durant l’année à venir, tels qu’ils ont été définis par des professionnels de Deloitte qui travaillent auprès d’organismes à but non lucratif et qui sont souvent eux-mêmes administrateurs d’organismes à but non lucratif; des organismes ont recommandé leurs propres pratiques exemplaires qui, avec leur autorisation, ont été incluses dans cette publication.
Chaque article renferme des questions que les administrateurs pourraient poser pour explorer davantage ces enjeux avec leur propre conseil d’administration et les membres de la direction. En outre, les articles sont accompagnés d’outils et de ressources que les administrateurs peuvent utiliser pour obtenir une compréhension plus approfondie des questions abordées et améliorer l’efficacité du conseil dans le traitement de ces questions…
… Les conseils qui dirigent plutôt que d’être dirigés seront ceux qui auront adapté avec succès leurs stratégies en vue de transformer ces défis en occasions et qui tireront parti des exigences en matière de conformité pour mettre en œuvre des concepts novateurs.
Aujourd’hui, je présente plusieurs points de vue se rapportant aux effets négatifs, à long terme, des agissements des investisseurs activistes. Depuis un an, j’ai fait plusieurs interventions sur ce thème dans le but de mieux informer les partisans de la « bonne gouvernance » de la situation qui prévaut dans ce domaine. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un billet que j’ai publié le 28 septembre 2013 et qui fait l’inventaire de ces publications.
Mon objectif n’est pas de susciter la controverse à ce sujet parmi les administrateurs de sociétés; je suis néanmoins très sensible aux voix, de plus en plus nombreuses, qui s’élèvent et qui concluent aux effets pervers des fonds activistes. J’espère donc qu’avec toutes les informations « scientifiques » et de nature « pratique », les lecteurs de ce blogue pourront se forger une opinion éclairée.
À cet égard, j’ai demandé à Yvan Allaire, président exécutif du conseil de l’IGOPP, de vous exposer succinctement sa position sur cette épineuse question*.
Un important et acrimonieux débat fait rage présentement aux États-Unis sur un sujet d’une grande importance pour la situation canadienne. D’une part, un groupe d’universitaires, dont le leader est le professeur Bebchuk de la faculté de droit de Harvard, soutient, études empiriques à l’appui, qu’il est faux d’imputer des mobiles de profitabilité à court terme aux «fonds activistes», que ceux-ci contribuent à une amélioration sensible et durable de la performance des entreprises ciblées, qu’en aucune façon leurs prescriptions et agissements ne suscitent-ils des comportements de maximisation de la valeur du titre à court terme, mais dont les effets à long terme seraient nocifs pour l’entreprise.
English: This statue is also known as « Statue of Three Lies » Lie # 1 : This is not John Harvard’s face; no picture or statue of John Harvard survived. Lie # 2 : John Harvard was not founder of Harvard University; it was founded two years prior to being renamed Harvard in 1638. Lie # 3 : The inscription says that Harvard was founded in 1638; in fact, it was founded two years earlier. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Évidemment, cette thèse est contestée et réfutée par un groupe réunissant des avocats, des universitaires, des juristes et surtout des dirigeants d’entreprise. Le célèbre avocat Martin Lipton, initiateur de la défense dite «poison pill» en est le porte-parole le plus véhément et assidu.
Vous trouverez au lien suivant un texte de Lipton qui réunit un nombre d’études aux conclusions divergentes de celles de Bebchuk ainsi que des témoignages de personnes ayant une longue expérience pratique de ces phénomènes.
Le sujet est important pour le Canada, car tant pour le Groupe de travail sur la protection des entreprises québécoisesque dans le cadre des consultations des commissions des valeurs mobilièressur l’à-propos de donner plus de pouvoir aux conseils en situation de tentative «hostile» de prise de contrôle, les opposants à toute intervention ou changement s’abreuvent abondamment à la fontaine de Bebchuk et al.
* Pour ceux qui veulent pousser davantage leurs réflexions sur les enjeux se rapportant aux conséquences néfastes des interventions des actionnaires activistes et « hedge funds », il me fera plaisir de vous faire parvenir les documents suivants :
(1) Hedge funds as “Activist Shareholders”: Passing Phenomenon or Grave-Diggers of Public Corporations ? Allaire et Firsirotu, 2007 .
(2) Activist Hedge Funds are good for you ! Allaire, 2013.
Voici quelques conseils très utiles aux personnes qui sont appelées à présider des conseils d’administration d’OBNL. Souvent, ces responsabilités sont confiées à des collègues populaires, jugés compétents dans les relations humaines…
C’est bien; c’est un bon début … mais il y a plus dans la job d’un président de conseil si l’on veut réaliser les objectifs de l’organisation. L’auteur nous fait part de plusieurs autres éléments importants à considérer dans la conduite des réunions d’une organisation à but non lucratif.
Notez que ces conseils sont aussi valables pour d’autres types de sociétés mais, Eugene Fram, l’auteur du blogue, est un expert de la gouvernance des OBNL, et ses suggestions s’appliquent très bien aux particularités de ce genre d’organisation.
Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Que pensez-vous d’un huis clos à la fin de chaque réunion ?
The Bottom Line: “Great meetings “are hard to come by. There are almost always moments of frustration and/or apparent progress. It is up to the chair to do a realistic post-mortem after each, recognizing what “works” with his/her constituents to move the organization forward. Some of the above suggestions can help produce tangible impacts that will assuredly merit heart-felt kudos from his/her fellow volunteers.
“Great Meeting!” That’s the pro forma exit line often delivered by nonprofit volunteers to the chair when the meeting is over. The meeting may or may not have been productive; the leader may or may not have been stellar. But it’s in the volunteer’s DNA to toss a parting compliment to the chair, also a volunteer. Here are my suggestions for conducting a meeting that will have at least a chance of earning the accolades.
Reporting on Operations: Keep this section to a minimum. Attach a list of routine, non-financial items to the agenda and make sure it reaches directors a week before the meeting. A Consent Agenda can be used for routine legal items or issues that need to be noted in the minutes. When directors attempt to micromanage operational issues,(e.g. try to suggest ad copy), the chair needs to take charge and redirect the discussion, perhaps by encouraging the director who is talking to complete the discussion off-line with the CEO .
Strategic/Policy Topics: These topics should always be central to the agenda, even if they are only updates on the work of board-staff committees. Completed committee reports need to be allotted substantial sections of the agenda, especially if they are coming up for a final vote.
Avoid Information Dumps: Examples: A CEO who simply reads the details of accreditation guidelines that nobody will remember. An enthusiastic staff member who presents a report without having reviewed it with the CEO to make certain he/she stays within the allotted time. A chair needs to diplomatically interrupt a director unproductively consuming meeting time to give an ad hoc speech. Many of these problems can be avoided if the CEO and chair anticipated them and have a redirection strategy in place.
Short Meeting (Photo credit: Accretion Disc)
Focus On Discussing Outcomes & Impacts: Also in the nonprofit environment there is a tendency to have meetings default to discussions of processes instead of outcomes and impacts. Discussions of processes are more interesting and more tangible. Outcomes and impacts are more future oriented. The chair needs to be alert to this default and ready to handle it.
Solving Problems: After every meeting the CEO and chair need to define what organizational problems have been put to rest as a result of the meeting. However, occasionally a meeting might get out of hand without any problems being solved. Records need to be kept to be certain this doesn’t become a trend. If it does, the issues must be identifies.
An Offline Suggestion: Most nonprofit volunteer directors only see each other occasionally. At board and committee meetings, some chairs take 10 minutes at the end of the meeting to ask each one to comment what is going on in their personal or professional lives. Those who use the technique report it helps with team collegiality.
Voici un document synthèse récemment publié par Deloitte sur la gouvernance des OBNL. C’est un document très précieux car il examine chaque élément de la gouvernance de ces organisations, répondant ainsi à de multiples questions que se posent les dizaines de milliers d’administrateurs québécois (le document est en français).
Comme vous le verrez, on y présente, en annexe, plusieurs guides et outils qui seront assurément très pertinents pour un administrateur :
Modèle de mandat pour le conseil d’administration d’un OBNL
Modèle de mandat pour le comité d’audit d’un OBNL
Modèle de formulaire d’évaluation de la performance du conseil
Modèle de matrice des compétences du conseil
Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de ce document. Vous trouverez ci-dessous un texte introductif à l’ouvrage.
Faites-moi part de vos commentaires en tant que membre de conseil d’administration d’OBNL. Bonne lecture !
Il y a près de 20 ans, nous avons publié la première édition de L’efficacité du conseil d’administration d’un OSBL dans le but de présenter aux organismes à but non lucratif (OBNL) (aussi appelés OSBL) un exposé des enjeux de la gouvernance. Notre objectif était de les aider à surmonter les obstacles à la mise en place d’un système de gouvernance efficace. Depuis, les pratiques en la matière ont bien évolué. Au fil des années, de nouvelles exigences ont été mises en place à l’intention des sociétés ouvertes et les meilleures pratiques autre fois adoptées par un petit groupe de sociétés sont maintenant devenues la norme au sein de la plupart des organismes.
Deloitte & Touche Region 10 Office(RMZ FUTURA), HITEC City (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Parallèlement à l’évolution des pratiques de gouvernance, les attentes des parties prenantes se sont accrues et tous les organismes ayant une obligation d’information du public, y compris les OBNL, sont désormais concernés. De nos jours, bon nombre d’OBNL vont au-delà de la simple conformité aux exigences réglementaires et ont adopté des pratiques exemplaires de gouvernance empruntées aux sociétés ouvertes ainsi que des pratiques établies et encouragées par le public et la communauté des OBNL elle-même.Cette troisième édition de L’efficacité du conseil d’administration d’un OSBL traite de la gouvernance des OBNL en fonction de la situation actuelle de la réglementation et des parties prenantes. Elle s’adresse en premier lieu aux administrateurs, car ce sont eux qui assument au final la responsabilité de la gérance de l’organisme. Nous espérons que ce texte permettra au lecteur de mieux comprendre les responsabilités des administrateurs d’un OBNL et l’amènera à orienter son organisme vers des pratiques de gouvernance plus efficaces.
Dans cette édition, nous :
Expliquons d’abord le sens d’une bonne gouvernance et nous soulignons son importance pour les OBNL;
Présentons ensuite le cadre de gouvernance de Deloitte, qui reflète les pratiques exemplaires de gouvernance actuelles et émergentes;
Traitons également en détail de chaque élément de ce cadre en plusieurs volets et proposons une série de questions pour permettre aux administrateurs de comprendre et de surmonter les difficultés au sein de leur propre organisme;
Traitons aussi d’enjeux propres aux OBNL et proposons certaines mesures que les OBNL et leur conseil d’administration peuvent prendre pour y répondre;
Présentons finalement certains outils populaires que Deloitte a conçus pour aider les conseils à s’acquitter de leurs responsabilités.
Le CAS est heureux de vous dévoiler sa deuxième série de capsules d’experts, formée d’entrevues vidéos.
Pendant trois minutes, un expert du Collège partage une réflexion et se prononce sur un sujet d’actualité lié à la gouvernance. Cette semaine Louis J. Duhamel, associé, stratégie corporative chez Deloitte, présente le rôle du comité des ressources humaines.
Voici un extrait du récent rapport de PwC sur l’état de la gouvernance aux États-Unis. Le sommaire exécutif reproduit ci-dessous montre clairement l’évolution de la pensée des administrateurs en ce qui a trait aux thèmes suivants :
(1) Évaluation plus sévère de la performance des collègues administrateurs;
(2) Résistances quant au remplacement des collègues administrateurs;
(3) La « stimulation intellectuelle » est la principale motivation à siéger sur un conseil;
(4) Divergences d’opinions quant à la communication d’informations concernant la gouvernance, la rémunération de la direction et les nominations des administrateurs;
(5) Lacunes quant aux politiques de communications avec les parties prenantes;
(6) Peu d’administrateurs sont prêts à reconsidérer la rémunération des hauts dirigeants, même si les actionnaires questionnent la politique;
(7) Augmentation significative de la surveillance des risques par le C.A.;
(8) Différences de perception entre la direction et les administrateurs au sujet de l’influence de diverses parties prenantes sur les stratégies;
(9 Proactivité plus marquées des administrateurs en ce qui a trait aux risques de fraudes;
(10) Importance accrue accordée aux projets en TI, bien que toujours considérée comme insuffisante;
(11) Augmentation importante de l’utilisation de conseillers externes, notamment en TI;
(12) Une majorité d’administrateur (aux É-U) croit que les récentes initiatives règlementaires n’ont pas accrue la protection des investisseurs, mais elles ont contribué à accroitre significativement les coûts;
(13) L’influence des firmes de conseil spécialisées en gouvernance décline.
We are witnessing unprecedented change in the corporate governance world: new perspectives on boardroom composition, higher levels of stakeholder engagement, more emphasis on emerging risks and strategies, and the increasing velocity of change in the digital world. These factors, coupled with calls for enhanced transparency around governance practices and reporting, the very active regulatory and lawmaking environment, and the enhanced power of proxy advisors, are all accelerating evolution, and in some cases creating a revolution, in the boardroom.
In the summer of 2013, 934 public company directors responded to our 2013 Annual Corporate Directors Survey. Of those directors, 70% serve on the boards of companies with more than $1 billion in annual revenue. As a result, the survey’s findings reflect the practices and boardroom perspectives of many of today’s world-class companies. The focus of this year’s research not only reflects in-depth analysis of contemporary governance trends, but also emphasizes how boards are reacting to a rapidly evolving landscape.
These are the highlights:
Directors are even more critical of their fellow directors than last year: 35% now say someone on their board should be replaced (compared to only 31% in 2012). The top three reasons cited are diminished performance because of aging, a lack of required expertise, and poor preparation for meetings.
Replacing a fellow board member can be difficult; 48% cite impediments to doing so. The top inhibitor, cited nearly twice as often as any other factor, is that board leadership is uncomfortable addressing the issue.
Board service is not driven by money or ego. More than half of directors (54%) say that their primary motivation for sitting on a corporate board is intellectual stimulation, 22% see board service as a way to keep engaged, and 17% indicate they simply want to give something back. Remuneration is low on the list.
There is a dichotomy between directors who believe it’s appropriate to communicate about governance issues directly with shareholders and those who do not. Just over 30% say it’s « very appropriate » to communicate about corporate governance issues, and about a quarter say the same about executive compensation and director nominations. But the same or slightly more say director communication about these three areas is « not appropriate. »
Regarding communication with other stakeholders, nearly half of directors say their boards either have no policy or one that’s not useful. Considering the increasing frequency of stakeholder interactions, it’s not surprising that about one-quarter of those without such a policy believe there should be one.
Boards continue to take action in response to say on pay voting results (70%) but few actually reduced compensation (3%). Over one-half of directors say that it would take a negative shareholder vote of 30% or more to cause them to reconsider executive compensation.
The number of directors who believe there is a clear allocation of risk oversight responsibilities among the board and its committees (80%) improved over the prior year by 17 percentage points. Yet half of those who say that there is clarity reflected that it still could be improved.
CEOs and directors have different perspectives on who influences company strategy or what threatens their company’s growth prospects. As reported in PwC’s 16th Annual Global CEO Survey, CEOs see more influence by the media and supply chain partners, while directors believe investors have more clout. Directors are significantly more concerned about the government impairing growth prospects.
Ninety-four percent of directors say they receive information on competitor initiatives and strategy, but nearly a quarter of them wish it were better.
Three-quarters of directors said their boards took additional action to oversee fraud risks. Six of 10 held discussions regarding « tone at the top, » a 14 percentage-point increase from last year. Other actions included increased interactions with members of management below the executive level and having discussions about insider trading controls.
Directors reflected on the increasing importance of the IT revolution at their companies—15% call IT critical, up from 13% in 2012, and the amount of time directors spent overseeing IT increased correspondingly. Despite the fact that about one-third of boards spent more hours overseeing IT, 61% want to spend even more time considering related risks in the coming year, and 55% say the same about IT strategy.
There was a jump in the use of outside consultants to advise boards on IT strategy and risk: from 27% last year to 35% this year. Even more are thinking about it. While most of these were hired on a project-specific basis, the percentage of consultants engaged on a continuous basis doubled from last year.
Almost a third of directors believe their company’s strategy and IT risk mitigation is not adequately supported by a sufficient understanding of IT at the board level. And only about a quarter « very much » agree that the company provides them with adequate information for effective oversight.
The majority of directors have evolved their practices to be more engaged in overseeing traditional IT issues: the status of major IT implementations and the annual IT budget. These account for the highest levels of director engagement (80% and 63%, respectively). But directors say they are not sufficiently engaged in understanding the company’s level of cyber-security spend (24%) and competitors’ leverage of emerging technologies (22%).
Nearly two-thirds of directors (64%) believe recent regulatory and enforcement initiatives have not increased investor protections, and 77% don’t believe such actions have increased public trust in the corporate sector. In addition, 51% think these efforts have not enhanced transparency to stakeholders « very much » or at all.
Nearly three-fourths of directors feel that increased regulation and enforcement initiatives have added costs to companies that exceed the benefits, and 56% believe they have put excessive burdens on directors. Over a third (36%) responded that such initiatives have contributed to unreasonable expectations of director performance.
Despite their perceived increased influence, proxy advisory firms appear to be losing ground when it comes to their credibility with directors. Directors’ ratings of the firms’ independence, thoroughness of work, and quality of voting recommendations all declined in 2013.
A summary of selected insights reflecting the best of the boardroom is included in the first part of this report. The appendix includes other graphs and survey results.
Plusieurs articles reliés à la gouvernance des sociétés :
Voici un excellent document publié par André Laurin de la firme Lavery, avec la collaboration d’André Vautour, sur les aspects juridiques et pratiques de la décision de nommer des administrateurs externes sur les C.A. de PME, familiales ou non.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait de l’ouvrage ainsi qu’un résumé des points les plus importants à retenir.
Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Plusieurs PME se sont dotées d’un conseil d’administration véritable et ont invité des personnes externes à la société à y siéger. Nul ne saurait nier les bénéfices que peuvent apporter à la direction et à la création de valeurs pour l’entreprise les conseils que peuvent prodiguer des personnes dont l’expérience et les compétences sont pertinentes. Nul ne saurait nier non plus les effets positifs d’une saine gouvernance.
Toutefois, il faut bien constater que nombre d’entrepreneurs sont réfractaires à la création d’un conseil qu’ils ne contrôlent pas complètement. Très souvent, la création d’un conseil a été imposée par le prêteur, l’investisseur ou l’éventualité prochaine d’un appel public à l’épargne.
En effet, l’entrepreneur préfère souvent se passer d’un véritable conseil de crainte de perdre le contrôle et de passer trop de temps en réunions. Par ailleurs, dans certains cas, il formera un comité consultatif formel ou informel composé de certains fournisseurs de services, d’amis ou de connaissances.
Dans ce bulletin, nous rappellerons tout d’abord les devoirs dont doivent s’acquitter les administrateurs de PME et les objectifs ou bénéfices de la gouvernance, pour ensuite suggérer certains modes de fonctionnement que peuvent adopter les administrateurs pour respecter leurs devoirs dans le contexte d’une PME et se protéger contre leur responsabilité potentielle.
À RETENIR
Une saine gouvernance peut et devrait être créatrice de valeurs pour la PME
L’établissement d’une saine gouvernance peut constituer une protection contre la responsabilité potentielle de l’administrateur
Les devoirs généraux de l’administrateur d’une PME sont les mêmes que ceux de l’administrateur d’une grande société (diligence et loyauté)
Les modalités de respect des devoirs et d’implantation de la gouvernance prendront une forme simplifiée et pratique dans le contexte d’une PME
Un cadre de fonctionnement adéquat et une réceptivité de la direction constituent des conditions essentielles à l’acceptation et à l’exercice de la fonction d’administrateur externe
Plusieurs mesures peuvent et devraient être prises à l’initiative de l’administrateur externe.
C’est toujours intéressant d’entendre un administrateur de plusieurs sociétés publiques nous expliquer les limites de son rôle, et surtout de nous expliquer les raisons qui font que « trop de Boards, c’est trop » …
Dans cette vidéo, Lucy Marcus discute de ce sujet avec Mike Rake, administrateur des firmes Barclays, Easyjet, BT et McGraw Hill et nouveau président de CBI UK .
English: McGraw-Hill Building at Rockefeller Center (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Celui-ci mentionne qu’il faut évaluer le risque que plusieurs événements majeurs, critiques, se produisent en même temps, surtout si, comme lui, on est président du conseil de plusieurs entreprises !
Il mentionne que la présidence du conseil d’une grande banque comme Barclays est un travail à temps plein, ce qui ne l’a pas empêché de siéger sur plusieurs autres conseils … Et vous, quand pensez-vous ?
Voici un excellent article publié par Geoff Beattie* et Beverly Behan** et paru dans Ivey Business Journal sur le sujet de la conduite des conseils d’administration. Les auteurs mettent l’accent sur l’importance des trois éléments suivants : (1) la conception d’un plan d’action concernant le management du CA, (2) le courage de poser des questions qui vont au-delà de l’indépendance requise des administrateurs et, (3) l’établissement d’une culture de performance et de reddition de comptes.
The role of the Board of Directors has never been more important. Boards make important decisions that affect companies, the people who work in those companies, the people who own those companies, and sometimes the economy itself. If ever there was a place where excellence is required and should be demanded, this is it. The effectiveness of a board should not be considered a nice addition to a well-managed company, but a prerequisite.
The Richard Ivey School of Business at the University of Western Ontario. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
But what makes a board effective? Surprisingly simple elements that are too frequently ignored. Among them, creating a plan for the board, demanding far more than mere independence from board leadership and establishing a board culture of performance and accountability.
Geoff Beattie sits on the boards of General Electric, the Royal Bank of Canada and McCain Foods and has served on and worked with other boards throughout his career. He is the former CEO of Woodbridge and Vice-Chair of Thomson Reuters
**Beverly Behan
Bev Behan has worked with over 125 boards, primarily S&P1500s, over the past 16 years. Her latest book, Great Companies Deserve Great Boards, was named Governance Book of the Year by Directors & Boards magazine.
Le document ci-dessous présente la problématique, bien réelle, de l’asymétrie de l’information entre les membres du conseil (le Board) et la direction de l’entreprise (le management). Il y a un gap naturel entre ce qui est communiqué par le management et ce qui est requis par le Board pour bien faire son travail. Ce dernier a besoin d’une information de qualité, c’est-à-dire une information complète (quoique synthétique), représentative de la réalité, la plus objective possible et, à jour.
Le rapport, préparé par la NACD (représentant le point de vue des administrateurs) et la firme comptable McGladrey (représentant le point de vue du management), présente un excellent compte rendu des problématiques soulevées par le manque de communication entre les administrateurs et la direction et propose plusieurs pratiques susceptibles de combler le gap d’information.
On y présente les résultats des « conversations » issus de quatre panels composés d’administrateurs et de membres de la haute direction. Le compte rendu fait ressortir les principaux problèmes de communication dans les domaines suivants : (1) La stratégie et le risque, (2) la rémunération des hauts dirigeants, (3) la planification de la succession du PCD, et (4) l’évaluation du Conseil.
Je crois que les personnes intéressées par cette question, c’est-à-dire les administrateurs de sociétés et les membres des directions d’entreprises, devraient prendre connaissance de ce document afin d’être mieux renseignés sur les moyens à prendre pour pallier l’asymétrie de l’information.
Voici un court extrait du document. Bonne lecture.
« Effective board oversight demands information that is as current and relevant as possible. There are, however, natural gaps between what management communicates and what the board needs to know. The information flow between management and the board may not always be perfect, and board committees may have similar troubles bringing the full board « up to speed » on certain issues. The purpose of this report is to address these issues, which we call the « effectiveness gap. »…
Plus (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The goal of this report is to offer some tips and strategies to improve communications between the full board, C-suite, and committees. In particular, we focus on four areas of concern: strategy and risk, executive compensation, CEO succession planning, and board evaluations. These four areas are traditionally of high importance to board members yet have also presented challenges.
To help bridge the gaps in effectiveness, it was necessary to speak directly with individuals from both management and the board. While the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) is able to assess the director perspective, we needed the C-suite perspective as well. We partnered with McGladrey to host four small gatherings of executives and directors in an effort to find ways of improving communications and relationships. The conversations that occurred during these gatherings provided the material for this document ».
Un numéro du Comité de vérification en bref de Deloitte aborde plusieurs sujets relatifs à l’efficacité des comités d’audit en mettant l’accent sur les principaux enjeux, notamment sur les façons de se préparer aux enquêtes internes. Le document présente les questions que les comités d’audit devraient se poser concernant chacun des dix enjeux retenus.
« Le rôle important que joue le comité de vérification dans le maintien d’une gouvernance appropriée a fait souvent l’objet de discussions dans les forums sur la gouvernance et les tables rondes du PCAOB en 2012. Le président du PCAOB, James Doty, a notamment indiqué : « Les investisseurs comptent sur les auditeurs et les comités de vérification comme agents intermédiaires pour surveiller le risque lié au processus d’information financière. Le comité de vérification surveille directement le processus de communication de l’information sur la situation financière et des résultats de la société aux investisseurs par la direction. Les auditeurs valident l’information. Naturellement, ces deux agents intermédiaires doivent se soutenir mutuellement en privilégiant une communication ouverte sur les moyens à mettre en oeuvre pour protéger les investisseurs contre les rapports trompeurs ou inadéquats établis par la direction. » [ trad.]
Les doigts du nénuphar (Photo credit: gelinh)
Les discussions sur la rotation des cabinets d’audit indépendants et le processus d’appel d’offres se poursuivent. Beaucoup estiment que le comité de vérification, qui représente les intérêts des investisseurs, doit être en mesure de contester la direction et les auditeurs et de remettre en question leurs positions au besoin. Il s’agit d’un rôle essentiel dans le processus de gouvernance de notre système financier ».
*Je suis en congé jusqu’à la fin septembre. Durant cette période, j’ai décidé de rééditer les billets considérés comme étant les plus pertinents par les lecteurs de mon blogue (depuis le début des activités le 19 juillet 2011).
Je vous propose la lecture d’un essai sur les principaux courants de pensées en gouvernance des sociétés au cours des soixante dernières années. Ce document, écrit par Douglas M. Branson de l’École de Droit de l’Université de Pittsburgh et paru dans le Social Science Research Network (SSRN), représente certainement l’un des points de vue les plus articulés sur la recherche d’une explication valable à la thèse de Berle et Means concernant la séparation de la propriété de celle du contrôle des firmes.
Bien que l’essai soit rédigé dans un style assez provocateur, il est fascinant à lire, pour peu que l’on soit familier avec la langue de Shakespeare et que l’on s’accommode des accents grinçants de l’auteur. Je recommande fortement la lecture de ce texte à tout étudiant de la gouvernance; c’est un must pour comprendre le champ d’étude ! J’ai obtenu l’autorisation de Douglas Branson pour la traduction de ce document.
Voici les points saillants de l’essai de Branson (en anglais, à ce stade-ci) :
Logo of the American Law Institute. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
In 1932, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means documented the widespread dispersion of corporate shareholders, and the atomization of corporate shareholdings. They noted that in the then modern corporation “ownership has become depersonalized.” The result was that a new form of property had come into being. The person who owned the property no longer controlled it, as the farmer who owned the horse had to feed it, teach it pull the plow, and bury it when it died. “In the corporate system, the ‘owner’ of industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of ownership while the power, the responsibility and the substance which have been an integral part of ownership in the past are being transferred to a separate group in whose hands lies control.” This was the fabled “separation of ownership from control.”
In one of the best known of his books (1956), American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, Galbraith rhetorically posed a number of solutions to the problem of unchecked corporate power, including the separation of ownership from control, although he generally did not use the Berle & Means terminology. He did not propose nationalization, as the British had done. Instead, he theorized that, indeed, corporations had grown too large, their shareholders no longer controlled them, competitive market forces no longer constrained them, and the potential for abuse was great. That potential would be checked however by the growth of countervailing power inherent in the growth of labor unions, consumer groups and government agencies. Galbraith pointed to the growth and influence of consumer cooperatives which enjoyed great growth in Scandinavia, at least in the post-War years. Essentially, those newly empowered groups would supply the controls historically owners had provided.
The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement of the Early 70s called for government intervention, as the nationalization movement had, but on discrete fronts rather than on a plenary basis. One scholar urged replacement of the one share one vote standard prevalent in U.S. corporate law with a graduated scale so that with acquisition of addition shares owners, particularly institutional owners who were perceived to be excessively mercenary would receive less and less voting power. A “power to the people” mandate would augment the power of individual owners, who generally held fewer shares but were thought to be more socially conscious. Calls for required installation of public interest directors on publicly held corporations’ boards sometimes included sub-recommendations that legislation also require that the publicly minded be equipped with offices and staffs, at corporate expense. Others proposed requirements for social auditing and for mandatory disclosure of social audit results.
Toward the second half of the 1970s, The Corporate Accountability Research Group, created and promoted by consumer advocate Ralph Nader, gathered evidence, marshaled arguments, and advocated the other, more drastic reform of the 1970s, federal chartering of large corporations. In certain of its incarnations, chartering advocates expanded the proposal’s reach, from the 500 largest enterprises to the 2000 largest U.S. corporations by revenue, to any corporation which did a significant amount of business with the federal government, and to certain categories of companies whose businesses were thought to be infected with the public interest. Whatever the universe of such corporations, these companies would have to re-register with a new federal entity, the Federal Chartering Agency. In addition, these corporations would no longer have perpetual existence as they had under state law. Instead the new federal statute corporations would have only limited life charters, good for, say, 20 or 25 years limited.
A Seismic Shift: the Swift Rise of Law and Economics Jurisprudence of the 1980s . Perhaps only once in a lifetime will one see as pronounced a jurisprudential shift as that from the corporate social responsibility and federal chartering movements to the minimalist, non-invasive take of economics on corporate law and corporate governance. Law and economics pointed to a minimalist corporate jurisprudence the core theory of which was that market forces regulated corporate and managerial behavior much better than regulation, laws, or lawsuits ever could.
An Antidote: The Good Governance Movement. The American Law Institute (ALI) Corporate Governance Project of 1994 constituted an implicit rejection of, and an antidote to, the law and economics movement. Succinctly, the ALI evinced a strong belief that, yes, corporate law does have a role to play. That belief, sometimes characterized as the constitutionalist approach, in contrast to the contractarian approach, underline and buttresses the entire ALI Project. The ALI crafted recommended rules for corporate objectives; structure, including board composition and committee structure; duty of “fair dealing” (duty of loyalty); duty of care and the business judgment rule; roles of directors and shareholders in control transactions and tender offers; and shareholders’remedies, including the derivative action and appraisal remedies.
The Early 1990s: The Emphasis on Institutional Investor Activism. Traditionally, though, institutional investors followed the “Wall Street Rule,” meaning that if they developed an aversion to a portfolio company’s performance or governance, they simply sold the stock rather than becoming embroiled in a corporate governance issue. Institutions voted with their feet. That is, they did so until portfolio positions had become so large that if an institutional investor liquidated even a sizeable portion of the portfolio’s stake in a company, the institution’s sales alone would push down the stock’s price. Thus, in the modern era, institutional investors are faced with more of a buy and hold strategy than they otherwise might prefer. So was born an opening to push for yet another proposed reform which would fill the vacuum created by the separation of ownership from control, namely, institutional activism, or “agents watching agents.” The case for institutional oversight was that because “product, capital, labor, and corporate control constraints on managerial discretion are imperfect, corporate managers need to be watched by someone, and the institutions are the only institutions available.”
The Shift to an Emphasis on “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance. In the second half of the 90s decade, the governance prognosticators did an abrupt about face, abandoning talk about the prospect of institutional shareholder activism in favor of pontification on the prospect of global convergence. The thesis went something like this. Through the process of globalization the world had become a much smaller place. Through use of media such as email and the Internet, governance advocates in Singapore now knew, or knew how to find out, what was happening on the corporate governance front in the United Kingdom and the United States. According to U.S. academics, the global model of good governance would replicate the U.S. model of corporate governance, of course…
Shift of the Emphasis to the Gatekeepers in 2001. Whatever the U.S. system was, it had a great many defects and it did not do the job for which it had been devised. In addition, of course, no sign existed that the convergence predicted had taken place. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) heads off in varying directions but a careful reader can discern that one of the legislation’s dominant themes is strengthening gatekeepers as a means of enhancing watchfulness over corporations. Thus, for example, SOX requires public corporations to have audit committees composed of independent directors, one or more of whom must be financial experts. Section 307 imposes whistleblowing duties upon attorneys who uncover wrongdoing. To enhance their independence, SOX requires that accountings firms which audit public companies no longer may provide a long list of lucrative consulting services for audit clients.
Emphasis on Independent Directors and Independent Board Committees. The movement for independent directors gathered steam with the 2002 SOX legislation, which required that SEC reporting companies, that is, most publicly held corporations, have an audit committee comprised exclusively of independent directors. The New York Stock Exchange followed by amendments to its Listing Manual that listed public companies have a majority of directors who are independent, making the 1994 ALI recommendation of good practice into a hard and fast requirement. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act jumped on the independent director bandwagon with its requirement that exchanges refuse to list the shares of corporations who disclose they do not have a compensation committee comprised of independent directors. Observers who have written about the issue assume that the Dodd-Frank disclosure requirement is a de facto requirement that corporations have compensation committees, albeit a backhanded sort of requirement.
L’extrait que je vous présente vous donnera une bonne idée de la teneur des propos de Branson. Vous pouvez télécharger le document de 25 pages.
Vos commentaires sont grandement appréciés. Bonne lecture.
This article is a retrospective of corporate governance reforms various academics have authored over the last 60 years or so, by the author of the first U.S. legal treatise on the subject of corporate governance (Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance (1993)). The first finding is as to periodicity: even casual inspection reveals that the reformer group which controls the « reform » agenda has authored a new and different reform proposal every five years, with clock-like regularity. The second finding flows from the first, namely, that not one of these proposals has made so much as a dent in the problems that are perceived to exist. The third inquiry is to ask why this is so? Possible answers include the top down nature of scholarship and reform proposals in corporate governance; the closed nature of the group controlling the agenda, confined as it is to 8-10 academics at elite institutions; the lack of any attempt rethink or redefine the challenges which governance may or may not face; and the continued adhesion to the problem as the separation of ownership from control as Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means perceived it more than 80 years ago.
*Je suis en congé jusqu’à la fin septembre. Durant cette période, j’ai décidé de rééditer les billets considérés comme étant les plus pertinents par les lecteurs de mon blogue (depuis le début des activités le 19 juillet 2011).
Voici un article publié par JOANN S. LUBLIN paru dans The Wall Street Journal qui montre l’évolution remarquable de la gouvernance des sociétés au cours des quarante dernières années. Vous verrez qu’il y a une tendance lourde à limiter le nombre de mandats des administrateurs de sociétés, mais que ce changement ne se fait pas sans heurt.
Plusieurs pensent que, malgré certains avantages évidents à avoir des administrateurs séniors sur les C.A., cette situation est un frein à la diversité et au renouvellement des générations au sein des conseils d’administration. C’est un article qui discute de ces problématiques avec nuance et avec des statistiques à l’appui.
Je souligne certains extraits pertinents de cet article. Bonne lecture. Faites-moi part de nos commentaires sur ce sujet assez controversé.
Board colleagues say long-serving members often provide useful context about a company, its industry and its past. But activist investors contend the growing ranks of long-serving board members occupy spots that otherwise might go to younger and fresher talent. « Over-tenured directors also frustrate the goal of race and gender diversity, » adds Brandon Rees, acting head of the AFL-CIO’s Office of Investment.
Staying Power
Twenty-eight outside directors have at least 40 years’ tenure on a U.S. public company board.
Voir l’article pour identifier les noms
While 40-year directors are rare, companies appear increasingly reluctant to shake up their boardrooms. Among Russell 3000 companies, 6,457 independent directors—nearly 34% of the total—have served a decade or longer, GMI found. That’s up from 3,216 or about 18% in 2008.
Companies in Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index elected the smallest number of new directors last year in 10 years, according to a study by recruiters Spencer Stuart.
Some activist investors believe long-tenured board members can become too cozy with management.
The Council of Institutional Investors, a governance advocate, may soon urge shareholders and boards to look more skeptically at the independence of long-serving directors, says Ann Yerger, its executive director.
« Board members may not be able to fully exercise independent judgment after several years of service, » she adds. The council represents 125 pension funds with more than $3 trillion of assets.
Certain less-tenured directors favor term limits to hasten turnover. But just 17 major corporations impose such limits, Spencer Stuart’s study showed. A 12-year term makes sense because « board members become very stale after a while, » says Fred Hassan, a Time Warner Inc. TWX +0.55%director since 2009 and former Schering-Plough Corp. MRK -0.21%chief executive. He hopes to propose that limit for new board members of the media giant.
Not surprisingly, long-serving board members frequently oppose such rules. Instead, they support replacing poor performers through periodic evaluations of individual members. Richard T. Fisher, a Leggett director since 1972, says he and David S. Haffner, the firm’s CEO, sold the idea to its board last year.
*Je suis en congé jusqu’à la fin septembre. Durant cette période, j’ai décidé de rééditer les billets considérés comme étant les plus pertinents par les lecteurs de mon blogue (depuis le début des activités le 19 juillet 2011).
Le court article ci-dessous, publié par Larry Putterman, blogueur en gouvernance, présente un argumentaire assez convaincant sur l’avantage d’avoir des administrateurs externes sur les conseils. Une lecture intéressante.
Qu’en pensez-vous ? Comme PCA ? Comme PCD ? Comme administrateurs de sociétés (ASC) ?
« There is the board principle I’ve always subscribed to: “eyes in, fingers out.” This means the board function is not to run the company, but to pick the management and set policy.
If the board is micro-managing the company, there is definitely a problem and either you need new management or outside directors with fresh eyes to help the company get back on track. The board’s job is to govern and management’s job is to manage. Here are the right ways outside directors can use their fresh eyes to a board’s advantage.
6 Reasons ‘Fresh Eyes’ Can Help Your Company
They have different perspective on issues…
They have experiences and views from other industries that may have already experienced and solved the problems or issues being discussed…
They have a new network of resources for the board to consult…
They will ask new and different questions to stimulate the board’s decision-making process…
You need to bring in someone who is not a specialist, but someone who has been involved in all areas of running a business…
They can bring a new understanding of a subject that the board does not have…
Outside directors bring incredible value with their “fresh eyes.” I believe boards that have not brought somebody new to the organization in the last one to two years run the risk of stalling the growth of the company ».
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*Je suis en congé jusqu’à la fin septembre. Durant cette période, j’ai décidé de rééditer les billets considérés comme étant les plus pertinents par les lecteurs de mon blogue (depuis le début des activités le 19 juillet 2011).
Voici le condensé d’un rapport sur les rémunérations des administrateurs de sociétés et sur les pratiques de gouvernance (aux É.U.), publié conjointement par le Conference Board, le NASDAQ OMX et le NYSE Euronext. Ce résumé a été transmis par Matteo Tonello du Conference Board et publié sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation.
This is « a benchmarking study with more than 150 corporate governance data points searchable by company size (measurable by revenue and asset value) and 20 industrial sectors. The report is based on a survey of public companies registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Stanford University’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance, the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI), the Shareholder Forum and Compliance Week also endorsed the survey by distributing it to their members and readers ».
Voici un extrait des points se rapportant à la rémunération des administrateurs. Pour de plus amples informations, je vous invite à lire l’article du HB Law School Forum ou à communiquer avec M. Tonello du Conference Board pour le rapport intégral de 2013.
Seal of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Directors are best compensated in the energy industry, but company size can make a huge difference. Computer services companies are the most generous with full value share awards, but equity-based compensation is widely used across industries and irrespective of company size.
Stock options are not as favored as they used to be, except by the smallest companies increasing skepticism on the effectiveness of stock options and stock appreciation rights as long-term incentives has led to their decline, especially in the last few years.
Additional cash retainer for board chairmen is seldom offered by larger companies, which are more likely to reward lead directors.
A corporate program financing the matching of personal charitable contributions is the most common among the director perquisites reported by companies.
While many nonexecutive directors have C-suite experience, former or current CFOs are less represented than expected in the board of financial services companies.
*Je suis en congé jusqu’à la fin septembre. Durant cette période, j’ai décidé de rééditer les billets considérés comme étant les plus pertinents par les lecteurs de mon blogue (depuis le début des activités le 19 juillet 2011).
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Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 